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


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11 October 1917]

[SUPPLEMENT TO THE NEW EUROPE

THE NEW EUROPE

A Weekly Review
of Foreign Politics

VOL. IV

19 July—11 October 1917

LONDON
CONSTABLE AND COMPANY LTD.
1917

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(VI) Diagrammatic Map of Future South Slav State Supplement

Errata in Vol. IV

- p. 60, l. 42, for Bussen read Bunsen.
 p. 99, l. 17, for then read than.
 p. 217, l. 31, 32, Mr. Newton's full designation should read : " secretary of the Board of Studies in History at London University and lecturer at King's College."
 p. 291 (foot), see under " Errata," p. 352.
 p. 319, l. 31, for British capital, read British silence.
 p. 345, l. 28, for Houševsky read Hruševsky.

The New Europe

VOL. IV, No. 40

19 July 1917

The Climax of the War

WE are fast approaching the most critical stage of the war. Both in the military operations and in the moral and political ends which they serve the climax is at hand. THE NEW EUROPE has never discussed questions of strategy in themselves, but has insisted that they shall be made to serve what are now called "war aims"; in the sense that the soldiers whose business it is to solve them are, or should be, the trusted servants of the civil governments of the Allied peoples. The matter of supreme moment is a true definition of the Allied war aims: that is to say, the expression in concrete terms of the faith that is in us, the statement of the objects for which we fight in a manner so clear, so convincing, so cogent, as to command the assent of all the belligerent Allied democracies. No business is more urgent. Its neglect would involve, nay, has already involved, grave peril to the Allied cause.

Some three or at most four months of active campaigning in the field lie before us this year. Should these months bring a defeat of the enemy so decisive as to compel him to sue for peace, the Allied Governments would find themselves sorely embarrassed by the lack of a concrete programme of war aims. They would be obliged hastily to "exchange views," to summon conferences and to decide precipitately matters of principle and fact that demand the most earnest and conscientious study. The desire to make peace quickly would overpower their judgment and would inevitably lead to the sacrifice of certain indispensable safeguards of European welfare. But a dispassionate survey of the military position yields little positive ground for believing that hostilities can end this year. The advent of another winter with the Allied armies still in the field will undoubtedly expose the Allied peoples to a heavier strain than any they have yet borne. Notwithstanding the bracing effects of the Russian offensive, extremely arduous domestic problems will confront the leaders of the Revolution when the winter sets in, and enemy intrigues will complicate them beyond measure. Moreover, the Russian

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leaders and the Russian people will be entitled to say to us : " You asked us for an offensive as an earnest of our fidelity to the Allied cause and as proof that our temper was not incompatible with a vigorous prosecution of hostilities. We have made an offensive, but where is that practical acceptance of our war aims that you led us to expect ? " In France and in Italy the prospect of a fourth winter in the trenches, and of coal and food shortage in the rear, is not alluring. The knowledge that by the spring an American Army will give decisive military preponderance to the Allies will hardly avail to maintain public spirit at an even level of serene confidence. But if, while the summer lasts, the Allies can proclaim the essential conditions of peace in such a way as to appeal to the hearts and the heads of the Allied peoples, the whole night of winter will be illumined by a ray of sure hope shining from the certainty of achievement next year.

The Russian Revolution and the coming of the United States into the war rendered to the British and French Governments the immense service of restoring the idealism by which they were originally inspired. Little by little they had been brought by a policy of secret negotiation and compromise to regard the war chiefly as a trial of strength that might have to end in an inconclusive peace. Even as regards Europe—extra-European questions belong to a special category—they had entered into compacts incompatible with their proclaimed ideals, and had thus given hostages to the insidious and powerful agencies that are working consciously to *saboter la guerre*. They had coquetted with the notion of a separate peace with Austria, Bulgaria and Turkey by turns, careless of the patent fact that any such arrangement must stultify their own professions and redound to the advantage of Germany. In short, they were fast losing faith and were drifting, or were being pushed, towards a betrayal of their peoples.

From this gravest of dangers, Russia and America have saved us, or may save us, if we take betimes full advantage of the opening they offer. The Provisional Russian Government has proposed an Allied Conference for the purpose of defining war aims and of revising secret compacts in the light of them. The British Government has accepted this proposal in principle, but fails to grasp the importance of hastening, with glad alacrity, to give it effect. True, an Allied con-

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ference "on Balkan questions" is shortly to meet at Paris, but it can hardly do duty for the larger conference which should meet as early as possible.

In the meantime, and in the absence of more definite British pronouncements, Mr. Arthur Henderson has done good service by his important speech to the Soldiers' and Workmen's Council at Petrograd. He declared that British labour is opposed to any peace agreement tending either towards domination over other nations, the seizure of their natural patrimony, or the violent usurpation of their territories. The peace agreement, he said, should aim at the unity, independence, autonomy, security, and freedom of nations, whether large or small. The question of Poland, its unification and independence, should be settled in accordance with the wishes of the Polish people, and the restoration and re-establishment of Belgium as a completely independent State must be definitely secured.

Mr. Henderson continued :—

"Then possibly by means of an international commission the populations of Mesopotamia and Africa should be safeguarded from the misgovernment of Turkey or Germany. Important changes in Turkey should also be provided for in order to protect the Armenians and the Arabs. Constantinople should, if possible, be made a free port, and the Dardanelles should be internationalised. Some means should be provided for putting the problems of the Balkan States on a satisfactory and permanent basis."

Notwithstanding the inadequacy of some points in this sketch of British war aims—or possibly of the telegraphic summary of the speech—it unquestionably follows the right line. It needs amplification and definition, both in regard to Alsace-Lorraine and to the subject peoples of Austria-Hungary, whose liberation is as indispensable to the future peace of Europe as is the restoration of Belgium itself. The most serious blemish upon Mr. Henderson's picture of peace is his reference to "some means . . . for putting the problems of the Balkan States on a satisfactory and permanent basis."

A just Balkan settlement safeguarding the future of all Balkan peoples is eminently necessary, but the lumping of the "Balkan States" together, as though the Allies had no present reason to distinguish between them nor special obligations towards Serbia, which has suffered temporary

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extinction in the Allied cause, seems to ignore an essential condition of the peace which Mr. Henderson, in common with the vast majority of his fellow citizens, is determined to attain. The claims of Greece and Roumania require special consideration; but, unless those of Serbia and of the Southern Slav race as a whole are understood and realised, there can be no lasting European or Balkan settlement.

The record of the Allies in regard to Serbia has been so bad and recent British ministerial references to Serbia have been so perfunctory, that it is necessary at this juncture to give special prominence to her case. None of the small Allied peoples, not even the Belgians, have suffered so cruelly as the Serbians. None have received less effective support. We talk of our Serbian "Ally." *Is Serbia an Ally? Has she ever been given the status of an Ally, or been invited to sign the Pact of London? And, if not, why not? Serbia has been plied by our enemies with every kind of blandishment, following upon cruel proofs of enemy power to do her hurt. Had she yielded, could the Allies (save perhaps Russia) have reproached her with betraying their cause? Has the British Government ever honoured Serbia with the despatch of a representative military mission to Serbian Headquarters? We believe not. We failed to chastise King Constantine in the autumn of 1915 when he dismissed Mr. Venizelos and broke faith with Serbia. Viscount Grey even sought refuge in the quibble that our military engagements in the Balkans were with Greece, not with Serbia; and on this and other pretexts we failed to help Serbia in the moment of her supreme trial. Even before that moment came, Great Britain, France and Russia spread dismay in the ranks of her army by disposing of territory of her race and tongue as though it were ours to give. Truly our record is not enviable.*

On the other hand, it cannot be said that the Serbian Government has been blameless. It has never risen to the height of its duties and opportunities. The Prince-Regent has indeed proclaimed the realisation of the Southern Slav ideal as his supreme war aim, but his Government has never placed this war aim frankly before the Allies as the Serbian national programme. It hesitated, bargained and quibbled, and thus placed the friends of Serbia and the supporters of a lasting European settlement in the invidious position of

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seeming to be more Serbian than the Serbs. Unless this sin of omission be quickly remedied the Southern Slav peoples will one day demand a terrible reckoning of those whose faith fell short of their opportunity.

Now that we are approaching the Inter-Ally Balkan Conference and the Conference for the revision of war treaties,—at which Greece and Serbia have a right, as they desire, to be represented—it is imperative that the Allied Governments should examine their consciences and place themselves in an unassailable moral position. Even more urgent is it that the Allied peoples should know broadly the real position of affairs, and the obstacles to a concordant definition of war aims. In this respect the British public is probably less informed than the Russian, the French, or the Italian. Since the Revolution the Russian Press has frankly revealed and discussed the secret treaties to which Russian opinion takes exception. In France knowledge of those treaties is very general, and in Italy the Convention of 27 April, 1915, which concerns Italy most nearly has been repeatedly discussed in public. In this country neither the Treaty with Roumania nor the Convention with Italy has been brought to public knowledge. The nation has been committed by the Government to engagements of extreme importance without the knowledge of Parliament or of the people.

The Russian proposal that the secret agreements between the Allies should be revised by a special Allied Conference is therefore welcome. Equally welcome is the insistence of American public opinion that the United States shall be worthily represented at the revising Conference. Our cause will gain great moral force if the Allied Governments can proclaim, with a clear conscience, that there is no discrepancy between their professions and their secret engagements. The fact can no longer be hidden that the arrangements concluded with Roumania last year, after much bargaining, assigned to Roumania regions outside her ethnographical limits, to which she has no publicly defensible moral claim. For these arrangements the responsibility belongs chiefly to the pre-Revolutionary Government of Russia and to the Roumanian Premier, Mr. Brătianu. While upholding to the full the claims of Roumania to national unity, the Allied peoples cannot in conscience sanction the allotment to Roumania of districts in the Banat and the Central Hun-

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garian plain, where the Rouman population is either non-existent or is vastly outnumbered by Serbs or Magyars.

As regards the Italian Convention, it is equally impossible—save in the name of the spurious “strategic principle” which Germany invokes in support of her claim to Antwerp and the Belgian coast—to justify the assignment to Italy of the main portion of Dalmatia where the Serbo-Croat inhabitants out-number the Italian-speaking population by more than ten to one. THE NEW EUROPE has been widely accused of “antagonising Italy” and of hostility towards Italian National rights. The accusation is as baseless as it is calumnious. No feeling save the truest friendship towards Italy has inspired any word that has been written in these pages. So strong and sincere is that friendship that we have striven to defend the good name of her people against those who would fain besmirch it by an illiberal policy. THE NEW EUROPE has been similarly accused of “hostility” towards Austria-Hungary. Apart from the consideration that Austria-Hungary happens to be an enemy Power, we admit the justice of this charge if by Austria-Hungary be meant the Habsburg system of oppressive government, and not the enslaved peoples whose liberation is essential to the peace of Europe. What we fail to understand is how we can be charged at once with antagonism to Italian rights and with hostility to the Habsburg system which the Italian people wishes to destroy; or we could understand it only should it appear that those from whom the accusation chiefly proceeds have themselves, advertently or inadvertently, done all in their power to reinforce the Habsburg position.

The *Times* of 14 July contained an important telegram from Rome summarising an article by the veteran Italian writer and war-correspondent, Signor Belcredi. In it he argued that while for France and England Germany appears to be the chief enemy, the main object of Italy is the dissolution of the Habsburg Monarchy. The “anti-German point of view,” he added, “is now accepted unanimously by all the Allies, but there has always been a tendency in France and England to question the wisdom of the destruction of Austria-Hungary.” Signor Belcredi hopes that the Russian offensive may check the manœuvres of those who maintain that an early peace can be secured by an arrangement with Austria. Among these intriguers he rightly specifies M. Cail-

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laux, who, "after trying in vain to unite Italy and France against England, is now endeavouring to show to France and England that peace can be obtained if Italian interests are neglected." While insisting that all the war aims of the Allies must be frankly discussed at the forthcoming conferences, Signor Belcredi declares that it must be made clear to Italy's Allies that "not only the Italian Government, but the enormous majority of the people have no sympathy with the Imperialistic idea which is often supposed to inspire Italian policy." With these views THE NEW EUROPE is, and has ever been, in hearty agreement. It is convinced of the necessity of dissolving Austria-Hungary, and it has deplored the shortsightedness of many Italian "imperialistic" manifestations, both in themselves and because of the grievous hurt they have done to Italy's highest interests by strengthening the Habsburgs. Before the conclusion of the Allied Convention with Italy the war was unpopular in Austria-Hungary outside the German and Magyar sections of the population. But the knowledge that the Allies had promised to Italy large tracts of Austrian territory which could not, on any liberal principle, be called Italian, enabled the Austro-Hungarian Government to arouse the anger of the Austrian Slavs and to throw them into the fight against Italy in a way that has cost Italian soldiers very dear. Instead of coming into the war as the open friend of all oppressed Habsburg peoples, Italy allowed it to appear that for some of them her victory would mean not freedom but merely a change of masters; and that others who might escape her rule—a rule as alien to them as that of Austria—would find her opposed to the realisation of their national ideal of independence and union with their kith and kin. Every attack in the Italian press upon the Southern Slavs, every allusion to "the Croats, the Cossacks of Austria," every denunciation of Southern Slav exiles as "the paid agents of Austria," has, under skilful Austrian manipulation, re-acted to the military disadvantage of Italy. Had Italy entered the war as the avowed friend of the Habsburg peoples, had she quickened her relations with Serbia by frankly espousing the cause of Serbo-Croatian independence and unity, she would not only have strengthened her moral and military position, but would have secured the enthusiastic support of her many friends in Allied countries who

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distrusted her apparently "imperialistic" official attitude. How could those friends meet the secret and open partisans of Austria who urged that the Dalmatian Slavs had no desire to exchange the whips of Austria for the scorpions of Italy? How could they defend the claims of Italian culture and the moral expansion of Italy, when her loudest advocates declared that only by force could they be ensured and that Italy had "progressed" beyond respect for the principle of nationality? If THE NEW EUROPE has upheld the traditional ideals of Italy against those who tread them underfoot, if we yearn after a whole-hearted agreement between Italy, Serbia, and the Southern Slavs to free the Adriatic from the menace of Germanism and secure Italy's rightful preponderance there, it is not because we love her less, but because we love her more. It is because our faith in her destiny and in her national genius is ardent, and because we look forward eagerly to the day when, returning to her noble tradition, she shall become the true leader of the crusade against Austrianism and the vanguard in the fight against the three "*Internationales*"—pro-German Socialism, International Finance, and the Clericals—that are its secret agents.

That day, we trust, is near at hand. Should Italy enter the forthcoming Conferences in the spirit suggested by Signor Belcredi she will find herself in a position stronger and with friends warmer than she anticipates. It is in her power to secure, before the Conferences meet, frank and hearty agreements not only with Greece but with Serbia and the Southern Slavs. Thus reinforced, she could contemplate with equanimity the revision of treaties and could insist upon a joint and vigorous effort of the Allies to strike a deadly blow at Austria in the only quarter where it can effectually be struck—that is to say, in the Balkans. She is in a position to reinforce the Serbian Army, not only by lending it the aid of her own armies, but by giving to it the thousands of Southern Slav prisoners, many of whom surrendered to her in the hope of being allowed to join the Serbian forces. She could insist that the French and British divisions be effectively employed, under proper leadership, to achieve the task for which they were sent to the Balkans; and she could thus establish upon enduring foundations the primacy of her influence throughout South-Eastern Europe.

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We have spoken frankly and sincerely without fear of the alleged "touchiness" of the Italian people. Our faith in the sound sense of Italy is more robust than that of her diplomatists who constantly represent her to Allied statesmen as living in a kind of suppressed hysteria; and our belief in her uprightness is firmer than that of the member of an Italian Embassy in an Allied capital who quite recently argued that, in regard to her Adriatic claims, Italy "had demanded one hundred in the expectation of being beaten down to take twenty." It is not in this spirit that firm friendships can be cultivated. They require sincerity. Without it the Allied peoples will not be able to marshal all their forces, moral and material, for the attainment of their greatest war aim—a Europe set free from tyranny to develop in peace on the basis of assured national right.

The Austrian Muddle

It is more and more difficult to obtain a clear idea of the political situation in Austria-Hungary. Kaleidoscopic changes are followed by sudden rumours, circumstantial announcements and prompt denials. But the very fact that Germany suffers equally from the increased severity of the censor in matters Austrian, and that even papers of the standing of the *Frankfurter Zeitung* have been penalised for their frank messages from Vienna, is the best proof of the alarm in official German circles at the progress of disintegration in the Dual Monarchy.

Even through the veil between us it is not difficult to detect the *désorientation* of the Emperor Charles and his advisers. The six months of the Clam-Martinić régime lent themselves naturally to misinterpretation. Because he refused to uphold the unveiled absolutism of Stürgkh or to comply with the insistent demands of the Austrian Pangermans for a constitutional *coup d'état* and the imposition of German as the language of State, a few thoughtless optimists have rushed into the opposite extreme and rashly assumed that Count Clam was throwing himself into the arms of the Slavs. In reality, with that blind groping for ideas which characterizes a certain type of mediocre Austrian aristocrat, he was searching for a middle course, and thought he had found it in the meaningless phrase: "My programme is Austria." He forgot that the rarest being in Austria is the man who

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calls himself an "Austrian," rather than a German, a Czech, and so on, and that in the sphere of patriotism at any rate Austria is not even a geographical expression. Clam was just sufficiently Slav to feel embarrassed at the grosser forms of anti-Slav persecution, but was at the same time German enough to contemplate constitutional changes such as would assure to the Germans a permanent parliamentary majority. Even as long ago as December he stood committed to the principle, if not to the extreme form, of the *octroi*,* and although the reactions of the Russian Revolution and the insistence of the young Emperor led him to convoke Parliament in spite of all objections from the German extremists, it was none the less natural that the Slavs should regard him as definitely in the German camp and frame their parliamentary attitude accordingly. The postponement of the Emperor's oath to the Constitution, which was announced in the Speech from the Throne, was interpreted by the Slavs, and almost certainly intended by Clam, as still leaving the line of retreat by *octroi* open; while the Government programme, as defined in a speech of well-meaning but uninspired verbosity, could only be explained as a centralist manifesto, and a rejection of the federalist idea. So obvious was this that those Entente journalists who had persisted in regarding him as a Slav federalist were reduced to silence. And yet the fact that more than a fortnight before he spoke all four Slav groups in the Reichsrat had openly challenged him by their uncompromising definition of national and constitutional claims ought to have made it absolutely clear that there was no manner of doubt in Austria itself as to his political tendencies.

The outspoken attitude of the Czechs, the closeness of their understanding with the Jugoslavs and Ruthenes, the astounding revelations of political and military oppression during the three years of war and the excitement maintained by a perpetual stream of news from Stockholm, where a whole series of rival deputations aired their views—all this produced an atmosphere of uncertainty and mutual suspicion. There was a general disinclination to drive matters to extremes by challenging the Budget; and the Minister of Finance, Dr. von Spitzmüller, performed the unique exploit of passing it through Parliament while withholding every essential figure which would have betrayed the appalling facts of the financial

* The arbitrary promulgation of a constitutional change.

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situation. But the restraint with which the Reichsrat treated matters of finance disappeared whenever national questions were under consideration. The Czechs and Jugoslavs in particular interpreted the right of self-determination in the sense of their national independence and unity, and went on quite logically to demand the abolition of the Dual System as forming the main obstacle to such a programme. When the Poles, abandoning the aloofness with which they had regarded their fellow Slavs for nearly two generations, definitely joined the opposition to the Clam Cabinet, the Premier had no alternative but resignation. Their action was, it is true, dictated in part by personal motives and by anger at his indifference to ravaged Galicia's claims for compensation; but, as the Germans of Vienna themselves admit, the determining factor was the rapid growth of Slav national feeling among all classes in Austrian Poland which forced their leaders to come to the aid of the other Slav parties in distress.

The Emperor made no secret of his reluctance to part with Clam and entrusted him with the reconstruction of the Cabinet. For two days the Premier made desperate efforts to secure a majority in Parliament, and even the scanty information at our disposal clearly indicates the growing confusion and perplexity in Viennese political circles. Incredible as it may seem, he appears to have put forward in this brief period several absolutely contradictory proposals for a solution of the crisis. He began by rejecting the demand of the Czechs and Jugoslavs for a new division of Austria on a racial basis. He then tried to bribe them by offering to create seven new portfolios in his Cabinet, to be filled by representatives of each of the non-German nationalities. And when this suggestion proved equally unacceptable to Slavs and Germans he appears to have actually come forward with a project for dividing Austria into four—presumably the German, Czech and Jugoslav districts and Galicia. Of this project we know nothing beyond the bare fact, but it is probably safe to connect it with the action of the Emperor in summoning Father Korošec, the leader of the Southern Slav Club, in audience. It is of course not known what passed between them, but Korošec, who before going consulted his Czech and Ruthene colleagues, was evidently not prepared to modify the Slav claims. Count Clam Martinic had to go after

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all. He has now been appointed Governor of Montenegro, and general comment has been aroused by the positively gushing terms in which the Emperor's formal letter of dismissal was couched—terms for which no parallel could be found in all the long reign of Francis Joseph.

Now came a fresh sign of *désorientation*. The retiring Ministers were replaced by a Cabinet of respectably obscure officials, of whom not a single one had ever held office or had ever taken even an indirect part in politics. Even the new Premier, Ritter von Seidler, an amiable departmental chief in the Ministry of Agriculture, had probably never been heard of by 99 per cent. even of the German population of Austria. His first step was to emphasise the provisional character of the new *régime*.

The general relief at Count Clam-Martinić's disappearance from the scene did not lead to any slackening in the Slav attitude. The Czech deputies in particular, whose uncompromising speeches have already been summarised in THE NEW EUROPE (No. 36), re-affirmed their claims more boldly than ever, and one of their most influential spokesmen declared that no Government would receive their support which did not base its policy upon the abolition of Dualism and the transformation of the Monarchy into a group of independent national States. The assumption that the Habsburg dynasty is to form a link between these States does not, of course, in any way diminish the radical nature of such claims, and indeed it would be foolish to make too much of the convenient habit adopted by the various advocates of racial claims, of using superficial expressions of loyalty to the dynasty as a cloak to cover far-reaching and well-nigh revolutionary designs. Alarm at the bold and united front presented by the Czechs to their persecutors, and at the deeds of prowess of thousands of Czech volunteers in the Entente armies, has penetrated even to Berlin; and there is good reason to believe that the political amnesty proclaimed by the Emperor Charles on 30 June was not merely due to his own good feeling and sense of the need for reparation, but was also directly inspired by the German Government and General Staff, who, true to the traditions of Bismarck, realise the importance of a German-Czech understanding, and would fain convince the intractable Austrian Germans of its necessity. In passing we may allude to the significant fact

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that the leading newspaper in Austria, the *Neue Freie Presse*, which for years before the war did all in its power to envenom the relations of the two races, should now be following the lead of its political and financial patrons in Berlin in urging moderation.

The effect of the amnesty has merely been to increase the political confusion. It is intensely and unanimously resented by the Germans of Austria, who are less than ever inclined for compromise, for the simple reason that rather than surrender to the Slavs any further instalment of political power in Austria, they would prefer to unite themselves bodily with their kinsmen in the German Empire. If, in the words of a prominent German journalist, the amnesty has had a "positively paralyzing" effect on the Germans, it has roused the Magyar jingoes to fury: and a phrase coined in Budapest has gone the rounds of the Press to the effect that the Czechs are fighting Austria on two fronts—in Galicia and in the Reichsrat. The first half of this jibe refers to the exploits of the Czecho-Slovak brigade, as announced in a recent *communiqué* of General Brusilov, the second receives added point from the latest action taken by the Czechs in Parliament. In the Constitutional Committee of the Reichsrat on 5 July, Professor Redlich (the well-known constitutional authority and the least Slavophile of German deputies) made conciliatory overtures to the Czechs, but was met in an absolutely uncompromising spirit by Dr. Stransky. This speaker, who in a recent speech had declaimed against the *Austrian* fortress of Peter and Paul,* and had quoted the famous saying that Bohemia had existed before Austria, and would exist after her, now declared that the Czechs declined to negotiate with the Germans before the Peace Conference. This statement, which caused a profound sensation in Parliament, was at once interpreted by the Germans as an attempt to make the fate of the Czecho-Slovaks an international question, and the explanations offered next day by its author are not calculated to diminish the impression. He had merely declared, he said, that as self-determination for all European nations till now under foreign rule had been generally accepted as a condition of peace, it would be well to await the results of the Peace Congress, where both groups of belligerents and the neutrals would be represented. While

• The Russian prison for political offenders.

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denying that his remarks partook of the nature of a demand, he added: "I surely cannot be reproached for being ready to accept from the whole world what the niggardly and harsh attitude of those at home withholds from me."

The above summary should make it clear that in Austria at present the authorities are living from hand to mouth, and that political chaos is aggravating the already desperate economic and financial situation. Even in Hungary, with whose political situation we propose to deal next week, there are similar signs of political disintegration. In both countries the Governments seem in their alarm to cling more firmly to the German alliance as the solitary hope in stormy times.

RUBICON.

"The Potsdam Figleaf"

A DISTINGUISHED German Socialist once described the democratic franchise of the Reichstag as "a fig-leaf to cover the naked absolutism of Potsdam." To-day we are grateful to the author of that phrase for giving us the true measure of the so-called democratisation of Germany. The present ferment in German politics is due to the desire for a "German peace," and not to any genuine national insistence on popular government. The German people are less politically inclined, and therefore less educated in political principles, than any of the great nations of the world. They are more open to interested suggestion and can be prompted to make any demand which is convenient to their rulers. Having never acquired the habit of independent political thought, having accepted the most servile Press in Europe as their mouth-piece, they are helpless in any crisis whose solution demands resolute political action. The Social Democrats themselves are the victims of this impotence; and their numerical strength in the Reichstag is in inverse proportion to their real political power. Thus, when their leader, Herr Scheidemann, returns from Stockholm with the message that the "democratisation" of Germany is the straight road to peace, the Kaiser meets him with an edict promising Prussian reform. And yet, before the ink is dry on the document, the Kaiser dismisses the Minister who signed it and replaces him with an able bureaucrat whom the *Frankfurter Zeitung* greets as an "absolute Prussian in whose

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veins runs the categorical imperative." We are not surprised that the less servile organs of the German Press maintain a melancholy reserve—doubtless, with an eye upon the Censor, whose eye is upon them—nor that the *Deutsche Tageszeitung* rejoices at the departure of Herr von Bethmann-Hollweg whose "incapacity has long prevented the German nation from breathing."

The new German Imperial Chancellor has been described as "a dark horse." But is the Prussian bureaucrat ever really a dark horse? Dr. Michaelis may answer the description in the sense that, having never occupied any great post, he has never yet shown whether he is a statesman or not. But his whole career stamps him as one of the great order of the *Beamtentum* which can think of Germany only as the autocrat's arena. The Prussian Bureaucracy is Prussian militarism in a black coat. It is the second of the great pillars of the throne: and its agents can no more rid themselves of their historic character than the Ethiopian can change his skin. The strength of Dr. Georg Michaelis is that he has no past: but, at sixty years of age, the man who has no past has little chance of a future. And since his predecessor has forgotten more of foreign affairs than Dr. Michaelis ever knew, the future which confronts him must fill him with dismay. But, in truth, the future is not in his hands, which may be firm enough for Food Control, but can hardly succeed in driving the team which has brought the German Empire into such peril. We must regard Dr. Michaelis as a *locum tenens*, sitting in office (if not in power) while the military party play out their gamble with submarines and aircraft. All Germany now realises that it is a gamble in which their whole future is at stake: and we may assume that until they realise that they have lost, there will be no sustained popular demand for "democracy." But we must realise, on our part, that the "democratic" device will never be set aside by the Wilhelmstrasse until it becomes something like a reality in the popular mind. As long as it is a "safe" manœuvre it will be used for all it is worth to cajole Russia and to succour the Caillautins in France and similar parties elsewhere. That is my interpretation of the crisis in Germany. Probably Herr von Bethmann-Hollweg—whose portrait by Dr. Sarolea we reproduce on page 32—was prepared to advance towards a demo-

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cratic system faster and further than Hohenzollen interests permitted. His attitude, by encouraging certain spokesmen in the Reichstag to make "excessive" demands, provoked a counter-mobilisation of the powerful forces nearest the Throne and gave the Kaiser a good opportunity to dismiss him.

Herr von Bethmann-Hollweg met his Waterloo on the anniversary of the Fall of the Bastille: but his defeat was prepared by the opening of the submarine campaign last February upon which Germany founded her hope of a decision against Great Britain. His position was never the same after his capitulation to the final ruthless demand which brought America into the war. He passes from the scene a humane man condemned to serve inhuman ends, an upright man broken on the Prussian wheel: and he bequeaths to his successor a situation which Bismarck himself could not redeem.

A. F. WHYTE.

Bulgaria's "Watch on the Danube"

IN previous numbers of THE NEW EUROPE attention has repeatedly been called to the extreme character of Bulgaria's war-aims. There is no party in Bulgaria which any longer keeps up the pretence—which a few Bulgarophils in this country apparently still maintain in defiance of facts—that this is merely a war for the "liberation" of Macedonia. To Macedonia, Serbian and Greek, has been added the Morava valley as "indispensable" to Bulgaria's future; and to the Morava valley is added the whole of the Dobrudja.

As usual, racial reasons are adduced in justification of this claim to the Dobrudja. Bulgarian politicians and writers do not content themselves with insistence on the preponderantly Bulgarian character of the population in the departments of Silistra and Dobrič, annexed to Roumania in 1913. They are united in demanding the whole. The Bulgarian press is full of messages from Bulgar colonies in Constantza, Baba Dagh, Tulcea, and many other towns and villages from all over this province of inextricably mixed population, calling for permanent union with Bulgaria. Where the population is not already Bulgar, feverish efforts are already being made to Bulgarise it. Officials, magistrates, teachers, and priests from Bulgaria

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are flooding the country with Bulgarian "education." By the end of May 44 new Bulgarian schools had been started in Northern Dobrudja. To racial are added historical and economic grounds in justification of the annexationist claim. Ministers and journalists remind the public that it was the first Balkan province won and settled by the Bulgar hordes of Asparuh, and call it fondly "the cradle of Bulgaria, a land bound up with Bulgaria's development even more nearly than Macedonia." The Dobrudja, declares Mr. Dinčev, Minister of Agriculture, is "to-day 'a productive country," while Macedonia will "become so in the future."

But above all the claim is frankly based on political and strategical reasons. A leading article in the ex-Anglophil (Mr. Gešov's) organ, the *Mir* (8 June), headed "Bulgaria, Guardian of the Danube"—from the pen of the Nationalist deputy Vazov—begins with the pronouncement, "One of the great national State duties of this Bulgarian generation is, beyond doubt, to safeguard and preserve for good to our State the whole Dobrudja to the mouth of the Danube." The writer seeks to show that this must be done in order to secure Bulgaria from invasion in the future and render her position in the Balkans safe from any attack. He concludes: "We are convinced that the Bulgarian Government, resolutely supported by our powerful Allies, will respond to the wish of a whole nation and that Bulgaria will become guardian of the Danube, and therewith of the peace of the whole Balkan peninsula." The *pax Bulgarica* linked to the *pax Germanica*: the Watch on the Rhine reinforced by the Watch on the Danube! When once the canal scheme by which Rhine and Danube are to be connected is carried through—Messrs. Radoslavov, Dinčev, and the rest are not concealing their interest in this—Bulgaria will, indeed, become a "triple pillar" of Central Europe.

For a refreshingly clear *exposé* of Bulgarian ambitions let us turn to the "Narrow" (Minority) Socialist organ, the *Rabotničeski Vestnik* (9 June). Its leading article is a crushing indictment of the "Broad" Socialists who, as THE NEW EUROPE showed at the time, went to Stockholm under the patronage of Mr. Radoslavov, Count Apponyi, and the German Government. The *Rabotničeski Vestnik* re-christens these "Socialist patriots" "Broad Nationalists." Their demands are frankly annexationist and Chauvinist.

BULGARIA'S "WATCH ON THE DANUBE"

"Dr. Sakarov demands out and out a common frontier between Bulgaria and Austria-Hungary, *i.e.*, a 'corridor' through Serbia; Asen Cankov demands the Timok valley; Ilija Janulov claims at least half the Morava valley. Janko Sakyzov timidly concludes his declaration with the words: 'We are in almost full agreement with our Government.'" And yet these people, the *Vestnik* proceeds, talk glibly of a "Balkan Federation" and pretend they are Socialists. Really they are not a whit better than the Roumanian, Serbian, and Greek "Chauvinists" they have been brought up to abhor. There can be no just settlement or lasting peace on their terms of a "Great Bulgaria" as the basis of a "Balkan Federation."

As we tried to show in a previous article (No. 29), the "Narrow" Socialists are the only un-Prussianised party in Bulgaria. Yet meanwhile the ex-Anglophils in Bulgaria are continuing their Swiss campaign in the hope of catching the guileless Western Powers. Mr. Gešov's "Union of Bulgarian Writers, Artists, and Scholars," which we have already described, continues to raise money and extend its ambiguous activities on behalf of the *roi de Prusse*.

BELISARIUS.

"A School of Foreign Affairs"

I AM delighted to see in your number of 21 June Mr. Whyte's article on "A School of Foreign Affairs." During my thirty years at Cambridge, teaching History and Political Science, it was my strongest wish to found a school of this kind at the University, and I am sure that it was one of the main objects of my friend Sir John Seeley, the founder of our school, to foster the idea by his teaching. At Paris I had been in friendly relations with M. Taine, M. Sorel, M. Boutmy, and, I may add, M. Hanotaux, who encouraged me in these efforts, and it was at the request of M. Taine that I edited the Paris despatches of Lord Gower, published by the Pitt Press. My idea was to give the Cambridge History School rather the complexion of the *École des Sciences Politiques* than of the *École des Chartes*, which was already well represented at Oxford, and to establish a Diplomatic Tripos, to take the place of (or to supplement) the examination of the Civil Service Commissioners. This might have

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been done by selecting certain papers from the Historical and the Modern Language Triposes, and by making the marks gained in them a part of the candidates' claims for a place in the Foreign Office or the Diplomatic Service. For many years there was not a Secretary or an Under-Secretary of Foreign Affairs whom I did not approach on the subject but I always received the same answer, that when *in office they were too busy for reforms*, and that *out of office they did not care about them*. So the same routine went on, coaching by Scoones and examining by the Civil Service. Undergraduates intended for a diplomatic career never exerted themselves at the University to obtain the knowledge which would fit them for their work. They preferred to amuse themselves, and when I argued with them said: " We can learn all that we want from Scoones when we leave." I was therefore reduced to the humiliation of seeing at Paris a training for public life which was entirely unknown amongst ourselves, and in the Embassies of Great Britain an ignorance of, and indifference to, political problems, which I hope no longer exists, but which certainly did exist in the days of my youth. Again and again English Ministers have lamented to me that first-rate diplomatists were so rare, and that our best were drawn from the Foreign Office.

One part of my scheme I did succeed in materialising. As soon as I went to Cambridge I founded an historical seminar, called the Political Society, which still exists, and has held more than five hundred meetings. It is not for me to praise it, but it was the backbone of our King's History School, which was at that time the best in Cambridge, and it was conducted by the undergraduates themselves with energy and enthusiasm.

There seems to be now a chance of the scheme—christened by Mr. Whyte " A School of Foreign Affairs "—which during the whole of my Cambridge career was nearest my heart, becoming a reality. It would be easy to organise. The Historical, the Modern Language Tripos (especially in its reformed shape), the newly-established Economic Tripos, all contain subjects in their teaching and examinations which are the staple of the *École des Sciences Politiques*. The Foreign Office, under the pressure of modern opinion, would probably co-operate, and we should see a school of statesmen and diplomatists worthy of the Universities and

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of our country. The Regius Professorships of History, both at Oxford and Cambridge, were originally founded with this object by King George I., who was acquainted in his own country with the excellent training of this nature given at Göttingen and Strassburg. In connection with the Professorships were founded a number of scholarships which were to be avenues to a public career. The scheme was not cordially supported by the University, and was dropped under his successor, but Mr. Goldwin Smith, one of the holders of the Chair, has told us that, if it had been continued, many discreditable pages of our history would never have been written.

OSCAR BROWNING.

Mr. Venizelos on the Greco-Italian Question

The following interesting interview with Venizelos appears in the *Secolo* of Milan of 28 June. Short passages from this interview were published in the *Morning Post* on 2 January last, but its special importance at the present moment prompts us to reproduce it in full. The *Secolo* writes:—

" The publication of this interview which our Salonica correspondent had last December with Venizelos was not, at the time, permitted. But during the past few weeks a radical change has taken place in the Greek situation and Italy's attitude has been authoritatively explained by Baron Sonnino to the Chamber.

" After seven months the interview has not lost its importance. To-day, when Venizelos returns to power, it seems to us even still more interesting to make known his views, which cannot have been modified in the meantime, on the relations between Italy and Greece."

" ' What do I think,' Venizelos said to me, ' of the presence of Italian troops in Salonica? I have been and am very pleased about it, because the intervention of your troops in Macedonia renders still more certain and speedy the victory which, all the same, I have never doubted a moment. I understand perfectly why you have made this your first question to me. Indeed, it has caused me considerable grief to see a section of the Italian Press completely deceived with regard to an article which appeared on 29 August in the *Kirix*, an official organ of the Liberal party; deceived so far as to deduce from it that I had declared that there exists a conflict between the well-understood interests of Greece and those of Italy. As I already had occasion to explain in a letter to my illustrious friend, the Honourable Nitti, the article in question related considerably more to internal than to external policy. It was, indeed, an answer to my opponents, who accused me of being myself responsible for the disembarkation of the Italians at Salonica, when

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I had remarked to them that if my policy of intervention had been carried out that disembarkation would not have taken place, because the situation in Macedonia would have been very different from what it then was and what it is now. I do not conceal, and I said it in the letter sent to the Honourable Nitti, that in the article it was recognized that, to Greek eyes, there existed a considerable difference between the arrival in Greece of the foreign troops in general, and that in particular of the forces of the Protecting Powers, who, for about a century, have so effectually contributed to the creation and subsequently to the aggrandisement of the Greek State. But from this particular point it cannot be concluded that the discord between the interests of our two countries is irremediable. Elsewhere the *Kiris* hastened to add, intentionally, that Greece considered a reconciliation between Italian and Greek interests as possible, and at the same time desirable.'

"What do you think, Mr. President, of the situation in Northern Epirus, Southern Albania, in relation to the *hinterland* of Valona?"

"I consider that our national claims on Northern Epirus are in no way incompatible with the vital interests of Italy, which push her to possess the mastery of the entrance of the Adriatic. This *maitrise* is assured to Italy by the possession of Valona and by that of the Island of Saseno. With regard to this, I wish to remind you that even during the Balkan Wars, when in Italy it was believed that we Greeks had aims on Valona, I, who was then Prime Minister, hastened to declare to the Italian Government that we had not any aims on Valona itself, and that, in any case, the Adriatic Sea was out of the range of our policy. And as I understood perfectly the vital interest which Italy had to occupy Valona, so I have never even dreamed of raising difficulties as to the occupation of the Island of Saseno, which, being an island which had belonged, and was considered as having belonged, to England, could also be held to be included in the islands ceded to us by England herself. I have no need to tell you,' the President added smiling, 'of the bitter criticisms this has cost me in the Greek Chamber.

In December, 1913, I began in Italy my travels through the European capitals and in a conversation with the Minister, Di San Giuliano, I declared once more that Greece not only had no claims on Valona, but that, far from raising objections, she would even have been glad if Italy had established herself there. I know that at the Consulta there exists a copy of this conversation of mine with the Honourable Di San Giuliano.

"In expressing this and in recognising that Italy had a claim to Valona, to the Island of Saseno and to a hinterland, necessary from a strategic point of view, I recognised on my part that we were dealing with a question of a political character. For us Northern Epirus is another matter. For us the possession of Northern Epirus is a question uniquely ethical and of patriotic sentiment. Dhelvinon, Aryirokastron and Koritza have always been *foyers*, true centres of Hellenic civilisation. This is a question, then, of a purely national character to which we are all profoundly attached.

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“ ‘ I wish to recall to you a fact to show the clearness of my policy. When the Conference of London obliged me to withdraw the troops from Northern Epirus, I obeyed without raising objections. So when I again sent troops there I did so, taking advantage of the upheaval (*sconvolgimento*) produced by the war, after having come to an understanding with the Italian Government; not directly, it is true, but through the medium of one of the Powers of the Entente. How is it possible, then, to maintain that the advance of the Greek troops into Epirus had the character of hostility towards Italy when this advance had taken place after an agreement with Italy herself? ”

“ ‘ I attach great importance to this being set forth with the greatest clearness in order that it may be shown that in my action there was nothing of the spirit of your great Machiavelli which some people have attributed to me. Believe me, I would never have sent Greek troops into Northern Epirus without the consent of Italy—a consent given me, I repeat, by the intervention of a Power very friendly to you. In any case, I declared to all the Powers, Central Empires included, that the occupation of Northern Epirus on the part of our troops did not imply a desire to set up a *fait accompli*, that I respected the decisions of the Conference of London, and that the question of Northern Epirus ought to be submitted, together with all the other questions, to the general Peace Conference. It is true, it must be added,’ proceeded the President, ‘ that having the support of the Entente and the consent of Italy, I hoped the Peace Conference would have recognised Greece’s possession of Northern Epirus as definitive and legitimate. What better demonstration of the loyalty of my proposals? ’ ”

“ ‘ What should be, according to you, Mr. President, the solid bases of an agreement between Greece and Italy, considered as a great Mediterranean Power, above all with regard to the Ægean and to the Eastern Mediterranean? ’ ”

“ ‘ Venizelos, without hesitation, thus expressed his own views:— ‘ These bases ought to rest on respect for the principle of nationality. I understand perfectly that sometimes a Great Power may for well-understood superior reasons, and to protect and defend vital interests, be constrained to make an inroad on the said principle. But in order that this inroad can be justified—not a juridical justification, let us understand, but a political—the Great Power must be dealing with truly vital interests. Now, I consider that the recognition of our national claims, based on the principle of nationality, is not incompatible with the interests of a great Mediterranean power like Italy. We have already spoken of Northern Epirus and I have shown you that there are no vital interests which prevent Italy allowing us to remain at Aryirokastron, Dhelvinon, and Koritza. ”

“ ‘ There is the question of the Dodekanese. This question is one which touches the heart of the Greek people—not because it is thought that the possession of the Dodekanese can bring them a greater grandeur. The Dodekanese holds the heart of our people, because it is a question of islands profoundly Greek by origin, by

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sentiment and by culture. Ours is, then, an entirely ethical interest. It is not for the possession of other harbours; already we have enough harbours in Greece.

“Notwithstanding this, I understood very well that Italy may have a vital interest in the Dodekanese, and this is the reason why, during the Balkan Wars, I began conversations with Count Bosdari, your Minister at Athens, with a view to an arrangement on the subject. As the Island of Stambalia (Astipalea) possesses two magnificent harbours—it is a question of Stambalia, is it not?—harbours which, it is said, were for Italy of great strategic interest, I said to Bosdari: “If Stambalia has, indeed, a strategic interest for Italy—well, let her take it.” And I also said to Bosdari: “If there is another island which Italy holds out for, let her take it too.” In general, I can tell you that all the points of view on which there would be an opposition of interests between Italy and Greece could only be points in which the Greek interest—above all, ethical and national—would be one worthy of respect, but reconcilable with the superior vital interests of Italy.. Italy, believe me, could well sacrifice some little thing of less interest to her in order to give satisfaction to us.

“‘I fail to understand,’ continued Venizelos, warming up, and accompanying his words with a wide sweep of his hands, ‘why Italian policy should be so distrustful towards me. What harm could Greece do, if instead of five millions she became a nation of six millions, to Italy who will come out of the war stronger and greater, to Italy which, within fifty years, can have sixty million inhabitants? We shall always be a small nation, with which she can in every way develop economic interests of a first rank.

“‘In conclusion, I wish to repeat to you that I do not understand, and I very much regret, the sentiments of hostility which are cherished in Italy towards Greece. We expect a little more sympathy from our great sister nation. From the external point of view, we are struggling for our national unity; from the internal point of view, for the democratic principle. We are fighting the same battle against the common enemy by the side of the big sister, who has gone before us to show us the way. We only ask what would be vital for us, and what for you great ones is of small importance. It is only Germany who does not admit that there can be room in the world for all.

“‘I am convinced that the misunderstandings existing between the two countries will be dispelled, and that will be possible all the sooner if the impartial Press will lend us its valuable help. I am, in any case, very glad that you have given me the opportunity of speaking directly to the Italian people after so long a time.’”

An Apostle of Italy

[In the history of Italy's war a foremost place will always be assigned to Cesare Battisti, the heroic Socialist deputy of Trento, who, when the great war broke out, devoted all his efforts to rousing Italy in the cause

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of liberty, and himself joined the ranks when she had made the great decision. Wounded and taken prisoner, he was not left to die in hospital, but was hanged by the Austrians in the square of his native town last year. In his case, as in so many others, loyalty to the sacred cause of Nationality involved him in the "crime" of treason to the fetish of a corrupt and artificial State.

The following extracts from one of Battisti's most moving speeches are translated from the volume "*Al Parlamento Austriaco e al Popolo Italiano*" (Milan, 1915), published before Italy's intervention in the war.]

"Forget us if you will: but do not say that we do not want to break away from Austria. It is an offence. It is a blasphemy . . . (14 September 1914).

"To-day, in Milan, and in other cities of Italy, a page of Risorgimento history is repeating itself. Just as in '48, in '59 and '60, in '66, so now thousands of fugitives have come from the unredeemed lands to the lands that are free. They are driven by the same ancient ideal, the same flame. But the state of mind of the fugitives of to-day is not like that of those fugitives of the past. . . . We to-day live in an anguish of expectation. We know not whether to-morrow will bring with it war or peace, liberty or fresh slavery for our native land. . . .

"Cesare Correnti has defined the Trentino as 'the vestibule of Italy' . . . Trento, *splendidum municipium*, was the heart and centre whence Latinism radiated to the extreme summit of the Alpine ring, and many geographers and historians have given the name of Tridentine Alps to the whole central chain which forms the geographical barrier between Italy and Germany. . . . All is Italian here—sky, vegetation, climate, traditions, legends, sentiments, Italian, too, its crime, which contrasts so vividly with that of the German and shares the passionate nature of the Italian. All this was well-known in the days of the Risorgimento: it was still repeated for some years after the capture of Rome, which all too many looked upon as the completion of Italian unity, and after that Treaty of Berlin, which was the sepulchral stone of the irredentist aspirations of Trento and Trieste.

"The Trentino's Italian character was recognised by Victor Emmanuel both by explicit declarations and by the victorious entry of the Bersaglieri in Valsugana in 1866. It was afterwards affirmed during the peace negotiations by Nigra and Visconti Venosta. It was admitted in 1867, 1868, and 1869 by the Cabinet of Florence, which, taking advantage of frontier rectification, tried to reopen the discussion with the Austrian Government. In 1878 the question of the Trentino wrung from Cairoli a few words of agreement, but in Corti, Italy's representative at Berlin, it had a defender who was neither convinced nor adroit. Since then it was no longer admitted officially by the Government. It remained a popular question, kept in motion by Garibaldi, by Avezzana, by Imbriani, and sealed by the death of Oberdan. With the coming of the Triple Alliance there began the fierce persecution of Irredentism. All at once, too, our cause ceased to be a living popular question. We, the unredeemed,

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lacked every help from our brothers, and in them the recollection grew steadily less.

"In 1889 Francesco Crispi dissolved the committees for Trento and Trieste and condemned Irredentism. He was answered by Ergisto Bezzi in words of fire. But it was a voice crying in the wilderness. The Italian character of the Trentino had but a single supporter—Austria. It was Austria who, growing ever more ferocious and cynically denying to her Italian subjects even the smallest right, kept them in a state of rebellion, steeled them anew to the struggle and in their love of country. It was Austria who from time to time made the Italians of the kingdom wince, when they heard the blows of the German stick lacerating Italian flesh. But they were mere momentary starts. The order went forth from Rome to the newspapers: *Silentium*. News from Trento and Trieste was suppressed by the whole Press. The Triple Alliance was continually renewed. The problem of the Italians in Austria, the problem of Austria herself, were systematically neglected. Every affront to Italian Irredentists was passed over in silence or hushed up. Against Austria's annexation of Bosnia, without the hoped-for compensations to Italy, Alessandro Fortis protested in a wonderful speech; but who in Italy remembered it 24 hours later? The national ferment of revolt which was coming to birth among Austrian populations once loyal to the Habsburgs, escaped the notice of the Italian public. Not without justice did Giovanni Pascoli, in an outburst of grief and sincerity, and indignant at so much apathy and indifference, exclaim, 'O unredeemed, redeem us' (*O irredenti, redimeteci voi!*).

"He who to-day is lukewarm in the cause of the unredeemed provinces, is so because he hopes that Trento and Trieste can be secured by diplomacy, or because he holds that Italy can adapt herself to the *status quo*, or because he hopes that national problems do not require a special solution of their own, but can be solved *en bloc* with the vast social and humanitarian problems. To hope that Austria will gracefully cede Trento and Trieste, or even the former alone, is like believing that the wolf is the protector of the lamb. . . . He who believes—and this is the thesis of many of our official Socialists—that the period of national claims is already past, and who points to internationalism as the universal panacea, deserves the same pity as one who denies the light because he is blind. Not merely that internationalism has, during the past year, shown its immaturity, in that it failed to prevent the European War, but in national matters it had already shown its impotence in that international state *par excellence*, Austria, where it had not succeeded in producing a national programme, or unfolding a policy acceptable to all the Socialist parties. . . .

"Side by side with reasons purely and ideally national, there subsist, as in the days of the Risorgimento, reasons of a military and economic order. No Italian military writer has dared to challenge the thesis put forward in 1866 by Menabrea as plenipotentiary of the King of Italy at Vienna, by General Govone, and many others; namely, that Italy, whatever treasures she may squander on fortifi-

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cations, is completely in the power of Austria, so long as the latter can dominate, from the strong place of Trento and its advance posts on the frontier, all the valleys which debouch upon the plains of Lombardy and Venice. Teutonism, in asserting its rights upon Trento, is merely translating into fact the ancient Imperial idea of holding in its power the keys of Italy for an advance towards the South.

"To-day it cannot be said that the Trentino is what it was in the years of the Risorgimento. No, to-day the Trentino is infinitely better. When the death of Garibaldi and the adoption of the policy of the Triple Alliance killed all hope of an early war of liberation, the Trentino, trodden under foot with growing ferocity by the Austrian Government, found it necessary, while waiting for a happier fate, to defend her own national life from the thousand threats of Vienna and Innsbruck. Thus began a stubborn, patient struggle to prevent them from robbing her of her own sweet tongue or destroying in the heart of her people their innate mountain pride, their love of liberty and of the motherland. From this struggle, which for fifty years she has sustained alone, she has emerged triumphant, tried as steel, strengthened, and more Italian than ever.

"Even in 1848, when the Diet was formed on an elective basis, the Trentino protested with the signatures of 46,000 electors against its annexation to Tirol. And this protest and the fight for autonomy continued without interruption for 76 years, now by abstention from the polls, now by abstention of the deputies from the Diet, now by obstruction, now by opposition throughout the corporations and communes. . . . By annexing it to Tirol the Government never succeeded in bringing the country to submission. It merely succeeded in impoverishing and bleeding it white. But apart from methods of oppression and Germanisation in the local administration, the Government devised other schemes and pursued them with fury.

"To the police was assigned a foremost task—that of hunting down every national institution. The Press has always been restricted. At Trento it is not possible to publish what appears with impunity at Vienna or Innsbruck. The opposition papers have dozens of confiscations every year. Despite colossal failures, police agents and public prosecutors have gone on inventing plots and conspiracies, planning out monster trials before German jurymen and judges, in order to spread terror in the country, and dissuade anyone from the very thought, not merely of annexation to the kingdom, but even of asserting the simplest national rights within the limits sanctioned by the constitution of the Empire. The Austrian prisons of Innsbruck, Stein, St. Pölten, Kufstein, Przemysl, have for a whole century always sheltered the most combative and generous sons of the Trentino. But their condemnation had no effect. Prison was the school of Italian sentiment.

"Another Austrian method was to deprave us by erecting German schools. As the provincial Diet could not commit the absurdity of imposing German schools upon exclusively Italian districts, the central Government erected its own German elementary schools in the chief towns, making attendance in them easy by free

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gifts of books and clothes, and compelling State officials to send their children to them. In vain! These schools could only collect a handful of Italians.

"More violent in this respect was the struggle of the Pangerman societies of Munich, Berlin and Dresden, which concentrated on the Alpine valleys, the remote villages and the districts along the linguistic frontier. Here it is the commune—only too often very poor—which has to bear the expenses of the school; and so the Pangermans would offer gratis German elementary schools, German kindergartens, German technical schools. Such a policy seemed bound to triumph, but the work of the *Schulverein*, the *Südmark* and similar societies was opposed by the *Pro Patria*, and then the *Lega Nazionale*, which erected everywhere Italian schools, crèches and reading-rooms. Thanks to this society, there are to-day in the Trentino 80 libraries, 21 infant crèches, 3 elementary schools, 35 continuation courses, and 10 technical schools. The work of the Germans has had the answer it deserved. They have sown on barren soil and reaped a wonderful work of Italian culture; for the reaction against them was not the least cause of the destruction of illiteracy in the Trentino. When to-morrow it is annexed to the Kingdom, it will be able to boast that it has fewer illiterates than any other province.

"But Austro-German obstinacy did not admit its defeat. It devised other and sharper weapons. The province was inundated by German gendarmes, revenue officers and railway men. But none the less the people of the Trentino continue to speak Italian, and it is the Germans who are compelled to learn Italian. A skilful attempt was made to exploit the plague of emigration—necessitated by the Central Government's neglect—for the creation of a Germanophil movement among the workmen who have to migrate to German countries. Everywhere emissaries were sent, suitable papers were printed, and a huge organisation called the *Volksbund* was formed. Its members have nothing to pay; they merely receive presents and shout on every occasion 'Long live Austria.' All in vain! All the political parties—Liberals, Clericals, and Socialists—united in successfully beating down the *Volksbund*, which, when it came forward at the elections of 1907, polled 3-400 votes among 70,000 electors.

"Yet other devices of pressure and corruption were employed by the Government. What the civil authorities failed to do was attempted by the military, who favoured the Austrophil communes and attacked the others, helping on those individuals who joined the rifle clubs and persecuting those who did not. The military authorities seized pasture lands and woods, doing what they pleased with the law and upsetting what had held good for centuries. Before the Austrian officer all had to bow as before a god. He who does not give way, be he rich or poor, peasant or *rentier*, clerical or anarchist, is the certain victim of vengeance. But not even under military sway did the country give in. . . .

"Not the least of these plans of corruption and domination was the economic struggle. German capital was mobilised, and a close

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net-work of German inns and alpine shelters was erected, to which came crowds of those tourists who are the typical forerunners of Germanism. With a keen spirit of patriotism, and risking enormous capital, societies and individuals met this action by erecting everywhere Italian hotels and shelters. But victory is not always possible in such fights. For instance, what is to be done when the Government always refuses to natives of the kingdom, and often enough to the Trentini themselves, the concessions necessary for carrying on certain industries, while it freely grants them to foreigners from Germany? What is to be done, save to protest, when, in order to carry out important State contracts, hordes of Germans and Croats are imported, while the people of the Trentino emigrate for lack of employment? Happily, Nature is herself the kindly ally of nationality. . . . On the lands bought by German masters the Italian workman holds out all alone, with his knowledge of the silkworm and the vine. The German peasant yields ground (*fugge*). It is Nature, my brothers of the Kingdom, who cries in his face: 'Italy for the Italians!' . . .

"For the sake of these memories, sacrifices and splendours, which are yours as well as ours, remember, O Italians, Trento and Trieste! To-day my whole country shudders with impatience, as it waits for liberation. It feels itself to be worthy of it; it feels that this is the great hour. And while it implores aid for itself, it feels bound to remind the Italians that they must think of their own defence, since it is not merely since yesterday that Austria has meditated war against Italy. The Austrian officers have always sighed for the march to Milan; the conquest of Venice has always been the dream of Conrad von Hötzendorff, who on the morrow of the mourning for Messina [*i.e.*, the earthquake of 1910], and at the beginning of the Tripolitan War, massed Austrian battalions on the frontier of Italy. Parliamentarians, members of the Upper House, ex-Ministers repeat in Vienna, with the persistence of a Cato: "Italy must be weakened." Undisturbed and protected by their Government, they insult Italy with vulgar abuse every time her name is pronounced in Parliament. Everywhere, in the Press, the school, the barracks, hatred of Italy is taught. The soldiers who are leaving to-day for the front are told by their officers: 'To-day in Serbia and Russia we have to defend our fatherland and Emperor, to-morrow we shall go down to punish disloyal and vile Italy.' And in her hatred Austria has the backing and approval of Germany. The one makes a path for the other. The gold which denationalises and corrupts in the Trentino, on the Garda, and in Italy herself, is the gold of Berlin!

"Let not Italy wait until the enemy has battered down the gates. Let her not hug the illusion that the eternal barbarian is glutted with rapine. He will continue his fierce course until he is conquered and played out. The eagles of Austria and Germany must have their beaks and claws cut.

"If Italy has old men who remember the tradition of Garibaldi, if she has citizens who feel the new and sacred 'internationale' proclaimed by the heroic sacrifice of Belgium, if she has young men who really desire 'war upon the kingdom of War,' let her grant

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peace and truce to her enemies only when they have passed the Alps.
Till then let us hear the call of our own poet :—

“ Pel sangue degli eroi, pe' franti petti
De' vegliardi, pel duol che si disserra
Da le piaghe di madri e di pargoletti,
Guerra a tedeschi, immensa eterna guerra,
Tanto che niun rivegga i patrii tetti
E a tutti tomba sia l' itala terra.”

“ By the rich blood of heroes, by the hearts
Of old men seared and broken, by the grief
That gapes from wounds of mothers and of babes—
War on the Germans, war, eternal, vast,
Till none shall see his father's roof again
And Italy shall be the tomb of all.”

To the colder North such rhetoric may sound extravagant: but upon it Cesare Battisti has set the seal of his blood.

“ Le Pays ” and Joseph Caillaux

[The following article, published in the Journal de Genève of 9 July, deserves the close attention of all students of the political situation in France.]

“ A new paper, entitled *Le Pays*, has recently appeared. Coming forward with a remarkable list of collaborators, it did not lack a certain attractiveness and aimed at winning the educated public. Its programme, which is democratic in tendency, is put forward in terms open to divers interpretations. Owing to the first attacks upon it, certain of its collaborators, such as M. Ernest Lavisse and M. Victor Bérard, announced that they had embarked by mistake on this stately vessel.

“ Soon afterwards, several papers started a lively campaign against it. The most virulent was the *Victoire* (the former *Guerre Sociale*), where “ Lysis ” opened fire and was soon followed by its editor, M. Gustave Hervé. They maintain that while cleverly securing the collaboration of writers who inspire confidence and whose patriotism is certain, this journal, by endless small notes, and by its systematic method of presenting events in a certain light, tends to discourage opinion, and tries to turn feeling more or less towards the idea of a peace of exhaustion and compromise.

“ M. Hervé addresses a curious and suggestive question to his adversaries as to the tendency given to their paper and the men who inspire it. M. Hervé points out that besides collaborators who merely bring their articles, a single man is all-powerful, namely, the editor, M. Dubarry, who is at the same time manager of the society which owns it. And he expresses astonishment at the fact that one clause in the articles of association imposes on the manager the obligation of ‘ respecting the occult character of the association and the incognito which its members desire to preserve.’

"LE PAYS" AND JOSEPH CAILLAUX

To this M. Dubarry replied that this term 'occult' was a legal phrase current in limited companies, and, further, that he was ready to furnish the names of the shareholders, under the seal of secrecy, to M. Jean Dupuy, President of the Parisian Syndicate of the Press, and two newspaper managers. In reality, it is hardly likely, that M. Dupuy is anxious to play the part thus assigned to him.

"In short, it is difficult enough to give a well-considered or definite verdict on this Press feud. One would like, first, to have a fuller and more certain knowledge of the facts. On the one hand, the violence of M. Hervé, always extreme in his movements, might seem at first sight excessive, and the unveiled appeal which he has made to the intervention of the secular arm is a little embarrassing. On the other hand, there is certainly a feeling of embarrassment, and sometimes shock, at the tone and general tendency of an organ which, at the most critical phase of the war, will undoubtedly contribute little towards raising moral. One cannot have a special love for clumsy humbugs (*les bourreurs de crâne*) without feeling bound to show indulgence towards systematic wet blankets (*débourreurs*) or anti-humbugs (*bourreurs à l'envers*). Meanwhile, though giving my impressions, I am not called upon to judge.

"In reality, what preoccupies those who have started this discussion with *Le Pays*, is to know whether its real inspirer is M. Caillaux. M. Hervé has put this question direct. He received an answer in a way which is not very conclusive, that the paper was not founded by M. Caillaux, but that M. Caillaux has a most lively sympathy for it.

"I have no doubt what exactly may be the ideas and projects of the ex-Premier, who has made no public declaration for three years past. It has been said that, counting on what might be called a policy of usury, he flattered himself that he would one day be the indispensable man whom events imposed upon France. These are ambitions of which it is difficult to have a precise view, because the only source of information are the stories that circulate. Last winter *The Times*, which is obviously not among his friends, attacked him with a certain violence on the occasion of his journey to Italy, where, according to the English journal, he only associated with the neutralists. M. Caillaux replied, with no less virulence, by a *démenti*.

"On the other hand, he has been credited, if not with the paternity, at any rate with the inspiration of certain organs such as the *Bonnet Rouge*, the *Pays*, the *Agence Républicaine d'Informations*, etc., which appear to have common tendencies, though appearing under different forms, in order to reach different publics. Finally, the papers have announced the formation of a '*Ligue Républicaine*,' destined to work especially in parliamentary circles; and of this he would appear to be more or less the creator.

"This doubtless explains the passion which inspires the polemics regarding *Le Pays*. In times such as these, what makes discussions of this kind somewhat obscure is that the blows exchanged between the players are often aimed at higher game. It would be wrong to

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exaggerate their importance. If after three years of war certain old habits regain the upper hand, and if our polemics are more violent than at the outset, they are tame indeed compared with those which sometimes centre round the person of the Chancellor or the aims of the war, in the German press. They are, perhaps, above all the sign of a vigorous patriotism which is alarmed at what it rightly or wrongly regards as a campaign of weakness. French opinion, like all other opinions in this long struggle, has its ups and downs. But it will not fail (*elle n'aura pas de défaillance*). It perceives clearly the aim to be attained, which is the establishment of a stable peace through the triumph of Right, and not through Compromise."

Thus far the Swiss correspondent. It would be highly instructive to supplement his article by extracts from such newspapers as the Swiss Germanophil *Berner Tagblatt*, which hails M. Caillaux as "the Saviour" who is to overcome "the powerful Camorra of the Jingoos" and secure an honourable peace, or from *Az Est*, the most widely read Hungarian daily, which publishes long speculations under the title, "The Future is Caillaux's."

Newspapers and politicians which, like *Le Pays* and M. Caillaux, aim at destroying that *Union Sacrée* which has upheld France in her great trial, at reviving the vile and moribund strife of clerical and anti-clerical and at sapping the idealism of the nation by a thousand subtle suggestions and whispers of despair, are the enemies alike of France and of the new and democratic Europe of our dreams. We say unreservedly that M. Caillaux's return to power would be a disaster to Europe, which every friend of the Grand Alliance must strive to prevent.

Reviews

International Conventions and Third States: R. F. Roxburgh. (Longmans.) 7s. 6d. The treaty bringing this war to a conclusion will, in all probability, bear the signatures only of the plenipotentiaries of the Powers which have taken part in the struggle, but it is obvious that its terms will affect profoundly the position of all the States which have remained neutral. The publication of this book is therefore very opportune; it is a clear and readable study of the effects of international agreements upon States which are not parties to them. Mr. Roxburgh deals with this subject from a standpoint which is eminently practical, for he admits that the foundation of international law is the practice of States, and he therefore formulates his conclusions in the light of the instances which he cites from the past. This is the only sound plan, for even if an agreement, such as the Hay-Pauncefote Treaty between Great Britain and the United States, providing for equal treatment in the Panama Canal of the shipping of all countries, confers no rights on the non-signatory States, those States would certainly consider themselves justified in protesting if the rule were not observed. It is well, therefore, to have the legal position clearly set out. H.

REVIEWS

Three Peace Congresses of the Nineteenth Century.—C. D. Hazen, W. R. Thayer, R. H. Lord (Humphrey Milford). Pp. v + 93. 3s. 6d. net. These three essays, which discuss the organisation, outstanding personalities and outcome of the three great peace congresses of the last century—Vienna, Paris, and Berlin—should be read in conjunction with the article on “The Climax of the War” in the present number, and with Mr. Whyte’s articles on diplomacy in former numbers. The problems to be faced by the conference which will end the present war bear many analogies to those which confronted its forerunners; they are in some cases actually the same, left unsolved before. It is unthinkable that the impending “reconstruction” of Europe should be anything but a clean and radical one, free from the entanglements of secret understandings and intriguing diplomacy. The next conference will have this advantage over the last that it will be attended by the representatives of exhausted and chastened Powers, but the deciding factor in a stable reconstruction will be the pressure of public opinion. The present book, therefore, which is admirably written, should serve as an effective warning in the approaching climax of the war.

G. G.

A Portrait of Dr. von Bethmann-Hollweg

We take the following sketch of the ex-chancellor from a letter by Dr. Charles Sarolea in the *Scotsman*, 12 July:—“Herr von Bethmann-Hollweg is to-day the most tragic figure amongst the statesmen of Europe. For three years he has borne a crushing burden, a burden which even Bismarck, the man of blood, was unable to bear in the piping days of peace, a burden from which the Iron Chancellor had to seek periodical liberation amidst the heather and the pine forests of his native Brandenburg. As Prime Minister of Prussia, as Chancellor of the German Empire, as Foreign Secretary of the Teutonic Alliance, he has to keep a firm grip of all the threads both of internal and of external policy. Distracted between Catholics and Protestants, between agrarians and industrials, between Germany and Austria, he has been made responsible for all the blunders of his subordinates. A rich man, and the scion of an historic house, he has led the life of a galley-slave; an honest man, he has been doomed to perpetual prevarication; a humane man, he has had to condone every atrocity; an independent man, he must cringe before his master; a peaceful man, he must submit to the continuation of insensate slaughter; a highly gifted intellectual, he has had to pursue a policy of insane stupidity. Twenty-five years ago a Professor of the University of Munich, Dr. Quidde, compared the Kaiser to Caligula. The analogy between William and Caligula or Nero points to another analogy, that between Herr von Bethmann-Hollweg and Seneca, the ill-fated Counsellor of the Cæsars. Read in the Annals of Tacitus the speech of Seneca to Nero, and you will perhaps understand the position of Herr Bethmann-Hollweg in the Imperial Palace of Potsdam.

Printed for Constable & Co., LTD., by EYRE & SPOTTISWOODE, LTD.,
His Majesty's Printers, East Harding Street, E.C. 4.

The New Europe

VOL. IV, No. 41

26 July 1917

Germany at the Cross-Roads

GERMANY is still in the grip of militarism. The recent crisis proves that, wherever the semblance of power may reside, the reality is still in the hands that launched the great war upon Europe. And it should warn British democrats to be wary in their welcome of any movement in Germany which *seems* to promise constitutional reform. There are many Germans in whom the desire for such a measure of political progress is as genuine as the cat's desire for fish, but the power to satisfy their appetites is about equal in both cases. Behind all movements towards a liberal constitution—especially in Prussia—there is a haunting, disabling doubt whether the people could use any engine of popular government they might receive from above. When Prince Bülow—once a responsible political chief and still eminently *ministrable*—candidly declares that the German people are “political asses,” his opinion is not an insult but a commonplace. When Professor Delbrück invites us to admire the pillars of militarism and bureaucracy that support the Prussian throne, he is well aware that Prussia has deliberately left her people politically uneducated, and that, therefore, a popularised government of Prussia is one of the most difficult things in the world to set up. And since the kernel of all German politics—Imperial and Prussian—lies in Prussian autocracy, the enemies of German Liberalism know that the Reichstag may speak and vote as it pleases, as long as the lever of power is in its present hands. We have never believed that German Liberalism could win its own battle unaided by the kind of external shock which the war has administered to Germany. German Liberalism capitulated to autocracy after the Zabern affair, and the measure of its present power may be taken in the appointment of the new Imperial Chancellor, whom every organ of reaction welcomes as a true chip of the old Prussian block.

The recent crisis, however, has left its mark. It is a Junker triumph which will yet cost the victors dear, for the victory is born in illusion. Dr. Michaelis may be all that

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his partisans hope, but it is now beyond the power of any one man, or, indeed, of any one Government, to deflect the course of European events and to set back the clock of progress. In the end a great idea prevails. And, in the present case, the great idea is moving with slow, irresistible force against the citadel of Prussian power, and no mere material force can arrest it. The Junker pits the submarine against liberty in utter ignorance of its powerlessness to prevail over the determination of free men; and, having nothing to fall back upon when it fails, he will awake one morning to find that the world has cast him out. The hour of that great awakening has not yet struck; but when it does—and only when it does—we shall see a new Germany.

Meanwhile we may take stock of the present situation by reviewing the events which led to it. Almost exactly two months ago Herr von Bethmann-Hollweg found himself between two fires which had been concentrated upon him with increasing intensity throughout the spring. On the one hand the Conservatives demanded an explicit declaration in favour of their annexation policy; and on the other, the Socialists insisted upon his recognition of the Russian formula of "no annexation and no indemnities." His refusal to satisfy either demand found support in a Reichstag *bloc* consisting of the Catholic Centre (90 deputies), the National Liberals (50), and the Progressive Peoples' party (which, with other groups, numbered about 70). The Chancellor argued that there was nothing to be gained from an explicit announcement of policy, but the form of his argument showed that, in reality, he could find no secure parliamentary basis for it, and that his silence was a tactical inertia imposed by the prevailing political confusion. Had he taken any substantial step either to meet the Socialist demand or to appease the Junkers, the *bloc* would have fallen to pieces or would never have come into being at all. For we observe that the National Liberals desire annexations, and only consented to abandon the demand for a public declaration of that policy because they hoped that the Chancellor would accept the proposal to form a parliamentary coalition ministry in which their own leaders would take important posts; and, on the other hand, a group of Bavarians in the Centre Party supported "no annexations," but feared that a centralised parliamentary ministry would encroach on

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their cherished particularist rights. These are but two of many factors which combined to rob the Chancellor of all initiative; and it will not escape notice that, throughout these two critical months, which offered a golden opportunity to a self-reliant Parliament, the Reichstag has displayed all its old impotence, and has conspicuously failed to exploit the situation for the benefit of its own prestige. And the course of recent events has only added to the confusion. The submarine campaign has not yielded the quick result which was promised; and the abortive German attempt to bring about a separate peace with Russia has utterly failed. To-day Russia is more closely attached to her Western Allies, mainly through the characteristic manœuvres of Berlin. America, too, looms like a threatening storm from the West; and the arrival of her first army in France has given the lie to all the comfortable assurances of the official German Press. These factors had already created widespread uneasiness in Germany when Herr Scheidemann returned from Stockholm with the message—which Mr. Lloyd George significantly underlined at Glasgow—that autocracy in Berlin was the real obstacle to peace. And as the Government had shown by its attitude even to the meagre reforms proposed by the Constitution Committee of the Reichstag (*see* THE NEW EUROPE, No. 33) that it had no serious intention of “democratising Germany,” the common people was goaded out of its wonted docility and forced the Social Democrats to act. The Government had intended to summon the Reichstag on 5 July for a period of three days at the outside; it was to vote the credits and go home. About a fortnight before this date, however, the *Majority Socialist* Press began to hint openly that they were not inclined to vote the credits on this occasion unless they received from the Chancellor a public endorsement of their peace formula “without annexations and indemnities” and also the assurance of immediate political reform. There were also general rumours that the discontent of the Reichstag with the Government policy would find strong expression, and, in particular, that the really Liberal parties were determined to force a form of parliamentary government through. When the Main Committee of the Reichstag, which is to all intents and purposes the Reichstag in secret session, met on 4 July to settle the business of the session, Herr Spahn,

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the leader of the Centrum, proposed that the fifteen milliards of credit should be voted first and the general political debate follow. This was opposed by Herr Ebert on behalf of the Majority Socialists, and significantly by Herr Erzberger, who is, after Herr Spahn, perhaps the most important member of the Centrum. Here was the first indication that a section at least of the Centrum would support the Socialists in demanding a change in policy as the price of the credits.

On 6 and 7 July Herr Erzberger continued the campaign by violent attacks on Dr. Helfferich and the Chancellor; and while the heated debate proceeded, the *bloc* which had supported the latter on 15 May seems to have endeavoured to devise a peace formula which they could impose upon him. But the prevailing confusion of parties and policies referred to above only increased, and the ex-Chancellor's temporising attitude exasperated his former friends to such an extent that he was left with the bare fifty votes of the Progressive Party in the Reichstag. It is almost certain that, personally, he favoured the demand for peace and reform; but the fact that he failed at the critical moment to give the Reichstag a strong lead which might have united all his friends shows that he was not master of the situation. And, in the end, that means that he could not secure the Kaiser's assent to the *Neu-Orientierung*. We are aware that there is much to be said for the view that the Kaiser's rescript promising franchise reform in Prussia shows that the ex-Chancellor had won him over to a liberal attitude; and if that fact stood alone, its significance could not be ignored. But subsequent events show that the Kaiser has no belief in "democratisation" as the Reichstag majority understands it, otherwise he could hardly have chosen his new Chancellor with such studied disregard of the Reichstag leaders. The appointment of Dr. Michaelis is a proof that the Hohenzollerns still rely upon the bureaucracy for all the functions of civil government. The new Chancellor's resistance to extreme agrarian demands in the matter of food-control proves that, like any administrator worth his salt, he has strength of mind, but it is no proof of his Liberalism. His first speech in the Reichstag sheds no light upon his true attitude, for, though it was punctuated by cheers mainly from the Right, it maintained a reserve on all the vital questions of the day, which left room for

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many interpretations. Stripped of its rhetoric, it takes its place beside many similar orations whose delivery has had no influence upon events.

Some time must pass before we shall see any issue from the present confusion; and, meanwhile, we assume that the heaven which has been at work in Germany will spread its influence even more widely. The process will certainly be hastened by events, whether Dr. Michaelis accepts their logic or not. The idea that democratisation is the road to peace has begun to fasten its hold upon the popular mind, and the privations of the coming winter will tighten its grip. If the new Reichstag majority, which favours reform, has learned its lesson, it can easily find means to convert Dr. Michaelis, or, failing to convert him, can destroy him. That is a large assumption—presupposing the power of sustained co-operation—which finds but little support in the past character of that body. It may be, however, that the exceptional pressure of events and the growing unrest of the people will combine to give the Reichstag a new vigour. And, meanwhile, it should be our endeavour to increase the pressure of war by all means in our power, and to make clear our refusal to accept reactionary Germany as a partner in the new Europe of the future. This does not necessarily imply “No peace with the Hohenzollerns.” We have always maintained that the dynasty is a German domestic concern, and we are convinced that any attempt to deflect our antagonism solely against the person of William the Second is the surest way of defeating Liberalism in Germany by uniting the nation in defence of its crowned head. But we are entitled to tell the German people that the Prussian caste is an anachronism in modern Europe, and that they can only hope to regain their true position in the world by dethroning it from its seat of power. By pressing home our military attack, by land and air and sea, we shall show that we are in earnest; and by aiding the incipient Liberal movement in Germany we shall do better service to our own cause than by pursuing the illusion of a separate peace with any or all of the lesser partners of the Central European Alliance.

Half-Gods in Hungary

"When the Gods go, Half-Gods arrive."

WHILE the political situation in Austria is one of complete *désorientation*, and the Clam-Martinic cabinet has been replaced by what a leading organ of opinion rightly describes as "not a government, but merely a routine administration," Hungary, too, is in a state of latent crisis. The masterful Tisza, whom our readers know as one of those most directly responsible for the European war, has been succeeded by a young and absolutely untried politician, whose chief recommendation lies in the fact that he belongs to one of the great magnate families and was a brother officer of the young Emperor during the earlier stages of the war. The process of cabinet-making lasted for nearly three weeks, and the result has been a hybrid creation which, save in the first enthusiasm of awakening from the Tisza nightmare, could commend itself neither to its Democratic nor to its Conservative supporters. Not merely is the new Government without a majority in Parliament—a fact which must not be estimated altogether at its face value in view of the well-ingrained habit of the rank and file in the Hungarian Parliament of transferring their allegiance to the party in power—but it is actually divided within itself on more than one vital problem of the day. A noteworthy illustration of this is provided by the attitude of Count Apponyi, the Minister of Education, and much the most distinguished member of the new Cabinet, who followed up the Premier's first public statement of policy by declining to consider himself bound by the late Government's economic arrangements with Austria and Germany, and by reserving to himself an entirely free hand when their ratifications should come before Parliament.

In the composition of the new Cabinet it is difficult to recognise any common factor save personal hostility to Tisza. Indeed, the new Premier, Count Esterházy, owes his position to the irreconcilable rivalry of Tisza and Andrassy and to King Charles' desire to select an adherent of the latter who would not be personally objectionable to the former. The one bold and outstanding appointment is that of Mr. Vázsonyi to the Ministry of Justice. A clever Jewish advocate with a certain facile gift of demagogic oratory and a keen

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love of self-advertisement, Mr. Vázsonyi has, for the past decade, been the spokesman of the lower middle class and the non-socialist workmen of Budapest in their demand for universal suffrage. Though Hungarian politics have always been the happy hunting ground of the carpet-bagger and the "Mameluke," this particular type has never yet made its entry into ministerial circles. With this one exception, however, and that of the new Finance Minister, Mr. Gratz, a well-known Liberal journalist, the rest of the Cabinet, despite its relatively advanced programme, represents various shadings of feudal conservatism. Counts Esterházy and Serenyi belong to the great landowning magnate class, and Mr. Mezössy, who significantly enough is Minister of Agriculture, is ultra-agrarian; Mr. Ugron, the Minister of the Interior, represents the extreme Magyar view in Transylvania as against the Roumanians—a view which has been intensified tenfold by last summer's invasion and the reprisals which followed the return of the Magyars; while Count Apponyi stands for the principle of Magyarisation in its extremest form and for the minutiae of Hungarian constitutional claims as interpreted by a nation of lawyers *par excellence*. His first act was to revive in their entirety his own grossly reactionary Education Acts of 1907, the worst clauses of which the Tisza Cabinet had suspended as needlessly galling to the non-Magyar standpoint. Indeed, there is nothing reassuring in a cabinet which might not unfairly be described as a preserve of Count Andrassy, who only yields to Count Apponyi himself in his uncompromising views on the question of nationalities. Not only is the Premier Andrassy's most promising lieutenant, but Count Batthyány, the Minister *a latere* (to the Court), is his brother-in-law, Count Serenyi is his cousin, and the Secretary of State in the Premier's Office, Marquis Pallavicini, is, like Count Michael Károlyi, his son-in-law.

The programme announced by Count Esterházy in Parliament, though it reveals him as well-intentioned and seemingly progressive, has a background of vagueness which contrasts markedly with the clear-cut intentions of his predecessor. With his long but very sketchy list of social and economic reforms—reconstruction, harvest, sanitation, housing, care of children, schools, pensions, etc.—we need not deal. It is worth noting that his reference to the

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financial position as entirely satisfactory drew a strong warning from Count Tisza, who reminded Parliament that self-denial must be the order of the day, and that otherwise Hungary, after the victory of her sons, will perish through its economic effects. The main feature of the programme, however, was electoral reform, which Count Esterházy described as the very basis and *raison d'être* of his Government. Starting from the assumption that the existing franchise is untenable, and that reform must take precedence of all other internal matters, he promised that it should be carried out with due regard for "the life-interests of the Hungarian State." The voting age is to be reduced to 24 (under the Act of 1913 certain classes were only to acquire the vote at 30), and all holders of the military Charles Cross are to obtain it at whatever age. There is to be automatic registration, redistribution, prohibition of certain legalised payments and a further stiffening-up of the (at present very ineffective) provisions against bribery, corruption and violence at elections. The ballot is no longer to be confined to the towns; but the ominous provision is added that it will only be extended to those constituencies "in which the necessary condition for serious exercise of the ballot is present, that is, where there is a numerous Intelligentsia and a high percentage of men who can read and write." This means that the foul old system of public voting, with all its attendant evils, is still to be maintained so far as possible in the non-Magyar constituencies where, very largely owing to the methods of Magyarisation in the schools, illiteracy is still fairly high. Here peeps out the cloven-hoof of Magyar oligarchy. "I desire to work on democratic lines," Count Esterházy had declared when his appointment was first announced, "but naturally democracy in Hungary can only be a Magyar democracy." In conclusion, the Premier promised to do all in his power to avoid elections in war-time, but threatened that, if hindered in the passage of the new reform, he will appeal to the country—to the true principle of majority as against a merely formal majority which owes its existence to an artificial extension of its mandate.

This threat draws discreet attention to the fact that the Government in power has only once been known to lose a general election—and that, by an irony of fate, when Count

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Tisza, in 1905, refused to employ to the full the incomparable machinery of corruption and oppression upon which all his predecessors and successors have invariably relied. If, during the next few weeks or months, Count Esterházy proves that he can ride, it may be that some of the time-servers who swell the ranks of the Tisza party may desert to the new Government, just as they flocked from the decaying Coalition in 1910 to join the new "Party of National Work." But though the air is already full of rumours to this effect, the rats still remain on shipboard, thereby suggesting that the counter-rumours of disintegration within the new Government are no less worthy of credence. Meanwhile the true democrats in Hungary, whose influence has not as yet penetrated Parliament, preserve an attitude of subdued and mournful scepticism, and it is still too soon to foresee whether words are to be followed by deeds in internal politics.

Meanwhile, in the sphere of foreign policy, the Magyars are quick to lay aside their quarrels and to present an united front to the bare suggestion of federalism in Austria-Hungary and especially to the programme of Czecho-Slovak unity. Recent debates in the Hungarian Parliament supply the answer to those who imagine that federal institutions can be introduced in the Habsburg Monarchy without utterly destroying the existing framework of the most complicated political organism in Europe and simultaneously breaking the political power of its present rulers. The issue, as raised in Budapest and Vienna, deserves careful study; for, complicated as it is, it provides the key to a problem which lies at the very root of European reconstruction. The Austrian Premier, Ritter von Seidler, on 27 June formally repudiated, in the name of his own Government and in that of the Joint Minister for Foreign Affairs, the doctrine of "Self-determination of Nations" as interpreted by the Entente, and claimed that the constitution assured to the Emperor the exclusive right of deciding upon matters of war and peace. This incautious pronouncement gave rise to much misunderstanding and adverse criticism, and the semi-official *Fremdenblatt* published an elaborate article of commentary; but this could not save Seidler from a polite but none the less emphatic rebuff from his Hungarian colleague. On 4 July, in the Hungarian Parliament, Count Tisza brought forward an interpellation which knocked the bottom out of Herr von Seidler's constitu-

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tional theories. While preserving the pretence of not commenting upon the Austrian constitution or the rights and privileges (*Hoheitsrechte*) of the *Austrian* Crown, he stated most categorically that the very idea of such reserved rights "is diametrically opposed to *Hungarian* constitutional theory," and that the Hungarian Government "has the right and duty to take a share in all questions of peace and to be constitutionally responsible." Count Tisza, and Count Esterházy after him, repudiated the phrase "Gesamtstaat" or "Joint State" as used in the *Fremdenblatt* article. Such a phrase, they argued, could not possibly be applied to such an organism as Austria-Hungary, which "is not a Joint State at all, but a union of two States of equal rank."

Later in the debate the late and present Premiers addressed a vigorous "Hands off" to the advocates of reconstruction on a racial basis. Neither Austria nor the joint Austro-Hungarian Government could have any say in matters affecting the fate of the nationalities of Hungary, and the Hungarian Government would resist any attempt at interference. Still more intolerable was the Entente interpretation of "Self-determination"—"as though any group of Hungarian citizens on a nationalist or any other basis could dissolve the unitary Hungarian State and decide their own fate outside its sovereignty and constitution." These pronouncements were enthusiastically endorsed by Parliament without a single dissentient note. There is no Magyar party which would dare to come forward with a federal programme.

The semi-official Government organ, *Pester Lloyd*, went still further in its commentary upon the debate. It pointed out that while Hungary, which resented any interference in her own affairs, was anxious in her turn to avoid interference in Austrian affairs, the question of introducing federalism in Austria did none the less raise the question of how far the Hungarian Government was entitled to interfere, in view of the inevitable effect of such changes upon the existing Dual System. Still more important and significant is the article published a few days later in the *Neue Freie Presse* by Count Julius Andrassy, who, as has already been pointed out, is the political mentor and party chief of the new Premier. Dealing with the delicate question of "Hungary's interest in political events in Austria," he re-states "the

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recognised maxim of Hungarian life," that the strengthening of the German-Austrians and their influence is a direct interest of Hungary. While disclaiming any desire to interfere in the private affairs of a neighbouring state, he makes it abundantly clear that interference may become imperative, in order to prevent what might throw the sacrosanct Dual System out of gear. He quotes more than one historical precedent, but dwells with pardonable pride upon his own father's record, when in 1871 as Hungarian Premier he intervened to prevent Count Hohenwart from transforming Austria into a federal state. "This incident makes it certain that the Hungarian Government does possess the right of interference, as against federalist tendencies in Austria"—tendencies which would be resisted more vigorously than ever by the Magyars of to-day. Hungary, he concludes, is not prepared to consent to either Bohemia or Jugoslavia receiving the same rights which she herself has secured with so many sacrifices. "Only in one case could Hungary come to terms with such an idea"—namely, if the existing Dual system were to be replaced by the Personal Union, in other words, if the person of the sovereign were to be made the sole link binding the various national states together. Such a pronouncement on the part of so eminent an authority on constitutional history and practice is no less impressive than the authoritative speeches of Tisza and Esterházy, and makes it abundantly clear that any attempt to change or frame anew the foundations of the Monarchy will be treated, in Count Andrassy's words, "as a life-and-death challenge by all those factors who are identified with its position as a Great Power."

RUBICON.

The Balkan Conference

It is unfortunate that the Balkan Conference of the Allies should have met in Paris under the influence of the Russian military crisis. Discussions and decisions will, in these circumstances, necessarily seem to some extent contingent upon events over which the Allied representatives have little direct control. It is evident that the collapse of Russia would affect, perhaps disastrously, the prospect of any

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satisfactory Balkan settlement. It would, moreover, tend to dishearten the Roumanians and, to some extent, the Serbians. It is scarcely conceivable that the Russian situation should take a definite turn for the better before the Conference rises, though it is possible that, during the next few days, Mr. Kerenski and his colleagues may so far assert their authority as to render the recovery of Russia a strong probability. If the members of the Conference are wise they will discuss Balkan questions on their merits, and consider plans for military action in such a manner as to be prepared for any turn in the general situation of the Allies—always bearing in mind that, without a sound settlement of the Balkan problem, there can be no true Allied victory.

There is reason to believe that, in one respect at least, the Conference will have before it a definite statement of the requirements of such a settlement. In our article on "The Climax of the War" last week we censured the Serbian Government for its failure to come forward with an official programme of national unification. We rejoice to think that this reproach is no longer deserved, and that the Government of Serbia, in agreement with the Southern Slav Committee, have now drafted, and will shortly make known, the main lines of a policy for the unification of the three branches of the Southern Slav race. Unless we are misinformed, this programme will include the formation of a single Serbo-Croat-Slovene Kingdom, under the Karageorgevitch dynasty, on a democratic basis, with a united parliament elected by universal suffrage. The three Southern Slav creeds—the Orthodox, the Roman Catholic and the Muslim—will be placed on a footing of complete equality. The questions of the alphabet and of the calendar will be similarly treated. The settlement of other internal issues will be reserved for a Constituent Assembly.

Thus, on one point at least, the Paris Conference will be confronted with definite proposals. The necessity of accepting them in principle, if not in detail, becomes the more evident in view of the demands put forward in the manifesto of the Austrian Navy League for complete Austrian control of the Adriatic, the possession of the Danube basin, and other aspirations incompatible with the future peace of the Balkans and of Europe. It may be too much to hope that the Allies will succeed, at one short conference, in

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assessing the just claims of Italy, Greece, Serbia and Roumania; but the Conference will have failed unless it is able to report some definite progress towards this indispensable end.

The Building of Greater Roumania : (I)

"Give us war and Sacred Union, that together we may make a Great Roumania, for in a small Roumania there is place neither for you nor for us."—(Mr. Take Ionescu's appeal to the King of Roumania at the meeting of 4/17 July, 1916.)

EXACTLY a year has passed since the last great interventionist meeting in the Dacia Hall in Bucarest, at which the late Mr. Filipescu and Mr. Take Ionescu made their final appeal to the Roumanian King, Government and nation to strike their blow for European civilisation and Roumanian ideals. "Frenchmen, Englishmen, Italians, Russians are giving their lives to make our Fatherland; it is not possible for us alone to stay out of it." In these words Take Ionescu linked Roumania's fortunes, once and for all, with those of the Grand Alliance of Humanity. And in telling phrases he clearly showed that the lot of the dynasty and that of the race were linked together. "The unanimous vote of 1866 (calling Prince Charles to the throne) was both a simple vote and a hope. Fifty years' experience has strengthened the tie, but this tree can only take root on the other side of the Carpathians."

Six weeks later the King, Government and nation had chosen war—war for National Union and, more vaguely understood, for Freedom. And now, after a year, the Roumanian people finds itself defeated, disappointed and deprived of two-thirds of its own soil, not to speak of the soil it had begun to liberate. The moment has come to take stock of the country's political and national future, and to see if we can estimate how it stands to-day, alike from the internal and the international standpoint.

Eight months after Roumania's intervention Mr. Take Ionescu wrote in THE NEW EUROPE (No. 31):—

"I urged my country, with all my power, to enter this war; and if my heart bleeds at the sight of the misfortunes which have befallen it, my conscience tells me that, if I had to make the decision again, I could not act differently. But if, from all this tragedy, nothing should emerge but a German peace, on the basis of the

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status quo, I should feel that I had committed a crime. . . . Were Roumania doomed to suffer all the torments of hell, I should continue to say 'No peace until Germany has been defeated.'"

In the sitting of the Roumanian Parliament on 27 December last Professor Iorga uttered these Dostojevskian words of comfort: "In our past there has been much suffering. If we have attained something it is not through the victories of our ancestors but through what they have suffered." A more practical consolation was that of Mr. Brătianu: "Whatever our sufferings are to-day—and I feel them like the most afflicted son of the Fatherland—whatever they are, and even if I had not intact the faith which I hold that by complete victory we shall win in this war recompense and compensation for this suffering, I have the conviction that the sacrifices made are not fruitless, for we have introduced Roumania's just cause to the conscience of Europe."

To these three representative men of modern, belligerent Roumania, then, intervention was "worth while." And it is worth our while to consider why this should be so, and what is the practical application to Roumania's internal and international problems of the principles on which such a faith must be founded.

War with the Central Empires was inevitable for Roumania if she was to become in the future what she had never been in the past—a complete, self-determined national State. Fifty years of negotiation with Austria-Hungary (and her German backer)—thirty-three years of actual alliance—had failed to bring about any amelioration of the condition of the Roumans subject to the Dual Monarchy or to offer any hope of a just solution of this most vexed of questions. The Hungarian Government proved itself deaf beyond reason to the voice alike of humanity and diplomatic tact, and both during the years preceding 1914 and during the war itself the oppression of the Roumans of Transylvania and the neighbouring counties became continually worse. Some account of this deplorable state of things appeared in the very first number of THE NEW EUROPE from the pen of Dr. R. W. Seton-Watson. It has long been one of the most flagrant scandals of Europe, this systematic suppression of a people of three to four millions, and it was a grievance deeply felt by every patriotic Roumanian. On the day King Ferdinand called his people to arms it was

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to this feeling he rightly appealed. "To-day it is granted us to assure unshakably and in its fulness the work realised for the moment by Michael the Brave: the union of the Roumanians on both sides the Carpathians." Every Roumanian felt the appeal, whether or not he considered it justified the risks of war. It is an appeal which no Peace Conference of diplomats can or ought to ignore.

The terms which Roumania secured in return for intervention have not been officially published. The whole question, however, has recently been dealt with on 14/27 May in the Petrograd Radical paper *Djen*—which now calls itself an "Organ of Socialist thought"—by Professor Vodovozov, who professes to give a correct account of the terms of the treaty signed on 23 August last year. The article gains importance from the fact that the *Djen* is one of the best informed and most fair-minded papers in Petrograd to-day, and in touch with Mr. Kerenski. The article in question has since then been quoted and endorsed by various Social Democrat and Social Revolutionary papers in Russia, including the Maximalist *Pravda* and *Djelo Naroda* (Mr. Černov's organ), and has had some vogue in the German and subsequently in the Bulgarian press.

Mr. Vodovozov takes the Roumanian treaty as a typical instance of the outrageous terms—terms conflicting with reason, justice, and rights of nationalities—accorded to negotiating Governments under the bad old system of secret diplomacy. He declares that Roumania was definitely promised the whole of Transylvania, Bukovina, and the Banat and the Bulgarian part of the famous Quadrilateral, including the towns of Šumla and Varna. He argues that these terms cannot be defended on ethnographical grounds, and Roumania's insistence on them shows that she is pre-eminently an imperialist and chauvinist State of the type most repulsive to the new trend of thought in Russia and the West.

It would be interesting to know by what authority Professor Vodovozov published the terms of this treaty and whether or not they are correctly given: for argument's sake let us suppose that the details are correct. In that case it must frankly be admitted that the terms offered Roumania are greater than can be justified on purely ethnographical grounds. A greater Roumania stretching to the Theiss and

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including the whole Bukovina would be a Roumania containing a considerable percentage of Magyar, Serb, and Ruthene elements which would feel themselves quite out of sympathy with their government. We hold no brief to defend the Roumanian treaty in all its details. But we may ask the *Djen*, the *Djelo Naroda*, and others of our Russian friends who heap abuse on Roumania because of it, these two questions:—

(1) Why do they emphasise those clauses of the treaty which give to Roumania land to which on racial grounds she is not fully entitled and gloss over the fact that to three-fourths at least of the territory she was promised she was fully entitled on those same grounds of race, language and sympathy? Professor Vodovozov stands forth as the champion of the Serbs of the Banat, the Bulgars of the Quadrilateral, the Ruthenes of N.W. and N. Bukovina, against Roumanian claims. But he has not a word in defence of the claim of the Roumanian population of Hungary. He dismisses this with the curt remark: "Only in Transylvania the majority of the population speaks Roumanian, but even here this majority is not at all big—it reaches 55 per cent. of the whole." He does not allude to the counties to the west of Transylvania—Krassó-Szörény, Szilágy, or Arad—where there are large Roumanian majorities. He does not recognise that, while to give the *whole* Banat or Bukovina to Roumania would conflict with strictly national rights, a line could be drawn nearly through the centre of the Banat, and northwards near Arad and Grosswardein (Oradea Mare), to Máramaros, within which there would be roughly a two-thirds Roumanian majority—and *that* on the Hungarian census returns, which are notoriously "doctored" to suit Magyar convenience. Instead of only 2,949,032 Roumans in Hungary there is every reason to maintain that the number is between 3½ and 4 millions. (They are, of course, ludicrously unrepresented in the Hungarian Parliament, where they have only *five*, instead of the 69 (or, really 80) deputies proportional representation would give them.)

(2) But there is another point. When Roumania entered the war last August, she did so in a world obsessed by *Realpolitik*. Economic and strategical reasons were conventionally considered to outweigh strict considerations of justice and humanity. Was it so easy for a small country

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like Roumania to be "moderate" in her demands? Who had shown her the example? Certainly not the Central Empires. And had the Entente Powers done so completely? She had seen Constantinople promised to Russia and North Dalmatia to Italy. Whether they had been promised rightly or wrongly need not be discussed. Suffice it that it could not have been on ethnological grounds. Why, then, should Roumania be willing to abandon *all* considerations of economic and military necessity in defence of a principle which greater Powers were overriding. Probably, in the old spirit of Eastern (yes, and Western) diplomacy, she bargained for more than she actually expected to make good. In the changed world of the Russian Revolution values have altered. It is safe to hazard the guess that *if* Russia frankly offered Roumania to support her claim to the line suggested above—supposing that such a claim to union were (as it certainly is) the wish of the majority of the inhabitants—she would frankly accept it. It does not follow Roumania was a criminal in asking for a little more a year ago. Frankly, Professor Vodovozov has been somewhat indiscriminating in his discussion of Roumania's territorial claims.

As for the wish of the inhabitants, there can be little doubt. In spite of all the forced professions of loyalty to the Hungarian Crown extorted from the Roumanian notables of Hungary, the proofs are patent that such loyalty—if it ever existed—no longer exists. The colossal number of sentences of death and confiscation of property inflicted on the Roumans of Transylvania for helping the invading armies last September shows the feeling of the population. It is only necessary to refer to the debates in the Hungarian Parliament last March and the figures there given by the then Minister of Justice. Free expression of opinion in Transylvania is, of course, out of the question. We can, however, judge from the attitude of those Roumans of Austria-Hungary who have been fortunate enough to escape abroad what is the feeling of the people as a whole. Of these leaders men like Father Lucaci and the poet Octavian Goga are solidly supporting the national cause, and are doing excellent work, one in America, the other in Russia, in bringing it under the notice of the democratic peoples of the world. There are, too, something like 130,000 Roumanian soldiers from Austria-Hungary prisoners in Russia. The

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greater majority of these have now volunteered to fight under the Roumanian flag for the liberation of their fellow-countrymen oppressed by Hungary. A committee of 250 officers and 250 N.C.O.'s and men recently petitioned the Russian Provisional Government to this effect. Something has already been done in the way of organising these troops. 150 officers and 1,300 men recently arrived in Jassy as the vanguard of what will be a valuable addition to the Roumanian Army and took the oath of allegiance to King Ferdinand.

These are facts which Russia and Europe cannot ignore. There seems to be considerable neglect of this burning question of the Roumans of Austria-Hungary on the part of Russian Socialists and of prominent leaders in other countries like Mr. Branting in Sweden. This is apparently due to ignorance of the facts, for there is no cause which could appeal to the Socialist and humanitarian more than that of the oppressed but indomitable Rouman peasants of Hungary. A lesser but by no means negligible question is that of Bessarabia—a province historically Roumanian (it was taken from Moldavia by Alexander I. in 1812) and, what is more important, racially two-thirds Roumanian. The old *régime* in Russia systematically starved the province of educational facilities and Russified the administration; With the dawn of freedom in Russia, Bessarabia, too, is beginning to find expression for its national consciousness. Three months ago a new "National Moldavian Party" came into existence at Odessa to which Bessarabians—soldiers, peasants, and educated alike—are giving their support. The platform of the new party includes ecclesiastical and civil autonomy for the province; the use of the Roumanian language in the civil and military administration; adequate land grants for the peasants and economic protection for the province; and reciprocal good treatment of "Moldavian" and other national minorities in and out of Bessarabia. The movement is in touch with the Ukrainian movement which has assumed such serious dimensions. It demands the sympathetic attention of the Russian authorities.

The greatest Russian objection to Roumanian claims, however, is the "*bourgeois*" and "*boyar*" character of the Roumanian Government. This opens up widely different questions of Roumanian internal politics, which will be dealt with in a subsequent article. But it is intimately

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connected alike with Roumanian national aspirations and Russian Socialist objections to them, and no consideration of the building of a Greater Roumania would be complete without it.

ALEXANDER SEVERUS.

Germany and the Habsburg Problem

THE political situation in Austria-Hungary is singularly critical. The monarchy is economically on the edge of the abyss; the working classes are reduced to absolute want; the lower middle class (officials, employees, etc., particularly) are starving; whilst the upper middle class, manufacturers and tradespeople, are ruined. From the intellectual point of view there is complete demoralisation: the nation is exhausted, its resistance broken; it is as incapable of moral elevation as of rebellion. Indifference and renunciation characterise it. Only the intellectual class, formerly occupied with politics, continues active—in so far as it is not threatened by imprisonment.

In this setting the Reichsrat met and presented a singular spectacle to the world. All that those acquainted with Austria had sedulously predicted for three years came to pass on the first day. The Czechs announced their programme for an independent Czecho-Slovak State, the Poles intimated their decision to separate from Austria in order to create a unified and free Poland, and the Jugoslavs expressed the desire to be united in a Jugoslav State. The solution of the Austro-Hungarian problem thus stated, signified that the Poles would definitely disappear from Austria, that the Czechs would become independent and would take with them almost a third of Hungary—the richest and the most important part—that the Jugoslavs would unite with their Balkan compatriots and the Italians with their co-nationals in Italy. The Germans in German Austria and the Magyars in Hungary alone would remain. This programme, then, signifies the definitive end of their domination. At a single stroke they would lose everything. What is especially important and absolutely decisive for the fate of the Monarchy is, that Austro-Hungarian Governments during the war have succeeded in compelling absolute silence for three years by force. Clam-Martinic committed the

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supreme blunder of convoking Parliament and unchaining the tempest of all the elements hostile to the Monarchy, a tempest which it appears impossible to still. And the most serious factor of all is the wide popular support which the movement receives. In Galicia enthusiastic demonstrations have forced the deputies to abjure their traditional Austrophil policy. In the Czech countries a genuine revolutionary movement, supported by all the political, economic, literary, and artistic organisations, by town and village, by the workmen and intellectuals, in a word, by the whole nation, threatens the deputies with pitiless severity if they do not state the full popular demand. Similar movements are taking place among the Ruthenes, Jugoslavs, Italians, and Roumanians.

The Empire is disintegrating. The internal situation is such that it is impossible for the Czechs, Poles, and Jugoslavs to withdraw their declarations in the Reichsrat which voice these popular movements. The fate of Austria is being decided. The Germans and Magyars cannot control this formidable movement. For, on the one hand, they do not understand the political psychology of their opponents, and did not believe that the process of internal dislocation was so advanced. On the other hand, blinded by their insensate projects of domination, incapable of understanding that everything is irremediably lost, they continue as of old: centralist and Germano-Magyar "Austria" must be preserved solely in order that some profit may be drawn from its preservation. Thus they refuse to yield an inch. For the Germans, the loss of their predominance in Austria would mean the complete loss of their political position. *And then there would be no object in their remaining in Austria, they would be happier in Germany.* And for the Magyars to lose their political privileges in Slovakia, Croatia, and Transylvania would mean the end of Magyarised Hungary and the loss of everything for them. What interest would they have in fighting to preserve Austria for the Emperor? That is the whole problem. *The fate of Austria-Hungary would be a matter of indifference to the Magyars from the moment that the Monarchy became federalised.* For they could lose neither more nor less whether it were federalised or dismembered altogether. In a certain sense they would be freer if it disappeared completely than if they remained in some kind

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of confederation reduced to their own population of eight millions, and exceeded in numbers by the others. Consequently, they will fight with the utmost energy against real and effective federation.

The Austrian Germans, on their part, are even more incensed against political concessions, in the federalist sense, to the Slavs than the Germans of the Empire. They understand very well that the real federation of Austria would, as matters stand, give great predominance to the Slav element in opposition to the German, which is scattered in small fractions everywhere over the Slav territories, and which would necessarily be sacrificed to the majority principle. That is why the Austrian-Germans have always been much more uncompromising towards the other nations in Austria-Hungary than the Germans of the Empire themselves, and also why they are now defending themselves against real federation and ready rather to separate from the Monarchy altogether. Thus it has been easy for the Germans and Magyars to make the ruling circles in Vienna understand that the plans of the Slavs—whether they aim at federation or at independence—mean the end of the Monarchy. All the more, everyone knows that Galicia is from this day finally lost, even if the Emperor were to try a Slav federalist policy. It is clear at present that the Poles will not form part of a federal Austria, and the same thing is true of the Jugoslavs, who lean towards the Balkans, and finally of the Ruthenes, who after the secession of the Poles could not remain in Austria. The Czecho-Slovaks alone would remain in it. And what would their position be? Ten millions of Czecho-Slovaks beside 20 million Austro-Magyars; that is to say, a position infinitely more dangerous than before the war. In these circumstances they would not wish to remain in Austria-Hungary for anything in the world.

Again, to satisfy the Slavs and to initiate *any* process of constitutional reform inevitably opens the road to the dissolution of the Monarchy. The Germans, the Magyars, and the ruling classes thoroughly understand the position. They know that the Slavs cannot and will not yield. They know also that to attempt to establish a real federation would inevitably lead the uncontrolled force of the Slavs to strip their enemies first of all their privileges and then ultimately to quit the Monarchy. It is for that reason that they will

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try their utmost to hinder this federation, for it is less difficult to dismember the Empire than to federalise it in the Slav sense: for so long as it is a question of federalising it, it is they who will have a voice in the matter, and having the power in their hands they will use it to prevent these changes.

The two dominant nations in Austria-Hungary at present are doing all they can to persuade the ruling classes that the sole possibility of saving Austria is to govern it with a strong hand, to make a display of concessions, but to preserve Austria as it is. If not, the Emperor is menaced by rebellion or by the indifference of these two loyalist nations, who would in such circumstances lose all interest in defending the Monarchy.

The dynasty is thus in a terrible dilemma:—(1) Either the *status quo* with small modifications, in order to throw dust in the eyes of Europe; (2) Or the attempt to establish a true Slav federation, which will inevitably lead to the final dissolution of the Monarchy; for true federation would on the one hand let loose the revolt of the Germans and Magyars, and, on the other hand, it would fatally strengthen the separatist tendencies amongst the Slavs and would drive them finally to a complete and inevitable separation from the Monarchy. The Austro-Hungarian problem would thus appear to be insoluble.

The rôle of Germany in this *impasse* is worth watching. German tactics are curious and very skilful. Germany sees that two eventualities must be excluded: (1) In the first place, the present state of affairs, in which the oppressed nationalities make too much noise, which the Entente exploits against the Central Empires, and in which the Polish question no longer admits of adjournment, has become intolerable, and Germany, therefore, desires a modification of the present state *with a view to bringing nearer a speedy and advantageous peace*; (2) The Monarchy must not be dismembered, for the preservation of Austria is a vital German interest. The Prussian plan is to originate a so-called "federation" in Austria, with fairly wide provincial autonomy, certain concessions to the nationalities, and, if necessary, the separation of the Poles and Italians from the Monarchy. But the preservation of the Monarchy is, above all else, necessary to Germany! And Germany begs

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the Austrian Germans to be reasonable and conciliatory, not to carry their uncompromising attitude far enough to threaten the existence of the State. She seeks to impress upon the Austrian Germans that, in the interest of *Deutschtum*, it is their duty to make sacrifices in favour of the Austrian Slavs, that, to a certain extent, they must sacrifice themselves in the true sense of the word, and that they will render to Germany an infinitely greater service if they preserve their State, in which they will share their power with the other nations, than if they compromise everything by hurrying on the general ruin. So spoke Herr Georg Bernhard in the *Vossische Zeitung*; and the *Frankfurter Zeitung* and the *Zeit* of Vienna have summed up the situation in similar terms. The Magyars especially thoroughly understood the position when they earnestly advised the Austrian Germans to make concessions in "Austria," so that they should not be compelled to make them themselves in Hungary, and thus bring about the same state of impending dissolution as obtains now in Austria. And thus also those who conceived the idea of the amnesty to the Slav political prisoners were acting under the prompting of Berlin, with the deliberate intention of saving Austria by throwing dust in the eyes of the Entente. In short, Germany's plan is this: Untenable as are conditions in Austria to-day, dismemberment would be a real disaster for Germanism in general; and, therefore, a bold scheme of federation must be advertised in order to dupe the Entente, and to preserve Austria until Germany herself is once more able to recover the lost ground.

The whole of Austro-Hungarian and German policy is now briefly: How to stop this irresistible movement of the nations leading irrevocably to the dissolution of the Monarchy; how to dupe these nations and the Entente at the same time by a scheme of reform acceptable to the Allies; how to save this state which threatens to crumble away the moment a single part of its framework is really touched?

Such is the problem at present. Such is the meaning of the Austro-German *pourparlers*, of the probable early offer of "peace without annexations and indemnities," of the amnesty accorded to the Slavs, of the plan to establish a commission at Vienna for the revision of the Constitution, of the departure of Clam-Martinic and Tisza, and of the project

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for a coalition cabinet in Austria. It is no new political orientation nor is it new tactics. It has been long in preparation and is now being tried. Its success depends upon our ability to distinguish the true from the false.

EDVARD BENEŠ.

Is a Separate Peace with Bulgaria Possible ?

[The following article comes from a competent Bulgarian source, its author being one of those who favoured the Entente cause, and, on the outbreak of war in October, 1915, withdrew to neutral soil. One point which deserves special attention is the suspicion with which the Bulgarian public appears to regard any promises from the Entente.]

WHENEVER some event favourable to the Entente occurs, such as the intervention of America, there is fresh talk of separate peace with Bulgaria. As one who knows conditions and tendencies in that country, I can affirm positively that this is out of the question, and that to believe the contrary is to misunderstand completely the true internal situation and the spirit which animates the Bulgarian people as a whole. Such a verdict rests not on mere vague speculations, but on information brought by travellers from Bulgaria, on a careful reading between the lines of the Bulgarian Press, and on the attitude of Bulgarian circles in Switzerland.

The causes are at once moral and material—on the one hand the cult of force and the Germanic idea, on the other the hold which Germany has obtained over the army and other institutions on which Bulgaria's security and independence depend. To begin with, Tsar Ferdinand and his Government are incapable of estimating exactly the true military position of the rival groups. The German General Staff, through its agents in the palace and in the Government, represents the military situation of the Central Powers as definitely superior to that of the Entente. The peace proposals of the former are regarded in Sofia, not as a sign of weakness, but merely as a proof of devotion to the cause of peace.

The Bulgarian people is inspired by the cult of Germany. Since war broke out, it has followed with ever growing admiration the achievements of the Germans, and has remained blind to such events as the battles of the Marne and Verdun, accepting trustfully the official *communiqués* of the Central Powers. The fact that the latter are fighting outside their

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own territory and hold vast tracts in their control serves to strengthen this confidence. The whole nation to-day sees in the triumph of the Central Powers the sole means of satisfying its national ambitions. There is no longer any real Opposition, and the former Russophil parties are full of contempt and insults for the Entente Powers, whom they regard as the victims of megalomania. The nation will never, even if it could, force the Government to conclude a separate peace with the Entente—firstly, in order not to betray its allies, and, secondly, in order not to give Serbia any chance of aggrandisement as a result of this treason. Thus it accepts with good enough grace all kinds of restrictions, the more so as it has been led to believe that the countries of the Entente are suffering even more from want and restrictions.

Even if Bulgaria realised that the game was irremediably lost, she could not capitulate as long as Germany did not do so. She will never surrender alone.

But the decisive factor which makes a separate peace impossible is material rather than moral. Whatever may be said, the Bulgarian High Command does not exist in real fact. Žekov, who was only a colonel when war broke out and was promoted to be Commander-in-Chief without taking part in any of the battles of the present war, is not strong enough to direct the operations of the Bulgarian Army according to his own ideas. According to indisputable evidence General Žekov is entirely under the influence, not to say the orders, of the numerous German officers on his staff. He submits willingly to this influence, because he is under the thrall of German methods.

What is true of the Bulgarian General Staff is equally true of the Ministry of War. Stop for a moment outside the building and count the *Pickelhauben* as they enter. There is a German official representative there, with an important staff; but the chief post has been filled by a colonel, in order not to lay too much stress upon his presence. But his staff is always at work and interferes with the affairs of the Ministry of War.

On the Macedonian front the German and Bulgarian armies are mixed in such a way as completely to efface Bulgarian control and to render impossible any treachery to the German cause. I learn, too, from Bulgarians who

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have come from their own country, that there are fairly strong German garrisons in the towns of Ruščuk, Šumen, Varna, etc., ready to intervene with great effect, should any attempt be made to overthrow the Bulgarian Government's present policy.

Nor is German control confined to the military sphere; it is economic also. The post offices, telegraphs and telephones are, to a great extent, managed by the Germans, who have also laid their hands upon the customs offices. Under pretence of giving advice regarding revictualling, the Germans manipulate it to their advantage. The Food Dictator, General Protogerov, ex-komitadji, has been selected by Germany. The mines, the factories, the war industries, are run by German engineers, who will know how to extract profit for their country when the right moment comes.

Since 1914 the German propaganda has played steadily upon the one argument: 'Never will the Entente keep its promises, if victorious.' Indeed, it was this spirit of distrust which sent Bulgaria to war, despite all the compensations offered to her, and to-day, no less than yesterday, the Bulgarian Government and people will refuse any offer of the Entente, both because they do not believe that it will ever dispose of the territory it promises, and also because they are convinced that in the event of victory it would repudiate its word.

Some time ago the Swiss press announced that overtures and *pourparlers* with a view to a separate peace between Bulgaria and the Entente had taken place on Swiss soil. According to our information this refers to certain private interviews between the former Bulgarian Minister at Berne, Mr. Simeon Radev [see THE NEW EUROPE, No. 7, p. 215] and some journalists of the Entente, and notably of Russia. But I can affirm that Mr. Radev had no idea of genuinely sounding the ground for a *rapprochement* with the Allies. His aim was something very different. He wished:—

1. To obtain information of a political and military nature, such as would serve Bulgaria and the Central Powers.

2. To learn the innermost feelings of the Allied Powers in respect of Bulgaria and her cause.

3. To see to what degree the Entente is anxious to make a separate peace with Bulgaria—which provides an answer

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to the further questions, to what degree the Entente has had enough of the war, and to what degree it no longer believes in its own final triumph.

And this surely provides a sufficient answer to the question which forms the title to this article.

A Handbook for Diplomats

Not long ago Mr. Punch paid THE NEW EUROPE the compliment of saying that if it had been in existence before the war the war itself might never have taken place. It is not for us to comment on this astonishing tribute, which we interpret as meaning, that if the British nation had been a closer student of Foreign Affairs the events of the past decade might have taken a very different—and, perhaps, a more pacific—course. Mr. Punch is a good pupil of Clausewitz, and appreciates the connection between armaments and policy. "War is the pursuit of a political object by other means," and he who embarks on any political course in foreign politics must be prepared to see it issue in war or the threat of war. Had we been more alive to this vital truth we might have shown the German Government betimes the folly of gambling on our pacific temper. And, certainly, a more alert public opinion would have unmasked that expert deceiver, Baron von Kühlmann, before he had so deeply compromised the safety of Europe. Doubtless, in the end, he only deceived himself and his Government. But we must observe that his self-deception, which was a contributory cause of the war, was only in part due to his misreading of our character; the other factor being our self-deception in failing to perceive that the change in our position after 1905—indeed, after 1899—entailed a change in our whole outlook on continental affairs. The difference between our attitude to the Navy and to Foreign Affairs during these years is significant. We saw at once what the German Navy Laws meant, and we took steps to meet them; but we failed to grasp the consequences of our Entente with France and Russia which, equally with our naval measures, was dictated by the attitude of Germany. There was thus a fatal divorce in the public mind between Defence and Foreign Policy. We insisted on having the ships, but we neglected to study the very European events which might compel us to use them. Absorbed in the pre-occupation of urgent domestic problems, we left our foreign affairs behind the closed doors of the Foreign Office, and hardly troubled even to inquire into the manner in which the Diplomatic Service discharged its duty. Our negligence should, therefore, give us pause before we endorse some of the sweeping verdicts so often passed against our diplomacy. The Foreign Office and its agents have a heavy account to meet, which is only in part due to the difficulties of co-operation in an alliance. But justice compels us to admit that the magnitude of certain failures is the measure of our own neglect. A vigilant public opinion is the best guarantee of efficiency in any public service.

A HANDBOOK FOR DIPLOMATISTS

These considerations bear closely upon an important book recently published by Sir Ernest Satow ("A Guide to Diplomatic Practice:" by the Right Hon. Sir Ernest Satow, G.C.M.G., D.C.L. (Longmans). 2 vols. 28s.). The editor of the series in which it appears—"Contributions to International Law and Diplomacy"—calls it "unique," and the author himself believes that "it is the earliest of its kind published in England." This claim, which is probably just, is enhanced by the workmanlike execution of the task which the author set himself. He has turned out at once a first-rate text-book of diplomacy, which every apprentice in the art should possess, and a work of reference which even the experienced practitioner will often consult.

Sir Ernest Satow gives several definitions of diplomacy from different authors, which I may epitomise as the whole art of negotiation in foreign affairs. His own definition runs:—"Diplomacy is the application of intelligence and tact to the conduct of official relations between the governments of independent states." Now, in the word *intelligence* there is a challenge which many diplomatists will be unable to survive. With the best will in the world we cannot say that "the application of intelligence" has been conspicuous in our diplomacy. Sir Ernest Satow himself forestalls so obvious a criticism by saying that whether diplomacy be skilful or blundering, responsibility belongs to the Secretary of State and not to his agents abroad. Broadly speaking, this is true; for the Secretary of State directs policy and appoints the agents of it. But the constitutional doctrine of ministerial responsibility—witness Mesopotamia—is not a reality. No one will maintain that Lord Cromer's success in Egypt was due to the wisdom of Whitehall, or to anything but his own sterling qualities. Nor can a just judgment of our recent Balkan diplomacy fail to assign a heavy share of the blame to the incompetence of more than "one man on the spot." The truth is, that the whole system, of which Downing Street and the Embassies abroad are *both* responsible parts, is not abreast of the needs of the time, and will not be until some of Sir Ernest Satow's excellent "Counsels to Diplomats" (see THE NEW EUROPE, No. 29, page 69) become the common practice of the Service. "One of the chief functions of the head of a mission," he says (p. 135), "is to train the junior members of the Service in the right performance of their duties, especially in the preparation of reports on subjects of interest. . . ." Against that I put the evidence published by the Royal Commission on the Civil Service [Cd. 7748], showing, in the words of Sir Maurice de Bussen, that "at most posts the routine work" of the average *attaché* is that of a typist! I am sure that Sir Ernest Satow deplores this as much as any man, but I think he might have spoken a little more firmly on the need for reform.

Let me transcribe a few sentences from Callières' "De la manière de négocier avec les souverains" (Paris 1716), which deserves re-publication, being, as Sir Ernest Satow himself calls it, "a mine of political wisdom":—"Il faut qu'il s'accomode aux mœurs et aux

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Coûtumes du Pays où il se trouve, sans y témoigner de la répugnance et sans les mépriser, comme font plusieurs Négociateurs qui loïent sans cesse les manières de vivre de leurs pays pour trouver à redire à celles des autres." Such counsel is still apt in our own day. " S'il est dans un Etat populaire, il faut qu'il assiste à toutes ses Diettes ou Assemblées, qu'il tienne grande table pour y attirer les députez, et qu'il s'y acquiere par ses honnestetez et par ses presens, les plus accreditez et les plus capables de détourner les résolutions préjudiciables aux interêts de son Maître, et de favoriser ses desseins." (Herr von Kühlmann must have known his Callières by heart!) " Une bonne table facilite les moyens de savoir ce qui se passe, lorsque les gens du pays ont la liberté d'aller manger chez l'Ambassadeur. . . . C'est le propre de la bonne chère de concilier les esprits, de faire naître de la familiarité et de l'ouverture de cœur entre les convives, et la chaleur du vin fait souvent decouvrir des secrets importants." Can our Ambassadors honestly say that they have encouraged their juniors in such courses? They cannot plead that, in any modern State, popular movements are no concern of diplomacy, for if they did not know it before, the War must have proved to them that such movements are the mainspring of all politics. It is significant that, in a recent Mission to Petrograd before the Revolution, the only member who predicted the coming event—and he was laughed at for his pains—was a young man who forsook the beaten diplomatic track and went among the common people.

A. F. WHYTE.

Review

The Method in the Madness (a Fresh Consideration of the Case between Germany and Ourselves): Edwyn Bevan. 1917. (Edward Arnold.) 5s. net. Mr. Bevan's book seems to stand like a friendly oasis in the desert of political passion. The Jingo, hurriedly searching his pages for fresh vials of wrath to hurl upon the cities of the German plain, will suspect him of those detached views which do not always go with patriotism of the noisy type. But the careful reader, with a sense for artistic fitness, will delight in the cumulative effect of Mr. Bevan's method of giving the devil his due, and will unconsciously contrast it with that other method—not alas! uncommon in our midst, even in these days of stress—of playing the devil's advocate. At the very outset he strikes a note of his own. "There are people on our side who seem to think of the German nation as animated by a single soul. The picture in their minds seems to be that of a certain number of Germans slaughtering women and children, and all the rest of the German nation looking on, as in an amphitheatre, witnessing precisely what is done and applauding. If, on the other hand, you try to convince them that there are quantities of Germans who are good and humane, they think you want to show that the public action of Germany has been

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good and humane, and that, therefore, we ought not to go on with the war."

The book is full of good things about the principles of German *Machtpolitik*, the fallacies involved in German invective against "Marinism," the fundamental difficulty that Germany's view of safety implies being strong enough to defeat a coalition of the world. When Mr. Bevan quotes German opinion he knows whom to quote with most effect, and his every argument is reinforced by views and teachings of Bülow and Delbrück, Schmoller and Rohrbach, and a score of others whom every educated German acknowledges as leaders of political thought, and not as Bernhardist backwoodsmen. Those of us who cling desperately to the ideal of a League of Nations must needs admit the contention that to assume "that Germany, with its present cast of mind, could be included in such a League as a Power of the same kind as the others, is to simplify a problem by shutting the eyes to one of its essential elements. The present catastrophe has not come about through the general failings of humanity everywhere, but through a special perversion of mind in one member of the family of States, which could not but bring about a violent disturbance. If you see a group in the street engaged in a scuffle, it is a cheap way of exhibiting your lofty superiority to pass it by on the assumption that all who engage in a street brawl are equally to blame, and that all struggles imply a deficient sense of dignity. It may be that on closer inquiry you will find that the group consists of a number of people trying to get a powerful maniac under control. One man disposed to be violent makes a whole number of peaceful people act violently. The question is not: Who is involved in the undignified struggle? but: What is the origin of the trouble?" This view may be commended to the new Chancellor, who in his first speech has laid equal emphasis upon the origins.

Specially interesting is the chapter which deals with the "competing views" in Germany regarding war aims:—Freedom of the Seas, Central Europe, Berlin-Bagdad and a Colonial Empire. Different groups of opinion lay special stress, now upon one and now upon another. Even among the extreme Pangermans opinions differ, the idea of sea-power, colonial expansion and world dominion appealing most strongly to the Conservative Junkers and the armament and shipping magnates, while "*Mittleuropa*" is favoured by "the educated middle class, the more liberal sort of professors, the great mass of people whose view of politics is more theoretical than practical, determined more by imagination and sentiment than the experience of affairs." Naturally there was a tendency to favour expansion either eastwards or outside Europe, according as the individual favoured the democratic ideals of the West or the conservative and autocratic standards of Russia; and this cleavage has ceased to be obvious since the Russian upheaval enthroned democracy in Petrograd. But it cannot be pointed out too often that both views are equally antagonistic to that *status quo* which pacifists put forward as a goal to aim at. No human being can foretell what the ultimate solution of Europe's miseries will

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be; but amid all the growing uncertainty one fact stands firm—that the *status quo* is irretrievably gone. “The Pangerman programme, which ‘would grab Belgium, Northern France, Brie and Belfort, Poland, Lithuania, Volhynia, Courland, the two Serbian Kingdoms, and bits of the Dobrudja and Wallachia,’ would show conspicuously on the map. But if Germany formed a close federation with Austria-Hungary, retained its hold upon Bulgaria and developed its influence upon Turkey into a virtual dominion, a great new Power would have come into existence, of which the map might show nothing.” The programmes of “Berlin-Bagdad” and “World-power” are of course not irreconcilable; the one is the complement of the other. Some had hoped to attain the whole at one fell swoop, others would have been genuinely content to stop short at the part, but almost all agree to-day that the final stage must at least be postponed. Surely the facts and quotations so ably marshalled in these pages sufficiently serve to refute the suggestion that “Germany is still impelled more by the craving for power in the abstract than by any clear idea of what it wants.” The idea of a land route through vassal European and Asiatic States, leading to a central African Empire stocked with the raw materials which are needed for ‘economic self-sufficiency,’ is enough to fire the dullest imagination.

Mr. Bevan's sanity of judgment is nowhere more in evidence than in the verdict on Bethmann-Hollweg. “There is in certain quarters in England a tendency to regard the Chancellor as standing for moderation and moral principle against the German Jingoism. The facts seem to show that he is indeed a man who is sensible both of the dangers involved in great adventures and of the moral aspect of things. This kind of sensibility, however, if it is not powerful enough to restrain people from a wrong course of action, is apt simply to make their action hesitating and unhandy. And this apparently is what has happened in the case of the Chancellor.” In him, indeed, there is nothing of Luther's *Pecca Fortiter*, and on the moral question there was no difference between Bethmann-Hollweg and the Jingo.

Mr. Bevan's psychology is sound. The average Briton's feeling towards the German to-day is not so much one of *Hass* as of *Ekel*—not the feeling of the Roman for the Hun, but of the characters in Mr. Wells's novel for the unwelcome Martians. For, in one sense, the word “Hun” is a misnomer. If Germany's misdeeds were but the work of men whose sudden passions had turned them into savages, we should know that their frenzy will pass, as that of other wrongdoers in all ages and countries. What fills us with misgiving is the very marvel of their discipline, the knowledge that their excesses have been committed, not in defiance of orders, but definitely by order. Such wholesale, scientific outrage is a new factor in human history.

R. W. S.-W.

NOTES

Petrograd and the Galician Front

The immediate cause of the riots in Petrograd was the initial success of the Russian offensive. A Government that was strong enough to renew the offensive had to show itself able to govern Petrograd. The very fact that the blow came when it did was, indeed, a striking tribute to the success of the offensive and the great work that Mr. Kerenski has accomplished. It was obvious to the Anarchists and Extremists that the changed attitude in the army would soon mean a changed attitude in Petrograd, and it was the work of German agents to persuade those whom they had duped that the moment had arrived to overturn the Government.

The signal for the riots was the resignation of the Cadet Ministers. No doubt the chances of a political crisis had been carefully watched. It was the one thing that Mr. Kerenski had hoped to avoid while the offensive was still in its initial stages. The order was Galicia first and then Petrograd. Once order was restored in the army in Galicia it would not be long before the same order was restored in Petrograd. Sooner or later the Government would have to put down the enemies of all government. Where Mr. Kerenski differed from the Cadets was in his choice of the moment for strong action, and, when the latter precipitated the crisis, he hurried back from the front, describing their action as a stab in the back.

The Petrograd riots may yet prove a blessing in disguise. A conflict could not have been avoided much longer, and, now that it has come, it has revealed the strength of the Government. In Petrograd Russia has won a victory over her enemies, and the lessons of this victory will be taken to heart. With Kerenski as Prime Minister and Tseretelli as his right-hand man we may look for greater decision in dealing with the Extremists, and we trust that the Council of Workmen's and Soldiers' Delegates will follow suit. It is essential that the latter should shake themselves free of the paralysing influence of the Leninites and join Kerenski in support of his doctrine that the real liberty, which must be vindicated at all costs, can only come through self-discipline and self-sacrifice.

Germany has now openly shown her cynical contempt for the Russian Revolution. She has sown disorder in Petrograd, and, profiting by Russia's internal troubles, she has attacked in full force in Galicia. We trust that her well-laid plans will prove disastrous to her, for they are based on contempt, not understanding, of the Russian people.

"We will never be Prussian"

Many inquiries have reached us as to the precise nature of the change made in the popular version of the Luxemburg national song, as given on the cover and in M. Destrée's article two weeks ago. The song referred to, "De Feier won" ("The Fire Engine"), ends with the burden: "Wei mir esou zefriede sin" ("How satisfied we are"). The public mostly sing: "Mer welle jo keng Preise gin" ("We don't want to become Prussians").

The New Europe

Vol. IV., No. 42

[REGISTERED FOR TRANSMISSION AT
THE INLAND NEWSPAPER RATE.]

2 August 1917

Our Italian Guest

THE march of events is carrying the war more and more out of the purely military setting of the past three years into a political atmosphere. In every country restless movements of popular opinion, stirred by the most diverse causes, are beginning to claim the attention of statesmen: and the principal phenomena in the European horizon are no longer this offensive or that, but gigantic political interrogations about the future. The fog of war is clearing: and the lifting veil discloses great streams of tendency all flowing towards one goal. Throughout Western Europe, in Russia, in the Near East, even in the Far East, great forces of popular feeling have been released and are pushing the world forward to new trials and new opportunities. In common with them the genuine popular movements of Central Europe tend in the same direction; and, given time, will not fail to create a large transformation of political habit. For the moment, however, we must leave the uneasy ferment in Germany and Austria to work out its appointed task of undermining the foundations of autocratic authority and so preparing for a more liberal future. He would be a blind leader of men who pretended that, in either of these two enemy countries, the liberalising process has gone far enough to justify democratic hopes. It has not: and we shall do most to assist it if we pursue our course towards *la Victoire Intégrale* and make quite sure that, when it comes, it shall not only be *intégrale* but also *sans tache*. Military pressure is one force making for German reform: the unmistakable sincerity of our democratic professions is another, and probably the stronger of the two. And we must see to it that the enemy has no excuse for imputing to us illiberal or rapacious designs.

We hope that the British Government will give these considerations an ever-increasing weight in its counsels. As conference succeeds conference—first on Salonica and all the problems that cluster round it, then on War Aims, and so on, till we come to the very threshold of peace itself—the vital importance of a firm grasp of principle becomes daily

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more evident. And we believe it is no mere self-delusion which enables us to see in recent official declarations on Balkan questions welcome evidence of a dawning wisdom. The Corfu Agreement between the Serbian Government and the Yugoslav leaders, the steady improvement in the Greek situation, and the growing desire in Italy for a just and lasting Adriatic settlement, all point in the right direction. And at this very moment London has a guest in her midst whose visit, if wisely used, may prove to be the beginning of a new Mediterranean *rapprochement* in which the three Great Powers concerned, with *all* their lesser friends and allies, will play appropriate and congenial parts.

Baron Sidney Sonnino, twice Premier and (since November 1914) Foreign Minister of Italy, is now in London. Throughout the war we have received no more welcome guest. Nor has any statesman among our Allies ever arrived at a moment more opportune for fruitful counsel. In character he is congenial; indeed, his very nearness to us arises from that strong Anglo-Saxon strain in his blood which makes him, perhaps, less *espansivo* than his Italian compatriots expect in their political chiefs. His whole outlook on public affairs proves to us that he is "a man to go tiger shooting with"; and if he keeps his own counsel, even to taciturnity, he also keeps his word. There will be no difficulty in reaching a frank agreement with him, for he never forgets the pregnant motto inscribed on the great walnut beam of his library in Rome—*Aliis si licet tibi non licet*. He has never cut a coat without first measuring the cloth; and if in one recent stroke of policy he acted too precipitately on his own initiative, we know the provocation that prompted him, and we are only all the more eager on that account to remove its cause. The opportunity offered by his presence in London is not to be missed. There are outstanding questions in the Mediterranean, the Adriatic, and in Asia Minor, which can only be settled by a frank interchange of views. The Adriatic problem, in particular, is even more critical than it has ever been since Italy entered the war; and the Pašić-Trumbić Agreement has still further ripened it. We are firmly convinced that the Italo-Yugoslav problem can be solved by statesmanship and good-will.

* * For a portrait of Baron Sonnino, see THE NEW EUROPE, No. 10.

Recent Montenegrin History

THE Great War has placed the dynastic principle on its trial. In our own country and in Italy the Royal Houses have identified themselves, even more closely than before the war, with the aspirations of their peoples, while in Belgium and Serbia King Albert and Prince Alexander have become the symbols of democratic kingship. But, by an irony of fate, our greatest and our smallest ally present us with the reverse of the medal. The world knows how the House of Romanov came to an end; and, in the present article, we give our readers a glimpse of the dynastic straits to which King Nicholas has reduced himself and his family by a long course of intrigue.

Mystery still surrounds the collapse of Montenegro in the autumn of 1915; but it is now known that the King's third son, Prince Peter, had a secret meeting at Budva in Dalmatia in May of that year, with the former Austro-Hungarian Military Attaché, Colonel Hupka; that telephonic communication was at times maintained between Cetinje and Cattaro; that by the King's orders the Montenegrin army remained absolutely inactive for many months, and that General Janković, the Serbian General sent to Cetinje at the Tsar's instance, and his successor, Colonel Pešić, were hampered at every turn; that an agent of Prince Danilo negotiated in Switzerland with an agent of the Central Powers for a separate peace during the Bulgarian onslaught; that Prince Peter, on his father's orders, withdrew the Montenegrin troops from the key-position of Mount Lovćen at the critical moment and allowed the Austrians to enter almost unopposed; and that the King, disregarding the unanimous resolution of his Parliament to fight to the end, telegraphed to the Emperor Francis Joseph and Baron Burián. It was only the invading Austrian general's excessive conditions, and the stern attitude of his own officers, that finally determined King Nicholas to retire to Medua and so to Italy—the bulk of his army having meanwhile been caught helplessly in a trap. But as is well known, Prince Mirko was left behind to reinsure Montenegro with the Central Powers.

Once established in France, King Nicholas sought to retrieve his fortunes by offering the post of Premier to

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Mr. Andrew Radović (*see* THE NEW EUROPE, No. 19), whose record as a patriot and a democrat is known to every Southern Slav. Subsequent events are related below.

On 18 August Mr. Radović presented a Memorandum to King Nicholas in the following terms:—

“ The events now taking place in the various theatres of war provide me, as a devoted subject, with the occasion for drawing Your Majesty’s attention to the future destinies of our country. There is no longer any doubt as to the complete victory of our Allies, which will lead to the final fall of the Turkish Empire in Europe, the defeat of Austria-Hungary and the liberation and union of the Serbian people. More than any other people, it has paid with its blood for its deliverance, which will probably be followed by that of the Croats and Slovenes, who, in agreement with the Serbs, aim at creating a Jugoslav State. This idea represents the ideal of a whole people. . . . He who seeks to combat the movement will sooner or later be vanquished, for he will find himself confronted by a torrent which carries away everything in its path. It is conceivable that, solely out of regard for the august person of Your Majesty, Montenegro might be re-established, while the other Jugoslav territories formed a State under the sceptre of the Karageorgevitch. In the most favourable circumstances Montenegro would expand in Herzegovina as far as the Narenta, and would form, with Ragusa, the Bocche di Cattaro and Skutari, a State of about a million inhabitants. This country is peopled by the most energetic element to be found among the Serbs, but as its richness does not correspond to the spirit and enterprise of the people, discontent has sprung up, and from day to day the desire for union for its brethren of prosperous Serbia and Bosnia increases.

“ After this war it will be very difficult to govern in all countries. Democracy will become dangerous, and will shatter like a torrent all obstacles in its way. The statesmen will be faced by the heavy task of guiding it prudently, in order to prevent overflow and upheaval. There is no doubt that the events which took place in our country before and after the catastrophe will render Montenegro more difficult to govern than any other State; to this must be added the recent internment of the Montenegrins, and the famine to which a large part of our unhappy population will inevitably succumb. At the best, financial union will have to be followed by military and political union with Serbia or the Jugoslav State. But despite this imperious necessity, excited spirits in the two Serb States will leave no means untried to produce union, so that they would become the theatre of every kind of intrigue, such as our common enemies would encourage. Instead of the peace and well-being so amply merited by the Serbian people after so many sacrifices, discord and trouble would prevail. The issue of such a situation can easily be foreseen, especially *after the reign of Your Majesty*. You would find it impossible to accept the exorbitant demands of democracy, and would end, amid discontent, a reign which, especially during the

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first forty-five years, has been rich in glory. Recent events, however, need to be effaced by a striking act such as would worthily crown Your Majesty's reign.

"Montenegro has, for many centuries, been the intrepid champion of Serbian liberty and the Slav vanguard towards the West. The day when, with God's help, the Yugoslav lands are liberated, this task will have been gloriously achieved. Your Majesty's great ancestor, the greatest of Serbian poets, the Prince Bishop of Montenegro, Peter Petrović-Njegoš, offered to the Ban Jelačić, a Croat and a Catholic, to place himself at the head of the Yugoslav State. Your predecessor, Prince Danilo, placed his throne at the disposal of Prince Michael, solely in order to realise union of the Serbs.

"Your Majesty in your youth gave free play to your patriotic sentiments in the hymn, 'Onamo, Onamo,' so dear to all Serbs, and in your works, 'The Empress of the Balkans' and 'The Poet and the Vila.' Your Majesty has kindled the national conscience of our people and inspired it with the sacred idea of realising the solemn vow of every Serb. The happy moment has come for Your Majesty to realise this dream, and to leave behind you one of the proudest names in Serbian history. . . .

"Your Majesty should become the champion of a strong and compact Yugoslav State, in which the Serbs, Croats and Slovenes would enter, and perhaps, later on, even the Bulgars, as an autonomous unit. This State should be formed on the model of Italy, with equality of all its members. The Croats are nearer to the Serbs than were the Piedmontese to the Neapolitans: both are more akin to the Slovenes than the Piedmontese to the Sicilians. Until a common code has been drawn up, the various provinces must retain their present legislation. The differences between them will soon be smoothed over, as in Italy. The roughness of the Serbs of Serbia and Montenegro will be toned down by the culture and love of order of the Serbs, Croats and Slovenes of the Habsburg Monarchy. The Croats cannot wish for an independent Croatia, since it would be under the tutelage of Hungary. A partition of Croatia, Bosnia, Serbia, Dalmatia and Montenegro into autonomous States would not suit the Croats, for then they would be in a minority everywhere save in Croatia. In the other event, the Croats, united with a large number of Orthodox Serbs, would gradually free themselves from the undue influence of their clergy, and would become, even in Russian eyes, patriotic Slavs. We, too, owe in great part to our religion the fact of having kept intact for centuries the conscience of our people, as also to the constant help of our powerful protectress, Russia, who has always sought the liberation of our people, alike for national and religious reasons.

"An independent Croatia, probably weakened by losing one fraction to Italy and another to greater Serbia, would, as a Catholic State, be under the influence of Vienna and Budapest, and thus lost to Russia, the Southern Slavs and the Allies. France and England appear to share this view, and many Russians also fear that the Croats, as Catholics, might have a bad religious influence

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on the Orthodox Serbs, though this fear has no foundation. On the other hand, many Italians consider so great a Slav State as dangerous to their interests, though, in reality, as the great Italian, Mazzini, maintained, it would be the natural ally of the Latin kingdom and the best outlet for its products."

The Memorandum goes on to point out that union must be followed by the fusion of the two Serb dynasties, which is rendered easier by the fact that the Prince-Regent of Serbia is also the grandson of King Nicholas. It is therefore suggested that Kings Nicholas and Peter should both abdicate in favour of Prince Alexander, and that the succession to the throne of the united State should be assigned after him to Prince Danilo of Montenegro, and then alternately to the heirs of the two dynasties. The proper procedure would, it is added, be for King Nicholas and his heir to notify to the Tsar their acceptance of these proposals, and then to conclude a formal treaty to that effect with the Serbian Government. The Montenegrin people would, after the war, be given an opportunity of ratifying the decision on a basis of universal suffrage. "There is not a Serb and in general not a Slav who would not welcome with enthusiasm so momentous a step on the part of Your Majesty, who, in the history of the Serbian people, would become the rival in glory of the Emperor Dušan . . ."

These proposals were received with apparent approval by King Nicholas last summer, but the actual decision was continually postponed. At last Mr. Radović, finding that a visit paid by the King to Italy in the autumn had increased his tendency to evade the issue, presented a second Memorandum on 11 January, 1917, couched in even more explicit terms than the first. The essential passage in this document runs as follows:—

"From the fall of the Serbian Empire [1389] to the present day, the ideal of the whole Serbian people has been union. Whenever this has appeared possible, we have seen Serbian monarchs who were ready to make sacrifices for the sake of unity. Never since Kosovo have we been so near to the realisation of this ideal. . . .

"If, unhappily, Montenegro is not capable, at this decisive moment, of offering effective aid in the struggle to realise an ideal which it has held for five centuries, Your Majesty and Your Government have none the less the duty to do all that is possible in this direction. . . . But it is clear that the most difficult question to regulate is the dynastic question, which alone—at least, in the view of us Serbs—could interfere with the idea of unification.

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“Dynasties which only considered their own private interests might evoke difficulties, and would, by doing so, incur grave responsibility. Holding as I do the view that this is the only road to safety and union for all Serbs and even Jugoslavs, I take the liberty of begging Your Majesty to send an autograph letter to H.M. the Emperor of Russia, declaring your willingness to take, as soon as possible, the necessary measures for reaching an accord with the Sovereign and Government of the kingdom of our brothers of Serbia, and also with the representatives of the other Yugoslav countries, in order to decide our unification and lay its foundations.”

Mr. Radović's proposals were declined by King Nicholas, on the pretext that the time was not yet ripe, and accordingly the Cabinet resigned. As THE NEW EUROPE pointed out soon afterwards, the Tsar signified his disapproval of the King's separatist intrigue by conferring upon Mr. Radović the Order of the White Eagle. He was succeeded as Premier by General Matanović, while Foreign Affairs were entrusted to Mr. Tomanović, the son of a former Premier, and Finance to Mr. Ilić, a Serb advocate from Croatia, and only recently a Montenegrin subject. It might have been expected that men who owed their position entirely to the King's personal favour could be relied upon to fulfil his behests, but there are limits beyond which men of honour cannot be induced to go. Annoyed at the activity of the Montenegrin Committee of Union, founded by Mr. Radović and other prominent exiles, the King insisted that his Government should address a Note to the Allies, disavowing the Committee and declaring that “the Montenegrins continue to regard the Montenegrin Government as the sole representative of their interests.” To this demand General Matanović refused the assent of his Government in the following terms:—

“The alliance gives us rights, but also imposes upon us duties. . . . The principle of nationality is the basis of our struggle against the Central Empires, the formula for solving the future constellation of Europe. . . . We unhappily are unable to fulfil our military duties, but we can, and are bound to, remain inalienably faithful to the great principle for which our best sons have shed their blood. To accept this Note, which officially proclaims separatism *pur et simple* for one part of our people, would be to disavow the alliance, to break the last thread which binds us to it, and force on a rupture of diplomatic relations.

“The demobilisation of the Montenegrin army in January, 1916, lost us the friendship of Great Britain and aroused the suspicions of the other Allies, and even of our Serbian brethren. The political

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catastrophe which would be the infallible result of this Note would mean the definite ruin of our country.

"The reasons which serve as basis for the Government's policy are as follows: The *status quo* is no longer possible in the Balkans. The national conscience is awake and expanding in all sections of our nation. *The idea of Union has become the faith, the religion, of the masses.* This faith has been created through the centuries by thousands of national martyrs. . . . To-day it only depends upon the attitude and skill of our popular representatives whether our national problem is to be solved by normal and legal means. For the separation of any section of our people would necessarily, as an anti-national reaction, lead to a revolution such as might efface the traces of the past."

General Matanović concluded by laying great stress upon the need for "a sincere and profound entente with Serbia," and for identifying the Montenegrin dynasty with the national ideal.

Not merely did this Memorandum fail to evoke any satisfactory reply, but a fresh crisis was produced by King Nicholas's action in telegraphing on 24 May to the King of Italy in the following terms:—

"I am happy to learn of the glorious successes obtained by your heroic army, to which my admiration and enthusiasm go out. Greeting with all my heart its supreme chief, I hope that this same hand which is liberating Italian lands will soon be stretched out towards my unhappy mountaineers."

The compliments to Italian prowess, altogether unexceptionable in themselves, were interpreted by the whole of Slav public opinion, and unquestionably intended by the King himself, as a direct slight to Serbia and a peculiarly insidious bid for Italy's aid in frustrating Jugoslav unity. Fortunately, the record of King Nicholas is sufficiently well known in Rome to make the Consulta chary of giving more than a perfunctory support to the inveterate Balkan intriguer. His action, however, rendered a Cabinet crisis inevitable, and on 5 June General Matanović addressed a fresh Memorandum to the King, explaining his reasons for accepting office last winter and for now resigning.

"The solution put forward by the late Premier, in favour of the union of the dynasties and alternative reigns, seemed to me very complicated, unrealisable and calculated to give rise to serious consequences. At that time I agreed with the opportunists, believing that this great work would have to be realised in the most advantageous way possible and with the least possible injury to existing

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historical foundations. For the rest, I was in entire agreement with my predecessors. The great events which are shaking the world open a new era in human history. Our people is also engulfed in the chaos of events. . . . Montenegro could not escape the general movement; and on the day when the barriers separating it for centuries from its blood brothers—and particularly from Serbia—had fallen, the problem of reconstructing the Serbian State had arisen of itself. The new situation demanded a new form of State; separatism, being in conflict with the spirit of the age, became impossible for the future."

The Government, he continued, accepted office on the understanding that a project of union should be prepared, ready to submit to Parliament for approval after the restoration of peace. More than once he asked the King's permission to proceed with the draft, but met first with evasion and on 15 May with a definite refusal.

"The annoying consequences of this have robbed us of the little prestige which was left to us: for Your Majesty's refusal could only be interpreted in competent quarters as hesitation to pronounce openly on a question of international policy which divides the world into two opposite camps. *Besides, Your Majesty had seen fit to raise great and delicate political questions whose solution was contrary not only to the spirit of the Government programme, but also to the constitution of Montenegro.*"

The telegram to the King of Italy, the Premier concluded, was a denial of the Yugoslav ideal, such as the Government could not ignore, the more so as its despatch without the knowledge of the Government was quite unconstitutional. General Matanović and his colleagues thus saw no alternative but to resign.

Mr. Ilić went even further. In his letter of resignation he flatly accused the king of acting "in flagrant contradiction to the programme of the Government," and added that in his opinion "the action of T.R.H. the Princes is not in accord with the interests of the Royal House, with the obligations towards the Allies, and with the well-being and ideal of the nation." He even expressed the fear that "the end may be a collapse of the dynasty's prestige," and concluded by demanding in so many words that "the Petrović dynasty should abdicate in favour of H.M. the King of Serbia," as "the sole conceivable means of avoiding a catastrophe." He not unnaturally added that his letter might be treated as an act of resignation.

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This dramatic action may be taken as a moral boycott against the dynasty on the part of all Montenegrins of any political standing. The new Premier, Mr. Eugene Popović, an old man of 72, is a native of Dalmatia, but has for most of his life been an Italian subject, and was for many years Montenegrin Consul-General in Rome. If he is scarcely known to his nominal compatriots, his colleagues are entirely unknown and subordinate officials, who have never played any political rôle and are mere creatures of the King. The most striking proof of the discredit which he has brought upon himself is the refusal of the Allies to admit his representative to the recent Conference in Paris. Disregarding all hints, King Nicholas was unwise enough to give to the Press a statement to the effect that Mr. Popović was the Montenegrin delegate to the Conference, who none the less remained outside.

Lord Robert Cecil and the Case of Serbia

DURING the debate on the Vote of Credit in the House of Commons (24 July), the Minister of Blockade (Lord Robert Cecil), replying on behalf of the Government to the debate on foreign affairs, and, in particular, to certain criticisms of our Balkan and Central European policy, used language which was at once more precise and more promising than is usual in the utterances of the Front Bench. After declaring that it was a mere platitude to say that Austria was not our chief enemy—who ever said she was?—and that it was calumnious even to say that the Government was lukewarm towards Serbia, he proceeded: "Something was said by two speakers about Alsace-Lorraine. As far as that goes, it will be for the French to say what they desire there, and for this country to back up the French in what they desire. I will not go through all the others of our Allies—there are a good many of them—but the principle will be equally true in the case of all and *particularly in the case of Serbia*. We are absolutely pledged, as I have already said, to full restoration and reparation. When the hon. Member goes on to discuss how far we accept the doctrine of the Jugoslav movement, I admit that is a point on which it is dangerous to go further than the position we occupied when the

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Government made their reply to Mr. Wilson's Note. They then said that they were there to liberate Slav nationalities, among others, who were oppressed and dominated by other races from whom they desired to be free. We did not go any further than that. We did not pledge ourselves to the particular form of liberation which we should advocate at the Peace Conference when it came off. I am certainly not in a position to go further than the Government then went in that considered utterance which they then made."

Our readers, who are aware of the critical position of Serbian affairs, will not miss the significance of Lord Robert Cecil's emphasis on "the case of Serbia." In view of the policy of the Serbian Government, which represents a most welcome understanding with the Jugoslavs of Austria, we must express our satisfaction that the spokesman of the British Foreign Office should have used such words in the House of Commons. They imply a true conception of Balkan policy: and, though Lord Robert Cecil naturally refrained from pledging himself to any "particular form of liberation," they mark a distinct stage in our approach to a good settlement. Much remains to be done in order to translate them into practical form: and we can only express the hope that the Balkan Conference in Paris may prove to be fruitful of some such result.

The following is the text of the joint declaration by the Serbian Government and the Southern Slav Committee:—

"The authorised representatives of the Serbs, Croats, and Slovenes, recognising that the desire of our people is to free itself from all foreign yoke, and to constitute itself in an independent National State, agree in declaring that this State must be founded on the following principles:—

"(1) The State of the Serbs, Croats, and Slovenes, who are also known as Southern Slavs, or Jugoslavs, will be a free and independent Kingdom with indivisible territory and unity of allegiance. It will be a constitutional, democratic, and Parliamentary Monarchy, under the Karageorgevitch Dynasty, which has always shared the feelings of the nation and has placed the national will above all else.

"(2) This State will be named 'the Kingdom of the Serbs, Croats, and Slovenes,' and the style of the Sovereign will be 'King of the Serbs, Croats, and Slovenes.' The State will have a single coat of arms, a single flag, and a single crown, its emblems being composed of the present existing emblems.

"(3) The special Serb, Croat, and Slovene flags and coats of arms may be freely hoisted and used.

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" (4) The three national denominations will be equal before the law, and may be freely used in public life.

" (5) The two alphabets, Cyrillic and Latin, will also rank equally throughout the Kingdom.

" (6) All recognised religions shall be exercised freely and publicly, and in particular the Orthodox, Roman Catholic, and Musulman creeds, which are chiefly professed by our people, will be equal and will have the same rights in regard to the State.

" (7) The calendar shall be unified as soon as possible.

" (8) The territory of the Kingdom will include all territory compactly inhabited by our people, and cannot be mutilated without attain to the vital interests of the community. Our nation demands nothing that belongs to others, but only what is its own. It desires freedom and unity. Therefore, it refuses consciously and firmly all partial solutions of the problem of its deliverance from Austro-Hungarian domination, and of union with Serbia and Montenegro in a State forming an indivisible whole.

" (9) In the interests of freedom and of the equal rights of all nations, the Adriatic Sea shall be free and open to all.

" (10) All citizens shall be equal and enjoy the same rights towards the State and before the law.

" (11) Deputies to the National Parliament shall be elected by universal suffrage, with equal direct and secret ballot.

" (12) The Constitution, to be established after the conclusion of peace by a Constituent Assembly elected by universal suffrage, will be the basis of the life of the State. It will create the possibility of organising local autonomies. It will come into force after receiving Royal sanction. The nation thus unified would form a State of some 12,000,000 inhabitants, which would be a powerful bulwark against German aggression and an inseparable ally of all civilised States and peoples.

NIKOLA PAŠIĆ,

Premier and Foreign Minister of the Kingdom of Serbia.

DR. ANTE TRUMBIĆ,

President of the Southern Slav Committee.

" Corfu, 7/20 July, 1917."

The Building of Greater Roumania : (II)

IN Roumania a large proportion of the soil belonged, during the early middle ages, to free peasant proprietors. The continual menace of foreign and civil war gradually led these farmers to choose feudal lords, whose tenants or serfs they thus became. In compensation, the peasants at least secured some measure of protection, and their lord took on himself the satisfaction of the prince's tax-collectors, and later on, those of his Turkish suzerain. By the end of the 16th century most of the land was in the hands either of these *boeri*

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(boyars) or of ecclesiastical and other corporations. Though a serf, the peasant was, on the whole, not worse treated than elsewhere in Europe. The 18th century, however, which saw the elevation of foreign princes to the thrones of Wallachia and Moldavia (the so-called Phanariots, or Greeks of Constantinople), witnessed also an increasing oppression of the peasants at their hands. The revolt of the peasant-born Tudor Vladimirescu in 1821 led to a return to the series of native Roumanian princes. But in the *Réglement Organique*, drawn up by Count Kiseljev, during the Russian occupation of 1829-1834, nothing was done to emancipate the peasants. In spite of the hopes of 1848 the agrarian question remained unsolved till the accession of Alexander John Cuza as Prince of the United Principalities in 1859. Cuza—a benevolent despot with a passion for sweeping reforms—after endless controversies with the obstinately conservative boyars, suddenly dissolved Parliament and promulgated new agrarian and franchise reforms by plebiscite. The peasant suddenly found himself both a voter (though his influence could only be exercised through one of the four electoral colleges which chose the deputies) and a landed proprietor. For the next fifty years his small freehold was secured to him inalienably for a small annual payment to the State. And yet the change was not all it promised to be. The *boer* at once turned, in most cases, from a despotic, but often benevolent, master, into a threatening neighbour. The peasant lost his privilege of pasturage on his lord's lands. He could not pay the State taxes or meet his debts. There was no capital behind him—beyond spasmodic and inadequate charitable advances on the part of the State—to see him over bad seasons. He had neither the means nor the brains to increase his farm's production by scientific methods. Moreover, various causes gradually made what had been possibly an adequate allotment of land in 1864 quite inadequate twenty years later. Nor was the peasant, in practice, perfectly free. Financial need in many cases—and where that failed, actual legislation—soon forced the peasant once again into the position of day labourer, and that to a master who no longer felt even a feudal interest in him, and who, as often as not, lived most of the year in Bucarest or abroad, leaving his estates in the hands of unscrupulous agents, or often

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mortgaging them, in Moldavia to Jewish, in Wallachia to Greek and Bulgar, financiers.

Something was, indeed, done by the State for the peasant, but not enough. After the Turkish war, lands were granted to some 40,000 soldiers' families out of the State domains. The law of 1872, forcing the peasant to work on the boyars' estates, was modified ten years later by a law securing him at least two free days a week for his own work. Peasants' banks were opened, and towards the end of the '90's Mr. Aurelian's Liberal Government planned, but did not succeed in founding, a central Casa Rurală to assist the peasants with advances. Politically, the peasants' influence was nil, and the new Constitution of 1884, which reduced the four electoral colleges to three, confined the illiterate (the majority of the peasants) to an indirect share in the election of the third college. Discontent increased everywhere. In 1888 there was a serious peasants' revolt, which required military suppression. In 1907 there was a much more serious outbreak, which, had the peasants possessed capable leaders, might have shaken the whole structure of the State. Such events showed agrarian reform to be inevitable.

Towards the end of 1913, Mr. Brătianu's National Liberal Government succeeded the Conservative Coalition of the late Mr. Măiorescu, who had successfully conducted the Peace Conference of Bucarest. Mr. Brătianu had pledged himself before election to franchise and agrarian reform. In any case, the 50 years' duration of the settlement of 1864 was almost over. But the outbreak of the European War was the cause or excuse (for there was much opposition on the part of both Liberal and Conservative politicians) for a further postponement. Nothing was done from August 1914 to August 1916. Then Roumania herself entered the war for national union and—freedom. The reformers had always realised that intervention in the war would mean not only the liberation of the oppressed Roumans of Austria-Hungary, but the reform of an unjust out-of-date system in Roumania itself. The indomitable, self-reliant Rouman peasants of Transylvania and Hungary, who had maintained their churches, schools, banks, and newspapers against all the unjust encroachments of the Magyar oligarchy, would introduce a new atmosphere of democracy into the united kingdom.

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The old *boer* Conservative leader, Nicolae Filipescu, expressed himself as content to accept universal suffrage and the new democracy which the war must involve. For similar reasons—just as much as from Germanophil sentiment—the reactionary elements in Roumania were against war. “There is no Transylvanian question,” Mr. Marghiloman declared last December to the Budapest *Világ*. Needless to say—like his fellow-senator, Gr. G. Cantacuzino, ex-Prime Minister, and one of the greatest landholders and ultra-Conservatives in Roumania—Mr. Marghiloman has remained behind in Bucarest. Reform was promised in King Ferdinand’s words to Parliament: “The peasant soldiers’ valour gives them still stronger rights to the soil they have been defending, and imposes on us more strongly than ever the duty of carrying through when the war is over the agrarian and electoral reforms on the basis of which this representative assembly was elected.” These words were spoken on 22 December, 1916, when the defeated but undismayed representatives of the nation had met again in the Moldavian capital. Three months later the Russian Revolution re-kindled Europe’s flagging ideals and infected Roumania with its enthusiasm. Reform could no longer be postponed. When Parliament re-assembled at the end of May, it at once resolved itself into a Constituent Assembly, and the Government hastened to submit to the two Chambers a Bill transforming the whole political structure of the State.

The reforms are of a triple character—agrarian, electoral, and administrative:—(1) The land grants of 1864 and 1878 are greatly augmented, with the result that some 2,000,000 hectares (5,000,000 acres) come into the peasants’ hands. King Ferdinand set a magnificent example by handing over *all* the Crown lands for division among the peasants; and there is to be a similar partition of State, municipal, and corporation estates. Finally, the big landholders are to be expropriated on a sliding scale, starting from the largest and continuing till every peasant soldier (for the beneficiaries are to be confined to those—the vast majority of the population—who have served their country in the war) has received his full 5 hectares (12 acres) of land, the Roumanian equivalent of our “three acres and a cow.” (2) The three electoral colleges for the Chamber and the two for the Senate are

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abolished. Equal and direct franchise is granted to all Roumanian male subjects who have reached 21 years of age, and the number of *direct* voters is thus increased from about 180,000 to about 1,250,000. Finally, administrative reforms—notably the introduction of immovability of officials—are promised, as is the clean sweep of the whole system of electoral and financial corruption which has poisoned Roumanian political life.

The reforms were brought forward in the Chamber at the beginning of June, and evoked opposition at once from the extreme Right and extreme Left. It would have been too much to expect that all the big landed proprietors—mainly, though not entirely, adherents of the Conservative Party—should show much enthusiasm for a measure which was to end for ever their age-long control. On the whole, however, they showed a most praiseworthy self-sacrifice. Nothing in their life as boyars, we might say, became them like the leaving of it. It is true that many of the reactionary leaders have remained behind in Wallachia under German occupation—among them 26 deputies and 21 senators (including four Wallachian bishops). Still the big landlords were well represented at the debate in both Houses. Many of them, while regretting the passing of the old order, frankly admitted the necessity for the change. Among those who spoke and voted in the Chamber for the reforms were big landlords like MM. Basarab Brâncoveanu, Iliescu-Olt, Mihai Cantacuzino, D. Bogdan, and Ioan Ghica. Only a tiny handful of ultra-Conservatives in the Senate and the Chamber frankly attacked the Bill from a reactionary standpoint. The second reading of the Bill was passed on June 13/26 by 129 votes to 2 (Cuza and Cincu). Of the 54 other members of the Chamber, 26 were in enemy occupied territory, 7 away on leave, 11 absent for various reasons, and 10 deliberately abstained from voting.

These 10 deputies constitute the new "Labour Party," which came into existence last May, under the influence of the Russian Revolution. Largely composed of dissidents from the Liberal Party, it is under the leadership of men of various types, like Mr. G. Diamandy, diplomatist and journalist; Dr. N. Lupu, the eminent bacteriologist; Messrs. Rădulescu, Bazilescu, Trancu-Iași, and others. From its first appearance in the Chamber it demanded enquiries into the

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abuses of the old *régime*, and refused all confidence to a Government, which it charged with connivance. Its programme included far more drastic reforms than those outlined by the Government. In spite of the party Press's attacks on these reformers, there is no reason to suppose that the majority of them are swayed by anything but the highest ideals. They have pronounced themselves in favour of the war and a *victoire intégrale*. They resent the rôle which the Bulgar-Roumanian Ivan Rakovski has been allowed to assume as representative of the Roumanian democracy. They lack tact and political wisdom, but they deserve respect. In the course of the debate they demanded complete expropriation of the landlords, and the creation of 1,000,000 peasant proprietors, and the nationalisation of the great industrial concerns of the country (which the Liberal Party regards as its preserve). Finally, they announced that, rather than block the reforms, they would abstain from voting on the second reading, but would subsequently introduce amendments in accordance with their political views.

None of their amendments, however, were carried. Accordingly on 14/27 June, when the Bill, as amended (very slightly), was put to the final verdict of the Chamber they recorded their vote against it. The figures on this historic occasion are interesting: For the Bill, 130; against, 14 (10 Labour Party and 4 Conservatives); abstained, 1 (Mr. Bazilescu); absent, 39. Next day the Bill was taken to the Senate, and there, on June 21/July 4, passed its final reading. 33 senators were absent (25 in Wallachia); of the 84 present, 79 voted for and 5 against. Of these 5 two (Messrs. Argetoianu and Grădişteanu) are old enemies and critics of Mr. Brătianu, while politically their views are ultra-Conservative.

Mr. Grădişteanu can congratulate himself on provoking a Cabinet crisis. In the next debate after the passing of the Reform Bill he accused the Prime Minister of being criminally responsible for Roumania's unpreparedness for war and toleration of incapable, corrupt and traitorous persons in the Army and Civil Service. Mr. Brătianu made a dignified if not completely convincing reply. His supporters, however, would not let the matter drop there, but insisted on a vote of confidence in Mr. Brătianu's past administration. Before this

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was put, Mr. Take Ionescu protested that it was impossible for himself and his supporters to vote for this motion, as they could take no responsibility for Mr. Brătianu's policy prior to the formation of the Coalition Cabinet last December. The motion was accordingly carried unanimously by the 54 Liberals present, Mr. Take Ionescu and 9 other Conservatives abstaining from voting.

This brought matters to a climax. Mr. Take Ionescu has been naturally restive at the disproportionate amount of power reserved in a National Government to Mr. Brătianu (who is both Premier and Minister of Foreign Affairs), his brother Vintilă (Minister of War), and his supporters, Messrs. Constantinescu (Interior), Anţonescu (Finance), and Duca (Education)—not to speak of his other Liberal colleagues. The Conservatives were certainly not allowed their fair share of influence. The four Conservative Ministers—Take Ionescu (without portfolio), Mihai Cantacuzino (Justice), Greceanu (Public Works) and Dr. Istrati (Industry)—at once tendered their resignations to the King, and refused to return unless on terms which assured them their proper weight in the National Government. King Ferdinand was anxious to secure this, but naturally unwilling to lose the Prime Minister with whom he has worked so long. The Cabinet crisis lasted some three weeks. Now that it is over it would be fruitless to explore it further. We note that Mr. Brătianu remains both Prime Minister (in view of his large majority in both Houses—elected, be it remembered, more than three years ago—there is no alternative to him) and Minister of Foreign Affairs. His brother Vintilă gives up the War Office to General Iancovescu (a soldier, not a politician) and becomes Minister of Munitions. Mr. Titulescu and the poet and novelist, Barbu Delavrancea—both "Takists"—enter the Cabinet, and Mr. Take Ionescu is to be styled Vice-President. It seems, however, to an outsider regrettable that a more truly National Government has not been formed, in which Conservatives, Labour Party and Transylvanian leaders could all have played a worthy part.

One further reform of the first importance—the full enfranchisement of the Jews—can no longer be delayed: and what has long been an article of faith with Mr. Ionescu has now been accepted as the definite policy of the Brătianu Government.

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Roumania, like her great Russian neighbour, is in a state of transition; but even her most hostile critics must admit that she is valiantly engaged in putting her own house in order. It ill becomes those who have suffered from reaction and autocracy in Russia to reproach Roumania for not having outpaced her great neighbour in progress towards democracy. The proximity of the old *régime* in Russia lay like an incubus upon Roumania: now that it has fallen, we hope to see the two countries marching hand in hand upon the path of reform.

ALEXANDER SEVERUS.

Portugal in the War

THE war caught Portugal in transition, with an empty treasury, a divided people, a great but slightly protected colonial empire. Four years had not passed since the overthrow of the Monarchy, and the dissensions in the ranks of the Republicans only disappeared when they were confronted by a Royalist attack. Within the *bourgeois* Republican party the extreme Left is held by a party called Democrat under the leadership of Dr. Affonso Costa, which, with a short interval in the beginning of 1915, has been in power, either openly or behind the scenes, since October 1910, embarrassed by the changing attitude of the Unionists under Dr. Brito Camacho and of the moderate Republicans under Dr. Almeida.

When the war broke out the only difference of opinion between these parties was as to how far they should go in the cause of the Allies. The Evolutionists, for instance, wished to fulfil whatever requests might be formulated by Great Britain, while the Democrats were inclined, rather, to attempt to force the hand of their ancient ally in order that Portugal might join actively in the war. The idea of Portugal remaining neutral was preposterous; she, in fact, claims no special credit for not having declared her neutrality. For Portugal to remain neutral would have been to betray her oldest and only ally, Great Britain, and to cut her own throat, which is the Atlantic. Even if the only friends of Great Britain in Portugal had been a group of persons but recently converted from Anglophobia, Portugal would still have been on the side of Great Britain. But there was

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never any doubt on which side the inclinations of the great majority of Portuguese lay. Their sympathy towards the English may be less widespread than an alliance of seven or eight centuries might have led one to expect, but towards the French it has always been sincere and profound. It was unthinkable that Portugal should be pro-German. The complaint has often been made that educated Portuguese *are* French.

Yet, it must be remembered, Portugal was in a peculiar position. The party or parties in power were in a minority, and they had done much to alienate a great part of the nation. The gulf fixed between "politics" and the "nation" in many European countries is a veritable chasm in Portugal. A few statistics may conveniently illustrate this fact. Portugal has a population of six millions, and about ninety per cent. of the population is rural, the only cities being Lisbon and Oporto. At the beginning of the 20th century ninety-nine per cent. of the entire population were Roman Catholics, thus leaving a few thousands only to support the cardinal item in the policy of the Republicans. One must hasten to add that they are not bigoted or fanatical Roman Catholics. The Church in Portugal, unlike the Church in Spain, has a tendency to Liberalism; many of the clergy are men of moderate and enlightened views. The greatest admiration is felt in Portugal for such priests as Cardinal Mercier. Finally, by the figures of the last census (1911), eighty-one per cent. of the women and sixty-seven per cent. of the men are illiterate. Although the uneducated in Portugal are not the least intelligent part of the population, it is clear that active politicians must be looked for only in the smaller section, which is split up into Republican Democrats, Evolutionists, Unionists, and Independents, the Manuelists, Miguelists and Integralists, the Socialists, Syndicalists and Anarchists, and the many prudent persons of education who keep themselves severely from any active part in politics. The electoral force behind the Democrats is not large; but, on the other hand, the political machinery is all in their hands—the system by which elections are won throughout Portugal by order of a small minority in office in Lisbon. The movement in the army at the end of 1914, which placed General Pimenta de Castro in power, was an attempt to bring the official element into line with the nation

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and to form a more national Government. The Democrats recovered command of the political machinery by the revolution of May 1915, which, although it by no means increased their popularity, confirmed their official power throughout the country. With the words "sacred union" on their lips, this party refused to yield a single inch in favour of the religious or other convictions of the great majority of their fellow-countrymen. The Democrats had always adopted the motto: "He who is not with me is against me," and, applying it to the war, they proceeded to proclaim *urbi et orbi*, with no little effect, the extraordinary doctrine that all those who were outside their party were pro-Germans.

It seemed indeed, at one time, that a German conspiracy had been formed with the object of rendering Great Britain unpopular in Portugal by isolating her in close connection with the party which has continued during the war to heap insults on the religion of over ninety per cent. of the nation, has accused Dr. Brito Camacho of treachery to his country because he preferred consistency to political convenience, and has set up Dr. Almeida to act as a figure-head while its own partisans monopolised official positions throughout the country and browsed comfortably on war profits. Fortunately, if such a plot existed, the Germans themselves have provided the antidote, for whatever sympathy may have been felt in Portugal towards Germany at the beginning of the war has been alienated by Germany's disconcerting methods of warfare. The Portuguese are a generous nation of idealists, they have a natural, deeply-ingrained love of civilisation and progress, they liked to think that the age of the barbarian was over. They have compared the methods of Great Britain and Germany in the war, they have witnessed with unfeigned horror a long series of brutalities such as the execution of Miss Cavell and the sinking of the *Lusitania*, while they have seen their own coal and wheat, for both of which Portugal relies very largely on overseas traffic, sunk by the pirates, and their fishing trawlers mercilessly attacked. The Portuguese point of view has been admirably summed up by Snr. Ayres de Ornellas in his book *Un Anno de Guerra* (1916), p. 261:—"A German victory would mean not only the predominance of the German Empire, it would imply something more: the enslavement to Germany not of foreign lands and peoples only, but of whatever represents the religious,

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intellectual, and moral heritage of humanity. The war is an attack made by materialism, brought to undreamed-of strength by Prussian militarism, upon whatever moral forces exist in the world." That is appreciated strongly by a nation of idealists. It is comparatively easy for a people in sympathy with its Government to support it by their sacrifices; the Portuguese people is doing more than that, it is loyally supporting a Government with which it is not in sympathy and judging it by one criterion only—that of its vigour in carrying out measures connected with the war. It is possible that the Democrats may realise later, after the war, that they have lost by not adopting a more conciliatory attitude in internal politics, but that does not affect the immediate concern of the nation, which is the war. All sensible persons in Portugal desire the present Portuguese Government a long life; the Democrats have the vigour which goes with narrowness; the present Premier and Minister for War are men of will and energy. It is felt that this is no time for changing the political machinery; if the present Government lasts to the end of the war so much the better, and if in order to do so it finds itself compelled to suspend the constitutional guarantees, its political opponents will not protest. If it is an injustice to the Portuguese people to pretend that it sees eye to eye with the politicians, it is equally unfair to the Royalists to say that they are embarrassing the Government. King Manoel has twice given very definite instructions to his followers in Portugal to set the interests of the nation above those of party, and these instructions have been obeyed. The services rendered by certain prominent Republicans to the cause of the Allies will not soon be forgotten, but the more difficult loyalty of the Royalists is an equally striking feature in the situation.

Since 1915 there have been two risings, those of December, 1916, and May, 1917, in neither of which the Royalists had the slightest part. The former was due to the discontent of a few Republicans who believed that they could manage affairs better than the men actually in office; the riots of May originated in the popular belief that food was being unfairly distributed and that flour was being cornered. The Republicans do not accuse the Royalists of having been concerned in these movements. "If by raising my hand," wrote a Portuguese politician a few weeks ago in the organ

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of the Manuelists, "I could immediately restore the Monarchy, I would not raise my hand." The Royalists are evidently content to wait. The editor of this journal (*O Diario Nacional*), Snr. Ayres de Ornellas, who represents King Manoel in Portugal, has rendered, and continues to render, excellent service to the cause of the Allies. He possesses a wider knowledge of Englishmen and the British Empire than is to be found among other Portuguese writers, and he uses this knowledge to bring home to his fellow-countrymen the part played by Great Britain in the war, and the importance of the war to the Colonial empire of Portugal. The real pro-Germans at present in Portugal are a few families bound to Austria by ancient ties, and a few international syndicalists, idealists, or anarchists, or whatever they may call themselves. But in all Allied and neutral countries one has to consider not only those who by conviction are pro-German, but especially those who may unwittingly lend themselves to the furtherance of German plans. Besides the harmless or carefully watched incurables mentioned above, there are without doubt a certain number of Republicans who would be glad to make a *coup d'état* and place themselves in power. If such a misfortune occurs it must not be taken too seriously: it will be the work of a few narrowly ambitious persons, afflicted by temporary megalomania, who would find disillusion after a very short spell of office. There is, further, the much-discussed question of an *entente* between Portugal and Spain. The idea is not popular in Portugal: one may go further and say that it is extremely unpopular. Better facilities of travel between the two countries, interchange of literature and art, by all means: but for either a political or an economic agreement there is a strong feeling that the occasion is very ill-chosen. What guarantee have you, say the opponents of the idea, that it is not a manœuvre of Germany in order that, when excluded commercially from the dominions of the other Allies after the war she may, through Spain, not be cut off entirely from Portuguese ports and the Portuguese colonies? Before the war, Portugal had suffered much from peaceful penetration on the part of Germany, and in Africa the penetration had been rather more than peaceful, since Germany had already bitten off a piece of Mozambique. One great advantage gained by Portugal in the war is that

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Germany has now ceased to be her neighbour in Africa. But so long as a great, hungry and unscrupulous Power remains at large Portugal can never feel secure.

The less that is heard of Portugal now the more may it be taken for granted that she is loyally co-operating with the Allies. At the beginning of the war Portugal gave to the Allies arms and ammunition, besides taking her part in the fighting in South-West and East Africa. Later she handed over a large number of her confiscated German ships, thus supplying Great Britain with many thousands of tons of much-needed transports; now she has sent troops, well equipped and carefully disciplined. The Portuguese Army in France will be further increased and it will be kept up to strength. Meanwhile the Portuguese fleet, though small and inadequate to the needs of the nation, has, under an energetic commander, shown great vigour in guarding the coasts of Portugal. In a word, Portugal is wide-awake, and with a great part of her army in France fighting side by side with the British, any internal disturbances that may occur will be of a very superficial, passing character, and yield cold comfort to the enemy.

As has been hinted, it would be easy to exaggerate the sympathy felt towards Englishmen in Portugal, nor is it likely to be greatly increased through political channels. A change in this respect will come more surely through individual Englishmen and Portuguese who take the trouble to acquaint themselves with the life, country, and traditions, the language, literature, and history of Portugal and of Great Britain.

A. G. LORAINÉ.

Germany and the Portuguese Colonies

While British opinion tends to regard the fate of the German colonies as already sealed, it is well to remember that many German writers are discussing a German Central African Empire, linking the Atlantic and Indian Oceans, and supplementing existing colonies by spoils from their vanquished enemies. Interesting light is thrown upon German aims by an article of Professor Hans Meyer in *Deutsche Politik* of 18 May, entitled "Germany and the Portuguese Colonies," of which we give the following summary:—

"The Azores occupy an important geographical position on the sea-way to Gibraltar. Their chief port, Ponta Delgada, on São Miguel, can hold a dozen big liners at a time, and is so well-equipped

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that it is now one of the best ports of call in the Atlantic. The islands lie on the direct line from the Mediterranean to New York, and from England to the Panama Canal. Moreover, the harbour of Horta on Fayal is an important cable centre for Europe, Africa, and America. . . . In the whole Atlantic there are few points of such importance to a great naval Power as the Azores. The island of Madeira is not so important . . . but it possesses a wonderfully mild climate and a fertile soil which have made it the most famous of all winter resorts for consumptives, and a great wine-growing centre. . . . The least fertile of all the Portuguese colonies are the Cape Verde Islands. . . . But their favourable position on the great trade routes has rendered them, and especially the harbour of Porto Grande on São Vicente, one of the most frequented coaling stations in the eastern Atlantic. It also is an important centre for submarine cables. In contrast to these three island groups the neighbouring colony on the mainland, Portuguese Guinea, has great productive powers, and a warm, damp climate which is fatal to Europeans . . . and neither the cultivation of the soil nor trade has made much progress. Indeed, the colony has for many years required regular subsidies from the Home Government. Its complete encirclement by French territory renders it entirely dependent upon French West Africa; and France will no doubt take advantage of this situation unless some stronger Power intervenes!

"The pearl of all the Portuguese colonies is the small volcanic island-group of Principe and San Thomé, which lies in the Gulf of Guinea, almost on the Equator. Their total area is only 1,200 square kil-metres, but they rise over 6,000 feet out of the sea, and, thanks to their abundant rainfall and warm, equable climate, . . . the chief product, cocoa, surpasses that produced in any other part of the world. Coffee and quinine also thrive. In 1913 the cocoa plantations of San Thomé produced 40,000 tons, to the value of £2,000,000. Principe, owing to sleeping-sickness, which has only lately been stamped out, is still comparatively undeveloped. The whole cocoa harvest . . . goes to the Lisbon market, whence the greater part went to Germany. Since the war this best customer has failed them . . . and, in consequence, both the Lisbon market and the planters on San Thomé are undergoing the severest crisis which they have ever experienced.

"Angola, lying south of the Equator, has an area of 1·27 million square kilometres, and is Portugal's largest colony. In the north it has an average elevation of 3,000 feet, and consists chiefly of savannah-land, but in the south-west its high forest plateaux rise to 6,500 feet, and the remainder is bush country, admirably adapted for European settlements. Thus Angola unfolds a wide and varied vista of development. We must add the excellence of its great harbours Lobito, Port Alexander and Tiger Bay, unrivalled along the whole West Coast of Africa from Morocco to Cape Town. Of these, Lobito should one day become the chief, since it is the terminus of the Bengualla railway, which is eventually to be extended along the Congo-Zambesi watershed to

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the rich mineral district of Katanga. . . . Opposite Angola, on the east side of sub-equatorial Africa, lies the second largest Portuguese colony of Mozambique. From a low-lying unhealthy coast district . . . it stretches inland to plateaux of over 6,000 feet forming the foot-hills of the South African *massif*. . . . The only portions suitable for permanent white settlements are the high districts along the Nyassa and the Namuli, where for the past twenty years European planters have lived. The native population, chiefly Kaffirs, is good-tempered, intelligent and industrious, especially in the north. In spite of this, the Portuguese did not develop it until foreign capital, chiefly British, entered its promising field. . . ."

Professor Meyer proceeds to describe the specially privileged position of the chartered companies which administer the northern half of Mozambique under Portuguese names, but, in reality, with British capital, and under British direction, and laments the yearly exodus of 80,000 to 100,000 natives to work in other colonies, both Portuguese and English, upon payment of a poll-tax to the Mozambique Government. "It must be one of the first tasks of any future enlightened Government of Mozambique to stop this weakening outflow of man-power."

With regard to the small Portuguese settlements in India—Goa, Damao, and Diu—Professor Meyer writes: "Germany would do well to leave these 'enclaves' to the English, in return for concessions elsewhere, as, owing to their circumscribed position, they could not be developed by any country but British India. As strategic naval bases for Germany they would be untenable save at an enormous cost. And there are other points in the Indian Ocean which are much better adapted for this object, *e.g.*, the island of Timor. . . . A colonial Power possessing greater energy and capital than Portugal could rapidly convert East Timor into a centre of coffee and tobacco growing, but the colony could hardly become of high commercial value unless unexpected mineral wealth were discovered. On the other hand, if, after a victorious war, Germany had both the will and the power, not merely to maintain her colonial possessions in the South Seas, but, with the consent of Japan, to strengthen them, by establishing a great East Asiatic base for naval operations, then East Timor might acquire the greatest importance as a *point d'appui*, owing to its controlling position midway between the Dutch East Indies and Australia, and at the western entrance to the seas round Northern Australia and New Guinea. Great opposition would, of course, have to be met from England and Australia, and hardly less from Holland." Professor Meyer then argues that England has always stifled Portuguese enterprise in order to secure to herself the reversion of these colonies. He continues: "The world-war . . . has brought forward the German Empire as a powerful rival claimant for the overseas possessions of Portugal, and England will have to come to terms with her over this heritage. Our greatest colonial aim, in war as in peace, is the formation of a solid Central African colonial empire.

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in which Mozambique, Angola, and the islands in the Gulf of Guinea will take their place. But German Central Africa could not exist unless it were bound to the Mother-country by a chain of naval *points d'appui* for which the Portuguese possessions of Guinea, the Cape Verde Islands, Madeira and the Azores are clearly designed. Of these Portuguese Guinea would only come into question if we extended our continental *bloc* to Senegal . . . , but we must acquire the three island groups in order to assure our sea-way to Central Africa. They are outposts of extraordinary importance for the control of world-shipping. In addition Portugal, England, France and North America would strenuously oppose our acquisition of these three island groups, and of Portuguese Guinea; North America, because she has for long had her eye on the Azores; France, because she considered the Cape Verde Islands and Guinea as belonging to her West African sphere of influence; England, because she already looks upon Madeira as belonging to her, and because she will not tolerate any Great Power in the neighbourhood of the Straits of Gibraltar, or on the great Atlantic trade-routes. . . . But we shall surely triumph in our world-policy if we set our German 'will to victory' against that of the other Powers, if, at the decisive moment, we have statesmen who, in the Napoleonic phrase, can 'think in continents,' and if we meet the danger of being fettered by paper conventions and treaties by throwing into the balance the—God grant it!—victorious German sword."

“Vorwärts” and Dr. Michaelis

The most interesting newspaper comment on the Michaelis speech is that of the *Vorwärts* (20 July), which is not to be found in the usual leader, but in the supplement (*Beilage*), under the heading "Was it wise?" (*War es klug?*), and in the form of a question addressed to the new Chancellor himself. The article runs as follows:—

"Was it wise, new Herr Chancellor, to begin your first speech, which the entire world awaited breathlessly, with a dissertation on the origin and cause of the war? Nobody doubts the fact that you agree upon this point with the majority of the German people, nor that by the same token you disagree with the millions outside Germany who attribute to us the responsibility of the present world-wide misery. We at home did not require convincing on this point; they outside will never be convinced; but you gave the enemy Press, who are much 'slimmer' than you imagine, a chance of side-tracking the real question forming the basis of your speech, namely, the war (a painful subject to them, and one which it does not suit them at present to discuss), in order to descant on the theme of how you, Herr Chancellor, a new man and until yesterday a blank page in the book of politics, had consciously and deliberately shouldered the burden of the old 'cursed system.' Any journalist who has professionally followed the war during the last three years

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would have advised you to avoid such a 'tactical' mistake in your campaign as 'Peace-Chancellor,' for such is what you are to be.

U-BOATS.

“ Was it wise, Herr Chancellor, to read us a lecture on the U-boat war? Here, again, nothing is to be gained, as both parties to the struggle read the question from a different standpoint. The German men and women who stand barefooted in the potato-queue say to themselves, ' If the U-boat war is a short cut to victory, why should it not be waged? If we are hungry, why shouldn't the English be hungry also?' But this point of view does not appeal to the English, French, and Norwegian. And the fisherwoman standing on the shore with swollen red eyes watching for her husband's boat gets distinct comfort from hearing the Germans described as sea pirates. Thus even in this are the peoples arrayed in opposition to each other. No one therefore needs any assurance from a Prussian Under-Secretary turned Chancellor that he sees eye to eye with the rest of Germany on this question. Why give the enemy Press-baiters a chance of describing the new Chancellor, the Peace Chancellor, as the champion of a cause which, as above described, cannot be popular?

“ Perhaps you thought it wise, Herr Chancellor, so sharply to attack those who hope for the U-boat war to win a decisive victory over England within a specified time, whereas you wish it said that victory will be won some day! At some uncertain time you say the U-boat war will overcome those influences which are at work in England to retard peace. That was a thrust through the arras which surely found a mark, but are you quite sure whom you spitted? Were you surprised when the Left with one voice greeted your remarks on this subject with shouts of 'Helfferich, Helfferich!' Did you notice how Herr von Heydebrand paled?

THE PEACE RESOLUTION.

“ Are you convinced in your adhesion to the peace resolution? You accepted it very half-heartedly; a half-hearted man cannot lead the Empire in these hard times. In the main you took your stand on the basis of the Reichstag's programme, and you gave assurances in this sense which were just sufficient. But you did not give the impression of agreeing with it; perhaps it was wise, but only if you had reckoned the value of the opposition you were shouldering. George, my boy, take care!

“ Perhaps, Herr Chancellor, in order to avoid suspicion it might have been wiser if you had seen your way to giving a still stronger note of feeling yourself, called by your own personal conviction in the matter, to steady such waverers as are still not wholly persuaded. And yet it is essential that, from now on, the Empire shall be governed on the lines of this programme. The peace programme of the Reichstag is the expression of the will of the German people; it is making world history. It has brought into the world a fact against which all Government opposition would be powerless.

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DEMOCRATIC REFORMS.

"It was not wise, Herr Chancellor, that you should say you were not minded to let the direction of affairs pass out of your hands at the very moment when practically the Reichstag was taking over that direction. What it promises in this respect is of far more value than anything hinted at in your friendly assurance of a contemplated call to co-operation with the Government in certain posts of some of the leading statesmen possessing the confidence of the people. This was a most unfortunate expression. For the unprejudiced reader immediately asks himself: 'Why only some? Why not all?' And, finally, it is unnecessary from your high position to proclaim to all the world that in Germany certain important places are occupied by men who do not possess the confidence of the people. A distinction thus established between men who are called to govern because they possess the confidence of the people on the one hand and those who only owe their position in the nation's councils to the fact of a Privy Councillorship on the other, will hardly raise the prestige of the latter.

TRUST IN THE CHANCELLOR.

"President Kämpf assured you of our trust, but you heard from the mouth of our comrade Scheidemann that you must take that trust with a considerable pinch of salt. Bebel once said that trust was a democratic virtue. Anyhow, *over-hasty trust is an old Liberal fault* which the Social Democrats are not thinking of committing, neither the leaders, nor the masses of the people who stand behind them! Remember! these masses are inclined to outspoken mistrust, to overcome which much wisdom is needed and much democratic understanding of their feelings and interests. Everything to-day depends upon a man standing at the helm who, not in one capacity or another, but in every capacity, possesses the confidence of the people."

German and Turk

Zwei Kriegsjahre in Constantinopel: Skizzen deutsch-jungtürkischer Moral und Politik. Dr. Harry Stuermer. Lausanne, 1917. (Payot et Cie.) 3 frs. 50 c. This is an interesting addition to the growing list of books published by Germans in revolt against the policy which has plunged their own country and Europe in war; and, so far as can be judged from its contents and the manner of its presentment, it is a genuine product of indignation and disgust on the part of its author. Dr. Stuermer, a Baden journalist, appears to have travelled widely before the war in the German, British and French colonies. After serving on the Eastern front, he was invalided home, and became correspondent of the *Kölnische Zeitung* in Turkey in 1915-16. The process of his disillusionment was begun by his immediate superior, who recounted his experiences during the

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Belgian campaign, and continued by one of his chief colleagues in Constantinople, the journalist Schweder, who had an intimate knowledge of the whole Western front. The latter, we read, "admitted to me in so many words even early in 1916 that we were letting Belgium almost starve, and were systematically trying to ruin our competitor, the Belgian industries, by removing all the machinery to Germany. And that was before the days of deportations of workmen! Schweder's stories dealt mainly with the sexual morality of our troops. There were thousands and thousands of cases of outrage committed on women and girls of Belgian and French families of good position, for the soldier, returning to the trenches after a short leave, with death before his eyes, did not care what he did, and shame generally kept the unhappy victims of this bestiality silent, so that punishment was very rare. I heard strange things . . . about the German policy of persecution in Alsace-Lorraine, which systematically punished not merely acts but sentiments with prison, and which did not hesitate to send young girls of good family, who had thoughtlessly made some harmless remark, to undergo long terms of imprisonment with common criminals and prostitutes."

Stuermer went to Turkey with his editor's advice ringing in his ears: "You will soon find out for yourself the moral bankruptcy of the Young Turks, and will see that Turkey is a mere frog, in a dying condition, and can only hold out so long as the war lasts and we Germans galvanise it." He appears to have liked the Turkish soldier, but to have resented more and more the intolerable Jingoism of the Young Turk officers; and what he learned of the Armenian horrors filled him with loathing. The climax was reached when his wife—a Czech—came home after witnessing a murderous onslaught on Armenian women, encouraged by the police, in one of the main streets of Constantinople, and cursed the whole German race for its connivance at such horrors. To his "deep grief" he has to admit that Mr. Toynbee's report on the massacres (*see THE NEW EUROPE*, No. 13—"The Clean-Fighting Turk") is no exaggeration, and that a large share of the responsibility must fall upon the German Government. He has words of the fiercest criticism for "the cowardice and unscrupulousness" of the German Embassy and the part sometimes played by German officers. He quotes one case of two officers travelling through Asia Minor, who found that a number of Armenians had barricaded themselves in some houses with a view to resisting transportation, and that no Turks could be found to fire upon the women. Hereupon the two strangers indulged in the sport of artillery practice until all resistance was at an end. The incident was reported to Berlin, but no notice was taken of it. His disgust at the Embassy was increased by finding that its subservience to Young Turk brutality produced the worst possible effect among every class of Turk. His summary of the Armenian horrors is sufficiently comprehensive: "Massacres, outrage of women, children thrown into the sea, young girls sent into brothels, all the younger women forcibly converted to Islam and put into Turkish harems; highly-cultivated families brutally expelled by

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gendarmes; attacks on the march by hired bands of robbers and criminals; 'settling' in notoriously malarious or sandy districts where there is no means of sustenance—in short, measures of extermination, at once bestial and refined, to which at least half a million human beings have fallen victims, while the remainder of this highly-cultured people is nearing its end, owing to the severance of all family ties, the forfeiture of all rights and economic ruin."

Dr. Stuermer exposes the impious fraud of "the Holy War," and the myth that the controllers of Turkish policy are genuine Moslems ("inwardly they laugh at Islam"). His estimate of Enver and Talaat is identical with that of all who know Turkey. The latter stands head and shoulders above the insignificant but self-advertising and theatrical Minister of War. "The spirit which prevails in Turkey to-day, the spirit of Panturk Chauvinism, is the spirit of Talaat, whose own special work is the Armenian persecution." His verdict upon Djemal Pasha is interesting; he speaks of his deep hatred of Germany, but denies the suggestion that he is really Francophil. He is "the most calculating of all the Turkish leaders," and is simply waiting his time to wreck his rival, Enver. The grandson of Mahmud II's official executioner, he has cruelty in the blood, and has been guilty of hideous excesses towards the notables of Syria. Of Yussuf Izzedin, the late Heir Apparent, Dr. Stuermer had a favourable impression. He hesitates to affirm positively his obvious conviction that his end was murder, and contents himself with quoting the sarcastic phrase of a high official: *On l'a suicidé*. Colonel von Leipzig's mysterious death, sometimes ascribed by Germany to English spies, Dr. Stuermer explains as an accident, having been himself present only a minute later and investigated the whole affair.

There are instructive passages about Young Turk Chauvinism. The present *régime*, he argues, "in reality means the substitution of the Panislamic idea by the narrowly racial Panturk idea," and the conversion of Turkey, and at all costs Anatolia, into a purely Turkish land. The decree enacting the exclusive use of the Turkish language in banks and businesses is, of course, incapable of translation into practice, but is held like a sword of Damocles over the heads of all foreigners. The frenzy of Turkification, he contends, is directed no less clearly against the Germans, "endangering all those vital German interests which, according to the Pangerman Imperialistic view, were among the foremost excuses for unchaining a world war." It is curious to note his conviction that if the Germans are beaten, the Turks will turn utterly against them, and that even to-day two-thirds of the "Intelligentsia" is for England and France. Turkey, however, he reminds us, can never be reduced by starvation, no matter how intolerable the requisitions, usury and profiteering may become.

Two final points of interest. We are informed that it is still a mystery to the Turkish authorities why the British did not force their way through the Dardanelles on 18 March, and again during the Anzac attack on Anaforta, and that, on both occasions, the

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Turkish gunners were at the last gasp, and the archives and banks of the capital in process of evacuation. The cession of the new Maritza frontier to Bulgaria is alleged to have been made with the worst possible grace, in the calculation that Greece also would ere long become involved, and that Bulgaria would then be forced to restore the ceded territory in return for Turkish help.

The book is written in the worst possible journalese, but a skilful translator could easily transform it into something very readable.

R. W. S.-W.

Thoughts for a Convention (Memorandum on the State of Ireland) : By A. E. (Dublin, 1917: Maunsell & Co.) rd. Ireland, like every other nation, has been dragged into the maelstrom of war, and a moment has been reached in which wise decisions may save her "from anarchy and chaos for generations to come." Only good can come of the perusal of this little pamphlet by one of those practical idealists who are the hope of Ireland, and we earnestly commend it to all Irish and British patriots.

The Unholy Alliance of Finance

We learn from an unimpeachable source that the secret conference of international financiers which recently took place in Switzerland, and at which French, British and German representatives were present, was inspired by somewhat different motives from those which the initiated ascribed to it at the time. Acting purely in the interest of the great capitalists of all countries, it aimed above all at an immediate peace such as would arrest the growth of International Socialism and the rising tide of revolution throughout Europe. It sought to forestall the holding of the Stockholm Conference by a direct arrangement between the belligerents, in which national claims would be entirely subordinated to considerations of world-wide finance.

The unconscious puppets of this movement are to be found in many opposite camps—among sentimental pacifists and honestly doctrinaire "Maximalists," among the numerous agents of Berlin, Vienna, Budapest and Sofia, who swarm on Swiss soil, and among the inveterate Austrophils and Bulgarophils of the Entente. Some of those who are personally interested in Turkish credit stand close behind the scenes. The movement has also found some support in certain ultramontane circles, which, despite their talent for intrigue, are too shortsighted to realise that the Church's only hope for the future is to lead the peoples and not to follow the dynasties. It may be doubted whether there exists a genius capable of harmonising so many varied and mutually conflicting interests: for humanity is in the grip of events far too vast to be arrested by such artificial intrigues. But it is none the less necessary to keep a vigilant eye upon certain tendencies which seek to seal the exploitation of the peoples by a disgraceful "hole and corner" pact.

Printed for CONSTABLE & Co. LTD., by EYRE & SPOTTISWOODE, LTD.,
His Majesty's Printers, East Harding Street, E.C.4.

The New Europe

VOL. IV. No. 43

[REGISTERED FOR TRANSMISSION AT
THE INLAND NEWSPAPER RATE.]

9 August 1917

The Chancellor's "Give and Take" Peace

"We must by means of an understanding and give and take (Ausgleich) guarantee the conditions of existence of the German Empire upon the Continent and overseas. Peace must build the foundation of a lasting reconciliation of the nations. It must, as expressed in your resolution, prevent the nations from being plunged into further enmity through economic blockades, and provide a safeguard that the league in arms of our opponents does not develop into an economic offensive alliance against us."

THE passage quoted above from the German Chancellor's speech on 19 July deserves closer attention than it has yet generally received. Although he went on to say "we cannot again offer peace," his speech and the Reichstag resolution do, in fact, constitute a second peace offer, as is evident from the disappointment manifested by Herr Michaelis and Count Czernin at Mr. Lloyd George's answer. It is important, therefore, that we should form a clear idea of the nature of the settlement proposed, the more so as the offer is certain to be pressed again and again during the coming months, with all the skill and pertinacity of German statesmanship. The Germans do not easily take a refusal either in politics or business.

What does the Chancellor mean by a "give and take" peace? He means a peace by which Germany will surrender occupied territory in Europe in return for the surrender by the Allies (1) of economic advantages; (2) of territory overseas. As the German mind sees it, Germany has something to bargain with (*Faustpfänder*) in the lands she has overrun, while the Allies have something to bargain with in respect of the occupied German colonies and in the economic sphere. Herein lies the opportunity for a business-like policy of give and take, leading to a "peace by agreement" and a general reconciliation. There is no need to enlarge in THE NEW EUROPE on the morality of using stolen goods as a means of bargaining, or on the wisdom of entering into negotiations upon such a basis. Were the Allies to do so, as the *Nation* and nineteen members of the House of Commons desire, the German Government could

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claim with truth that it had secured solid economic advantages for the German people as a result of its "leopard-spring" upon Belgium and Serbia. What we are concerned with here, however, is the details of the bargain.

We may leave on one side any consideration of the German colonies, or a possible extension of German rule in Africa, as an element in such a bargain. There is much difference of opinion in German governing economic circles on the colonial question, but so careful and dispassionate a student of German opinion as Mr. Edwyn Bevan (*The Method in the Madness*, p. 142) believes that, as a result of the war, enthusiasm in this direction is by no means so widespread as it was. In any case, the recovery or increase of overseas territory is a wholly secondary consideration in the proposed *Ausgleich*. The really important matter, in the eyes of the German authorities, is the elimination of the Allies' economic advantages. Wherein do these advantages consist? It is difficult to give a brief answer to so comprehensive a question; but it seems important to draw attention to one very important factor to which due weight is not always given in Allied circles. Briefly, the contention is that what the Germans most fear is not the policy of the Paris Economic Conference of June 1916, but the new economic situation which has come about since the intervention of the United States. It is this which explains why the economic issue is so much more prominent in the peace offer of July 1917 than in that of December 1916.

The Paris Economic Conference performed a valuable service to the Allied cause. It was indeed indispensable, both in tightening the blockade, and as a reply to Germany's avowed post-war aims. But, useful though it was in promoting "a single economic front," it did not cause the Germans any very great measure of alarm as regards the post-war period. Apart from conflicts of interest, which the Germans hoped to exploit, among the Allies themselves, too large and important a section of the world still remained neutral for the proposed post-war measures to be easily carried through; and the Germans were confident that, by one means or another, they would be able to resume their economic life substantially on a pre-war basis. German economic literature during the latter half of 1916 devoted a good deal of attention to this subject. People did not

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buy German goods before the war out of love for Germany; quality and price, it was argued, would outweigh sentiment in the long run. Meanwhile expedients of various kinds were being devised for the transition period, some of them of a kind which induced neighbouring neutral States to introduce emergency legislation about foreign firms and the marking of merchandise.

How far these brave expectations would have been realised we shall never know. Probably, here, as elsewhere, the Germans undervalued the strength of the moral feelings they had aroused, both among belligerents and neutrals. As it is, however, the year which has elapsed since the Resolutions were framed has transformed the international economic situation in a manner which could not have been foreseen by their authors, with the result that the object which they were intended to secure is likely to be attained far more completely than could have been hoped for in June 1916. At that time it was still natural to discuss the post-war economic situation in terms of markets and "dumping," and to devise tariff and other measures for hampering exports from enemy countries. To-day the centre of gravity has changed from exports to imports, from selling to buying. The problem of the immediate post-war period is seen to be one, not of *markets* but of *supplies*, not of devising means for keeping out enemy goods but of diverting from the hungry grasp of the enemy the raw materials, without which his goods cannot be manufactured. The universal shortage of shipping, foodstuffs and raw materials, is, in fact, producing a situation in which all the old landmarks of fiscal policy are submerged. It is true that the German Government is still preoccupied as to the future of Germany's foreign markets, as to whether German dyes and electrical machinery and glassware and toys will find the same acceptance as heretofore in Britain and the United States, in China and South America. It is true, also, that it cannot be pleasing to face the prospect of having to negotiate commercial treaties simultaneously and separately with each of the States with whom relations will have to be renewed. But the German Government's most anxious concern at the moment is how it is going to provide food, clothing and employment for its own people on the conclusion of peace. To put it in a sentence: what

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the Allies threatened a year ago was the reconquest by Germany of her foreign markets; what they threaten to-day is the restocking and revictualling of blockaded Germany herself.

After three years of warfare and at least two years of strict blockade, the stock of raw materials at the disposal of the Central Powers has, by universal admission, run very low. Germany's first and most pressing need after the war, more pressing even than the importation of foodstuffs, is seen to be the replenishing of those stocks, for without them she cannot "reconstruct" her industries on a peace basis, or even revive the fertility of her exhausted soil. Moreover, without employment available for her industrial workers, she dare not demobilise her armies; for widespread unemployment "after the pressure of the war has been withdrawn and the means for curbing public discussion can no longer be used with effect" would, as Dr. Dernburg has recently declared, lead to "fatal misunderstandings." "Misunderstandings" in war-time can be ignored, or, at least, suppressed. But when the soldiers come home, revolution may come with them.

The Allies, in fact, controlling, as they do, so large a proportion of the natural resources of the world, have their finger on Germany's windpipe. The German Government knows full well what measures it would adopt if it were in the same position. That is the meaning of its sudden conversion to economic internationalism, to the policy of "give and take" and "let bygones be bygones." It explains Germany's desperate reliance on the submarine, which is expected to reduce Great Britain to the same plight as that in which Germany now finds herself, and so to prepare the way for joint measures of relief. It explains what the Chancellor means by the curious expression "economic blockade"; *i.e.*, a blockade not maintained by naval force, but operating in time of peace. He is afraid of Germany finding herself in a position in which there is no physical obstacle to the import of supplies, but in which the supplies themselves are simply not purchasable in sufficient quantity, owing to their having been diverted elsewhere to meet the needs of the Allied and neutral Governments and their peoples. For, as the Chancellor knows well, having served in the German Food-Controller's

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office, Germans are not the only people who will be famished for supplies after the war; and it is not likely, unless arrangements are specifically made to that end in the peace-treaty, that the Allies will allow Germany a share in any supplies which they control prior to satisfying the just claims of Belgium, Serbia and Poland, and the other peoples who have suffered and starved at Germany's hands.

The problem of the restocking of the Central Empires has been much discussed in recent months; it must, indeed, loom large to anyone on the spot who is considering the future of those denuded countries. For some time little was said about it in print; but recently the late Chancellor seems to have seen in it a convenient weapon against the advocates of a "dictated peace," which would leave Germany with wide extensions of territory East and West, but, in Naumann's phrase, still in an "economic prison-house." It formed the chief subject of the discussions at the recent joint meeting of the German, Austrian and Hungarian Economic Associations at Budapest. In a message to that gathering, advocating a "peace by agreement, free from anger and menace," Herr Dernburg contributed a penetrating analysis of the post-war economic situation, which we print elsewhere (*see* p. 119). Special attention should, perhaps, be drawn to the characteristic suggestion that the supplies which Germany must secure should be classified, according to their order of importance, into three groups: (a) military material; (b) material for storage, to be available in the event of a renewed naval blockade; (c) supplies to meet the "natural" demand of the civil population for the satisfaction of its daily needs, and that part of the civilian quota must be withdrawn from internal consumption and worked up for export purposes to restore the equilibrium of exchange.

It can thus be seen what kind of a "bargain" it is that he has in his mind when the German Chancellor speaks of peace on a "give and take" basis. No doubt he is thinking partly of the permanent conditions of international intercourse after the war. He would like to exact favourable commercial treaties from Germany's enemies, as was done in 1871, with the Most-Favoured Nation clause drawn in the widest possible terms, together with a guarantee of the Open Door in the colonial possessions of present enemy Powers.

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But the problem which is most before his mind is how to assure for his country the indispensable means of recuperation in the immediate post-war period, and to avert the disastrous prospect of an "economic blockade" with all its possible domestic consequences.

The foregoing has not been written in order to encourage readers of THE NEW EUROPE into the belief that the war can be won by economic pressure alone. That would only be the case if the shortage of material made a further successful *military* resistance impossible, and of that there is no sign at present. The considerations dealt with above primarily concern the *post-war* situation, and it is not ourselves but the enemy who is anxious to use them for bringing the war to an end. It is from this point of view, as helping to interpret the meaning of the latest "peace offensive," that they are of interest. But they would further seem to impose upon Allied statesmen the duty of thinking out a definite policy, both on the side of practical measures and as regards ultimate aims.

The obvious practical bearing of the question is that the Allies should tighten and co-ordinate their naval and economic control by every means in their power. The Allies are, as has been said, the real "League of Nations"; and the League of Nations has always been contemplated by its framers as wielding the power of economic boycott. Let the Allies perfect this side of their armoury; let them bring their plans and methods completely up to date; and let them make full use of the help which can be given them by every one of the States, small as well as great, which has broken off relations with Germany. The summoning of a new Economic Conference, with the United States represented, would be the best answer to the German Chancellor's latest offer.

As to ultimate aims, perhaps little more can be usefully said at present than the few sentences lately reported from a speech by Mr. Will Thorne, M.P. :—

"I am not out for building up great tariff walls. I want freedom of exchange. But I am certain the people of this country will not allow any peace until the great military machine of Germany is completely smashed."

The Allies are not fighting for selfish and private ends, and no honourable man in the Allied camp desires to hamper

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and cripple Germany's economic development out of envy and vindictiveness. That has been made abundantly clear by Allied spokesmen on numerous occasions, though it might be once more re-affirmed by their united voice for the benefit of doubters in Germany, Russia, and elsewhere. An extension of economic internationalism and of mutual intercourse and confidence between the nations is indeed bound up with the principles of the Allied cause and with the very conception of a League of Peace. But between such a league and the present temper of Germany's rulers there can, as so strong an internationalist as President Wilson has said, be neither confidence nor compromise; and until their power has been broken, the Allied peoples can neither forget nor forgive their outrages, nor can the Allied economic control be relaxed. It is true that that control is the mightiest weapon of the kind that has ever been wielded, far mightier in its social effects than the old Navigation Acts. Yet what Adam Smith said of England and the Navigation Act may be applied to-day to civilisation as a whole :

"As defence is of much more importance than opulence, the Act of Navigation is perhaps the wisest of all commercial regulations of England."

The Navigation Acts were an infringement on freedom of trade and international intercourse, devised in the interests of particular Powers. The Allied economic control is a far greater infringement, but it is devised in defence of civilisation itself. That it will be continued, in some form or other, after the conclusion of peace seems to follow inevitably from the nature of the post-war economic situation; the process of restocking and revictualling the belligerent and neutral countries is essentially one for co-operative rather than for competitive action. How Germany will be affected by it and what share she will have in its proceedings depends not, as the Chancellor thinks, on how many square miles of conquered territory she will be willing to evacuate, but on the kind of Germany that confronts the Allies at the making of peace.

ATTICUS.

The Queen's Hall Meeting

THE War Anniversary meeting at the Queen's Hall last Saturday was both necessary and useful. Not only did the Prime Minister make an excellent speech—that he can usually be trusted to do at a great public gathering—but the presence on the platform of Baron Sonnino, the Italian Foreign Minister, and of Mr. Pašić, the veteran Serbian Prime Minister, gave an opportunity for spontaneous outbursts of enthusiasm that revealed, more directly than words could have done, the warmth of our feelings towards the Allies. Mr. Lloyd George and Baron Sonnino were long and loudly acclaimed; but those present will certainly recognise the truth of the statement in the *Daily Mail* report that, “undoubtedly the heart of the meeting went out in deepest welcome to Mr. Pašić, the Premier of Serbia—a venerable white-bearded statesman who was cheered again and again as a mark of the popular sympathy for his gallant country.”

No adequate idea of the effect of Mr. Lloyd George's speech is given by the bare text of his words. The pathos, the telling gesture of sarcasm, the note of firm resolve and of high faith, cannot be rendered by the printed line. Such speeches should be reported by phonograph and film, and reproduced throughout the country. They would help to counteract the rumours and suspicions of weakness on the part of the Government, and of its readiness to toy with the idea of an inconclusive peace. It would be idle to deny the existence of these rumours and suspicions; nor can it be gainsaid that they have derived some nourishment from the attitude of Ministers themselves. The failure of Mr. Lloyd George to mention Alsace-Lorraine in his message to the Alsatian-Lorraine banquet on 14 July; Lord Robert Cecil's unfortunate remark that “Austria is not the chief enemy”; and Mr. Balfour's failure to find a word in favour of Italy or against *her* chief enemy, Austria-Hungary, during last Thursday's debate in the House of Commons, have combined to produce a disagreeable impression not in this country alone.

Baron Sonnino, whose speech contributed notably to the interest of the Queen's Hall meeting, will, at least, carry back with him to Italy a feeling that the heart of the British people is sound, and that we stand by our Allies and against our enemies, without qualification or discrimination.

Democratic Forces in Italy

"The good faith of those organs, individuals and sects which presented to the nation the programme which, in the eyes of the Italian people, counterbalanced the sacrifices of the war and the renunciation of the benefits of neutrality is now being brought to the bar for judgment. The trial is only at its opening stage. . . . It began with the dismal sense of decapitation produced in the country by the unforgettable declarations of the deputy, Barzilai, when, by a rhetorical artifice worthy of the end which it was intended to serve, he borrowed from the phrase of a Socialist deputy occasion for announcing to the Chamber that Baron Sonnino had renounced almost all the aims of the Italian war, and congratulated him thereon. It was continued in the declarations of the representatives of interventionist democracy lately returned from Russia. It was continued in the resolution carried at the Interventionist Congress at Rome, and not, so far, officially repudiated by any of the parties which adhered to it. And it was continued in the revelations of Le Temps on the shameful 'black mass' of Paris. Regarding these insults to the good faith of a whole people which has offered itself in sacrifice for an ideal aim (passage censored . . .), and which sees this ideal spat upon by those very traitors who presented it to them, which now hears itself accused of imperialism, not this time by foreigners but by Italians, for having offered its life in defence of the purest moral abstraction by which any people was ever inspired—regarding all this we observe the silence of the accomplices, the tongue-tied embarrassment of the Corriere della Sera, the equivocations and lies of the Masonic organs, the insolent triumph of Salvemini and his like—for it is right that all should be mentioned by name and judged on their attitude, the true index of their good faith before the eyes of the public. . . ."

THE passage quoted above from the Clerical-Chauvinist, *Mattino*, of Naples, 13 July, well reflects the rage and dismay produced among Italian Imperialists by the recent unlocking of the lips of Italian democracy.

For a long time we have had to listen to the somewhat strident tones of Italian Nationalism proclaiming its version of Italy's war aims, and aspirations in all parts of the world, and we have been puzzled by the comparative silence of the democratic organs. That silence, it is now clear, was not the silence of lurking sympathy nor of calculation, but was a silence imposed by the Censorship. Why this should have been so it is difficult to understand, for the Italian Government cannot be supposed to share the views of the Nationalist party. We may at least take it as a hopeful sign that the bar has at last been removed. The fact not only indicates a less particularist attitude on the part of the Italian Government, but allows the Allies for the first time to get a true vision of Italian public opinion.

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The facts referred to by the *Mattino* require, perhaps, some elucidation, which we will give as shortly as possible.

On 30 June, Signor Barzilai, speaking in the Chamber after the resumption of open sittings, interpreted the declarations made by the Minister for Foreign Affairs as a modification of Italy's programme of war aims, bringing it more into line with the democratic principles of the *Entente* as emphasised and clarified by the Russian Revolution and by the adherence of America. Signor Turati (the leader of the Official Socialist Party in the Chamber) had, he said, described this modified version of Italy's war-aims as an "edition more suitable for the pocket." Baron Sonnino, it may be added, was not reported as having signified any dissent from this interpretation put upon his utterances by Barzilai.

For Signor Labriola's point of view we may refer to THE NEW EUROPE of 24 May, where an article published by him in the *Messaggero* on "Necessary Revisions" is partly reproduced. Since his return from Russia, whither he went as a representative of Italian Socialist Interventionism, Signor Labriola has published further articles advocating a cordial understanding with the great democracies of Europe, and with the Serbs and Jugoslavs for the settlement of the Dalmatian question, expressing distrust of Baron Sonnino's Conservative prepossessions.

On 1 and 2 July a Congress of Interventionists was held at Rome with the object of exercising pressure on the Government. The first resolution carried was in this sense—condemning the internal policy of the Government and demanding the creation of a War Council and social legislation to remedy the injustices which tended at present to alienate the proletariat.

The second resolution, signed by various Reform-Socialists, and moved by Signor De Ambris, ran as follows:—

"The undersigned affirm the necessity for obtaining (1) the territorial reintegration of the invaded countries; (2) the making good of the damage suffered by these countries as a consequence of their invasion; (3) the integration of nations such as France, Italy, Roumania, etc., part of whose territory is subject to foreign domination; (4) the reconstitution as independent nations of Poland, Armenia, and, generally, of all dismembered peoples now subject to foreign domination, even though artificially reunited in a State-conglomerate.

"The undersigned further recognised the existence of other

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problems (adjustment of zones of mixed population, freedom of the seas, disarmament, colonies, etc.) which can only be solved by the establishment of a permanent pact between peoples uniting them in a free federation, even without, and in opposition to, those nations which should refuse to adhere to it.

"In this way it will be possible to realise the ideal, proclaimed by President Wilson and by the French Republic, of constituting the Society of Nations. They declare accordingly that the supreme end of the war ought to be defined in the constitution of the United States of Europe and of the world—the only sure guarantee of lasting peace, of international justice, and of a better future for humanity."

For what followed we will quote verbatim the account given by the *Corriere della Sera*.

"The speech of deputy De Ambris was loudly applauded by part of the assembly, while the counter-demonstration of another part gave rise to a lively tumult. Bartolozzi made himself the mouth-piece of the Opposition. He asked that the Congress should confine itself to the discussion of the quickest and most suitable means for hastening victory and increasing the country's power of resistance. The words of Bartolozzi produced fresh tumult, which, in consequence of the intervention of an officer of Bersaglieri, Rivanera, wounded and promoted for valour, ended in a great ovation to the army and cries of "Viva l'esercito! Viva i meravigliosi soldati d'Italia!" After discussion . . . the resolution was approved by a very large majority."

On 2 July *Le Temps* published a report of the proceedings of an International Congress of Freemasons, held in Paris during the closing days of June, at which several leading Italian Masons were present. According to this report a resolution, moved by M. Lebey, in which a League of Nations was welcomed, and the general lines of peace laid down on the basis of national self-determination, failed to make any special mention of Italy's irredentist claims, merely referring to them in the general category of "lands at present suffering under Austrian oppression" whose status was to be determined by means of plebiscites.

The report was reproduced in the Italian papers, and, of course, called forth a storm of indignation. Then a violent dispute arose as to its correctness, and revelations were made concerning what took place behind the scenes, "conferences between Italian and Jugoslav representatives, in which the former had allowed the latter to impose their views," etc., etc., hinting at alleged connections of Lebey with Caillaux and of both with German Masonry. The whole affair is of no great importance, perhaps, but it

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furnished Italian Clericals and Imperialists with a good opportunity for discrediting the patriotism of the Democrats and for making a counter-offensive. For the recent letting loose of democratic opinion amounts to an actual insurgence of the Left against the Right wing of the War party in Italy.

In commenting on the vote of the Interventionist Congress, *Il Secolo* fairly throws down the glove to the Nationalist journal. It describes the result as a "victory of the anti-nationalist and anti-imperialist tendencies," and goes on to expose in ruthless terms the inhumane and German character of the "real-politik" and the whole philosophy of the Nationalist party.

The *Idea Nazionale* seeks to belittle the importance of the vote, representing the Congress as having been precipitately organised and unrepresentative, swamped by an inroad of Socialist Interventionists from Milan. There may be some truth in this. But the vote of the Congress is not an isolated fact: for the Paris Conference on Balkan questions has called forth a number of articles in the Italian Radical Press of which the prevailing note is the subordination of particular aims and ambitions to the general programme of the Allies, the Alliance being understood not as an ordinary war coalition, but as a league of nations vowed to establish international organisation for peace.

The importance of the movement may be gauged, moreover, by the violent reaction it is producing among the extreme Imperialists.

J. C. POWELL.

Unconventional Envoys

PUBLIC opinion moves too slowly to keep pace with events. It cannot take a wide perspective, with every feature of the political landscape in its true setting; nor can it accommodate itself to the rapid changes in the political weather of the war. Accustomed in time of peace to watch at leisure the slow development of each successive phase of politics, it positively resents the sudden demand made upon it by such events as the Russian Revolution, and it takes a long time to adjust itself to the new situation. The angry outcry against the Government for the issue

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of Mr. Ramsay Macdonald's passports for Russia was one indication of this unhappy lack of adaptability in the British mind; for the point in dispute was quite other than was commonly supposed. Kindred considerations apply to the more important case of Mr. Henderson, which was so precipitately pre-judged by public opinion and by the House of Commons last week. There may have been something irregular in Mr. Henderson's proceedings; but we may remind the sticklers for etiquette that war is a huge irregularity itself, which is apt to upset the accepted conventions of peace. Indeed, the readiness to be unconventional is part of the true capacity to conduct war to victory.

The victory we desire implies more than a military decision in the field which will enable us to free Europe from Prussian militarism. It will be no victory worth having unless it is made the beginning of a new era, in which reason shall overrule force; and in order to give reason its full play we must see to it that all "reasonable" Europeans are enabled to unite and concentrate their forces upon one or two essential points. There are extremists in every camp in Europe. But between them stands a large, unorganised body of sober opinion, quite capable of a true judgment, yet desperately slow to move, which always wakes up after the event to damn those who have erred. The problem to-day is to arouse and marshal it betimes, and so to make it the determining force in the peace. It is very doubtful whether the Government will do anything to mobilise it; for no Government has ever shown the least sign of a desire to rely either on Parliament or on public opinion in any vital matter of foreign policy.

At this point we must emphasise the importance of using unconventional as well as conventional methods of communication with our Allies. When the whole nation is at war, the expression of its opinion can no longer be left—as in the good old days—solely to the official diplomatist. There is, in recent events, the fullest possible justification for employing unofficial envoys both to interpret our intentions to our Allies and to elicit their views. In the case of Russia this point is so obvious—the result of Lord Milner's mission hammered it into every head—that it hardly needs any further emphasis. But the principle is equally applicable elsewhere. In France, where the Socialist Party is such a force and

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where the British Embassy is not in the habit of cultivating the acquaintance of parliamentary Socialists, it could do nothing but good to allow a mixed Labour deputation from Great Britain to discuss the outcome of the war with their French colleagues. And instead of denouncing Mr. Henderson for accepting Mr. Ramsay Macdonald's company, we should rather applaud him for it. Herr Scheidemann's visit to Stockholm throws a significant light upon this argument; for no sooner had he placed himself in contact with the Socialists of other countries than he discovered the hopelessness of defending Germany as she is, and went home with the conviction that Germany must reform herself before she can re-enter the new concert of Europe. Every Socialist in Europe is now aware of this fact, and will do everything in his power to drive it home. By this we do not suggest that the Government should issue passports to enable British Socialists to take part in a conference where enemy Socialists are present; but we do insist that nothing but good can come of conferences between the Socialists of the Allies, because they have shown, for the most part, a true perception of the issue. We are content to leave the education of the Majority Socialists of Germany in the capable hands of Mr. Branting, the Swedish Socialist leader, who has already done so much to open their eyes.

Meanwhile the importance of knowing exactly the state of opinion in all the Allied countries lies in this: that, before long, Germany will renew her "peace offensive." Terms will be offered which will wear a generous appearance in all that concerns Western Europe, and will leave the East open to German power. There are many reasons why such proposals should be rejected. We have discussed them many times before in these pages and need not treat them in detail just now. But two of them are supremely important. First: The terms offered will be based upon the German desire to reap advantages elsewhere from the conquest of Belgium and Northern France. They will not be based on any principle which a good European can accept. They will only recognise the rights of nationality in Belgium in order to deny them to other peoples. Second: The manœuvre will proceed from the deliberate motive of forestalling and stifling a democratic movement among the

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German people. On both grounds it must be resisted. And, meanwhile, we must make sure that the approaching Conference on our own war aims shall bring all our commitments into unison with our public professions. We shall thus stand on firm ground in meeting the next German "peace offensive," and may do something to encourage German democrats to bring their rulers to book.

BOREAS.

The Crisis in Poland

AFTER a few months of preparatory work the Provisional Council of State of the Kingdom of Poland decided that the time had come when the promises made by the Central Powers on 5 November, 1916, must be redeemed. By its constitution the Council was destined to be an advisory body (*Beirat*), but the nation expected it in time to become a real factor in the government of the country (*Nebenregierung*). This was difficult to achieve in view of the intransigent attitude of the majority of the German officials, who, following the leadership of General v. Ludendorff and the chief of the civil administration of Poland, Herr v. Kriess, tried by all means at their disposal to prevent the Council from achieving this object. They even violated the statutory rights of the Council by constantly ignoring their representations, which, according to statute, had to be taken into account. The reluctance of the Germans to give up any part of the administration of the country into the hands of Poles, coupled with an economic exploitation unprecedented in the annals of history, had created throughout the country a feeling akin to revolt. The parties of the Left especially considered that the Council did not put forward their demands with sufficient strength.

On the other hand, the Germans, whose position on the Eastern front had been strengthened by the Russian Revolution, were unwilling to make any concessions.

The Council was thus caught between two fires. On 1 May it unanimously declared that, if the Central Powers made no concessions, the position of the Council in face of the opposition in the country would become untenable. The Marshal of the Crown, in opening the debate, enumerated the grievances of the Council, and especially underlined the fact that public opinion demanded that members of the

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Council should resign in a body if they were unable to obtain substantial concessions. It became evident that the nation held the Council responsible for the government of the country, and yet in fact the Council had no real power. In face of such an attitude of the population the situation could not last. Seeing that matters were getting serious, the Council of State demanded the immediate surrender by the occupying Powers of the most vital parts of the administration, fixing the time of the German reply for 10 May.

When the Council reassembled on that date the Commissioners of the occupying Powers asked for another delay, explaining that the two Central Powers had not had time to reach an agreement on the question. A week's delay was agreed upon, but when this elapsed the two Governments were still in disagreement.

Thereupon the Council suspended its activities. It was not till the end of May that the Government Commissioners were able to give the reply of their Imperial masters. This, however, was far from being satisfactory. It gave evasive answers to the Council's demands, and invited them to draw up a project setting out the details of their scheme. Despite the deliberate insufficiency of the answer, the Council could but comply with this request—the only other alternative being resignation. A mixed committee was appointed, consisting of an equal number of Councillors of State and representatives of those parties which stood aloof from the Council. The committee was requested to elaborate a detailed programme on the basis laid down by the German answer. On the recommendation of this committee the Council adopted on 3 July a detailed plan for the reform of the administration of the country. Obviously the settlement of the details of a joint administration of a country under military occupation must be largely a matter of give and take on the part of both sides concerned. But to a large portion of the nation it was obvious that the negotiations were not conducted *bonâ fide* on the side of the occupying Powers. The continuance of the high-handed administration of the country by German officials, many of whom still applied the anti-Polish methods used for the last fifty years in Posen, and perhaps the influence of the Russian Revolution on the ruined, starving and ill-treated working-classes

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in Poland only fostered the spirit of opposition. For some time the parties of the Left had been asking their representatives on the Council to resign, and some of them complied with this request. A further difficulty was created by the fact that when it came to the practical laying down of the foundations of the new State, class and party differences were bound to emerge. The whole situation became extremely tense, and a spark was only wanted to cause an explosion. The question of the oath to be taken by the Polish legions supplied such an opportunity. The problem of the creation of a Polish army had given the Council of State grave anxiety, and it was from the first determined that the Polish army, if created, should be dependent entirely on Polish authorities. Its attitude to this question is best expressed by the proclamation of 14 July :—

“ The Provisional Council of State called to the task of rebuilding the Polish State, has, from the first moment of its activities, held to the fundamental principle that this reconstruction ought to be based on the formation of a Polish national army and the Polish Legions should act as its cadres.

“ At its first meeting, held for purposes of organisation, the Council of State appointed a military commission, and, at the same time, declarations from all the regiments in the Legions were accepted, in which they welcomed the Council of State as the Polish Government. A declaration from the Polish Military Organisation, whereby this body placed its strength and blood at the Council of State's disposal, was also accepted, and recognition was expressed of the services rendered by the Legions and Brigadier-General Pilsudski both on the battlefields and in the formation of a Polish army. Since that time the Council of State has not for a moment desisted from its work of furthering the cause of a Polish army.

“ The Emperor Karl was requested to hand over the Legions to the Polish State. A demand was made to secure for them better economic support, and the principles were laid down in accordance with which the formation of a national army should be carried out.

“ To the proposed elimination of Austro-Hungarian subjects ” (*i.e.*, Galician Poles) “ from the Legions the Council of State opposed itself absolutely, and its protest was heeded. The Legions were finally turned over to serve as cadres for the formation of a Polish army, the chief command over which was placed in the hands of General Beseler. The management of the Polish armed forces was organised regardless of the proposals of the Council of State. As a result, however, of the Council's further efforts to safeguard the Polish character of the army thus in process of formation, a solemn word of honour was received from General Beseler, who undertook to train and give the country a national army.

“ It was also arranged that Polish officers should have a share in

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the management of the army, and that officers of the Legions, without regard to their allegiance, would be given battalion, company, and platoon commands in the training camps. The Council of State obtained an assurance that, up to the regimental commands, all appointments would be given to officers of the Legions, and also that both the Polish uniform and the Polish language for command would be retained. Lastly, consent has been secured in principle to the establishment of a War Department and the introduction of a uniform military judicature for all the legionaries.

"In the negotiations with regard to the formula of the oath, the Provisional Council of State three months ago rejected two proposed formulas, and has instead accepted a third and final one, which met with no protest either in the Council of State or outside of it. Two months ago the Council of State received from all the regiments the assurance that they would take the oaths only according to the formula accepted by the Council of State. Negotiations regarding this formula continued for three months, and finally the Governments of the Central Powers gave their assent. When at last a reply was received from the Austro-Hungarian Government to the effect that it would not demand the withdrawal of its subjects from the Legions, the Council of State called on all the officers and men of the Legions from the Congress Kingdom to take the oath."

This, however, many refused to do. In this some were guided by the conviction that the behaviour of the Germans in Poland was far from being satisfactory, and that their intentions towards Poland were not sincere; others, however, objected to the inclusion in the oath of the mention of the "future King of Poland." The Council succeeded in obtaining from the German authorities a guarantee that the legionaries who refused to take the oath would not be punished. But a series of arrests among all classes of the population took place. Among them the most prominent figure is that of Brigadier-General Pilsudski, former leader of the Polish Legions, and lately President of the Military Commission of the Council of State. On the occasion of the refusal by a part of the legionaries to take the oath the Council of State published a proclamation to the nation, in which, after a short historical account of their attitude towards the question of a Polish army (quoted above), they went on to say:—

"The Council of State solemnly declares that those who have taken the oath or may take it in future, as well as those patriots who may, in future, join the ranks of the volunteers, are militarily under obligation of obedience towards their military superiors. Politically, however, they have their highest national authority in the Council of State, which is, at the present time, the only legitimate and recog-

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nised body representing the Polish State, that is, the Motherland to which they pledged their loyalty.

"The Polish army cannot be used for any purpose other than national cause, and only with the consent of the Council of State. At the present moment the Council of State does not wish to throw the meagre nucleus of its own army into the whirlpool of battle, and thus to put too great a strain on the cadres of the Polish army.

"The Council of State will continue to work with a view to the earliest possible creation of a national army and a national government, those first fundamentals of independent statehood. The Council of State, which is, for the moment, the only legal representative of the Polish State, will proceed immediately to the organisation of supreme national authorities in accordance with the project of the 3 July—and to these it will hand over its functions without delay.

"Being at present the only authority with a right to define the political attitude of the Polish nation, the Council of State declares that the Polish nation does not wish to encourage the orgy of international hatreds, but desires to become a peace factor co-operating for the conclusion of the present sanguinary strife; it denies to anyone abroad, outside the frontiers of Poland, the right to dispose of Polish lives.

"Until the nation itself, assembled in a general and free Diet at the Royal Castle in Warsaw, takes over the sovereign authority, it is solely the provisional organs of the Polish Government, acting in Poland and its capital, that have the right and the duty to lead the nation to the goal desired by all.

"The Provisional Council of State, for the moment the only representative of the Polish State and its political Government, will at once take in hand the organisation of the Polish State authorities in accordance with the project voted on 3 July, and will then without delay hand over its functions to those authorities."

It is hardly possible to over-estimate the meaning of this proclamation. It contains some points of international importance. First of all, it is stated that the Council of State assumed "the highest national authority" over the Polish army. Secondly, the Council declared that they look upon an early peace as favourable to Poland, and, finally, by declaring that it "does not wish to throw the meagre nucleus of its own army into the whirlpool of battle," the Council has, in fact, declared the neutrality of Poland. But by laying stress on the proviso that it "denies to anybody abroad the right to dispose of Polish lives," the Council has coupled its declaration with the express condition that nobody will force Poles to serve in any army "outside the frontiers of Poland."

VARSOVIENSIS.

Mr. Balfour's Speech

MR. BALFOUR, replying mainly to Mr. Whyte, made an important speech on 30 July in the House of Commons. There were those who heard it, and agreed with it, and yet were not quite satisfied. None the less they did not speak after the Foreign Secretary had finished. I, for one, felt that the present position is too delicate to give irresponsible utterance to first thoughts. A Member may easily say things in his place in Parliament which will be used by the enemy to create a false impression of the reception given to the Minister's statement. THE NEW EUROPE, however, is read by most of those who take an interest in Foreign Politics and have influence on general opinion in regard to them; and there is something which ought still to be said in its columns with reference to this speech.

Anyone reading the verbatim report must allow that all the pertinent considerations were present to Mr. Balfour's subtle mind. It was the balance of the speech which was not, perhaps, quite satisfactory. In the earlier part of what he said, Mr. Balfour spoke at length, boldly, and clearly in regard to Belgium, France, and Alsace-Lorraine, but the reference to Austria and to the Balkans were timid and colourless. Those who weigh words will appreciate the reasons for this and not be misled, but the mass, even of our own educated people, read with a view to the general impression, and, moreover, read only abbreviated reports. The same is true of our Balkan friends. Now it seems to me that the general impression is likely to be that Mr. Balfour looks upon our interests in South-Eastern Europe as of quite a different order of importance from our interests in Belgium and France. Those of us who pay attention to Balkan affairs feel that it would be very unfortunate if such an idea, which I believe to be far from the truth, became general either here or in the Balkans, although we quite agree that it would be most unwise if the Government were to define its position in detail. What was wanted, especially in every public reference we make to the subject is a human note of sympathy and of association with the Roumanians, Serbs, and Greeks who have suffered for the ideals they hold dear and have incidentally served the Allied and the British cause valiantly.

In the latter part of his speech Mr. Balfour clearly faced

MR. BALFOUR'S SPEECH

the contingencies both of a German and of a non-German peace, and then he dwelt at some length on the democratisation of Germany. If there is real democracy at Berlin, the Austrian and Magyar domination on the Danube will be undermined, and the Balkan peoples will be free to settle their own future. What we may have to accept, however, is a peace which is neither German nor non-German, but something between. In that case it may be essential, both for the permanent settlement of Europe and for the maintenance of the British Empire, that the Balkan peoples should be helped by us to achieve a certain stability and independence. From that point of view it is surely all-important that our people here should not be led to underestimate the significance for them of the Balkan problem.

The truth of the matter is that the word "unselfish" is not quite appropriate for the description of British interests in Europe, and its use appears somewhat dubious even to our Allies. Our interests there are vital to us, as all our history shows, but they differ from those of other nations in being negative instead of positive. We have no wish to annex or dictate, but there are certain things which we must, if we can, forbid. We are bound to fight against any Power, and especially a strategically central Power, which aims at the domination of the Continent, and we have a special interest in preventing such a Power from controlling the Rhine mouths and the south shore of the English Channel. But our highest interest is Peace and Freedom in Europe; and from this point of view the *Corriere della Sera* speaks surely the elementary truth when it writes "Germany could even renounce Alsace-Lorraine and by saving the territorial integrity of her accomplice (Austria) could assure to herself uncontested dominion from Hamburg to Constantinople. If the *Entente* tolerates in the midst of Europe the existence of such a block it will have lost the war." There are people, both within and without Parliament, who are working to induce the British nation to forget this aspect of our problem.

H. J. MACKINDER.

31 July.

Helsingfors and Petrograd

THE Finnish Parliament in the last week of July passed the new constitution by 136 votes to 55 (having previously voted the urgency of the discussion by 165 to 27). Its text was as follows :—

“ Since the rights of the monarch have ceased, the following is to come into force, in accordance with the resolution of the Diet :—

“ § 1. The Diet of Finland alone decides, confirms and puts into execution all laws of Finland, including those relating to home affairs, taxation and customs. The Diet also makes the final decision regarding all other Finnish affairs, which the Emperor-Grand Duke decided according to the arrangements hitherto in force. The provisions of this law do not relate to matters of foreign policy nor to military legislation and military administration.

“ § 2. The Diet meets for regular sittings without special summons, and decides when they are to be closed. Until Finland's new form of Government is determined, the Diet exercises the right (in accordance with § 18 of the Orders of the Diet) of deciding upon new elections and the dissolution of the Diet.

“ § 3. The Diet controls the executive power of Finland. The supreme executive power shall, for the present, be exercised by the Finance Department of the Finnish Senate, whose members are nominated and dismissed by the Diet.”

It will thus be seen that in the two vital questions of Foreign Affairs and the Army a moderate attitude was adopted. The radical group of the Swedish Popular Party proposed an amendment in the following terms :—“ The Diet, which regards it as its right and duty to demand full independence in the name of the Finnish people, and reserves in this respect its full freedom of action, resolves,” etc. ; but this amendment was rejected by 125 to 63. The motion of the Main Committee, however, by which it was resolved not to submit the new law to the Provisional Russian Government for its sanction, was passed by 104 to 86. It is doubtless this action which has brought the conflict between Helsingfors and Petrograd to a head, and has resulted in the Provisional Government dissolving the Finnish Diet and ordering new elections in two months' time.

According to the latest telegrams the Diet, in its turn, disputes the Provisional Government's right to exercise the prerogative of dissolution, and a deadlock has ensued.

Dr. Dernburg on Reconstruction.

[We print below large extracts from an article entitled "Economics of the Transition Period," by Dr. Dernburg (*Wirtschaftszeitung der Zentralmächte*, 22 June, 1917), written on the occasion of the Conference of the combined Economic Associations of Germany, Austria, and Hungary, at Budapest. Dr. Dernburg was formerly German Colonial Secretary, and during the war has played an appropriate part in revealing to the American people the true nature of German policy.]

"We confidently expect the war to end on terms favourable to the Central Powers. On any other hypothesis it would be senseless to discuss the question of transition economy at all. There is, indeed, a strong agitation on foot in Germany in favour of a 'dictated' peace, such as would impose our conditions upon the rest of the world. I will not discuss here whether such a peace is at all attainable, or how long and what sacrifices would be required to attain it. Suffice it to say that the problems of the transition period after a dictated peace would bear a very peculiar complexion, they would involve a long-continued garrisoning of occupied countries, the forcible levy of contributions in raw materials and gold, and so on. . . . A dictated peace would, in fact, be little better than an armistice—no peace at all—and would necessitate the continuance of the existing economic conditions. Anyone, therefore, who speaks of transition economy must assume that we shall embark on a peace by agreement in the sense of the Austrian Emperor's speech from the Throne, where he declares that 'the true peace formula is only to be found in a mutual recognition of a valiant defence, and in establishing conditions whereby the future life of peoples may remain free from anger and vengeance, so that for generations to come the appeal to arms may be unnecessary.'

WAR'S WASTAGE.

"But even so, the question is not easy. The Central Powers have used up their natural resources to a greater extent than the *Entente*; the *Entente*, on the other hand, has thrown a greater strain on its credit. In every country the means of production have been exposed to a tremendous strain. Substitute industries have assumed extraordinary proportions. The world's means of transport are, to a large extent, destroyed by sea and rendered inefficient by land. There will be an immeasurable and world-wide hunger for raw material and commodities of all kinds. Can it be satisfied in a short time? The answer is, No. . . . I assume that the resolutions of the Paris Economic Conference will be entirely dropped, and that there will be no boycott from any quarter. The universal necessity will undoubtedly impose this. . . . Leaving out of account the difficulties of transport and exchange, the fact remains that all countries will compete for raw materials. The exclusion of the Central Powers and their allies from the number of consumers has nowhere produced a surplus of raw materials.

MILITARY NEEDS COME FIRST.

"But even inside every single national economic unit a competi-

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tion has grown up between various demands, each equally claiming to be in the national interest. First, there is the demand for the repair of military material. Even if, as I desire and hope, we arrive at international arrangements for the prevention of war, they will only secure confidence if they are backed by the strength and the determination of the contracting Powers. These repairs involve, first, the renewal of millions' worth of destroyed material for which there will be an immediate demand. Second, there will be a demand for storage. How necessary this is the Central Power have discovered by bitter experience. England, too, has lost her island security. So that not only must ordinary peace supplies be replenished, but supplies of the most important foodstuffs and raw materials must be stored and financed to serve for the needs of many years ahead. Then, thirdly, comes the natural demand of the civil population for the satisfaction of its daily needs. We cannot hope to arrive at a satisfactory arrangement between these three competing interests without facing the further difficulty that a substantial inroad will have to be made upon the ration left over for civilian needs. All these things must be paid for in goods, gold, or credit. Exportable goods do not exist in sufficient quantities. Our stock of gold is not available for the purpose, and, as for credit, many of the countries which produce raw materials are not in a position to give it. The sources of credit in other countries are much impaired by war loans. Credit, however, cannot be secured by force. *Nothing remains but to withdraw part of the imported raw materials from serving the needs of the civilian population* and to work them up for export purposes so as gradually to arrive at a commercial and financial equilibrium. Now, owing to the interruption of the war, this export trade will not get under way as quickly as would seem desirable. We shall, therefore, have to prepare our minds for a very long period of transition, and, like the rest of the world, shall be in need of a peace by agreement resting upon a solid basis. Above all, under the conditions that I have described, the return to free private commercial dealings is not to be looked for too quickly.

DOMESTIC TROUBLES AHEAD.

“Add to this great domestic difficulties, not only in our own, but in all countries. Industry has been transformed by the war, and though it has accumulated great resources, these are to a large extent immobilised in war loans. There are, therefore, considerable financial problems to be faced. Again, the repair of material requires not only time but considerable amount of capital as a result of the general increase in the cost of production. The industrial conditions produced by the war have in all branches of production been favourable to tendencies hitherto combated both by the industrial community and by the State. Every industry in any way capable of combination has been formed into a cartel. The shortage of raw material, labour, and transport has led to a system of rationing of raw material, closing of businesses and transference of work to the most capable firms, while weaker businesses

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are hit by the taxation of profits. On the other hand, combinations of wage earners have been very much strengthened by the war. The right to combine and so bring influence to bear on the rate of wages and on conditions of labour can neither be withheld nor taken away. In a democratic country neither the State nor the employers are strong enough to do this In the light of these considerations the problem of reintroducing our soldiers into productive activity is vital. It can only be done in proportion as employment, that is to say, raw material and working capital, are available. For even a partial period of unemployment would lead to disastrous manifestations. Demobilisation will have to be carefully worked out, and will certainly extend over a long period, however irksome it may be to those with the colours. . . . The Governments, which must for a long time to come remain equipped with great powers after the pressure and strain of war has ceased and the means for curbing public discussion have necessarily been laid aside, will only be able to surmount these difficulties if they can rely on the active help of the whole of their peoples; *that is to say, after they have satisfied the justifiable political ambitions of their citizens for a share in responsibility and decisions.*"

Colonies and Submarines

[As a footnote to Dr. Dernburg's argument we print the following passages from an article by Professor Hintze, of Berlin, in the *Euro-päische Staats und Wirtschaftszeitung*, 2 June, 1917.]

"It is precisely the difficulty of securing raw materials that makes the possession of colonies desirable for us. Our colonies are now in the hands of our enemies. That we shall get them back is a matter of course, due to our self-respect amongst the nations. *Belgium and the other occupied territories serve as pledges for their recovery.* In detail, however, there will have to be considerable alterations in our colonial property, which must be extended and consolidated. But we must be careful not to overestimate the value of a colonial empire, which can hardly be an important factor in our political power. . . . Its economic importance remains the chief consideration. But we also need oversea harbours and bases for our fleet. This brings us to another point. We live in the back apartments of the European House while our opponents have a front door on the highway of the Atlantic. We have only the backdoor on the North Sea and the Baltic at our command, which, as the war has shown, can be barred by England. It is this which makes the freedom of the seas so vital. It will not be opened so long as England enjoys her naval supremacy. Alterations in the laws of naval warfare will be of little avail. Certainly such an alteration should not be confined to mere details of the right of capture. This would militate against the commercial war of our submarines, and thus strengthen England's position. Side by side with this must come a restatement of contraband, which would make a starvation war like that of to-day impossible under

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international law. A blockade of the North Sea ought not to be regarded as legitimate. Those who desire the freedom of the seas must insist that there is some sea-power in existence which can effectively limit England's sole supremacy. Therefore, it is of the first importance for us that there shall be no hindrance to the strengthening of our fleet. We used, to say before the war that our fleet would protect our oversea trade and possessions. *This task it has not fulfilled in the present war*, but we see the need of it to protect our coasts and provide a secure base for our submarines. The submarine weapon must not be struck out of our hand. It is the most effective help in war against a superior sea-power, and the increased risks and uncertainties that it involves are well calculated to prevent the outbreak of war. . . . The submarine is the warship of the small Power. So long as England maintains her supremacy, it is indispensable to us."

"Mittelafrika": a German War-Aim

In the weekly review, März, 14 July, 1917, Emil Zimmermann writes an article under the above title, which must be read as a contribution to the "annexation" controversy. After pointing out that the European military situation has unduly favoured the annexationists and depressed the colonial school, he proceeds:—

"Every traveller is well aware of England's mighty world-position, and knows, as does the Government, that Germany's overseas position depended on England's goodwill. We lived by grace of the English 'open door.' By our own strength we had achieved next to nothing, apart from Kiauchow, and the very little done in our colonies, which—the fact in itself is significant—have never been popular. Our great overseas commercial undertakings were all established in territories which the Portuguese, the Spanish, the Dutch and, above all, the English, had developed. In recognition of this state of affairs the Imperial Government, before the outbreak of war, had negotiated with England with the ultimate aim of securing a great German 'Mittelafrika.' It was there that Germany was to lay the foundations of her world-power.

"The Imperial Government should have endeavoured to hold fast to the same line of policy even through the war; but the war itself destroyed the slender foundations on which we had begun to build 'Central Africa.' The Morocco-Congo Treaty had already brought the idea into disrepute, and it was very easy for 'continental' politicians to decry the Central African proposition as weak-kneed pandering to England, and to talk of the 'sacrifice' of valuable hostages (*Faustpfänder*) on the Continent for the sake of a Central Africa held only by the grace of England and America. These 'continentally' short-sighted politicians are of course supported by the tens of thousands of officials and officers who have been given posts in the occupied territories infinitely superior to those they held before the war; many soldiers in the ranks who have their own hopes for the future on the newly-won soil would also agree with them.

“ MITTELAFRIKA ”: A GERMAN WAR-AIM

Officers of the Higher Command expect to be able to settle tens of thousands of disabled soldiers on the conquered territories; German business men dream of enormous profits to be made along the new frontiers. All these elements taken together explain the extraordinary strength of the feeling in favour of a firm ‘continental’ peace which is now sweeping through the country.

“ But this current of opinion quite overlooks the fact that for us the main problem is not how to become stronger on the Continent—the war has shown that we are fully strong enough there—but how to maintain our position overseas, and the economic policy dependent on it, without which we shall grow weak on the military as well as on the economic side.”

After emphasising Germany’s post-war need of abundant raw materials, he proceeds:—

“ The situation has been radically changed by the U-boat campaign. The United States, China, Brazil, and a number of smaller Central and South-American States have associated themselves with England in a joint move against Germany, and we are faced by an entirely new state of affairs. If, for instance, all these States should mutually conclude commercial treaties by which they pledged themselves to a high tariff on all exports to enemy States, then, in addition to increased cost of living we should have increased cost of raw materials. Our industrial concerns would be forced either to underpay their workers, which would lead to constant labour troubles, or else to give up exporting, and dismiss their workers. The latter, moreover, could not be provided for either in Courland or Lithuania; and Belgium, as an industrial State, would herself suffer in the same way.”

After pointing out that continental conquests will not yield cheap raw materials, he turns to strategy with the words:—

“ ‘Mittelafrika’ would lie at the very centre of England’s main arteries leading to South Africa, Australia and India; and, in German hands, it would contribute towards crippling the British Empire. Through German ‘Central Africa’ we should best be able to influence decisions in Australia and India, as we could threaten their sea communications with England. And thus a strong German Central-Africa could help towards German possessions in the south seas. The country is, of course, still undeveloped economically; but so much the more would we be able to lay the foundations of our own world-policy by means of hard, but profitable, work, instead of remaining mere parasites upon England. As things now stand, Central-Africa in its undeveloped condition could not supply all our needs in raw materials. But a policy of co-operation with further developed South American States, such as Argentine, Chili and South Brazil, could be initiated, as also with Mexico; and by inviting the Germans of North America to migrate to these countries, and to develop them, we could set up another alliance against that of the Anglo-Saxon race, and thereby drive a wedge into the coalition of our enemies. Such is the policy dictated by our truest national needs, which alone can be decisive.”

Reviews

Russian Realities and Problems: edited by J. D. Duff. Cambridge, 1917. (University Press.) 4s. 6d. net. One of the greatest realities in all history separates the reader of this volume from the period in which its contents were first delivered in the form of lectures. And yet, though our whole outlook upon Russia has been transformed, and though what seemed advanced and extravagant nine months ago has been utterly outdistanced by the rush of events, the names of the five authors are in themselves a guarantee of seriousness. Professor Miljukov, who contributes so lucid an account of the powers and limitations of the Russian Duma in its first decade of existence, has always been known as the chief upholder of the parliamentary tradition in Russia; and thus what he writes is only rendered the more interesting by the knowledge that the whole fabric of the Duma has since been submerged by elemental forces, and he himself, after a brief interval of power, dashed aside and left far behind by the torrent of events. In the same way the interest of Mr. Dmowski's extremely able survey of Polish history is only intensified by the fact that he, the chief advocate of Russophil and Tsarophil tendencies among the Poles, has had the ground cut from under his feet. The other writers raise less controversial issues. Mr. Harold Williams brings his unequalled knowledge of Russia to bear upon the non-Russian nationalities and their problems. Professor Struve surveys the immense possibilities of Russian agriculture and industry, while Professor Lappo-Danilevsky deals very learnedly with Russia's contribution to science and thought. "Russia is one huge process of evolution," says Mr. Williams; "Russia is only beginning to be," and we, who are vitally interested spectators of events, cannot afford to ignore such guides as these.

La Politique Marocaine de L'Allemagne: Louis Maurice. Paris, 1916 (Plon). 3 francs. This little volume is a most useful contribution to the tangled history of Franco-German relations during the ten years which separate the conclusion of the Franco-British Entente from the outbreak of the Great War. As a succinct and unadorned narrative of the Moroccan Affair it forms a most useful supplement to M. André Tardieu's classical study of Algeciras and its diplomacy. M. Maurice's conclusions may be summed up in the view that 1914 witnessed the bankruptcy of the Treaty of 1911, just as 1911 that of the agreement of 1909, and 1909 that of the Act of Algeciras—"a series of bankruptcies willed by Germany and destined to be reproduced indefinitely." He is unquestionably right when he says that in all these years Germany never really used any argument towards France save that of *quia nominor leo*, but was always determined "to make her claws felt." On the other hand, it is difficult to feel any enthusiasm for the view that "France's obvious and capital interest is to exclude all competition from Morocco." Here speaks the stiff Protectionism of the French Colonial system which, at any rate in the old extreme form, is hardly likely to survive the present upheaval.

R. W. S.-W.

REVIEWS

The British Soldier's Guide to Northern France and Flanders: Hon. J. W. Fortescue. [*The Times*]. One Penny. The soil of France has seen more battles, upheavals, and political experiments than any other. Studded thickly with historic names, it is an eloquent witness of supreme place which the French people hold in the history of the world. Mr. Fortescue, the well-known historian of the British Army, gives us a corner of France devoted to "the oldest and most familiar of the British Army's campaigning grounds." "The campaigns dealt with in his pages fall into five groups, namely, those of William III., from 1691 to 1697; of Marlborough, from 1702 to 1711; of Stair, Wade, Cumberland, and Ligonier, between 1742 and 1748; of the Duke of York, in 1793 and 1794; and of Wellington, in 1815. In every case France was the enemy, and the general front of the British was towards the West and South. Now, with that most gallant nation for our friend, we face in the opposite direction." We hope that Mr. Fortescue will expand his military "Baedeker" in a more substantial and enduring form.

Trieste and Salonica

The declarations recently made by the Freemasonic Congress in Paris have given rise to much lively comment in the French and Italian Press. In the *Giornale d'Italia* of 24 July Senator Cocchia makes a curious contribution to the discussion. Referring to "the significant silence which, for the first time in an official document, has been thrown over the old thesis of Belgium's restoration," he asks whether this is "a mere accident or deliberate neglect." From the Italian point of view the most marked feature in this Masonic programme is the absence of any reference to Trieste, and the Senator tries to explain it as follows:—"I am not in their secrets. Certainly the question of Trieste will either be solved to-day or never. And it is possible to solve it apart from that conquest for which we hoped and which we still confidently await from the valour of our arms. . . . To me it seems that their thought ran more or less on these lines: 'What right has Greece to Salonica? And why not remove the apple of discord by entrusting its guardianship, at any rate provisionally, in exchange for Trieste, to the Power which so ardently desires it?' Do not these two solutions form part of that system of Balance of Power, which is the chief secret of diplomacy in all time?"

It is still not sufficiently realised that Salonica is something very like the Mecca of political Freemasonry—the centre from which subterranean wires go out to all the haunts of the international financier. We shall not go far wrong in ascribing to these cryptic influences part at least of the blame for the paralysis which has overcome the Salonica expedition. For how can mere straight-thinking generals, absorbed in the vast problems of strategy and supply, hope to prove a match for their hidden opponents in the greatest of all games—opponents who possess the resources of a Talaat, a Djavid and a Carasso, with all their tribe of secret agents?

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A Bavarian Verdict on Austria

How the question of the regeneration of Austria is regarded in well-informed German circles may be gathered from a very outspoken article published by the *Münchener Neueste Nachrichten* of 25 July, which sums up the attitude of the various non-German groups as follows:—"The Poles no longer take interest in anything but their Greater Poland, and make no concealment of the fact that they want a separate position (*Sonderstellung*) at the very least, and are absolutely indifferent as to whether a new constitution comes into being for the other portions of the State. It is pretty much the same with the Ruthenes, who are only concerned as to how they can satisfactorily get away from the Poles. With the Czechs it is different. All their pronouncements, from their first constitutional protest on the 31 May onwards, are to the effect that they positively no longer want the Austrian 'joint State' (*Gesamtstaat*) in its present form, but a Czecho-Slovak kingdom under Habsburg rule, to be secured to them by the Peace Conference. In other words, they expect their salvation from outside, that is, from the *Entente*. If none the less they decided to take part in the Constitutional Committee, this was merely for the purpose of supervising and, if possible, exploiting in their own direction the activity of this Committee." After a confused reference to the Southern Slavs, he proceeds:—"It is with these parties, then, that Parliament is to create a constitution for the *Gesamtstaat*. Those who fancy this to be possible are pursuing an ostrich policy such as can hardly be distinguished from a complete lack of ideas. But if the miracle were really to take place, and if—in present circumstances obviously as the result of the Germans being voted down—a new constitution were to come into being, corresponding to the wishes of the Slav parties, this would of necessity lead to a further dislocation of the body politic and not to the formation of a united whole in which the various parts would agree peaceably among themselves (*friedlich-schiedlich vertragen*). It is thus clear that nothing useful is to be attained on the path indicated by Dr. von Seidler. If order is to be restored in the empire the matter must be dealt with in another manner; an understanding must first be sought in the provinces, and such frontiers drawn as are necessary for the subordination of the parts to the whole. But whether the hour for this has struck—now, before the final decisions have been reached—is another question. For the inter-connection between military events and the internal condition of the State can—unfortunately—no longer be doubted."

It is worth adding that this last sentence was written *after*, not before, the commencement of the Russian debacle in Galicia.

Erzberger and the Distracted Centrum

Herr Erzberger—the *enfant terrible* of the Catholic Centre Party in the Reichstag—has set all German tongues a-wagging by his declaration that if he could only have an hour in closeted converse with Mr. Balfour or Mr. Lloyd George he could find common ground

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for the discussion of peace between Germany and Great Britain. Herr Erzberger is of that sanguine tribe whose wishes are the parents of their thoughts; and, despite the *bona fides* he has shown in his attacks on Dr. Helfferich and Dr. von Bethmann-Hollweg, early in July, we cannot say that sound judgment is his strongest point. In that we appear to have the agreement of his own colleagues in the Centrum; for the General Committee of the Party has authorised the publication of the following declaration in their own organ, *Germania* :—“ The Centre Party approves of a peace by understanding and agreement which guarantees the political safety and economic further development of Germany. It appeals to all members of the Centre Party to be steadfast, firmly and unshakably, in a firm desire for an honourable peace, as are our heroic army and our glorious navy, until the happy ending of the war.”

These are the words of Mr. Facing-Both-Ways. They do not differ one whit from the usual German formula; and until they are rewritten in a substantially different and definite form, we shall make no progress towards peace. The British Government can assist that process by candidly meeting the growing popular demand that the result of the approaching Allied Conference on War Aims shall be a real concord between our professions and our actions. Secret agreements, of the old diplomatic kind, are an offence to the peoples of the modern world.

“Vorwärts” Attacks the Wolff Bureau

Vorwärts (25 July) attacks the Wolff Bureau for alleged wilful misrepresentations of statements made in the Reichstag, which it gives out in one manner for the benefit of foreign opinion and in a totally different manner for German consumption. The paper continues :—“ The Reichstag has clearly and unmistakably declared that forcible annexations, political, economic, or financial oppressions, are irreconcilable with the Kaiser’s words, ‘ We are not driven by lust of conquest.’ This is what the Reichstag really declared to other nations, and the Wolff Bureau attempts by distortion to create a gulf between the Reichstag and those nations. In consequence of this it is easy to pick up adverse comments from foreign papers and present them as proof that the action of the Reichstag has been a blow in the air and a needless humiliation to Germany.” *Vorwärts* asks whether the Wolff bureau is the mouthpiece of Krupp’s press agencies or the plaything of arbitrary officials or the tool of the Government, and continues :—“ If the latter, why does it not serve the Government instead of thwarting its purpose? The natural consequence of all this is that Germany’s action appears double-faced, false, and treacherous, and that the Government, the Reichstag, and the whole people are placed in a false position.” *Vorwärts* then quotes the Chancellor’s words that he would not allow the direction of affairs to be taken out of his own hands, and remarks that the cessation of such cross-purposes is the first essential condition of political success. †

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The Imperial Socialists

At a public meeting in Berlin on 26 July the Socialist Majority leader, Herr Scheidemann, after emphasising Socialist loyalty to their Fatherland, dealt with the internal situation thus:—

“ We are reproached for taking part at a meeting at which the Emperor also appeared. It is true that we are Social-Democrats and Democrats, but not Zulu Kaffirs. (Stormy applause.) We accepted a friendly invitation, and met even the Emperor with question and answer. Bethmann-Hollweg unfortunately did not understand how to secure for himself the majority of the Reichstag. One may say of him what one will, but it is his imperishable merit to have carried Universal, Equal, and Secret Franchise for Prussia. We were asked in Stockholm whether we did not want to produce at home a crisis like the Russian. I repeat, we have no such desire. In Russia it has come to Socialists shooting at Socialists. We do not want a separate peace, but if the Russians want peace, they may rest assured that they can have it without annexations and without the least war indemnity. So long as our opponents do not cease fighting we shall, I repeat, place at the State's disposal the means for continuing the war. Though we are International Social-Democrats we have not ceased to be good Germans.”

Libels on Russian Leaders

Freedom of political comment is a great asset at all times, but the commentators cannot retain their freedom unless they use it with discretion. That is so axiomatic that we should not mention it but for the disloyal manner in which certain organs of the British Press (chiefly in their despatches from Petrograd) are now endeavouring to discredit the Revolution by the most dishonourable means. Open support of reaction is now being given by certain British writers whose connection with important London newspapers gives their articles a wide circulation. Some of them are well-known critics of democracy even in England; others are thoughtless persons in search of purple copy; others, again, are old friends of Tsardom. These latter gentlemen—traitors to the ideal of a New Europe—did all in their power, before the Revolution, to discredit the Duma because, at that time, the Duma was the sole champion of liberalism. And since the Revolution they have used all the weapons employed by the old *régime* to blacken the character of those who were honestly striving for the salvation of Russia: (a) by stirring up the old feud between Russian and Jew; (b) by calling every Russian Socialist a “ pro-German ” or a Jew; (c) by shouting the war cry, “ Victory first, reform afterwards,” which is the time-honoured device of every reactionary for postponing real democracy to the Greek Kalends. Such manœuvres give the Russian people the impression that there is a powerful body of British opinion ready to welcome the Tsar back to the throne. It is to combat that notion that we draw attention to these libels on Russian leaders.

Printed for CONSTABLE & Co. LTD., by EYRE & SPOTTISWOODE, LTD.,
His Majesty's Printers, East Harding Street, E.C. 4.

The New Europe

VOL. IV, No. 44

[REGISTERED FOR TRANSMISSION AT
THE INLAND NEWSPAPER RATE.]

16 August 1917

Mr. Kerenski's New Ministry

THE new Russian Government is a compromise between the ideas of the Cadets on the one hand and of the Social Democrats on the other. Four moderate Cadets have joined the Government on the understanding that they will be given a free hand and no longer be subject to the decisions of the Central Committee of the party. This removes the danger of the Cadet Ministers resigning in a body and precipitating a Cabinet crisis similar to that of last month. The Social Democrats have made a similar compromise. Three members of the party (*i.e.*, of the Minimalist group) have joined hands with Mr. Kerenski on the understanding that they will no longer be the mere puppets of the C.W.S.D. Though responsible to that body they are to be given the right of personal initiative to a wider extent than in the former Coalition in which the policy of the Government was practically dictated by the C.W.S.D.

Such a compromise on the part of the Cadets and Social Democrats was absolutely essential if the new Government was to become a committee of public safety with almost unlimited powers. The Petrograd riots and the insubordination at the front were a severe blow to the prestige of the C.W.S.D., and it was clear that it could no longer claim the responsibility of government without arousing violent opposition, which might have led to a counter-revolution or a military dictatorship. It was to avoid these dangers that the C.W.S.D. yielded part of the power which it had exercised almost without restraint during the previous two months. It has had the courage to yield at the right moment, and in the wise hands of Mr. Tsereteli it may rapidly regain much of the prestige that it has lost.

Mr. Tsereteli's main task will be to reconcile the idealism of International Socialists with practical realities. The Russian Government, if it is to be a real coalition, can no longer be merely the mouthpiece of International Socialism, and Tsereteli himself, though remaining an Internationalist, is not likely to try to force the hand of the Government in

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this direction. The failure of the old Coalition was that it was directly responsible to the C.W.S.D. and the Cadets always found themselves in a minority. The agreement between Kerenski and Tsereteli probably means that the latter will use his influence in the C.W.S.D. to make the relations between the different parties in the Government as smooth as possible. No official blessing is to be given to an International Socialist Conference, 'but no effort will be made to stop those who wish to attend.

It is easy in the light of recent events to point to the mistakes of the C.W.S.D., but it would not have been so easy for any other party in power to have avoided them. These mistakes were due to a sincere desire not to ignore the opinions of any section of the people. The numbers and influence of the Maximalists were always an unknown factor, and it was impossible for a Government whose very foundation was freedom of speech to refuse it to the more extreme elements on the Left. The abuse of this freedom by a few corrupt agents of an enemy Government has led to a violent revulsion of feeling, but it may yet prove to have been the right policy to have trusted the masses to the utmost. A "strong" Government in the early stages of the revolution was well-nigh impossible and might have provoked a far more serious conflict than actually occurred in Petrograd. After the revolution people were not in the mood for a "strong" Government that would take upon itself to decide what was good and what was not good for the masses. The Russian people have had a terrible experience during the last few months, but that experience may prove to be the salvation of Russian democracy.

Though the defeat of the Russian armies in Galicia and Bukovina may have had a salutary effect on the spirit of democracy in Russia, as is shown by the firmer determination to defend the country, it has been a severe blow to the cause of democracy outside Russia. Nothing in this war has revealed who are the friends and who the foes of democracy so unmistakably as the reception given to the Russian revolution. The Russian failures at the front have been pounced upon by some as proof that democracy is a "wash-out," that there must be no politics in war time. Russian democracy was faced with almost superhuman difficulties, and in striving to overcome them it inevitably made blunders.

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But the difficulties of Russia are the direct result of the old *régime*. The political difficulties are due to the suppression of all political education, the economic to the corruption and incompetence of the old bureaucracy. The leaders of the revolution not only had to gain political experience, but had to do so under economic conditions that made the task of government well-nigh impossible.

It is important that public opinion here should not be turned against the C.W.S.D., for it still remains the most representative body in Russia. If the new Government is more independent than the last, the fact remains that no Government could at the present moment exist—without risking civil war—unless it had the support of the Workmen's and Peasants' Deputies. The difference between the new Coalition Government and the old is one of power and responsibility, not of principle. Mr. Tsereteli has left the Government not because he disagrees with its programme, which on all essential points remains the same as before, but because he cannot divest himself of any of his responsibility towards the C.W.S.D. Though the change of Government in Russia may mean a change in the method of conducting the war it must not be taken to mean any change in the objects for which it is being fought.

The Government that is to save Russia from anarchy or reaction is for the most part Socialist in character. Its composition corresponds to the strength of the political parties, and it is not surprising, therefore, that the chief posts in the Government should be in the hands of the Social Revolutionaries. There seems little doubt that the Social Revolutionaries are far and away the strongest party in Russia at the present moment. Though before the war divided into several groups, they have succeeded far better than the Social Democrats in welding the party together. A striking proof of their power is to be found in the results of the municipal elections in both Petrograd and Moscow, where they gained large majorities. When it is remembered that they are essentially a peasant party, chiefly interested in the land question, their success in the two big cities is all the more remarkable. When the various village and provincial units are reorganised on a democratic basis it is probable that the Social Revolutionaries will further increase in power, and there is every prospect that the

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elections to the Constituent Assembly will give them a large majority.

This means that the new Government is still controlled by Socialists, though, being more independent of the C.W.S.D., it will not be forced into carrying out an elaborate Socialist programme before the Constituent Assembly meets. There is more chance, therefore, of avoiding class bitterness which has a paralysing effect on the conduct of the war. Both Kerenski and Tsereteli recognise that the main task at present is the defence of the country and the restoration of the fighting qualities of the army. Such economic and financial reforms as are introduced will have this object in view. If full powers are given to General Kornilov it is only for special military objects, and he is to be a military dictator only at the front. There is much ignorant or malicious talk of the need of a military dictator who will assume the reins of government at Petrograd as well as at the front, as though politics were of no account during a war. What we understand by the agreement between Kerenski, the hero of the Revolution, and General Kornilov, the hero of the war, is that every political as well as military means will be employed for bringing the war to a successful end. One of the greatest victories of this war is the Russian Revolution, and unless the war ends with the triumph of Russian democracy one of the chief guarantees for the future peace of Europe will have been lost.

RURIK.

The Ukraine Problem

APART from an infinity of contributory causes—economic, social, financial—there are five main political problems which lie at the root of the World War. Of these three—Anglo-German rivalry, the question of Alsace-Lorraine and the fate of Constantinople and the Straits—are fairly generally understood, or at least have from the first been recognisable in their main outlines: while the fourth, the Southern Slav question, though at first ignored or misconceived even by statesmen of the first rank, has gradually imposed itself upon the popular consciousness. Of the fifth—the problem of the Ukraine—it is true to say that after three years of war its very existence is still scarcely known to public opinion.

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The course of events since the Revolution, however, has made it impossible to ignore the problem any longer, especially as it has completely revolutionised the traditional attitude of Austria and Russia both towards it and towards each other.

The very name of the Ukraine had fallen into oblivion in the west : but that it is not a mere modern invention is shown by the numerous books devoted to Ukraine events which were published in English as long ago as the 17th century. The word signifies " border " and took its origin from the debateable country which then lay between the three unwieldy rivals of those days, Turkey, Poland and Muscovy. But the territory inhabited by Ukrainians stretches far beyond this border country, and its inhabitants were commonly known as Little Russians, or in Austria as Ruthenes, until gradually " Ukrainian " has come to be accepted as the national name. To-day their numbers are estimated at some twenty to twenty-five millions on Russian soil, occupying Podolia, Volhynia, Kiev, and Cholm, and stretching far to the east of the Dniepr to the Sea of Azov and beyond ; four millions in Eastern Galicia and Bukovina and half a million in the Carpathian districts of Hungary. Their earliest state formation was that of Kiev, which accepted Christianity under Vladimir in the 10th century and had already attained a high degree of culture and commercial prosperity, before the rival Russian principalities of the north rose to power. Kiev's independence was destroyed by the terrible Mongol invasion of 1239. In a greatly reduced form the state of Halitch-Volhynia dragged out a somewhat precarious existence under its own dynasty for a century longer, until it in its turn collapsed before the combined onslaught of Poland and Hungary. The western half (what is roughly the Eastern Galicia of to-day) fell under the Polish Crown, while Volhynia, Podolia and Kiev preserved a looser connection with Lithuania, at whose court White or Little Russian was the predominant language. But after the union of the Polish and Lithuanian crowns in 1385, the oppressive aristocratic system of Poland asserted its sway more and more, until by the Union of Lublin in 1569 the old equality gave place to unfettered Polish hegemony. In the century that followed, however, Poland proved unequal to the task of defending her conquests against the hordes of Tartar invaders from

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the east or the Turkish menace from the south: and in consequence anarchy grew apace throughout the Ukraine. It was under these unsatisfactory conditions that the Cossacks first became a serious political factor, forming as time went on "a regular guerilla republic of the steppe," defying all foreign suzerainty, taxation or military service, and attracting to themselves large numbers of peasants who sought to escape the intolerable burden of serfdom. Thus the lands of the Dniepr and the Don were to all intents and purposes already lost to Poland long before the rising of 1648 united peasants and nobles in a common cause.

Under its famous Hetman, Bohdan Chmielnitsky, the Ukraine concluded in 1654 the Treaty of Perejaslavl, which, little as it has been respected, has ever since formed in theory the basis of its whole constitutional position. Drawn up in haste and ambiguously expressed, it was none the less a formal act of union between the Ukraine and Moscow, and as such must be regarded as one of the most important stages in the development of modern Russia. But no greater contrast in political outlook can be imagined than that between the two contracting parties. On the one hand stood ancient Moscow, in which autocracy, already strong in its semi-Tartar days, acquired additional strength from the methods which it borrowed from the West; on the other, a loosely-knit republican organisation resting upon essentially democratic local institutions. Just as fire and water cannot mingle, one of these opposing types of government was bound to yield to the other; and under 18th century conditions the victory of Tsardom was well-nigh inevitable.

From the very first the Tsars encroached upon the privileges of the Ukraine, whose Hetmans consequently wavered between Moscow and Poland, the victims of continual infringements and restrictions from both sides. The attempt to find fresh allies led them into alliance with Turkey and with Sweden, but in each case "the Northern Colossus" proved too strong for them. The picturesque figures of Charles XII and the Hetman Mazeppa illuminate for a moment this dark corner of history. The battle of Poltava (1709) put an end to all hope of Ukraine independence. Peter the Great, who in one of his ukases took the uncompromising line that "it is well known that all Hetmans since Chmielnitsky were traitors," set himself deliberately to break their power. His

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centralising work was completed by Catherine the Great, who deposed the last Hetman, Cyril Rasumovsky, in 1764, crushed the resistance of the Zaporogue Cossacks in 1775, introduced Russian administration in 1780, and three years later replaced the old peasant liberties of the Ukraine by serfdom in its most cruel form. The Church of the Ukraine was subjected to the Patriarch of Moscow, and "a vexatious clerical censorship" stifled literary development and russified education, which was far more advanced than the West is apt to imagine. It is estimated that in the middle of the 18th century there were in the province of Černigov 866 schools, dating from the period of Ukraine autonomy; but sixty years later not one of these survived.

The partition of Poland complicated the situation still further. The western fragment of the Ukraine fell under Austrian rule, and though this at first seemed to deliver it more than ever into the hands of the Polish nobility, it did in effect lay the foundations for a revival of national consciousness and culture in the 19th century. After 1815 in particular the Habsburg Court showed special favour to the "Ruthenes" and the Uniate Church: and their language was encouraged both in church and in school. Further concessions were obtained during the Revolution of 1848, and even under the reaction which followed the Ruthenes fared relatively better than any neighbouring race; for, in its alarm at the revolutionary movement among the Poles the Austrian Government sought a make-weight among the Ruthenes. But with the failure of the Polish insurrection against Russia in 1863 the whole situation rapidly changed. Galicia became a haven of refuge for the Poles, and Russian repression only served to facilitate an understanding between Cracow and Vienna. Austria found it well worth her while to buy the support of the Poles by what almost amounted to creating a Polish political monopoly in Galicia. The whole administration was Polonised, and in education and the courts the Ruthene language was subordinated to the Polish; while the most determined attempts were made to undermine that stronghold of Ukraine national feeling, the Uniate Church, and to introduce enclaves of Polish colonists among the Ukraine peasantry. For a generation past the struggle between Pole and Ukrainian has grown in acuteness, and has centred in the

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demand for Ukrainian schools and university and for a democratic franchise as a weapon of national defence.

Meanwhile, in the Russian Ukraine the old historic traditions smouldered under extremely unfavourable circumstances. For a brief moment national feeling raised its head in 1846, and a brilliant little group of writers created the Guild of SS. Cyril and Methodius at Kiev to further the twin ideals of nationality and democracy. But within a year it shared the fate of all similar institutions under the hateful rule of Nicholas I.: political thought and literary effort were repressed with equal severity. Centralism and autocracy went hand in hand; and in 1863 the Minister of the Interior, Valujev, roundly declared that "the Ukrainian language never has existed, does not exist, and must not exist." On this basis all attempts to develop the language were treated as the first step towards political separatism, and even scientific and historical research were viewed with profound disfavour. In 1876 the authorities went so far as to prohibit the publication of any book in Ukrainian, save of a purely historical or literary character: and in practice the censorship made this decree almost absolute. For thirty years this iniquitous embargo was upheld. The sufferings of the Ukrainian peasant-poet, Taras Ševčenko—the Burns of the Slavonic world—will always remain one of the most shameful incidents in the history of national Chauvinism. With a refinement of cruelty Nicholas I. even went so far as to order the exiled poet to be deprived of the physical possibility of writing and painting; and this order remained in force for three years. But here, too, the spirit of liberty triumphed over all obstacles—

"Bury me, be done with me! Rise and break your chain.
Water your new liberty with blood for rain!
Then in the mighty family of all men free
Maybe sometimes very softly you will think of me!"*

So sang Ševčenko, and his songs became the watchword of a new era for his race and set in motion forces as elemental and irresistible as the mighty waters of his own Dniepr. Hatred followed him beyond the grave, and on the centenary of his death the Tsar's soldiers held back with their bayonets the crowds which sought to pay their tribute at his tomb. But on the same day in Tarnopol and in Lvov thousands

* From Mrs. Voynich's charming translations (Elkin Matthews, 1s.).

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of peasants gathered in his honour and hailed him as the re-awakened soul of a great nation.

For the Ukraine, as for all the nationalities of the Russian Empire, the Revolution of 1905 was the bursting of a dam behind which had gathered the pent-up forces of many generations. In South Russia the democratic movement at once assumed a national Ukrainian form, and its swift progress surprised even its own adherents. After thirty years of utter suppression there suddenly sprang up a flourishing Ukrainian press at Kiev, Harkov, Odessa, Poltava, Yekaterinoslav, and Mohilev. In 1905 thirty-four newspapers were founded, and popular pamphlets and other literature were distributed in large masses through various new publishing houses. Even after the first check under Stolypin this continued, as is best shown by the fact that the number of copies of Ukrainian books printed rose from 191,000 in 1909 to 600,000 in 1911. Numerous educational and patriotic societies came into being, notably the Prosvita of Kiev; while the Zemstva and the co-operative unions devoted themselves with special energy to the neglected cause of national education.

In the first Duma the Ukraine Club consisted of 40 deputies. In the sphere of social politics their desires centred upon the land, for which every real peasantry has always hungered. But what lay behind was a programme of national autonomy within a federalised Russia—a reversion to the idea of contract between equal parties, which Drahomanov and other Ukraine historians read into the famous treaty of 1654. That such a programme was irreconcilable with Polish national claims—resting as they do upon a stubborn insistence on Poland's extreme historic limits and a negation of the modern idea of nationality—served as an index of future conflicts, but was immaterial at a moment when the Polish State was still a distant dream. But, with Russian nationalism in the uncompromising form which dominated society in the last decade of Tsarism the conflict was immediate and fundamental. Not merely the extreme reactionaries in Church and State, but the whole political world which lay between them and the revolutionary parties of the Left, took alarm at a movement so antagonistic to the centralist *régime*. Under Stolypin's "cooked" franchise (1907) the Ukrainian deputies vanished from the Duma, their Press and national organisations were subjected once more to

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the old methods of repression, and the Ukrainian language of instruction, which had been partially introduced after the Revolution, was again banished from the schools. In short, the movement was driven underground, and to the superficial observer it was for the time possible to deny its very existence. Indeed, the Russian nationalists adopted in regard to the Ukraine the very arguments by which the Magyars so long befooled Western Europe in regard to the subject nationalities of Hungary. It is, of course, true that the Ukrainian and the Great Russian are closer kinsmen, both racially and linguistically, than any other two branches of the Slavonic race. But against the common theory that Ukrainian is a mere local dialect of Russian may be set the formal pronouncement of the Petrograd Academy of Sciences in 1905, recognising it as an entirely distinct language. The essential difference is one of temperament and political outlook, for in the South the old democratic traditions of the Cossack Republic have never died out. Persecution only served to accentuate this difference, and fanned dying ashes into flame. Never even in the history of national movements was there a more perverse example of a government kindling, by its stupid intolerance, centrifugal tendencies among a population which might easily have been appeased with a tithe of what it afterwards came to demand.

The political interaction between Russia and Austria-Hungary has been very great for at least a generation past, despite the tremendous barriers which impede intellectual intercourse. This was at once apparent in 1905; for, it was really the Russian Revolution which made Universal Suffrage a living issue in Hungary, and carried it to speedy triumph in Austria. Here the chief obstacle to reform was the aristocratic caste, which still dominated the Polish Club, and the chief motive of their opposition was fear of the submerged Ruthene democracy, which so eagerly awaited political recognition. The Poles skilfully used their special position in the Reichsrat to extract unjust concessions at the expense of their rivals. Of the 103 seats for Galicia, 78 were assigned to the Poles, and only 25 to the Ruthenes, whereas, on a basis of population the proportions should have been nearly equal. None the less, the breach had been effected, and henceforth the Ukrainian Club was a factor

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which could not be ignored. The Galician capital, Lvov (or Lemberg) became the centre of an acute racial struggle. Situated in territory which is overwhelmingly Ukrainian, the town itself is mainly Polish, with a large Jewish minority, but is none the less a focus of Ukraine national feeling. It has found its patron in that very remarkable figure, Count Andrew Szeptycki, the Uniate Metropolitan of Lvov, who, himself a member of an ancient Ruthene family which had been Polonised till the present century, has long devoted all his energies to the task of spreading education, training up an active and keenly patriotic clergy, and fostering art, literature and political thought. The Museum which he founded and the "Ševčenko Society," whose publications he helped to endow, exercised a profound influence beyond the Austrian border, despite all the frowns of official Russia.

The gross corruption by which the Szlachta—the ring of Polish conservative landowners—endeavoured to prop up their tottering power at the elections of 1907 (the first held under Universal Suffrage) created a very heated atmosphere in Galicia, and re-acted upon the relations of Poles and Ruthenes. The struggle raged most fiercely in the University of Lvov, which remained in Polish hands, although a limited number of Ruthene chairs had also been created for such distinguished scholars as the historians Hruševsky and Kolessa. To such an extent were passions roused, that a young Ukrainian student, Šyčinski, assassinated the Polish Governor of Galicia, Count Potocki. Reprisals followed from the side of the Poles, scores of Ukrainian students were arrested, and the great hunger-strike which they organised in prison became one of the political sensations of Austria. The magnitude and democratic character of the national revolt became apparent when a couple of years later Šyčinski was smuggled out of prison and across the Russian border, to emerge during the great war as the leader of the Ukrainian movement in the United States and Canada.

The Ukrainian party in the Austrian Parliament, though it has produced no outstanding personality who could be compared to the famous Czech leaders Kramař and Masaryk, has none the less proved its real worth as a firm bulwark of national claims, and is far from negligible in the interplay of parties. Its democratic outlook—inherent in a race whose aristocracy has been assimilated by an alien race

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—was intensified by bad economic conditions and the consequent growth of emigration. Driven alike by racial, political and economic reasons into hostility to its Polish masters, it would have gratified its natural Slavonic feelings by such an alliance with the Czechs and Jugoslavs as the summer of 1917 has finally produced; but in those days it found itself repelled by all those who, in their enthusiasm for Russia, accepted the Russian reactionary thesis that Ukrainian nationality is a "fake." It was therefore driven by circumstances to seek temporary allies among the German parties. In the decade preceding the war it was looked upon with growing favour by the Clericals of Vienna and by their patron the late Archduke Francis Ferdinand, who sought to exploit the most national institution of the Austrian Ukraine, the Uniate Church, as a weapon against Orthodoxy. Fantastic designs of political and military ambition linked hands with no less ambitious ecclesiastical pretensions. "Barbarous Russia" was to be "hurled back into Asia," a vast Ukraine kingdom created, stretching from the San to the Dniepr or the Don, as an appanage of the Habsburg Crown, while the Jesuits were to establish their sway in the very heart of the Orthodox church-system and drive in a fatal wedge between Moscow and Constantinople. On the other side stood a certain school of militant Panslavists, who dreamt of nothing less than the extension of the Orthodox faith throughout the Slavonic world, and interpreted political movements in the light of religious fanaticism. To them the very existence of a Ukrainian movement in Galicia and the increasing latitude accorded to it by the Austrian Government seemed a direct challenge of the most dangerous kind. Indeed, self-preservation drove the old *régime* in Russia to oppose the Ukrainian idea by every means in its power and to encourage and even subsidise the so-called "Moscalophil" party in Galicia. The rivalry of Ukrainians and Moscalophils—the latter refusing to admit the distinction between Great and Little Russians—was complicated by the jealousy of the Poles, who did not hesitate to join hands with Petrograd in its campaign of proselytism. The most striking example of this was the sensational end to the High Treason Trial at Lvov in June 1914; the accused Moscalophils being acquitted by a jury consisting of Poles and demonstratively presented with flowers on leaving the court. The concessions wrested from the Poles by the

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Ukrainian leaders in Vienna in the previous March, under pressure from the Austrian authorities, had equally alarmed Chauvinist opinion among the Russians and the Poles. The promise of a complete Ruthene University at Lvov had now become definite, and on many sides the opinion was openly heard that its opening would be regarded as a *casus belli* by the Petrograd Government. Galicia swarmed with spies, and the traffic in military information assumed unheard-of dimensions. Thus each move and countermove added to the explosive material which already lay to hand, when the final catastrophe came.

A subsequent article will deal with the radical transformation of the Ukraine problem, as a result of the Russian revolution and the progress of the Federal Republican idea.

RUBICON.

Mr. Lloyd George on Serbia

THE Serbian Society is to be congratulated on having assembled so representative a company in the Savoy Hotel on 8 August to do honour to our most sorely-trying ally in the person of her veteran Prime Minister. The presence of Mr. Lloyd George, in the midst of many urgent calls upon him, and of Lord Robert Cecil gives good warrant for the belief that the Government is fully alive to the importance of encouraging the Serbian nation in its hour of trial. Mr. Lloyd George's speech—a little masterpiece of eloquence—will give every Serb new life in these critical days: and Lord Robert Cecil's declaration, spoken with all the emphasis of deliberation, will be read in every Southern Slav land as proof of British goodwill to the Southern Slav cause. We have travelled far from the days when a popular London weekly could cry "To hell with Serbia." The war has torn aside the veil which the diplomacy of Vienna had hung between us and the Serbian people who at last stand revealed before us as an intrepid nation "rightly struggling to be free." There can be few in Great Britain who have not now learned that the twin causes of Serbian freedom and Southern Slav unity are British interests in the highest sense of the word, that our duty to the British Commonwealth and our championship of the little peoples of Europe compel us to make the Serbian cause our own. We believe that the nation is daily growing more alive to the importance of a good

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Balkan settlement, and in Mr. Herbert Samuel's speech we discern welcome evidence, not only of goodwill, but of a true conception of the right policy to pursue in South Eastern Europe. His insistence on the part which Jugoslavia will play in a reconstructed Europe was most timely, and the welcome which his words received must have shown him how faithfully he interpreted the mind of his representative audience. The comments of the Press on the following day only serve to deepen the impression that the British public is now alive to the importance of the Balkan Question.

One point remains. The admirable speeches of our leaders will fade from memory unless they are translated into action on the Balkan front.

Slesvig : the Legacy of 1864

THE origin of this war goes back to Prussia's three previous wars: of 1864 against Denmark, of 1866 against Austria, and 1870 against France. Berlin provoked these three conflicts with the same set purpose. Without robbing Denmark of the two valuable maritime provinces Slesvig-Holstein and, two years later, driving the Austrians out of Holstein, the predominant partner of the German Empire would not have been able to challenge British sea-power in the present war. To-day, England, France, and Russia pay dearly for their mistake in permitting what the late Lord Salisbury described as "one of the most wanton and unblushing spoliations which history records" In a highly elucidative work published in 1906, "*Manuel Historique de la Question du Slesvig*," the Danish writer, Emil Elberling, comments as follows on the Vienna Treaty which concluded the war of 1864:—

"This treaty set the seal of international approval upon the dismemberment of the Danish Monarchy which, but twelve years before, the Great Powers had upheld as necessary for the peace and equilibrium of Europe. . . . But this treaty was a capital event, not only for the Danes but for Europe: its immediate consequences occurred in 1866, 1867, 1870-71 (and its remoter consequences, we may add, in 1914). . . . Assuredly it was a shrewd thrust of Cavour's when he advised Italian diplomatists to watch Slesvig; and Palmerston was not exaggerating when he said that Slesvig was a match that could set all Europe alight."

Now, in their reply of 10 January last to President Wilson,

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the Allies claimed only "the restitution of provinces formerly torn from the Allies by force or against the wish of their inhabitants. . . ." This leaves altogether out the question of Slesvig "formerly torn" from Denmark. Are the Allies going to let Germany keep those "most wanton and unblushing spoliations?" Generally speaking, it cannot be called their duty to fight for any country which is too pusillanimous to fight for its own interests and has in this war even, like all neutral countries around Germany, rendered her aggressive power material assistance. But the Triple Entente can now make good their neglect of 1864. Moreover, as Prussia began with the Danish conquest of 1864 to challenge Great Britain's sea-power, the latter surely cannot leave that initial step unaltered. Let us see how Prussia went to work with her first step towards this war. We leave aside all the hypocritical Prussian haggling about the Danish reforms in Slesvig-Holstein. Prussia meddled with that internal question of Denmark for her own selfish purpose, just as she did with the Spanish affair to provoke the conflict with France in 1870. This war has given the world to understand how well the Prussian rulers served their own purpose by placing German Princes and Princesses on the thrones of other countries. Kanitz, the Prussian Minister at Madrid in 1869, informed Bismarck that the furtherance of the candidature of Prince Leopold of Hohenzollern-Sigmaringen for the Spanish throne "would be full of dangers." Yet afterwards Dr. Hans Delbruck stated in the *Preussische Jahrbücher* of October 1895, that the reproaches of the French, that the Hohenzollern candidature was the work of Bismarck, "were well-founded," and that that candidature was undoubtedly "the work of Bismarck." Likewise Bismarck manipulated the Danish war.

When the Danish King Frederic VII. expired in November 1863, the male line of Frederic III. (the first hereditary Danish King until 1670) had died out. According to the female succession, Prince Frederic of Hesse, the eldest son of Frederic V.'s daughter Louise Charlotte, who married Wilhelm, Landgrave of Hesse, would have been the legal heir to the throne of Denmark. But he renounced his right, his sister Mary doing the same. His second sister, Louise, had married Prince Christian of Glucksburg, whom, by the London Treaty of 8 May, 1852, England, France, Russia,

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and Sweden, with Denmark, Austria, and Prussia, "d'un commun accord," recognised as the successor of Frederic VII. It is worth bearing in mind those words "d'un commun accord," which Austria and Prussia sealed with their signatures. They departed from it with the same faithlessness wherewith Germany in 1914 broke her pledge towards Belgium. Before the treaty in 1852 was made the Duke of Augustenburg laid claim to the Duchy of Holstein, which he had to leave, after an attempt to stir up a revolt in that province against Denmark. The duke afterwards renounced all claims to Holstein, for which he was royally paid the sum of £400,000. For this enormous indemnity he made the following solemn pledge: "We, moreover, promise, for us and our family, by our princely word of honour, not to undertake anything whereby the tranquillity of his (Danish) Majesty's dominions and lands might be disturbed, nor in any way to counteract the resolutions which his Majesty might have taken, or in future might take, in reference to the arrangement of the succession of all the lands now united under his Majesty's sceptre, or to the eventual organisation of his monarchy." This renunciation, which clearly recognised Slesvig-Holstein and Lauenburg as belonging to Denmark, was negotiated at Frankfort with the Duke of Augustenburg by none other than Bismarck, who later on supported the claims of the duke's son to all his father had renounced. The son, indeed, protested against that renunciation, *but only six years after his father had signed the pledge and received the £400,000.* And when Frederic VII. died, the young Duke of Augustenburg appeared as pretender to the Danish throne with the support of Prussia and Austria, in flagrant violation of the Treaty of 1852, to which they had appended their seals! As Bismarck said in 1863: "If the European treaties are to be measured by morality and justice they should rather be abolished altogether."

The comment of the late Lord Salisbury is striking. He wrote, just before the attack on Denmark:—

"In conformity with the treaty, France, England, Russia and Sweden have at once (after King Frederic VII. expired) recognised Prince Christian as his successor. Austria and Prussia hang back. They are not shameless enough openly to repudiate their plighted word, but they refuse to keep it. They will not recognise King

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Christian, though as yet they have abstained from recognising the pretender (the young Duke of Augustenburg, whose illegal claim they actually supported). Saxony and Hanover, overjoyed, at being allowed to play a conspicuous part of any kind, be it ever so ignominious, loudly proclaim that they are not only willing, but eager, to dishonour the faith that they have pledged. Meanwhile, the great mass of Prussian and Austrian Radicals, with that curious indifference to morality which is characteristic of sentimental politicians, are furiously calling upon their sovereigns to enter upon the same dishonest course. They do not trouble themselves to argue. 'The London Treaty (of 1852),' says Von Sybel (the Prussian historian and an extreme National Liberal politician), 'is *contra bonos mores* . . . it proposes to rivet a German population to the poisoned chain of Danish rule,' and therefore by the light of this convenient standard of 'good morals,' he proposes to break the faith which Prussia has solemnly pledged, and in which, for twelve years past, has suffered us implicitly to believe. This habit of political repudiation appears to be ingrained in Prussian politicians. Along with his conquests and his glory, Frederic the Great has left them also the disastrous legacy of his treachery. Like most mere imitators, they follow chiefly the defects of their model, and overlook its beauties. There is little enough in their recent history of his military prowess or his political sagacity; but of his unblushing perfidy, of his cynical contempt for pledges given and treaties signed, they are admirable copyists."

Written in 1864, these words are true to-day. To give an illustration how Prussia to-day copies the "perfidy" of Frederic the Great, I recall the hollow justification of the invasion of Belgium by the falsehood that they had discovered at Brussels "proof" of Belgium's conspiracy with England and France against Germany. Frederic the Great began his seven years' war in 1756 by suddenly invading Saxony. When he found Europe shocked by that invasion, he sought to justify it by "documents" found in the Royal Palace at Dresden, proving that the Court of Saxony had conspired with Austria and Russia to attack Prussia. Even Prussian historians had later to admit the falseness of that accusation, as they will afterwards admit it in the case of Belgium. But Frederic the Great was at least not such a hypocrite as his present-day successor, for he said: "First I take what I can, thereafter I can always find some pedant to justify my actions." Hohenzollern William also takes what he can, but calls it "a defensive war."

As we have shown, the late Lord Salisbury perceived the real object of Prussia's quarrel with Denmark. "It is

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necessary," he said, "in order to avoid forming too mean an opinion of the Schleswig question, to keep in view the vista in the background—the German fleet riding in the harbour of Kiel." There was the crux of the matter, and he continued:—

"The bearing of German aspirations on the present dispute (of 1864) may, in short, be summed up thus: The National party desires above all things that Germany should be a great naval power; the dismemberment of Denmark is essential to that end; and we find, actually, that the National party are those who are urging on with the greatest vehemence the dismemberment of Denmark. . . . To take but one testimony out of many, we will quote from the report of the Committee of the House of Representatives at Berlin in 1860. 'Without these Duchies,' say the Committee, 'an effectual protection of the coasts of Germany and of the North Sea is impossible; and the whole of Northern Germany remains open to a hostile attack as long as they belong to a Power inimical to Germany.' A more simply formulated reason for stealing your neighbour's property was never, perhaps, before printed in a State paper. The speakers in the recent debate (1 December) in the Prussian Chamber have not been less plain-spoken. A Committee was appointed to consider the claims of the pretender, Prince Frederic; and the reporter of the Committee, von Twesten, makes the following candid remark: 'The Duchies are, for Germany and Prussia, a strong bulwark under all circumstances against any attack coming from the north. This as well as their maritime position are advantages which Prussia can never relinquish.'

"Dr. Lowe, who is a conspicuous man in the National Verein, speaks with even less affectation of concealment: 'What interest has Prussia in the maintenance of the London Protocol? Since the time of the Great Elector Prussian policy has always been rightly directed towards gaining the North German Peninsula for Germany.' The extract is curious, both as an admirable specimen of the morality current among the German patriots of the present day, and also for the calm audacity with which the new geographical designation of North German Peninsula has been invented. Without such a key to the conduct of Germany, the whole correspondence (about the Danish question) is simply unintelligible. The oppression alleged, even if it be genuine, is so slight in itself—it is so insignificant in comparison to that practised by the great German Powers towards subject nationalities of their own—the claims made are so unreasonable—the determination on the part of Germany to disintegrate the Danish monarchy is so transparent—that, unless some ambitious motive were at the bottom, the whole transaction would be one of the mysteries of history.'

Little Denmark put up as heroic a fight against her two powerful attackers as did Belgium in the beginning of the present war, but, left alone, Denmark had ultimately to give in. The Peace Treaty, concluded 30 October 1864, at

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Vienna, and drawn up in French, commenced with the following clause: "Il y aura à l'avenir paix et amitié entre Sa Majesté le Roi de Danemark et Leurs Majestés l'Empereur d'Autriche et le Roi de Prusse, ainsi qu'entre Leurs Héritiers et Successeurs, Leurs États et Sujets respectifs à perpétuité." That "perpetual peace and amity" Prussia, *within two years*, intentionally broke in regard to Austria, who, having helped Prussia to rob Denmark of valuable territory, had herself to be ejected from it, as well from Hamburg and other German States up to 1866 in her possession. Ambitious Prussia required all that territory in order to make united Germany strong for her present attempt, to become the supreme ruling power at sea as well as on land. A quarrel was then easily enough picked with Austria. But according to Herr Klein's book, "Der Kanzler Otto von Bismarck in seinen Briefen, Reden und Erinnerungen," published two years ago, Von Moltke admitted afterwards, that "the war of 1866 did not arise from defence against Prussia's threatened existence, but was a struggle deemed necessary and therefore sedulously prepared by the Berlin Cabinet, not for gain of territory or other material gain (*sic*), but for an ideal object, for establishment of power (*Machtstellung*)." Every German war of conquest was always marked as "an ideal object." The spots on the Prussian leopard do not change!

Mark what follows. The Germans of Slesvig-Holstein had revolted against Denmark and hailed the war of 1864 in the confident hope that their country would become a *separate State* under the rule of the young Duke of Augustenburg, who assumed the title of Frederic VIII. It never entered his mind or theirs that Slesvig-Holstein and Lauenburg would be incorporated into a Prussianised German State. Yet, with that secret intention, Bismarck had started the war against Denmark. The conquered territory of Slesvig-Holstein was occupied by a mixed Prusso-Austrian force. Quickly the troops of the German Confederation were removed, and Prussia refused to recognise the authority of the Diet over the conquered provinces. Bismarck revealed his conditions in a circular, dated 22 January 1865, as follows:—(1) The conquered provinces should enter the German Custom Union; (2) they should have posts and telegraphs in common with Prussia; (3) the port of Kiel

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was to be transformed into a Prussian military harbour; (4) the establishment of Rensborg as a fortress of the German Confederation with a Prussian garrison; (5) cession of territory necessary for the building of fortresses at Dybbol and Sanderborg, and the construction of a canal from Kiel across Holstein to the North Sea; finally (6) the incorporation of all the troops occupying the conquered territory into the Prussian Army. The importance of points 3, 4, and 5 for Germany's future policy will not escape the reader. The crisis for which Bismarck worked came slowly to a head. He failed to win over Austria by guaranteeing her the possession of her non-Austrian provinces, like Venetia. But the Prussian politicians, with an eye on Germany's future naval power, openly agitated for incorporating Slesvig-Holstein and Lauenburg into the Prussian State. No heed was paid to the petitions of the Germans in those provinces to remain a separate State. Then, as now, "necessity" knew no law. Although Prussia had in 1864 supported the young Duke of Augustenburg against Prince Christian as recognised King of all Danish possessions, when two years afterwards that young duke claimed his right to reign over the conquered provinces, the legal advisor of the Prussian Government in a lengthy document disputed the legal right of the young duke, and even went so far as to state that "King Christian IX. had been *the sole legal sovereign of those provinces.*" Duplicity could no farther go. Prussian might finished the process in the war of 1866, when the catastrophe of Koniggrätz made Prussia master of the coveted German States, including the valuable maritime provinces of Slesvig-Holstein, which became and were intended to become the pivot of Germany's naval power.

At the Peace of Prague in 1866 Austria made the reservation that the northern part of Slesvig should again be reunited with Denmark, "if its inhabitants expressed that wish by a free vote." Bismarck, indeed, was not unwilling to concede the point, and even declared, 22 December 1866, before the Prussian Chamber of Representatives: "My opinion has always been, that a population, which by its constancy and clearly expressed wish shows that it will become neither Prussian nor German, but become part of a neighbouring State of the same nationality, can never be an element of strength for the Power from which it tries to

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separate itself." This remark may be remembered at the settlement of the present war. However, the Prussians at that time out-Prussianized Bismarck. By a supplementary treaty, in October 1878, that reservation made by Austria was struck out of the Treaty of Prague. But the Danes of the north were not the only sufferers. When Austria and Prussia divided the spoils of the Danish war, Lauenburg was handed over to Prussia, for which she paid Austria an indemnity of two and a half million *Rigsdaler* (about seven million francs). This sum Prussia some years afterwards exacted from the population of Lauenburg, which thus paid dearly for its so-called liberation in 1864.

The Slesvig question helped to stir up feeling in France against Prussia. For that reason Bismarck did not regret that the Prussian Parliament rejected his advice in regard to the Danish population of that province. The war of 1870 was as "necessary" for Prussia as her two previous wars had been. It was also "quietly prepared." And, with her fresh conquest of 1871, Prussia had managed her game very well for the present world conflict. The wars of 1864 and 1866 delivered into her hands valuable maritime provinces to develop the German navy. The two provinces torn from France supplied her with rich mineral resources to strengthen the German war-machine, supported by the millions wherewith Bismarck hoped "to bleed France white." For years Germany, under Prussian leadership, bided her time to start the conflict which should make her the ruler of the world. And while Germany prepared for war, the larger part of the world believed her protestations of peace. The deception was frankly revealed by that typical Prussian firebrand, Count Reventlow. On page 398 of his book, "Deutschlands Auswärtige Politik, 1888-1913," published shortly before the beginning of this war, we find him saying: "Tsar Peter the Great said: 'A ruler with only an army possesses but one arm. With an army and a navy he has two arms.' It is natural (*es liegt auf der Hand*) that German policy on principle strove to prevent warlike conflicts until the second arm (her navy) was sufficiently strengthened (*bis der zweite Arm genügend erstärkt war*), apart from cases which involved national honour. To prevent such cases from arising formed therefore also a task of the German policy. Within those limits the avoidance of large warlike conflicts was thus to some extent a question

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of economising strength." This unblushing revelation, that Germany for years talked about peace in order to gain time to gather her strength for a large war, when her "second arm" would be "sufficiently strong," should dispel all notions of her sincere striving after a lasting peace now. Her rulers have not yet learned their lesson.

JOHN C. VAN DER VEER,
London Editor of the Amsterdam *Telegraaf*.

Europe and South America

THE NEW EUROPE, which is interested in all questions relating to nationalities, "backward peoples," and democracies in general, has not yet given any space to the consideration of these problems as they exist in the most numerous group of Republics in the world. No "school of foreign politics" can afford to neglect the study of countries which must now inevitably be brought into closer touch with Europe than ever before, and which offer some of the last remaining opportunities of expansion for white races. South America is as yet but thinly populated, even in regions suitable for white men; she needs labour and capital; and it is no reflection on her to say that her industries have still to be created and her resources developed.

It is impossible to live and travel for any length of time in South America without becoming deeply impressed both by the vastness of her resources and by the manifest determination of the Republics that a great future shall be theirs. It seems clear that, though the energy needed to ensure this future may be supplied from other sources, the ascendancy in South America will always remain Latin. But the Latins of South America are not altogether the Latins of Europe. If one might presume to generalise, one would say that environment, not less than racial admixture, has created a new type. The South American has had to face vast problems—the peopling, the communications, the development of great regions; he has had to use foreign immigration and yet avoid being swamped by it. Spanish colonial policy taught him a lesson and he has wisely provided himself with very liberal constitutions, even if he has not yet been able to live up to them entirely. Speaking generally, social distinctions are as much marked and the governing class is as definitely

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restricted to a certain number of families in these democratic republics as could be the case in a conservative monarchy.

The South American is as proud of his country as he is of his personal possessions. He is extremely conscious of the newness of his civilisation, extremely sensitive to criticism. There is a good deal of *façade* about him, love of display, love of fine words, but there is also a genuine responsiveness to ideas and ideals. Just as the stucco battlements of his *palacio* often conceal back *patios* where the family of three or four generations live a homely, private life, so behind the outward show, there are serious qualities and very real abilities which must be taken into account. Unfortunately the South American reputations which have reached Europe have been those of infamous tyrants like Rosas, or Francia and Lopez of Paraguay, rather than of social reformers like Sarmiento and Mitre of Argentina, or of great soldiers like San Martin and Bolivar.

The population of South America is said to reach a total of over fifty million inhabitants, of whom considerably more than half have at least some European blood in their veins; that is to say, they are descendants, on one side at all events, of Portuguese or Spanish settlers, or else themselves are immigrants from Europe. Inter-marriage with Indians was very general in earlier days. In countries like Paraguay, where the inhabitants still speak as much Guaraní as Spanish, the fusion seems complete, and hardly less so in parts of Brazil, where there is the further admixture of a negro element. In the new world the white man has not so much imposed his civilisation on the Indians as caused them to withdraw from regions which it has suited him to inhabit. In South America, where the white element is strongest, the pure Indians have gone almost entirely. In Argentina and Uruguay an Indian is rarely to be seen; in Chile the Araucanians, a fine race, never conquered by force of arms, are, from other causes, falling away in numbers and quality. Where the pure Indians are most numerous their condition is much what it was when the first white man set foot on the continent.

The "backward peoples" of South America have not had much to thank Europe for. From the days of the Conquistadores, when that handful of astounding warriors—upheld by the loftiest faith and yet stained by every conceivable crime—overthrew a civilisation much higher than

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their own and enslaved the whole population, down to our own time, when horrors like those once reported from Putumayo are said to have had their counterpart in certain German concessions,—it is a record of which Europe has no reason to be proud. With the exception of the Jesuit missions of the 17th and 18th centuries, and, possibly, of some more recent missionary work, it is difficult to find that any attempt has ever been made to civilise or to preserve the aboriginal peoples.

Modern Europe lives already to a certain extent in South America, for settlers have been coming in for the past fifty years in a fairly constant stream. Close touch with their respective mother-countries is maintained by the various foreign colonies—Italian, German, British, Polish, Southern Slav, whatever it may be—by means of national churches, schools, clubs, hospitals, as well as by newspapers in the different languages. But the second generation of settlers will, as a rule, speak Spanish or Portuguese rather than another tongue, and will tend to merge into the nationality of the new country. In Chile, for instance, it is common to find families with an English surname who can speak no English.

Students of the subject of nationality are thus confronted in South America with an aspect of the problem which has no parallel in Europe. With the exception of Brazil, where the population of European descent is Portuguese by origin, the ruling classes of all the South American Republics are of Spanish blood; they speak the Spanish tongue with only such differences of pronunciation or accent as exist in the speech of a north and south country man here; they have the same form of religion, the same form of government; the outward type is so much the same that no foreigner could decide to which Republic a well-dressed individual of either sex would belong; except in the case of Chile and Argentina, there are no natural barriers on the frontiers such as would seriously check intercourse between the different Republics. But, one in race, speech and religion, as the ruling classes in nine out of the ten Republics are, there is no kind of desire for union among them, or scarcely a tendency towards any form of loose federation. The citizen of any one Republic would probably be unwilling to admit that he had much in common with the citizen of another; and, indeed, many of the Republics have developed a very distinct mentality and

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outlook of their own. Marriage between citizens of different Republics—at least in the well-to-do classes—is comparatively rare. It is easier for a Chilian to be friends with a Colombian, who is separated from him by some 2,000 miles, than for next door neighbours to be on cordial terms. Rivalry, and a strong tendency to individualism, often mark the relations between the Republics. Why is it, that while in Europe people of one blood and speech, or even those who are only akin, tend to group themselves together, in South America they prefer to separate into distinct and almost hostile States? It may be that the memories of the evils of central government, as exercised by the Viceroys of Spain have not yet been effaced, and, moreover, it must be remembered that since they threw off the European yokes, no common danger has so far threatened the Republics.

With the old Europe South America had not much in common. With the new Europe—a Europe of democracies—she must at least be in direct moral sympathy. To what extent this sympathy or the insults of Germany may force some of the Republics to follow the lead of Brazil and Bolivia and to take a definite stand with the Allies is quite uncertain. There are cross currents in South American politics the force of which it is difficult to gauge. It is not apparent that it would be to the interest of the Republics to take an active part in the war, but it is clear that the Allies would stand to gain a good deal by their adhesion. The Brazilian, Argentine and Chilian navies would be valuable for patrol purposes; there are many German ships in both Atlantic and Pacific ports; the possibility that points on the long coast line might be used as bases of supply for submarines and raiders would be eliminated; it would be better, especially, perhaps, after the war, that the immense agricultural and mineral resources of the continent should be in friendly rather than neutral hands; it would mean the death-blow to the scheme for a new Germany in South America.

Up to the outbreak of war, the chief European influence in South America was undoubtedly and increasingly German. The armies of Argentine, Chile, Bolivia and Paraguay were trained by German officers. Peru alone had a military mission from France. German trade was pushed by all the resources of German diplomacy. To some it seems that the European war forestalled the struggle that was bound

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to come, when the Monroe doctrine should be put to the test, and the United States should meet Germany in South American waters.

The tempting word "*inesplorado*" is still to be found often enough on the maps of South America. It might be written over the whole continent for all that most Englishmen know of its actualities and possibilities. It is hardly wise that this should continue to be the case, whether the Republics are in future to rank among the enemies or the friends of the Allies. We are beginning to realise how closely the economic conditions of the whole world are bound up together. From a material point of view it is safe to say that nowhere else in the world does so much of natural value lie dormant as in the mines, forests, and uncultivated lands of South America, or so much of natural energy go to waste as in the vast unutilized water power of the continent.

ELLINOR F. B. GROGAN.

Count Tisza and Mr. Balfour

[Budapesti Hirlap, 3 August, contains an article by Count Tisza which, on account of its deliberate attempt to fan the dying flame of the war spirit in Hungary, deserves attention. The "periodical signs" of weakness to which he refers are assuredly not to be found in the Budapesti Hirlap itself, which outdoes Count Reventlow himself in chauvinism; but their existence and the anxiety which they inspire in the Magyar ruling caste is proved by the very violence of Count Tisza's attack on Mr. Balfour. We have not forgotten, nor shall we allow the world to forget, the provocative part played by the master mind of Hungary in laying the train which set all Europe alight. And his attempt to cast the blame for the continuance of the war upon the Entente may be taken as the measure of his anxiety to conceal his own share of the original guilt in provoking the conflict.]

"In view of periodical signs in the Hungarian Press and public opinion, I do not feel it to be superfluous if I devote a moment to the declarations of English statesmen in answer to the latest pronouncements of German, Austrian and Hungarian statesmen. I shall criticise in detail the British Premier's answer to the German Chancellor. Lloyd George treated with scorn the German peace offer: he summoned Germany to specify her conditions and made it clear that only a democratised Germany could reckon on England's favour. A few days later Sir E. Carson spoke of peace and as a preliminary condition for negotiation asked Germany to withdraw to the right bank of the Rhine. There were some more moderate men in the English Parliament who asked the Government whether it identified itself with

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this declaration, and who on receiving an affirmative answer asked whether Sir E. Carson and the Leader of the House knew that there is German territory on the left bank of the Rhine. This, too, was answered in the affirmative. The British Government, then, does not want to speak for peace till the German Empire gives up not merely Alsace and Lorraine, but also the old German districts left of the Rhine.

" Later, Balfour declared that England still adheres to the general principles announced in August 1914, but that the method of their application depends on the military issue of the war. Consequently it would be very dangerous if the Government declared itself on its peace aims. Assuredly, for our part, having proclaimed our desire for a peace without conquest, and honourable to both sides—we demand a better definition of our aims, while they, adhering to their original attitude of conquest, made details regarding conditions dependent on the fate of war and refuse all further light on the subject.

" There are, however, three statements in Balfour's speech which throw light on the British Government's attitude. He emphatically asserts that no British statesman went to war with the idea of adding to British possessions *on the European Continent*. There is not a word as to what leading statesmen's views are to-day . . . so that this self-denial is merely limited to the commencement of the war and to the European continent, and England retains her complete freedom of annexation in the event of victory on the continent and in any case, as regards the past, freedom to annex German colonies.

" Then after this self-revelation Balfour sends a message to the Monarchy and to Germany. He asks it to allow the nations of which Austria and Hungary are composed to decide for themselves the path which they wish to tread. We know very well what this fine phrase means in the mouth of Entente politicians—namely, the liberation from a supposed yoke of those races to whom (sometimes more or less rightly, sometimes, thank God, without any right whatever) they ascribe treasonable tendencies, and such a transformation of the Monarchy as would secure the leading *rôle* to the Entente's humble servants. The Germans meanwhile are urged by Balfour to create a Germany uncorrupted by the designs of world-power. Let the tyrannous, oppressive, barbarous Germany rise to the level of Great Britain, and there is some hope that ' the one great peace-disturber in Europe's history may be got rid of.'

" It is really incredible, and only the indifference and lack of orientation of the English public in respect to European politics makes it possible for a leading British statesman to speak thus to-day of the German Empire, and to place himself in so false a light before English public opinion. For forty years the alliance of the Central Powers has kept the peace of Europe against Russia's lust for Constantinople and France's longing for *revanche*. And they would have finally preserved the world's peace if the two aggressive Powers had not been joined by England, in her fear of the German's peaceful competition. The Panslav schemes for the partition of the Monarchy, the French idea of *revanche* and England's economic greed brought this horrible war upon mankind, and since its outbreak it was we who

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again and again proposed an honourable peace and who were met each time with scorn.

"And so once more to-day the English Government answers Count Czernin's and the German Chancellor's reiterated offer by proclaiming its original war aims, by refusing their definition in detail, and by declaring that the attainment of their aims depends on the fate of war and seeks its mission 'at the present moment not in the discussion of peace terms but in the continuation of the war with all possible means.'

"I have placed side by side indisputable facts and dry quotations. These show clear as day that the English Government is above all responsible for the prolongation of humanity's sufferings—bleeding from a hundred wounds—and that it is a shame, a disgrace, if any Magyar should be found to heap English statesmen with praise and to seek on our side the obstacles to peace."

La Nouvelle Société Helvétique

The all-but unanimous approval which greeted Mr. Hoffmann's resignation in Switzerland—German, French and Italian-speaking cantons alike—was rightly interpreted by close observers as the sign of a robust patriotism. For it was the first time that Swiss citizens as a whole had judged a question of foreign policy not from the standpoint of that country whose language they spoke, but purely from the point of view of Switzerland's honour and interests. The election of Mr. Ader in Mr. Hoffmann's place was, it is true, made the occasion for an "anti-welsch" manifesto by a largely pro-German organisation, the *Deutschschweizerische Gesellschaft*. But their remarks, including the ridiculous statement that Switzerland was running the risk of becoming a second Greece, were justly criticised by all the leading German-Swiss papers and characterised as *unzeitgemäss* even by the most moderate. The *Entente* countries will, of course, keep on the watch for manœuvres of this kind, for any sign of a revival of malicious activity in the pro-German ranks; but for the present it may be said that the new and welcome orientation is practically unchallenged.

Most opportunely the new spirit in Swiss foreign politics finds an appropriate instrument in the Nouvelle Société Helvétique, a London section of which was formed a few months ago, with an office at 28, Red Lion Square, W.C. This Society was founded at Berne, in February, 1914, and its aims may very well be summed up in its motto: *Pro helvetica dignitate ac securitate*. During its short existence it has shown an extraordinary activity in promoting Swiss interests. Much of its enterprise has been and still is necessarily directed against Germany, since it is from that country that nearly all the danger to Swiss economic and intellectual independence comes. On such questions as the use of the name Swiss by purely German commercial undertakings, the granting of naturalisation certificates to too large a number of foreigners—

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chiefly Germans—the Society has shown a vigilance which every Swiss patriot must commend.

There is no lack of subjects to which the Society can, and, perhaps in the near future, will be compelled to, turn its attention. There are, for example, at least two Swiss newspapers having the name Swiss in their titles, which everyone in Swiss official circles knows are nothing more than organs of German propaganda, yet they are allowed to continue to deceive. Then there is the apparently unlimited freedom which is being given to German commercial undertakings to set up establishments in Swiss territory, financed exclusively with German money and having for their ostensible object, not merely the capture of the Swiss market, but also the exploitation of other markets which would be closed to anything bearing the German name. Swiss trade-marks are being used in the same way. These are things which must be dealt with, not only because they arouse suspicion in *Entente* countries, but because, by winking at them, or at least neglecting to put a stop to them, the Swiss Federal Government runs the risk of making the country merely a shield for German commercial and political intrigue. No Englishman wishes to see this; above all, no English firm or institution wishes to compromise Swiss neutrality or independence as they have been compromised during the past three years by Switzerland's neighbour across the Rhine. For this reason the London branch of the *Nouvelle Société Helvétique* can arouse nothing but sympathy and interest among us. English people, who are conscious of the traditional bond of sympathy and common ideals between themselves and Switzerland, will wish the Society every success in its endeavour to attain its ideal of true Swiss independence and national individuality.

The Boot on the Other Leg

[Two days before Bethmann-Hollweg resigned, and at the height of the German crisis, *Die Zeit* (Vienna) published the following brief article.]

“The German people yearns for freedom and for peace, and believes that the road to peace lies through political freedom. Late, indeed, at the eleventh hour, after the grim education of a three years' war, this conviction is burning itself into the German mind. In the earlier stages of the war other views prevailed. Germans then believed that, whatever faults the war had revealed in the economic and financial preparations of the Fatherland, the political equipment of the empire had been brought to the same pitch of perfection as the military. The belief prevailed that the existing system of government in Germany, which left unbridled power in the hands of one man, was admirably designed for the successful conduct of war, and the only thought that occurred to any man was the need for removing, on the pretext of military necessity, the last feeble checks upon irresponsible government. Day by day obedient penmen in the German Press preached the doctrine that

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the autocratic system of Germany was superior to the enemy's practice of responsible and popular government; and the opinion grew that the German system would emerge so strengthened from the war that the democratic enemies of Germany would be forced to copy it."

"Our democratic enemies thought otherwise. Germany's so-called autocratic system appeared to them as her chief weakness, which they therefore duly exploited. The whole enemy attack against Prussianism was concentrated upon this point. At first Germany paid no heed; and Germans did not believe that the war could not end till they were politically free. But as the war drew on and assumed ever more terrible forms . . . the contention of the enemy gained strength. . . . The conception of a democratic Germany as the peace-bringer proved its power by strongly influencing all neutrals. Wilson seized upon it and gave it even more striking expression than it had received on English or French lips. Then came the Russian revolution with its well-known motto; and under its influence even the Germans began to understand that their political *régime*, however admirably designed for war, was an obstacle to peace. To-day in Germany the democratic idea has as many friends as peace, though the great leaderless mass of the middle and working classes have so far proved their lack of political sense. The friends of democracy and peace are a majority alike in the country and in the Reichstag, and they do not shrink from quoting Lloyd George, Ribot, and Wilson to prove that a speedy and lasting peace depends upon the democratisation of Germany.

"Herein lies the root of all present discontents. The German crisis has arisen from the failure of statesmen to attune themselves to this popular mood. The German people demands to be led through freedom to peace. It is our earnest hope that both may soon be granted to it, and also to us in Austria."

Mr. Plehanov on Roumanian Claims

In the following interview (in the Jassy paper *Evenimentul*, 7 July) Mr. Plehanov, the well-known Russian Socialist leader, explained that Russian Socialist opinion was so divided that he could speak only for himself, but he maintained that many of his fellow Socialists agreed with him.

"The question which interests you most," he said, "is that of Roumania. Perhaps you have read the article in the *Pravda* and other papers denying to Roumania the right to free the subjugated Roumanians. Why does this astonish you? Are not those who profess such theories at the same time hostile to the liberation of that considerable part of Russia which is occupied by the enemy? As they are against the continuance of the war, the scope of which is above all the liberation of Russian territories invaded by the Germans, they thereby admit the foreign yoke for their own brothers. They would be inconsistent if they took a different attitude in what concerns the Roumanians.

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" Apart from these opinions, which find only a limited number of adherents, the Roumanian cause *ipso jure* comes within the Socialist formula, which we shall not abandon : ' The right of nations to dispose of themselves.' You Roumanians should adopt it, and together with us and our Allies should make the greatest efforts to attain this end. This is the application of the principle of nationalities in its most democratic form? The aims of Roumania's war are none other than this : you wish to liberate your co-nationals from Austro-Hungarian dominion, and, in that, you have a perfect right which the most orthodox Socialist principles cannot contest. I assure you that, personally, I consider Roumanian aspirations as just. Russian democracy cannot but be with you, and I entertain the hope that it will even sympathise with that larger idea of the future, complete Roumanian national unity. So long as the nations are not free to decide their own fate there can be no solid basis for peace. That is why, convinced that we are supporting a just cause, we continue to maintain as the basis of our action this principle of the right of peoples to dispose of themselves."

A German Socialist on Alsace-Lorraine

In the *Arbeiter-Zeitung*, 31 July, Herr Hermann Wendel, a Deputy of the German Majority Socialist Party, writes an article on the question of Alsace-Lorraine which he describes as " one of the most substantial obstacles in the way of an understanding between the belligerents." After a brief recital of the historical development of opinion on the problem in Germany and France since 1871, and of the powerful influence thereon of economic considerations, he warns Germany against a repetition of Moltke's blunder and repudiates a solution by brute force. " The only way to prevent the hot ashes of this problem from threatening another conflagration is to enshrine in the treaty of peace a final settlement acceptable and accepted by *all* concerned. He who takes his stand upon the self-determination of nationalities, and seeks a new international world-order, cannot exclude the possibility of a popular vote, and must be prepared to abide by the result. To prophesy the result is impossible, for although a majority before the war had resolved, on opportunist grounds, to make the best of the German connection [*see* THE NEW EUROPE, No. 5], the operation of various causes during the war—courts-martial, preventive arrests, wholesale internments, etc.—had aroused a bitter and dangerous reaction against us." Herr Wendel then discusses at length the various projects—exchange of French colonial territory for Lorraine, neutralisation of the provinces, full autonomy within the German Empire—which have been proposed at one time or another. He expresses his own preference for " autonomy "; and there can be little doubt that the grant of full rights of self-government, say, when Prince Hohenlohe was Statthalter, would have worked a vast change in the political outlook of the *annexés*. But the blind arrogance of Prussia forbade so liberal an act; and, when twenty-five years later the great war broke out, Germany had to confess that her Reichsland was still " enemy country." It was

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doubtless the uneasy feeling that the Reichsland is still French in spirit after all, that prompted Herr Wendel to pen his last sentence thus:—" But whatever solution we envisage, three years of the hell of war compel us to approach it with a cool head free from the romantics of nationalism." Some of our own friends in France might do worse than ponder the meaning of this dictum for French and German chauvinists alike.

A Sin of Omission

The British Government does not seem to be aware that its position as the mainstay of the alliance against the Central Powers imposes on it a special obligation towards all its partners, and especially towards Russia. In the anniversary messages sent by the King to his Allies on 4 August Russia was ignored on the deliberate and incredible plea that she had no Government which His Majesty could formally recognise. This masterpiece of official make-believe was solely due to the failure of the Foreign Office to realise that etiquette has no place among the stern realities of war; and it casts a slur upon the British Monarchy which we resent. We have had occasion more than once to draw attention to the utter lack of imagination in the diplomatic world, but we hardly expected to receive so signal an illustration of it direct from Downing Street itself. The action of the Foreign Office in despatching a belated telegram to Mr. Kerenski in the King's name only serves to emphasise the original omission; and the terms of the message are so cold that, unless Mr. Kerenski reads them in the light of our notoriously undemonstrative national character, he may well wonder whether Great Britain really welcomes the Russian revolution after all. We can only hope, in conclusion, that the delinquent in the Foreign Office had such a *mauvais quart d'heure* from the Prime Minister that he will not repeat the offence.

Austrian Envoys in Sweden and Switzerland

We learn from a sure source that Count Goluchowski, former Austro-Hungarian Foreign Minister (1896-1907), is at present in Switzerland as the special envoy of the Ballplatz. He has doubtless been chosen as a suitable agent for secret dealings on neutral soil on the ground of his Russophil reputation. He is a Polish patrician who, during his tenure of office, played a large part in the Austro-Russian Mürzsteg agreement on Macedonia (1903). Whether his Russophil views have survived the House of Romanov we do not know: but the *mot d'ordre* for all partisans of *la Victoire Intégrale* is, "keep an eye on Goluchowski." And the same may be said of Count Adam Tarnowski (see THE NEW EUROPE, No. 18), who has recently arrived in Stockholm on a similar mission. No friend of Balkan unity will forget or forgive his evil work in Sofia during the Balkan wars:

Printed for Constable & Co., LTD., by EVRE & SPOTTISWOODE, LTD.,
His Majesty's Printers, East Harding Street, E.C. 4.

The New Europe

VOL. IV, No. 45

[REGISTERED FOR TRANSMISSION AT
THE INLAND NEWSPAPER RATE]

23 August 1917

The Voice of the Vatican

THE reception given in Allied countries to the Papal Peace Note is reported to have caused deep depression in the Vatican. Still deeper, we imagine, is the disappointment which the quality of the Pope's action has caused among men and women of good faith and goodwill inside and outside the pale of the Roman Church. While it cannot be said that, since the death of Leo XIII., the Vatican has risen in the esteem of the world, there was, undoubtedly still a tendency to regard the headquarters of the *Romana Chiesa* as one of the great spiritual agencies of humanity and to cherish, however faintly, the larger hope that it might one day rise to the height of its opportunities. The war which in many ways seemed to be rendering the lines of cleavage between Christian churches in Allied countries less distinct, had strengthened the desire that when the Roman Church should break silence it might speak in tones befitting the transcendental origin which it claims and the trusteeship for Christendom to which it holds itself to have been appointed.

Benedict XV. has ignored, if, indeed, he ever understood, the greatness of the opportunity that was opening out before him. He might have led the conscience of mankind towards the consummation of its loftiest aspirations. He has preferred to preach an unneutral homily of which the pious accents scarcely avail to mask the unmoral substance. The Head of the mightiest ecclesiastical organization in the world has committed himself to a course of which the only Christian explanation is that he knew not what he did.

We do not suppose that His Holiness Benedict XV. was, for a moment, conscious that, in signing the document prepared for him, he was outraging the conscience of the vast majority of Christians. Only those who have breathed during the war the benumbing atmosphere of "spiritual neutrality" that prevails at the Vatican and in other neutral courts can understand how the Sovereign Pontiff, the supreme guardian of the faith and morals of his world-wide flock, could so far forget the moral issues of the war as to

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identify himself with the view that "the terrible struggle . . . appears increasingly a useless massacre," or could deliberately weigh in the same scales the wrongdoer and the victim, the oppressor and the oppressed, the faithless and the faithful, demonstrating his "perfect impartiality towards all the belligerents" by holding the balance meticulously even between right and wrong. It may be said, as is sometimes urged in explanation of papal indifference to the issues which make of this war the greatest of crusades, that unless the Pope be called upon to arbitrate between the belligerents and to give an award nicely adjusted to their several deserts, he cannot take sides in a conflict in which millions of Roman Catholics are fighting against each other. Each side, it has been argued, claims that it is defending its holiest possessions. How can the Pope act as judge and divider between them, unless all submit to him their differences, place before him the fullest information and bind themselves to accept his verdict?

The answer to this plea is that this war is not as other wars; that it owes its special character to the confessed wrongdoing of a powerful military State against a weak non-military people—an intensely Roman Catholic people to boot, whose neutrality the aggressor had solemnly sworn to protect; and that since the Vatican found no word to condemn this atrocious outrage at the moment of its perpetration, or even when the full truth had been laid before it by the most eminent among the Princes of the Church, it ought, even at the eleventh hour, to make a stand against triumphant wrong in favour of downtrodden right. But, if it be admitted that out of transcendental aloofness or for recondite reasons of high policy, the Head of the Roman Church was bound to eschew all appearance of partiality, the admission is transformed by the Pope's Peace Note into an irrevocable condemnation of his conduct.

The Note has been analysed and refuted on its merits by the Press of all Allied countries. One of its least neutral features has, however, escaped attention. The Pope calls for the complete evacuation of Belgium "with a guarantee of her full political, military and economic independence towards all Powers whatsoever." As the Roman Catholic *Tablet* observes, there is "supreme irony" in the suggestion that Germany should be called upon to renew her pledge to

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martyred Belgium since the war has shown that Germany respects only those treaties which she is powerless to break; but neither the *Tablet* nor any other organ has pointed out the odious partiality of the insinuation contained in the words we have italicised, that the independence of Belgium was threatened as much by France and England as by Germany. This is a pure pretence, invented by Germany to mask her own wickedness. It is utterly at variance with the facts. To find it espoused, even by implication, in an "impartial" papal document, suffices to stamp the whole production as the fruit of enemy machinations. In view of this display of anti-Ally bias, the suggestions for the restoration of the German colonies, in return for the evacuation of Belgium and Northern France, for the "complete and reciprocal condonation" of the nameless havoc wrought by Germany—who celebrated the Papal initiative by burning St. Quentin Cathedral—and for the "true freedom and common enjoyment of the seas," fall into their places as parts of a coherent whole.

The singular circumstance that only in the case of "the territories forming part of the ancient kingdom of Poland" is allusion made to the sufferings endured by the ravaged peoples reveals the immediate authorship of the Note. It is as though Father Ledochowski, the General of the Jesuits, whose main political interest is the restoration of Poland under Austro-German auspices, had written his name large across the pontifical periods; while those who have eyes to see, may detect in the strange reticence of the Note in regard to Serbia, the influence upon him of his redoubtable Austrian coadjutors Fathers Galen and Zabeo. These two men have laboured for years to prepare the way for the practical realisation of the Pangerman dream in the Balkans under Habsburg and Jesuit guidance. Were proof needed that in Jesuit hands the Sovereign Pontiff is as wax it may be found in the *Civiltà Cattolica*, the leading Jesuit review, of 21 July. The Rome correspondent of the *Tablet* recently called attention to the iniquitous garbling of Mr. Lloyd George's Glasgow speech in a footnote to an article on peace in that review; but he did less than justice to the article itself. In it the Pope was summoned to do what he has since done. It was obviously written with foreknowledge that he would be made to do it. It supplied many of the arguments that figure prominently in his appeal,

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and it contained at least one tell-tale observation that may indicate a main inducement held out to the Pope. This observation foreshadowed the admission of a papal representative to the Peace Conference. Those who watched the desperate efforts of the Vatican in 1900 to secure admission for a Papal delegate to the first Hague Conference in order to obtain an indirect acknowledgment of the Temporal Sovereignty of the Pope, will understand the present effort to establish for the Vatican some status in regard to the belligerents that shall peg out a claim for Vatican participation in the Peace Conference. And those who know by sad experience how potent in ecclesiastical diplomacy are considerations of political advantage and how completely they outweigh the moral and religious interests which the Vatican professes to serve, will readily conclude that no more powerful temptation could have been offered for the abandonment of Papal neutrality than the prospect of the inclusion of a Papal delegate among the plenipotentiaries who will sign the treaty of peace.

If this be an approximately correct reading of the Papal initiative, it is clear that Jesuit cunning has once more overreached itself. A Vatican that had raised its voice in defence of Catholic Belgium at the outset; that had supported the demand of the Belgian Episcopate for an ecclesiastical commission of enquiry into German atrocities in Belgium—the slaughtering of priests, the ravishing of nuns, the burning of churches, and the desecration of sacred emblems—nay, even a Vatican that had remained throughout loftily neutral and transcendently removed from the mundane horrors of the war, might have found among Allied peoples supporters of its claim to share in the practical making of peace. But who, save Germans or Austrians, or, possibly Young Turks, as void of faith in Mahomet as in Christ, can desire the presence at a peace conference of a delegate chosen by a pontiff who has sought, under cover of disinterested solicitude for peace, to advance and accredit enemy aims. Not only has the Pope destroyed the very basis of his own claim to impartiality, but he has dashed from the lips of those who looked forward to an era of greater spirituality—in which the Roman Church would have garnered a rich harvest from the renascent faith of peoples—the cup of hope they longed to quaff. This war,

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one of the great turning points in human history, seemed to offer the Roman Catholic Church an opportunity nobler than any that has presented itself since Christendom was riven by Reformation and Counter-Reformation. Never before, in Allied countries, had differences of religious allegiance seemed so meaningless; never before had there been so general a yearning for the reunion of Christians round the essential tenets of their common faith. On the one side were ranged the champions of human right and liberty, and on the other the lawless henchmen of medieval dynastic despotism. The Roman Church, whose tragedy it was to have sold its soul to potentates in return for their help in extirpating heresy during the Counter-Reformation, had at last a chance to regain its birthright and to prove itself a true mother of peoples and a foe of tyrants. An Apostolic Pope, a Churchman of faith and vision, might have seized the chance of flinging open the door into an ampler life with fuller scope for the fulfilment of an evangelical mission. Faced by the question whether the Roman Church should lead the peoples or seek to prop the tottering despots of the earth, such a Pontiff would have made the larger choice.

Benedict XV., guided by men whose spirit is still that of the Counter-Reformation, has made the lesser choice. Henceforth he may sit enthroned in his high Vatican; but the nations whom he might have helped to guide will wearily but steadfastly pursue without him those ideals of right and freedom in truth which Christianity first taught them to revere.

The "Evacuation" of Epirus

ON 13 August Mr. Balfour announced in the House of Commons that Greece was at war with Germany, Austria, Bulgaria, and Turkey. It is, therefore, to be hoped that Greece will now be treated with the deference due to an Ally. Her status had already been indicated by her representation at the Allied Conference held in Paris on 25 July; and that Conference decided to recognise the restoration of Greece to a *régime* of full discretion and independence by withdrawing all the occupying troops and military control, and revoking the other precautionary measures which had been made necessary by King Constan-

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tine's German connections. Italy alone, having always been inclined to regard Mr. Venizelos and King Constantine with equal suspicion, now made certain reservations, and found it necessary "for military reasons" to continue her occupation of "the triangle contained by the Santi Quaranta road and the Albanian frontier" (that is, presumably, the territory which commands the road from Santi Quaranta to Koritsa, and is contained by the road, itself and by the frontier of Epirus as delimited by the Protocol of Florence: and this apparently without regard to previous negotiations in Athens, when the Italian Minister had promised Mr. Venizelos to mitigate the military occupation of Epirus by permitting the return of the Greek civil authorities.

Accordingly the restitution of the confiscated units of the Greek fleet was begun on 2 August, the French troops were withdrawn from Thessaly, the Isthmus, and later from Corfu; the evacuation of Thasos (and presumably of other Greek islands in the Ægean, which may have been occupied by the Allies, except, of course, the Dodecannese, which has been occupied by Italy since 1912) was reported last week in a grateful telegram from Salonica. England, France, and Russia (who according to the declaration of Mr. Politis in the Greek Chamber "desires the Greek people to choose freely their own system of government") have proved their confidence in the democratic Government of the Greek people. It is a pity that Italy for the benefit of our Alliance cannot do the same.

Accustomed as we are to our own Defence of the Realm Act, we would not presume to inquire into the nature of "military reasons," but we may be permitted to observe that the existence of the Italian kingdom is not seriously endangered by the attitude of the population in Northern Epirus. Italy, it is true, has guaranteed the independence of Albania; and, though the fact that Italy has undertaken to protect the independence of Albania does not make the Adriatic littoral an Italian protectorate, it might be necessary, if Albanian independence were threatened, for Italy to occupy the southern marches. But Albania is certainly in no danger from the south; Mr. Venizelos has repeatedly declared his intention of respecting the decision of the Powers with regard to Albania, and as lately as 7 August he

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informed the Greek Chamber that the delimitation of Northern Epirus would undoubtedly be settled at the Peace Congress. We think, therefore, that it would be a graceful act if Italy were to affirm her solidarity with the Alliance by withdrawing all her troops from Epirus and Corfu and trust the Government of Mr. Venizelos to respect the frontier as delimited in 1913, subject to its reconsideration at the end of the war. Greece being now our Ally may surely be trusted to guard and to keep open for the benefit of the Alliance the road from Santi Quaranta to Koritsa.

It may, of course, be premature to discuss the evacuation of the "Santi Quaranta triangle," for quite recently the Italian authorities, in happy ignorance of the decisions of the Paris Conference, were still in occupation of villages as far south as Philiatæ and as far east as Samarina and Metzovo. Confining ourselves, therefore, to general principles, we would merely remind the strategists of our Alliance that Italy's primary objective lies in the northern Adriatic and is not brought sensibly nearer by the elaboration of defensive measures against Greek villagers.

We feel bound, in this matter, to call the attention of the British Government to its obligations to Mr. Venizelos, who has proved himself worthy of their trust, and to insist on their loyal support of him in his difficult task. The Allies, in conference in Paris, made promises to him which must be redeemed.

Austria : A Study in Confusion

POLITICAL chaos reigns in Vienna. The picture of Austrian confusion presented in these pages on 19 July (*see* THE NEW EUROPE, No. 40) still holds good. Emperor, Government, and Peoples are in a state of unexampled disarray owing to the conflicting claims of the nations composing the Dual Monarchy.

The first stumbling-block for Dr. Seidler was the project of a parliamentary Sub-Committee for the revision of the Constitution. It almost brought about a split of the Slav *bloc* owing to the uncompromising attitude of the Czechs. The Jugoslavs and Ruthenes apparently agreed to take part in the Sub-Committee while the Czechs were by no means unanimous in the matter, though it was a question

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of tactics rather than of principle. The Czech Socialists and Clericals led by Šmeral and Hruban were in favour of going to Vienna, not for the purpose of negotiating a compromise, but in order to emphasise the unanimous Czech demand of 30 May for the union of all Czechs and Slovaks in an independent, democratic, Bohemian State. On the other hand, the Radicals, led by Dr. Stransky and the ex-Minister Pražek, who finally won over the Young Czechs and Agrarians and thus gained a majority in the Bohemian Club, advocated "passive resistance" on the ground that any further negotiations with Austria were futile and dangerous, as the Czech question was of an international character and could therefore be decided only at the Peace Conference. The *Narodni Listy* (Dr. Kramář's organ, which took a conciliatory attitude, wrote on 29 July:—

"Even the worst sceptic has in mind our boldest and highest national aim (of independence), and if he disagrees with the optimist, it is only on the question of how to attain it."

The question was finally referred to the National Council, which postponed a decision indefinitely, thus practically endorsing the Radical policy of passive resistance. These dissensions among the Czechs caused the Jugoslavs and Ruthenes to abstain from a common Slav Conference which was to be held at Prague at the end of July. The Radical *Lidove Noviny* apologised to the Jugoslavs by explaining the anxiety of the Czechs to keep aloof from Austrian politics, on the ground that the Constitution Sub-Committee would be made the stepping-stone to a Coalition Cabinet which the Czechs could never enter without fatally compromising their prospects of independence at the Peace Conference; while the participation of other Slavs in Austrian politics, in return for temporary concessions, would hardly affect the question of the ultimate liberation of the Poles, Ruthenes, and Jugoslavs, and their re-union with their kinsmen beyond the frontiers of the Monarchy. Thus, for the time being, the proposal for a revision of the Constitution was buried.

The next test of Seidler's statesmanship was the formation of a permanent Parliamentary Cabinet. On 31 July the Bohemian Club was invited to send two representatives to the Cabinet in return for autonomy "in accordance with the principle of national self-determination." This offer

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was rejected not only by Mr. Stanek, the President of the Bohemian Club, but also by the Czech Socialist leader, Mr. Šmeral, who also had an interview with Dr. Seidler. On 6 August the Polish Club passed a resolution declaring that the formation of a parliamentary government was "unreal" at present, that no Pole would enter it, and that, in the words of their declaration of 16 May, a united and independent Poland with an access to the sea remained their unalterable demand. A similar resolution was adopted by the Yugoslav Club on 7 August, declaring the solidarity of all Southern Slavs with the Czechs and supporting their refusal of national autonomy *within the existing provincial boundaries*. They further declared that "the absolutist régime in Bosnia-Herzegovina and the oppression of the Yugoslavs in Austria constituted an insurmountable obstacle to parliamentary collaboration with a governmental majority." And as to the Germans, only the Nationalists—*National Verband*—who were promised four seats, were in favour of Seidler's proposal, while the Social Democrats and Christian Socialists opposed it. Thus the prospect of a Parliamentary Cabinet supported by an organised Government majority faded, and the only alternative was, therefore, the appointment of a permanent bureaucratic Cabinet. Dr. Lederer, the Viennese Correspondent of the *Berliner Tageblatt*, rightly points out that neither Emperor Charles nor his advisers have yet succeeded in taking even the first steps towards a new order in Austria. We commend the statement to confiding English Austrophils.

A still better analysis of the present situation in Austria is given by Prince Lichnowsky—late German Ambassador in London—in the *Berliner Tageblatt* on 29 July. Discussing the possibility of the exclusion of Galicia and Dalmatia from Austria, which would give the Germans an absolute majority in the Reichsrat, he declares that "the preservation of Austria from Teschen to Trieste as a uniform State in which every nation could freely develop, yet where the first and leading rôle would be played by the Germans is for us a question of the utmost political importance." With regard to the demand of the Bohemian Club, he says that "the enlarged kingdom of Bohemia would, if the Bohemian State-right is realised, possess a similar position to that of Hungary in 1867. . . . We should see a State springing up between

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Bavaria and Silesia which would exhibit Russian, French, Polish, and British sympathies, but never any pro-German feelings." With regard to the Germans of Bohemia, he declares that "the Slav demand for so-called 'equal rights' of both languages in all parts of Bohemia means the appointment of Czech as well as German officials, and this the Germans unconditionally reject. This sums up the position now and as it was before war broke out. The war has only accentuated national dissensions instead of placating them for the benefit of the State. The Government appears, therefore, to be confronted with a problem *which cannot possibly be solved to the satisfaction of both parties*, as they are faced with the choice of the bitter opposition of either the Germans or the Czechs. The traditional system of dodging and muddling through (*das Fortwursteln und Durchfretten*) usually results in the opposition of both parties. For the solution of this question also the result of the war ought to be of great and perhaps decisive importance, and it is significant that the Czech National Council rejects all participation in the revision of the Constitution, and wants to bring the Czech question before the Peace Conference, and thus to make it an international question." The writer states in conclusion that "the Austrian Germans, whom we may divide into a court aristocracy with Anglo-Roman culture and taste, a capitalist *bourgeoisie* steeped in Jewish influence, and a Nationalist, Socialist and Christian-Social democracy, ought to be able to preserve the German character and the unity of Austria if they hold together. They need Germany's support, without which they cannot exist unless they are treacherous to German interests. No other political attitude is possible for them. A renewal of the Great-German plan under the leadership of Vienna need be feared as little as an anti-German Coalition in which Austria would participate." Such is the situation at the present moment. The Austrian Germans are resolved to remain Prussia's Allies, for they need her support in order to be able to oppress the Slavs. On the other hand, the Czechoslovaks and Jugoslavs perfectly understand each other and are determined, with the aid of the Allies, to achieve their national unity and independence of Berlin, Vienna and Budapest. In these circumstances can any sober man continue to plead for the preservation of the greatest realm which Germany has annexed during the war, namely, Austria-

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Hungary? And can anyone doubt that the disintegration of the Dual Monarchy is inevitable in view of the demand of its own peoples?

V. NOSEK.

Roumania's War Anniversary

MONDAY, 27 August, is the anniversary of Roumania's declaration of war against the Central Powers. The events which gradually led the Danube Kingdom to throw in her lot with the Grand Alliance are still too near us to be related in authoritative fulness; and, for the moment, we are not concerned with movements of diplomacy but with the new relation to the British Commonwealth which Roumania's act created. We welcomed our new ally a year ago with gladness and enthusiasm. In very different circumstances we repeat all that was said then with an emphasis born of our comradeship in arms and in adversity. The high hopes entertained by Roumania and her new Allies in 1916 were speedily broken. Once again the interior lines of the enemy asserted their influence and enabled Germany to throw vast forces across the Hungarian frontier which overwhelmed the gallant armies of King Ferdinand. The victory was not of German making only, for other causes were at work both in Russia and in Roumania which made the German task incomparably easier than it ought to have been. The culprits are not all brought to book yet; but when they are it will be found that the Roumanian people were beset in front and rear and that in the circumstances the part they played was heroic indeed.

Roumania is a western Power in an eastern setting. Her people bear in their names and in their speech the mark of Roman civilisation, and they look to the Latin nations of France and Italy as the sympathetic upholders of a tradition which is their own. It is only natural, therefore, that the bond of sympathy should be strong between Bucarest and Rome and Paris and that the Western-Latin influence should be predominant in the language and culture of Roumania. But high policy often wrests nature from her true course; and, in the case of Roumania, policy followed the dynastic bias of the reigning house which—until the accession of King Ferdinand, a national monarch in the best sense of

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the term—lay towards the Hohenzollerns. The dynasty was not alone, however, in looking to Germany for military and political support. There were large sections of society and influential parties in the Roumanian Parliament whose Latin foundations had been concealed by a German superstructure. We must not forget that Germany not only took Roumania as a partner in alliance but gave her substantial economic assistance—for a consideration, of course—which fostered a large traffic of merchandise and ideas between Germans and Roumanians. The mere act of war does not remove the deep effects of such intercourse; and it would be puerile to pretend that the Germans did their work so badly or so ruthlessly that the Roumanians will be glad to forget it. Wherever Germany goes she lays deep foundations, and even if her arrogance destroys almost as much as her efficiency creates, she must be reckoned a formidable rival from whom we have much to learn.

The supreme need of the moment is the establishment of cordial relations not only between the Government but between the peoples of Britain and Roumania. The task is not easy. Access to Roumania is difficult and the military situation has created a certain prejudice against us because of our inability—for causes yet to be fully explored—to succour the Roumanians in their hour of need. We shall not repeat here the tale of our failure in the Balkans; but we cannot ignore it in considering the present state of affairs on the lower Danube. It has greatly imperilled our whole Eastern enterprise and has inflicted hardships upon our smaller allies which give us but a small title to their gratitude. But, despite its grave effect upon the prestige of the Allies, we are fortunate in being able to say that the alliance has not been broken under the strain, and we are convinced that the people of these islands are filled with praise and admiration of the stalwart spirit which Roumania has shown in adversity. We hope that means will be taken at the earliest opportunity to give the Roumanian people tangible evidence of our goodwill and of our determination to uphold their just claims. The appeal of nationality has great force in that country, as it has here; and it would be a great comfort to the army and the people 'out there to know that their mission of liberation in Transylvania is well under-

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stood and heartily supported by the public opinion of Great Britain. We cannot expect our diplomatists to bear such a message for us with the warmth and eloquence which carry conviction. We therefore hope that the Prime Minister will make a public declaration on Monday which will show that this nation stands firm in support of the liberation policy which is the true expression of the democratic will. Mr. Lloyd George's voice will carry further than any other. He is a master of vibrating speech which can give new life to a nation in travail. It is just such a ringing message as he can send that is most urgently needed to mark the first anniversary of Roumania's war as the birthday of a popular alliance between the two peoples.

An Anglo-Roumanian *entente*, expressing a democratic desire for intimate and cordial contact between the nations, would serve the immediate purpose of the war by giving the hard-pressed Roumanians a tangible pledge of British sympathy. And on this ground alone it should be brought into being. But, rightly guided, it has a much more spacious task to perform in the period of restoration after the war. Not only would it play a useful part in preventing the establishment of that exclusive economic and "cultural" domination by which Germany is wont to foster her political designs, but it would render yeoman assistance in the general reconciliation of the nationalities in Eastern Europe which is essential to the future happiness of the whole continent. Public opinion in Great Britain is not fully aware of the manner in which the Roumanian, Bulgarian, Serbian, and Italian questions are interlocked, nor of the historic part which the Habsburg dynasty has ever played towards each of these four. Habsburg policy has created a most intricate territorial problem in which some disinterested Power must play friendly arbiter to the four claimants. It is in the hope that Great Britain may not fear to assume the *rôle* that we plead for a new understanding between us and the Roumanians. We look forward to the day, of which recent Roumanian reforms give promise, when the people of that progressive Danube kingdom will freely enter the congenial orbit of Western Democracy bringing with them their Transylvanian kinsmen whom they went to war to liberate.

Mr. Balfour on "Secret Diplomacy"

MR. BALFOUR made the debate on the adjournment of the House of Commons the occasion of an interesting speech on diplomacy, in which he re-affirmed the regrettable decision of the Government not to set up a parliamentary committee on Foreign Affairs. The Foreign Secretary will not accuse me of discourtesy if I say that we do not accept this refusal as the last word on the subject. We recognise that no Government will set up such an organ except under pressure which will be increasingly applied. Mr. Balfour also challenged the validity of certain criticisms passed on "secret diplomacy." He said that debates in the House, on fitting subjects and at fitting times, were the very life-blood of a free country, but in foreign affairs there must be reticence: the business of diplomacy being better done, not by proclaiming our policy at Charing Cross, but by confidential conversations. . . . To reveal from day to day what is ultimately revealed with all due precautions in a Blue Book would really be insanity. . . .

It is no part of our intention to advocate "insane" action: but it is essential that, while the process of diplomacy is confidential, its broad intentions should be public. In the customary argument against secret diplomacy there is some confusion of thought upon which Mr. Balfour played with his wonted dialectical skill. Let me repeat, by way of reply, what I wrote in these pages four months ago. "It is against secret *policies* in which the national liability may be unlimited that the only genuine protest can be raised: for such policies are the very negation of democracy and the denial of the most fundamental of all popular rights, namely, that the citizen shall know on what terms his country may ask him to lay down his life. This justification of popular control does not presuppose the publication of diplomatic negotiations. On the contrary, it rests on the assumption that the People and Parliament will know where to draw the line between necessary control in matters of principle and the equally necessary discretionary freedom of the expert in negotiation."

Our public life cannot fail to benefit by a democratic endorsement of all national engagements in foreign policy: and the Foreign Office may rely on Parliament to leave the daily process of diplomacy in the hands of its trusted agents.

A. F. WHYTE.

The Ukraine Problem since the Revolution

THE Russian Revolution meant the liberation not only of the Great Russians, but of all the other nationalities of the Empire. The first proclamation of the Provisional Government restored all the constitutional rights of Finland and removed the civil and religious restrictions that had hitherto been imposed on the non-Russian nationalities. The case of Finland was rather different from that of the other nationalities, as Finland's union with Russia was of a looser character. The Poles received their independence at the hands of Russia, but Polish territory was still occupied by the enemy, and the working out of any detailed arrangement was not so pressing. The other important national question was that of the Ukraine, and it was a problem much less simple than that of either Finland or Poland.

Russians and Ukrainians are so closely related both by race and language that many Russians have been slow to admit the distinctions of nationality that undoubtedly exist. But for the oppression of the old Tsarist Government there might have been no political movement in the Ukraine; and further, but for the rivalry between Austria and Russia the Ukrainian movement might not have developed so rapidly. That, however, is no argument for refusing to look facts in the face as they are to-day. Whatever may be the cause, there is undoubtedly a very strong feeling of Ukrainian nationality both in Eastern Galicia and Northern Hungary and in the Ukrainian provinces of Russia. Ukrainian is more than a dialect of Russian, it is a separate language with a literature of its own.

A previous article in THE NEW EUROPE (No. 44) dealt with the Ukraine problem up to the outbreak of the war. In that article mention was made of the intrigues of the Austrophils and Russophils in Eastern Galicia during the years immediately preceding the war. The Russian Nationalists under Count Vladimir Bobrinski carried on an energetic campaign against the Ukrainian movement in Eastern Galicia, and even attempted to convince public opinion in Great Britain that the Ruthenes were but "Russian peasants in Galicia." This campaign was accompanied by much bribery and espionage, but in condemning the actions of the Russian Nationalists we must remember that Austria was engaged in similar attempts to turn the Ruthenes against the Russians.

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Where both sides are to blame it is difficult to decide upon the rights and wrongs of the controversy.

In considering the immediate causes of the war the Ukrainian problem must not be overlooked. The development of the Ukrainian movement in Eastern Galicia, in the anti-Russian form that was favoured in Vienna, was a real danger to Russia, and even Russian Liberals have looked askance at the political aspirations of the Ukrainians. It is a matter of life and death to Russia that the Ukraine should remain an integral part of the future Russian Republic, as an independent Ukraine would threaten to cut off all access to the Black Sea and the Straits. During the war, Austrian and German intrigues with certain Ukrainians in Vienna have made Russians view with suspicion the whole Ukrainian movement in its political aspect.

One of the first incidents in the war was the Russian invasion of Galicia, during which the whole of the territory inhabited by the Ukrainians was occupied by Russian troops. The history of that occupation is painful reading. The first Russian Governor of the occupied provinces, Sheremetjev, adopted from the start a hostile attitude to the Ukrainians, favouring the Poles at their expense and opening Polish schools in Lvov. His policy was too one-sided, and shortly afterwards he was succeeded by Count George Bobrinski, cousin of Count Vladimir. It was not long before the new Governor made his intentions clear. His avowed object was the Russification of Galicia, and, on the ground that it was a Russian country, he insisted on introducing the Russian language and Russian laws. The schools were put under the direction of the well-known Russian Nationalist, Chihachov, who introduced Russian teachers and closed the Ukrainian schools. The Holy Synod was also active, and sent to Galicia the notorious Bishop Eulogius, who tried to impose Orthodoxy, and replaced Uniate by Orthodox priests. The Uniate Archbishop of Lvov, Count Andrew Szeptycki, was arrested and sent to Russia, where he remained a prisoner until the Revolution (*see* NEW EUROPE, Nos. 3 and 27.)

Meanwhile, in the Ukrainian provinces of Russia, the Russian Government were pursuing a systematic policy of oppression. This oppression was not only directed against dangerous political movements, but against every cultural movement, including the suppression of the leading educa-

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tional society, the "Prosvita," of Kiev. Russian Liberals in the Duma, especially Mr. Miljukov, spoke out boldly against this policy, and the Cadet party passed resolutions in favour of a wide measure of cultural autonomy for the Ukraine.

Previous to the Revolution it was difficult to estimate the strength of the Ukrainian movement. There was no real freedom of the Press, and, in the absence of Ukrainian representatives, it was left to the Cadets to plead their cause in the Duma. The policy of the Cadets, however, was not enough to satisfy the Ukrainians once the Revolution became a reality. During the early days of the Revolution the National movement in the Ukraine remained beneath the surface, and it was not until April that it began to attract public attention. On 6 April a deputation came from Kiev to Petrograd, requesting the Provisional Government to proclaim the principle of Ukrainian autonomy and to appoint a special Minister for Ukrainian affairs. On 19 April the Ukrainian National Congress was opened in Kiev. The opening address was given by Professor Hruševski of Lvov University, a native of the Russian Ukraine and the "little father" of the Ukraine movement. At this Congress the majority supported the idea of national territorial autonomy in the future Russian Republic. In attempting to define the boundaries of the future autonomous Ukraine, the following claims were made: The western frontiers were to be the Governments of Lublin and Grodno, the south-eastern the River Kuban, the northern the River Pripet, and the southern the Sea of Azov and the Black Sea without the southern shore of the Crimea. In other words eight Governments or provinces of Russia were claimed, viz., Kiev, Poltava, Podolia, Herson, Volynia, Harkov, Yekaterinoslav, and Černigov.

A few days after the opening of Congress elections took place for the Central Rada or Council. Hruševski was elected President, and Messrs. Vinničenko and Yefremov, Assistant Presidents. Vinničenko, like several of the present Russian Ministers, is still in his thirties. Born in 1880, in the Government of Herson, he was later a student at Kiev University, where he took an active part in politics. Since 1900 a member of the illegal Ukrainian Revolutionary Party, he has suffered exile in Siberia, whence he escaped and

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returned to Russia after remaining some time abroad. He is well known in the Ukraine as a novelist and dramatist. Yefremov, the other Assistant President, is known as a publicist; politically he belongs to the Radical Democrat Party.

The formation of the Central Rada was soon followed by the opening of the Ukrainian Army Meeting. The main object of this meeting was to demand the immediate nationalisation of the army. It insisted on the creation of a Ukrainian national army and the division of Ukrainian officers and soldiers in the rear into separate units. It is this demand which has met with the strongest opposition on the part of the Russian Government, who have been backed by the C.W.S.D. Kerenski has steadily refused to divide the Russian forces into separate national armies, realising that such changes would seriously disorganise the army at the front and might also cause dissensions between the different nationalities. He has, therefore, consistently rejected the claims of the Poles, Ukrainians, Letts and Esthonians to a separate national army, though he has made concessions in the case of troops in the rear of the fighting armies. When in Kiev, on 1 June, Kerenski spoke on this subject as follows: "We consider it impossible at the present moment to regroup the armies on the principle of nationality. After the war we can deal with the question of changing the form of grouping the army, but not now. For this reason we have stopped the organisation of Esthonian, Lettish and other national detachments."

Shortly afterwards another Ukrainian deputation went to Petrograd to present to the Provisional Government their demands for Ukrainian autonomy. These demands were both political and military. In the first place they asked for the publication by the Provisional Government of an act approving of Ukrainian autonomy, and agreeing that the Ukrainian question should be brought up at the Peace Conference in connection with the fate of Galicia and those parts of Ukrainian territory seized by the Germans. They also requested the appointment of a Special Commissioner for Ukrainian affairs and the control of all elementary, middle and high schools. Their military demands were for the formation of separate Ukrainian army units in the rear, and, where possible, at the front.

The answer of the Russian Government did not satisfy

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the Ukrainian delegates. Prince Lvov made it clear that the Provisional Government could not agree to Ukrainian claims before the Constituent Assembly met, on the ground that the autonomy of the Ukraine was a matter for the whole Russian people. If the Ukrainians proclaimed their autonomy before the Constituent Assembly met, there was danger that the latter might not agree to it.

Thus the differences between the Rada and the Provisional Government were partly military and partly political, and in both cases attempts were made at a compromise. The military demands of the Ukrainian Army Meeting had the support of the Rada, but thanks to the moderation of Hruševski and Vinničenko a compromise was reached by which Kerenski permitted several reserve brigades to be formed into the nucleus of a Ukrainian army, provided that no attempts were made to interfere with those regiments already at the front. The political compromise was more difficult, and raised such a storm in Petrograd that the events which led up to it must be discussed at greater length.

The failure of the delegation that went to Petrograd in the middle of June merely stiffened the attitude of the Rada.

On 17 June, after several days of secret session, the Rada passed a resolution declaring that the Provisional Government had acted against the interests of the Ukrainian people, and explaining that it would itself publish a manifesto setting forth the demands of the Ukrainian democracy. Before giving the substance of the manifesto that appeared a few days later, a word must be said about the extreme Separatists (or *Samostinniki*). On 18 June they held a meeting at Kiev which was chiefly attended by soldiers who had come to Kiev for the Army Meeting. This meeting resolved to form in the Ukraine a democratic republic with the sovereignty of the Ukrainian nation guaranteed. This republic would be able to make free alliances with other nations and would be represented at the Peace Conference. The *Samostinniki* were no doubt supported by enemy agents in Kiev and elsewhere, but received very little support from the Ukrainian people, who preferred the moderate counsels of their leaders, Hruševski and Vinničenko. They cannot be ignored, however, as no doubt their violence

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made the speedy solution of the Ukrainian question all the more necessary.

The manifesto of the Ukrainian Rada was published on 24 June. The most important parts of it ran as follows:—

“ Without separating from Russia, and without breaking away from the Russian State, let the Ukrainian people on its own territory have the right to dispose of its life, and let a proper Government be established in the Ukraine by the election of a Ukrainian National Assembly, a Diet, on the basis of universal, equal, direct, and secret suffrage. Only such an assembly has the right to issue laws which are to establish permanent order in the Ukraine, while those laws which affect the entire Russian State must be issued by an All-Russian Parliament. No one knows better than ourselves what we want, and what are the best laws for us. No one better than our own peasants knows how to manage our own land. For that reason we wish, after all private, State, Tsarist, Ministerial, and other lands have been handed over throughout Russia to the various peoples, and after a constitution has been drawn up by the All-Russian Constituent Assembly, that the constitution and public order in our Ukrainian territories should be entirely in our own hands, that is, in the hands of a Ukrainian Diet. . . . We thought at first that the Central Russian Government would lend us a hand in this work, and that we, the Ukrainian Central Rada, would be able, in co-operation with it, to organise our country; but the Provisional Russian Government has rejected our demands and has refused the stretched-out hand of the Ukrainian people. We have sent out delegates to Petrograd to submit to the Russian Provisional Government our demands, the principal of which are as follows:—That the Russian Government should publicly, by a special Act, proclaim that it is not opposed to the national will of the Ukraine and to the right of our people to autonomy; that the Central Russian Government should, for the decision of all affairs affecting the Ukraine, have by its side our High Commissioner; that the local authority in the Ukraine itself should be vested in the person of a Commissioner elected by ourselves, acting as the representative of the Central Russian authority; and that a definite portion of the taxes collected from our people into the State Exchequer should be handed over to us, the representatives of the Ukrainian people, for cultural and national needs. All these demands have been rejected by the Central Russian Government, which did not want to say whether it recognised our people's right to autonomy and to dispose of its own life. It has evaded a direct reply by referring us to the future All-Russian Constituent Assembly. It has refused to have by its side our High Commissioner. It has refused to co-operate with us in bringing about a new order in our country, and it has refused to appoint a Commissioner for the Ukraine in order that we may administer our country in harmony and in order. The Government further refuses to hand over to us the taxes, collected from our people, for the

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needs of our schools and our organisation, and now the Ukrainian people has compelled us to assume the entire responsibility. . . . It is for this reason that we are issuing this Universal Act to our people, proclaiming that henceforth we alone shall regulate our life."

The Act proceeds to call upon every individual member of the Ukrainian people to help in the work, and to proceed to organise itself locally in various institutions, and then calls upon them to come to an agreement with the other nationalities living on Ukrainian territory :—

"The Central Rada hopes that the non-Ukrainian peoples living on our land will also concern themselves with the maintenance of law and order in our country, and will, in this grave hour of general political anarchy, co-operate cheerfully with us to organise the autonomy of the Ukraine."

A few days later, on 30 June, the Rada proceeded to carry out the words of the manifesto. A committee of the Rada met and selected the members of a General Secretariat, in reality a Council of Ministers, to look after internal affairs :—food supply, finance, agriculture, and all questions affecting the different nationalities of the Ukraine. Vinničenko was elected President of this body with the office of General Secretary of the Interior, while Yefremov was appointed Secretary for International Affairs. The General Secretariat was to be the executive organ of the Rada, which would become a national Diet.

The rapid development of the Ukrainian movement caused alarm in Petrograd. On 12 July Terešenko and Tsereteli arrived in Kiev, where they were joined soon afterwards by Kerenski, in order to negotiate with the Rada. After some days an agreement was reached, according to which the Rada consented to postpone the carrying out of its manifesto if the Provisional Government immediately prepared a Bill giving autonomous rights to the Ukraine, including the town of Kiev and those provinces in which the Ukrainians formed a majority. On 16 July the agreement was confirmed by the Provisional Government after the Cadets had left the Cabinet as a protest. The main points were as follows :—(1) The General Secretariat was recognised as the highest administrative organ, but was to be supplemented by representatives of other nationalities. (2) The Provisional Government would execute measures concerning the Ukraine through the General Secretariat.

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(3) The constitution of the Ukraine and the decision of the land question were to be decided by the Constituent Assembly. (4) The Rada was to work out a Bill for Ukrainian autonomy.

This agreement caused a Cabinet crisis in Petrograd which was followed by the Maximalist rising of 17 July. The Cadets criticise the agreement as premature and complain that Tereščenko and Tsereteli exceeded their powers in concluding it, as such questions could only be decided by the Constituent Assembly. They maintain that the precedent was a bad one, and point to the action of the Ukrainians in summoning to Kiev a conference of all the non-Russian nationalities as the first-fruits of the weakness of the Provisional Government. On the other hand, those Ministers who concluded it considered it essential to come to terms with the Rada before it was too late. The movement was growing rapidly, and the leaders were moderate and ready to come to terms. It is not easy to judge yet whether they were mistaken or not in their opinion, as since then the whole situation has been changed by the retreat of the Russian armies. The Ukrainians are threatened with the loss of everything by the advance of the Germans, and meanwhile all interest is centred on the defence of their country. Their leaders have made stirring appeals to the Ukrainian troops at the front, and, though there has been trouble with some Ukrainian regiments, there is, nevertheless, much of the old warlike Cossack tradition in the land of the Dnieper, and in defence of their country the Ukrainian people will resist the enemy to the uttermost.

RURIK.

Herr Bernstein as Witness for the Prosecution

Under the title "The World after the Great Day," Herr Eduard Bernstein, Minority Socialist Leader, and Member of the Reichstag for Breslau, contributes an article to *Die Neue Zeit*, the German Socialist weekly, 3 August, 1917, in which he subjects the Reichstag resolution and Dr. Michaelis' speech (19 July) to a close scrutiny. After declaring that the framers of the resolution hoped that its adoption would mark a red-letter day in the history of the Reichstag

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and the German people, and that it might smooth the way to peace, he proceeds:—

“All honour to this idea and to the intentions of those who conceived it, but what a falling off in the attempt to realise it! The great day has passed, and those who hoped to make it an hour of democratic triumph must now confess that it has not realised their dream. The blame is not entirely theirs. The ill-omened desertion of the National Liberals, which reduced the majority to little more than half the Reichstag, was no fault of the majority, for the latter had made great concessions—too great, perhaps—in order to secure National Liberal adhesion. Of worse omen was the declaration of the new Chancellor that his policy would not depart from Bethmann-Hollweg's lines, though he added that his war-aims could be realised within the terms of the Reichstag resolution, *as he understood it*. Thus at one stroke he robbed it of all that made it significant. ‘Away with all equivocation,’ cried Herr Erzberger in a heroic moment in that speech before the Reichstag Committee which made such a profound impression, ‘away with all equivocation, let us have no more groping in the dark.’ A valiant word; but no more than a word. The new movement, which it seemed to have provoked, was once again stamped with equivocation by the Chancellor's speech. No triumph here; but a crushing defeat!

THE REICHSTAG EQUIVOCATES.

“But, truth to tell, it was not the Chancellor who spoke the first equivocal word, it was the Reichstag in its own resolution. It is not in the light of the comments made by friend and foe alike upon it, but on the ground of our own deep conviction that the Socialist advocates of a people's peace must ask the question: ‘Was the resolution what the occasion demanded from men who were sincere in their demand for peace?’ The comment that springs to the lips of all real seekers after a good peace is to be found in the threefold declaration made by the German Peace Society, the *Bund Neues Vaterland*, the National Women's Committee for a lasting peace, and the *Zentrale Völkerrecht*, when they insisted that the Reichstag must complete its policy by an explicit pledge on each of the three following points:—

- (1) *The recognition of the right of national minorities to equality of treatment in politics, trade and culture.*
- (2) *The promotion, as far as possible, of unfettered international commerce, free trade, and the ‘open door.’*
- (3) *The prevention of the exhausting and dangerous competition in armaments by an international agreement for a general disarmament.*

“ But the sharpest rebuke to the equivocations of the Reichstag came, not from the pacifist bodies, but from Hugo Haase, spokesman of the Independent Social Democrats, in his fine, marrowy speech of 19 July. He characterised the resolution as measuring the progress of certain parties which had previously demanded annexations [the Centrum in particular.—*Editor*], but as

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incompatible with truth for those who, like the Independent Social Democrats, were not afraid to face disturbing facts. 'The statement regarding the beginning of the war is historically untenable, he said . . . and the same verdict must be passed upon the new Chancellor's version of those events. We do not forget Austria's ultimatum to Serbia, Austria's mobilisation against Russia, nor the councils held here in Berlin on 5 July 1914, nor the activities of Tirpitz and von Falkenhayn in those critical days.' And after revealing the confused and equivocal nature of the Reichstag peace programme, our colleague said: 'The resolution ends in a bellicose blare of trumpets (*in schmetternde Kriegsfanfaren*) and lashes the people into war-fury once more.' In truth, could any man read the closing words of the resolution as an invitation to peace? . . . The words 'Right to Development' contain the whole controversy between Socialism and Chauvinism, and can be used by the Jingo parties—not only Herr Michaelis, but Count Westarp and Herr Dietrich Schäfer and all the *Ueberannexionisten*—to cover their war-aims. There is but one word that can draw a clear line between peace and Imperialism . . . it is *the right of self-determination for all peoples*. That word is missing in the Reichstag's pronouncement. Not only is it missing, but its place is taken by phrases which leave the door open to all kinds of veiled annexations, economic and other; and instead of clinching the matter by a demand for international free trade, the Reichstag demands the 'freedom of the seas.' Listen to Haase on that:—

" 'What do you mean by "the freedom of the seas?" ' Before the war, our fleet, in its brilliant expansion, sailed proudly and unhindered on every sea, and in peace its "freedom" was secure. . . . How do you propose to achieve this result in war? A Socialist world would be a world without war where this problem could not arise. But as long as there are wars the freedom of the seas in war will belong to the strongest Power. Where is your guarantee against that? There is but one way: the way of general disarmament and the abolition of capture at sea.'

REACTION AT THE HELM.

"The demand made in the threefold declaration of the pacifists closed with the sentence:—'Unless the Reichstag insists on disarmament as part of a general peace programme, its ostensible intentions will assuredly—and justifiably—be misinterpreted abroad.' The reception of the report of 19 July abroad proves the justice of these words. . . . At first a profound impression was made, and all over Europe men breathed more freely. . . . In Germany and in every country a change was wrought under our very eyes . . . even the fiercest anti-German writers changed their tone a little . . . and everywhere men began to see light through the darkness of war. . . . But these hopes were utterly destroyed by the issue of the ministerial crisis. Bethmann-Hollweg fell, not before the new Block (Centre, People's Party and Majority Socialists), but before the sweeping attack of the Right, reinforced by all the elements of reaction in German society. He

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went, followed by the tears of the Left. . . . Bethmann fell before the onset of reaction. Tied hand and foot by his entourage—those serried ranks of reactionaries whose voice always has the last word in our affairs—he was powerless to make progress. And Michaelis . . . ? He steps into office with the benediction of these gentlemen, hailed as the trusted agent of Hindenburg and Ludendorff, and his speech bears the hall-mark of the approval of the High Command. . . . The Army has won; and, politically, we know what 'the Army' means. The manner in which the crisis has been solved is a manoeuvre . . . and even if half-a-dozen parliamentarians were made ministers, the essence of the system remains absolutely unchanged. . . . We are not one inch nearer a parliamentary *régime*. Dr. Michaelis is not a parliamentary Chancellor . . . he is the hope of the stern, unbending Tories . . . and his declaration that German war-aims could be realised within the limits of the majority resolution, was but an empty favour (*ein Blumensträusschen*) thrown to the new *bloc*, which only made the resolution itself ring the more hollow. It is depressing to realise this . . . and we cannot be surprised that the promised jubilation fell flat. . . . Let us acknowledge that the *bourgeois* parties have progressed in adopting the policy of the resolution . . . but we must also confess, with pain, that for Social Democrats it is a miserable compromise. . . . Coalitions always lead to compromise . . . and, as is well-known, I am not an uncompromising opponent of political coalitions. . . . But this coalition means, not compromise, but the betrayal of our Socialist faith and the desertion of well-tryed Socialist comrades. It throws doubt on the good faith of the German people. . . .

THE REAL ENEMY OF PEACE.

"In the Chancellor's speech, *security* and *guarantees* figure largely. . . . Security is, in this war, the greatest of all questions; it appears in every speech of friend and foe alike . . . but it can only be found in a radical change of the State-systems and in the uprooting of militarism. One accident or another may bring hostilities to an end . . . but there can be no enduring peace between the nations as long as militarism holds sway. And one of the causes which has given this question such prominence has been the capitulation of German Socialists to militarism. . . . The formation of the *bloc* with the Centre and the People's Party does not alter this but rather emphasises it . . . for the framers of the resolution have shown their anxiety not to arraign German militarism. . . . Here, if nowhere else, we had to say No! And in saying it we run no risk of being misunderstood, for our attitude is clearly defined in the memorial which Haase gave to the Dutch-Scandinavian Peace Committee on our behalf, and in the Resolution which the Independent Socialists tabled in the Reichstag in the following form:—

"The Reichstag seeks a peace without annexations of any kind or indemnities, based on the right of self-determination of all peoples.

HERR BERNSTEIN

'It demands the restoration of Belgium and compensation for all the wrongs done to her.

'The Reichstag demands the immediate initiation of peace negotiations on the basis of this programme: an international agreement for general disarmament, freedom of international trade as well as unrestricted international intercourse; an international agreement for the protection of workmen from exploitation; recognition of the equal rights for all the inhabitants of any State, irrespective of sex, race, speech or religion; protection of national minorities; an international tribunal for compulsory arbitration.

'For the execution of this peace-programme and for the attainment of peace, the immediate raising of the state of siege is the most urgent pre-requisite. Equally indispensable is the complete democratisation of the whole constitution and government of the Empire and its constituent States, which can only find a final and sure issue in the creation of the Social Republic.'

"Let anyone compare the true mind of Socialism, thus clearly and succinctly set forth, with the Reichstag resolution and then bethink himself how differently German Social Democracy would stand before the world to-day, how much nearer it would have come to an understanding with the Socialist-Labour parties of other countries, and thus to the end of the War, if the resolution I have just quoted had been backed by the united force of all its representatives, one hundred strong, in the German Reichstag."

"The Adriatic Problem:" from the Italian of Professor Salvemini

The *Unita* of 2 August takes the following sentences from the *Corriere della Sera* as the text of a noteworthy article on "The Adriatic Problem":—"We have always proclaimed our programme of aspirations, but we have rarely shown that we mean to leave room, side by side with our own, for the aspirations of others. . . . Our primacy over the Adriatic means nothing at all unless the rights of others be defined." "Italy's war aim must be dismemberment of Austria. . . . The key to the European war is there. If Austria is destroyed, Germany has lost the war, if Austria remains strong the Entente would lose it." "Such aims," the *Corriere* argues, "are only attainable if Italy allies herself with the subject peoples of Austria—above all, the Southern Slavs. What is needed is a common understanding for action against the common enemy, a spiritual accord for a common future."

The *Unita* welcomes the attitude of the leading Lombard organ to Italo-Slav friendship, and urges it to ventilate the whole question still further. "The central problem which must be faced and solved with faith and boldness is that of the fate of Croatia and Slovenia.

"THE ADRIATIC PROBLEM"

On the very shoulders of Venezia Giulia, which this war must win for Italy—in Carniola, Corinthia and Styria—live a little over a million Slovenes who, to the north along the line of the Drave, are in conflict with the Germans. To the east of Slovenia and to the north-west of the Quarnero live 3,500,000 Croats and Serbs engaged in unremitting resistance to the Magyar oligarchy. In these two regions and in Bohemia lies the vital point of the Austrian problem.

"Austria can lose Galicia, Transylvania, Bosnia, Dalmatia, Trentino and Venezia Giulia without ceasing to be the old Austria, if only she retains Bohemia, Slovenia and Croatia. She would be an Austria reduced to thirty-five million inhabitants, that is, about as strong as Italy; and in that case the Germans and Magyars would forge more stably their dominion over the Czechs, Slovenes and Croats, because the latter would be reduced to an absolute minority, owing to Austria losing the Latin and Slav provinces of her periphery. It would be an Austria more than ever bound to Germany, thanks to the impregnable German-Magyar majority. . . . If, on the other hand, you detach Slovenia and Croatia from Austria and Hungary, leaving them free to unite in a federation with the other Southern Slav regions, then the old Austria is gone for ever. The Archduchy of Austria and the Kingdom of the Magyars become inland states like Switzerland; and even the union between Hungary and Austria itself is loosened if Hungary is granted towards the Black Sea, the Ægean and the Adriatic, those same conditions of free customs and railway transit which France and Italy grant to Switzerland. An independent Bohemia becomes possible, thanks to customs agreements and railway conventions assigning the railways east of Trieste and Bohemia to a joint Italian-Slav-German-Czech administration, in which the political and economic interests of the Czechs would be identical with those of Italy as owner of Trieste, and of Slavia as owner of the immediate hinterland. Thus the whole eastern policy of Austria and Germany would be bankrupt, for they would be separated from the Ægean by a mass of eleven millions, which could not easily be crushed.

ITALY'S TRUE INTEREST.

As for Italy, she must prefer to have behind Trieste and Istria a Serbia-Croatia-Slovenia rather than an Austria-Germany; for the new State would be less dangerous, and finding itself wedged in between Italy's Adriatic provinces and Austria-Germany would have the same interest as Italy to keep the Germans away from the Adriatic. The Germans—except as peaceful traders—could not reach Trieste and Pola without smashing the northern wedge of the new State. Hence it would be a natural and permanent ally of Italy. . . . As regards Italy's allies, the creation of Serbo-Croat-Slovene unity is an absolute necessity for England, because only when Germany and Austria have been shut off from the Ægean will England be safe in the eastern Mediterranean. Henceforth England would defend the Isthmus of Suez against Germany by means of the new Serbia on the line

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of the Drave, and in this Italy has the same interest as England. It is Italy's good fortune that a solution of the Southern Slav problem favourable to her interests and those of the anti-German Powers is possible, thanks to the movement towards unification with Serbia which has grown steadily more intense during the last twenty years in Slovenia and Croatia. . . . By this we do not mean to suggest that every Slovene and Croat desires to break off from Austria and to unite with Serbia. Not even the Italians were unanimous in 1860 in desiring the unity of Italy. In Croatia and Slovenia the Irredentist movement is opposed by the Trialist movement, which seeks to unite the Southern Slavs inside the Austrian Empire in a kingdom set free from German and Magyar exploitation, but associated in a new Federal Austria under the sceptre of the Habsburgs, with a predominance of the Croat Catholics over the Serbs. This solution would be a disaster for Italy, even if she came out of this war as mistress of the whole Adriatic. In an *Austrian* Jugoslavia the Catholic, Jesuit and Italophobe elements would prevail through the protection of the dynasty. And the new Austro-Magyar-Slav Empire, allied with Germany, dominating the whole western Balkans save the Italian coasts, would soon set itself to reconquer the Adriatic. . . .

THE MAZZINI TRADITION.

"It is thus evident what should have been Italy's policy *if we really want to dismember Austria*—to take up once more our splendid Mazzinian and Garibaldian tradition and proclaim ourselves the allies and champions of the Southern Slavs against the Germans and Magyars. This straightforward policy, traditionally Italian, nay, pre-eminently Italian, was, and is, an urgent necessity. Uncertainty about Italian intentions has produced in Slovenia and Croatia a third party—that of the politicians, neither resolutely Trialist nor resolutely Irredentist. They merely want no longer to be exploited by Germans and Magyars, but they are afraid that the war may replace Austrian rule in Dalmatia by Italian rule; hence they are ready to become Trialists if Austria conquers, provided she guarantees their complete autonomy, or full-blooded Jugoslavs if the Entente conquers, provided they are sure of not being handed over to the Italians. So they negotiate with the House of Austria, threatening to go with the Entente if they are not guaranteed autonomy, and with the Entente, threatening to go with Austria if they are not guaranteed against an Italian conquest of Dalmatia. Italy's task should be to reconcile the Irredentist Serbophil current with the intermediate current. She ought to have offered to the more reasonable section of the Slavs a fair compromise on the mixed territories of the Adriatic; she ought to have pledged herself to legal equality and scholastic rights for Slav minorities under Italian rule, exacting similar guarantees for Italians remaining within the boundaries of the new Serbia; she ought to have offered the more resolutely her support in creating the new Jugoslavia, in that this support would have justified in the eyes of all sensible men the renunciation by

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Jugoslavia of all territories east of Gorizia and inside Istria, as well as those military points in the central Adriatic which we demand as necessary to Italy's maritime security."

THE FAVOURABLE MOMENT.

After quoting pronouncements of Mr. Pašić in *The Times* and *Novoe Vremja* last year as proofs that the Slavs were ready for a compromise, Professor Salvemini continues as follows:—"In spite of this we allowed half-a-dozen fanatics and sparrow-brained intriguers to plant themselves in the offices of the newspapers and the foreign propaganda, to insult the Slavs in every possible way, to lay claim to the whole eastern Adriatic coast, to threaten persecutions against the leaders of the Slav parties on the day of Italy's conquest, to abuse as Austrian spies all the Slav refugees whom Austria had condemned to death, to proclaim that for Italy the problem of Dalmatia is a colonial problem, to deny the existence in Slovenia and Croatia of a national sentiment, to deny that Slovenia, Croatia, Bosnia, Serbia and Montenegro could ever federate in a single national State without arousing Italy's opposition—in short to do all that was possible to weaken the Irredentist Slav movement, and drive the middle party towards Trialism, by playing the game of all the Austrian agents who work up hatred in Italy against the Slavs and hatred among the Slavs against Italy. . . . For two whole years the campaign in our press seemed to have the sole purpose of inciting hatred against Italy among the Slavs of Austria, and thus galvanising Austria. It is lucky for us that the blindness of the Germans and Magyars prevented the new Emperor from solving the internal Austrian problem on the basis of the Trialist programme! The *Corriere* is right in lamenting the fact that in England there are statesmen and newspapers which have not yet understood the necessity for dismembering Austria; but can it tell us what Italy has ever done to spread the idea of dismemberment outside Italy—and in Italy itself? To-day, after two years of error, Italy seems to be returning to her senses. Even the *Giornale d'Italia* speaks of the necessity for "a fair settlement between Italian and Yugoslav aspirations on a basis satisfactory to all," and refutes "the Maximalist Italian thesis; while the *Corriere della Sera* published articles worthy of the spirit of Mazzini." The *Unita* concludes by emphasising the need for prompt steps to make good the time lost and to employ so favourable a moment for an Italo-Slav agreement, such as would create a new and formidable crack in the decaying structure of the Austrian State and save Italians and Southern Slavs alike from the German danger.

Magyar Ideals

Among the numerous political writings which appear in Hungary, the following three books, published during the last few weeks, deserve attention: "The Rejuvenation of the Magyar Nation," by Viktor Toroczkai; "The Magyar Day of To-Morrow," by Nicholas

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Szegedy, and "The Book of Magyar Names," by the ex-Deputy Zoltan Lengyel.

In the first book Baron Toroczkai gives his idea of the future Hungary. He is a member of the Independence Party and a supporter of the present Government, hence his views do not lack significance. The contents of the book give expression to the self-same aim of Charles Eötvös and all the other Magyar politicians, viz., the creation of a powerful and independent Hungary whose feelings, language and opinion would be exclusively Magyar. "The Hungarian nation must attain unity and no efforts should be spared for the rejuvenation of the Magyar race." He insists that the sons of Arpad, who are so valiantly fighting for the existence of Central Europe, should be allowed to expand their frontiers, the more so as this war is not going to be the last war, but only the beginning of other terrible wars. He says that it is in the interests of Pangerman Central Europe that the Magyar race should become stronger by assimilating all the Slavs and Roumanians inhabiting Hungary, and he regrets that the non-Magyars were not extirpated before 1848. Only a Magyar should be allowed to possess and buy landed property in Hungary. The State must colonise and divide the land according to the needs and wishes of the Magyar race. Magyar emigration to America must be stopped. Banking institutions should be only Magyar. Slovak and Roumanian banks, as far as they exist, must come under State control. The right to vote must depend upon the elector's knowledge of the Magyar language. He would give to Croatia the Serbian Macva, but Dalmatia, Bosnia-Herzegovina, Slavonia and Fiume should be annexed to Hungary and Magyarised. Only thus, says the author, can the watch-word of Szechenyi be realised: "The Magyar State was not, but will be."

The book by Nicholas Szegedy is founded on the same principles. The author regrets that King Louis the Great, Gabriel Betlen and George Rakoczi did not pay greater attention to the question of nationalities in Hungary. He ascribes the beginning of the policy of Magyarisation to the reign of Joseph II, and attributes the growing consciousness of the non-Magyars to their intellectual leaders, who found an excellent support in the English Scotus Viator, Octavian Goga and others. Szegedy is in favour of an economic solution of the nationalist question. The Magyars want a Magyar State, and, therefore, they must influence everything: the Church, Schools, Banks, Societies and Administration. The State should not only demand the knowledge of the Magyar language from the Slovaks and Roumanians, but it should also exert influence upon their feelings and convictions. He maintains that the integrity of Hungary is sacred, and that it is absolutely out of the question for the non-Magyar nationalities to obtain the right of propagating even federalistic or autonomistic tendencies after the war. That would, in his opinion, constitute high treason of the worst degree.

The book by Lengyel, giving a list of true Magyar names which the author recommends all renegades, with non-Magyar names, to adopt, forms a characteristic complement to the above two exponents

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of the chauvinistic Magyar mentality. Extirpation and Magyarisation, these are the ideals of the Magyars, the "chivalrous champions of liberty." This is the way the Magyar leaders propose to "rejuvenate" their nation. All their talk about the "democratisation of Hungary" thus appears to be their usual trick for deceiving uninformed foreign opinion.

Review

With the Turks in Palestine. Alexander Aaronsohn. (Constable.) 2s. Mr. Aaronsohn is a Zionist whose parents migrated from Roumania to Palestine a generation ago in the early days of the movement which is now widely known in the world. The outbreak of war found him in the village of Zicron-Jacob in Palestine, a Turkish subject liable for military service. He was mobilised and served for several months in the Turkish army. His experiences as a conscript during the earlier months of the war, his narration of the events which led to the Turkish attack on the Suez Canal, and his subsequent adventures in the course of his escape from Palestine combine to make this little book a real document of war. Mr. Aaronsohn has achieved that rarest of author's triumphs; he leaves the reader asking for more.

A. F. W.

A German Socialist on Democracy

The reluctance of Germans to admit that they have anything to learn from their enemies may be studied with profit in *Die Glocke* (21 July), to which Dr. Paul Lensch, a somewhat Chauvinistic Majority Socialist, contributes an article entitled "The German Revolution." In the eyes of this arrogant democrat the movement now in progress in Germany is something entirely new. The promised abolition of the three-class franchise in Prussia is the inauguration of a revolution "beside which even the great French Revolution of 1789 was a mere cackle of hens." Writing before the composition of Dr. Michaelis' Ministry was known, he assumes that "the Chancellor will obviously appoint the leading parliamentary figures to the most important posts (*in den ausschlaggebenden Stellen*)"; and asserts that "he will only be able to retain his own high office by the confidence of the people's representatives. If he fails in this, he will disappear in three days. . . . From to-day onwards the road is open which will lead Germany to the forefront of the world's democracies." But, of course, German democracy will be a reality in a sense which England and France have failed to achieve. And, while this process "will bridge the gulf between North and South Germany, it is doubtful whether it can achieve the same result for us and our present enemies who, under Poincaré, Renaudel, Lloyd George and Henderson, remain our deadliest foes." Dr. Lensch then sings a pæan to his "people in arms which inspires such fear" in the hearts of all its enemies. "They know that Germany has achieved in this war something beyond their power. France and England united have been unequal to the task of dealing

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with half the German Army. . . . What a humiliating thought for the loud-mouthed leaders of the western 'democracies.' . . . But to the peoples themselves, who long for peace as we do, we shall expose the deceit of their nationalist and chauvinist leaders, and prove to them that the German people will fight to the last man rather than submit to their aggressive dictation. We shall send the news of the approaching triumph of democracy in Germany to these peoples, among whom, like foxes with burning tails, it will kindle a conflagration." Dr. Lensch has evidently a good deal to learn. We commend him and his fellows to the notice of Mr. Branting in Stockholm.

"The Unholy Alliance of Finance"

We observe that *Vorwärts* is pressing the Chancellor to reveal the meaning of the meeting of international financiers in Switzerland, to which we drew attention on 2 August. And simultaneously Mr. Philip Snowden—who, for reasons best known to himself, attributes to THE NEW EUROPE a semi-official character—asks the Leader of the House of Commons for a statement on the subject. For our part, we draw attention to the matter again; *first*, because it should not be allowed to fall out of public notice; *second*, because as long as our Governments in London, Paris and Rome, permit bankers to meet the enemy, they cannot refuse Socialists permission to do so without incurring the open distrust of all honest men.

Signor Malagodi and "The New Europe"

"When in doubt, attack the plaintiff's attorney," is a forensic device which often recoils on him who uses it. In the present instance the victim is a certain Signor Malagodi, not unknown to some of our readers, who sent the following message to the *Nacion* (Buenos Aires, 31 May):—"In England a review, entitled THE NEW EUROPE, is being published to support the Southern Slav programme. This review has been principally started in order to support the idea of the establishment of a new State to replace the Habsburg dynasty, a state which is already baptised with the name of Jugoslavia. Some prominent British politicians, in good faith, have been allured to support this idea, ignorant of the fact that they have to do with a simple manœuvre inspired and supported by the Austrian Government."

We doubt whether any newspaper paragraph was ever so closely packed with stupidity and malice. One of the aims of THE NEW EUROPE is that of all Italian patriots, viz., the liberation of all Austrian nationalities from oppressive rule; and because, in one respect, this programme entails a certain conflict between Italian Chauvinism and Yugoslav national feeling in Dalmatia, Signor Malagodi thinks that he can serve the interests of Italy by calling the Yugoslav movement an Austrian manœuvre. We believe that he represents a diminishing party in Italy; for the Italian Press, as a whole, evidently realises that an Italo-Slav Entente is the only guarantee of peace in the Adriatic.

Printed for CONSTABLE & Co. LTD., by EYRE & SPOTTISWOOD, LTD.,
His Majesty's Printers, East Harding Street, E. C. 4.

The New Europe

VOL. IV, No. 46

[REGISTERED FOR TRANSMISSION AT
THE INLAND NEWSPAPER RATE]

30 August 1917

Stockholm and *La Victoire Intégrale*

THE tangled controversy that now surrounds the word "Stockholm" is the fruit of divided counsels, in which the British Government has been much the worst sinner. From the very outset of the world-wide debate on the project of an international Socialist conference to be held in the Swedish capital the one thing lacking has been a clear lead from London. Doubtless there has been confusion at times in Paris on the question, but M. Ribot's Government has never allowed itself to be driven into the equivocal position of our own Cabinet. The French Cabinet has, from the first, expressed its open distrust of the Stockholm conference. Mr. Lloyd George, on the other hand, after a period of changing opinion, seemed to have decided against the proposal, but wished to throw the odium—if there were any—of rejecting it either upon British Labour or upon Mr. Kerenski. We are not here concerned with the indecent exhibition to which Mr. Asquith promptly put an end in the House of Commons on 13 August, nor with the Kerenski telegram episode (*see Daily News*, 20 August), and it is regrettable that such comparative irrelevancies were allowed to obscure the issue. The importance which they acquired was due to the vacillation of the Government and to no other cause, for that alone made Mr. Henderson appear to blow hot and cold at once. Mr. Henderson himself has been the chief victim, and, in certain respects, he may also prove to be the real culprit; but the Government cannot escape a heavy share of blame for having shirked its responsibility, for having dragged Mr. Kerenski's name into a dispute in which he could take no part, and for having supinely hoped that British Labour would save them the trouble of making a firm decision. The Labour Conference was allowed to meet on 10 August in ignorance of the fact that the War Cabinet had decided to refuse passports for Stockholm. Whether Mr. Henderson was aware of this it is impossible to say; but it does not seem probable; and the fact itself proves that the War Cabinet, being divided against

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itself and misreading the Labour mind, pusillanimously hoped that the Conference would save it the trouble of speaking in clear tones.

These considerations must appeal with equal force both to opponents and supporters of the Stockholm Socialist Conference, who cannot but prefer to know where they stand. And we think that the more sagacious leaders of Labour must scan the future with some anxiety arising from the knowledge that the rank and file suspect that Ministers have been playing with them. The whole trouble arises from a refusal to deal with the Stockholm project on its merits as a war measure. A true judgment of it must be "realistic," in the sense that mere prejudices like the refusal to talk to an enemy should be ruthlessly pushed on one side in order that the question may be faithfully answered: Is it a step towards victory—*la Victoire Intégrale*—or is it solely a manœuvre of the enemy? With characteristic blindness to facts the partisans of opposing opinions have only darkened counsel with their biassed propaganda. The *Morning Post* and Mr. Snowden are equally hysterical over Stockholm. Neither will admit that there is anything to be said for the opinion of the other; and, in consequence, neither knows how much there is to be said against himself. The unfortunate result of this conflict is that the general public has nothing but partisan exaggerations to guide it in coming to conclusions; for no organ of the Press has yet endeavoured to state the pros and cons of the whole problem, and it appears to be nobody's business to present the case without bias. The Government, which has given such an unmistakable lead in the nation's military effort, apparently thinks it is not worth while to assist it in the process of thinking out the main problems of the settlement, and has not itself taken serious thought about Stockholm. Thus we are caught unprepared by one of the most serious issues of the war which the Russian Revolution has presented to us. Without the Russian Revolution there would have been no Stockholm, but I may point out that the attitude of the Russian Government has really nothing to do with the merits of the case; for, once the proposal was made, and unless Mr. Kerenski were to change his attitude to the extent of refusing passports, the question for all who are invited to take part is the question I have asked above, namely,

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Will an international Socialist conference at Stockholm promote or will it discredit the war aims of Western Democracy?

The answer to this question has been in some degree compromised by recent events, and even Mr. Branting is now reported to have doubts about the possibility of holding it. The field of view is encumbered by the *débris* of heated and largely irrelevant controversy, and the public has almost irrevocably, on slender evidence, taken sides in the dispute. But even in these unfavourable circumstances I present an outline of the arguments for and against Stockholm, and a plan of action which may commend itself to those—a great number, I believe—who wish to see the Government and the country liberated from the shackles of unreason which a too fervent patriotism has riveted upon them. The whole Stockholm affair has been an illustration of government by clamour. We wish to see a speedy return to government by reason.

The opponents of an international Socialist meeting lay their emphasis solely on the military aspect and repudiate all attempts to deal with the enemy otherwise. "The working men of England are now in the trenches negotiating with the enemy at Lens and at Langemarck. Their terms are the terms which England has always offered to her enemies, not words, but Birmingham hand grenades and Sheffield steel" (*Morning Post*, 22 August). The argument is presented under five heads: (1) Germany has appealed to force of arms and must accept the inevitable result; any other attitude on our part would be a betrayal of the British armies in France, and a hint to the enemy that we were near the end of our tether. (2) Whether we call it a consultative or a mandatory conference, our representatives would be forced into the position of accepting conclusions which we could not and would not support, and they would be liable to be hoodwinked by the German Majority Socialists acting on the express injunctions of the German Government. (3) There is a danger that the conference would be prolonged in such a way as to lead to a premature armistice and so to an unsatisfactory peace. (4) It is almost certain that our own Minority Socialists would come back determined to foment domestic trouble in Britain by strikes and otherwise in order to display their "good faith" to "their German friends." (5) At such a conference it is inevitable that

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indiscreet revelations—in the form of half-truths—would be made by Entente pacifists which would prove embarrassing to the Western Governments.

Against these reasons we may place another five-fold argument in favour of the Stockholm Conference: (1) In view of the fact that the conference was first conceived in Russia—though the original initiative was actually Dutch—and represents a genuine feeling for international understanding on the part of the Soviet and of some of the present Russian Ministry, we ought to stretch a point in favour of participation in order to give Russian democracy a pledge of our good intentions. And this is reinforced by the reflection that contact with the German Social Democrats can only end in the further enlightenment of Russians and others on the character of official Socialism in Germany. (2) The conference will open—so Mr. Branting has assured us—with a frank probing of the responsibility for the war: a process which can only end either in the awakening of Germans to the guilt of their Government *or* to their public ostracism, not only by Entente Socialists, but by the Socialists of every country in the world almost without exception. Such a gain alone makes the conference worth holding. It is significant that the French insistence on this point has been met by a semi-official announcement in the *Frankfurter Zeitung* that, in that event, passports will not be issued to the German Socialists. The significance of such a refusal is obvious—and stamps Germany with the guilt of war. (3) This leads to the third contention; which is, that the Germans will be driven into the open, and will have to declare unequivocally their attitude—Mr. Branting will permit no quibbling on the point—on “the self-determination of all peoples,” including Poles and Alsatians. If they honestly accept the formula they must act upon it at home or else lose their little remaining credit with every Socialist in Europe; if they reject it or hedge, the conference dissolves. (4) Contact between the Independent Socialists of Germany (Haase, Bernstein, and others) and our own “pacifist” minority will do the latter a great deal of good in ways which had better not be described too minutely. (5) By not going to Stockholm we put ourselves in an inferior tactical position: (a) as regards Germany, because the Wilhelmstrasse will instantly disseminate the untruth that the Entente is so

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ashamed of its war-aims that it dare not allow free discussion of them on neutral soil, and, by this means, try to depress the rising democratic movement in Germany; (b) as regards Russia for the self-same reason; (c) in France, because the persistent suppression of what is now acknowledged to be a strong and growing opinion can only end in trouble; (d) in Great Britain itself, because of the suspicion already rampant in certain quarters that our Government is not acting with candour, either in the Stockholm matter, or in the general matter of war-aims. Mr. H. G. Wells sums up the last two points in the words: "Like the mass of intelligent people everywhere, I am increasingly dissatisfied with the ambiguous behaviour of the Allied Governments in the matter of war-aims, which is splitting up the unanimity of the Allied peoples" (*Morning Post*, 22 August).

A careful comparison of these two sets of arguments shows that they are not, in any sense, framed to meet one another, but issue from minds so antipathetic that it is very difficult to find a common denominator for them. Clearly, these ten arguments are of unequal value, and some of them are obviously hypothetical and illusory in their forecasts of risk or gain. Argument No. 1 of the first set has great force, but Nos. 2 and 3 of the second set seem to us to have even greater force, and so on. Indeed, the true estimate would consist in a careful combination of the strongest elements in each of these presentations of the case. By this we do not mean simply to strike a nice balance between "Yea and Nay"; quite the contrary, but, before fruitful action can be taken, the whole case must be dispassionately reviewed—an indispensable process in statecraft which is not in high favour to-day. And I believe that such a review of the situation would show that the most important aim of the moment is, not an unofficial discussion by Socialists at Stockholm or anywhere else, but the careful revision of the war-aims of the Allied Governments in the light of new conditions. The conference of Allied Socialists now sitting in London will help to clear the air, and cannot fail to give a new impetus to the best purposes of the Grand Alliance; but the decisive word does not yet lie with any such body, however powerful. It lies with Governments. We hope, therefore, that our own Government will accelerate the preparations for the official conference on war-aims, and that,

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meanwhile, the united Socialist parties of the Entente will let the Stockholm idea lie and thus give the general public time to regain sanity on the subject. Nothing is to be gained by forcing the proposal just now; it will only come to riper fruition if it is allowed to rest while our Governments define their intentions. Meanwhile, it is obvious that recent discussions must have clearly indicated to Downing Street, the Quai d'Orsay and the Consulta the direction in which Western democracy means to travel. We will only add our conviction that it is a most dangerous delusion to suppose that the "turning down of Stockholm" means that the vast popular current flowing towards a more democratic Europe has ceased to flow. The postponement of the international Socialist meeting only means that the demand for it will be renewed with redoubled force before Christmas. It lies with our Government to decide whether this growing stream is to flow towards the *victoire intégrale* or to be driven underground into courses which cannot lead to the common weal of Europe.

A. F. WHYTE.

Spain and Russia : A Parallel

THE events of last week in Spain may be summed up in one sentence: If Spain had been a belligerent, there would be to-day in Madrid a Provisional Government with a Spanish Kerenski at its head.

Let us first, however, point out that the Spanish and the Russian cases are not identical. The Spanish Restoration is not so heavily laden with political crimes as Tsardom was. The tone of its policy is different: not tragic but cynical, not oppressive but depressive, not criminal but blundering. Yet we may draw a parallel between the Russian and the Spanish Revolutions if only in order to illustrate by analogy and contrast why Madrid and Barcelona failed, while Moscow and Petrograd achieved such an astonishing success.

The situation, both in Russia and in Spain, was that of a monarchical *régime*, without a real popular basis and artificially maintained by means of a combination of forces—military, ecclesiastical, economic—ultimately resting on a mass of uneducated peasants; a growing working class

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imbued with socialist ideas and more or less efficiently organised into unions with strong political as well as economic views; an industrial class, more and more dissatisfied with the incompetence of the bureaucracy; and, at the top of it all, Governments more or less parliamentary in form, absolutely determined to carry on the system without ever touching on any vital question for fear of upsetting the precarious balance of the whole at the slightest conflict with reality. The parallel can be carried even further. Russians and Spaniards are apt to theorise in politics, and, under the spell of ideas, to be swept off their feet and lose touch with the hard ground of facts. Russians and Spaniards are extremists, with whom the most popular parties are the black and the red, while the delicate greys of constitutional monarchy which so well fit the British atmosphere only find favour with a minority of educated middle class men. Russians and Spaniards, when the war broke out, had behind them a series of unsuccessful attempts at establishing political liberty, and had repeatedly proved to the world and to themselves that they were incapable of organising a popular force sufficiently powerful to triumph over the established order.

But the war broke out, and the parallel, for the moment, stops. In Russia millions of peasants joined the army, and were the witnesses and victims of the treachery and incompetence of the Government of the Tsar. The officer caste was half swept away by the military disasters, half absorbed into the ever-growing ranks of the newly-appointed civilians. Lastly, the generals found themselves robbed of the fruit of their labour by a corrupt and degenerate Court. The net result of these facts was that the army, as a whole, was brought round to a revolutionary turn of mind. Nothing of the kind happened in Spain. The Spanish army, with a sure instinct, took their stand by neutrality. The corps of officers is not anti-democratic in its origin. The sons of the aristocracy are in its ranks, the comrades of the sons of the *bourgeoisie*, and the type of officer whose parents are of a quite humble extraction is not rare. But it is not the blood, but the spirit that makes an aristocracy. The Spanish army is, of all classes in Spain, the most privileged class, and, moreover, the most united and the most conscious of its corporate existence. The soldiers, mainly drawn from the peasant

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classes—not as a result of deliberate measures of inequality, but merely because the peasant class is by far the most numerous in Spain—are illiterate and very strictly disciplined into blind obedience. There is a sprinkling of workmen politically more developed, but they find themselves so diluted in the mass that their numbers are insufficient in any way to diminish the absolute control of the officers over the whole army. Thus the Spanish army constitutes a force of unrivalled power in the country in the hands of a strongly-organised trade union of officers.

It is well known that on 1 June this trade union, whose executive committee was clandestine, asked for recognition, backing its demand with a thinly-veiled threat to strike. The King had, till then, been the absolute head of the army. True, the constitution says that the King is irresponsible and that his decrees must be countersigned by a Cabinet Minister. But, in practice, just as the King appoints a Cabinet, and the Cabinet, by skilful handling of the electoral machinery, appoints a Parliamentary majority, the War Minister, who is supposed to be responsible for the military policy of the State, had become no more than a mere countersigning machine with no other utility than that of giving constitutional value to the decisions of the King. Thus custom and the cowardice of Governments had placed in the hands of the King the control of military affairs, and especially questions of personnel, and the King exercised it by means of his military household—an institution probably inspired by the Kaiser's *Kriegs-Kabinet*. It was in order to break the power of this military household that the Officers' Trade Union suddenly faced the Government and the Crown with an ultimatum asking for recognition. The mere fact of demanding, not to speak of the unheard-of substance of the demand, was unconstitutional, since the right of petitioning is explicitly denied by the Spanish Constitution to the army and the navy. Nevertheless, and in spite of the efforts of the Garcia Prieto Cabinet, the King, over the head of his Ministers, capitulated. The trade union had chosen its time too well.

A curious delusion then overtook the Spanish nation. Undoubtedly, the action of the army was unconstitutional, and, therefore, in the true militaristic vein. Yet the officers had made a stand against the nepotism and jobbery

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which were rampant in War Office nominations, under the *régime* of the Casa Militar. There was at this moment a community of interest between the army's action and the people's wishes. The army had only done in its own professional sphere what the people wanted to achieve with a wider national scope. The method itself was revolutionary, in harmony with the temper of the people at the moment. On this slender basis, and under the inspiration of the Russian revolution, the Spanish people raised great hopes of a radical change. For a time the word *revolution* appeared in every column of the Spanish Press. The dumb feeling of political unrest which had been growing in the country for the last four years, as it became more and more obvious that the Crown did not mean to respond to the advances made by the Reformist Party in order to bring about a democratisation of the system of the Restoration, suddenly became articulate. The Garcia Prieto Cabinet fell in the midst of these fresh winds of a political spring, and all eyes turned to the Crown, expecting the new, bold act which would open to the Spanish Monarchy a period of really Liberal renaissance. In lieu of spring the Crown brought back Señor Dato. The same old wheel was turning again as if nothing had happened in these three weeks so full of destiny. A wave of hopeless disappointment passed over the nation. A storm was gathering in the industrial areas, and revolution seemed inevitable.

Here, again, the Spanish situation was not unlike the Russian. An attempt was made by the political leaders of the nation—except the Socialists—with a view to incorporating the revolutionary spirit into the established order, thereby avoiding an open revolution. The Duma, though unrepresentative, tried to bring about the salvation of Tsardom by transforming it into a Constitutional Monarchy. This was the task of Miljukov during the last days of the fallen dynasty. Miljukov and the Duma failed, and the Revolution broke out, took the power out of the hands of the Moderates and, *helped by the army*, dethroned the Romanovs.

Spain had also her Miljukovs—the Catalan deputies and senators. Their intervention was due to several causes: Catalonia is of all the Spanish “kingdoms” the most progressive, and the only one in which, as a whole, deputies

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are really elected by the people, and not smuggled into Parliament by the Government. Thus the Catalan Parliamentarians, being the real representatives of the people, felt in sympathy with their grievances, and understood that a change was necessary. Then, also, the majority of Catalan Parliamentarians are in favour of Home Rule, not only for Catalonia, but for all the other "kingdoms," and they felt that when the whole country was groping for new things, the time was ripe for them to put forward their favourite scheme for a Federal system of Government. Lastly, being at bottom of a Conservative turn of mind, whatever their political ideas, the Catalan Parliamentarians desired to avoid the outbreak of a revolution, with its bloodshed and wanton destruction of property.

Thus it was that at a meeting held in Barcelona, the representatives of the Catalan people decided to demand from the Government the immediate opening of Parliament, and in the event of a Government's refusal, to summon an Assembly of the Deputies and Senators of the whole of Spain in order to deliberate on the situation. The Government, unable to rise above its ordinary party views, refused to appear before a Parliament which, having been elected under Count Romanones, was the true image of its maker. Moreover, after having assumed full powers through the suspensions of the Constitution (an emergency measure fully constitutional in itself), the Government declared that the proposed Assembly would be considered as seditious and could not be tolerated. The Assembly, nevertheless, met at Barcelona on 19 July, attended by 71 members of both Houses out of 760. This small figure is the best proof that could be given of the real value of the people's representation at the Cortes. The Assembly decided to consider itself as permanently established, to set up three Committees in order to study a programme of immediate reforms respectively in the Constitution, the Army and Justice, and the National Economy, and to meet again in another town at a later date. The Government tried to raise against the Assembly the old Castilian prejudice against Catalan Home-Rulers, and to ridicule it by taking full advantage of their absolute control of news and papers, thanks to a severe censorship. But, in spite of the very efficient efforts of Señor Sanchez Guerra, the Home Secretary, who, as a former

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journalist, headed the campaign, the whole country was soon convinced that the Assembly of Barcelona had been one of the most important events in the modern history of Spain, and the measure of popular success which it gained during a very short interval in which the Censor's hold on the press was slightly loosened, was a remarkable sign of the political liveliness of the whole country during those memorable days. The Mayor of Barcelona, though a Government nominee, resolved to resign rather than to oppose the support which the municipality of the great liberal city wished to offer to the Assembly. Many more municipalities, notably those of Oviedo, Málaga, Salamanca and Saragossa, declared also in favour of the movement. Practically the whole of the Basque provinces followed suit. And the Press, as soon as it was unfettered by the Censor, almost unanimously decided to support the general demand. The whole country seemed to have reached a kind of sacred union in order to demand that a non-party Cabinet should be entrusted with the task of organising impartial elections for a Constituent Assembly.

Then it was that the Spanish extremists thought fit to interfere. Remember the Russian events. Our "maximalists" decided that our "Miljukovs" were too slow. The railway strike of 10 August (six days before the announced date for the second meeting of the Assembly in Oviedo) was taken by the revolutionary Socialists as the basis for a general strike which was to bring about the collapse of the *régime*. The facts are well known. The strike was universal. Spanish workmen will go a good length when asked to put up a fight. In Madrid, Barcelona, the industrial areas in Asturias, Bilbao, Catalonia, Aragon, the tramways, the building trades, the bakeries, and many other important services were paralysed. But the Government, *with the help of the army*, made short work of the revolution. The country was declared in a state of war. The reserves were called up. The railway men of military age were mobilised. Guns and machine guns destroyed barricades in the streets of Madrid, Barcelona, Sabadell and other towns. In three days the revolution was dead. Two thousand prisoners, several hundreds of dead and wounded, were the victims of the wild attempt.

Thus, in Spain as in Russia, the efforts of the Moderates

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towards a Liberal solution were shattered by the sudden intervention of the Extremists. But while in Russia, thanks to the war, the army was with the revolutionaries, in Spain, thanks to neutrality, the army was with the Government. And now Russia is a Socialist Republic, while Spain rapidly moves towards a type of military monarchy which cannot last. A hope remains that when the present natural reaction has spent itself, the King will see where his real interests are. The victory of the Allied democracies will help him and Spain.

S. DE MADARIAGA.

The New *Risorgimento*

THE great advance of the Italian armies on the Carso has given the greatest satisfaction to their comrades in arms on all fronts. It has proved to the enemy the weight of Italy's arm and the invincible spirit of her people. It lays at rest the malicious rumour, born of enemy inspiration, that Italy was too weary to strike; and the magnitude of its success makes every friend of liberty in Europe a debtor to the dauntless soldiers of the Latin kingdom. No one, least of all the enemy, will underrate the military significance of this offensive; and the reports of uproar in Trieste are but the first indication of its political effect upon the subject races under Austrian rule. Italian guns on the Carso are hastening the process by which the Habsburg dynasty is being brought to a final judgment. The Italian Press has been at some pains to reveal to us the political aims to which these military events are leading, and insists—none too soon—upon the essential continuity of the national policy of Italy in relation to Austria-Hungary. Taking as its text the Pact of Corfu by which the solidarity of the whole Jugoslav race was revealed to the world, it has discussed the Italo-Slav problem in terms which show that Italian public opinion is fast awakening to the necessity for an understanding between these two Adriatic neighbours. The emphasis which the more liberal newspapers, led by the *Corriere della Sera*, now lay upon the importance of the cordial co-operation of Italian and Jugoslav against their historic common enemy, justifies the hope that the vital question of the Adriatic will now emerge from the fog of misconceptions in which Austrian policy has deliberately shrouded it.

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The extent to which Austrian craft has succeeded in fostering enmity between Latin and Slav in those regions may be gauged in Admiral Thaon di Revel's letter to Mr. Whitney Warren, the well-known American architect, published in the *Westminster Gazette* of 25 August. The Chief of Staff of the Italian Navy argues that "the Trentino, Trieste, Istria, Dalmatia and the Adriatic are five magical words," in which Italy's war aim is enshrined, and that without the possession of Dalmatia and the Curzolari Islands "the Adriatic will never be a sea on which Italy will feel herself safe." He lays a true emphasis on the defenceless character of Italy's eastern coast, and enters a strong plea, which we cannot but support, for a territorial settlement which will give the Italian people a sense of security in the Adriatic. When he comes to interpret his plea in the form of a demand for large and unjustifiable annexations, his argument instantly loses weight; for he supports his thesis with illustrations, which reveal his failure to appreciate the *imponderabilia* of national sentiment in Dalmatia. In the closing words of his appeal to the American people he says:—

"America can be, in a certain manner, the arbitrator between two civilisations; she may either kill Latin civilisation by leaving the Adriatic in the hands of the Barbarians, or she may push back the *Teuto-Croatian hordes*, who are far from the confines which Nature intended for them. I feel sure that your generous and intelligent race, cherishing above all liberty and justice, will not hesitate between the two."

The words which we have italicised bear a suspicious resemblance to the favourite phrases which the *Idea Nazionale* employs to discredit the Yugoslav movement in Dalmatia. The gallant Admiral does not strengthen his case by the disloyal pretence that the Croats are "the Cossacks of Austria"; and Mr. Whitney Warren, his American sponsor, merely invites our amazement when he says that Dalmatia belongs to Italy "on the same grounds that Alsace-Lorraine belongs to France." Dalmatia is a Yugoslav region, in which the Italian population is not more than five per cent. of the total; and the future of Latin civilisation in it depends entirely upon the temper in which Italy approaches the whole Adriatic problem. Statesmanship can create good relations between Italy and Jugoslavia; and we believe that Italian

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statesmen will take up the task in the right spirit. Foresight must warn every Italian that only by accommodation and goodwill can the permanent interests of Italy be secured.

The true answer to Admiral Thaon di Revel was given by the *Corriere della Sera* (14 August) in an article entitled "The Discussions on the Pact of Corfu." Dealing with arguments in the *Tribuna*, the *Perseveranza*, and especially in an article by Signor Tamaro in the *Idea Nazionale*, the *Corriere* said: "It is stated that the Yugoslav movement is a fictitious invention, with Austria's mark upon it, intended to provide the Habsburgs with a way of escape from disaster, and that once Yugoslavia is a reality it will gravitate into the orbit of Austro-German politics, with the result that Italy will find she has at her borders, not one Austria, but two. . . . It is easy to prove that the Yugoslav movement is not an Austrian invention by referring to evidence dating from before 1914, given by men whose Italian sympathies are undoubted, experts in the problems of the Adriatic. We do not wish to go back to the well-known prophecies of Mazzini and Tommaseo . . .; we shall only refer to Count Samminidelli's words in 1899, when he was vice-president of the 'Dante Alighieri,' and to what Cesare Battisti and Virginio Gayda said after the Balkan wars. . . ."

"In reality, the national movement of the Southern Slavs, which started in the times of Napoleon and remained quiescent during the greater part of the 19th century, had an extraordinary revival after 1905, when the Serbo-Croat coalition was formed to combat the Austrophil *partito del diritto*, led by Dr. Franck; it developed markedly after 1912-13, when Serbia so greatly increased her attractive power over her kindred races under Habsburg rule. Think of the Croats, the Slovenes and the Serbs, who often crossed the frontiers of Austria and were welcomed in Serbia as brothers, and called to public office exactly as the refugees from other parts of Italy were welcomed in Piedmont between 1849-59; think of the Austrian Serbs, who after 1912 emigrated to colonise Kossovo. . . . For the matter of that, the best proof of the existence and success of the movement is afforded by the fact that the Habsburg Government sought to stifle it by supporting the party of the Right against the Serbo-Croat coalition, and by abso-

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lute calumnies, such as the Agram Trial, and finally by plotting in 1913, and carrying out in 1914, the scheme of overwhelming Serbia, so as to suppress the Southern Slav movement at its source, just as it attacked Piedmont in 1859 to suppress the Italian movement.

“It is suggested that once Jugoslavia were constituted she would prove a dangerous enemy to Italy and the ally of the Austro-Germans. Frankly, we are unable to see upon what grounds this is based, for the opposite appears to us much the more likely forecast, seeing that Jugoslavia will be unable to come into being and to maintain her existence except by driving the Austro-Germans away from the Adriatic and out of the Balkans; she will, therefore, necessarily have to reckon with the permanent hostility of the Austro-Germans, and as she will be much weaker than we are, it will be all to her interest to draw closer to us in her resistance to the threatening advances of the Austro-Germans from the north. . . .

“If we declare ourselves not only not hostile but favourably inclined to the Jugoslav solution of the question as opposed to the Croat-Slovene solution, it is because the former offers us dangers far smaller and less inevitable along with advantages far more important and certain than the latter. . . . An independent Croatia-Slovenia, that is, a State in which the Clerical influences favourable to Austria would predominate unopposed, would be a State which would gravitate inevitably into the Austro-German orbit, while in a State composed of Croatia, Slovenia and Serbia, the Orthodox Serbians would be able to exercise a powerful anti-Austrian and anti-German influence. . . . Although crushed and bereft of many of her people, Serbia yet remains for the Southern Slavs the centre from which the movement sprang, and the centre to which it must return, just as Piedmont was the centre for the other parts of Italy, even after the disasters of July and August, 1848, and after Novara. . . . If this is the case, we, conscious of our strength and right, ought not to refuse to treat with the champions of Jugoslavia. . . .

“It seems to us that this attitude is preferable to that which has not yet been abandoned and which consists in denying *à priori* the good faith of all Jugoslav propagandists, and in asserting the necessity of treating them as enemies.

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Such tactics appear to us to run counter to our own interests, by giving the enemy material assistance in that propaganda which encourages the Slav regiments to fight against us, and by fostering in Allied countries that very state of mind which the tour of Baron Sonnino has done so much to combat. To deny that there is a national Southern Slav movement, because, under the Austrian flag, Croats fight fiercely against Serbs, and because in Croatia there is a strong party favourable to Austria, is as true as to deny that there was a national Italian movement in 1859-61 because Garibaldi had to fight against Italians in Sicily and in the kingdom of Naples. . . . The other differences of dialect, costume, etc., cannot be greater than those which, after 1860, proved no obstacle to the union of the various parts of Italy. . . . In truth, the Italian movement and the Yugoslav movement present a most striking similarity."

The Bulgarians and Slavdom

BEING convinced that common action based on an understanding between the Serbs and the other Christian nations in the Balkans was necessary both in their dealings with the Turks and with Austria-Hungary, I have always advocated intimate relations between Serbia and Bulgaria. For this purpose I thought that it would be worth while even to sacrifice something of our own if it could not be done otherwise. During the Balkan wars—before the unexpected attack on the Serbian Army by the Bulgarians in June 1913—I had to endure angry discussions and to live through bitter hours in Skoplje, then the Serbian Headquarters, because of this heretical opinion. Still worse was it at the beginning of this war, in Kragujevatz, when I urged, contrary to the opinions of my best friends, that it was necessary to meet the demands of the Bulgarians to the utmost limit, if only it would prevent them from taking armed action on the side of the Central Powers.

At the same time, I was always conscious of the fact that the Bulgarians are not a South Slav tribe; that they are not, by race and nature, the same as the rest of our people, but "slavonised," having adopted the language and external characteristics of their Slav neighbours. To-day,

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when the Bulgarians themselves are doing their utmost to prove this fact, it no longer excites controversy to express such convictions publicly; but there was a time before the Balkan wars, when it was not so popular to declare frankly this point of view. Then the idea that was mooted of a South Slav Community involved the Bulgarians as well and such union was a recognised item of South Slav propaganda. As editor of the "Serbo-Croat Almanac" of the younger generation, which, supported by the collaboration of the best authors and names amongst the Serbo-Croats and Slovenes, propagated the idea of a firm and inviolable national union, I purposely did not ask the Bulgarians to join. I avoided asking them to do so even when they themselves offered their collaboration, and they, following our example, founded an "Almanac" of their own under the editorship of the late Bulgarian novelist, Pencho Slavejkov.

I was in favour of a close union with Bulgaria for purely political and practical reasons, but never lost sight of the difference in our races. Just because of this difference I expected mutual advantages from co-operation. I saw in the Bulgarians a progressive people who possessed all those positive qualities, some of which are lacking in the true South Slav races, and which the latter should have learned from the Bulgarians: perseverance, an industry that does not disdain small things, discipline, and, as a result, the faculty of organisation. The over-developed intelligence and individuality, the deep-seated causes of the separatist tendencies of the Slav nature (and in consequence the very reason of the disunion of our people) would, in my opinion, have gained the necessary correction by coming into close touch with the non-Slav nature of the Bulgarians, which rather resembles that of the Germans. The ability of the Bulgarians to assimilate the language and external characteristics of their Slav neighbours would, I thought, help towards this union, in addition to the political and economic interests common to all the Balkan Christians.

Circumstances did not tend to the accomplishment of what I wished to happen, but they clearly showed that the basis of my conviction was the right one. After all that has happened—and things have developed with very great

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rapidity—it seems to-day more probable that the explanation of such an unpopular opinion—that the Bulgarians are not Slavs and that this fact explains their behaviour—will meet with more indulgent attention.

Thus my point is, that the Bulgarians have been counted by mistake amongst the Slavs. The Slav language and the external characteristics have been imposed on a morally lower Tartar race—on one hand by the strongly developed racial attractiveness and capacity for culture of the South Slav tribes, and on the other by force of circumstances and constant changes in the Balkans during the Middle Ages and in more recent times. The Bulgarians could not, of course, assimilate them entirely: the barbaric elements in their former language, for instance, were always strong enough to spoil the fluency and expressiveness of the Serb tongue. Nevertheless the Bulgarian literary language, by freeing itself from its origins constantly developed towards the language of the Serbian peasant.

At the same time, historical events caused the true origin of the Bulgarians to be gradually forgotten, and they began to be looked upon as related to the Slavs, and later on even as Slavs themselves. Under the long-lasting Turkish yoke there was hardly anything to strengthen the consciousness of the racial feeling, and the liberation of the Bulgarians from the Turks with the help of the Russians brought them quite near to the Slavs. So much so that their protectors and liberators, the Russians, formed a close bond with them and took the view that in freeing the Bulgarians they were liberating not only Christians from the Turkish yoke but Slav brothers. The liberated Bulgarians became the children of the holy Orthodox Slav mother, Russia. The only sign which showed that the Orthodox Slav religion was not that of their ancestors was that they readily used to change the forms of it and the government of their churches to suit their political convenience and in a manner contrary to the true spirit of religion.

Far from enriching the intellectual and spiritual treasures of the South Slavs with whom they became associated, the Bulgarians limited themselves to copying the Slavs. These facts are well known, and the Bulgarians themselves cannot conceal them. Their savants, of course, are reticent about them, but their greatest poet, Ivan Vazov, in lucid hours of

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sincere patriotism—before the wars, naturally—cannot help crying out longingly :—

“ Oh Bulgaria, thou art such a beautiful land,
But poor art thou, Bulgaria, poor in illustrious names.
In thy soft mountains, in thy naked rocks,
Neither memories nor signs are there of any glorious past.”

More characteristic, perhaps, even than the poem, is Vazov's accompanying note :—

“ The poverty of our fatherland in monuments or other relics connected with our historic past is crushing indeed. There are no fortresses, no ruins of palaces, no monuments whatever, whether sculptural or architectural; nothing at all to tell of the Bulgarian past. Nearly all architectural remains of any value date from Byzantine times. The only relic worth mentioning is the building of the Asen dynasty, the cathedral of St. Demetrius in Trnovo, which is rough work giving testimony of poor taste. The same may be said of the church in Boyana, on the Vitosh plain. The sculptural works in Preslava have been brought there from a devastated Greek town. There are no remains whatever of artistic work. It is ridiculous to blame the Turks because we have no monuments or relics of old times.”

Personally, I shrink from supporting my thesis by quoting this bitter accusation of his country by a poet and patriot, and I should abstain from doing so if Europe had not so cruelly misread my own country and if the Bulgarians had not wantonly destroyed not only the human remnants of the Serbian nation, but also the memorials of her past on the soil they have invaded. In contrast to Bulgaria, Serbia is sown with monuments and relics of the past; she swarms with living memories of remote and nearer ages and she resounds with echoes of famous names. Serbian poets, unlike Vazov, are able to sing of the “ Graves of Glory ” which will flood with light the paths of coming generations. On the field of Kossovo, where the Serbian Empire perished more than 500 years ago, the Monastery of Grachanitzza still tells of former glory, and in the middle of the wildest part of Albania there is a holy Serbian monument of rare beauty—the Monastery of Visoki Dechani.

Serbian civilisation and schools originated at the time of St. Sava, the great author and teacher of the thirteenth century, and their influence had not disappeared even in the darkness of slavery under the Turks. The “ Code of

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Tzar Dushan" is a proof of a highly-developed sense of law. Above all, the Serbian national songs are a spiritual treasure which proves the never-failing genius of the nation through the centuries. They mark at the same time, perhaps in the best way, the frontiers of our race. The Bulgarians have national songs too, but they are borrowed, or closely imitated, from the Serbs—songs of Kraljevitch Marko and other Serbian heroes. They have added nothing new to them, or to their other literature, which is not original but built on foreign models. Perhaps the only true Bulgarian literary work of great value is the book "Baja Ganje" which vividly portrays the Bulgarian with his Tartar characteristics as opposed to those of the Slav, and with all the good and bad qualities which have been discovered in them in recent years by observers of men and things in the Balkans.

It is true that there are Slavs in Macedonia who call themselves Bulgarians. Whilst the Serbs, true to their Slav nature, argued amongst themselves as to what should be done in the neglected country under the Turks, and divided themselves into different parties before they had agreed about anything, the non-Slav Bulgarians worked hard, organised and educated, and though unable to make true Bulgarians from Slavs, formed at least a pro-Bulgarian party in Macedonia. The Serbs have paid for their indolence and for their Slav nature, and have still to pay for it. British travellers in parts of Macedonia heard many natives say that they were Bulgarians and naturally believed what they heard on the spot rather than what the Serbs in books affirmed from afar.

But if the Serbs have omitted to do what they ought, and if it is just that they should pay for it, it cannot be just that the Slavs in Macedonia, with their Slav nature and characteristics which no one denies, should be declared once and for ever to be Bulgarians, who are not true Slavs. The Serbs cannot allow the Bulgarians, with their lower culture, to rule over them, any more than the nations of Western Europe can allow Prussian or German militarism to declare their domination over the world, in spite of the military qualities of the disciplined Prussian sergeant and the splendid organising capacities of the whole German race. Because of the industry and readiness of the Bulgarians,

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the Serbs cannot renounce that part of their nation in Macedonia, in whose veins flows Serbian blood. Macedonia is the cradle of our glory and of our past which we cannot renounce.

It may, however, be pointed out again that the practical qualities of the Bulgarians which led to this state of affairs in Macedonia must be highly esteemed, especially by the Serbs and the South Slavs who lack them. The combination of Slav intelligence and intellectual versatility on one side and Bulgarian industry and sense of order and discipline on the other, helped the Macedonians who amalgamated themselves with Bulgarians to become the leaders and most influential men in Bulgarian policy and in the public life of Sofia. It is obvious from this fact alone, that the same combination of South Slavs and Bulgarians on a bigger scale would give the best results for the Balkans and for Europe, and from this point of view a close union between the South Slavs and Bulgarians was, in my opinion, always desirable. But time has altered the problem, which must now wait to be taken up again after the *victoire intégrale* of the Allies.

MILAN ČURČIN.

The Moscow Conference

At the time of writing it is impossible to prophesy the outcome of the Moscow Conference, but it may well prove the most important event in the history of the Revolution. The original idea of such a Conference came from Mr. Kerenski, and it rests with him to see that it is not used against him by his enemies, for in spite of his marvellous record of devotion and self-sacrifice his enemies are numerous and powerful. Mr. Kerenski is the greatest support of democracy that this war has produced, for not even the most malicious Press can accuse him of lack of determination or patriotism. Demagogic appeals to strong government and patriotism have been made too often during this war in the interests not of democracy, but of those who wish to use democracy for their own purpose; fortunately, both for Russia and for Europe, Mr. Kerenski is the valiant upholder both of patriotism and strong government, and, what is more, he has the courage and

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sincerity to expose and resist what is not in the true spirit of democracy. It is this combination of courage and sincerity that has made him the genius of the Russian Revolution.

The first idea of the Moscow Conference was to bring all parties together and secure the moral support of the nation for the new Coalition Government. Mr. Kerenski first mooted the idea while in the throes of Cabinet making, but difficulties arose and the plan was set aside for some weeks. Meanwhile the Coalition Government was formed and increased efforts were made to reconcile class rivalries, but without success. The Cadets have given very lukewarm support to the Government in spite of the presence in it of four of their members, and their growing hostility to the Socialists has made it more and more difficult to keep together any semblance of a Coalition. Thus the last month has witnessed the steady embitterment of class feeling at a moment when it is most to be deplored.

Such is the atmosphere in which the new Moscow Conference is to meet. On the one side are the Cadets relying on the support of the various groups and classes standing to the Right of them; on the other side are the Socialists represented by the C.W.S.D. and the Council of Peasants' Delegates. In between these two extremes are the small but devoted band of Kerenski's immediate followers, who for the last month have been trying to bring the *bourgeois* and Socialist parties together. They are essentially moderates, and in times of excitement moderation loses much of its appeal. The disasters at the front have driven many men into the arms of the Right, putting their trust in those that preach strong government and iron discipline, while the increasing bitterness of the Right has driven the Socialists still further to the Left. In these circumstances the difficulties of Kerenski's task have been enormously increased.

The fears of the Socialists are not without foundation. The military defeats came to them as a thunderbolt, for they saw that the Revolution was threatened not only by the enemy without, but by the counter-revolution within. The opponents of the Government raised their heads, and left no stone unturned to ruin still further the prestige of the C.W.S.D. The first open sign of the increasing courage of

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the parties to the Right of the Government was a meeting of the Duma that took place on 31 July. The most startling speech was made by Maslennikov, formerly a member of the Progressive, now transformed into the Radical Democratic, party. The Executive Committees of the C.W.S.D. he described as "a group of mad fanatics, swindlers, and traitors," and called upon the Duma to come out into the open. "Only the Duma," he said, "can save Russia. I call upon the President to summon all the members of the Duma and demand that the Government shall appear before it as a body and report on the condition of the country. Then the Duma will show this Government what to do, what new Ministers should be appointed and what present ones removed." This speech was punctuated with marks of approval from Purishkevich, who since the Revolution has been showering the most violent abuse on the Socialists. Miljukov and Rodzianko, who were also present, tried to remove the impression created by the previous speakers, but it was too late. The next day the Socialist Press raised the alarm. The counter-revolution, they cried, is already a reality. What difference is there, they added, between the Bolsheviki of the Left who demand all Power for the C.W.S.D. and the Bolsheviki of the Right who make the same demand for the Duma?

Since then there have been further meetings, not only of the Duma, but of the *bourgeois* parties. The Cadets can now rely on the support of all the parties to the Right of them, and during the last few days the Cossacks have declared in their favour. The Cadet party is well organised and lacking neither in brains nor in money. Consisting originally for the most part of professional men, they have now gained the support of the big landowners and the industrialists, of all those whose interests are threatened by the agrarian and industrial reforms of a Socialist Government. There is little doubt that their plans are now mature, and that they have come to the Moscow Conference prepared to strike a blow for power. The one unknown factor, however, is the attitude of the army. There are a number of generals who have been removed, some for military, other for political, reasons, to whom the policy of the young democratic Minister of War is far from acceptable. While imposing discipline upon the common soldier, Kerenski

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has not spared those in high places who have opposed the authority of the Government. The only guarantee of a stable Government is to find a general who will work hand in hand with the Minister of War, who less than any man can be accused of neglecting the interests of his country. It is to be hoped that in General Kornilov Mr. Kerenski has found such a man. Unfortunately a dispute has arisen on the question of discipline and capital punishment. It appears that in principle they are in agreement, but that General Kornilov criticises the slowness of the Government in giving him a free hand. It is unfortunate that such a difference should have arisen on the eve of the Moscow Conference when discontented politicians are openly looking round for a military dictator, with whose help they may attempt a *coup d'état*. General Kornilov is to state his case, and speeches are to be made by Generals Alexeyev, Gurko and Brusilov, all of whom have suffered at the hands of the Provisional Government.

In such conditions the outlook is full of danger. There are many people in Russia and in this country who have grown impatient with Russian democracy, and are looking for the strong hand to show itself. These people would, no doubt, welcome a *coup d'état* in Russia that took the power out of the hands of its present holders, and they talk glibly of a military dictator. They have raised the cry: "The country is in danger," but the safety of the country is not necessarily guaranteed by acts of violence. Many people here look back with regret to the days of 1916, when the Russian armies were sweeping all before them, and they imagine that but for the Socialists and the Revolution all this might be repeated. A strong Government would receive a welcome here, but a strong Government is not necessarily an autocratic or a military Government. The only strong Government in Russia is one that will gain the maximum support among the people, and it is easier to achieve this by a spirit of reconciliation than by a spirit of violence. If the Cadets can gain this support better than the Socialists, they must do so on their own merits, and not by violence, for Kerenski has issued a solemn warning that violence will be met by violence.

There is no reason to think that the present Government is unequal to the task it has set before it. The failure at

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the front was not wholly due to Socialist propaganda; it was largely the outcome of the breakdown of organisation for which the old *régime* was mainly responsible. This organisation must again be built up; it will not right itself by a *coup d'état* on the part of any political party. The claims of the Cadets to carry on the war more vigorously can only be fulfilled if there is harmony and co-operation in the rear, and threats of violence are not likely to achieve this end.

Russian democracy will not be overthrown without a struggle, and in that struggle it will have the sympathy of those who have welcomed the Revolution in this country. The growth of Russian Imperialism would hardly be an encouragement to German democracy, which we hope to see emerge as a result of this war. Unless real democracy can be established in Russia, it will be difficult to secure it elsewhere. It is for this reason that we give our support to Kerenski, the ardent champion of Russian democracy in the struggle that lies before him.

RURIK.

“ A School of Foreign Affairs ”

[*Ever since the publication of Mr. A. F. Whyte's article on " A School of Foreign Affairs " (see THE NEW EUROPE, No. 36) our post-bag has been full of communications of all kinds, which show that there is a widespread interest in the proposal. Two of these we select to show that there is clearly a practical possibility that before long this most desirable institution may come into being. We hope our readers will do all they can to ventilate the idea and to secure for it the support of public men.*]

I.—THE PRESENT EQUIPMENT OF LONDON.

Mr. Arthur Percival Newton, secretary of the Board of Studies in History at King's College, writes :—

“ I welcome the proposal to found a ' School of Foreign Affairs ' with the heartiest agreement; and as I feel that we can at once make it a matter of practical politics in the University of London, you will, I hope, permit me to comment upon the practical means of carrying it out. May I point out in the first place that I understand you to use the word ' School,' not as involving any new building or institution, but in the sense in which we always employ the term, *e.g.*, in the School of History, or of Agriculture. In some cases the ' School ' is found under one roof, *e.g.*, the School of Slavonic Studies at King's and the School of Oriental Studies at

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the London Institution. The School of Economics is only in part at the London School of Economics and Political Science, and some of the work is done at University College and at King's, while the rapidly developing School of Imperial Studies is even more widely spread. All the post-graduate work in the University is inter-collegiate, and I think it is certain that the work of a new School of Foreign Policy would be done in the three colleges—University, King's, and the London School of Economics and Political Science, together with the new School of Oriental Studies at the London Institution.

AN EXISTING NUCLEUS.

" The nucleus of the new school is already in existence. New developments have taken place at an extraordinary rate during the war in the Faculties of Arts and Economics, and many of them have been deliberately designed in expectation of some such idea as Mr. Whyte's. It is impossible within narrow limits to explain what is now going on, but I may mention that the University now has (or next session will have) a properly endowed Chair or Lectureship in the language and culture of *every European country* :— *French*, four chairs, and a chair in the History and Political Institutions of France, held by Professor Paul Mantoux; *German*, four chairs; *Italian*, a new chair at University College and a lectureship at King's; *Russian*, a new chair at King's with lectureships in other Slavonic languages (Serbian, Polish, etc.); *Spanish*, a chair at King's; *Portuguese*, a new chair at King's; *Dutch and Flemish*, a new chair now in process of endowment at University; *Scandinavian languages*, new lectureships now in process of endowment at University; *Modern Greek*, now in immediate prospect at King's; and so on.

" The development of our School of History has outstripped the provision made for carrying it on, and we are now preparing for a campaign for the endowment of further chairs and lectureships. The foundation of the new School of Foreign Policy would obviously fall properly into the scheme of the History School when it is launched. Thus you would need a reader in the History of Diplomacy; a lecturer in Historical Geography, who would be specially concerned with the boundary delimitation of the past (*cf.* Hertslet's 'Map of Europe by Treaty'), and a lecturer in Diplomatic Technique, who would properly treat his subject (the preparation of protocols, etc.) from the historical point of view. The historical work of the school is linked with the Faculty of Economics, and with the new work in Commerce that is now being actively developed in concert with the London County Council, and with the Committee on the Consular Service. Questions of Commercial Treaties obviously lie midway between History and Commerce. International Law is now moderately well equipped in our Faculty of Laws, but there are infinite possibilities for its development.

THE NEED OF A LIBRARY.

" No School of Foreign Policy could attempt to do first-rate work without a proper working library, with access to the British Museum

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for reference. We cannot claim that the libraries of the three Colleges afford anything more than a nucleus for such a library, yet they are by far the best nucleus to be found in any educational institution in the country, and only need larger grants to make them a perfect instrument. The lines for their development are already laid down, and the first extension would be a more *liberal expenditure on foreign periodicals*. We have good collections of scientific periodicals, but are very short on the political side. A good deal of the work of the students in the school will be in the public archives. The staff of the School of History are closely in touch with the officials of the Public Record Office, and the MSS. Department of the British Museum, and methods of research have been systematized. It is essential, if the new school is going to attain influence, to establish in connection with it a Publication Fund. London has no University Press in the real sense of the word, and we are baulked in all directions by the difficulty in publishing the researches of our students. I would suggest that a Publication Fund should be one of the first endowments of the new school.

“ I am inclined to think that the greatest difficulty will arise, not on the academic, but on the official side. The Foreign Office, until the war broke out, utterly ignored the University of London. They have had to take notice of us during the war because they needed our help, but I doubt whether anyone would be optimistic enough to think that the leopard has really changed his spots. Most of us expect that when peace returns we shall be calmly relegated once more to the background, and that things will return to their old peaceful ways of jog-trot and official conservatism. That, however, is a matter rather for the politician than the academic person, and a good many of us trust that those members of the House of Commons who are determined to keep things moving will make use of all the technical help that can be offered from the academic side. . . . My chief purpose in writing this letter is to show you that the ways are prepared, and to let you know that from the academic side we shall be ready to give you every assistance in our power.”

II.—A FOUNDER OF SCHOOLS OF DIPLOMACY.

“ Those who are working to establish Schools of Diplomacy may well study the career of a man who spent his whole life in the endeavour to make politicians see the necessity for such schools, and who, for his pains, was sneered at as a visionary.

“ David Urquhart, who died at Naples in 1877 at the age of 72, knew both Europe and the East better than most of his countrymen knew England; and from that knowledge he was convinced that ignorance of Foreign Affairs meant disaster, and that secret diplomacy, which had led to great evils in the past, would lead to still greater ones in the future. Mr. Urquhart entered the Diplomatic Service after having taken part as a young man in the Greek War of Independence. He travelled from Denmark to Persia, studying as he went all the countries through which he passed. He spent three years in Turkey, as a Turk, among the Turks, and was the first Englishman

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to penetrate the mountain fastnesses of Circassia. He knew Poland, that pawn of European diplomatists, and the Poles, and through his friendship with the Czartoryski and Zamoyski families he learnt the machinations of Russian secret diplomacy. The Russian diplomatists were, he said, at that time the only diplomatists worth the name, for they made it their business to know, not only the external, but the internal politics of all the countries of Europe.

URQUHART'S PROPHETIC INSIGHT.

"With a strangely prophetic vision, he saw that nothing could safeguard the Peace of Europe but (1) the re-establishment of the forgotten Law of Nations, and (2) the diffusion of a knowledge of Foreign Affairs amongst all classes of men. In the endeavour to accomplish these two aims he spent his life, and sacrificed his career, his health, and his fortune. When quite a young man in the diplomatic service he attempted to get a diplomatic college founded in England. The attempt was frustrated by the death of William IV, who was his friend and trusted his judgment. In 1843, through the Papal Nuncio Cappaccini, who visited England, he made another attempt for the establishment of such a college—this time at Rome. He had great hopes of succeeding, but Pope Gregory XVI, who had invited him to go and discuss the matter, died while Mr. Urquhart was on his way to Italy.

"As early as 1840 he had set up schools of Foreign Affairs for the working classes, whom he had drawn aside from the dangers of Chartism, to a wider and nobler point of view. Industrial troubles, he showed them, were only symptomatic, due in large part to the immorality in so many of her international relations of which England was guilty, *e.g.*, in the Afghan and Chinese Wars. Much of this immorality was due to ignorance on the part of the great mass of the people, and it was the duty of each man to raise himself out of that darkness of ignorance, and when he had arrived at the knowledge of what was just and right, he was himself personally responsible for all national injustice against which he had not protested. In sixty-two towns Mr. Urquhart turned Chartist associations into schools for the study of Foreign Affairs. During Mr. Urquhart's parliamentary career, which was short and stormy, and devoted to tasks which he himself knew were impossible, the schools fell into abeyance, to be revived again about 1853. From this time they rapidly spread until they numbered over ninety, composed for the most part of working men

A CHAIR OF DIPLOMACY.

"From 1862, Mr. Urquhart was obliged by his health to live abroad, and the men carried on their studies and their work without the stimulus of his magnetic personality. But abroad, as at home, Mr. Urquhart worked for his great cause. He corresponded with statesmen of all countries; he wrote for the paper he had brought out for the use of the working-men's associations, at first known as the *Free Press* and afterwards as the *Diplomatic Review*; and,

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best of all, he tried to link up the English movement he had created with the similar movements in other countries. He became intimately acquainted with many foreign juriconsults and social reformers—notably with those of the school of M. Le Play—then coming into notice. He worked hand in hand with all whose aims were the same as his own, from French Jesuits to the Sultan of Turkey. The result was a circle of earnest men and women of many nations who were all working for the re-establishment of the *Droit des Gens* and the founding of a Chair of Diplomacy. Most of them agreed that it should be at Rome, though some were in favour of some Swiss University town such as Lausanne. United in support of these aims there were Mr. Urquhart and his English friends, German scholars, French and Swiss lawyers, Italian cardinals, Eastern Catholic bishops, the Sultan and the Grand Vizier. The Pope was approached, was keenly interested, and the matter was to have come up before the Vatican Council of 1870, when its sittings were suspended by the Franco-German War.

" This is a very imperfect account of a life that was gallantly devoted to what seemed to be a forlorn hope. But what forty years ago was the fair and far-off vision of a heroic spirit, very lonely in its height and depth of vision, is to-day a project which most statesmen and diplomatists are working to realise in one form or another."

G. R.

A German-American on Germany

[We take the following extracts from an address delivered by Mr. Otto H. Kahn before the Merchants Association of New York at its Liberty Loan Meeting, 1 June 1917.]

" What we are now contending for are the things of humanity, liberty, justice and mercy, for which the best men amongst all the nations—including the German nation—have fought and bled these many generations past, which were the ideals of Luther, Goethe, Schiller, Kant, and a host of others, who had made the name of Germany great and beloved until fanatical Prussianism run amuck came to make its deeds a by-word. This appalling conflict which has been drenching the world with blood is not a mere fight of one or more peoples against one or more other peoples.

" It sharply divides the soul and conscience of the world. It transcends vastly the bounds of racial allegiance. It is ethically fundamental. In determining one's attitude towards it, the time has gone by—if it ever was—when race and blood and inherited affiliations were permitted to count.

" A century and a half ago Americans of English birth rose to free this country from the oppression of the rulers of England. To-day Americans of German birth are called upon to rise, together with their fellow-citizens of all races, to free not only this country but the whole world from the oppression of the rulers of Germany, an oppression far less capable of being endured and of far graver portent. Speaking as one born of German parents, I do not hesitate to state it as my deep conviction that *the greatest service*

A GERMAN-AMERICAN ON GERMANY

which men of German birth or antecedents can render to the country of their origin is to set their faces like flint against the monstrous doctrines and acts of a rulership which have robbed them of the Germany which they loved and in which they took just pride, the Germany which had the good will, respect and admiration of the entire world. I do not hesitate to state it as my solemn conviction that the more unmistakably and whole heartedly Americans of German origin throw themselves into the struggle which this country has entered in order to rescue Germany, no less than America and the rest of the world, from those sinister forces that are, in President Wilson's language, the enemy of all mankind, the better they protect and serve the repute of the old German name and the true advantage of the German people.

"Gentlemen, I measure my words. . . . The burden of German teaching is that might makes right, and that the German nation has been chosen to exercise morally, mentally and actually, the over-lordship of the world and must and will accomplish that task and that destiny whatever the cost in bloodshed, misery and ruin. The spirit of that teaching, in its intolerance, its mixture of sanctimoniousness and covetousness and its self-righteous assumption of a world-improving mission, is closely akin to the spirit from which were bred the religious wars of the past through the long and dark years when Protestants and Catholics killed one another and devastated Europe. I speak in sorrow, for I am speaking of the country of my origin and I have not forgotten what I owe to it. I speak in bitter disappointment, for I am thinking of the Germany of former days, the Germany which has contributed its full share to the store of the world's imperishable assets. And I speak in the firm faith that, after its people shall have shaken off and made atonement for the dreadful spell which an evil fate has cast upon them, that former Germany is bound to arise again and, in due course of time, will again deserve and attain the good-will and the high respect of the world and the affectionate loyalty of all those of German blood in foreign lands."

Review

La Bataille Économique de Demain : Victor Boret (Payot). 3 fr. 50. It is the curse of the French economic system that it tends to develop the home-keeping qualities of Frenchmen and to depress initiative. Mainly designed for a purely protective purpose it has gravely hampered the colonial trade of France and practically stifled her shipping. In this it reflects a strong trait in the French character, which, for want of a better term, we must call the canny instinct, fostered by the peasant proprietary system and by the widespread diffusion of moderate comfort throughout the country. *Tout homme a deux pays, le sien, puis la France*, is a true saying which throws light on the present economic position of the country : for the pleasant land of France is, indeed, so pleasant that it must be a powerful magnet which can draw a Frenchman to foreign parts. And wherever the pioneer spirit is weak and the call of the home country strong, there

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you have conditions which are inimical to a prosperous foreign trade. These are present in a strong degree in France, and were aggravated by the loss of great mineral wealth and an enterprising population when Bismarck took Alsace-Lorraine from her. The return of those two precious provinces will restore to France a most valuable part of her national equipment for trade which, properly handled, will give her a new start in the industrial race. M. Boret's book, published on the eve of this restoration, is timely. It analyses the conditions which have deprived France of large portions of international trade which she ought to acquire and shows how the disrespect into which the mercantile professions had fallen among the intellectual classes in France was reflected in the mediocrity of many merchant houses. All prejudice against trade must be swept away: a new spirit must animate the traders of France: no German commercial outpost must be allowed to stand undisputed, as it did in every quarter of the globe before the war: consuls and merchants must co-operate, each learning from the other, and for that purpose the former must be capable and self-reliant standard-bearers of French interests: tariffs must play their appropriate part in the new order, but must not be allowed to stand in the way of progress as they have too often done in the past. Such is the main burden of M. Boret's argument, which we welcome all the more because it refutes the deadly doctrine that the revival of foreign trade can be secured by State action in the domain of taxation. M. Boret's insistence on the all-powerful quality of individual initiative gives his book a high value. His career is evidence that he reckes his own rede.

A. F. W.

An Echo of the Kulturkampf

[We take the following passage from an article entitled "The Vatican and the Allies," by Dr. Sarolea, "Everyman," 24 August.]

Our historical memories are short, but when we read this last pontifical document our thoughts involuntarily go back to another document. In 1917 Benedict XV., as the result of German pressure, throws his whole weight in favour of peace. In 1887, exactly thirty years ago, Leo XIII., also as the result of German pressure, threw his whole weight in favour of Prussian militarism. Those were the days when the German Catholics were engaged in a deadly struggle with Bismarck. Those were the days when German Cardinals were thrown into prison and when thousands of priests were persecuted. Catholicism is always at its best when it is persecuted, and the German Catholics, under the leadership of Windthorst, then had the courage of encountering the vengeance of the Man of Blood and Iron and of challenging the whole might and majesty of the German Government. Bismarck had laid before the Reichstag his famous Septennate Law, which provided for a formidable increase of the military forces of the Empire. It was the first move in that competition for armaments which was to lead to the present catastrophe. The final decision lay with the Catholic Party. If the Catholic Party, which was a solid block of a hundred members, had

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stood out till the end, Bismarck's military policy was defeated and the whole course of European history might have been different. Bismarck saw the danger. He bethought himself of an infallible means to overcome the obstacle, and he thought of the infallible Pope. He offered Leo XIII. to relax the stringent measures against the Catholic Church on condition that the Catholic Party should agree to vote the Septennate Bill. The Pope succumbed to the temptation and concluded the ignominious and fateful bargain. He enjoined on the Catholic leaders to vote for the Bill. Windthorst, most loyal and most devout of Catholics, resented and resisted this unlawful interference of the spiritual power in a purely political matter. He even took it upon himself to withhold and ignore the first diplomatic Note of Cardinal Jacobini. The Pope expressed his discontent. Cardinal Jacobini sent a second Note. The Bishops became clamorous, and organised the "khaki" election of February, 1887. The joint power of Leo XIII. and of Bismarck proved too strong even for Windthorst. The Centre had to yield to the pressure of the clergy. The military party gained a decisive victory. The Papacy suffered an ir retrievable defeat. We are still told *ad nauseam* in historical text-books that Bismarck had to go to Canossa. Future historians will tell us, in strict accordance with the facts, that it was Leo XIII. who went to Friedrichsruhe.

The Twilight of Diplomacy

Sir Ernest Satow recently defined diplomacy as the exercise of tact and intelligence in foreign affairs. On the application of intelligence to these affairs in the Near East, the Greek White Book sheds a revealing light, which displays to the world the perilous incompetence of British diplomacy. We now learn that Turkey was already the ally of Germany when our agents at Constantinople were still talking of Turkish neutrality; for on 4 August 1914 Mr. Theotokis, Greek Minister at Berlin, was informed that the alliance had been signed, and was invited, as a Greek patriot, to draw his own conclusions about the proper attitude of Greece. At that moment there were at least three Embassies in Constantinople whose business it was to discover the intentions of Turkish ministers. Not one of them—British, French or Russian—seems to have had an inkling of the truth, although their intercourse with Turkish officials must have presented frequent opportunities of discovering it. This signal failure, coming as the climax of many damning revelations of diplomatic incompetence, makes our reiterated demand for reform in the Foreign Office more urgent than ever. It justifies every censure that has been passed upon our diplomacy, and should silence those impudent superior persons who repudiate the idea of popular control. The Mesopotamian affair proved to us that the official world fears nothing more than publicity. The Greek White Book clinches the matter. The House of Commons will fail in its duty to the nation if it does not insist upon a drastic reform of diplomacy.

Printed for CONSTABLE & Co. LTD., by EYRE & SPOTTISWOODE, LTD.,
His Majesty's Printers, East Harding Street, E.C.4.

The New Europe

VOL. IV, No. 47 [REGISTERED FOR TRANSMISSION AT
THE INLAND NEWSPAPER RATE] 6 September 1917

La Victoire Intégrale

"WAR is the pursuit of a political object by other means," and without a clear definition of the political object, it is sheer senseless slaughter. In every modern war the intentions of the belligerents have fluctuated with every change in the military situation; and to-day we can observe how largely unforeseen events, both military and political, have influenced opinion in every European country. For more than two years after the outbreak of war the energies of the Allies were absorbed in the struggle against Prussian military power, leaving little time or energy for political thought. During that period the Allied Governments proclaimed their one simple aim—the defeat of the enemy—and refused to be drawn into any discussion of their ultimate European policy. But, from the first, the peoples who rallied to their call to arms fastened upon one theme—the freedom of all nations—and have never forgotten it. When they speak of victory, they think of a new Europe in which "the common, nameless herd of humanity" may go about its business in security and peace. And they have most clearly shown that the only Europe which will correspond to their aspiration is one in which the people's will is the guiding force in politics. The war has now reached a stage in which this popular cry sounds too insistent to be ignored. The march of events is carrying us more and more out of the purely military setting of the past three years into a political atmosphere; and every day brings us nearer to the time when the Allied Governments must show by public profession that they have truly interpreted the will of the common people. "In every country restless movements of popular opinion, stirred by the most diverse causes, are beginning to claim the attention of statesmen, and the principal phenomena in Europe are no longer this offensive or that, but gigantic political interrogations about the future. The fog of war is clearing, and the lifting veil discloses great streams of tendency all flowing towards one goal" (THE NEW EUROPE, No. 42, p. 65). It is high time that our Governments should define the moral and political ends to which military operations are leading

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in such a manner as to command the assent of all the belligerent Allied democracies.

The words "security" and "peace" assume that triumph of principle which we have called *La Victoire Intégrale*, and in order to reveal the full meaning of the expressive phrase which is printed each week on the title-page of THE NEW EUROPE, I turn to three victories of the past, each of which was complete in its own way. The American Civil War, the Franco-Prussian War and the South African War all ended in the undisputed victory of one of the belligerents. Each of them throws light upon our conception of a true victory, and each was pursued with that definite political object of which Clausewitz spoke. The nature of the object is the point of significance for us. If I wished to draw the picture of an ideal *Victoire Intégrale*, I should take Lincoln's policy in the American Civil War, for the victory of the North was a dearly-bought triumph of arms in which a whole nation was born again. All the evil wrought by the North after Lincoln's death during that terrible episode called "reconstruction" cannot detract one tittle from the essential justice of Federal policy in the Civil War, nor can it tarnish the ideal proclaimed at Gettysburg on which Lincoln afterwards set the seal of his life. To us Abraham Lincoln is the ideal victor. Beside him, to display the contrast between the victory that creates and the victory that destroys, I place Bismarck. Lincoln made America a nation and gave it an ideal which transcended the ordinary bounds of national patriotism because it was compounded of justice and goodwill. Bismarck made Germany an empire and gave it an ideal in which neither justice nor goodwill had any part. If we look at him solely in a German light he is a great figure to whom every patriot will do homage; but, looked at *sub specie æternitatis*, he wears the aspect of an evil spirit. He gave Germany "blood and iron," and the Europe of to-day is his legacy. Lincoln gave to his people, and not to Americans only but to the whole world, "a new birth of freedom." The contrast is a lesson in the uses of victory.

The South African War ended in victory for the British arms, but the consummation of *la Victoire Intégrale*—the triumph of political principle which alone gave our military success a permanent value—was delayed for three years.

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The full significance of that final victory of freedom in South Africa was not revealed for seven years more; but, when war broke out in 1914, even the fiercest opponents of Sir Henry Campbell Bannerman's policy confessed that it was justified. In more than one speech during his fruitful visit to these islands, General Smuts has told us of his debt and ours to the courageous minister who opened wide the gate by which South Africa freely entered the British Commonwealth. He has done well to remind us that, though South African conciliation was mainly the work of one political party, it is much more truly described as the congenial expression of the great principle which is the foundation stone of the Empire. This experience is so recent that it must surely be present to the minds of our statesmen to-day. It indicates most clearly the course which we must pursue. It is the latest of the many forms in which the principles of nationality and self-government have found expression in the long course of our island story, and its success proves once again that peace is most secure where nations are free to govern themselves. I do not suggest that national autonomy is the grand specific for a universal peace; but I do insist that where adult peoples are subject to an alien rule, there are the seeds of war.

It follows from this that victory to be complete must be more than the defeat of the enemy. It must provide a foundation on which the security and peace of Europe can be built, for only then can we say that our ends have been secured. There are many who think that this foundation could be laid at once, if only we would consent to negotiate with the enemy on the basis of certain declarations which his spokesmen have made. On that view Herr Bernstein has supplied a pointed comment (*THE NEW EUROPE*, No. 45). He takes the Reichstag declaration (19 July), and subjects it to a searching criticism which ought to prove to our advocates of a peace by negotiation that Germany is not yet ready to accept the right principle. He brands the German Chancellor as the trusted agent of the army chiefs, and adds significantly, "we know what 'the army' means in our politics." And he roundly accuses the Reichstag majority of equivocation in that very resolution which has been acclaimed in certain quarters in this country as a genuine document. The resolution does, indeed, mark an advance

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from the naked rapacity of certain earlier statements, especially by the Centre Party; but it is only a first step, and, until its authors give better proof of good faith, we cannot say that a peace by negotiation is in sight. The new ferment in Germany is too new to make any great change in the established political system. It must be left to spread further, to undermine the foundations of autocratic authority, and thus to prepare the way for a more liberal régime. It is a hopeful sign, and it should be our care to see that nothing is done to arrest its progress, but I suspect that "Général Janvier" and "Général Février" will do more to spread it than any premature advances by the Allies. And if, meanwhile, the German people hear in our statesmen's speeches the sincere accent of democracy, they will probably make the greater haste to demand the same profession *and practice* from theirs.

This conviction springs, not from a desire to prolong the war by a single unnecessary hour, but from a reading of the German situation in which Herr Bernstein's article in *Die Neue Zeit* is but one factor among many. It may seem strange to welcome the leader of the German Independent Socialists as a partisan of *la Victoire Intégrale*, but I do so welcome him for two reasons. First, because he has indicated very clearly that Germany has not yet learned her lesson, though she shows unmistakable signs in that direction; second, because the statement of war aims made by his party at Stockholm expresses substantially the true purpose of the Western democracies. His insistence on a change of heart in Germany as the indispensable preparation for peace, and on the rights of all nations to freedom and self-government as the condition of a new international order in Europe, places him in the great and growing company of those who are the true friends of peace, and distinguishes him from those who often appear to prefer pacifism to an enduring peace. I believe that he would subscribe without hesitation—and with him a daily increasing number of his compatriots—to the following policy which is the true expression of *La Victoire Intégrale*: (a) that the European settlement shall express the inherent right of every people to determine (by plebiscite, constituent assembly, or other adequate means) the nature of its political allegiance and the form of its own government; (b) that, where the rights of national minorities cannot

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be met by this provision or by voluntary migration and expropriation, they shall be assured by the free exercise of language, civil liberty, education and religion; (c) that where the lands of ancient civilisations in Asia are administered by one of the Great Powers, that Power shall act as trustee, and shall conduct its government in the interests of, and, as far as possible, in co-operation with, the peoples under its charge, and so prepare them for ultimate self-government; (d) that uncivilised parts of the world shall be governed in the interests of the native population, and the tutelage of the civilised Powers shall be exercised with a scrupulous regard for native rights, especially in matters of native labour and land tenure; (e) that the trustee Powers, in all extra-European territory, shall pursue the policy of the open door, shall apply all available resources exclusively to the betterment of such territories, and shall maintain only such military establishments in those regions as are required for local defence and public order; and finally, (f) when peace shall have been established on these foundations, the Signatory Powers shall forthwith open discussion for the purpose of creating a new World Order on the lines of the American proposal of a League of Nations.

A. F. WHYTE.

The Reform of Diplomacy

[The following article summarises the experience of a Foreign Correspondent who, in the course of his work, has had intimate contact with several British Embassies and Legations.]

RECENT events have given a new impetus to criticism of British diplomacy, and, by awaking the general public to a sense of the importance of reform, they have brought the subject nearer the foreground of politics than ever before. The publication of the Greek White Book with its revelation of the grave defect in our diplomatic service in the Near East is but the latest of a series of incidents which have aroused public feeling. Even before that, anyone acquainted with the working of our missions abroad would have endorsed every word in the admirable "Note on Diplomacy" (THE NEW EUROPE, No. 29), which described some of the salient faults of our diplomatic system. But it is doubtful whether such broad criticisms, fundamental

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and incontestable as they are, will avail to secure the reforms they imply; for lay criticism usually fails for lack of technical knowledge, while discipline, loyalty and tradition combine to impose reticence upon members of the institution itself. Censure is apt to be disarmed by a natural sympathy for the overworked and conscientious public servant; and reform is postponed on the plea that a crisis is no time for judicious changes. Most Englishmen would prefer to drown on a familiar though worn-out steed rather than change horses in mid-stream. Thus the crisis is allowed to pass, and with it the memory of the shortcomings which produced it. With the return to normal conditions criticism lapses once more into its former sporadic vein, and public interest wanes.

These conditions are the very marrow of official bones. They are indispensable to the retention of the present system, which has stalwart defenders at headquarters; and they are only the more effective in staving off change because they are so easily created. The obstacles that lie in the path of the reform of a firmly-established public service are always great; and, in a moment of crisis, they are wellnigh insurmountable. Nothing but the driving force of public opinion can overcome them. In the present instance public opinion must be resolute in its demand, for the reform of our diplomacy is an instant and pressing need. Our failures in Turkey, Bulgaria and Greece have done much to prolong the war, and, though the military power of the enemy may provide the excuse in certain cases, no diplomatist can use it to explain away those faults which are inherent in the system. Great Britain positively invites a repetition of disaster if she leaves the negotiation of peace in the hands which have so grievously failed her in the test of war. No matter what part popular opinion may play in the final settlement, the instrument of the popular will in foreign affairs must be the diplomatist; but the old machinery will not serve our purpose. We must model it anew before we can hope to play a worthy part in fashioning an enduring peace.

The present argument is designed both to survey certain defects in the present system and to suggest practical remedies. Mr. Whyte has already shown in his article how our diplomatic service fails in its primary mission—to be the eyes and ears abroad of the home Government. Outside the diplomatic

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caste, except in certain small capitals, where a slightly condescending acquaintance with the British Colony is tolerated, the diplomatist has neither time nor opportunity to get into touch with either persons or ideas. His acquaintance with the politics of the country depends almost entirely on a hasty reading of second-hand official correspondence which he could study as well or better at home. It can hardly be denied that our diplomacy is out of touch with the real forces at work in other States, or even with their real public life. This is due partly to ignorance of foreign languages and partly to the diplomatic social tradition. The ordinary diplomat arriving at a post abroad is forthwith introduced to a little ring of foreign colleagues, mostly in the same position as himself. In monarchical countries he is introduced to the Court. In republics formal cards are exchanged with certain cabinet ministers whom he will probably never meet. If he is below the rank of councillor he is occupied with clerical work of a purely mechanical nature for the greater part of the day at the Chancery of his Mission. Whatever his rank, he is expected to give up the rest of his time to social engagements, strictly within the small ring of international and occasionally local "society," which is least distinctive of all the real political influences at work in the State. His only alternative—or rather the only alternative which is accepted in his profession—will be for him to frequent in a discreet way, together with his less domesticated colleagues, the less reputable and more expensive form of "night life" which prevails in most capitals abroad.

The language question is of the first importance. Linguistic poverty is, indeed, the hall-mark of the service, and is due in part to Foreign Office regulations and in part to the Englishman's inveterate reluctance to learn any language but his own. The regulations authorise a small extra allowance for a nodding and purely conversational acquaintance with any of seven languages, payable while the recipient of it is in the country where that language is the vernacular. But this does not apply to Norway, Sweden, Denmark, Holland, Portugal, Hungary, or the Balkans, in the last of which only Turkish—a language practically restricted to a now extinct ruling class—was provided for. The *attaché* is indeed expected to know French and German, but a third

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language is optional and can be only either Spanish or Italian. Where the third language is taken, it is said by cynics to be a guarantee against appointment to any country where it is spoken.

But if our diplomatic service is out of touch with ideas abroad, it is equally, if not more, aloof from popular movements at home. Unlike most foreign diplomatic services, there is a complete divorce between our Foreign Office establishment and our diplomatic service. Though the two rank equally and are, theoretically, interchangeable, they are absolutely out of contact. The older men thus lose all grip on the policy of headquarters. There are ministers who, through years of crisis, have never once been able to discuss general questions with their chiefs at home, and a great number of the heads of our foreign missions are never personally acquainted with the Secretary of State. The young men grow up in a false tradition, thoroughly out of touch with the currents of political thought at home. In whatever way we may regard it, this divorce of the home and foreign branches of the service is one of the roots of our diplomatic failure. Its origin is both financial and administrative. Owing to the difference in scale of pay and standard of living, only a very few junior Foreign Office men can afford diplomatic life abroad. Moreover, for a diplomatist to work at home it is necessary (except in rare instances, such as the extinction of a mission) for him to arrange an exchange with a Foreign Office clerk, of whom there are only some 55 as against 125 diplomatists. Few of the latter would refuse the chance of spending a year or two at home, while few of the former are prepared to serve abroad, except at a post offering exceptional advantages. Exchanges are thus increasingly difficult to arrange. The result is that few diplomats can now spend more than short and irregular periods of leave in England, during which they are naturally eager to escape from their work. At this moment, it is true, a considerable number of diplomatists are employed in the Foreign Office, but most of them really belong to missions withdrawn from enemy countries, while the rest practically all owe their appointment at home to purely personal reasons or to war's emergency.

One of the commonest complaints heard among senior diplomatists is due to the separation between the embassies

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and Downing Street, viz., on the question of initiative. It is often so uncertain whence the initiative of suggestion is expected to come that no initiative is forthcoming. Heads of missions are taught to be the humble mouthpieces of their chiefs at home, until their only ideal of public duty is rigid adherence to the letter of the sacrosanct "instruction." Thus a tradition that it is a mere formal channel of communication gradually settles about the mission, and paralyses its action far more than the proverbial check on its free powers imposed by the development of telegraphy. To give one example only of the result of this, it is now an almost universal practice, as may be seen in all recent published diplomatic correspondence, for our representatives abroad to report conversations with foreign ministers of State practically without comment. It is hardly necessary to point out that such reports are meaningless unless read in their context, which is obviously the psychology of the speaker. In Turkey, Greece, the Balkans, and all Oriental States, this consideration ought to be paramount; but it can have no bearing on the practice of diplomacy unless diplomats feel that they are free to interpret their instructions within reasonable limits. It is just in this wider psychological appreciation of character and language, *i.e.*, in the true function of diplomacy, that our diplomatic system most completely fails. Words are sent home without comment solely because of the tradition that all initiative rests with the Foreign Office. It is only in moments of disaster that the Foreign Office wildly appeals to the discretion of the head of the mission—usually with the result that all responsibility and blame for defeat falls on the shoulders of the defenceless public servant abroad.

The whole diplomatic service has suffered seriously by this divorce from the Foreign Office. The tendency has so long been for it to be merely a mouthpiece to the officials at home that it is in considerable danger of becoming simply a service of "second-division" clerks to the "first division" in Downing Street. But the effect on the Foreign Office itself, though more subtle, is even more dangerous. Hardly ever abroad, never face to face with the effects of a policy which to him must always be academic, never confronted with the difficulties and even occasional dangers of residence in countries of different civilisations from his own, the junior

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Foreign Office clerk has no grasp of realities. From the university to a Permanent Secretaryship he leads a regular, convenient, and essentially secure life, free from competition and even minor discomfort. Ultimate decision over those abroad rests with him, to some extent, even as a junior, and he will often frankly admit that his decisions are simply leaps in the dark. These difficulties, of course, are inherent in all Government services, but, in both the Foreign Office and the diplomatic service, reluctance to face facts and to think out problems is intensified by the full force of tradition and caste. The possession of the Eton manner or the correct ritual of a Christ Church address is a far straighter road to diplomatic success than the surest grasp of Balkan intrigue.

The present system tends, on the whole, to repress talent. It would be hard to conceive of any service in which less stimulus is offered to energy or skill. At the age of twenty-four or twenty-five, the *attaché's* seniority is fixed by his position in the entrance examination, and he retains this relative position until he reaches the rank of Senior Counsellor, usually at the age of forty-five or fifty. No effort of any kind can alter his rank in the slightest degree. Promotion in the true sense of the word does not exist, though he can, of course, get "good" or "bad" posts—places of interest and responsibility or the reverse. His whole training, such as it is, and sometimes his whole character, will depend on these appointments. Failing promotion for merit, and considering the great difference between various missions, these appointments are naturally of enormous importance. Yet they are entirely in the hands of one man, who may be quite unable to oppose the whims of a chief of a mission or to make any stand against favouritism in high places. It is rare, during the first ten years of his career, for a diplomatist to have any opportunity of showing either capacity or initiative. Diplomatists have been heard to say that they had spent these first years in our larger embassies at the purely mechanical tasks of typewriting and cyphering. There is a traditional case of a secretary, who, trained in this admirable school for seven years, was then promoted to the writing of "docket sheets," *i.e.*, short titles and summaries covering despatches. This new employment came to him as so great a shock that he resigned his commission "owing to the intellectual strain." One result of this

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complete absorption in the details of routine is a growing incapacity to judge great issues. The tradition is maintained by the very men who have suffered most from it, and any interest in politics is naturally discouraged. Initiative, always hindered by any hierarchical system, is rendered entirely impossible, and the qualities of judgment, decision, and wide comprehension, which are most necessary to the senior diplomat, are precisely those which our modern diplomatic training kills. The failure to get the right men in the right posts (see *The Times*, 1 September) is largely due to the fact that our Foreign Office rarely knows where the right men are. There is no test by which the home authorities can gauge personal values. While there is no incitement to effort, there is similarly no penalty for incompetence. There are a number of men in our service to-day whose incompetence or undesirability is fully recognised, but who cannot be removed from it without grave scandal or injustice. At the Foreign Office the diplomatic secretary's department does its best to forget their existence, and meanwhile an incalculable amount of harm is done abroad.

A system of impartial official reports from various quarters, carefully checked and verified; a scheme of promotion based on these reports (on the same lines as promotion in the Navy) worked by a committee strong enough to be able to make a stand against all purely personal considerations; and a method of automatic superannuation which should not unduly stigmatise those who fell under it; these measures would do more to raise the general standard of our diplomatic service than almost any other, but they must be accompanied by a resolute intention to insist on efficiency at the expense of tradition. No public service can entirely escape red tape. But the particular defect of our diplomatic service in this respect is that it combines officialdom with an esoteric caste sentiment, so that the *odi profanum vulgus et arceo* of the ordinary privileged official becomes intensified into an hostility towards the uninitiated which it is hard for those who have not witnessed it to realise. Upholders of this "esoteric" principle prefer to see work done badly by the "right" person rather than well by the "wrong" one, and there are numerous instances where, in times of stress, trained men have been wasted doing inferior work

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solely because of the prejudice against the employment of female typists. In the few cases where war conditions have absolutely forced such increases in staffs, the results have been admirable. It follows that reform must include a large increase in the clerical staff of all our foreign missions by the addition of typists and, where necessary, shorthand-writers, trained indexers, &c. This would set free the professional diplomatist for his proper work and thus make for increased efficiency. The "office management" of our foreign missions must be taken out of amateur hands; the typing, now often done by men who have never used a typewriter before, must be entrusted to capable experts, who should also be made responsible for the filing, indexing, &c., which, at present, are lamentably neglected. "Secrecy" provides no excuse. A small expenditure would ensure the employment of reliable persons, from whom many diplomatists might probably learn lessons in discretion!

But, in truth, unorganised organisation and unsystematic system are deeply rooted in the service. Reform on practical lines is regarded as iconoclastic, and, above all, as dangerously *definite*. The diplomatic service more than any other clings to the good old British tradition that one should never be too definite—either in motive or in method—and in this it only reflects the attitude of the Foreign Office itself to the whole practice of foreign affairs. The result is a series of paradoxes, which are ultimately reflected in the inconsistency of our foreign policy. To destroy is always easier than to reform. Where a criticism may meet with universal approval a suggested improvement will always find a majority of opponents. Purely destructive criticism is usually as valueless as it is facile, but there will be found inherent in these notes a number of suggestions which are in some degree constructive as well as critical. There are certain reforms in our diplomatic service which seem so obviously necessary that a very small amount of pressure from public opinion should suffice to secure them.

The first of them is to widen the basis on which candidates for the service are selected. Doubtless, in selecting men who are to mix on equal terms with the so-called "ruling classes" of other States, social considerations cannot be ignored. But if the financial test could be lowered or dispensed with, and the choice placed on the same basis

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as for the Foreign Office—for which there are usually about twice the number of candidates that there are for the diplomatic service, and for which the standard is accordingly a good deal higher—the field of recruitment for British diplomacy would be greatly enlarged. For this, adequate pay is essential *from the time when a man first enters the service*. When the total increase involved is considered, and the fact is remembered that the war, which a better diplomacy would probably have shortened, is costing us six million pounds a day, the false economy of parsimony appears in startling relief. Were the question seriously taken up in Parliament, the Treasury could hardly oppose such a reform. The payment of adequate diplomatic salaries—which is the second urgent reform—would render possible interchange with the Foreign Office, and might help towards the third, under which each three years' service abroad should be followed by one year's service at home, and *vice versa*. By this means, each branch of the service would benefit; and if, at the same time, the professional diplomatist were released from purely mechanical work, his period of service abroad would bear fruit in a knowledge of foreign languages, peoples and politics. The means whereby the Foreign Office could make sure that the embassies abroad were loyally acting in the spirit of the reformed system—whether by inspection or otherwise—must be left for another occasion. Reasons of space forbid their discussion in these pages. But enough has been said to show the drastic nature of the changes which are necessary and the lines which they should follow.

The last word of this argument strikes the same note as the first. If the public wishes to be well served it must insist on having good servants; and if it allows the present occasion to pass without using the power of Parliament to reform the Foreign Office the responsibility for future disasters will lie, not in the diplomatic service, where it lies at present, but with the nation itself.

DIPLOMATICUS.

Kerenski and Kornilov

THE Moscow Conference has brought into striking relief the two leaders of the Revolution—Kerenski and Kornilov. Without either of her leaders Russia might truly be described

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as on the edge of an abyss, but, with their united courage and devotion, she will yet emerge triumphant. It was not without anxiety that we watched the preparations for the Moscow Conference and read of the growing differences between Kerenski and Kornilov, for, in the excited atmosphere of the Conference, no one knew what Kornilov's presence might lead to. There were many who would gladly have embittered the relations between the Commander-in-Chief and the Prime Minister, and talk of a military dictator had become a commonplace. It was in these circumstances that Kerenski delivered his opening speech.

Kerenski's speech was a challenge to all those, both on the Right and on the Left, who desired to overthrow the Government. After his speech everything depended on Kornilov's reply. Had he made an attack on the Government, as many of those present hoped he would do, the Moscow Conference might have been the prelude to a civil war that would have been the undoing of Russia, and would have spelt disaster to the future of Europe. But Kornilov's speech was, from first to last, that of a soldier inspired by a sense of duty towards his country. While laying bare the conditions at the front and his fears for the future, he stated plainly the measures he thought necessary to remedy them, but there was no word of reproach, no attempt to profit by the weakness or mistakes of the Provisional Government. It was this which saved the situation and gives us hope that Russia will struggle through to the Constituent Assembly.

The two leaders of revolutionary Russia are supplementary to one another. If Kerenski is the genius of the Revolution, Kornilov is its defender; while the former must have full powers to guide the Revolution, the latter must have similar powers to defend it. Kornilov's demands are not those of a military dictator but of the General of the Republic; and if this is the spirit in which he acts, the differences between him and Kerenski need not be of long duration.

A sketch of the services rendered by Kerenski and Kornilov will show what are the two forces that must come together to save Russia. In temperament they are poles apart; Kerenski gloried in the fact that it had fallen to him to sign the order for the abolition of capital punishment *for ever*; Kornilov demands that in the army it should be

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restored. Since the Revolution the careers of both have been equally rapid. From the very outbreak of the Revolution Kerenski has seen clearly the need for action and what form his action should take. It was he who, by joining the first Provisional Government, made it clear that a Coalition Government was essential. The speed with which he made the decision was characteristic. Five minutes was all that he required, and, as soon as he had given his consent, he appeared before the C.W.S.D., whose representative he was: "Comrades," he said, "I must give you news of extreme importance. Comrades, do you trust me? A Provisional Government has just been formed in which I have accepted the post of Minister of Justice. Comrades, I had to give an answer within five minutes, and it was not possible to receive a mandate from you."

The joy and the pride of the Revolution in its early days were personified in "the brilliant youth of the Revolution," as he was then called. "Citizens," he cried, "the honour of the nation demands that the first sacred days of freedom should not be darkened by acts of violence, even though they be caused by natural excitement. I am glad that it has fallen to my lot to sign the order for the abolition of capital punishment for ever." Within two months his joy in the Revolution was clouded: "I regret that I did not die then—two months ago." No longer was he to be "the brilliant youth of the Revolution," but its responsible leader. Though the burden of the Revolution rested upon his shoulders, those who followed him closely declared that, in spite of the strain on his health, already feeble since a serious operation in 1916, his face had become fuller and his earlier fits of depression had given place to extreme self-confidence. "Away with depression and despair!" he exclaimed at a meeting of officers, "the strength of the Revolution is the strength of its enthusiasm."

During the Cabinet crisis in May there was only one man who could step into the breach, and Kerenski became Minister of War and Marine. In his new office he had to face the opposition and ill-disguised hostility of a large party in the C.W.S.D. Strict discipline in the army and an offensive against the enemy were the theme of every speech he made, but throughout this period he never dissociated the spirit of the Revolution from that of democracy. "I demand

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insistently, with all the might of the revolutionary people, that all submit to discipline. I myself never did military service nor have I worn uniform. But I am accustomed to the iron discipline of a revolutionary party. We, too, had officers and soldiers, though all were equal; but, at a word from our leaders, we were willing to give our lives without a murmur." Another Cabinet crisis in July still further increased Kerenski's responsibilities, and he became Prime Minister. From the very beginning he has been the mouthpiece of the Revolution, and it is recognised that the success of the Revolution depends upon his success; if he fails, Russian democracy, too, may fail.

Last March the Revolution succeeded because the army supported it; so now, too, the Revolution can only be maintained with the help of the army. But it must not a beaten or demoralised army, for, until discipline in the army is restored, the Revolution will be in danger. The opposition of the C.W.S.D. is not to a well-disciplined army, but to the use that may be made of the army in the hands of an ambitious general. It is to be hoped that in Kornilov the C.W.S.D. will not be slow to recognise the real General of the Republic.

Kornilov's career has been that of a hard-working and determined soldier. By birth a Siberian Cossack, he worked his way up by sheer ability and force of character. In Brusilov and Ruzski Russia has produced two brilliant leaders and strategists. Kornilov may not be their equal in strategy, but he yields to none in strength of character. And at the present moment it is the latter quality that Russia requires. Kornilov, too, has suffered from the treachery and incompetence of the old *régime*. He tasted to the full the bitterness of the 1915 retreat. During the battle of the Dunajec in May, 1915, Kornilov was with his division in an advanced position beyond the Carpathians. The retreat of the armies on his right cut his communications through the Dukla Pass; but, with the greatest gallantry he broke through and rejoined the main armies. His next task was to cover the rear of the retreat in front of Sanok in Galicia. It was here that he was surrounded and taken prisoner. For more than a year he was kept a prisoner in a castle in Hungary, but, thanks to the help of a Czecho-Slovak, who acted as his guard, he managed to escape. Together

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they made their way close to the Roumanian frontier, where, overcome by hunger, the Czech left him to seek food in a neighbouring village. The Czech never returned, and Kornilov, left to himself, made his way across the frontier. This was in August, 1916, on the eve of Roumania's intervention. His rescuer paid for his devotion with his life. He was shot in Pressburg by the Magyars, into whose hands he had fallen.

At the outbreak of the Revolution Kornilov played a notable part. He was the first military Commandant of Petrograd, and it was to him that the Tsaritsa surrendered. His command at Petrograd was cut short by the disobedience of the troops, and, unable to get satisfaction from the C.W.S.D., he resigned. Shortly afterwards he received the command of the south-western front, and it was his army that stormed Halicz and entered Kalusz. When Brusilov became Commander-in-Chief, Kornilov was promoted and received the command of all the armies south of the Pripet. In this command he has been through all the humiliation of the retreat. The stern measures he demands are the fruit of bitter experience, and he asks for them solely in the interests of his country. He has the support of such stalwart revolutionaries as Savinkov and Lebedev, Acting Ministers of War and Marine, whose devotion to the Revolution is beyond question, and we trust it will not be long before a full agreement is reached between him and Kerenski. ✠Kornilov's conduct at the Moscow Conference, where the reception given him was enough to turn the head of any ambitious general, is the surest guarantee that in him the Republic has found its most intrepid defender.

RURIK.

The Hospitallers and Constantinople

WHEN Philippe le Bel of France and his creature, Pope Clement V., destroyed the Templars they unwittingly infused strength into the Hospitallers—a strength which bore its splendid fruit in the defence of Rhodes and Malta, and in the frustration of Turkish maritime enterprise in the Mediterranean. When Sismondi, in discussing the fall of the Roman Empire, came to consider religion as the great motive power of the Moslem world in the seventh and eighth centuries of our era, he could find no parallel in Christendom

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but the record of the Hospitallers, of whom he said that, had their numbers been but large enough, they might have conquered the world. Be that as it may, their vitality then was such that they stood as the acknowledged "Bulwark" (a term applied to them or to their Grand Master d'Aubusson in a Papal Bull) between Islam and Europe; and when Rhodes fell in 1522, the Emperor Charles V. immortalised the memory of it in the pithy words: "Nothing was ever more nobly lost." It may almost be said that, in losing life, the Hospitallers have ever re-found it. The great Napoleon did his best to crush them in 1798; but that consummate madman, Paul I. of Russia, gave a glimpse of sanity in taking the dispossessed knights under his wing, and, a decade or two later, his sane successor, Alexander I., disputed Napoleon's ambition to be master of Constantinople, the seat of the hereditary foe of the Knights of St. John.

Europe then showed little sympathy for the Hospitallers. The French *sans-culottes* were quite of one mind with the Corsican upstart that the day of the Knights of Malta was over. England held Malta, and very rightly determined not to let it go. But did that cut the vital cord of the Order? Far from it. When the Congress of Vienna settled the balance of power and the frontiers of Europe, the homeless knights met in Paris and decided that the Order *should* live, whether the crowned heads of Europe gave it a *chef-lieu* or not. Three centuries before, Charles V. was too great a soldier and statesman to neglect the Hospitaller; but, a hundred years ago, neither Church nor State lifted a finger to help them. To-day, if any man doubt the vitality of the Grand Priory of the Order of St. John of Jerusalem in England let him go down to St. John's Gate, Clerkenwell, and study all that is done there, especially on St. John the Baptist's Day, when the Order assembles to do honour to its patron saint.

It is not only in England that the Order is powerful. The Catholic headquarters of the Order re-established itself at Rome, and has its priories in Italy, Austria, Bohemia and elsewhere, and its "associations" in France, Spain, England and other countries. This war for the moment, as will be easily understood, has thrown that *chef-lieu* of Rome out of gear. The Grand Master, an Austrian, in May 1915, found that the climate of Vienna suited his health better

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than that of the Campagna. The Prussian Lutheran Branch, known as the *Johanniter-Orden*, has the credit or discredit of having served the Kaiser as an instrument of intrigue in the Baltic provinces of Russia. When the Kaiser, ten or twelve years ago, visited Marienburg, the old headquarters of the Teutonic Knights, whence they dragooned the Lett and the Pole under the shadow of the Cross, his speech distinctly implied that he saw in his Knights of St. John a bulwark of East Prussia. There is no reason to suppose that they have been anything else, both in the sense in which the Grand Priory of England has done magnificent hospitaller and ambulance service to the British Empire during this war, and also in a sense which can hardly be reconciled with pure philanthropy.

It cannot but have caught the notice of all English people who think at all that, although the Order of St. John of Jerusalem started work under the Geneva Convention half a century before the British Red Cross Society was heard of, the latter, by the mere power of its name and symbol, and by the pushfulness of those at its helm, will, in the future, be in the eyes of the nation most typical of what is known as Red Cross work. Those organs of the Press which Lord Northcliffe some months ago, speaking in the Automobile Club in the presence of the Grand Prior of England, designated with a sly touch of humour as "modest," have long ago accustomed us to "The Red Cross and St. John."

Now the vitality of the Order of St. John—*Nulli secundus*—is to-day not one whit diminished; and, when internationalisation seems to be the *mot d'ordre* of the hour, shall not one of the oldest international organisations of the world prove that, with all the renewed vigour of an Antinous rising from the earth, it can once again take up, under modern conditions, the functions which it so stoutly and efficiently performed during the Renaissance? The very section of the globe which was its sphere of action then is now one of the great *crucis* of this war; and the political thought of Europe hovers at this moment in embarrassment around the solution of the destiny of Constantinople and the Straits. Mr. Dascovici, who gives the Roumanian view ("La Question du Bosphore et des Dardanelles," par N. Dascovici. Genève) shows that Roumania, no less than the Russian Council of Workers and Soldiers, is opposed to the Russianisation

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of Stamboul and the Straits; and, curiously enough, he quotes the *Gazette de la Bourse* of Petrograd, of five years ago, as remarking: "If we wait much longer we shall have the United States and Japan poking their fingers into the Byzantine pie." Now, as we all know, the question of entrusting the guardianship of the internationalised Straits to the United States has been seriously considered and discussed. I suggest a different proposal, founded on a great tradition, which must not be dismissed merely because it is ancient. Glorious tradition associates the Knights of St. John of Jerusalem with Rhodes and the west coast of Asia Minor and with the Ægean. When Italy occupied, in 1911, the island of Rhodes she once more hoisted over the old palace of the Grand Masters the very flag that floated there when d'Aubusson and de l'Isle Adam defended it against the Turks. For the White Cross of the Knights descended to Italy through the House of Savoy. Is not this omen remarkable and significant?

As I have already shown, the Order of St. John of Jerusalem is a power in England and the British Empire, in Prussia and Austria, and in most of the Catholic countries of Europe. What is wanted is the re-union of the several branches—a re-union which has never been complete since the days of the Reformation—and that a re-union in which it is to be clearly understood that sectarianism is to be made as dead as it may be. If a little quiet sectarianism survives no harm will be done. Italy, Austria, Bohemia, Spain, England, Prussia, France and, finally, Russia (which cherishes the revered hand of St. John the Baptist and equally revered ikon of Our Lady of Philermos, in the chapel of the Winter Palace—*vide* Bedford & Holbecke's "Short History of the Hospitallers," 1902, pp. 99, 100—and in which country alone hereditary Knights of the Order are said to exist) all play their part to-day in the maintenance of the very practical and effective vitality of the Order of St. John. In the great cause of aid to the wounded and sick in war the British Red Cross Society has now qualified itself for partnership with the White Cross of St. John; and when the inexorable hand of fate once more draws into the forefront of the political arena the very scenes in which the Hospitallers acquitted themselves with such distinction four hundred years ago, and when we realise that we have here

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a ready-made international organisation capable of executing the mandates of Europe, are we to ignore it?

It is generally recognised that the custody of the neutralised portions of Rumelia and Anatolia—to use the time-honoured old names—which are to be set apart under an international administration for the maintenance of the free navigation of the Straits, demands, not a combatant force, but a military and naval police. Such a force the Order of St. John of Jerusalem, duly authorised by the Powers of the World, is competent to create and maintain. Its finance will be determined by the same Powers. In the past the Order has been the embodiment of European co-operation for the defence of Christendom. In the future it may, to the benefit of the entire world, become the trustee and guardian of what the great Napoleon considered it, the master-key of political and commercial dominance in the Near East, provided that unity and religious toleration be established and maintained within the Order itself. In all that acts and reacts upon Constantinople the British Empire must not forget its duty to Islam. That our King and Emperor's Indian subjects have impressed upon us during this War. The Order of St. John of Jerusalem has, since 1901, taught philanthropy to the millions of Moslems in the Indian Empire, greatly to the advantage of our armies in the field, especially in Mesopotamia, and when the policy of our Empire and of the world demands an administration equally grateful to Christian and Moslem, eight centuries of history and the diplomatic *débâcle* of the last three years plead in favour of the Order of St. John of Jerusalem.

The *fiat* of the Allies has decreed the emancipation of Europe from Turkish rule. If "the Allies' Candidate for Constantinople" (THE NEW EUROPE, No. 8) abides by its motto of "no annexation and no indemnity," what remains but internationalisation? And who or what can rival the international record of the Hospitallers? When the Congress of World Powers convened to partition the globe are at sixes and sevens over Stamboul, the eight-pointed Cross of the Knights of Rhodes and Malta stands once more to win the title of "Bulwark" of Europe.

A. C. YATE.

An Armchair Jingo on German Aims

Professor Erich Brandenburg, of Leipzig University, has made an extremely frank and illuminating contribution to the literature of the war, under the title "Germany's War Aims" (*Deutschlands Kriegsziele*: Leipzig, Quelle & Meyer, 1917. 1 mk.). It is so typical of German professorial mentality that we propose to analyse it in some detail.

At the very outset he assumes that the enemy will be made to pay to the utmost possible limits in money and in kind, with "no sentimental considerations for the heavy lot of those affected"; because Germany's policy was defensive. "Even if Germany and Austria should have decided (and of this we are unaware) to impose their will on Serbia at the risk of a European war . . . this would only have been an act of defence. For never would the leading statesmen of both Powers have fallen upon this idea if they had not seen enemies steadily closing in upon them." He denounces the view that Germany, having never wanted to extend her frontiers, may rest content with a reversion to the *status quo*, since, otherwise, she would incur the suspicion of having acted from other motives. But in arguing thus he indirectly invalidates the assumption that the Entente Powers have always been inspired by purely aggressive aims. What is sauce for the goose is sauce for the gander. . . . The whole trend of his argument is against the *status quo*. In the true vein of Treitschke, he proclaims the German demand that the earth should belong to the strong as "a far higher ethical demand than mere love of peace." He opposes international courts of appeal, on the ground that they would inevitably tend to favour those in possession, and to hamper "the strong newcomer, him who wants more than he has and to whom the future belongs." Here we have in a single phrase the whole philosophy of the Germany of 1914 and the secret of the world-wide coalition against her. "No international court could have endorsed the annexation of the North German states by Prussia, the exclusion of Austria from Germany, the *restoration* of Alsace-Lorraine to Germany, the emancipation of the Christian Balkan states from the Turkish yoke, and so on . . . for in all these cases the unquestionable right of possession was on the side of those against whom the decision of war went." But his real animus against arbitration is the belief that "in every world-congress Germany, as *the best hated country*, would find herself alone," and "would be outvoted without any consideration of her interests." Are these the murmurs of a guilty conscience, the pained realisation that something must be wrong with a Power which can mobilise almost the whole world against it?

"A DANGEROUS UTOPIA."

Turning to other aspects of German policy, he brands Friedrich Naumann's "Central European Soul" as "a dangerous Utopia," owing to the absence of anything like cultural unity. "There would, of course, be a strong, perhaps a predominant, German tinge in

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Central Europe, but it would no longer be a *German* culture," and "from the peoples of Eastern Europe we have nothing to learn." He rightly maintains that unless the two central Allies are ready to sacrifice part of their own freedom, and even State-sovereignty, for the sake of greater unity, nothing is possible beyond the ordinary military alliance. And if *political* unity is impossible, still more so is economic unity, which would be disastrous for the weaker party. He rejects even the idea of an intermediate customs frontier (*Zwischenzolllinie*), warning his countrymen that political relations are not unchangeable; for the Entente may break up, and thus the whole European situation be transformed. Here and elsewhere in the book his attitude towards Austria-Hungary is one of distrust.

Discussing Germany's conquests on West and East, Professor Brandenburg takes the view now widely adopted among the Belgians themselves, that "neutrality" is no longer of any value, either to Belgium or to either group of belligerents, but from this he goes on to assume that an independent Belgium would unite very closely with France and Britain, and cannot therefore be tolerated. "The possession of the coast of Flanders," he says, "is indispensable for our sea-power. . . . Germany must surround herself at the danger spots on East and West with smaller states, as independent as possible in their internal administration, but externally subject to the protection and supreme control of the greater neighbouring state." The ideal Vistula-Narew frontier line cannot be secured, owing to the pledges already given to Poland, while it would be bad strategy to annex Suwalki or Lithuania. On the other hand, Briey and Longwy must on no account be restored to France, Luxemburg must finally enter the Empire, while Germany must maintain a military, political and economic control over Belgium, Poland, Lithuania and Courland. "The small peoples must make up their minds that their fate will be decided by force of arms. They can only claim freedom to develop their own culture if they submit willingly to the protective relationship; since every effort to dissolve it would compel the dominant State, in its own interest, to adopt sharp counter-measures."

A RING OF VASSAL STATES.

These "protected states" (*Schutzstaaten*) must submit to certain essential military guarantees. The chief frontier fortresses, harbours and coast defences must be in the hands of the "protector" (see Bethmann-Hollweg's confessions to Mr. Gerard), and there must be no separate local army. The vassals may be allowed diplomatic intercourse with foreign governments, very much as the minor North German states were allowed by Prussia after 1848; but any treaty or agreement must be ratified by the German Emperor and the Bundesrat. There must be an unitary customs area, and German control of communications. . . . For Poland, Russia would then become a foreign country; but Professor Brandenburg recognises the danger of an irredentist movement in the new state in favour of union with Posen and Galicia, and even of a tendency

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to secure this end by Russian help. This can only be met by the definite limitation of Polish independence in certain directions; there must be German garrisons, restriction of Polish recruiting, control of treaties with foreign Powers, and the same introduction of German social legislation as in the case of Belgium. The Poles might be allowed to elect a Pole as their King, *since Belgian and Balkan precedents prove that a German Prince is apt to become isolated*, if he pushes a German policy among his new subjects. In Courland and Lithuania, however, a German Prince or Grand Duke might hold his own, since there exists a strong German element "entitled to predominance." Above all, there must be a special policy of colonisation on methodical lines—"a large part of the very extensive Crown domains and a certain percentage of the baronial estates must be ceded direct to the German Empire for purposes of colonisation" by picked German settlers. It might even be advisable to form a Military Frontier, on the analogy of the old Turkish border, under some general as Statthalter!

BELGIUM.

His plans for Belgium are no less drastic. The retention of the Coburg dynasty is "absolutely excluded"; but there is no very suitable substitute. The selection of "an entirely reliable Catholic Prince from a German ruling House," or of a native Belgian aristocrat, the proclamation of a Republic or the appointment of a military Governor, are all open to very grave objections, because they could only be imposed by "the most primitive methods of brute force." Hence the only satisfactory alternative is to recognise "the unbridgeable gulf between Flemings and Walloons," and partition Belgium. Unluckily, the most obvious method, that of uniting the Flemings to Germany and the Walloons to France, is impossible, owing to strategic reasons, since it would still further weaken Germany's western frontier. Liège and Namur are too vital for Germany to renounce control of the Walloon districts. Our professor therefore proposes to revive the old provincial units of the Middle Ages, and, organising them on the Swiss cantonal basis, to form two distinct federal states, a Flemish, consisting of Antwerp, Brabant, Flanders and Limburg, and a Walloon, consisting of Liège, Hainault, Luxemburg, Namur and the Walloon section of Flanders. This arrangement would have the advantage of depriving the country of a centre of gravity, and so weakening tendencies to aspire to former conditions; it would also make each of the two entirely dependent upon Germany, and would obviate the necessity for a dynasty.

The net result of such schemes would be to surround Germany by a ring of vassal States, containing over 20,000,000 inhabitants, and to ensure, so far as possible, that in the event of a new war, operations would be again conducted outside real German territory. Austria-Hungary is advised to do likewise, presumably by erecting vassal Jugoslav, Roumanian and Ukrainian States along her borders. . . .

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After discussing *Mittelafrika* as a German War Aim (see THE NEW EUROPE, No. 43), he turns to the Freedom of the Seas, on which his verdict is surprisingly sober. Even Germany's victory will not secure naval predominance to her. Britain's superiority rests not only on the size of her fleet, but on the control of strategic points all over the world; and though, of course, it would be a great advantage to Germany to wrest Gibraltar, Cyprus or Suez from us, or to establish Ireland's independence, he admits that the coast of Flanders is the only new strategic point which the German Fleet has any chance of securing.

In conclusion, he tilts against six main "illusions" prevalent in Germany, which English readers will note with varying feelings: (1) The possibility of restoring the *status quo* without serious changes; (2) the belief in the gratitude of nations whom Germany "is helping to independence" (the Poles and Flemings); (3) the hope of a new Central European state-organism; (4) the view that the more Germany annexes, the stronger she will be ("the annexation of alien races does not strengthen but weakens a State resting on the national basis"); (5) the view that access to the high seas or "the freedom of the seas" can be attained without the complete overthrow of England; (6) that this war will end war or create conditions for international agreement or disarmament. This motley list is interesting as showing the main opinions which a German professor finds it necessary to combat in Germany to-day.

The Serbo-Roumanian Barrier

[A welcome indication that the Balkan peoples are awaking to the value of co-operation as the surest means of defence for the Balkan Peninsula is given by the following leading article, written by I. Ursu, in the Iași paper *Evenimentul* (18 July). It is headed: "The Expansion of Roumania demanded by European Equilibrium and Peace of the World."]

"Just as the barometer indicates fine weather at a moment when the sky is still clouded over, so the situation of Roumania in the future constellation of European States, in spite of all the unhappiness she has suffered, promises to be favourable. For in the future formation of Europe account must be taken of the causes which have provoked the war, and means must be found to eliminate them. I maintain that the immediate cause of the present war was the Peace of Bucarest, which, by strengthening Roumania and Serbia, erected a barrier against German ambitions in the Orient. . . . As the Balkan settlement of 1913 angered Germany by the aggrandisement of two States which had co-nationals in Austria-Hungary, and could provoke in course of time an agitation calculated to diminish German authority in the Habsburg Empire, it was natural that Germany should try to clear the way for Pangermanism by the destruction of Serbia and the humiliation of Roumania. How much Germany felt herself affected by the Peace of Bucarest, which re-established the

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equilibrium against the interests of Berlin's satellites, Bulgaria and Turkey, is seen by the decision of the Emperor William as early as 19 November, 1913 (four months after the Peace of Bucarest), to let loose the war, a decision which, in a moment of sincerity, he communicated at the time to the King of the Belgians (Baron Beyens's "L'Allemagne et la Guerre").

"European diplomacy must now place in Germany's path towards the Persian Gulf a barrier so powerful as to convince the Germans of the impossibility of realising the Pangerman dream, and to force them to renounce this for ever. These powerful barriers can be no other than a great Roumania and a great Serbia—two States which dominate the roads leading to Constantinople and Salonica. The States aggrandised will be able, however great the power of Germany is, to set themselves, together with Italy and with Russia, against any future attempt of Germany to open for herself a road to the East over their dead bodies. The aggrandisement of Roumania and Serbia will have, as a consequence, the separation of Germany from her Balkan satellites, Turkey and Bulgaria, for whom it will be made impossible to serve any longer as unconscious instruments of Pangermanism. At the same time, by the expansion of Roumania and Serbia a death-blow would be given to the anachronistic state of Austria-Hungary, of which Germany has made the most powerful base for Pangerman action.

BREAKING THE HABSBURG LINK.

"For only by breaking the first and most powerful link in the chain of Pangermanism, *i.e.*, Austria-Hungary, can Berlin's vision of world domination be destroyed for ever. By the aggrandisement of Roumania there is secured also the negative object followed by the peoples of the world of assuring peace by the disintegration of Austria, and, at the same time, of assuring themselves the positive aim of creating natural barriers calculated to prevent in future any repetition of the terrible events of 1914. All peoples of the world except the Turano-Germans, have consequently a material and moral interest in supporting the enlargement of Roumania and of our fellow sufferers beyond the Danube (the Serbs). . . . The new territorial settlement will lay the foundations of European peace on a basis of justice and national union. From the Vosges to the Black Sea newly-constituted units will arise and make an end for ever of Pangerman dreams, and will be naturally a factor of equilibrium and of peace for old Europe, ceaselessly tormented by wars. Freedom will thereby be assured, and each nation will be able to bring its offering to the altar of the civilisation of mankind."

A similar indication of the desire felt in Roumania for a close alliance with Serbia is afforded by the publication in *România* (20 July) of a poem by Demostene Botez in honour of the Jugoslav division that fought so gallantly last autumn in the Dobrudja. After dwelling on the courage and devotion of these men, the poet concludes: "Henceforward we love you as brothers; for the sacrifice of your gallant youth we gave you in return the fairest

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tribute—our heart's devotion." We hope that comradeship in misfortune and a mutual admiration for gallantry in the field—such as the Roumanians on their part have displayed in the full in the fierce fighting on the Seret this last month—will knit closer the bonds between two States which, in association, can do much for one another and the world.

Jugoslav Sentiment in the Serbian Army

[We have received the following description of the welcome given by the Serbian Army at Salonica to the Jugoslav deputation, from Mr. Ivo Čippico, the Serbian novelist and a member of the well-known Dalmatian-Croat family of that name. Mr. Čippico is attached as war correspondent to the Serbian Army.]

"It has been a great historic event. But the Army, the national Serbian Army, has greeted it with self-restraint and wisdom. Long since had the leaders of our Army carried in their soul this Declaration. They were its great pioneers in the days of peace, as they still are to-day in these times of bloody warfare. The representatives of the Government of the *once* free kingdom of Serbia—and *now* free in the souls of her exiled sons, and with them the representatives of the unredeemed Serbo-Croat and Slovene lands (with Ante Trumbić at their head), united by one idea, scaled those Macedonian mountain peaks, which Serbian troops had carried by storm. And there upon the mountains, in sight of the Ægean, echoed the tones of the Serbian language expressing to the Army their admiration and proclaiming the national will of three peoples in one—Serbs, Croats and Slovenes.

"The great idea of unity, conceived through centuries of pain and travail, cleansed and purified by the blood of glorious heroes, manifested itself on 9 July on Mt. Jelak, clothed in its pines and firs, in sight of the famous Kaimakčalan, in full view of the enemy—manifested itself in the shepherd's royal huts (was not the Crown Prince there?) garlanded with fresh and fragrant pine-tree branches. There, on that wide and illimitable front, amid those rugged and arid mountains, by day and by night, without relief or respite there kept watch these brave and pure-souled heroes, the martyrs of a great ideal.

"Our men realised this, and sent a chosen company of their fellows, representative of all our unredeemed Jugoslav lands, in order that they might hear the shout of that word which is becoming a fact—*Jedinstvo*: 'Unity.' . . . Thoughtfully and earnestly they heard the national word: 'We are all children of one great Motherland. We are all equal before the law, Serbs, Croats and Slovenes. All free to confess our faith, Orthodox, Catholic and Mahomedan.' Strengthened and revived, with calm in their souls, ready to face the enemy's fire, these heroes of death returned to their trenches.

"On 15 July the envoys were received by the Voivode Mišić, in the name of the Army, with the following words:—'Great and true

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work needs no words; it is clear and evident—easily understood by everybody. And the truth of unity in soul and body displayed itself with the speed of shell-fire along the front even to the deepest dug-out. This word Unity, resurrected and awakened by the will of the whole nation, found an echo in the breast of every soldier, even to the last recruit. And those, too, who are daily dying through oppression, persecution, starvation, and yet constantly expecting deliverance, have openly proclaimed in the Croatian Diet in the full light of day their resolve for a free Croatia, independent of foreign domination and foreign influence. And those in the Imperial Parliament of Vienna have also demanded the unification of Serbs, Croats and Slovenes in one single, independent State. Without even brotherly pourparlers, discussions or negotiations, this longing for unity has manifested itself spontaneously and naturally breaking through all artificial and political boundaries, and even all religious and social differences. The whole nation wills Unity. Not one single political party, not one single association, either religious or social, in any of the Unredeemed lands has ever doubted it, declared so courageously as it was by the Jugoslav Committee in Europe. Faith, suffering and silence are ancient and inseparable companions. Let us be of good heart; the glorious day is dawning!''

Reviews

The Future of Constantinople. Leonard S. Woolf. (George Allen and Unwin.) 2s. 6d. None of the great issues of the war is shrouded in such obscurity as the future of Constantinople. The Russian Revolution has upset the provisional and controversial settlement proposed by the old *régime* and accepted in principle by the British and French Governments, and, therefore, the alternative—Constantinople or Tsarigrad?—no longer exists. The field is thus left open to the speculation of the ingenious which ranges from the almost incredible proposal, favoured in certain pacifist quarters, that the Turk should be left in possession, to the scheme propounded by Colonel Yate in these pages this week, that the Knights Hospitalers should be instated as the governing senate of Constantinople on behalf of the civilised world. The opinion that internationalisation is the most hopeful plan is steadily growing and will probably prevail, for it would be hard to find a national State—with the dubious exception of the United States of America—which would be at once an acceptable and an efficient occupant in the eyes of Europe. If Russia declines the responsibility it must be taken up collectively. The difficulties of internationalism are as obvious as its advantages; and both are set out, rather too briefly, in Mr. Woolf's useful little book, which presents a sketch of the international plan based on the experience of the Danube Commission. Mr. Woolf's argument is temperate and well-informed, and should greatly help to clarify the confused opinions now commonly held about the position and value of the great eastern city. The story of the Danube as an international

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waterway is full of significance for the future of Constantinople, for it shows how the pressure of necessity drove a group of jealous Powers, in spite of themselves, to devise an autonomous organ of administration which has amply proved its worth during the last generation. We shall return to this aspect of the subject shortly in an appreciation of *Le Danube : aperçu historique, économique, et politique*, by Mr. C.-I. Baicoianu, of Bucarest; and meanwhile we may observe that the success of the Danube Commission has its roots in the sound principle laid down by the Congress of Vienna, of the "freedom of river navigation." Since Constantinople, in Mr. Woolf's words, "is but a port of passage on the river's banks," and since the "river" at Constantinople is the greatest natural waterway in the world, the "freedom of its navigation" must be made doubly secure. This would satisfy the economic need of Russia, Bulgaria and Roumania; and if it were realised by a new international organ—international in responsibility though not necessarily in composition—it would do more than a thousand books to make the League of Nations a reality.

A. F. W.

La Propagande Allemande et la Question Belge : T. Mélot, ministre plénipotentiaire, Paris. (Van Oest.) 1917. 60 cent. This little pamphlet, the first of a series of *Cahiers Belges*, gives an admirable survey of the various methods of propaganda employed by the Germans in respect of Belgium. In the opening months of war they denounced the Belgians as hordes of assassins. After the Marne they tried conciliation, and when this failed, they set themselves to establish German influence by fomenting disunion between Flemings and Walloons. Finally they fell back upon the most shameless exploitation, removing or destroying plant in Belgian factories with a view to placing the country's industries at Germany's mercy, and releasing their own civilians for military service by wholesale deportations of the Belgian population. M. Mélot makes it clear that the Germans with their habitual perseverance, at once so clumsy and so ingenious, conducted simultaneously three separate campaigns in favour of Flemish separatism—one in Belgium itself, one in Holland and one in the other neutral countries. The most ambitious of these schemes was the foundation of the Flemish University at Ghent. It is, perhaps, not sufficiently realised that the deportations, quite apart from the brutal methods employed, took place in direct defiance of the most explicit pledges given early in the war by Baron von der Goltz as Governor, and by Baron von Hühne, military governor of Antwerp, to Cardinal Mercier and other representative Belgians. Very full details will be found in M. Fernand Passelecq's newly published book, "*Les déportations belges à la lumière des documents allemands*" (Paris, Berger-Levrault, 1917).

R. W. S.-W.

Practical Pacifism and its Adversaries : Dr. Severin Nordentoft. (Allen & Unwin.) 1917. Pp. vi + 213. 4s. 6d. net. It is one of the paradoxes of war time, due, no doubt, to the prevailing nervous tension, that a few extreme, unpractical "pacifists" should have

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brought opprobrium upon the true cause of peace; that the one in a thousand who is content to cry for peace in the abstract should have been allowed to discredit what, in effect, is the very object which the rest are striving to attain. It is a pleasure, therefore, to find a book which makes a practical contribution to a cause which all men who are not what Mr. G. K. Chesterton calls "homicidal maniacs," must have sincerely at heart. Dr. Nordentoft is a Danish medical man who approaches the problem of war in the same scientific spirit in which he approaches the general problem of disease. It is as useless to seek a panacea for war as it is to seek a cure for all disease. The causes of war must be sought out and understood in all their manifestations and then tackled separately. The pacifist cause has already succeeded, for instance, in abolishing religious wars, the small feudal wars of the Middle Ages, and the wars which the Vikings waged for war's sake. What is its immediate problem now? The author will carry with him general conviction when he insists that it is to ensure for all nations, great and small, a practical measure of independence and self-government, the minimum basis of which is the right to use their own language and national customs. The evils of oppressive rule which denies these rights, as, for instance, in South Eastern Europe, are well known to readers of THE NEW EUROPE. It is one of the main objects of the Allied cause to establish the rights of the small nations upon a sure basis, and that is also the immediate task of practical pacifism.

G. G.

"The Voice of the Vatican"

*Mr. Hugh A. Law, M.P., sends us the following comment on "The Voice of the Vatican" (THE NEW EUROPE, No. 45):—*The writer "surely perverts the plain meaning of the Peace Note when he imputes an 'odious partiality' to that passage which calls for the 'complete evacuation of Belgium with a guarantee of her full political, military and economic independence towards all Powers whatsoever.' I can see in these words no 'insinuation that the independence of Belgium was threatened as much by France and England as by Germany.' As Canon Moyes recently pointed out in the *Times*, Pope Benedict's aim is a very practical one, namely, to induce all the belligerents alike to submit their conflicting arguments and claims to a Peace Conference. This being the case, he cannot, in the nature of things, and whatever may be his personal opinions, decide between them. He speaks as a friend of Peace, not now as a judge, still less as an advocate of the Central Empires. Moreover, one might ask how France and England could be injured by the exaction of a pledge which it is neither their interest nor their desire to violate. But the writer's error is not mainly dialectical. Rather it springs from a failure to appreciate the necessary implication of impartiality. Recollection of the criticisms which, not so long ago, were directed against President Wilson himself, should serve for useful warning."

NOTES

Monsieur Malvy

M. Malvy has resigned his portfolio in circumstances which are still too obscure to enable us to form a definite opinion. But it is clear that his administration of the French Home Office in the Almeyreda affair was not above suspicion, and his previous connections with M. Caillaux do not warrant the opinion that *la Victoire Intégrale* has in him an unequivocal champion. An uncompromising partisan of Combism—a *Daily Telegraph* correspondent in 1914 called him “the most courageous and the most energetic of all M. Combes’ retainers”—he forced his way to the front of the political stage at an early age. Born at Figéac in the department of the Lot, which he represents in the Chamber, he early displayed a talent for politics, in which he carried on and intensified the Republican traditions of his father, who was mayor of his little native town. He was elected to the Chamber in 1906, and by 1910 he had made his mark. Late in that year he led the successful attack on M. Briand, and received as his reward the office of Under Secretary at the Place Beauveau. He subsequently served under M. Monis, M. Caillaux and M. Doumergue, an association which sufficiently indicates the colour of his coat. Throughout his career his motto has been “No quarter to the Church”; and it would appear that even the educative influence of the war has not availed to soften his anti-clerical temper.

The Position in Greece

On 27 August the Greek Chamber of Deputies, at the conclusion of the debate on the Address, unanimously adopted a vote of confidence in the Government, 188 deputies being present; and voted the following order of the day:—

“The Chamber, proclaiming the sacred character of the international conventions and of the obligations of the alliance between Greece and Serbia, addressing a fraternal salutation to the heroic Serbian people, and feeling convinced that the entire nation is ready for all sacrifices to take part in the universal struggle in favour of freedom by the side of the Allied States, in order to re-establish the national honour, approves the Prime Minister’s address, and expresses complete confidence in the Government.”

In the Chamber, in short, all goes well. The masterly speeches of Mr. Venizelos and the frank explanations of his Foreign Minister, Mr. Politis, have left the opposition without an answer. We will not attempt to examine here the speeches of Mr. Venizelos, which, together with the 77 documents published in the Greek White Book (besides fully confirming everything that has been written about King Constantine in the pages of *THE NEW EUROPE*), provide some most important material for a diplomatic history of the war. We only wish our own Government were likely to follow the example of Mr. Venizelos in the frankness with which he expounds the history of his negotiations.

NOTES

But we must not assume that the task of Mr. Venizelos is completed. No man works more quickly and firmly than he; but the speed with which he has succeeded in restoring the normal process of Government must not dispose us to forget that Greece has passed through a revolutionary movement. Some of Russia's advisers made the tragic mistake of thinking that after a successful revolution on Saturday, it was possible to begin a new offensive on Monday morning. The revolt of the Greek people against a military autocracy and the expulsion of King Constantine cannot, of course, be compared with the tremendous forces of the Russian Revolution. But a minority of the people in Old Greece have been so thoroughly debauched by King Constantine's German propaganda that they remain an element of weakness. The nation has lost its temper; and some months of good government may be required before it regains consciousness of strength.

Another section of the population, represented by some serious speeches in the debates in the Chamber, is intent on political reconstruction, and looks forward to the end of the war, when a Constituent Assembly is to decide whether King Alexander's provisional tenure of his father's throne is to be confirmed. Mr. Venizelos very definitely expressed his opinion that Monarchy, "with proper safeguards," should be given a last chance. But the Greeks are a politically educated people; and once they have begun to question the convention of monarchy, it will not be easy to make them believe that a king whose functions are purely negative, is a necessary part of the democratic machine. For France and America they have always had peculiar sympathies, and they could not fail to be influenced by the example of Russia. There has begun in Greece a Republican movement that may not easily be checked, even by the loyalty of Mr. Venizelos to the wishes of the Protecting Powers.

Polish Affairs: A Caution

The resignation of the Council of State in Poland has drawn attention to Polish affairs at a moment when public opinion in Great Britain and France is preoccupied with many other matters. Its significance, however, will not be missed by those who have read "The Crisis in Poland" (THE NEW EUROPE, No. 43). The Council must be regarded as an authentic organ of Polish opinion, in spite of the fact that it lacks the support of certain sections, and its spirited defiance of Berlin goes far to prove its *bona fides* against the manoeuvres of a group, known as the National Democrats, who are endeavouring to secure the approval of Downing Street and the Quai d'Orsay for their sectional aims. The Polish Conservative paper, *Czas*, of Cracow, declares that the Foreign Office has received a memorandum from Mr. Roman Dmowski, the National Democrat leader, in which he makes certain territorial claims. Mr. Balfour will do well to examine it with a critical eye, for many dangers lurk in Mr. Dmowski's policy.

Printed for CONSTABLE & Co. LTD., by EYRE & SPOTTISWOODE, LTD.,
His Majesty's Printers, East Harding Street, E.C. 4.

The New Europe

VOL. IV, No. 48 [REGISTERED FOR TRANSMISSION AT THE INLAND NEWSPAPER RATE] 13 September 1917

Stockholm : A French View

IN defiance of the best principles of journalism we are dealing with the question of Stockholm at the moment when it ceases to be a burning one. Our reason is that to-day it forms a complete whole, and that it can only be understood if treated as a whole.

The Stockholm Conference, or rather the project of a Conference, has been to International Socialism what a prism is to the light. These long discussions, lasting for several months, have split it up into a series of different *nuances*. The Socialists hoped that a meeting of an Internationale would affirm their unity as alone capable of preparing a world-peace. It sufficed to speak of this meeting in order to destroy the phantom of Socialist unity, not only as between the different countries, but also inside each of the belligerent countries. Has the Internationale ever existed? In any case it has been demonstrated that it does not exist at the present moment and does not represent in Europe any coherent force. What has had the effect of giving the various Socialist groups an apparent cohesion are the clumsy polemics of the anti-Socialist press and the anathemas, sometimes impolitic enough, launched by the various Governments. But even when these groups rallied in their resistance to external pressure, there was not any profound and definite agreement between them on the subject of the Stockholm Conference.

Let us survey events from the beginning. The first plan for an International Congress was put forward towards the middle of April by a Dutch Committee, whose President was the Germanophil Troelstra. There is no doubt that the intentions of this committee were, if not deliberately to help German diplomacy, at least to promote the ideas of undiluted pacifism without any regard for the interests or standpoint of the Allied Democracies. Such was the verdict of the French Socialists and of the British Labour Party. The permanent administrative committee of the French Socialist Party, sitting in Paris, declared that the

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object of the proposed meeting was ill-defined, and, further, that the Dutch section of the Internationale, which had issued the invitations, had no mandate for taking this initiative. As for the Labour Party, it held to the resolution promoted some months before at the Manchester Congress, where, by a crushing majority, it had been decided never to enter into relations with the Socialists of enemy countries so long as the invaded territories had not been evacuated. Thus the first act in the drama of Stockholm was a flat refusal on the part of the French and British, and there was complete disagreement between the Allies and the neutrals who sought to convoke the Conference.

The second act opens with the intervention of the Russians. The Russian Revolution had just taken place. The Socialist Party was in power. The Workmen's and Soldiers' Committees, filled with the most advanced exponents of Socialism, dictated their will to the Government. A spirit of distrust towards the Western Governments was already noticeable not only among the Maximalists, who favoured an immediate peace, but among the Russian Socialists as a whole. France sent M. Albert Thomas, Great Britain Mr. Henderson, Belgium M. Vandervelde, to dispel their distrust and to uphold joint action between Russia and her Allies. It was then that the Soviet of Petrograd endorsed the initiative of the neutral Socialists in favour of an International Conference. Even those who had been most hostile to the Dutch Committee's action felt it impossible to reject the invitation of the Russian Revolutionaries, both on account of the sympathy which all Socialists desired to show to the Great Revolution, and owing to the fear that their refusal might give the Maximalists the upper hand and enable them to impose their policy of peace at any price. But the Socialist leaders of France, Belgium, and Great Britain were agreed only to accept the invitation on condition that it was clearly understood that the German Socialist majority could not re-enter the Internationale except by repudiating its Government and renouncing the attitude which it had taken up since the beginning of the war. The question was thus raised in a manner which made equivocation impossible. For the Western Socialists it was a matter of either bringing the Germans to recognise the crimes to which they had

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themselves been the accomplices and to open a revolutionary struggle against the Imperial Government, or to identify themselves to the bitter end with the policy of that Government, which all Socialists in the world were bound in duty to oppose. I will not enquire whether this attitude was not based to a large extent upon illusions; for in any case they were of short duration. The *coup de théâtre* which followed the return of MM. Moutet and Cachin to France almost immediately put a new complexion upon the problem.

MM. Moutet and Cachin, who had left for Petrograd at the same time as Messrs. O'Grady, Thorne, and Saunders, had during their stay there shared the preoccupation and anxiety of all Allied representatives in Russia. When they returned to Paris, at the end of May, the Russian Revolution was suddenly transfigured before their eyes. The glory of appearing before the French Socialists as the missionaries of triumphant Socialism, the hope of suddenly restoring that party unity which had been so seriously compromised by the dissensions between Majority and Minority, led them to put forward, at the National Congress on 27 May, a motion accepting unconditionally the invitation to the Stockholm Conference. This was a real surprise stroke, something like those stampedes which sometimes run through the great American Conventions. It will be remembered what emotion this unexpected resolution caused among middle class French opinion and the indignant outcry raised in the non-Socialist press. In the Chamber, and especially in the Senate, there was keen irritation. M. Ribot, who had at first, like all the Allied Governments, shown considerable hesitation as to the attitude to be adopted in view of the Soviet's invitation, mustered sufficient energy to inform the Chamber that the French Government would refuse passports. At this moment there was unity, at least in appearance, in the French Socialist Party. But it was only apparent, for the Minority agreed to go to Stockholm in order to prepare an early peace, while the Majority still hoped to bring an indictment there against the German Socialists. It was only apparent, because the Allied Socialists, who had remained at Petrograd, were astonished at the vote of the French National Congress and expressed their regret at the collapse of the guarantees which they had succeeded in obtaining by painful negotiations. There was

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the same disagreement between the Socialist groups in other countries. The British were afraid to commit themselves and did not follow the example set by their comrades in Paris. The Belgians, MM. Vandervelde and de Brouckère, announced, even at Petrograd itself, that they would not go to Stockholm.

What followed at Stockholm itself during June showed still better that obstacles far stronger and more efficacious than any refusal of passports by the Governments lay in the way of a conference. The Dutch-Scandinavian Committee, which at the request of the Belgians had replaced the too Germanophil committee of Mr. Troelstra, had invited the Socialist parties of the various countries to send delegates in order to discuss beforehand and separately the questions which might be raised at the Conference. These consultations showed the unbridgeable gulf which separated the German, Austrian, Hungarian, and Bulgarian Socialists on the one hand, from the French, British, and Belgian on the other. Certain French Socialists were naïvely astonished when they saw the German Majority delegates, in their reply to the Dutch-Scandinavian Committee, expounding ideas, if not identical with those of Pangermans, at best far removed from any thought of reparation or guarantees for future peace. The attitude of the Russians remained that of impartial witnesses, refusing to give a precise definition to their formula: "No annexations, no indemnities," which Socialists all over the world repeated subject to their various interpretations. This divergence became more acute when, in their reply to written questions of the Committee, the various Socialist groups tried to define their peace programme.

Despite the vote of the French Congress and the efforts of the French Socialists (some of whom are ardent patriots, while others accept the extreme pacifist doctrine of Zimmerwald) to draw up a joint reply to the questions issued, there was hardly any agreement between the various national groups or inside each of those groups, save on the one point of protesting against the action of the Governments if they definitely refused passports.

We then come to the journey of the Soviet's missionaries to Stockholm and the West, to prepare the way for the Conference. It took a good long time to get a clear idea of the mentality of MM. Goldenberg, Erlich, Rusanov and Smirnov ;

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for a long time they maintained an attitude of observation, explaining that they had come to the West not to discuss but to inform themselves and to report to Petrograd. However, it became almost at once apparent that they declined to draw any distinction between the Allied Socialists and those of enemy countries. At the inter-Allied Conference recently held in London they went still further in opposing the revival of the resolution voted by the International Conference of February 1915, which in moderate terms expressed reprobation for the illegalities committed by the Germans in Belgium. They added "that it was time to substitute for the war ideology which had inspired that resolution the true idealism of the Internationale." It may be imagined that the intervention of men animated by such a spirit only served to revive and accentuate the dissensions between patriots and pacifists which were hidden under a mask of unity.

A new phase, then, began with the return of Mr. Henderson to London. At Petrograd Mr. Henderson does not seem to have been very favourable to the Stockholm Conference, save as a means of holding back the Russian Socialists and dissipating their distrust. After his return he worked actively in favour of the project. After getting the executive committee of the Labour Party to vote a motion for presentation at the Conference of 10 August, he went to Paris together with the Russian delegates to discuss with the French Socialists the conditions under which they would consent to go to Stockholm. At Paris discussion centred mainly on the question whether the resolutions put forward at Stockholm would be binding resolutions or not. The French and Russians said Yes, the British said No, and Mr. MacDonald himself declared that he accepted the idea of a consultative conference rather than see the majority of his compatriots refuse to take part. But this agreement in form between the British delegates only veiled for a moment their profound disagreement; on the conduct and conclusion of the war Mr. MacDonald and Mr. Henderson remained as far apart as ever, and each hoped that the Stockholm Conference would produce diametrically opposed results. The French majority, through M. Renaudel's organ, declared to all and sundry that the binding character of the resolutions at the international conference was intended to put the German Majority against the wall. The French Minority was of another opinion, and

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the Russians made it clear that if an attempt were made to discuss the responsibility for the war at the beginning of the conference it would not be worth attending. A compromise was agreed upon more or less upon the lines desired by the British delegates, but this was once more a mere veil to conceal irreconcilable differences. And before the delegates had left Paris that veil itself was rent in two by a declaration signed by thirty-four Socialist members of the French Parliament, including M. Guesde, emphatically refusing to have anything to do with the Stockholm Conference.

The last act began with the first resolution of the British Labour Congress, which was the occasion of Mr. Henderson's triumph and downfall. It will be remembered that at the very moment when the Labour Party agreed by an immense majority to a consultative conference at Stockholm, they were obliged to adjourn the debate as to the question of the representation of groups, because agreement had not been reached. What for the moment upheld and assured the unity of the party was the irritation produced by the act of the British Government in immediately afterwards refusing to issue passports. Even at that moment, however, the fact that the Labour Ministers remained in office showed that there was no real rupture with the Government, as the pacifist groups of the I.L.P. and B.S.P. desired. Ten days later the second congress of the Labour Party not merely saw the majority for Stockholm drop almost to nothing owing to the miners' change of front, but it refused to "the small Socialist parties the right of separate representation," and next day the labour leader declared, "Never will the I.L.P. submit to such a decision." The only moment at which there was an impression of unanimity was when the meeting cheered Mr. Henderson, who had fallen from power because he would not help his colleagues in the Cabinet to deal a fatal blow to the Stockholm Conference.

The *dénouement* occurred at the inter-Allied Socialist Conference, whose debates have only been the subject of a brief official summary. At first the public only learned its results and the fact that unanimity could not be reached on any of the resolutions. But did that mean that the Conference had been a failure? After all, what meeting could ever reach any decision if the voting had to be unanimous? Such is the argument employed to-day by the pacifist minorities in

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England and in France, but indiscretions committed on both sides make it now possible for us to understand what really took place.

If we were to believe *The Nation*, *Herald*, and *Labour Leader*, and to accept without criticism the voting figures just published by the latter, we should have to conclude that the resolution put forward by Mr. MacDonald on the subject of Stockholm and the passports had an enormous majority. What prevented this resolution, or one like it, from being accepted by all was, we are told, the obstructive tactics (the phrase is Mr. Bernard Shaw's) adopted by the French majority, led by M. Renaudel and M. Albert Thomas. But if we listen to M. Renaudel himself, we shall learn why no agreement could be reached on another question, that of war aims. It was because from the outset the British Pacifist groups, backed by the Russians, refused to renew the declaration of February 1915. Men who think like M. Renaudel cannot agree with those who refuse to reaffirm the view that the invasion of Belgium was a crime for fear of displeasing Herr Scheidemann. The manoeuvre of the French Majority was a counter-manoeuve, intended to prevent certain tiny groups, reinforced by the Russians and by the Italian official Socialists, from posing as the true Allied Socialist majority, which was entitled to impose its policy upon a hopeless minority. As, on the other hand, the Belgians refused to go to Stockholm if the first item in the agenda was not the indictment of the German Majority Socialists, it is obvious that unity of form could only have been obtained by the sacrifice of convictions and realities. Two incidents, we are told, accentuated at the last moment the disagreement which it would have been dangerous to deny. A proposal to send a delegation to President Wilson to invite him to take practical steps towards the realization of the League of Nations was rejected with scorn by the Russians, the official Italian Socialists, and the British pacifists. How could the international proletariat approach a capitalist Government with a view to preparing harmony among the nations? Then, when it was a question of nominating a permanent inter-Allied Committee, the same groups, we are informed, refused to take part, on the ground that the terms "inter-Allied" and "international" are incompatible. What could be more significant than such an attitude?

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The day after the Conference some of the most important members of the French and British majorities, with the Belgian and Italian reformist delegates, published a manifesto expressing the views of those who may be called the patriotic Socialists. In this the idea of an International Conference was not abandoned but postponed till a more favourable moment. It was expected that the pacifists would publish a manifesto at about the same time, but no such document has appeared and we are entitled to enquire whether the pacifists are at one among themselves. It was, perhaps, difficult for a man like M. Longuet, who has always declared in favour of national defence and against peace at any price, to come to an agreement with those of his colleagues who, like Mr. Snowden, Signor Lazzari, M. Goldenberg, M. Lorient, do not stop at such trifles. Or, if it was possible to agree in private conversations, it was clearly more difficult to do so publicly. So one more hope of unity has vanished. The pacifists have been modest enough, after the triumphant votes announced to us through the indiscretions of the *Manchester Guardian* and the *Labour Leader*.

The Trades Union Congress, which has just closed, has declared itself more than ever in favour of an international conference, but has recognised that this will not be possible until the Allied Socialists can agree among themselves. On this formula there has—at last!—been almost complete unanimity. And this amounts to agreement on this single point, that hitherto no agreement has been possible. In fact, among those who have discussed among themselves the question of going to Stockholm, it would be easy to distinguish five or six different tendencies. Some, like Mr. Hyndman, adhere to the Manchester resolution, and refuse to have any relations with enemy Socialists until the invaded territories have been evacuated. Others, like M. Vandervelde, only wish to meet them in order to frame an indictment against them. Others again, like M. Renaudel, would consent not to begin with such an indictment, on condition that before the Conference broke up the German Socialists would be obliged to pronounce upon the responsibility for the war, and to take sides for or against their Government. Others prefer to remain silent upon this awkward question, in the belief that it will then be possible

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to come to terms with the German Socialists as to the foundations of a just peace, acceptable to the Allies. Others, finally, think that any peace is just and any war unjust, and that the Stockholm conversations will lead to direct peace negotiations, whether the Governments wish it or not. A few, perhaps, cherish the illusion that peace, even if it involved the victory of the Central Powers, would be the beginning of the Socialist Millennium and of universal bliss.

I leave aside the intentions and calculations of the neutrals, which vary greatly. The sympathy of a man like Mr. Branting for the just cause of the Allies is scarcely open to doubt, as is that of Mr. Troelstra or Mr. Stauning for Germany. Did not Mr. Troelstra say to the Stockholm correspondent of the *Cologne Gazette* a few days ago: "If the Conference were to begin with the treatment of the question of guilt for the past, it must not be forgotten that the real question during the Conference is the question who is willing to assume responsibility for the prolongation of the war"? As to the attitude of the enemy Socialists, a single word must suffice. We know that in the preliminary discussions at Stockholm the official German Socialists, a few days before shaking hands with the Emperor, consented to attend an International Conference with binding resolutions. We are entitled to ask whether they were counting on a majority at the Conference, or whether they made the mental reservation not to stand by the binding decisions after having obtained the assurance that the Allied Socialists would carry out their side of the bargain. Herr Müller, who spoke in their name at Stockholm, is the same man who, on the eve of the declaration of war, invited the French Socialists to vote against the military credits.

Every reader of Edgar Poe will remember the case of Mr. Valdemar. Mr. Valdemar was dead, but by a miracle of hypnotism he had been persuaded that he was alive. They had even preserved his voice for him, and Mr. Valdemar spoke in sepulchral tones. But all of a sudden this hypnotic suggestion ceased, and Mr. Valdemar dissolved into his original atoms. Such is the history of the defunct Conference of Stockholm.

But the Internationale is not dead. It is not dead for the excellent reason that it has never been really alive. Just as ghosts cannot be killed, so it is impossible to kill

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the vague and alluring hopes of classes and generations which have greatly suffered. That is why the wishes for a future conference, though bound to remain platonic so long as Socialist unity is a mere fiction, are not to be regarded as negligible. Even those who save themselves from hallucinations by keeping their eyes fixed upon realities, cannot forget that the most realist of statesmen counted among realities what are called *imponderabilia*.

VILLEHARDOUIN.

Quo Vadis, Germania ?

An open letter to a German Democrat

AFTER a long interruption I should like to try to resume some sort of relations with you ; but, before we can really reach anything like a lasting understanding, we must have a pretty thorough agreement about the things that really matter. I know that you, personally, have always held liberal views, despite the fact that, like all " good Germans," you used to ram your *Hochseeflotte* and the Imperial greed of England down my throat as often as possible. I did not resent that, just as I expected you to understand why my blood quickened at the sight of a Union Jack in foreign parts : a healthy pride in the Fatherland is an indispensable ingredient in the true international spirit, for internationalism must be the co-operation of conscious national forces or else it is meaningless. But I have always had uneasy doubts about you. You are so easily scared by bogeys that you can hardly be trusted to hold fast to a great principle if its defence means a collision with authority. Think of the dissolution of the Reichstag over the Navy, of the Zabern incident, of all those conflicts with the Supreme Power in which you democrats lost the day because you had not the courage to resist. And in the light of these capitulations read our demand for a democratic Germany as the herald of peace. Do you see what a cleft stick we are in because of your slavish obedience to authority? Do you now begin to understand why the Pyrrhic victory of the Reichstag on 19 July is worthless as a pledge of democratic intentions in Germany until you do something to bring your rulers to book? Do you not realise, as I told you that night during our Boer War when we listened to

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the frogs at Friedrichroda, that 1848 was an unfinished tragedy of many scenes repeated every time a crisis of democratic origin arose in Germany, and that every time the curtain rang down upon the triumph of reaction another nail was driven into the coffin of European peace? I ask you to bear all this in mind when your rulers tell you that it is nothing but greed and the lust of destruction that prompt us to refuse your so-called offers of peace. I ask you to look at recent history, not through your own eyes nor through mine, but through Mr. Branting's or—dare I suggest it—through Hugo Haase's! I suggest that you should try to answer the question candidly: "Why did Wilson bring America into the war?" Finally, I sum it all up by imploring you to think for yourself.

To assist you in that process let me recall another talk of ours on a balcony of the Hotel Hungaria at Budapest, in November, 1908: a significant year that loses none of its interest for us, but rather grows in importance, as we look back upon it. Recent events had sharpened our interest in foreign affairs: and your presence in Budapest was, in itself, proof that something was in progress in those dim regions of Bosnia which you had made your own. Looking back upon your descriptions of that tumultuous country, its mixed races and religions, its increasing ferment of national feeling and its unsuspected importance in the play of peace and war, I think your estimate was remarkably fair and accurate. Bosnia has proved to be a *foyer de Guerre* largely because your Government and the Austro-Hungarian would not accept your reading of Balkan affairs. Yours was a voice crying alone—echoed in vain a year or two later by *Scotus Viator*—and the policy of blind dynastic interest shunned you and passed on to its doom at Serajevo.

My purpose in writing to you now, however, is not to praise your prescience in the affairs of the Near East, but to recall to your mind your old insistence on good Anglo-German relations and your belief that we might co-operate to create a new world order. Candidly, why was your belief not realised? It was, perhaps, premature, to attempt any heroic measure of internationalism; we were all too deeply imbedded in the quagmire of feuds old and new to be able to pull ourselves out and scale the peaks whence alone one may descry the blessed isles on the horizon and set a true

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course for them. That is all true; but it is not the whole truth—we did try to find ways and means of peace with you; at the Hague, in the matter of African Colonies and Bagdad, in Haldane missions and in naval holidays we did a great deal. Why did we fail? I take all the legitimate blame possible for myself and my own country; but, at the end of it all the blame really lies with you. We showed that we were ready to co-operate, but we failed because in your rulers there was no real reciprocating will to co-operate. Nor was there any force of German public opinion in favour of “constructive pacifism” comparable to that which had grown up in France and Great Britain. And, let me remark here, that it was the sense of security which the *Entente Cordiale* gave to France and which alone made that growth possible. In French minds the *Entente* was a bulwark; it was not a spear-head. Our agreement with France, like our Russian policy of 1907, was forced on us by your incurably restless foreign policy, *and could have been brought about by no other means*. Rightly taken it might have been a long step towards European pacification; and it would have developed in that way but for your Tirpitzes and Reventlows and other firebrands who taught you to regard it as an aggressive alliance against you. In your foolish pique you forgot that for nearly a generation before the creation of the *Entente* your Central European bloc—Germany, Austria, Italy, with Roumania and Turkey as possible allies in war—had dominated the Continent, while Russia, Great Britain, and France stood apart, singly and alone, jealous of one another and careless of the gigantic power which you were preparing in your new German Empire. Your statesmen have gravely misled you in saying that we were irreconcilable. We were not. It is true that the conflicts of Entente and Triple Alliance are more conspicuous and sensational than the attempts to understand one another; Agadir and the “shining armour” of 1909 are lurid points to which all eyes turn, while the “conversations” of various dates are little noticed. Yet the latter are the true signs. When the British Government opened negotiations with Berlin with the intention of finding a “formula” under which the Franco-British Entente could be found compatible with a friendly relation to Germany, we interpreted their action as proof of sincerity. We, who knew the British Ministers engaged,

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understood their intention and justified their action on the ground that it satisfied one of the strongest desires of British democracy (namely, a frank and determined attempt to find a *modus vivendi et amicitiae* with your own people). And we were satisfied that, even if it failed, it could do no harm. It did fail. And we know why. Neither Government quite trusted the *bona fides* of the other, though I think that history will pass sentence upon Berlin as secretly desiring the negotiations to fail. The revelations of 5 July 1914, on which a certain lady in high position in Berlin could shed much light, and the publication of the Willy-Nicky correspondence show that your rulers and leaders were too absorbed in the old game of pull devil, pull baker, to raise their eyes to see any better prospect; although Dr. Paul Rohrbach has proved (in *Der Krieg und die deutsche Politik*) that they had in their pigeon holes plenty of evidence of English goodwill. Indeed, Dr. Rohrbach says: "In Africa, for instance, English policy had gone a surprisingly long way to meet us."

Now it is quite beside the point for you to tell me that there were many people in Germany who sincerely longed for friendship with Great Britain. I know there were, but they were helpless and voiceless, because, *first*, having no independent press, they lacked an organ of expression; and *second*, having no political sense, they did not know how to use even the very moderate powers possessed by the Reichstag to put sustained pressure on the Government. If you dispute this, please listen to the story of the recent Reichstag crisis (19 July) as told by your own journalists. Thus while the crisis was brewing the *Frankfurter Zeitung* said: "On grounds which cannot be publicly stated we see ourselves obliged to publish our usual political section without our own expression of opinion until further notice." That was merely a negative, servile and disingenuous way of saying what the *Deutsche Volkszeitung* proclaimed *urbi et orbi* in the words: ". . . the contents of all German newspapers to-day tally almost word for word, because they are all fed from the same source, and they are unable, owing to the restrictions of the censorship, to display their talents or to take up an independent attitude towards the events of the day." This is the system which Professor Lasson called "the most perfect political structure the world has ever known." One would almost think that the German censorship had no relation to military

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events but was solely designed to prevent the distant thunder of the tumbril from sounding in Hohenzollern ears. And the point of real significance is that the German people and the German newspapers take this treatment lying down. Small wonder that Prince Bülow called you "political asses" and that even pro-German neutrals lament your incapacity for sustained popular action. In no country in the world could a professor write as most of yours do and continue to retain the respect of the intellectual world. In no country is there such a complete contrast between scientific, military and commercial efficiency and political immaturity. Only in Germany can a Karl Lamprecht speak as follows (17 November 1914):—"We Germans are not known outside, nor is it known that we are the freest people on earth, and in the suffrage for the Reichstag we possess the freest suffrage in the world. We must take care that people get to know us in this respect and must therefore, before all things, introduce an accurate news service. The receipt and issue of news can only be done by a thoroughly big Imperial office which systematically sifts and appraises the stuff."

Apart from the slight contained herein upon the still small voice of the German God (which goes by the name of the Wolff Bureau) this declaration is precious. We must thank your professor for a masterly picture of the free German people and its big Imperial office faithful to the tradition of Bismarck though executing his intentions with all the systematic blundering of a Bernstorff, a Zimmermann, or a Bethmann Hollweg. This fetish of "the thoroughly big Imperial Office" is Germany's political damnation. Is it so deep-rooted in your affection that nothing—not even your million dead in this war—can eradicate it? Such a confession would be full of tragic significance because it would mean that all our appeals for the co-operation of German Liberals—not in word but in constructive political action—could find no echo in Germany and that the world must return to the old weary round of plot and counter-plot, of destruction and death which preceded and made this war. It is this that makes us all anxiously watch the Reichstag just now. Anxiously, yes; because you have many times given us cause for anxiety when some progressive cause lay in the hands of German Liberals. Your Progressives are so timid; they are fit companions of Mr.

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Feeble-Mind and Mr. Ready-to-Halt; there is not one Great Heart among them; and when Hindenburg straddles, like Apollyon, across the way, they bow in awe as before the Ruler of the World. How else can we explain the ineffective, almost inaudible protest which they made, when your Jingoës forced America into the war—a blunder that would have made Bismarck vomit? How else are we to interpret the whole Reichstag crisis on which Eduard Bernstein has shed such an illumination? In what other way can we—dare we—read the future except by the light of your present and past until you arise in new strength and play the man?

BOREAS.

Who is to represent Poland?

CAREFUL students of the press can hardly have failed to notice the appearance in different quarters a few weeks ago of paragraphs which seemed to herald the appointment of a Polish official representative in Great Britain. These announcements at once gave rise to interesting questions. Who is to appoint the representative? And where is the present seat of the Polish State? And what Polish authority has authorised this statement in the daily and weekly press?

Rightly to answer these questions involves a review of recent developments in the political life of Poland. It must not be supposed that Poland is cursed by a multiplicity of party differences beyond any other State. It has its differences, of course, and as, during the period of partition, there was no political responsibility, these differences had no safety valves in the possession of executive influence and authority. Up till 1905 the National Democrats were representative of much that was best in Poland, but since that date they have continually inclined to reaction. When the Russian Revolution came, the party found itself politically hopeless and bereft of a programme.

When they realised this fact they began to make desperate efforts to re-establish their lost political fortunes. They made a raid on the programme of their opponents, stole "items" here and there, and circulated paragraphs among the newspapers which were designed to show, what is certainly not the fact, that the National Democrats stand at the helm of Polish politics, and that, therefore, their repre-

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sentative may rightly be regarded as the spokesman of his country in the Western capitals. Obviously this could only be attained by obtaining the necessary powers from a political Congress which would give them something of a representative character. So a political Congress was engineered in August at Moscow, and the circumstances that led to it may be plainly discovered from references in the Polish press.

The chief features of the plan may easily be guessed from the comments found in the Moscow *Gazeta Polska*, a National Democrat organ (25 June/8 July) which greets the idea with much enthusiasm. We give the essential passages:—

“ The Polish Political Congress, and later the combined organisation which it is to produce, ought to unite all those who regard as pernicious any political inactivity at a moment like the present, and who desire such action as would supplement and strengthen the will of the nation. Alas, there is a certain divergence of views in our midst with regard to the interpretation of the country's will, and, therefore, also with regard to the settlement of those objects of our foreign policy which we wish to attain in this war.”

After a long attack on those who disagree with the “ foreign policy ” of the National Democrats, the paper continues:—

“ Should adherents of both sections meet at the Polish Political Congress all the energy and time of the delegates would be spent in recriminations and quarrels, and the Congress would be condemned to fruitlessness. The Organising Committee has, therefore, acted very wisely in appealing only to those parties, unions, associations and political clubs which recognise the need of a uniform national policy aiming at absolute independence and the complete reunion of Poland with access to the sea. . . . The agenda of the Congress will contain two matters of primary importance: the present state of the Polish question and the situation in Poland. As both these matters, so far as we know, will be handled by people remaining in direct contact with the decisive international factors as well as with Poland, all doubts which may be entertained by the participants will be adequately cleared up and removed. With this as a background, discussion will then develop on the third matter on the agenda, embracing the aims of Polish policy outside of Poland. After these aims are properly defined and understood, the Congress will proceed to crown its work by electing a ‘ permanent controlling organ.’ ”

Thus the Congress was clearly intended as a means of harnessing as many political organisations as possible to the chariot of the National Democrats. Still more significant, however, are the article's omissions. A few weeks earlier a movement to unite all Polish political parties and factions was initiated by the important Council of Assemblies (*Rada*

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Zjazdow) at the instigation of Mr. Alexander Lednicki, Chairman of the State Commission appointed by the Russian Provisional Government to wind up Polish-Russian affairs. Mr. Lednicki, whom the Poles in Russia have long regarded as their most disinterested and most democratic leader, issued an appeal inviting all parties and factions to meet and discuss the possibility of evolving a truly representative and national policy. The National Democrats were invited like the rest. They sent delegates, but as soon as they perceived that they would have to take only such a share of representation as was their due, they decided to do all in their power to wreck the work already accomplished towards unification. Thus their subsequent appeal to the Poles in Russia is simply a piece of flagrant "political humbug," to quote the organ of the Polish Democratic Committee in Russia (*Dziennik Petrogradzki*, 24 June/7 July).

After declaring that the project of the National Democrats is intended to replace that of Mr. Lednicki, and that it is directed against the whole movement towards a co-ordination of policy with the Council of State, the *Dziennik Petrogradzki* went on to discuss the proposal in detail. It was the intention of the organisers to leave out the democratic associations, the People's party, the revolutionary fraction of the Polish Socialist Party, and the National Labour Union. The Congress, therefore, was to sit without these parties being represented, and would include only the National Committee and its adherents.

"To make this camp of National Committee adherents appear larger and more representative a new party was created. This is the Association of Polish Independence and Reunion. This new association has taken out a patent for those watchwords of independence and reunion which are the property of all the Polish parties, and as for the National Democrats, nothing has been left undone to show that they have taken the association under their protection. . . . This is presumably a tactical manœuvre designed to make it appear that not only the National Democrats and Realists, who are, after all, only few in number in Russia, but as many as three parties will take part. In reality, however, as it is their pious wish that the Democrats, Populists, and Socialists should not take part, the Congress will be attended by National Democrats in all sorts of guises. . . ."

The *Dziennik* then pointed out that the Congress instead of being "all Polish," as the promoters wished to make it appear, would in reality be "all National Democrat."

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"The delegates will attend, first, as former or present (?) deputies, again as members of the National Democratic party, again as members of the Association of Polish Independence and Reunion, again as representatives of the National Clubs, and still again as representatives of 'social and political organisations.' As the same men are active in all these groups, parties, clubs and organisations, it follows that in this way a characteristic plural franchise is at last brought to birth."

This well-trumpeted Polish Congress was convened at Moscow, and is said to have been attended by 400 delegates "representing the pro-Ally Polish political parties and organisations in Russia," but in reality representing only the National Democrats, according to the wonderful plural franchise already referred to. As there was no opposition, there was complete unanimity of opinion. The Congress set up a "Polish Council of the United Parties" (*sic*) which, according to the grandiloquent language of the promoters, "will be the political representative of the Poles in Russia."

What, however, is the immediate objective of all these efforts? In a recent article in *Land and Water*, ostensibly by "I. N.," but advertised weeks before as by Mr. Roman Dmowski, the immediate aim of all this political plot is frankly revealed. "At the same time," we are told, "the *Polish representatives* in the other allied countries, including America, are working for the organisation of the Polish army on the Eastern front and for the recognition of Poland as a belligerent and *an Ally possessing official representation.*" Poland must have an official representative in the allied countries, and who could be more acceptable than National Democrats? The manœuvre is as transparent as water.

A POLE.

In printing the above contribution from a Polish source THE NEW EUROPE has no intention of taking sides in an internal Polish party feud, or of associating itself with attacks upon the National Democratic Party and its able and talented leader, Mr. Roman Dmowski. Its sole object is to sound a note of warning, lest Entente statesmen, in their relations with the Poles, should identify themselves with those who represent a single party rather than the nation as a whole.

So long as the old *régime* still prevailed in Russia there were many grounds for arguing that the programme of complete independence for Poland was impracticable: and under the circumstances the National Democrats could not

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be blamed for subordinating political freedom to national unity, and staking everything upon their relations with the Russian autocracy. But since the Revolution their alliance with reaction has proved a fatal handicap, and they have lost all credit with the parties of the revolution; while they had already lost almost all influence over the situation in Warsaw. Hence their recognition by the Western Powers as the official representatives of Poland could not fail to give offence to the Russian Government. Indeed their territorial programme, involving as it does the union of vast tracts of Lithuania, the Ukraine, and even Russia proper to Poland, is such as no Russian—Left, Centre, or Right—could ever seriously entertain; and it is this which makes the Polish Conservative *Czas*, of Cracow, treat it as incredible that British statesmen could ever commit themselves to such a group. Their recognition would at the same time be resented by the Polish Council of State, at present the sole political body qualified to speak for Poland as a whole. If, again, the test of recognition is to be hostility to the Germans, then it is to be borne in mind that the foremost opponents of the German *régime* in Warsaw, General Pilsudski (now in a German prison) and the Social Revolutionaries (*à la Kerenski*) are also the chief opponents of the National Democratic Party, and that during the recent wholesale arrests in Warsaw adherents of the latter were spared by the Germans, despite the anti-German doctrine of their leaders abroad. If, again, it be argued that there can be no dealings with the Warsaw Council of State because it was the creation of the Central Powers—an argument more plausible than convincing—this cannot at any rate apply to Mr. Lednicki, who has been officially recognised by the Russian Government as their representative in Polish affairs, and who is in touch with, and fully representative of, the dominant currents in Warsaw. To go behind his back and recognise as the envoys of Poland persons, however distinguished, who were acceptable neither to him nor to his Russian colleagues, would be a double error.

The enemy press is already placing sinister interpretations upon the relations of the Entente with the National Democrats. The notorious Professor Schiemann, writing in *Deutsche Politik* of 10 August, informs us that "in April of this year a conference took place in London

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between Entente politicians and the Polish leaders, Count Plater Syberg, Count Zamoyski and Seyda [all National Democrats—ED.], which brought to the Poles the certainty that they might reckon upon the Entente for the support of their Pan-Polish plans, which, as is well known, include Courland, Lithuania, Cholm and other Ukrainian territory, as well as Posen, West Prussia and Silesia." This story, as also the account of further negotiations with Mr. Bonar Law, is, of course, as false as the further conclusions drawn by the German Socialist deputy, Dr. Quessel, in the *Sozialistische Monatshefte*. But the territorial designs of the National Democrats are no invention, and, therefore, to give them formal recognition would be nothing short of a hostile act to Russia.

In a word, we have the highest regard for the brilliant political gifts of Mr. Dmowski and we could wish that there were among the Poles to-day more men of his calibre. But we venture to believe that it would be a fatal blunder for the Entente to commit itself to any definite alliance with him and his party. In a country where clericalism and the landed interest are so powerful as in Poland, the National Democrats are still likely to play an important part for many years to come. But the forces of progress lie elsewhere, and our alliance must be with the future not the past.

The Moral of the Morel Case

THE propaganda of pacifism has taken many forms during the war; but in none of them has it achieved any striking success. It failed to grip the common people because it failed to understand one or two elementary facts; and it has never recovered from its initial blunder in assuming that the British people could take no moral interest in the violation of Belgium. Whenever its spokesmen laid claim to wide and growing popular support, some disconcerting incident like the Aberdeen by-election would occur to confound them; and it might have continued thus to the end of the chapter. Take the case of the Union of Democratic Control. There are probably few who would not subscribe, almost without reservation, to the principal tenets of that body as set forth in the fivefold statement of its aims; but the overwhelming majority of men withhold their support

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from the Union because they distrust its leadership in politics. It is therefore probably true to say that, while the general policy of "democratic control" is making giant strides in popularity, the personnel of the Union itself quite fails to exercise a commensurate political influence. It is credibly reported that one of the Independent Socialist leaders in Germany spoke of them in terms of the highest praise, extolling them for their self-sacrifice and moral courage, but regretting that they had not more "sense." Very much the same attitude prevails in this country, except as regards the Secretary, Mr. E. D. Morel, who has remained an enigma—some would say a sinister enigma—throughout. Mr. Morel has been the object of fierce attack in the press, of which certain organs have made it their constant practice to circulate insinuations about him. Mr. Morel has ever preserved an unruffled silence, which began to puzzle moderate men when he continued to ignore even such specific and outrageous slanders as the statement that he had been at one time, and perhaps was still, in German pay. The statement was probably untrue, but Mr. Morel's refusal to prove it and thereby to clear himself and give his society just the kind of popular advertisement which is valuable grist to the propagandist mill, only deepened the mystery surrounding his name.

The Government, meanwhile, kept an eye upon the propaganda of the society, raided its premises more than once, and gave the clearest possible evidence of the suspicion in which it held the Union of Democratic Control. The man in the street, putting two and two together, assumed that the public prosecutor had damning evidence up his sleeve, which, when revealed at the proper moment, would destroy the Union. But the man in the street was wrong; for when the blow fell, the Government succeeded in getting Mr. Morel locked up for six months on the trivial charge of violating the Defence of the Realm Act (or one of its Regulations) by smuggling a pamphlet to M. Romain Rolland out in Switzerland. We say a "trivial charge," not because one may break the law with impunity, especially in war-time, but because, in comparison with the attacks of his newspaper critics, the public prosecutor's indictment of Mr. Morel was a masterpiece of anti-climax. Clearly the raids on the U.D.C. office produced but flimsy evidence. But, mark the

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sequel! The Government has procured the temporary silence of Mr. Morel's persuasive tongue. Have they reckoned the cost? On their own showing, the propaganda of the U.D.C. is "undesirable" and should be "discouraged." By their own act they have proved that they regard Mr. Morel as a dangerous person; but the means they have taken to prove it have produced the opposite impression. We are prepared to wager that thousands of working men in the North, reading the trial in the light of the accusations previously made against Mr. Morel, are saying, "We thought Morel was a blackguard; but, if that is all the Government have got against him, he can't be." It is hardly probable that the Government gave the matter sufficient thought to show that the prosecution of Mr. Morel on that particular charge could not fail to remind the public of previous incidents, such as that of which "Gordon" was the hero, and thus contribute to deepen the almost rancorous suspicion in which Ministers are already held in too many places. In their own interest, and still more in the interest of all that is at stake in the war, we earnestly beg the Prime Minister not to allow his subordinates to play ducks and drakes with national unity for the sake of a momentary success like the conviction of Mr. Morel.

The Pope's Motives

We are surprised that more prominence has not been given to the sensational interview with the Pope, published by an Allied Catholic Diplomatist "long resident in Rome," in the *Daily News* of 7 September. His revelations fully confirm—it is true, in a cruelly tactless form—the conclusions already drawn in our own article of 23 August, on "The Voice of the Vatican." He summarises the motives which underlie the Papal Peace Note under three main heads, and first of the three stands, as we had already suggested, the Vatican's "desire to obtain a seat at the Peace Congress, at which the question of Temporal Power may be considered by the principal world-powers." The anonymous diplomat gives a clue to his nationality by stating that he belongs to a "race which, like the Jews, has neither temple nor country," and whose country "lies under the iron heel of the invader." "The Italians," he declares, "believe that

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the present Pope is satisfied with the solution of the Roman Question which has prevailed for close on 50 years. The reverse is the case. The Pope, so far as this question is concerned, is more Jesuit than the Jesuits. In conversation he constantly refers to the need for a fresh solution of this thorny problem. Temporal as well as spiritual freedom, he believes, is absolutely necessary to the head of the Catholic Church." If this be true, His Holiness can hardly be blamed for sympathising with the Central Powers, since it is obvious that the other group of belligerents can never admit such a claim. The presence of Italy in our alliance would in itself be a sufficient obstacle; but it is no less certain that Russia—even revolutionary Russia—could hardly be reconciled to once more placing the head of one Christian Church in such a favoured position; while the British and American Governments, though full of the best intentions towards the Papal See, can hardly be expected to commit themselves actively in its favour, in view of the indifference, not to say hostility, of very large sections of their populations. It is extremely doubtful whether any of the Allied Powers would, under any circumstances, admit the purely political claim of the Pope to be represented at the Peace Congress; but even the bare possibility that he might seek to raise the question of the Temporal Power would undoubtedly clinch the matter.

The second motive adduced for the Pope's action is his "fear to offend the powerful German Catholics, thereby incidentally giving impetus to the German modernist school at Munich, which before the war had become restive and undisciplined." It is difficult to believe that such fears can have played more than a subordinate part in determining his action, for there are obviously many similar considerations which weigh in the opposite direction. The third motive adduced is far more serious—"fear lest the Austrian Empire, the greatest of the Catholic Powers, should suffer shipwreck. . . . The Papal Note was not 'dictated by Austria,' yet, as my personal intercourse with His Holiness has taught me, he has a very warm corner in his heart for the Danubian Empire." Benedict XV. still thinks and reasons on the lines of the old diplomacy, and cherishes the House of Habsburg as one of the chief bulwarks of the "Universal Church." And yet a really great Pontiff, worthy

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to fill the throne of Gregory VII., of Innocent III., and even of Leo XIII., at one of the turning points in all history, would have realised long ere this that those to whose hands the destinies of Catholicism have been entrusted must throw off the trammels of dynastic tradition, and demonstrate the harmony between the ethical standards of the Church and the loftiest aspirations of the peoples. The second Rome is rooted in the past, but, like all other human institutions, it must move with the times, and it is just this adaptability and elasticity which has hitherto been the secret of its wonderful survival. Eternal principles are not the less eternal because they reveal themselves to different ages in varying light. To-day the dynastic plea is at a discount, save in the well-watered constitutional form to which we are accustomed in these islands; and for an institution like the Papacy to identify itself with the dynastic idea is simply to court disaster. Only by shaking off its subservience to courts and castes, and making the cause of the peoples its own, can the Papacy assure itself a foremost place in the Europe of the future.

Sweden and Neutrality

The revelations published by the American Government as to the gross misuse of the Swedish diplomatic service by the German Minister in the Argentine need not surprise anyone who has followed German methods in the United States, Mexico, Norway, Greece and elsewhere—as employed by such desperadoes as Papen, Boy-Ed and Schenk, with the full approval of Herr von Zimmermann, and other heads of the German Foreign Office. We are most reluctant to believe that the Swedish Government, as such, is in any way associated with such criminal practices; but it is obvious that the Swedish Foreign Minister and his subordinates cannot escape direct responsibility, and the Entente Powers cannot be expected to listen to Swedish complaints unless and until they obtain really satisfactory assurances that her rulers have ceased to be neutral merely in name.

According to a seemingly inspired statement in the *Observer* of 9 September, the Swedish Foreign Office, soon after the outbreak of war "assumed the rôle of telegraphic courier for the German Government," and has for the past three years virtually acted as a clearing-house for German cipher messages. As far back as May 1915 Sir Edward Grey, on the basis of reliable information, entered formal complaints with the Swedish Government, and on two occasions received the admission that "there might have been

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some grounds for complaint at one time," and the assurance that nothing of the kind should occur again. The smartness of the American Intelligence Service has revealed the fact that these breaches of neutrality and of faith have none the less been long ago resumed, if, indeed, they were ever discontinued.

THE SWEDISH FOREIGN MINISTER

It is probably not a mere accident that the German and Austrian press has of late been paying special attention to the utterances of the Swedish Foreign Minister, Mr. Lindmann, and singing his praises as a true representative of his whole nation. In the light of what we now know, the confident tone in which Mr. Lindmann emphasises the strictly neutral attitude of Sweden no longer seems to ring true. In his speech of 22 August he dealt at length with the difficulties of supply and the general shortage produced by German submarine warfare and the British blockade. "A policy of neutrality," he said, "involves, in the first place, our repelling by every means at our disposal any attempt of either belligerent group to violate our neutrality. But it involves more. A neutral State is bound to take up *such an attitude that it should not by commitments to one of the belligerent parties come into a false position towards the other. It cannot allow itself to be made use of, in the interests of one or other of the belligerents, as a factor in the present conflagration.* But a policy of neutrality which bears in mind the country's life interests consists not merely in the art of avoiding conflicts with the belligerents and maintaining the balance; we must also think of the future and take steps to ensure the maintenance of the country's sovereignty and independence." He dealt at some length with Sweden's negotiations with the belligerents, which were prompted by the need of securing sufficient imports of food and raw material. He expressed the hope that, in the matter of negotiations with Washington, the American people, with whom Sweden was so intimately connected, "would not wish to make difficulties of so serious a character" (we quote from the official Swedish report). He maintained that during the war there had been no export of grain "in the truest sense of the word," and that the export of meat and pigs had never reached the dimensions ascribed to it. While asserting that "the whole world at this moment longingly desired peace," he admitted that the moment of its coming was doubtful, "though it might be nearer than some are inclined to believe." The problem of safeguarding the interests of neutrals at the conclusion of peace and afterwards had, he stated, been already discussed at the meeting of the ministers of the three Scandinavian Powers, and proposals for joint action had been made to the other European neutrals. "The war," he concluded, "must be followed by the erection of a system which would offer surer guarantees than have hitherto existed for reconciliation and for averting international conflicts."

One of the official organs of the Central Powers in commenting on this speech describes Sweden as "the model State of true neutrality, which has succeeded to the full in asserting its dignity,

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sovereignty and independence." Though Washington has just provided an extremely lurid comment upon such statements, we should be the last to blame the Swedish people for the secret misdeeds of their Foreign Office, and we earnestly hope that the dismissal of those responsible for such a betrayal of trust will open the way for happier and more intimate relations between Sweden and the Entente.

Austrian Intrigues in Switzerland

We have more than once had occasion to allude to the presence in Switzerland of numerous political and financial agents of the Central Powers. The *Secolo* of 26 August treats this subject in much greater detail and in a new light. "Austria," it writes, "being less hated in France and England than Germany, is in a better position to make approaches and to manœuvre in neutral countries, and to judge by results hitherto, Austria's Jesuitism cannot be said to have been without fruit. The methods of these intrigues differ very greatly and naturally vary according to the surroundings in which they are undertaken. But their general line is substantially directed towards strengthening in neutral countries the view that grave differences exist between Vienna and Berlin, and that Austria would be disposed to enter into immediate negotiations with the Entente for a separate peace. That differences do exist between the two Empires is undoubted: the high military circles are painfully conscious of the yoke imposed on them by the German Command, while the Court of Charles does not get on with the Hohenzollerns and in the masses of the people resentment against the Germans is acute. It would, however, be a profound mistake to believe in the sincerity of the wish expressed by these confidential agents of the Berlin and Vienna Governments in favour of a separate peace, on condition that Austria-Hungary received assurances that she would not come out of the struggle unduly curtailed.

"The reality is very different: it is that between Berlin and Vienna there is a complete agreement as to this policy of intrigue, and that Berlin approves the anti-German tactics of Austria in neutral countries. Thus Baron Giskra [an Austrian diplomat, son of a well-known German-National leader in Austria—*Ed.*] can play the Anglophil for the purpose of keeping up cordial relations with certain English circles, while Count Goluchowski, a more reserved but no less skilful Ententist, can cultivate no less interesting relations with Entente clerical circles through his nephew Skrzinski [a Pole attached to the Austrian Legation in Berne—*Ed.*] and a lady friend of his. All these describe Austria-Hungary as the victim of Germany's militarist ambitions in order to induce the Entente Governments to consider seriously the idea of a separate peace. . . ."

After further references to the various Austrian and Hungarian agents at work in Switzerland, the writer continues: "The best force of Austrian high finance and those persons who have widest relations with French and English capitalists have been mobilised to produce.

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through the mediation of serious financiers, the famous meetings of the 'Yellow Internationals' of Geneva and Lucerne. It works forcibly upon Franco-British capitalists by holding out the possibility, by means of a general peace or at worst a separate peace with Austria, of saving the vast sums invested not only in Austria but also in Germany. In this game Franco-British-Austrian capitalism finds the cordial support of Belgian capitalism. Finally, the big industries and Austrian cartells urge the need of an agreement between Austrian and Franco-British industry to combat German competition, while the Chambers of Commerce of Vienna, Graz and Linz vote resolutions in favour of closer economic union between Germany and Austria."

Among fresh political arrivals in Switzerland are the late Hungarian Premier, Count Maurice Esterházy, the Magyar pacifist leader, Count Michael Károlyi, and, it is alleged, Mr. Diner-Denés, one of the most capable Socialist journalists in Hungary. The first of these may be assumed to be in close touch with Count Andrassy's agent in Switzerland, M. Felix Vályi, the editor of the *Revue Politique Internationale*, a very able monthly review which devotes special attention to whitewashing the Magyars and Young Turks.

Cardinal Bégin and Conscription

Under the title "A Canadian Urban V." the *Christian Science Monitor*, one of the best informed *political* dailies in America, publishes an article upon the attitude of the Roman Catholic hierarchy in Canada towards the war. After asserting that "wherever the influence of the Roman Catholic Church is the strongest, a tremendous campaign has been waged to prevent the recruiting of men in the Allied countries for the war," and citing Ireland and Australia as instances, it continues as follows:—

"Now the effort to repudiate conscription has come up in the Western Hemisphere, and is summed up by the Roman Catholic Archbishop of Quebec in terms which go infinitely further than anything the Bishop of Killaloe or the Archbishop of Melbourne has ever thought it wise to advance. . . .

"The conscription law which has been passed by the representatives of an entirely democratic nation, Cardinal Bégin describes as 'a menace which causes the Canadian clergy the worst apprehensions.' Military service . . . the Cardinal describes as 'a serious blow to the rights of the Church of Christ, independent in its domain, and whose laws and practice exempt the clergy and that class of the society which that name designates from the service under arms.' In plain English the Cardinal is claiming as exempt from military service not only the regular clergy, who are exempt in any case without question, everywhere, but all those divinity students, teachers, and other adherents of the Church of Rome, which that Church chooses to embrace under the comprehensive title of clergy. Not only, therefore, is he reviving the claim that the Church of Rome in all its phases

CARDINAL BÉGIN AND CONSCRIPTION

is above the civil law, but he is apparently prepared to do his utmost to prevent the ordinary civil population from taking their place in the ranks for the defence of their country. . . . In order that there may be no misconception at all as to the stand which the Roman Catholic Church in Canada is taking, Cardinal Bégin frankly brushes democracy aside, and takes his place as the critic of democratic institutions as typified in the House of Commons in Canada. 'If,' he declares, 'we judge by the very rude knowledge revealed by certain speeches made in the Commons, one may indeed fear that some legislators, so little enlightened and maybe also somewhat ill-willed, may not make a choice that we would approve, and here is what legitimatizes all the fears.' In plain English, the Cardinal places the judgment of his Church above the decision of the House of Commons, and boldly declares that it is not the will of the nation which should prevail, but a decision of the Church of Rome as to what it may approve.

"Finally, Cardinal Bégin declares that the Roman Catholics of Canada are assured by treaties of the free practice of their religion. . . . He goes on to demand that legislation shall not be passed which is displeasing to the Roman Catholic minority, and he declares that 'no one will dare, on a matter so important and delicate, hurt the sentiments of the whole Roman Catholic population of the Dominion.' In other words, the Roman Catholic minority in Canada is to determine the policy of the country, and is to repudiate the acts in Parliament of the representatives of an entirely democratic country elected on a democratic franchise. Any failure of the majority to give way to the minority will, the Cardinal insists, 'sow, on this side of the Atlantic, the seed of the fatal religious discords that have divided the Old World.' To the average man it would seem that this is perilously near what the Cardinal is engaged in doing himself. The Roman Catholic Church in Canada is demanding privileges which it may enjoy under the governments of Austria and of Spain. . . . But Vienna is not Ottawa, nor is Madrid Toronto. If, therefore, the democratic government of Canada is not prepared to haul down its colours to him, it will be interesting to know what Cardinal Bégin proposes to do by way of obedience to the legislature of the country and of respect for law and order."

"Dying Serbia"

(Primo vivere deinde philosophare)

[Under the above heading the Journal de Genève (4 August) publishes the following article, which we commend to the attention of our readers as forming the reverse side of the medal to the many admirable verbal assurances recently made by British statesmen to Serbia.]

"In the House of Commons on 25 July Lord Robert Cecil, replying to Mr. Dillon, declared that, far from being disposed to abandon Serbia, the British Government had not the least intention of repudiating the promises already made, to the effect that Serbia

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would obtain the most complete reparation and restitution. No one doubts that such is the intention of Britain and her Allies, but will there be any Serbs left to benefit by these reparations and restitutions if nothing is done meanwhile to rescue this unhappy people, which is dying of hunger and misery, to say nothing of the ravages of war? No one knows the exact number of lives lost in Serbia, but, according to the most optimistic estimate, one quarter of the population has probably already perished owing to war, epidemics, lack of nourishment and privations of every kind. If we merely count the men, and, in particular, the educated class, the proportion would be higher. Consequently the birth-rate is bound to be reduced for many years, and of what use for purposes of re-population will be the children who have lived or may still be born under the influence of so desperate a physiological situation?

“ Serbia is not being revictualled, and her fate is a thousand times worse than that of Belgium and Northern France, whose own resources are supplemented by the abundant and generous help of the Belgian Relief Commission, while Serbia, poor to begin with, receives nothing from her Allies.* The Americans and Swiss gave Serbia some assistance last year, but this work was interrupted because the Americans themselves came into the war, and are thus cut off from Serbia, and because Switzerland, being rationed has no more food for export. . . . The Allies, in opposing the revictualing of Serbia, have resort to the argument of the blockade, which would apparently be infringed if the Serbs received something to eat. One day some gentlemen met round a green table and decided that, when a country was in the military occupation of the enemy, the latter was bound to provide for that country's needs. But these gentlemen round the green table did not foresee the possibility that this enemy might not have enough for his own subsistence. As charity begins at home, an Austrian officer was quite logical in saying one day to a Serb: ‘ If it's a case of dying of hunger, you will die first.’ Other gentlemen, who still dine every day decide to-day that, in accordance with certain established principles, the Serbs ought to feed themselves, and that the Powers who occupy their country are in duty bound to assure them the means of doing so. Let all Serbs perish rather than one principle! And if it be objected that, in spite of principles, the necessity of revictualing Belgium was recognised, there are people who will give the ‘ stoic ’ answer that the revictualing of Belgium and Northern France was a mistake. . . . ”

* While there has never been any *official* succour to Serbia, as to Belgium, it is of course to be remembered that the generosity of the British public has been perhaps unique even amid the boundless generosity called forth by the war. The Serbian Relief Fund alone has received over £450,000 in subscriptions (exclusive of enormous quantities of stores), while the Scottish Women's Hospitals and other institutions have also expended large sums in aid of the Serbs. But since Serbia has been overrun, nothing whatever has been done by the Allies for the population which remains behind, though private funds continue their work for the Serbs in exile.—
EDITOR.

Review

The Old Empire and the New: Arthur Percival Newton. (Dent.) Pp. xi + 140. 2s. 6d. net. "The desire for understanding of the Imperial problem grows daily among all classes, and it is one of the most important duties of our universities to do all that they can to satisfy this desire." These words explain the *raison d'être* of the Imperial Studies movement which has been started at London University, and of which the present book is the first fruit. It is, indeed, highly important in these days when first principles are being searched and tested that there should be as little misapprehension as possible as to what the British Empire really means. German propagandists have had a quick eye for the capital to be gained, both in their own country and in neutral, from the spectacle of the "British Empire, on which the sun never sets," fighting on the side of democracy as against imperialism. Crude generalisations have succeeded only too well in obscuring the real nature of the two principles which are in conflict in this war. If the issue is not to be confused it is imperative that hard facts should be made widely known; that the system which has been pursued, with fatal results, by the dominant powers in South Eastern Europe should be clearly distinguished from that on which has been built the spontaneous loyalty of the free members of the British Commonwealth. The full fruition of that Commonwealth of Nations has still to come, and it is therefore all the more important that the problems ahead should be clearly grasped. Dr. Newton's well-written and solid chapters are an important contribution to the study of those problems. G. G.

Economic Stress in Vienna

The economic situation in Austria-Hungary, which was known to be extremely serious for over a year past, has now reached a pitch at which little or no attempt is made to conceal it. The Austrian press fills columns with details as to the shortage of coal, soap, vegetables, fruit, boot leather and other necessaries. But far more enlightening as to the mentality which these conditions produces is a leading article in the *Vienna Zeit* of 26 August, from which we give the following extracts. The mere fact of publication is in itself significant.

"The war has taught us modesty in our methods of life. But there is a lower limit of requirements, below which even the most modest cannot sink. . . . The war has put us upon short rations, has forced us to one economy after the other, and forced back our habits of life far behind those of former generations. This took place more or less automatically: we kept on tightening our belt. . . . But, after all, there comes a moment at last in which one cannot go on cutting down and tightening one's belt, because the primitive necessity of life has been reached, and because this can no longer be put off. Man must eat, and he must also clothe himself. He need not have sweets, or oysters, or tarts or cream, he can give up roasts, and even meat; but bread and potatoes he simply

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must have, to fill his stomach. In his dress, too, he can do without all kinds of superfluities, all that is mere fashion, adornment and foppery; but a whole coat, an untorn shirt, and boots whose soles are not full of holes—these are things which are really needed and which the most modest citizen wants and must have. . . . The introduction of clothes cards are announced for an early date. The clothes card is an excellent institution for effecting economy in use and making stock last out . . . but now it is too late, because there is little material left to economise with, and few stocks to spin out. The same is true of boots and underclothing. What is still left fit for use cannot be procured by persons of the middle-class. But even usable mending material is not to be had. Torn stockings, underclothing, cannot be 'darned' . . . because there is no more darning wool. The executive ought not to have looked on helpless and inactive in face of such an exhaustion of necessary materials." Only the State can help, the writer concludes, and there must be no more mistakes and uncertain experiments.

Mr. Venizelos and Northern Epirus

In view of the refusal of Mr. Venizelos to admit the representatives of Northern Epirus to the sittings of the Chamber, it is perhaps worth while to publish his full reasons for doing so, as explained in his speech in the Chamber on 6 August. The speech is taken from *Nea Imera* (7 August):—

"The moving appeal of the deputies of Northern Epirus finds the deepest echo, not only in the hearts of the men who constitute the Chamber and the men who constitute the Government, but also in the soul of the whole of Greece. Unfortunately the criminal policy of those who succeeded the Liberal Government had as a result that Northern Epirus was deprived of the Greek occupation, which the Liberal Government had succeeded in erecting during the first months of the European War, with the concurrence not only of one of the belligerent groups and one member of the opposing belligerent combination, but with the acquiescence also of the remaining Powers of this combination. To-day, as unfortunately we possess no international title to Northern Epirus, nor even the military occupation of it, we cannot admit the deputies of Northern Epirus to this Assembly without subverting International Law and creating international complications. But while we have as yet no international title to Northern Epirus, and while we have lost the military occupation which we had set up at the beginning of the war, we have with Northern Epirus other unwritten bonds, bonds stronger even than any declaration of men and any agreement of nations. (Applause and expressions of approval.) To this section of unredeemed Hellenism the nation is bound not only by a common history of thousands of thousands of years, but, further, by racial reasons and by the firm determination of the majority of the inhabitants of that part not to cease to be Greeks and not to accept subjection to foreign rule. If any fear could arise that these bonds should not be a sufficient title for Greece to her former status, I

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think that I am justified in believing that now that Greece has taken the path pointed out to her by her history, her traditions, her Allied obligations and her vital interests; now that Greece shares in the Great European War, ready to undergo the necessary sacrifices in the common struggle; now that Greece will not be judged unheard at the Peace Conference which will follow the war, but will necessarily be represented—it is difficult for us to imagine that racial rights to Northern Epirus will be ignored (prolonged applause), inasmuch as these harmonise entirely with the aims for which the Allies are carrying on the war. I thought that it was incumbent upon me to set forth these hopes of the Liberal Government from this platform, not only that our conscience should be soothed as to the painful necessity of not admitting the deputies of Northern Epirus, but also as a message of consolation to the deputies of Northern Epirus and to the people which they represent. The Government will admit a debate on the subject if such a debate is called for by the opposite group in the House, who perhaps claim that a decision of the Chamber in opposition to the declarations of the Government should be asked for." (Applause.)

Dr. Michaelis and the Prophet Hosea

Vorwärts recently unearthed an address delivered by the present German Chancellor a few years ago to the German section of the Student Christian Movement, in which he declared that his favourite text was the verse of Hosea which runs (Hosea x, 12):—

12. *Sow to yourselves in righteousness, reap in mercy; break up your fallow ground: for it is time to seek the Lord, till He come and rain righteousness upon you.*

Verses 13 and 14 were probably too pointed even for *Vorwärts* to quote, but with their significance for present-day Germany, we find them too pregnant to miss:—

13. *Ye have plowed wickedness, ye have reaped iniquity; ye have eaten the fruit of lies; because thou didst trust in thy way in the multitude of thy mighty men.*

14. *Therefore shall a tumult arise among thy people, and all thy fortresses shall be spoiled*

A new French Periodical

The appearance of *Colonies et Marine* is welcome evidence of the increasing interest which Frenchmen now take in colonial and maritime questions; and a prosperous career is assured to it if it can avoid the pitfall into which French colonial politics nearly always fall, viz., an excessive protectionism. The first number, including a heavily censored article on submarine warfare, gives good promise of what is to come. One of the greatest services which such a journal can do to the whole Western world is to thresh out the African problem, and present a reasoned settlement which can command the assent of all moderate men.

Printed for Constable & Co., LTD., by EYRE & SPOTTISWOODE, LTD.,
His Majesty's Printers, East Harding Street, E.C. 4.

The New Europe

VOL. IV, No. 49 [REGISTERED FOR TRANSMISSION AT
THE INLAND NEWSPAPER RATE] 20 September 1917

M. Painlevé and the Socialists

AFTER a week of laborious and delicate negotiation the Painlevé Cabinet has come into being. Public opinion and the press in France have given it a reserved and lukewarm reception, but this does not really provide any clue to the probable duration of the new Cabinet, as certain journals would have us believe. Ministries which were unpopular at their birth have sometimes proved to be those which have the greatest vitality. It will be remembered that the famous Waldeck-Rousseau Cabinet formed in July 1899, was one of the longest of the Third Republic, although its opponents from the very outset declared that it would fall at the first sitting of the Chamber. Perhaps this will be the fate of the new Painlevé Cabinet. It will have to govern without the support of the Socialists and of a part of the Radicals. This constant opposition may be a source of weakness, but in view of the fact that it is only a question of a group of 180 deputies it is by no means a fatal flaw. If M. Painlevé has a devoted majority, all the more loyal because of its limited numbers, he has no reason to fear the future.

More serious is the reproach that it is a cabinet of the Right, although its chief, M. Painlevé himself, belongs to the Left. In this respect the composition of the two big committees, which are one of the innovations of his governmental system, is somewhat surprising. As a matter of fact, the new Ministry is made up of a War Committee and an Economic Committee; the members of the former are to be M. Painlevé himself, M. Ribot, M. Louis Barthou, M. Paul Doumer, and several other ministers. It is probable that the Premier will not be the absolute master of this Committee in view of the great political experience of those whom he has chosen as colleagues. On the other hand, he has consented not to be a member of the Economic Committee, over which M. Doumer is to preside. It is to be feared that under these circumstances M. Painlevé may be forced to abandon the direction of various important

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affairs to collaborators who, like M. Doumer or M. Barthou, do not represent the same shade of political opinion. Finally, one may expect that the Cabinet, for lack of support from the Left, will be obliged by force of circumstances to give a *coup de barre* (sudden turn of the rudder) to the Right in order to maintain its balance. Such an attitude is all the more probable because the Executive Committee of the Radical party has at the last moment pronounced against the constitution of a Cabinet which includes no Socialists, and for this reason has even demanded the resignation of M. René Renault, who had agreed to accept office. Attacked by the Socialists, only partially supported by the Radicals, M. Painlevé will instinctively turn for support to the Centre or even to the Right.

With these reservations it is well to examine the new situation created by the abstention of the Socialists. Their absence from the Cabinet is an event of considerable importance since they had consented to collaborate in the formation of all coalition governments since the end of August, 1914. On the other hand, this decision does not appear to be so much the result of deliberate political calculation on the part of M. Painlevé as on that of the Socialists. M. Painlevé has on several occasions given proof of his sympathy for the Socialist Party, and a few days before the formation of his Ministry he refused to enter a Ribot Cabinet which had been formed to the exclusion of the Socialists. The Socialists, on their side, are not hostile to M. Painlevé, and appear to have made up their minds, rather suddenly, to refuse their support to a Government of which M. Ribot was a member. The quarrel seems to have arisen through some clumsiness on the part of the negotiators, and should be easy of adjustment.

None the less this seemingly superficial conflict may be deeper than one thinks. It is for this reason that it deserves the attention of the Allies, who cannot remain indifferent to internal questions in France in so far as they affect the conduct of the war.

M. Albert Thomas, who since May 1915 has played such a great part at the Ministry of Munitions, did not refuse to join the new Cabinet without good reason. In his ideas he is nearer to M. Painlevé than to many French Socialists. If he has relinquished office to rejoin the ranks of his

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Socialist comrades it is because he has been forced to do so by important considerations. We will not enter here into the petty personal jealousies which his promotion to the front rank of politics has aroused in his own party. Some of his former friends have never forgiven him for having become the reorganiser of French industry, the envoy of the Republic to the Russian Revolution, the successful intermediary between Paris and London. Mere grudging ill-will of this type would not have sufficed to paralyse M. Thomas' action. He was fettered by far deeper rivalries. As a matter of fact, M. Albert Thomas appears to have left the Ministry of Munitions because he no longer felt sure of Socialist support, which had long rendered his position in the Government unassailable. He preferred rather to leave of his own free will than to provoke dissension within the ranks of the party by insisting on remaining in power. To understand the position of M. Albert Thomas to-day one must understand that of the French Socialists.

The Socialist Party to-day, despite its title of "United," falls into several groups. These schisms, latent for months past, have become apparent since the debate on the Stockholm Conference, which in France, as elsewhere, has proved the touchstone of Socialist opinion. To-day one can distinguish four sections in the French Socialist Party, or rather in the parliamentary group which represents it in the Chamber: (1) Those deputies, about 40 in number, who have pronounced outright against Stockholm and follow their leaders, MM. Guesde, Bracke, and Groussier, in parade-ground order. (2) Then follows a group of about ten members, which sways now to the Right and now to the Left, and whose oscillations are directed by the three Pilgrims of Petrograd, MM. Cachin, Moutet, and Lafont. These three deputies, who have declared outright in favour of Stockholm, and who though they did not understand the aspirations of the Russian Revolution nevertheless claimed to have interpreted them to the outside world, have never forgiven M. Albert Thomas for having laid down, in Russia itself, conditions which excluded the French Majority Socialists from participation in the international Socialist conference. (3) Further to the Left is the group of so-called Minority Socialists, numbering about 45, under the leadership of M. Jean

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Longuet, the grandson of Karl Marx, and of M. Pressemane. This group is numerically important in the French Parliament and has a large number of adherents in the organisations which it represents. Whereas all the Socialist organisations in France have seen their membership greatly diminished by mobilisation and by casualties, that of the Minority groups has increased. This surprising phenomenon can only be accounted for when one realizes that a great number of isolated leaders, anarchists and dangerous militants of every kind, have joined these organisations in order to find in them ready-made instruments for pursuing their own private propaganda. This fact accentuates still further the danger of the part played latterly by the Minority Socialists. (4) Finally, there is the tiny group of Zimmerwaldians, formed by MM. Brizon, Raffin-Dugens, and Blanc. The part they play is practically nil, although they still claim to be members of the United Socialist Party.

The same schism has been produced in the French workmen's syndicates. The *Confédération Générale du Travail* falls to-day into two groups, that of the Right being led by M. Jouhaux, that of the Left by M. Merrheim. The discord showed itself very strikingly at the recent inter-Allied conference of Trades Unions in London. The Minority claimed to be specially represented, and had appointed as its delegates MM. Merrheim, Bourderon, and Péricard. The Majority accepted the principle of special representation, but replaced the name of Péricard by that of Hélène Brion. The Minority refused to submit to this selection, although Hélène Brion is a well-known pacifist: and as the Majority refused to make any concession, M. Merrheim's partisans decided not to go to London. The unity of the syndicalist movement is quite as illusory as that of the Socialist movement in France.

In view of this situation, M. Albert Thomas, realising all the difficulties involved in his entering the Painlevé Cabinet, preferred to remain with his party and to retire from office. His future task will be to reorganise the party in order to have real authority when he returns to power. The Socialist Congress which is to meet at Bordeaux in October will give him the opportunity for this reorganisation. If it should result in throwing a pitiless light upon the internal dissensions of Socialism and restoring real unity to the party

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at the expense of sacrificing a group, then the moral force of the Left as a whole will have increased in the Chamber. If the Congress persists in aiming at an illusory unity, the unrest will continue. M. Thomas, paralysed by the Left of his party, will perhaps not be so very quick in returning to power. A dangerous propaganda will still go on under cover of the party banner, and party unity will compromise the *Union Sacrée*. Perhaps complete national solidarity is no longer possible in the fourth year of war. It can only be effective if the Socialist Left wing joins all other parties which desire to continue the war and isolates the partisans of peace at any price. These tactics might have been successfully adopted over a year ago, when three Socialists accepted the Zimmerwald invitation: the Majority leaders ought then to have excommunicated them. The schism has become more difficult to-day, but it is necessary, and on the courage of the Majority depends very largely the normal development of internal French politics.

At Bordeaux the breach between the advocates of war until reparation is secured and the advocates of peace at any price may arise over a question already debated at the London meeting. At it the Minority refused to vote anew the resolution accepted by the Inter-Allied Socialist Congress of February 1915. ("The invasion of Belgium and France by the German armies threatens the existence of nationalities and impairs the faith of treaties. Hence the victory of German Imperialism would be the defeat and destruction of democracy and liberty in Europe.") The Majority will have to bring the question up again at Bordeaux, and in the interests of the party to detach themselves formally from the Minority if it should persist in its refusal. There can be no union between men who differ as to the invasion of Belgium and France.

Clear though the path may seem to be, it is doubtful whether the Majority will have the courage to act. It must not be forgotten that some of the party leaders draw their whole authority from this division and from their personal relations with opposing groups. M. Thomas may not find effective support when he attempts the ungrateful task of peacemaker.

If the Congress of Bordeaux should leave the French Majority under the thrall of the Minority, the problem of

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Socialist participation in the Cabinet will be complicated. French public opinion, disunited on the Stockholm issue, will perhaps harden in its attitude of resentment towards those who maintain relations with the missionaries of Zimmerwald and the tacit apologists of the invasion of Belgium. M. Painlevé may be forced to continue to dispense with Socialist help and so to rely still more on the Barthou and Doumer groups.

On the other hand, those French working-class circles to whom M. Thomas' tenure of office was a guarantee against reckless governmental action will take alarm at the new political tendency. If difficulties should arise they will no longer show the conciliatory spirit which has inspired the workmen throughout the war. More than once M. Thomas' personal intervention prevented such clumsy acts of authority as the arrest of M. Merrheim, and such incidents are bound to recur. A Government which acted thus would commit itself to a policy of repression such as is perilous in time of war.

Thus the abstention of the Socialists from the Painlevé Government threatens the doctrine of the *Union Sacrée*, and this fact is specially alarming to all those who know that the Germans conceived Stockholm as a trap intended to dissociate the Socialists from their Governments. As the war drags out, Germany, who has renounced military victory, and never hoped to win by economic means, pins its hopes more and more to a moral stratagem whose success would shatter at the last moment the resistance of its enemies.

VILLEHARDOUIN.

Swedish Politics

PROBABLY no other neutral country in Europe has received so much attention from the British Press since the beginning of the war as Sweden. Before the war it was just the reverse. Except as to such English business people as were in commercial connection with the Northern kingdom, and some adventurous spirits who dared to leave the much fly-beaten track of Norwegian salmon rivers for new fields of action in the sister country, Sweden may be said to have been practically a *terra incognita* to the British mind.

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But with the war things changed quickly. People began to study maps, even large maps, in accordance with the advice of the late Lord Salisbury, and then the situation of Sweden—not only the geographical situation, but for that very reason the political situation also—became highly interesting. As so very few people knew anything about Sweden, except as the country where matches and Swedish drill came from, it became a matter of guesswork to know what position Sweden would take under the new world-shaking conditions.

In the very first days, when everything was in the melting pot, the boiling of which had been started by the Central Powers, there were certainly many Swedes who did not know themselves. One thing, however, was certain, and in the minds of many Swedes ominous, and that was the fact that the two Western democracies, to whom the Northern democracy had always looked for light and leading, were going to fight side by side with the Russian Bear, whose menacing paws had on several occasions been stretched forth within reach of the Swedish capital. But the then Swedish Government took at once the only correct and possible action. In conjunction with the Norwegian and Danish Governments, it declared for a strict and impartial neutrality towards all the belligerents—a declaration to which not only the overwhelming majority of the Swedish nation gave its unqualified support, but which also seems to have met with approval from both the belligerent groups. And in spite of certain incidents, both at earlier stages of the war and quite recently, which have caused a good deal of comment, sometimes justified and sometimes less so—incidents to which we shall return later—it cannot be said that Sweden has deviated from the path of neutrality in such a way as to justify the abuse that from time to time has been heaped upon her.

Great Britain has, perhaps naturally enough, only taken an interest in matters where she considered herself placed at a disadvantage; but those who know might tell a tale about the fury of the Germans over actions, on the part of Sweden, supposed by the Central Powers to be solely in the interest of the Entente and therefore highly unneutral. Be it said at once that almost all those actions on the part of Sweden which have caused annoyance in Great Britain

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were of a commercial nature, and that many of them caused a good deal of anger amongst the Swedes themselves.

The Argentine cable incident, the latest and most serious item in the catalogue, is a thing that stands quite apart, and it may be said at once that there is not the slightest doubt about the feeling of the Swedish nation with regard to this most regrettable occurrence. But even with regard to the earlier controversial matters, the nation as a whole has certainly not been at one with her Government.

There are some popular sayings which have been so often quoted that very few dare to question their literal truth. One of these is that a people has the Government it deserves.

To understand the real position in Sweden, and how it came about that the Cabinet of Mr. Hammarskjöld was in power when the war broke out and could, in spite of its being supported only by a minority in Parliament, remain in power until April this year, requires a little retrospect in modern Swedish political history.

The Swedish Parliament, the Riksdag, consists of two Chambers. The Second is the popular elected Chamber, and has 230 members elected directly by the voters upon a fairly wide franchise. The First Chamber, or Upper House, consists of 150 members, elected by the town councils and county councils, the elections to which bodies rest upon a property qualification, giving even as many as forty votes to higher incomes. Naturally enough this property qualification makes the Upper House a Conservative stronghold, and the abolition of this qualification is one of the principal planks in the platforms of the Socialist and Liberal parties during the present elections in Sweden. It is further to be noticed that an ordinary bill, private or governmental, has to be passed by both Houses to become law, but that in case of financial matters, if the Houses come to different decisions, a new vote is taken, where the "ayes" in both Houses and the "noes" in both Houses are added together. It will therefore be understood that a Government must have a majority in both Houses if it wants to pass its ordinary bills, and that, at all events, to be able to carry its Budgets it must have a strong minority in the Upper House to add to its majority in the Lower House, or *vice versâ*, according to its political colour.

In 1911 the triennial elections to the Second Chamber

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brought in the Liberal party as the strongest, and its leader, the late Mr. Karl Staaff, formed a Cabinet, being apparently assured of the support of the Socialist party, which gave him a decisive majority when both Houses voted together on the Budget. One of the first questions which he had to take in hand was the solution of the problem of national defence, the rock on which so many Swedish Cabinets have been wrecked. In spite of very far-reaching proposals, both with regard to expenses and increased time of military service, his plans did not seem to meet with approval in militarist circles, and the result was a rupture between the Cabinet and the Crown, which in this matter sided with the military. Things came to a head when the political opponents of Mr. Staaff organised a gigantic peasant procession from all parts of the country to the Royal Palace in Stockholm, where the spokesmen asked the King for an immediate solution of the defence problem in the direction demanded by the military experts. The agitation for this somewhat irregular way of attaining the object in view had been fanned by the fear of an aggressive attack from Sweden's Eastern neighbour. A great number of Russian spies had been recently detected in different parts of the country under circumstances which left no doubt about their designs; and the then Russian military *attaché* in Stockholm was so deeply implicated in these affairs that he had to leave the country. The notorious Sven Hedin, assisted by stars of lesser magnitude, traversed the country trying to rouse the people and put them on their guard against the threatening Russian danger. Mr. Staaff and his Cabinet resigned and, after several unsuccessful attempts by the Crown to form a moderate Liberal Cabinet, a Conservative Cabinet was formed, with Mr. Hammarskjöld as Prime Minister and an untried political force, the banker Mr. Wallenberg, as Minister for Foreign Affairs. Parliament was dissolved and, thanks to a not very dignified campaign on the part of the opponents of Mr. Staaff, a campaign in which the Liberal leader was belied and vilified in the most outrageous way, the Liberal party lost many seats to the Conservatives. But the Socialists also increased their numbers. According to the Constitution the ordinary triennial elections had still to take place during the autumn of 1914, the occurrences related above having taken

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place in the early part of the same year. The election campaign for the autumn elections was just beginning when the world-war broke out. It is almost certain that under ordinary circumstances a Liberal-Socialist Government would have been the result of these autumn elections, as the parties were returned in the following numbers : 87 Socialists, 86 Conservatives, and 57 Liberals.

But under pressure of the common danger a kind of domestic truce was declared, Mr. Hjalmar Branting, the leader of the Socialist party, taking the initiative by promising in his first election speech his and his party's support to Mr. Hammarskjöld's Government in their policy of strict and impartial neutrality. Mr. Staaff also gave his support, and a compromise was arrived at with regard to the defence question. There are many political observers in Sweden who consider that this magnanimity on the part of the Liberals and the Socialists was mistaken, and that the formation of a Coalition Cabinet in which all three parties were represented ought to have been insisted upon at once. The presence in the Cabinet of Mr. Branting and Mr. Staaff and some of their colleagues might have prevented several acts on the part of the self-sufficient Mr. Hammarskjöld which have caused a good deal of trouble and unpleasantness in Sweden's relations towards the Entente Powers. But it is very easy to be wise after the event. Certainly both Mr. Branting and Mr. Staaff acted with the best intentions, hoping by their action to be able to show a united Swedish nation in support of an impartial policy of neutrality.

The first difficulty with which the Liberal and the Socialist leaders had to contend was to bring Mr. Hammarskjöld to express his public disapproval of the agitation carried on by the so-called Activists, a group of maniacs, few in numbers, but noisy in expression and not without a certain influence in important circles, who demanded that Sweden should join Germany in the fight against Russia. These people had a good deal of more or less half-hearted support in a certain section of the press, and they undoubtedly created abroad an erroneous impression of the real feelings of the Swedish nation ; but at last the pressure of the opposition parties was successful, and the Activists had to retire from the stage.

Then came all the difficulties occasioned by the blockade,

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which gave rise to so many controversies between the Swedish and British Governments. There is no doubt that in the beginning of the war a good deal of foodstuff, as well as other commodities, was exported to Germany from Sweden, as well as from the other Scandinavian countries; but probably still more was exported to Russia, and the export of things Great Britain used to get from Sweden was continued. Enormous profits were made by individuals in Sweden, not always of Swedish nationality, but just as often from Germany and the Baltic provinces. As the war continued and article after article was declared contraband, export prohibitions were issued, but it is undoubtedly true that licences for export were granted without due consideration to the effect likely to be produced in England. As a result the Swedish nation itself found it increasingly difficult to obtain commodities necessary for the maintenance of her agriculture and industry, and at the same time there was a growing dissatisfaction on the part of Great Britain. Two distinct attempts to arrive at a general understanding with England through a commercial agreement failed mainly on account of the attitude of Mr. Hammarskjöld. His training as an international lawyer prevented him from seeing matters in the light of practical politics, as they had to be looked upon under the circumstances then obtaining. Matters came to a climax early this year, when the Swedish negotiators for a commercial agreement returned from London and could not get Mr. Hammarskjöld to accept the proposal they put before him. The unrestricted U-boat campaign had just then begun, and Sweden was in very great need of many important commodities. The discontent with the Hammarskjöld Cabinet, which for a long time had been very great among the working classes, spread to industrial and commercial circles, and Mr. Hammarskjöld found it necessary to tender his resignation to the King. The discontent in parliamentary circles had also been very great, not least on account of the aloofness of the Government in their dealings with Parliament.

A new Cabinet was formed, but not, as might have been expected, either a Liberal-Socialist Coalition Government or even a Coalition Government formed by all the three parties, but a purely Conservative one. This Cabinet, which still holds office to-day, has Mr. Carl Swartz for its

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Premier and Admiral Arvid Lindman, a former Conservative Prime Minister, for its Minister for Foreign Affairs. This Government, however, took up quite a different position, both with regard to their relations with the parliamentary parties and other matters, from that of the Hammarskjöld Cabinet. On the strength of this it received the support of the opposition parties pending the results of the elections now going on. Although no general agreement with Great Britain was concluded, it is quite certain that several separate agreements were made with regard to the imports of necessities, and among other matters it should be noted that one cause of irritation to the Entente was removed by the opening of the Kogrund passage in the southern part of the Sound, which had been closed by the Hammarskjöld Government to all save Swedish traffic. This released a great number of British ships, which had been practically interned in the Baltic.

Certainly matters were made more difficult for Sweden by the entrance of America into the war, and by the latter's unwillingness to ship any grain or other necessities to Sweden except under very stringent guarantees. But nevertheless it would certainly have been possible to make a satisfactory arrangement, if the so-called Argentine disclosures had not complicated the situation. It is quite easy to understand the anger of both America and the Entente Powers—to say nothing of Argentine; but at the moment of writing there is not sufficient material at hand to place the guilt where it is really due. There is not the slightest doubt that the Swedish Minister at Buenos Aires has acted with culpable negligence in transmitting cipher telegrams from the German Minister there, especially when he ought not to have been ignorant of the acts committed by German representatives in other capitals. It is also obvious that some official in the Swedish Foreign Office must be greatly to blame for the same kind of action, but the Swedish nation as a whole cannot be blamed for it. They have had no knowledge of what has been going on, and they have had no power to interfere. They are now in the midst of general elections, but the whole election campaign was practically over when the disclosures were made. It is, therefore, possible that these disclosures will not be able to influence the result very materially. But so

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much can be taken almost for granted, that both the Liberals and the Socialists, especially the latter, will gain many seats and gain them from the Conservatives. And if—as may be supposed—an understanding can be arrived at between Liberals and Socialists, a Coalition Government formed by these two parties may come into power, probably with Mr. Branting as Prime Minister. In any case, Mr. Branting will play a prominent part in Swedish politics in the near future, just as he has done during the whole time of the war. He has never concealed his sympathies towards the Entente, and nobody has more clearly expressed his abhorrence of the crime committed by Germany when she violated the neutrality of Belgium, and of the crimes she has continually committed during her warfare. But it is equally certain that nobody in Sweden is more eager to maintain the neutrality of the country than he: and in this he certainly has the support of the overwhelming majority of the Swedish nation. Nor is there the slightest doubt that he also has the support of practically the entire Swedish nation in expressing his indignation at the part played by Swedish officials in the Argentine incident. The Swedes, like most nations, may have many faults, but they are not inclined towards treachery. It may be taken for granted that they will not rest satisfied until the suspicion that they have in any way connived at such underhand dealings is removed.

A NEUTRAL.

Russia's Need for Unity

THE recent crisis in Russia centred round the figures of Kerenski and Kornilov. In a previous article we declared that it was only by an agreement between these two dominating personalities that Russia could be saved, that any attempt to separate them would be the "prelude to a civil war that would be the undoing of Russia and would spell disaster to the future of Europe." We hoped that Kornilov would have refused the offices of those who whispered in his ear that he *alone* could save Russia, that the Provisional Government in the hands of Kerenski was incapable of decisive action. But those who planned the intrigue that carried Kornilov off the path of his duty as the General of the Revolution, were ready to make use of a military disaster

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for the sake of their own advancement. They knew that Riga would fall, not because the Provisional Government denied them the military powers that were necessary, but because the Germans had concentrated masses of artillery on what the Russians recognised as the weakest part of their line. They knew, too, that the Russian troops at Riga had fought with all their old determination, and that the fears of a German advance on Petrograd were groundless, but they did not hesitate through their agents in Petrograd to flood the capital with alarmist news. The Government Commissary at the front denied the reports that Headquarters had circulated, but in the midst of the discussion General Kornilov launched his ultimatum.

Monday, 10 September—the day of the ultimatum—was the blackest day in the history of the Revolution. We had watched Kornilov at Moscow and had not expected such a stab in the back to a Government that was known to be grappling with unheard-of difficulties. Under pressure from Savinkov, Minister of War, Kerenski had restored the death penalty both at the front and in the rear; and on the question of Government Commissaries with the army, an agreement was not far distant. What, then, was the explanation of this sudden ultimatum from the Commander-in-Chief? In England and France there was a tendency not to look for an explanation at all, not to enquire into the rights and wrongs of the crisis. Kerenski was branded as a mere talker, full of good intentions but vacillating—his services to Russia were swept aside in a moment; whereas Kornilov stood for order and the prosecution of the war. There were few who stood firm to their principles, forgetting that it was on the question of principle that Russia herself would decide. The appeal to “order,” which was all that Kornilov could offer, had not the magical effect that many people here expected on a population which under this same word “order” has been oppressed for generations. People in Russia have a great longing for order, but it is for a new order of their own making; and it is what helps the speedy establishment of the new order that helps the prosecution of the war.

The explanation of Kornilov's ultimatum is to be sought in the intrigues of those who surrounded him. Everything goes to show that General Lukomski, Chief of Staff, was

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the ringleader. General Lukomski is a product of the old bureaucratic Petrograd, where earlier in the war he served as Secretary of the War Office. Well versed in political intrigues, he seems to have gathered round him at Headquarters those discontented politicians who saw their own advancement in the defeat of the Revolution. We cannot but believe that Kornilov was deceived by them and made to believe that Kerenski had sold his soul to the Maximalists in Petrograd; for Kornilov's proclamation rings true, and his whole career in the past has been one of loyalty and devotion to Russia. We have little doubt that Kornilov is prepared to stand his trial and abide by the consequences, but we have as little doubt that Kerenski, the first Minister of Justice under the Revolution, will show the same justice to his new opponent as he showed to his enemies of the old *régime*.

It is difficult to trace the course of events in Petrograd. There seems little doubt that the ultimatum took Kerenski entirely unawares, but his reply came with lightning rapidity. His own position was one of extraordinary difficulty. His Government was not a strong one; in name a Coalition, it had little support from the parties it was supposed to represent. A successful general was marching on Petrograd, the Cossacks were in revolt, the generals whom the Government had nominated to succeed Kornilov had gone over to the other side. Kerenski's only haven of refuge seemed the C.W.S.D., but that by itself was a broken reed. The population of Petrograd was not to be relied upon; it was rife with discontent, and the food ration had just been reduced. The entire responsibility lay on Kerenski's shoulders, his Cabinet having resigned to leave him a free hand. Kerenski, allied with the C.W.S.D., could offer little resistance to Kornilov's rapidly advancing troops.

It was in these circumstances that Miljukov and Alexeiev appeared to intervene. We do not know for certain whose was the guiding hand. Kerenski, in apparent alliance with the Maximalists—the leaders of the July riots had been released from prison—seemed further removed than ever from Miljukov. Moreover, Alexeiev had been the first general to suffer at the hands of the C.W.S.D. At first Kerenski hesitated. How was he to face the C.W.S.D. if he reconciled himself to those whom the latter had proclaimed its enemies? There must have been some strong

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influence behind Kerenski to effect the reconciliation, and we may not be far wrong in suspecting the influence of Savinkov, Minister of War. It is no secret that Savinkov is one of the outstanding figures of the Revolution, and that Alexeiev was his choice as Chief of Staff in place of Lukomski.

Savinkov has spent his life in the cause of the Revolution. He is reported to have been connected with the assassination of Plehve, Minister of the Interior, and of the Grand Duke Serge, and his hand was also in the mutinies of the Black Sea Fleet in 1905. After 1905 he escaped to Paris, where he remained until the outbreak of the war, with intervals at Nice and in Italy. During the early part of the war he acted as a War Correspondent on the French front, working hand in hand with Plehanov and Avksentiev on their paper *Prizyv* in Paris. Together with them he went to Russia after the Revolution and for some time past he has worked with Kerenski at the Ministry of War. Like Kerenski, he is a Social Revolutionary in politics, but does not belong to the extreme wing of the party, of which the sinister Černov is the champion.

The appointment of Alexeiev made the victory of the Government certain; if it meant Kerenski's triumph, it also meant the triumph of Savinkov. The strain of those few days must have taxed Kerenski's nervous powers to the utmost, and in spite of his volcanic energy in times of crisis, he will need a strong hand and a stout heart to support him in the future. If Savinkov is prepared to step into the place of his friend and colleague when the time comes, he will play the part without faltering. It remains to be seen what part he will play for the present, but those who have followed his career know that he has the temperament and the daring of a leader, and that no Government whose motto is action can go long without his services.

With Alexeiev in command, Kerenski is for the moment free to occupy himself entirely with political questions. It rests with him now to reform his Coalition on a broader basis. Having put down rebellion on the Right, he must deal with similar attempts on the part of the extreme Left. Russia was saved from civil war by the good sense of her own people. We trust that the same good sense will lead to a Coalition, established on a sufficiently broad basis to

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include Cadets and Socialists alike. Kerenski himself recognises the necessity of this still more forcibly since the Kornilov episode. The nation has been stirred to its depths, and out of the depths a strong national Government must arise. Though temperamentally the Cadets are far removed from the Socialists, yet this is the moment when men of every temperament are needed. Temperament alone is not enough for the work of construction that lies ahead. It may be a quality in which the Cadets are lacking, but no one can deny their ability and experience. At a recent meeting of the Cadet party one of their members declared: "The Cadet party is the brain of the country. The whole of intellectual Russia is in our party." To which another deputy, from the South of Russia, replied: "It is all very well to be the brain, but let our party also be the heart of the country. Let the revolutionary temperament of the country also be in our party." Kerenski, on the other hand, possesses this quality in a supreme degree; he has experienced the "iron discipline of a revolutionary party." In him one feels the ardour and the throbbing of real life. Let him therefore take the helm while the Cadets help to pull the oars.

If the Cadets are to join the Government there can be no further trifling with the extreme elements on the Left. The weakness of the former Government was that it refused to act decisively against the Maximalist leaders in spite of the published proofs of their guilt. Among Socialists Maximalism is a question of temperament, and there are Maximalists in every country; but in Russia these men have been led by what can only be described as a handful of adventurers, with whom *agents provocateurs* of the old *régime* have associated themselves. It is impossible to have any sympathy with men who are willing to act as agents of an enemy Government, or even to consort with men whom they know to be suspected. The C.W.S.D. must purge itself of those whom it knows to be dishonest, for otherwise they run a grave risk of compromising the Revolution in its most ideal aspects. With the rest we can have sympathy, though we disagree with their methods. Democracy in Russia has triumphed and a Republic has been proclaimed; if the C.W.S.D. is to be the organ of Russian democracy, it must first set its own house in order.

17 September.

RURIK.

Enemy Portraits : (IV) Baron Kühlmann

THE Press-Bureau of the German Foreign Office has once more found a chief worthy of the great days which live in the pages of Busch's Bismarck: and there are already abundant signs of a new and more artistic interpretation of its functions. The marionettes already foot it less clumsily across the stage, the wires are less visible now that the footlights are discreetly dimmed, and the directing hands have altogether a lighter touch. Yet those of us who have studied continental zoology with especial reference to the reptile section, are not likely to be deceived by such obvious stage management. The bleating of the lamb cannot conceal the roaring of the beast of prey, the true woodman will not be fooled by the call of the decoy: and though the *Deutsche Tageszeitung* be occasionally suppressed, or the *Vorwärts* granted a lengthier tether, we shall still be able to detect an underlying method in the universe of Wolff. The great "British Peace" hoax is a very typical piece of rehearsing. At first sight it may seem to our public unduly crude, though even here our sensational press is providing the advertisement which its authors desired, and forcing the minds of many to revert to a subject which the collapse of the Stockholm idea was leading them to lay aside for the first time for many months. But it is from the standpoint of internal German consumption that this elaborate hoax must be judged: and here Luther's famous motto "*Pecca fortiter*" has been fearlessly employed. There is no surer device, they argue, for obscuring the true situation and preventing the spread of pessimism at home than to impute to the enemy the very fears, the very loosening of fibre, which it is increasingly difficult to conceal among their own population.

The new German Foreign Secretary is a dangerous adversary, as the number of his pre-war dupes in London and the outcome of his underground activities in Stockholm, the Hague, and Constantinople, amply attest: and in his new office he acquires added importance from the fact that he is working for a Chancellor who is absolutely without experience in foreign politics, and is therefore likely to be dependent upon a lieutenant who knows the continent from end to end, and has to justify his rapid advancement by practical proofs of wisdom and ability.

Richard von Kühlmann is not a Prussian, but a South

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German, who in his own family typifies the transition from the old Germany to the new. His father, who as a young man was a keen adherent of the Liberal party in Bavaria, afterwards became a pioneer of German industrial expansion, and spent many years at Constantinople as director of the Anatolian Railways. His mother was a daughter of the minor poet Baron Oskar von Redwitz who had many close connections with Austria and lived latterly in retirement in a villa at Meran. Thus his parents brought him the double gift of a practical business outlook and an artistic temperament. Born in 1873 at Constantinople, he grew up in an atmosphere surcharged with political intrigue and subterfuge, in the happy hunting ground of would-be students of old-world diplomacy. His first post was at Tangier and coincided with the eventful visit of William II. Indeed, if rumour speaks true, he played no small part in making up his Imperial master's mind when a mild groundswell from the Atlantic was being quoted as an excuse for not landing. His part in this and in the later Casablanca affair seems to have favourably impressed Kühlmann's superiors, and after short periods of service at the Hague and Washington, he was sent in 1908 as First Secretary to the London Embassy. Here he worked for the six years preceding the war, devoting great energy to the study of English conditions, and feeling the pulse of parliamentary and above all journalistic circles. In this he was remarkably successful up to a certain point. He had about him something of the breezy tone which his predecessor Kiderlen-Wächter affected. But what in the latter was the downright, slow-moving, rather gross quality which the Germans themselves describe as *Schwerfälligkeit*, is in the former little more than a deliberate mannerism intended to cover his real feelings and to throw both his adversary and acquaintance off the scent. Kühlmann's bluff geniality, his accessibility and his familiar tone towards the newsman or the *arriviste*, all mark him out as the *faux bonhomme* who requires constant watching. "My ambassadors," said Bismarck, "have to change front like non-commissioned officers," and Kühlmann knew his drill to perfection. But to him was assigned the subtler rôle of watching his own chief and keeping headquarters supplied with secret information which could only be acquired through subterranean channels. His thorough knowledge of Turkey stood him in

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good stead during the negotiations concluded in London in the eighteen months preceding the war, which resulted in the Bagdad and African agreements between Britain and Germany. It would be interesting to know what were his views of the negotiators against whom he found himself pitted, and what were his relations with Hakki Pasha and other Young Turks party to the discussion. And all the time his indirect influence upon events in Ireland was far greater than we as yet have any perception. During the war he has been known to boast to neutrals of his conquests in high political circles in London, and there are good reasons for suspecting that he has long maintained his own line of approach to London, if, indeed, he has lost it even now. Meanwhile, at home, he is sometimes decried as an Anglophile—a fact which he appears to regard more as an asset than as a handicap.

Psychology is a science which the Germans mightily affect, but in the application of which they are peculiarly deficient. In it Herr von Kühlmann poses as an adept, and though his successes lack that inner flame which burns upon the altar of true knowledge, they serve at any rate as the jets which light up a low-class thoroughfare. "Official diplomatic relations" (with the enemy), he said in his inaugural speech to the Reichstag, "are of course broken off, but the stream of public opinion flows even across the frontiers drawn by trenches and cannon. Our newspapers flit across to the enemy's country, those of the enemy are studied here, every word that we speak here or that is said in a responsible quarter in Germany, however confidentially, reaches our enemy in one form or another. . . The study of the psychology of our enemies, of the changing currents of public opinion, is also an important duty, lest we should, at a moment when all is hard, stiff, and unbending, stretch out our hand and hope to produce an effect by soft words, or lest, when on the other side the ice is melting and a more conciliatory mood sets in, we should break in with a harsh word. We must keep touch, blade to blade" (*Wir müssen ihnen an der Klinge halten*).

We are the first to welcome a good phrase from the mouth of an enemy. Herr von Kühlmann shall have his wish. We shall keep blade to blade, in diplomacy as in war.

Further Montenegrin Revelations

FRESH revelations regarding the attitude of the Montenegrin Royal House are published in the *Gazette de Lausanne* of 30 August by the Montenegrin ex-Premier, Mr. Andrew Radović, whose memoranda to the King in favour of Jugoslav unity were published in No. 42 of THE NEW EUROPE ("Recent Montenegrin History").

Mr. Radović begins by defending himself against the calumnies of his opponents, one of whom was an accomplice of the Austrian police spy, Nastić, in the iniquitous Cetinje treason trial of 1905, by which Nicholas rid himself of Radović and other champions of progressive and constitutional government in Montenegro. He meets the reproach of having taken office last year under the Monarch, against whom he now makes such grave accusations, by affirming that it was only during his actual tenure of office that he learnt the true facts. He then enumerates the following very concrete charges:—

" 1. That the interview between Prince Peter and Colonel Hupka, the former Austrian military attaché at Cetinje, took place without the knowledge of the members of the Government (a point which I only learnt in November, 1916, from an absolutely authentic source).

" 2. That Prince Peter on that occasion proposed the health of Francis Joseph, as he himself has admitted to me.

" 3. That the Montenegrin Consul-General in Milan, Mr. Carminatti, did actually conduct negotiations at Lugano, as special envoy of Crown Prince Danilo, with Count Bernsdorf (*sic*) of the Deutsche Bank, as delegate of the Central Powers. This was admitted to me by Mr. Carminatti himself, who added that, in the event of the negotiations being successful, a sum of five million marks had been promised.

" 4. That Crown Prince Danilo had sent this proposal in writing to King Nicholas, through Mr. Alexa Martinović, a month before the catastrophe.

" 5. That neither the King nor Prince Danilo had informed the Allies on the subject of this proposal.

" 6. That the truth of these facts was admitted to me by Prince Danilo in person.

" 7. That immediately after the occupation (of Montenegro), according to the evidence of Mr. Rentis, Greek *Chargé*

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d' Affaires at Cetinje, an interview took place between him and Colonel Hupka, confirming the existence of these negotiations with Count Bernsdorf, and their serious character.

"8. That Prince Peter did actually have the Bulgarian hymn played, as he admitted to me himself, under the pretext that this hymn was part of a *pot pourri*. He explained the fact of having had the Austrian hymn played by its resemblance to the British National Anthem (*sic!*).

"9. That among those who remain in Montenegro, and have been in a position to know a great deal, there exists the conviction that there was treachery.

"10. That King Nicholas and his sons, as may be gathered from the resignation of Mr. Janko Spasojević, resolutely opposed Serb national union, making it known that this union could not be realised without the extermination of one of the two Serbian dynasties.

"11. That Prince Peter would prefer to become a vassal prince of the Austrian Emperor rather than prince in a Serbian State whose king was a Karageorgević. This he stated to me personally on the eve of my resignation."

In conclusion, Mr. Radović quotes a sensational extract from the letter addressed to King Nicholas on 20 May, 1916, by the Montenegrin Premier, Mr. Lazar Miuškovic, on his resignation. "It is you, with your family and your camarilla, who have brought Montenegro to its present bankruptcy, and not the policy of no matter what government, since the first day of your reign. The proofs of this are the interviews of your son, Prince Peter, with Colonel Hupka, the negotiations of the hereditary Prince Danilo, through the intermediary of Mr. Carminatti with Count Bernsdorf, agent of the Central Powers, and many other mistakes which I need not quote. I am persuaded that all these mistakes of your family and camarilla, and even my own, are not to be attributed to the Serbian people of Montenegro, who have never failed in their national duty, and have made so many sacrifices for the realisation of Serbian ideas. Consequently, I am convinced that this people will find men who will not allow it to be held responsible for the crimes of others, and that it will enter without stain into the Serbian community, as it well deserves after a struggle of centuries for the deliverance and union of the Serbian people." Mr. Radović is fully justified in

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emphasising the importance of this letter from the best known of recent Montenegrin statesmen, a man who was his own political opponent, and therefore cannot be suspected of sympathy or collusion with him personally. Mr. Miušković, it should be added, represented Montenegro at the Balkan Peace Conferences in London in 1912 and 1913, and was also Premier during the critical period of the Austrian conquest of Montenegro. He has always been known for his devotion to the dynasty.

Naturally enough the enemies of Yugoslav unity have not been idle in spreading calumnies about Mr. Radović and his movement. They have even succeeded in inducing one of the most reputable Roman journals to give currency to the view that he was justly condemned in the infamous Cetinje treason trial, and that his wife (who, with a number of other Montenegrin ladies, was allowed to pass through Austria to Switzerland after the Austrian conquest) received a sum of 250,000 francs from the Viennese authorities. It is the same method which was employed at an earlier stage against the Yugoslav Committee, who, as was pointed out in THE NEW EUROPE at the time (No. 5), were denounced as in the pay of that Austrian Government which had condemned its members to death for treason and confiscated their property, until they met the charge by publishing the sources of their income.

It will interest and amuse our readers to learn that for many months past similar tactics have been employed by certain jackals of the Italian "nationalist" movement, with regard to ourselves. These individuals have devoted themselves to spreading in London the impudent calumny that THE NEW EUROPE is financed in the interests of Austria! Needless to say, such methods do not find a fruitful soil in England, even in war time, and responsible Italians are well aware of the comic nature of the charge, which merely reflects upon its authors. We shall not pay them the compliment of alluding to them by name, but we suggest to their employers that such a mentality is not the best equipment for propagandist work in England. Our people are either too stupid or too honest to swallow readily the Machiavellian argument that those who are the most uncompromising advocates of the dismemberment of Austria are, in reality, its corrupt and secret champions.

Zimmerwald and Kienthal

[The Socialist meetings at Zimmerwald and Kienthal passed almost unnoticed at the time, and even now that these hitherto obscure names have become political watchwords, there is still very general ignorance as to their meaning. The following account forms part of an article published in the Vienna Zeit of 19 August last, by Herr Bernstein, the German Minority Socialist leader.]

“The International Socialist Commission, whose permanent seat is in Berne, but which for some months past has also had a bureau in Stockholm, owes its origin to an International Socialist Conference which was held early in September 1915 at Zimmerwald, in Canton Berne, with the purpose of preparing some international Socialist action for ending the war, until such time as the International Socialist Bureau, which had been established before the war by the International Socialist Congresses, or its permanent Executive Committee, should take the matter seriously in hand. The Commission, therefore, was not originally conceived as a rival to the International Socialist Bureau, and in one of the declarations issued by the Zimmerwald Conference it is expressly stated that it was only intended to fill the temporary gap which had arisen through the Bureau's inability or unwillingness to act.

“But things did not stop there. If the Zimmerwald Conference, although attended chiefly by Socialists who were in opposition to the official Socialist parties in Belgium, Germany and France, refrained from direct polemics, and only breathed criticism through the spirit of its resolutions, that of Kienthal, held also in Switzerland at the end of April, 1916, by Socialists who grouped themselves round the Zimmerwald Commission, adopted a much sharper, and at times a directly hostile tone against the leaders of the official parties, as indeed against all Socialists who had not gone into uncompromising opposition to the Governments of their respective countries. There was a clearly marked tendency at Kienthal to set up the International Socialist Commission of Berne, whose secretary and moving spirit was the Swiss Socialist member of Council, Robert Grimm, in opposition to the International Socialist Bureau, and more especially to the Dutch Commission at The Hague, which represented it for the time. In the resolutions of the Kienthal Conference the conflict between the policies of the Socialist Parliamentary majorities in the countries mentioned above, and that of the English Labour party, assumes a much more acute form than in those of the Zimmerwald Conference, and as the former have rather the character of a definite programme, it would really be more correct to describe the Socialists who group themselves round the Berne Commission as being of the Kienthal persuasion. But party labels are a law unto themselves, and so the name of Zimmerwald remains

“At the same time there were at Kienthal, as previously at Zimmerwald, sharp differences of opinion with regard to the direction and limits of Socialist intransigence. To go into them in detail here

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would lead us too far afield. The mere fact that three or four distinct grades of Russian Socialists—Bolsheviki, radical Mensheviki, Social Revolutionaries and Moderate Mensheviki—were represented, as well as two opposition Polish parties and several fragments of the German Social Democratic opposition, which differed widely among themselves, made it impossible for any unanimous conclusion to be reached, except to the extent of establishing a fundamental principle of opposition to any weakening of class-warfare in the interests of national defence. The *Union Sacrée* of France was as energetically repudiated as the party truce proclaimed in Germany. Class warfare as opposed to any co-operation whatsoever with bourgeois Governments or parties in the interest of the State—such, in a word, is the policy laid down by the Conferences of Zimmerwald and Kienthal as the only right and true one for all Socialists.

“This necessarily entails the abandonment of all distinctions between Governments and parties, both with regard to the origin of the war and to war-aims; which, however, does not mean that all such distinctions are inadmissible. But they are treated as being to no practical purpose. In all the resolutions and declarations of the Zimmerwald-Kienthal combination the whole responsibility for the war is thrown simply upon Capitalism, which follows Imperialistic tendencies, and is represented by all Governments and bourgeois parties alike. Undisturbed by their explanations, undisturbed by the actual war situation, all Socialist parties are to wage revolutionary war against the Government of their country, to refuse all war-credits and war-supplies, and, with the battle-cry of ‘Down with the War!’ to demand ‘immediate peace without annexations.’

“This does not, however, mean that the Socialist proletariat should remain indifferent to the political effects of peace upon the various States. On the contrary, in the resolution of the Kienthal Conference dealing with the attitude of the proletariat towards peace terms, they are urged to ‘defend themselves by class-warfare against all forms of national oppression, to oppose all exploitation of the weaker nations, and to demand the safeguarding of national minorities and the autonomy of all peoples upon the broadest democratic basis.’ But this is to happen on the basis of indiscriminating class-warfare against all Governments and all parties connected with them. The idea that useful work in the cause of universal peace might be done, even before the overthrow of Capitalism, by the creation of national and international machinery, is challenged more than once.

“Thus in section 5 we find: ‘The plans for removing the danger of war by the limitation of armaments and by compulsory arbitration are merely Utopian. They assume the existence of some universally recognised law, and of some material Power which stands above the clashing interests of States. No such Law and no such Power exist, nor will Capitalism, whose tendency is to aggravate the differences between the bourgeoisies of different countries, allow it to come into existence. . . Democratic control of foreign policy presupposes a complete democratisation of the State. Such control

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can only be a weapon against Imperialism, but in no way a means of converting diplomacy into an instrument of peace.'

"It is quite in accordance with this point of view that the specifically pacifist movement should be repudiated in section 6 as follows: 'On these grounds the working-class must refuse the Utopian demands of bourgeois or Socialist pacifism. The pacifists conjure up new illusions in place of the old ones, and endeavour to enlist the proletariat in their service; but this can only end in the masses being led astray and diverted from revolutionary class-warfare, to the advantage of the "See-it-through" politicians.'

"Following up the same train of thought, section 11 lays down the principle that the proletariat in their revolutionary class-warfare for the Socialist cause must not merely fight against the lust for annexation of the belligerents, but also against 'all attempts to create, under the flag of the liberation of oppressed nationalities, States which would be ostensibly independent, but in reality entirely lacking in vitality.' It is true that the proletariat does not wage its war against annexations, 'because it considers that the map of the world as it was before the war corresponded with the interests of the peoples, and must, therefore, remain unaltered.' Socialism itself strives for 'the overthrow of every kind of national oppression through the economic and political union of all peoples on a democratic basis.' But such a union 'can never be achieved within the framework of capitalistic State boundaries.'

"Thus, although the Zimmerwalder are not in favour of the restoration of the *status quo*, they repudiate both any policy of annexation and also the creation of new independent States belonging to the smaller nationalities as a part of the present capitalistic social order. On the other hand, they decline to throw the political weight of the working-classes into the scale, either for or against any peace on the basis of terms obtainable to-day, in so far as this might conflict with the agitation for immediate peace. *One can deduce from this that it is a matter of indifference to them to whose advantage, of the two groups of Powers, such a peace would be, and what its immediate effect upon the political conformation of Europe: and such deductions have actually been made by sympathisers with the Zimmerwald movement.* The Socialist of Galician origin, who writes under the name of Karl Radek, maintains them in his essays almost to the utmost limit, and the attitude hitherto adopted by the Russian Socialist, Uliamov-Lenin, differs only very slightly from that of Radek, whereas Germany does not lack champions of similar ideas. But by no means all the Socialist parties or groups represented at Zimmerwald and Kienthal are prepared to draw these ultimate conclusions. The German Independent Social-Democratic party is in very close touch with the Zimmerwald movement and the Berne Commission established by it, and in the Memorandum on Peace Questions, drawn up at the end of June by its delegates to the Stockholm Conferences, very definite demands are formulated, such as had either been dubbed Utopian or brushed aside as impracticable in the Resolution of Kienthal.

ZIMMERWALD AND KIENTHAL

“Whole groups of the Russian Socialists represented at Zimmerwald and Kienthal have also, since the Russian Revolution has given them a direct voice in the direction of their country's policy, adopted quite a different attitude towards questions of war and peace from that developed in the programme of Kienthal.”

French Catholics and the Papal Note

The well-known Roman Catholic writer, M. Julien de Narfon, contributes to the *Journal de Genève*, of 6 September, a very instructive article on the Papal Note and French Catholic opinion. He ascribes the Pope's failure to gauge the situation to the fact that the Vatican has only extremely limited sources of information, and has for many years past been profoundly misled as to political tendencies in the various European countries—notably during the French Republic's attack upon the Congregations—owing to undue reliance upon conventional diplomacy. Benedict XV., he holds, has excellent intentions, and certainly would not have taken such a step if he had been better informed. “Many Catholics are well aware that the Papal Note is a mere diplomatic document, and does not even remotely impinge upon the religious authority of the Pope, . . . but ignorance is too general and faith not sufficiently active with the majority, for religion not to suffer somewhat in this unfortunate affair. The nickname of ‘the Austrian woman,’ applied to Marie Antoinette at the dawn of the Revolution, played a great part in destroying the Monarchy. We are a country where, in given circumstances, words may have more power than ideas.” The Vatican's disclaimer of Austrian influence is invalidated by that passage in the Note which describes the Pope as “driven by the appeals of our children who implore our intervention and our words of peace.” M. de Narfon quotes the Berlin *Lokalanzeiger* as stating that the substance of the Papal Note are the conditions of peace desired by Germany, of which the Pope was well aware. The Papal Nuncio in Vienna, too, has announced in the *Reichspost* the joy with which the Austrian Emperor welcomed the Note.

“Of all the belligerents Austria is unquestionably most in need of peace,” and the Supreme Pontiff may be excused for his interest in a country which, rightly or wrongly, he regards as the rampart of Catholicism. “In my opinion, wrongly. Catholicism at the court of Vienna is essentially formal, they confess and communicate to order. That has nothing to do with true piety, but fits in very well with a considerable laxity of morals. His Apostolic Majesty wished that the Eucharistic Congress of Vienna in 1912 should have an extraordinary success, and that the official world should figure magnificently in the closing Procession of the Holy Sacrament. And I heard Cardinal Granito di Belmonte, Papal Legate at the Eucharistic Congress of Lourdes, pronounce an ecstatic eulogy of the Emperor Francis Joseph at the moment when Austria was sending her ultimatum to Serbia. But we know that the Eucharistic Congress of Vienna was merely an attempted apotheosis of political

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and dynastic interests . . . and that the Monarchy did not scorn to let the bill, amounting to 5,000,000 crowns, be paid by six rich Jewish industrialists and financiers, who were ennobled 'for having lent their aid to a work of monarchical defence.' There is no deep religious life in Austria. The Church there is very rich, which is far from having a happy influence on the people. There are no apostles among its clergy, and if you look through the annals of Catholic Missions, you will find that this clergy is not represented. In short, a sumptuous setting for meaningless gestures, a skeleton of religion draped in purple and gold. But it is a fact that Papal Rome has long been taken in by this outward seeming. After the conclave of 1903, when I expressed to Mgr. Gasparri my astonishment that the Sacred College should have yielded so quickly to the insolent veto imposed by his Apostolic Majesty upon the candidature of Cardinal Rampolla, Benedict XV.'s future Secretary of State replied as naturally as possible: 'One can't make a Pope against Austria!' Would it be equally impossible for the Holy See to try to patch up a peace for Austria? One thing is sure, that the Catholics of France are flatly resolved to oppose this Austrian peace, even were it partly Roman too, this peace without the reparations and guarantees demanded by the Christian law of war, and to wait till the force of our arms really imposes a peace which is both Christian and French."

In this connection we would recommend to our readers the striking article entitled "Break Austria!" in this month's *Nineteenth Century*, by Canon William Barry, the distinguished Roman Catholic historian. It is satisfactory that he, like a well-informed writer in the *Church Times* of 31 August, is alive to the fact that the preservation of His Apostolic Majesty's "family entail" is not in the true interest of Christianity.

Review

L'Italie et le Conflit Européen (1914-1916): Jean Alazard. Paris, 1916. (Alcan.) 3 fr. 50. This book contains the best account yet available of the motives which led Italy to throw in her lot with the Western Powers and of the very serious internal obstacles which hampered her decision. M. Alazard gives an excellent survey of the Giolittian era—of those methods of personal selection and influence, combined with a system of electoral trickery, by which Giolitti maintained himself and permeated the Chamber with a belief in his indispensability. "For twelve years," said the *Corriere* at the moment of his final resignation, "he had worked to decompose the old parties and groups, to manufacture a majority lacking any clearly-defined political label, and having only one characteristic, namely, that of having confidence in him." Due emphasis is laid upon Giolitti's motives for resigning in March 1914, upon his desire to evade the financial difficulties to which the Libyan war had given rise, and upon his share in Italy's military unpreparedness.

REVIEW

No one who reads these pages attentively is likely to uphold the absurd and superficial criticisms sometimes levelled against Italy for her delay in entering the struggle. The fight between neutralists and interventionists, the split inside the ranks of public opinion between reviving Irredentism and the material arguments against any rupture with Germanism, are brought out very clearly, though M. Alazard seems to pass over clerical influences with too light a touch, and probably shows undue optimism with regard to the diminution of German financial interests in Italy. As in all great moments of national decision, the motives which inspired Italy were mixed; being compounded of every shade of opinion, from the purest Mazzinian idealism to the *sacro egoismo* of certain Government circles and the naked and unashamed Jingoism of the so-called "Nationalists." While the latter were never tired of pouring ridicule on the assumption that the great struggle is one between Imperialism and Democracy, and insisted on regarding it as an open bid by rival forces for the mastery of Europe, even the *Corriere della Sera*, whose immense influence in Italy is due to the fact that it voices the opinion of the more sober and constructive elements in the country, justified action as follows: "Politics are the quintessence of egoism, and we are egoists. Let us simply reckon up our rights and our aspirations in relation to our forces." Side by side with this phrase deserve to be placed the expression of opinion of two widely different advocates of intervention. The Roman professor Borgese argued that Germanophilism must lead Italy to declare war on Germany, "for thus you will prevent, in the event of an Entente victory, the empire of William II. being too badly treated at the peace." Contrast with this the words of that eminently sane writer, Signor Prezzolini: "The problem of the war is not the problem of Irredentism; it is the problem of Italian liberty. It is not a question of planting the Italian flag on the cathedral of San Giusto. It is a question of freeing Europe from German domination—which is a trifle more essential." Beside all this were the exalted enthusiasm of men like Renato Serra, the poetic frenzy of d'Annunzio, the ultra-democratic ideals of Bissolati and the Reformist Socialists. In a word, the motives, dreams and ambitions that prompted Italy to action on one side or the other were quite unusually complex, as was only to be expected in a country whose political and social psychology has for centuries been the most complex in Europe.

For Italy even more than for her neighbours the war has been the crucial moment, upsetting at one and the same time a deep-rooted system of alliances, and a no less deeply-rooted internal political *régime*. The diplomatic revolution which her action involved will doubtless be discussed for many years to come, according to individual sympathies or antipathies. But of the moral revival and popular idealism which finally launched the ship of State upon the stormy sea of war, with a glorious disregard for the machinations and secret bargainings of the politicians, there can be only one opinion.

REVIEW

M. Alazard pleads very warmly for a permanent economic and political alliance between France and Italy. It is, of course, to-day clear to the veriest tiro in diplomacy that the colonial enterprise by which France and Italy sought consolation for failure to maintain or complete their national unity, was skilfully exploited by Germany, and that, under Bismarck and his successors, discord between the two Latin sisters had become one of the pivots of Prussian policy. M. Alazard has the courage to declare that a continuance of this old and useless squabble would inevitably make of Italy the mere satellite of Germany, and of France the satellite of England. The force of events, he argues, is driving France to change the bases of her policy, and "to add to the Slav and English alliances, which the European balance of power rendered necessary, the Italian alliance, which was demanded by our will to live free and strong."

R. W. S. W.

The "Programme" of an Italian Pacifist

In last Saturday's *Herald* there appears an amazing interview with the Italian Socialist Deputy, Signor Modigliani, a delegate to the recent Socialist Conference held in London. Asked what was the peace programme of the Italian Socialists, he said: "*We have no programme. We have not worried ourselves about questions of frontiers, we care nothing about frontiers. From the commencement of the war all we have wanted is a cessation of hostilities. The movement to obtain the Trentino and Trieste is the work of a few intellectuals; it had no popular following before the war and the general public now is more or less indifferent.*" If this statement really represents the considered opinion of Signor Modigliani and the section of Italian Socialists whom he represents, it seems a great pity that their desire for peace should not have induced them to think out a more practical means of attaining it. We all want peace as soon as possible. But if the war has taught us anything at all it surely is this, that nothing is more fatal than an attitude of indifference towards problems of international politics. So long as there are different nations and races, and so long as human nature is what it is, there is bound to be potential friction, which may at any time lead to war. It is, therefore, the duty of all true pacifists to work for a state of affairs in which the chances of friction are reduced to the minimum. It is our conviction that such an international *régime* can be based only upon the principle of nationality, and that the alternative system, as exemplified by the rule of the Habsburgs over the conglomerate of subject races which together form "Austria-Hungary," can only spell disaster. It is futile to adopt an attitude of detachment from "questions of frontiers." However high "above the battle" such an attitude may seem to place Signor Modigliani, in reality it merely accepts *in perpetuum* an actual disposition of political frontiers which has proved so fatal to the peace of Europe. We are grateful to the *Herald* for revealing yet another advocate of a German peace.

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The Revelations of Secret Diplomacy

For some weeks past Europe has been flooded by a stream of revelations such as are calculated to bring irremediable discredit upon the old methods of secret and dynastic diplomacy. The scandals associated with the names of Papen, Boy-Ed, Archibald and Dumba were "written off" by many people as the exploits of a few desperadoes. But since the Romanovs were overwhelmed by their inner rottenness, since M. Burtzev obtained access to the secret archives, and since Mr. Lansing was free to act upon his vast stores of knowledge, the pace has sensibly quickened. The Tsaritsa's correspondence with Rasputin, the Zimmermann telegram to Mexico, the revelations of the Greek White Book concerning Constantine's betrayal of Serbia and Turkey's engagements with Berlin, the Gerard revelations, the story of the Potsdam Crown Council, Lord Haldane's account of his Berlin mission, the secret pact of M. Ribot and the Tsar, the Suhomlinov Trial, the German offer to Roumania, the gross perfidy of the Swedish Foreign Office, and, finally, the telegraphic exploits of "Willy" and "Nicky," supplemented by Mr. Izvolsky's account of the Björkö Treaty—all this has produced a cumulative effect which no true democrat will allow to fade away. To THE NEW EUROPE, which stands for popular control wherever possible, for open agreements between free peoples, and, above all, for unflinching loyalty to that union of hearts which we call the Entente, this mass of evidence is in the nature of an *embarras de richesse*. Our readers may rest assured that we will deal with it fully and faithfully, not shirking what might at first sight seem to favour the enemy's case, and still less rushing into the breach to save Germany's befouled honour at the expense of our Russian ally, as Mr. Brailsford has done in the *Nation* and the *Herald*.

The German Press is eagerly exploiting the Suhomlinov Trial as a means of concealing so much else that is utterly damning to the Wilhelmstrasse, and incidentally makes capital out of British capital. It is, however, well aware that the fresh upheaval in Petrograd has deprived us as yet of the full Russian case, and that Berlin is infinitely better served than London with news from the Russian capital. Germany may like to pass her verdict on incomplete evidence; we prefer to await the full facts as accessible to our Russian ally.

These obvious manoeuvres of the German press (to which Herr von Kühlmann has just issued an elaborate official scheme for "increased co-operation with the Imperial authorities"—*Norddeutsche Allgemeine Zeitung* of 5 September) will not allow us to be deflected from the essential fact in the whole diplomatic controversy between the rival groups. It is this. The British Government at the very outset—by an act which, we have always held, will live in history as one of Lord Grey's supreme merits—published the whole diplomatic records of the fatal fortnight in 1914. The German Government has persistently declined to follow suit. Of all the many Governments concerned, none have doled out diplomatic information so sparingly, and even what it has published has been extensively "cut" and "doctored," as can be proved by comparison with

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Austrian Official publications. If the discussion of responsibility is to be continued on a sound basis, we are entitled to demand, as many prominent persons both in Germany and Austria-Hungary are now demanding, that the full diplomatic correspondence which passed between Berlin and Vienna in July-August, 1914, and the full text of the momentous telegrams between "Willy" and "Nicky" during the same period (of which two instalments have already appeared) shall be published without further delay. If the German Reichstag cannot enforce this next week, its control of affairs is a mere farce; and if it does not desire such a publication, we shall be entitled to draw our own conclusions. Until Germany follows Britain's example in this respect—after an interval of three years—we need not take Germany's insistence upon the Suhomlinov affair very seriously.

A German View of Kornilov

It is worth noting what the Germans have to say of the Kerenski-Kornilov affair. Herr Behrmann, the leading German correspondent in Stockholm, who has repeatedly shown a quite uncanny inside knowledge of events in Russia, informed the *Vossische Zeitung*, even before Kornilov's ultimatum, that the real question at issue was not, as alleged, "army organisation, but the continuance of the war." "While Kerenski," he wrote, "gradually began in practice to sacrifice his democratic and pacific principles to the Entente's demands, and thus got into considerable trouble with the Soviet, the new generalissimo has, in a sense, moved towards the Left, and may to-day be regarded as the man who would like, in the name of the army, to place himself at the head of the peace movement."

Behrmann adds the delightful yarn that Kornilov, infuriated by an attempt of the British Military Mission to secure control of the Russian Army, sent in a memorandum to Kerenski on 16 August, arguing that it was impossible and inadvisable to continue the war, and that he "must not miss the psychological moment for establishing Russian freedom and independence." Of course the truth is that Russia swarms with German agents, who, following the old methods so rife in the days of the Ohrana, have insinuated themselves into the counsels of the Soviet, the parties, the high command; and it goes without saying that their favourite tactics are to blame Britain and the Entente for Russia's misfortunes. Meanwhile, the crying need of the moment is to find men ready to devote their whole energy and sympathy to the promotion of Russo-British relations. At present, so we are assured by one of the greatest living experts on Russia, our tiny group of workers in one of the great causes of the future—men like Professor Pares and Dr. Harold Williams—are literally outnumbered by a hundred to one by those whose one aim it is to embroil Britain and Russia, and reduce the latter to absolute political and commercial subservience to Berlin.

Printed for CONSTABLE & Co. LTD., by EYRE & SPOTTISWOODS, LTD.,
His Majesty's Printers, East Harding Street, E.C. 4.

The New Europe

VOL. IV, No. 50 [REGISTERED FOR TRANSMISSION AT THE INLAND NEWSPAPER RATE] 27 September 1917

Jewry's Stake in the War

"THEY turn towards the East morning and evening, their supplications are full of hopes for a speedy return to Zion, and yet, since their dispersion, by their own exertions they have done but little to bring about the restoration of the political independence to which so many confidently looked forward as the forerunner of the Messianic age. With true Oriental resignation they lean upon the promise 'The Lord will fight for you and ye shall hold your peace.' . . . It may be—who can say?—that Zion will again become the centre of God's cult. But Zion secured by the good will of foreign Powers is a vision which no true prophet ever saw. Not in our days, nor by the skill of generals, nor by the strength of legions, will Israel's mission be accomplished. The Return may come; but it will come by other means and in other times."

Thus wrote Sir Philip Magnus, a distinguished British Jew, in the *Jewish Chronicle* of 13 November 1891. His article has just been reprinted as a propagandist pamphlet. It may therefore be assumed that his views have not changed. They fitly define the attitude of semi-assimilationist Jewry in Western countries which qualifies the prayer, "Next year in Jerusalem" by the unspoken reservation, "but not in our time, O Lord!"

Over against the semi-assimilationist and assimilationist Jews who take up this paradoxical, though perhaps not subjectively insincere, position stand the Jewish Nationalists, or, as they are more frequently termed, the Zionists. They say in effect: "The return to Palestine is the age-long dream of Jewry. Let us strive to realise it." Their position is as clear as their sincerity is unquestionable.

Between them and the semi-assimilationists there are other differences. The latter contend that the Jewish problem is essentially religious, not racial, in character. Hence it is susceptible of settlement by complete religious emancipation. By conversion to Christianity or Buddhism a Jew ceases to be a Jew. Any aversion which non-Jews

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may show towards Jews is therefore religious intolerance, and anti-Semitism in all its forms is simply religious persecution. As such it is at variance with the principles of modern civilisation.

The Zionist view may be quoted from a letter by Dr. Charles Weizmann, the President of the English Zionist Federation, to *The Times* of 28 May, 1917:—

“ It may possibly be inconvenient to certain individual Jews that the Jews constitute a nationality. Whether the Jews do constitute a nationality is, however, not a matter to be decided by the convenience of this or that individual. It is strictly a question of fact. The fact that the Jews are a nationality is attested by the conviction of the overwhelming majority of Jews throughout all ages right to the present time, a conviction which has always been shared by non-Jews in all countries.”

Dr. Weizmann places the question on the basis of fact and experience. No moderately intelligent and impartial observer who has had the requisite experience of Jews, both as individuals and in the mass, can doubt either that the Jews are one of the most clearly differentiated races in the world, or that their special religious beliefs and practices have been a potent, if not an indispensable, agency in conserving the individuality of the race. Though in the case of the Jews the influences of race and religion are almost inextricably intermingled, and though local environment tends in the long run somewhat to modify the mental and physical character of the various sections of the Jewish people, a mere change of religion would no more cause the Jews to cease to be Jews than the Japanese would cease to be Japanese were they to abandon Shintoism in favour of some form of Christianity.

During the last two months the practical military and political aspects of the Zionist and non-Zionist standpoints have been debated with varying degrees of frankness at the British War Office, and, if rumour be other than a lying jade, even in the holy of holies of No. 10, Downing Street, itself. The Secretary of State for War has been plied in turn with the arguments of semi-assimilationist and of nationalist Jewry. In a moment of unwonted hardihood the War Office publicly committed itself to a scheme for the creation of a special Jewish regiment. Had it known

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how perilous was the ground on which it had ventured its feet, and how thorny the path which it had elected to tread, it may be doubted whether all the courage of its bluff soldiers and doughty civilians would have availed to urge it forward.

The idea of the Jewish Regiment sprang from the precedent created by the Mule Corps formed in Egypt by Zionist refugees from Palestine for service on the Gallipoli Peninsula. The Mule Corps worked well and bravely. The courage shown by its men would have proved, had proof been needed, that the Jew is no coward and that, when fired by an ideal, he can be as brave as the bravest. It was thought that to repeat this experiment on a larger scale, and in particular to offer the thousands of young alien Jews in England an opportunity to serve their race and their faith in a fighting Jewish unit with a Jewish badge and expressly destined for service in Palestine, might simplify the problem of dealing with alien Jews of military age and, incidentally, make a powerful appeal to Jewish racial and religious enthusiasm the world over. It is no secret that the idea had commended itself to the Foreign Office and to the War Cabinet. An official statement expressing sympathy with the Jewish National ideal was reported to be under consideration. Then suddenly the semi-assimilationists, including many of the "Knights and Barons" of British Jewry, mobilised themselves, and an Oriental member of the Government found time amid the pre-occupations of his department to portray the danger involved to the cause of Jewry in any impolitic, nay impious, attempt on the part of David Wales to assume the functions of Joshua. The whirl of his dazzling dialectics appears to have reduced the minds of the War Cabinet to a state of hypnotic coma. The prospect of being judges and dividers in Israel seems to have appalled our unsophisticated Statesmen. Thus, as Major David Davies, M.P., recently wrote to *The Times*, "Goliath won the first round." "David and his brethren" may or may not be rallying for a second bout. None can refuse them sympathy in their belaboured plight. But for their encouragement some truths may be placed deferentially before them.

Complicated above all others, the Jewish question can never be understood by mere weighing of argument and

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counter-argument. Like the nationality of the Jews, the Jewish question is a fact. Some Jews of the assimilationist and semi-assimilationist persuasion affect to regard public recognition of this fact as a confession of anti-Semitism and of religious intolerance. In their eyes, to call a Jew a Jew is not to denote his membership of one of the most glorious among the ancient races in the world, but is akin to an outrage. These are the people who, when Moses Rabinovitch of Lodz gets into trouble in an East End police court, write to the papers to protest against his being described as a Russian, or a Polish, Jew, and insist that religious tolerance requires him to be called simply a Russian or a Pole. For them, Herr Ballin is simply a "German" and not the German Emperor's ex-"*Ozeanjud*". They feel themselves to be something more than one hundred per cent. British, and are comfortably oblivious of the fact that the average Briton regards them as British indeed by choice or education, but as little more British than any Armenian or Syrian Arab, might be after a period of naturalization. Voice, gesture, gait, and, in most cases, physical conformation stamp them as Jews quite apart from their religious tenets, and cause them to be recognised even when the oriental swiftness of their intellectual processes passes unnoticed. But the point to be remembered is that the interests and activities of these gentlemen do not constitute the Jewish question. That question concerns the great mass of Jewry, and it is the mass to which the Jewish national ideal appeals. The interests of Jewry are not identical with those of its millionaires or half-assimilated professors and politicians. The Jewish people counts at least fourteen million souls, most of whom are poor. They have good qualities and bad, but they are human beings entitled to consideration as such. Many of them suffer under disabilities which no merely religious emancipation can remove. Relief from their troubles has in the past been sought largely by migration, but for many years the openings for migration have been progressively narrowed or closed, and, as a result of this war, are likely to become still narrower. Restrictions upon the naturalization even of the well-to-do alien will certainly be more severe in future than they have been in the past. Changes in Russia, Poland, and Roumania may lessen to some extent the tendency of the great Jewish

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reservoirs in Central and Eastern Europe to overflow into other countries, but they cannot serve as a substitute for the Jewish national ideal nor can they remove the danger of anti-Semitic outbreaks. Dispersion and eventual assimilation can never be the ultimate aims of any healthy people. Reunion and national self-affirmation are worthier objects. The great need of the Jews is sincerity towards themselves and towards others; and the value of Zionism is that it tends to bring the intense pride of the Jew in his own race and in its all but unrivalled contribution to civilization, into harmony with his public bearing. The bracing and invigorating effect of Zionism upon the Jewish masses can hardly be credited by those who have not witnessed it. To the orthodox Jew of the Ghetto its appeal is immediate. To the unorthodox, or to the frankly sceptical, its national aspect is stimulating. Instead of seeking to dissimulate their inborn characteristics and striving vainly to "feel like" members of another race, they find courage to stand forth as national Jews—and are often surprised to find themselves welcomed as fellow men with an honest purpose, instead of being regarded as interlopers and mitigated outcasts. With a Zionist Jew it is possible to discuss Jewish problems as French problems may be discussed with a Frenchman or Italian problems with an Italian. Sincerity breeds respect, and respect cordial sympathy, where reticence and dissimulation would have bred little save distrust and aversion.

Behind the arguments of Jewish assimilationism in its various forms lurks the fear that, should Jewry ever acquire a national territorial status of its own, the non-Jewish world would turn upon the Jews and say: "Now you have a country of your own; go to it." This fear is at least as ill-founded as would have been any similar fear on the part of the Greeks during the first half of the nineteenth century. The contention that Palestine could not contain one half of the Jews in the world cannot avail to condemn the assignment of Palestine to a National Jewry. The existence of a Jewish State would certainly react, and react healthily, upon the position of Jews who might elect to remain in the Dispersion. They would, perforce, become more closely identified with the countries of their adoption, and would have less and less justification

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for "internationalism" or for those rapid changes of political allegiance to which they have been addicted in the past. In their case the designation "Jew" would, indeed, acquire more and more a denominational and less and less a political meaning. They would have elected to stand aside from the current of National Jewry, and might gradually attain their ideal of assimilation. The concern of the world is not with them, but with the actual and potential Jewish nation; and it is in regard to the future of the Jewish nation that the projected Jewish regiment acquires its special significance. The Germans have quickly perceived its meaning. Since the idea was first mooted the German press has insisted upon the importance of persuading Jewry that only under German auspices can Jewish National hopes be fulfilled. In dealing with the Jews, Germany has many advantages. The Yiddish language, or jargon, is based on German. German *Kultur* is thus easily accessible to them. Jewish hatred of Russia has long been tinged with pro-Germanism, since Germany seemed the one Power strong enough to overthrow the Russian giant, break down the Pale and open all the Russias to economic exploitation. Moreover, many, perhaps the majority, of German Jews inside and outside Germany heartily believed before the war that German military organisation was destined to rule the world, and that under its ægis their opportunities for trade would be infinite. But the Jews are not all traders, nor, in the mass, are they influenced solely by greed of gain. They cherish higher aspirations, and are swayed by other motives. They honestly desire freedom as a good in itself, and they recognise, in their heart of hearts, the immense superiority of the Anglo-Saxon over the German conceptions of political and social liberty. They are not proud of the Jewish international financier, and earnestly desire to rid Jewry of the stigma which he and his kind have branded upon it. They would fain make of the Jewish name a clear title of honour. At this fateful crisis in the history of humanity some of their leaders have turned to the Government of the British Commonwealth of free peoples and have asked for help. Why is the response, the only possible response, delayed?

JOSEPHUS.

Zionist Ideals

“THE object of Zionism is to establish for the Jewish people a home in Palestine secured by public law.”

This is the aim of the Zionist movement as formulated by the First Zionist Congress held at Basle in August, 1897. The Basle Programme proceeds to point to the means by which this end is to be attained:—

“ 1. The promotion, on suitable lines, of the colonization of Palestine by Jewish agricultural and industrial workers.

“ 2. The organization and binding together of the whole of Jewry by means of appropriate institutions, local and international, in accordance with the laws of each country.

“ 3. The strengthening and fostering of Jewish national sentiment and consciousness.

“ 4. Preparatory steps towards obtaining Government consent, where necessary, to the attainment of the aim of Zionism.”

A common fallacy is the belief that the aim of Zionism is the creation of an independent Jewish State, into which a vast body, perhaps the majority, of the Jews of the Diaspora, will migrate. To those who hold that view Zionism is an imperialist movement, one aimed at the conquest, perhaps peaceable, if not, forcible, of the Holy Land, carrying with it, presumably, the ousting of its non-Jewish populations. But this is very far from the truth. To responsible Zionists the attainment of the status of an independent State in Palestine is not a matter of practical politics at the present day. The Jewish people is not ripe, nor can it be in the near future ripe, for independence. In the political sphere all that Zionism asks immediately is autonomy for the Jewish population, present and future, of Palestine, self-government in domestic, in internal matters, an extension of the autonomy which the Jewish colonies already enjoy under the Turkish *régime*, independence in matters of education, of local government, of religion—gas and water Home Rule one might say, but rather more than that: cultural Home Rule. As the Jewish population increases the area covered by this system of Jewish autonomy will increase. It will not increase at the expense of the non-Jewish population, nor will its liberty, its right to self-government, diminish the liberty

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or the rights of its neighbours. There is room in Palestine for at least another million Jews without displacing the present inhabitants. Palestine is an empty land, a deserted land, not a desert, one that has been deprived of its people. For its regeneration a population must be provided, and it is only from the Jewries of the Dispersion that this population will come. That it is quite practicable for self-government of this character to be enjoyed by the Jewish population of Palestine, without encroaching on the rights of the non-Jewish population, is shown by the experiment of the past thirty years. During that period between forty and fifty self-governing Jewish settlements, ranging in size from three or four thousand inhabitants to less than a hundred, have sprung up. The Turkish Government has granted them an autonomy that is practically complete. The only grounds of interference by the Central Government are in respect of taxation—and this is met by the payment by the local authority of a lump sum annually—and serious crime. But there is no serious crime among the Jews of Palestine, and, therefore, no cause for Government interference on this ground.

The relationship between these Jewish colonies and their Arab neighbours is in every respect friendly. The benefit to the latter is direct and is admitted. The roads laid out by the Jewish colonies, the drainage works undertaken by them, benefit all who use them or live within reach of them, independent of race or religion. The improved methods of agriculture and of organization that the colonists have introduced into the country have been adopted, as far as their capacities have admitted, by the natives who, having had the advantage of a practical acquaintance with them, have recognized their value. The Jewish tribunals have gained so great respect that there are instances of Arab litigants appealing to them for arbitration and accepting their awards. The experiment of Jewish self-government has been so successful as unquestionably to justify an extension.

Zionists do not desire to obtain absolute control of Palestine. They have no desire for the responsibility of the guardianship of the places which they recognise as holy to Christian and Moslem as well as to Jew. They acknowledge the right of the devotees of Christianity, in all its branches, and of Mohammedanism to free access to the centres of their

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devotion which the Holy Land encloses. They feel that no one faith or sect has the right to place obstacles in the way of any other. To secure an open road to the Church of the Holy Sepulchre and to the Mosque of Omar as well as to the fragment of the Temple still remaining above ground they want a Power that can if necessary restrain every sect and section of the population from attempting to encroach on the rights of another. They want also the protection of a Power that will secure the land against all possibility of outside aggression. Politically, the fondest dream of the Zionists is the incorporation of Palestine in an Empire whose basis is liberty and justice, whose statesmen recognise that unity is not necessarily uniformity, in whose dominions there is room for a diversity of races, of political systems and of cultures, whose history has proved that empire and liberty, of the people as well as of the individual, are not incompatible.

But Zionism is not so much a political movement as it is a cultural one. The aim of the Zionists is to obtain not a home for all the members of the Jewish people—in no circumstances can anything but a small proportion of the Jewish people settle in Palestine—so much as a home for Judaism, for the Jewish civilisation. Zionism is to a great extent a spiritual movement, a movement to secure for the Jews a land where they will be free to settle and to develop as Jews without any of the political, economic or social restrictions from which they suffer in other lands, and where as a consequence Judaism itself and the Jewish spirit will develop on their own lines free of all hostile or distracting influences. Throughout the Dispersion since the destruction of the Jewish State, Judaism has never had an opportunity of showing itself to the world in the full light, of reciting in unsmothered accents its message to humanity. In a Jewish land, in Jewish surroundings, it feels that this opportunity will at length be given.

ALBERT M. HYAMSON.

The Position of Armenia

THE Armenians, like the Jews, have hitherto been a nation in dispersion. Their colonies are scattered from Chicago to Singapore, but the majority of the four million Armenians

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in the world were subject, at the beginning of the war, to two foreign empires—Turkey and Russia. They were divided between them in approximately equal proportions—something like two million Armenians under each.

In this partition the Armenians themselves had had no voice. Turkey acquired her holding in Armenia by conquest, in the sixteenth century, Russia hers in the nineteenth—again by conquest, only in this case at Turkey's and Persia's expense. The Russo-Turkish frontier that divided Armenia before the present war was delimited, after the last Russo-Turkish war, in 1878; and this is an important year in Armenian history, for the Treaty of Berlin, by which the delimitation was ratified, also guaranteed political reforms to six vilayets (governments), mainly inhabited by Armenians, which Turkey still retained. The guarantees were vague, and have never been enforced; but the document was signed by all the European Powers, and though it has brought Armenia no material redress, it remains of capital importance for her political future. The Berlin Treaty gave the Armenian problem an international status in the Turkish provinces, and established the precedent for an international solution of the problem as a whole.

From 1878 down to the outbreak of the present war, there is a melancholy parallelism between Turko-Armenian and Russo-Armenian relations. The Armenians had an ancient historical tradition, a pronounced national individuality, and an active social life. They could neither be assimilated nor ignored, and for despotic empires the alternative was repression. Both Turkey and Russia had already placed restrictions on the Armenian national (Gregorian) Church—Turkey as early as the fifteenth century, when she set up an Armenian Patriarch at Constantinople as the semi-official head of the Armenian community in the Ottoman Empire; and Russia in 1836, after the Katholikos at Etchmiadzin—the supreme head of the Gregorian Church in all countries—had become a Russian subject as a result of the last Russo-Persian War. After 1878 the Armenian policy of both empires became harsher, and overstepped the ecclesiastical sphere. Abd-ul-Hamid's system in Turkey is notorious. He armed and licensed the unsettled elements among the Kurds, inflamed Moslem

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against Christian, and brought about the Armenian massacres of 1894-6.* Russian methods cannot fairly be compared with Hamidian, but it must be recorded that British attempts at joint intervention in Turkey in 1894-6 were checkmated by the Tsardom's diplomacy; and that in 1905-6 the Tsar's viceregal government in the Caucasus tolerated, if it did not instigate, a racial war between the Caucasian Tatars and Armenians as bloody as the racial war in Macedonia under the Turkish *régime*. In general, however, the Russian Government was more European in its methods. Armenian schools in Russia were closed in 1884, and in 1903 the whole Armenian church and school property in the Caucasus was confiscated by an Imperial decree.

These concentrated attacks on their national existence led the Armenians to form political organisations a generation earlier than any neighbouring nationality and on individual lines. The most important of them has been the Dashnakzutium Party (dating from 1890), which organised defence against massacre, first in Turkey in 1894-6 and then in the Caucasus in 1905-6. Founded to fight against extermination, Dashnakzutium was naturally revolutionary in its origin, but it has proved itself adaptable to new conditions. After participating in a secret congress of Russian nationalities in 1904, the Dashnakists adopted a Socialist programme for the Caucasus; and in 1908, when the Turkish Committee of Union and Progress (with which Dashnakzutium had co-operated in exile) came into power in the Ottoman Empire, the Dashnakists there transformed themselves into a constitutional party and worked with the C.U.P. in the Ottoman Parliament from 1908 to 1915.

It is remarkable that though the Armenians were repressed by both empires, and by Turkey the more bloodily, they gravitated towards Turkey during this period and away from Russia. Dashnakzutium was founded for action in Turkey alone, but became active in Russia too after the confiscations of 1903. Between 1908 and 1915 the Party was actually legitimised in Turkey and banned in Russia. The Armenian conscripts fought bravely for Turkey in the Balkan War; and in 1913 the Ottoman Government at last accepted a scheme of reforms for the

* The 1909 massacres in Cilicia must also be placed to his account, though they occurred after his fall.

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Six Vilayets,* which had been worked out by the Russian and German Foreign Offices on the basis of the Treaty of Berlin. In 1913 the centre of gravity of the Armenian problem lay in Turkey, but it has swung violently back to Russia again through the consequences of the present war.

The first factor in this has been the alienation of the C.U.P., who, after the Balkan disaster, threw their liberalism overboard and abandoned themselves to their "Pan-Islamic" and "Pan-Turanian" proclivities. In this mood they regarded the reform scheme imposed on them in 1913 as a mortal offence. After the outbreak of war their resentment was increased by the refusal of Dashnakzutiun to raise volunteers (in addition to the Armenians in the regular army†) for the invasion of the Caucasus, while the Caucasus Armenians volunteered for Russia. The breakdown of the Concert of Europe gave the C.U.P. the opportunity for revenge, and the "deportations" of 1915 (the facts of which are too well known to need repetition here) were an organised attempt on their part to exterminate the Armenian race in the Ottoman Empire.

The second factor has been the occupation of the major part of Turkish Armenia—about two-thirds of the Six Vilayets and half the Vilayet of Trebizond—by the Russian Army of the Caucasus. The beginning of the Russian advance was simultaneous with the deportations, and it reached its present limit with the capture of Erzinjan in the summer of 1916. But the Tsar's generals did not come as liberators. They were as complacent as Abd-ul-Hamid to the predatory Kurds. They refused to allow the Armenian peasants to return unless they could produce title deeds to their lands (a condition which the circumstances of their flight from the Turks made it impossible for them to fulfil); and in the Plain of Alashkert they settled four Russian "labour battalions" of a thousand men each, from which natives of the Caucasus were excluded. These settlers were allowed to send for their families, and the intention was to split Armenia (more effectually than by the old Russo-Turkish frontier) by a new Cossack line,

* With the addition of Trebizond.

† In Turkey, as in Russia, the Armenian conscripts liable to service in the regular army responded loyally (more loyally than the Kurds) to the mobilisation order.

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like the lines which had secured previous extensions of Russian territory north of the Caucasus and across Siberia. This policy was terminated abruptly by the Revolution.

The Revolution is the third factor which has removed the centre of gravity of the Armenian problem from Turkey to Russia. The Revolution made a clean sweep of the Tsarist system and the Tsarist personnel, both in the Caucasus and in the Occupied Territory. The Southern Caucasus is now governed by a Commission of the Provisional Government, consisting of six Duma deputies for the Trans-Caucasian Provinces; the Occupied Territory is governed by a civil commissioner administering the provisions of the Hague Convention; and in both regions local administrative organisations are being built up—in the Caucasus, naturally, for the moment on more democratic lines. The survivors of the Turkish deportations are still languishing in Mesopotamia, and the loss of those who perished has struck the Armenian nation a heavy blow, but it is broadly true that the soil of Armenia is now free from both the oppressions which have lain upon it for the last forty years. Behind the front which is being held by the Russian Revolutionary Army, Tsardom and Turkdom have disappeared alike, leaving the indigenous nationalities face to face. The problem of this zone of nationalities, lying between the Russian and Ukrainian areas on the north, and the Arab area on the south, has been added by the Russian Revolution to the nationality problems of Eastern and South-Eastern Europe, and will call for solution at the general settlement. The Armenian problem, in its present phase, is inseparable from this wider question.

Among the many tribes and tongues of the Caucasian region, two nationalities besides the Armenians have come to the front—the Georgians and the Tatars.

The problem of the Georgians is comparatively simple. They are a compact nationality, of one language and one religion (the Orthodox Greek Church). They are a small nationality—about two millions—with no kinsmen, so that they can hardly stand alone. They all live within the present frontiers of Russia, so that the question of Georgian autonomy within a larger whole can be settled between Georgia and Russia with no third party; and in bargaining with Russia they can appeal, like the Ukrainians, Finns and

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Poles of the Congress Kingdom, to positive rights secured by treaty, for Georgia united herself with Russia, no longer ago than 1783, by a voluntary contract, which guaranteed her ecclesiastical and political home-rule. The contract was swept aside by the Tsardom in 1801; the right remains.

The position of the Tatars, on the other hand, is singularly undefined. They have no written charter, no historic rights, no native culture, and they are divided into hostile sects. Their strength is in their potential affiliations. Their Turkish speech links them, on the one hand, with the Ottoman Turks (whose literary language they use), and with fourteen million other Turkish-speaking people in Russia on the other. Their Moslem religion (in spite of sectarianism) links them, firstly, with the non-Tatar Moslems of the Caucasus, who double the Tatars' numbers, and form, with them, a Moslem *bloc* equal, numerically, to the Georgians and Caucasus Armenians combined. In the second place, it links them with all the Moslems in the world. The Caucasus Tatars have seen where their strength lies, and have started to organise themselves on a very ambitious scale. Whether they will succeed is more than doubtful, for with the least political experience of all the Caucasian nationalities they are attempting the most difficult political task.

The Armenians must reach a settlement with these two nationalities before their own problem, and with it the whole problem of the Caucasian area, can be solved. Their differences with the Georgians should not prove formidable. During the nineteenth century the Armenians have tended to encroach on Georgia, through their cultural and numerical superiority and through the current of migration from the Turkish to the Russian side of the frontier, which Turkish atrocities set up. With the liberation of Turkish Armenia the current is already beginning to flow the other way, and thus the friction should automatically disappear. The relations between the Armenians and the Tatars are far more difficult to settle. They are interlocked territorially, and Armenia constitutes a geographical barrier between the Tatars of the Caucasus and their Osmanli kinsmen in Anatolia. This is a stumbling-block to the Pan-Turanian movement, and the deportations were an attempt to remove it from the Ottoman side, but the Islamic sensitiveness of the Tatars is a more serious irritant still. Since the Russian

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revolution the Tatar press at Baku has plunged into the controversy, in the Occupied Territory, between the Armenians and the Kurds, and this has had an adverse effect, in the Caucasus itself, upon Tatar-Armenian relations.

The Armenians stand midway between the Georgians and Tatars in their political position. They are less isolated than the Georgians, poorer than the Tatars in relationships; less compact than the Georgians, less scattered than the Tatars. Like the Georgians they have a historical tradition, but they are destitute, like the Tatars, of valid historical rights, for there has been no United Armenia since A.D. 387, and no independent Armenian State since 1375. On the Russian side of the frontier their claims rest simply on the inherent rights of nationality; on the Turkish side, on the contrary, they are not merely documentary but international, for they rest on the Berlin Treaty of 1878, which was signed by the European Powers.

The claim of Armenia to national independence is three-fold—the sanction of the Berlin Treaty, the wrongs Armenia has endured, and the capacity of her people to hold their own in the world, which they have proved by their miraculous survival. The cause of Armenia may be compared with the cause of Poland. In Armenia, as in Poland, no one disputes that frontiers are hard to delimit and mixed populations hard to provide for; but everyone agrees that an independent Armenia must arise as a result of the war. The Allied Governments proclaim it in their public pronouncements; the Germans still mutter the formula of the integrity of the Ottoman Empire, but dare not demand in terms the restoration of Armenia to the Turks since the world has learnt what happened in 1915.

ARNOLD J. TOYNBEE.

“The Reform of Diplomacy”

[We have received the following comment from a British diplomatist of high standing and wide experience.]

“In your number of 6 September there appeared an interesting article signed ‘Diplomaticus,’ on ‘The Reform of Diplomacy.’ The article contains several valuable suggestions, and it cannot be denied that some useful reforms could and should be introduced both in the Diplomatic Service and in the Foreign Office. I trust that I may be

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allowed, as an old Diplomatist who has had over forty years of public service, nine of which were passed in the Foreign Office, to make one or two observations on certain points where I venture to think some misapprehension exists.

"The writer of the article apparently considers that our diplomatists are in the main 'ignorant of foreign languages.' I can assure him that a very high standard is demanded at the entrance examination, both in French and in German; and that a thorough knowledge is required of the third language, if a candidate, as is usually the case, takes one up as an optional subject. Moreover, many diplomatists, during the course of their career, become well acquainted with several other foreign languages. Deficiency in linguistic attainments cannot justly be alleged against our diplomatists. I may observe that the examination for candidates both for the Diplomatic Service and for the Foreign Office is an exceedingly stiff one, as a perusal of the subjects would clearly demonstrate.

"I am surprised to notice that the writer of the article states that a great number of the heads of our foreign missions are never acquainted with the Secretary of State. The Secretary of State invariably sees all heads of missions when they are in England, and in several cases is in private correspondence with them when they are abroad. The writer also considers that the interchange between Diplomats and Foreign Office clerks should be developed. I entirely agree with him; but I would remark that, before the war, more than half of the clerks had been originally in the Diplomatic Service, or had temporarily served abroad. Our Ambassadors at Paris and at Constantinople, and our Envoy at Brussels, had all been on the Foreign Office Staff, while the Permanent Under-Secretary was an ex-diplomatist.

"The writer of the article implies that our representatives abroad are mere 'humble mouthpieces' of their chiefs at home; that they are out of touch with the forces at work in other States; that they have no 'initiative of suggestion,' and that they report 'conversations with foreign Ministers of State practically without any comment.'

"These are somewhat sweeping charges, and, with all respect, I submit that they are scarcely in accordance with facts. A diplomatist abroad is in many respects in the position of a counsel: he is briefed from home, and it

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depends on his knowledge and experience whether he is able to carry out his instructions skilfully. The methods by which he acts upon his instructions are entirely or very largely left to his own tact and discretion. It is natural that his success will greatly depend on the position and influence which he may have obtained in the country to which he is accredited. He should, of course, keep his Government fully and accurately informed of all that passes in the country in which he resides; and access to the Foreign Office archives would doubtless show that our diplomatists are not wanting in that part of their duties. The diplomatist should certainly not, and as a rule he does not, hesitate to give his opinion in regard to the matters with which he has to deal; and he should report his appreciation of the Statesmen and colleagues with whom he is in relation. Such appreciation obviously could not be made public.

“There are some other points in the article with which I would like to deal, but I hesitate to occupy more of your space. I am in accord with much that appears in the article, but I hope *Diplomaticus* will permit me to rectify one or two statements which he has made.

“AN OLD DIPLOMATIST.”

[A valued reader of high academic distinction writes as follows.]

“I have read with much interest the article on ‘The Reform of Diplomacy,’ by *Diplomaticus*, in Number 47. If *Diplomaticus* had read the report on the Foreign Office and Diplomatic Service made by the recent Royal Commission on the Civil Service, he would find that the recommendations of that Commission are very much on the lines he suggests: a wider recruitment, free interchange between service at home and abroad, the removal of the property qualification for diplomacy, and the provision of adequate pay and allowances and of a proper clerical staff to relieve the officials from purely mechanical duties. Perhaps his article may help to remind the Government that such a report is in existence.

“A CONSTANT READER.”

[We have also received the following comment from a well-known Englishman abroad.]

“Our Embassies might have rendered a great service to their country by serving as a centre where British

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residents might occasionally have an opportunity of meeting representative inhabitants of the country in which the Embassy is situated. Mutual sympathies would thus be created, and the two nationalities would thus not remain, as is often the case, strangers one to the other. There are countries in which the lack of such a centre has been severely felt.

"Similarly, British Embassies might give a lead to the British colony in the capital where it is situated, by showing a keen interest in all British national and patriotic work. Too often—even since the war began—the old phrase has been the apparent rule of ambassadorial action, or inaction, that the British Embassy is here only for the natives of the country to which it is accredited (*i.e.*, in practice, for the local 'smart set' and a few officials), and not for the British. This is not the practice of French, Russian, or United States' Embassies.

"The article omits all notice of one important cause of diplomatic success and failure—the Ambassador."

Greece and Bulgaria

"THE name of this book, gentlemen," said Mr. Politis, Greek Minister of Foreign Affairs, in the Chamber on 17 August, in laying the Greek White Book* before the Deputies, "the colour of which is the traditional white, calls forth the idea of loyalty, of conscience, of dignity, but the title which suits the book is that of 'Black Book,' 'Dark Book,' for I can solemnly affirm that these documents form incontestably the darkest page in the long history of Greece."

Few readers of the Greek White Book would be prepared to dispute this mournful admission of Mr. Politis. The documents published by the Greek Government prove indisputably that their predecessors had no justification whatever for their desertion of Serbia. The extracts published in *The Times* on September 19 show that the excuse put forward that the Treaty of 1913 envisaged only the possi-

* "Διπλωματικά Έγγραφα, 1913-1917." We hope that the Greek Government will provide us with French and English editions with the least possible delay.

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bility of an attack by Bulgaria alone, and therefore had a "purely Balkan character," is quite untenable. The publication of the two Military Conventions of 14 May and 1 June, 1913, makes it clear that this allegation was the reverse of the truth, for, in fact, in the second Convention, Greece, on account of the critical situation confronting her, was forced to agree to Serbia's demand that the scope of her assistance should be extended against not only Bulgaria, but "a third Power." The further pretext that Serbia, by breaking off diplomatic relations with Bulgaria, constituted herself the aggressor, and thereby released Greece from any obligation to come to her assistance, is excellently answered in the telegram of Mr. Pašić's Government on 15 November, 1915, in reply to Mr. Zaimis. But even had all these pretexts been valid, the anti-Venizelist Governments would still have been guilty of the grossest treachery to Serbia, in not informing the Serbian Government in advance that they had no intention of meeting their obligations. This is the point made by Mr. Venizelos in his great speech in the Chamber on 26 August last. On 2 August, 1915, just before resignation, Mr. Gounaris categorically asserted in wires to Greek representatives abroad that "a Bulgarian attack on Serbia could not leave us indifferent, and a Turco-Bulgarian Entente would have as its one result the strengthening of the bonds between Greece and Serbia." And yet in the Chamber a month later the same Gounaris declared that he did not consider the Treaty binding.

Volumes might be written on the treachery of the anti-Venizelist Governments and the intrigues of MM. Streit and Theotokis with the Central Powers; but the Greek White Book has other material to which attention may be drawn. It throws welcome light on the relations between Bulgaria and the Central Powers. On 24 July, 1914, Streit reports to Venizelos that the German *Chargé d'Affaires* at Athens had just assured him that, in the event of war between the Central Powers and Serbia, Bulgaria would probably take advantage of the situation. This may, it is true, be regarded merely as a German attempt to exercise pressure upon Greece; but the attitude attributed to Bulgaria is confirmed in a telegram from Theotokis to Streit on 25 July, in which he says: "I ought to assure you that from the reservations which I noticed in what Herr von Jagow said to me with

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regard to Bulgaria's action, I gained the impression that Austria must have concluded an understanding with Bulgaria with regard to action in common." On 4 August Theotokis wires to King Constantine: "The Emperor brings to the knowledge of Your Majesty the fact that an alliance was to-day concluded between Germany and Turkey; Bulgaria and Roumania are also setting themselves on the side of Germany." We know how the attempt of King Charles of Roumania to induce his country to intervene on the side of the Central Powers broke down before the combined opposition of all Roumanian statesmen, with the solitary exception of Mr. Carp. It is clear that similar arrangements had already been made with the Bulgarian Government; unfortunately they met with no such popular resistance in Bulgaria as in Roumania, for the simple reason that the Bulgarian nation as a whole had long ago made up its mind that its Chauvinistic aims could only be attained with the help of the Central Powers. On the same day, 4 August, Theotokis wires the information given him by Herr von Jagow that "a firm understanding exists between Turkey and Bulgaria." On 11 August Herr Zimmermann assures him that "Bulgaria and Turkey are already Allies; Bulgaria will take action at a suitable moment against Serbia." On 13 September Venizelos wires to Greek representatives abroad that the German Minister in Athens had assured him "that an entente has definitely been concluded between Bulgaria and Turkey."

All this is merely corroboration of what every impartial student of recent Balkan politics always realised, namely, that, for the past decade, Bulgaria had secretly, sometimes openly, been working in close association with the Central Powers. While her national aspirations on Serbian Macedonia were put forward to give a decent colour to her act of aggression, Bulgaria was already planning a repetition of her attempt of June 1913 to establish her hegemony over the Balkan Peninsula.

Evidence had been given in THE NEW EUROPE (Nos. 27, 29, 32 and 40) of the fact that every party in Bulgaria, except the International "Zimmerwaldians" ("Narrow" Socialists) is united in demanding for Bulgaria not only Serbian Macedonia, but the whole of Old Serbia (now in Bulgarian possession), the Morava Valley, and the whole

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of Dobrudja. Since the return of Venizelos to power the Bulgarian press has been free to advocate openly what it has always secretly desired—the permanent retention of Eastern (Greek) Macedonia. The documents published at the end of the Greek White Book show the ruthless way in which, in direct violation of the promises with which they appeased the Skouloudis Government, the Bulgarians have set to work to root out the Greek element in Eastern Macedonia. A telegram sent by Mr. Naoum, Greek Minister in Sofia, to Mr. Zaimis, on 14 June 1917, sums up the number of Greeks who had died in Kavalla up to 28 April as 6,000. In Drama and Serres, he says, the situation is similar. By refusing to supply the Greek inhabitants with food or employment, the Bulgarian authorities have induced them to agree to their proposal to transfer them to the interior of Bulgaria and Dobrudja.

Mr. Naoum justifiably conjectures: "By this measure they aim at the systematic elimination of the Greek population of Macedonia, with the sinister intention of destroying the present Greek character of the country." The Bulgars are only doing in Greek Macedonia what they have already done in the Morava Valley. They wish to rid themselves of inconvenient Serb and Greek populations and to replace them by Bulgars, in order that they may be able at the Peace Conference, or in their preliminary intrigues with the Entente and neutral Powers, to point out "the purely Bulgar character of these occupied provinces.

It is not without interest that the "Alliance of Bulgarian Scholars, Writers and Artists" is at this moment renewing its intrigues in Switzerland with a view to cajoling the Entente Powers. In THE NEW EUROPE (No. 32) attention was called to the activities of this "Alliance," and it was there pointed out that though the Bulgarian Government pretends to express great indignation with these activities, it must in fact find them of great value to the Bulgarian cause. An interesting confirmation of this conjecture is supplied in the fact that the latest representative sent by the "Alliance" to Switzerland is Mr. Milev, editor of the official *Echo de Bulgarie*. If Mr. Pejev, editor of Gešov's paper the *Mir*, has done good service recently to Mr. Radoslavov, it is only fair that Mr. Milev should return the compliment by helping Mr. Gešov's attempted intrigue

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with the Western Powers. We again recommend our readers to watch the activities of the "Alliance of Bulgarian Scholars, Writers and Artists."

BELISARIUS.

Russian Revelations : Lenin Exposed

LAST week in THE NEW EUROPE, "Rurik," while rightly protesting against the unjust and fickle tendency of certain Western reactionaries to "write off" Kerenski at the first news of a rival claimant to his power, laid equal emphasis upon the need for purging the Soviet of certain shady elements whose continued presence is an offence to all good Russians. Just as the German General Staff had its agents in the late Imperial family and among the Army chiefs of the old *régime*, so the foulest methods of secret service have been employed to instil German corruption into the counsels of the Revolution. Just as it is beyond all dispute that many even of the most extreme Maximalists are men of high character and genuine idealism—though betrayed by ill-digested theories into a demand for obvious impossibilities—so it is by now equally notorious that among them are men who have received the money and followed the directions of Berlin. In Petrograd their names are in every mouth, and it is imperative that the new Russian Government should take prompt and drastic steps to end for ever their influence upon the revolutionary movement. Delay might fatally compromise a noble cause.

The following letter amply justifies the suspicion with which their leader Lenin had long been regarded. It was addressed by General Denikin to Mr. Kerenski, and was published in the first number (24 July) of the new Russian weekly, *Bez Lišnih Slov* (Without Superfluous Words), edited by the Socialist leader, Gregory Alexinski. The name of the editor, already well known in the West for his very important books on "Russia and Europe" and "Russia and the War," is in itself a guarantee of good faith.

"On 8 May this year the Germans conveyed to the rear of the VI. Army Yermolenko, ensign of the 16th Siberian Regiment. On being cross-examined by the staff of the VI. Army and by the staff under me, he explained that he had been imprisoned in Germany since 1914. He had there, owing to a mistake, received a large amount of Ukrainian literature and correspondence addressed not

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to him, Dmitri Yermolenko, but to Stephen, who was evidently a popular Ukrainian politician, as the letters came from Lemberg, Vienna, and other places.

"Probably on the basis of this correspondence the Germans concluded that in Yermolenko they had an influential representative of a whole political party. For this reason they decided to make use of him for their own ends. They proposed to Yermolenko to send him to Russia as though he had escaped from prison. In Russia he was to free himself from military service, and, without counting the cost, he was to conduct an agitation by every means possible in order to obtain the following ends:—

- (1) The removal of the Provisional Government, and especially the retirement of Miljukov and Gučkov.
- (2) The separation of the Ukraine from Russia as an independent State.
- (3) The immediate conclusion of peace between Germany and Russia.

"After long conversations with the Germans, and on the advice of his comrades, who were also imprisoned officers, Ensign Yermolenko agreed to the proposal and received 1,500 roubles for his initial expenses, with the agreement that he was to receive 8,000 roubles monthly. He was then conveyed secretly to the rear of the Russian Army.

"According to the instructions of the German officers, Yermolenko was to report to, and receive money from, a Ukrainian in Russia, Skoropis-Yoltuhovski, who had been entrusted with the same task by the Germans, and who received money from Germany through Stockholm from a certain Svendson, who was in the German Embassy there.

"The same German officers explained to him that after the Berlin meeting of Socialists, at which Lenin and Skoropis-Yoltuhovski were present, Lenin was entrusted with the same task by the Germans. Lenin received money from people in Stockholm who were in touch with Berlin. Lenin and Skoropis-Yoltuhovski were to keep in contact with one another, just as Yermolenko was to keep in touch with Yoltuhovski. In case of treachery, Yermolenko would be condemned to death.

"In informing you of the above, I ask you not to refuse to make known to me what decision you take. I also enclose documents which have been received from Yermolenko, who has been detained for the present in Mogilev."

[Gen. Denikin has since been implicated in the Kornilov plot, but this does not of course in any way affect the evidence contained in the above letter.—ED.]

YERMOLENKO'S OWN STATEMENT

The following additional information was supplied by Yermolenko himself:—

"(1) I was sent to Russia by the German Government with the

RUSSIAN RELATIONS: LENIN EXPOSED

same task as was entrusted to Lenin and Yoltuhovski, who came from Berlin on 11 April 1917.

" (2) Lenin was instructed to agitate for peace and to try by every method to undermine the confidence of the nation in the Provisional Government, and to remove, by every means in his power, the Minister of War (Gučkov) and the Minister of Foreign Affairs (Miljukov), who were an obstacle to German aims for the conclusion of peace. He was also to secure the removal of any of their successors who might follow the same policy.

" (3) Yoltuhovski had the following commission. He was to arouse in the Ukraine the idea of the separation of the Ukraine from Russia and the idea of propaganda for an immediate peace. He was also to try and get those Ministers removed who were opposed to the conclusion of peace.

" (4) Unlimited funds were given to carry out this propaganda. Money from the German Government was received in the following way. In Stockholm at the German Embassy there was a certain Svendson, through whom Lenin and Yoltuhovski received cheques on Russian banks.

" (5) All reports were to be handed to Svendson, who would forward them.

" (6) In Berlin there were two meetings of Socialists in which Lenin and Yoltuhovski took part. Lenin always kept by Yoltuhovski. I learnt of this from Shiditski and Lübers, who were on the General Staff in Berlin, and also from the Inspector of the Ukrainian Regiment, Captain Kadak, and from others.

" (7) Captain Shiditski said that in case Yoltuhovski were arrested, Potocki would be appointed President of the Union for the Liberation of the Ukraine, and that an announcement would be made to this effect in one of the Ukrainian papers in Kiev, to which I was to refer for instructions and money.

" (8) When I left Germany I was given 1,500 roubles for expenses."

Austro-German Intrigue in the Ukraine

OF all the national questions which this war has brought to an issue, none is more obscure and more open to misinterpretation than that of the Ukraine. In Nos. 42 and 43 of *THE NEW EUROPE* an attempt was made to summarise the historical development of the Ukraine, and the influence of the Russian Revolution upon its fortunes. It has too long been the fashion to decry the Ukraine movement as artificial and meaningless—a standpoint only possible to those who have never come into contact with its leaders in Eastern Galicia, and to whom the name of the poet Sevcenko and all that it denotes to his struggling compatriots are a sealed

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book. While, however, we accord our full sympathy to the Ukraine in its resolve to secure free national development on its own lines, in close accord with its Great Russian kinsmen, we think it necessary to draw attention to certain dangers in the movement, which its leaders must set themselves to counteract, if they are to avoid being fatally compromised.

During this war Germany has set herself deliberately to exploit for her own purely selfish ends more than one genuine movement which seemed capable of being twisted to the detriment of her enemies. It is notorious that in Ireland, in Flanders, in Poland alike, she has cared not one rap for the instruments which she has employed or for the cause to which the more reputable of them were ready to sacrifice themselves. In the Ukraine, too, she is following a similar policy, in the hope of hastening the dissolution of Russia and not merely preventing her from obtaining Constantinople, but even cutting off her access to the Black Sea. It is curious to note that the late Chancellor should have dabbled in this project, which was during the Crimean War associated with the group of Prussian politicians led by his father.

The following statement, communicated by the Russian War Office to the *Russkoye Slovo* of 2 September, throws an interesting light upon this latest German intrigue in Southern Russia. It is most satisfactory to know that the Rada (National Council) in Kiev, under its President, Professor Houševsky, the intellectual leader of the Ukraine movement, has consistently refused to enter into relations with the *Bund zur Befreiung der Ukraine* ("Union for the Liberation of the Ukraine,") or to support its insidious appeal to support the return of various doubtful individuals to Russia. As has already been pointed out in our pages, the solution favoured by the Rada and all its responsible leaders, is that of a Federal Republic, with due regard to essential unity in foreign relations. Only the agents of Germany seek to promote the idea of complete Ukrainian independence, being well aware that such a claim cannot, for vital geographical and economic reasons be conceded by Russia, and that its assertion would therefore render grave internecine troubles, if not open civil war, inevitable.

"The Union for the Liberation of the Ukraine was created in

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the beginning of August, 1914. It was based on the firm conviction then prevailing in Austria that the Austrian troops would soon occupy parts of Russian Ukraine. The object of the Union was to get to work hand in hand with the Galician Ukrainian organisations in those parts of the Ukraine occupied by the Austrians, and to conduct there an agitation in favour of the union of Russian and Austrian Ukraine under the sceptre of the Habsburg Monarchy.

"The Union was composed entirely of Russian subjects. The following political *émigrés* living in Austria took part in it: A. Skoropis-Yoltuhovski, M. Melenevski, A. Žuk, V. Dorešenko, D. Dontsov, and N.N. Zaliznyak. Many Ukrainian *émigrés* refused to join the Union, partly because of the very strong Austrian influence in it and partly because the first three members here mentioned were not regarded favourably.

"Owing to the connection between the Union and the Austrian Government Dontsov and Zaliznyak severed their connections.

"When Austrian hopes of occupying the Russian Ukraine came to nothing, the members of the Union went to Vienna. Those who remained in the Union severed their connection with the Galician organisations and bound themselves still more closely to the Austrian Government. At that time the Austrian Government began to make use of the Union as a weapon for achieving their own aims, which had nothing in common with the interests of the Ukraine. Yoltuhovski, Melenevski, Žuk and Dorešenko carried out various commissions for the Austrian Government, as, for example, the dispatch of agents to Russia, Roumania, Bulgaria and Turkey as spies for the Central Powers.

"At that time the idea was conceived of separating the Russian Ukrainian prisoners of war from the rest of the prisoners and placing them in separate camps for the purpose of spreading ideas favoured by the Austrian Government. The Ukrainians were sent to the camp at Freistadt and the work of propaganda in this camp was entrusted to members of the Union.

GERMAN CONTROL

"This happened just at the time when Germany began to take control of all Austrian measures. The Germans laid their hands also on the Union, and, although it continued for some time to work in Austria, it was already under the control of the Germans. The Germans tried to get as many Ukrainians as possible to join the Union and for this purpose they spent large sums of money, which were supplied by the German Government. The Germans also made use of the names of leading Ukrainians without their knowledge or permission.

"At first the Austrians did not know that the Union was working with the Germans. When the Austrian Government was convinced that this was so, it grew very cool towards the Union, and the latter gradually transferred its activities to Germany, being placed directly under the German Government.

"The main propaganda of the Union was for the complete

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separation of the Ukraine from Russia, with the object of forming an independent State which would be in the orbit of the Central Powers. The German General Staff, which controlled the activities of the Union, began to select amongst the Ukrainian prisoners people suitable for sending to Russia with the object of doing propaganda in the Russian Ukraine in favour of complete separation from Russia and the immediate conclusion of peace. They were also to act as spies for the German Government.

"Up to the present this Department has been under the control of von Lübers, of the German General Staff, and the organisation of the camp for Ukrainians has been under the charge of General Friedrich. He has also had charge of the instruction of teachers, speakers, and writers, which include the following Russian subjects: Gavrilka (from the Government of Poltava); Podolko and Orišenko (from Podolia); and Ščerpin (from Kherson).

GERMAN GOLD.

"Those who worked in this direction were Skoropis-Yoltuhovski, the President of the Union, and his closest associate, Melenevski. In the German Foreign Office those who had charge of this question were von Bergen and Trautmann. The German Government spent large sums of money on propaganda and on the dispatch of agents to Russia. The President of the Union, Skoropis-Yoltuhovski, received large sums of money every month for his expenses. His associates received 1,200 marks monthly; those who were chosen by the Union to agitate in the camps received 600 marks monthly; and those who were sent into Russia received a lump sum of 1,000 roubles.

"Independently of this the German Government also spent a considerable sum of money upon organising amongst the Ukrainian prisoners of war a party of *Sečeviki*. The first regiment of *Sečeviki* was formed from these prisoners in order to fight against Russia. The chief part in this organisation was taken by Skoropis-Yoltuhovski.

"All these facts are confirmed by documental evidence in the possession of the Russian military authorities. Besides these details the following may also be added. After the occupation of Cholm by the German armies, the 'Union for the Liberation of the Ukraine' sent a telegram of congratulation to William. This telegram was printed in the *Vyestnik Soyuza* and signed by Dorešenko and Melenevski. In the year 1915 the Union published a pamphlet in Munich calling upon Germany to liberate the Ukraine from the Russian yoke. In August 1914 the Union appealed to Sweden and Bulgaria, calling upon them to join with the Ukraine against Muscovite barbarism. The appeal to the Bulgarian people was printed in the Sofia paper *Utvo* with the help of the Austrian Legation. At the end of 1914 Melenevski went to Constantinople to the Turkish Minister of Foreign Affairs, Talaat Bey, to ask him to help the Ukraine in its desire to separate from Russia. The latter promised to give his help."

Maximilian Harden on Alsace-Lorraine and Peace

[The following is a summary of that portion of Maximilian Harden's article in *Die Zukunft* (30 June 1917) which dealt with the prevailing situation. It will be remembered that after this issue *Die Zukunft* was suppressed. In spite of its unusual interest this article has passed almost unnoticed by the British press.]

After stating that the four paragraphs of the official German answer to the resolution of the French Chamber demanding the restoration of Alsace-Lorraine fall under the four heads: Justice, The Right of Nations, World Conscience, The Will of the People, the article proceeds: "The announcement of these principles, which they violated in 1871, would lead one to suppose that the Germans contemplated restoring Alsace-Lorraine. But no, they intend to keep it. . . . The Wilhelmstrasse organ says: 'The people of Alsace-Lorraine wish to remain German.' This is a strange assertion coming from the mouthpiece of the Hohenzollerns. It was not the opinion in Berlin in the time of Louis XIV. . . . The Prussian Minister, Schmettau, said quite plainly in his letters to Prince Eugène and the Duke of Marlborough in 1709: 'It is well known that the Alsations are more French than the Parisians.' When the Prussian Chancellor, Hardenberg, demanded on 4 August 1815 that Alsace and the Netherlands, Meuse, Moselle and Saar fortresses should be taken from the French, he based the demand on the necessity of guaranteeing military safety for the neighbouring States, and agreed on this point with the Württemberg Minister, Count Wintzingerode, who wrote: 'We must demand Alsace-Lorraine as guarantees of German safety.' On 19 September 1870, when Jules Favre emphasised the attachment of the people of Alsace-Lorraine to France, Bismarck replied: 'I know the people do not like us.' The Chancellor Bethmann, as recently as 4 December 1913, admitted in the Reichstag that nothing could be done with Alsace-Lorraine if they were firmly resolved on Prussianising the inhabitants. The Zabern scandal was being dealt with at the time. In spite of the conditions revealed, Germany acted as though she were prepared to give complete autonomy to Alsace-Lorraine; to-day the talk is of Prussianisation or partition. . . .

ATTITUDE OF GERMAN SOCIALISTS.

"It is a fact (a fact which cannot be disputed by the utmost zeal of the Scheidemann fraction) that Bebel, Liebnicht, and Schweitzer were strongly opposed to the annexation. A quarter of a century ago Friedrich Engels, the friend of Marx and his collaborator in formulating the dogmas of Socialism, wrote: 'German Social Democracy could neither exercise nor retain power without repairing the wrong done to other nations by its predecessors in office. It must prepare the way for the restoration of Poland, so basely betrayed

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to-day by the French *bourgeoisie*; it must put North Slesvig and Alsace-Lorraine in a position to decide their own political future unfettered.' This is what only the Independent Socialist Party (Haase-Bernstein) wants now. And the Soviet has announced that it would not condemn the restoration of Alsace-Lorraine to France as an annexation. It refuses to consider any further extension of territory, for the idea of Imperialism, that ambiguous word, is abhorrent to it, and therefore the Allies are asked to oblige them by entering into fresh conversations over the war aims."

Reviews

The Memoirs of a Balkan Diplomatist: Chedomille Mijatović. 1917 (Cassell). 16s. net. Some special reference is due to what, we believe, is the first volume of Serbian memoirs ever published in English. Though perhaps somewhat unequal in quality, it is always interesting, and the reader cannot fail to be arrested by the fresh and original outlook of this veteran diplomatist. From a historical point of view the most valuable passages are those relating to the secret treaty concluded by Serbia with Austria-Hungary in 1881, while Mr. Mijatović was Foreign Minister, and to the Bucarest Treaty of 1886 (following upon the Serbo-Bulgarian war) at which he acted as sole delegate for Serbia. The treaty of 1881 was the direct result of Russia's *désintéressement* in Serbia, as expressed in the Bulgarophil project of San Stefano and the abandonment of Bosnia to Austria-Hungary. Indeed, Count Šuvalov, acting for Prince Gorčakov himself, bluntly informed Serbia's Russophil Premier, Jovan Ristić—when he presented himself at the Congress of Berlin—that he need not look for help to Russia, and had far better address himself to Austria-Hungary. This was nothing less than a reversion to the ideas prevalent under Joseph II. and Catherine the Great, by which Turkey's European possessions were to fall into two spheres of influence, a Russian and an Austrian. The Serbs had no alternative save to negotiate in Vienna, and concluded a secret convention for five years, by which Austria-Hungary recognised their right to annex Kosovo and Macedonia (except Salonica) and promised her support to the Obrenović dynasty, while Serbia undertook not to agitate in Bosnia and to conclude no secret treaties without notifying their contents to Vienna. Austria-Hungary's proposal that in the event of a war in the Balkans her army should be free to pass through Serbia, was postponed for decision at a later date. As Mr. Mijatović is fully entitled to point out, this convention was one of the main reasons which made it possible to proclaim Serbia as a kingdom, and which produced Austrian intervention against Bulgaria in 1885. To-day there is piquancy in the knowledge that Francis Joseph as long ago as 1881 formally recognised Serbia's national claim to Macedonia.

Mr. Mijatović makes no attempt to conceal the criminal folly of

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King Milan's attack on Bulgaria in 1885. Apparently the king himself told him that his object was not mere compensation for Bulgaria's acquisition of Roumelia, but the deliberate provocation of war between Russia and Austria. He also hints, in view of what Milan told him of conversations with his boon companion Crown Prince Rudolf, that the latter may have been in the plot. King Alexander once described the author as "not a politician at all, but a monk who has lost his way to his convent": and the book is full of lively anecdotes illustrating his unconventional and outspoken methods of diplomacy. There is, too, a steady current of mysticism and occultism, as is only fitting in one whose mother was for six years of her childhood apprenticed to a famous witch and soothsayer! He gives an account of the famous prophecy of the peasant Mata Popović in 1868, and of the séance which foretold the assassination of Alexander and Draga and various other incidents which seem to attest his own psychic powers.

R. W. S. W.

Le Monde Slave: Revue Mensuelle, edited by Ernest Denis and Robert de Caix. Paris (21, rue Cassette). No. 1 (July), No. 2 (August). 3 francs each. We recommend very cordially to our readers this admirable new publication, which has the collaboration of all the leading Slavists of France.

The latest number contains four notable articles—a long first-hand account of Serbian heroism by Mr. V. Lebedev, acting Minister of Marine in Russia, who himself fought as a volunteer in the Serbian ranks; a survey of the Austrian Parliament and its activity during the summer, by Professor Denis, of the Sorbonne; "The Czecho-Slovaks and the War," by Mr. Edvard Beneš (author of "Germany and the Habsburg Problem" in No. 41 of THE NEW EUROPE, and "Albania in European Politics," by the well-known publicist M. René Pinon.

Few who have read the British Blue Book will feel disposed to resent the judgment of Mr. A. P. Hacobian in *Armenia and the War* (Hodder and Stoughton, pp. xvii + 200, 2s. 6d. net) when he says (p. 13) that the Armenian atrocities "constitute a terrible and lasting reproach to the European diplomacy of our time." The European diplomacy of the last forty years cannot escape its share of the blame; it has by now a good many "terrible and lasting reproaches" to its account, but the case of Armenia has proved to be the worst. If the Allies are to make good their pretensions to the championship of the small and oppressed nationalities, they cannot, as Mr. Hacobian fears may be the case, allow the question of Armenia to be pushed aside by other "more important questions" which will be discussed at the Peace Conference. The Allies have, indeed, in their Note to President Wilson, pledged themselves to deliver "the people who lie beneath the murderous tyranny of the Turks." It remains for them to translate their vague promise into practical politics.

G. G.

NOTES

Kerenski and Černov

After having overthrown one rival Kerenski is now face to face with another. Kornilov's movement has been suppressed, but there remains a still more dangerous movement under the leadership of Černov. It was not enough to put down counter-revolution on the Right without adopting the same measures towards the extremists on the Left. The whole essence of the Maximalist movement is quick and decisive action, and unless Kerenski acts with the same speed and decision, he cannot hope to overcome it. He has already made the first move in an open attack on Černov in the press, but he is now waiting for the Democratic Congress on 25 September to endorse his action. In the forthcoming Congress Kerenski's whole position is at stake. He has proclaimed the principles of a Coalition Government, while the C.W.S.D. demands all power for the Socialists. Hitherto this doctrine has failed to find a majority in the C.W.S.D., and so long as that was the case, Kerenski's policy of forming a coalition was a feasible one. The coming Democratic Congress is a trial of strength, not only between Kerenski and Černov, but between two policies. Kerenski stands for democracy on a sound national basis, while Černov upholds the class war and the negation of the very idea of nationality. Under existing conditions the triumph of Černov could only be shortlived, and the failure which would then follow would mean the postponement of democracy in Russia to an indefinite future. All true friends of democracy are with Kerenski, recognising that his fall would be a severe blow, not only to Russia, but to the Allies. With Černov and what he stands for the West cannot compromise.

Russian Troops in England

There were few who did not believe the story of Russian troops in England in the autumn of 1914. Though the story has long since been dismissed as one of the many hysterical rumours of the first months of the war, it is interesting to learn after three years that there *was* some foundation for it. During the recent Suhomlinov trial extracts from letters written by Suhomlinov to Yanuškevič, then Chief of Staff, were read in Court. What will interest our readers most is the following :—

“The English Minister of War asks that Cossacks be sent to England to strengthen the English Army. This idea pleases the Emperor very much.”

Count Bernstorff's New Post

When he left Washington Count Bernstorff already stood convicted of plotting murder, theft and treachery on a grand scale. The mass of fresh documentary evidence just published by the

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United States Government gives added piquancy to the recent announcement in the German Press that Count Bernstorff has been appointed German Ambassador at Constantinople. With such ruffians as Enver and Talaat to deal with he will be in his true element.

The Birth Rate in Hungary

No figures are as yet available as to the total casualties of the Great War, although the deaths from wounds and disease (exclusive of the civilian population) have been estimated at the appalling figure of 7,000,000. But some idea of conditions inside the Central Empires may be obtained from the statistics recently published in Hungary. In the *Világ* of 26 August Dr. Julius Rác, a well-known Magyar statistician, publishes a long article entitled "The Decline of the Population." "Hungary's losses alone" (*i.e.*, without Austria), he writes, "in heroic dead, are reckoned at 700,000 to the end of 1916. Nor can we as yet even approximately count the number of incurables, cripples unfit for work, and deaths hastened by war privations." The number of births in Hungary, which in 1912 and 1914 was 765,891 and 746,911 respectively (*i.e.*, 36.3 and 34.7 per 1,000), fell in 1915 to 481,819 (22.4 p.t.), and in 1916 to 333,551 (15.6 p.t.)—in other words, by more than half. Meanwhile the number of deaths among the civilian population has only fallen from 506,144 in 1914 to 428,057 in 1916. It is at once apparent that there has been a terrible increase in mortality, for the huge drop in the birth rate shows that infant mortality plays a lesser part than in normal times, while the number of deaths shows no real decrease in proportion to the wholesale withdrawal of men from civilian life. Thus, while in 1914 there was an excess of 240,767 births over deaths in the civilian population of Hungary, there was in 1915 and 1916 an excess of 48,482 and 94,506 deaths over births. Somewhat similar losses have probably been recorded in Austria and Germany.

Errata

In "Villehardouin's" article on "M. Painlevé and the French Socialists" (No. 49) an unfortunate error of translation has crept in. At the foot of p. 291, in the sentence "These three deputies . . . have never forgiven M. Thomas for having laid down, in Russia itself, conditions which excluded the French Majority Socialists from participation in the international Socialist conference"—the italicised words should be replaced by "the conditions on which alone the French Majority Socialists would participate."

No. 49, page 319, line 31, for "makes capital out of British capital" read "makes capital out of British silence."

The New Europe

VOL. IV, No. 51

[REGISTERED FOR TRANSMISSION AT
THE INLAND NEWSPAPER RATE]

4 October 1917

The Economic Weapon

It is becoming increasingly clear that, whatever may happen in the near future on the battle-fronts, the Allies possess in their immense concentration and control of economic resources a weapon which must ultimately, if they hold together, decide the war in their favour. Indeed, they could win the war by this means even if (*absit omen!*) they did not all hold together: for the Western Powers alone would be sufficient to drive the weapon home. This conclusion is not everywhere accepted, it is true, by our pessimists, some of whom are so committed to the invincibility of the German military machine and the impossibility of reaching a "decision," that they seem to regard Germany's economic resources as a sort of widow's curse, subject to miraculous renewal. But the Germans themselves know better, and it may be worth while to draw attention to some recent German evidence on the subject.

The German military authorities, as we now know, had not thought out beforehand the economic implications of a protracted war with the seas closed against them. A conference was indeed summoned at the Ministry of the Interior in May, 1914, at which representatives of commerce, agriculture, industry and handicraft, were present, to discuss the economic problems arising out of war. This gathering, as was stated by a speaker at the meeting of the executive of the German Trade Conference (*Handelstag*) on 9 August, 1916, "looked forward confidently, as regards economic preparedness, to a war even with England as an enemy and with a complete blockade of the North Sea." But the published report goes on to recall the fact that this confidence was based on an estimate "of a war of one year's duration at the outside." When war was launched at the end of July, 1914, there were large stocks of every kind of war material in hand. Moreover, as has been pointed out by Professor Tyszka of Berlin in his recently published book on German fiscal policy, the end of July is the period of the year when German grain stocks happen

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to be at their highest, for the yearly imports of wheat reach their maximum in July, while the export of rye, by which the Junkers set such store, is greatest in September.* But no sooner had war broken out with Great Britain than the German authorities realised the serious possibilities involved, and within less than a week a special "Raw materials section" of the Prussian War Office had been organised, with Dr. Walther Rathenau, one of the most prominent German business magnates, at its head, with instructions to accumulate stores from every source on which he could lay hands. Rathenau's purchasing agents did their best, and their efforts, coming at a time before the British blockade of neutrals was strictly enforced, have undoubtedly protracted the war; but they were faced with what the intelligent part of the German public now fully recognises to have been an impossible task.

This is clear from the very frank statements which are now allowed to be made on the subject. Several of these have lately been made available to British readers in the very well-selected extracts published in *The Times* under the heading "Through German Eyes." Two of them are worth recalling, because of the significance attaching to the quarter from which they proceed. General von Freytag-Loringhoven, who was Quartermaster-General in the field at the beginning of the war, is summarised by a reviewer in the *Frankfurter Zeitung* as admitting that "the power of a radical decision of a world-war has slipped away from the armies and that the strategical situation is conditioned by the world-economic situation." It is owing to Germany's unfavourable position in this regard, he continues, quoted textually, that "victories which once would have been absolutely decisive, and the conquest of whole kingdoms, have not brought us nearer to peace." Coming from a soldier, this is a remarkable confession of the limitations of military force. If it does not yet spell the bankruptcy of militarism—for the soldiers still hope to use the "kingdoms"

* The figures are: wheat import (average over years 1908-11), July, 247,000 tons; February, 119,000 tons. Rye export: September, 101,080 tons; July, 19,000 tons. As Professor Tyszka remarks, "If the war had broken out in the late winter or early spring there would have been a quite extraordinary shortage of corn, more especially of wheat." It is, perhaps, worth while recalling in this connection that the Agadir crisis also occurred in July.

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they have conquered as pawns to bargain with—it shows that they know, better than some of our own faint-hearts, that the sword is not all-powerful in the modern world, and that of the two weapons, the military and the economic, the latter is incomparably the more inexorable.

The other testimony, by Dr. Friedrich Naumann, is still more remarkable, for it amounts to the virtual recantation of the very article of faith for which his name has become famous. In two recent issues of the *Die Hilfe*, Naumann has been appealing to the old Free Trade doctrines of international harmony and the mutual dependence of nations, which he declares to be endangered by the Allied economic control, or, as he picturesquely calls it, forgetting for a moment the German levies and requisitions in Belgium, Poland, and elsewhere, their "organisation of economic death." One rubs one's eyes on reading sentiments like these, for the whole argument of *Mittleuropa* and of the propagandists of Berlin-Bagdad was based on the idea that the era of free-trade internationalism had passed beyond recall (very misleading statements were constantly made by this school of writers about British colonial policy in this connection) and that the twentieth-century was to witness the establishment of a new Balance of Power, no longer in Europe but over the whole world, through the emergence of a small number of highly-organized, ring-fenced, self-dependent "Empires" or "economic blocks" (*Wirtschaftsgebiete*). Of these the area controlled by the Economic General Staff in Berlin, whether it included only Central and South-Eastern Europe, or stretched to the Persian Gulf, or extended through Egypt to Central Africa, was to be, if not the largest, certainly the most efficiently managed.

Naumann is neither a statesman nor an economist, and his judgment on the question at issue would not by itself carry much weight. But he is an extremely able and attractive writer and has a peculiar gift of interpretation which enables him to express at any given moment just what millions of common men are obscurely feeling. There is a certain grim humour about his conversion to a belief in the need for closer commercial intercourse between the nations. He and his compatriots have been living for over two years in a large "economic block" which seemed

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in 1915, when *Mitteleuropa* was published, a vast domain full of fruitful possibilities. They have discovered by painful experience what any text-book of commercial geography might have told them if they had pondered its lessons—that life in a community without an adequate supply of cotton, wool, silk, leather, and jute, of animal and vegetable fats, of lubricating oil, of tea, coffee and cocoa, of copper, tin, nickel and other even more indispensable metals, not to speak of foodstuffs, is so squalid and lowering as to be almost unendurable. If the British public knew the full truth as to the condition of the civilian population in the Central Empires, more especially in the urban districts, it would at once be less inclined to grumble at its own discomforts and would have a better understanding of the increasing emphasis laid by German speakers, official and non-official, on the necessity of securing favourable “economic peace-terms”—in other words, a settlement which will enable them to replenish their exhausted supplies of food, clothing, and other necessities within a reasonable period after the conclusion of hostilities. Every intelligent German now realises that in this matter Germany is dependent on the goodwill of her present enemies. That is the explanation of Herr von Kühlmann’s references to Scripture and of his sudden discovery of the solidarity of the “peninsula of Europe.”

What is the bearing of this situation upon the policy of the Allies?

It is obvious, in the first place, that they cannot accept, or even consider, the German invitation, so bluntly held out to them by the Chancellor, to enter into negotiations on the basis of bargaining for territory in exchange for economic concessions. The Allied peace terms are absolute, which admit of no bargaining, and the fact that the enemy still hopes to contrive a peace by means of eighteenth-century chaffering of this kind is the best proof that the spirit which we are determined to exorcise is still alive within him.

The same consideration rules out the proposal which has been made in some quarters, that the Allies should invite the Central Powers to make peace by a certain date and threaten them with post-war economic reprisals varying in duration or intensity according to the length of their

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subsequent resistance. If the Allied Governments are in earnest, as their peoples assuredly are, in their desire to see a new world-order emerge out of the chaos and horror of the war, they cannot afford to sully the prospect by binding themselves, even conditionally, to prolong the war atmosphere beyond the conclusion of hostilities. We are fighting for peace with all the weapons at our command, the economic weapon included, but the peace we desire is a real peace.

The fact that it is impossible to use the economic weapon as a basis of negotiation does not, however, condemn the Allies to inaction on the "economic front." The time has come when they might well take stock of their economic position and make plain to the world, including the German people, what that position is and how they intend to make use of it. In other words, they might embark on the attempt, from which they have too long and too cautiously refrained, to dissipate some of the misunderstandings which have arisen concerning the Paris Resolutions and to show how they intend to embody in their economic policy the principles and ideals already expounded in other connections.

The Paris Resolutions have been frequently represented in the Allied countries, especially in America, as embodying a policy of reaction dictated by protectionist interests. Most of those who hold this familiar view have never read the Resolutions or the preamble by which they are conditioned and are imperfectly informed as to the far-reaching German policy to which they were a belated reply. In reality, of course, the Paris Resolutions, framed as they were in June, 1916, during the critical days of the Verdun attack, served a double purpose. They were partly defensive, and looked forward to the possibility of a "war after the war" against a Germany in secure possession of *Mittleuropa*. They are certainly open to criticism on that score as a policy of despair, but not as a policy of reaction; for against such a Power the economic boycott would have been the only remaining refuge of civilisation. But in so far as they envisaged action by the Entente and neutral Powers amongst themselves, the preamble, with its insistence on an international standard of commercial fair dealing, will remain memorable for the way in which it boldly set what has hitherto been regarded as the selfish concern of separate Governments upon an international

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footing: and the same applies to the resolution as to the co-operative organisation necessary for the apportionment of supplies at the end of the war. All that is needed in this connection is that the Allies should bring their policy up to date by adapting it to the present economic position, which is very different from that which prevailed, or was believed to prevail, in June, 1916. At that time it was still possible to think of the post-war economic situation in terms of *markets*: to-day it is obvious that the dominating factor is *supplies*. No manufacturing country will be able to resume its export trade on the old basis or even to demobilise its armies till it has secured the raw materials which are essential to industrial production.

The world-shortage of supplies, and of shipping to convey them from producing to consuming and manufacturing countries, will therefore be, if not the most important, certainly the most urgent, problem which will confront the world on the close of hostilities. It will be the first international task of the new world-order: and on the way in which it is carried out will depend the spirit and atmosphere that will prevail during all the other difficult labours—the fixing of frontiers, the safeguarding of minorities, the rehabilitation of public right—on which the Powers will be closely engaged for many months after the first urgent questions have been disposed of. It is extremely important, therefore, that the ground should be carefully prepared for the satisfactory handling of this problem.

The time would seem to be ripe, then, for a new economic conference, to revise and bring up to date the findings of the conference of June, 1916. It should not be a conference of the Allies in the narrow sense—that is, of the signatories to the Pact of London—but of all the Powers, great and small, which have either declared war on Germany or broken off relations with her. It should be summoned for the purpose of considering the post-war economic situation, and of discussing how best the resources of the various States could be organised in the interests of their own peoples and of the civilised world. Such a conference, when it met, would find itself compelled, like its predecessor, to abandon the self-regarding competitive outlook and to fall back on co-operative methods. It would inevitably be driven to consider how the existing inter-ally system of

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economic control could best be adapted to post-war purposes and to the needs of neutrals. The result would probably be the organisation of something which could be described as a relief commission, with comprehensive powers in respect of shipping and supplies to tide over the period when the pressure of the shortage will be most severe. There is good ground for believing that such a plan is both practicable, in the light of recent experience, and would be acceptable to the Powers chiefly concerned.

If such a plan were adopted, it should be made clear to the Central Powers that when they have accepted the Allied terms, including, of course, full reparation by the guilty parties for the ravages of war and acts done in violation of international law, there is no desire to penalise them further or to hinder their recuperation. Their peoples should be offered, under these conditions, a proportionate share in the controlled supplies and ensured against any legal restriction upon their legitimate trading activities at the expiration of the period of trade control. No pledge or action by Governments, of course, can give back to the German trading community the confidence of individual dealers or purchasers in the countries they have antagonised.

No doubt, this will not give the German Government what it is now seeking to obtain, which is unrestricted freedom to compete with the Entente Powers and neutrals during the immediate post-war period. This demand, however, can in no case be conceded, for, apart from the fact that it would leave the door open to the import of war-material, the result of such competition both in raising prices and in sowing discord between the Powers can easily be imagined. As reparation would involve the handing over to the Allies and neutrals of German tonnage equal in amount to what they have illegally sunk, it is not likely that, in the event of an Allied victory, Germany would have many ships left to compete with. On the other hand, even if Germany were able to retain such of her merchant fleet as remains to her, the Allies would still be in a position to make it very difficult for her ships to load goods, even if they were free to cross the seas to fetch them. Once Germany has faced the inexorable facts, she will, therefore, have powerful reasons for acquiescing in an international arrangement.

ATTICUS.

“The Freedom of the Seas”

GERMAN propaganda in neutral countries was for long at a disadvantage owing to the general dislike in which Prussian militarism was held. The character of German military power, alike in its high mechanical efficiency and in its ruthless disregard of personal feelings and personal freedom, was well known all over the continent of Europe: and events so recent as the Zabern incident of 1913 had served to keep alive a healthy detestation of it. The success of the German arms at the outset quite failed to obscure the ugly side of German militarism, because it was accompanied—we may go further and say it was partly secured—by methods of the utmost brutality which no mere military exigency could explain or condone. The invasion of Belgium proved that the spirit of Colonel Reutter prevailed throughout the German army, and that the excesses of the German troops were not to be classed with the inevitable brutalities of war but were part of the carefully conceived design of the German General Staff. These facts began to sink into the minds even of neutrals friendly to Germany; and German correspondents abroad complained that the prestige of the Fatherland, despite its undeniable military success, was becoming a little dimmed. The fact of German militarism was too notorious: even German officials could not pretend that it did not exist; on the contrary, they gloried in it. The problem, therefore, was to distract attention from it to some feature of the enemy's policy conspicuous enough to bulk largely in neutral eyes. As the war went on, the feature which emerged was the Allies' blockade, the visible expression of British “Navalism.” Emphasis on it would serve the twofold purpose of diverting moral indignation against England and of actually embroiling the greater neutrals—*e.g.*, the United States of America—with the Allies on account of their interference with neutral trade. Every incident that could be invented or distorted was related in leaflets in every European language or thrown on the cinematograph screen: the “Black List,” the *Baralong*, the control of cables and the censorship in general, each served its turn in the great campaign against the Allies and particularly against Great Britain. And a cloak of high and disinterested

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policy was thrown over the whole operation by the invention and propagation of the doctrine of "The Freedom of the Seas."

The doctrine itself was not new. It had been expounded in many forms and at many times. Indeed, under the guise of a discussion of the capture of private property at sea in time of war, it had aroused a good deal of interest in British circles before the war. Lord Loreburn had taken it up and championed it in the *Manchester Guardian* (25, 28, 31 March, 1, 3, 4, 9 April, 1913) in a series of articles which made a profound impression in commercial circles especially on account of his insistence on "the most serious trouble which awaits us when next we find ourselves neutral in some great naval war." Two debates in the House of Commons (1 April, 1913, and 6 May, 1914) carried the subject before a still wider audience and gave Sir Edward Grey the opportunity of making a cautious declaration of the Government's readiness to consider proposals. The question was generally reviewed too exclusively from the point of view of British neutrality in a naval war, and the advocates of the immunity from capture of private seaborne property gave too little account of the effect of their doctrine in Great Britain as a belligerent. It is perhaps worth noting that the present Attorney-General was formerly known as one of the upholders of the reform in question. The practical shape which it took during the years immediately preceding the war was seen in the Declaration of London which, without adopting the entire doctrine, was none the less a partial expression of it. But the Declaration was never embodied in international law and the whole subject took on an entirely different aspect with the outbreak of war.

Germany has revived it for her own purpose. She proclaims a desire for the freedom of the seas on grounds which are obvious to the least careful student of her position behind the blockade of the Allied Powers. The mere sound of the words—Freedom of the Seas—arrests attention. To the incautious mind they convey the conception of a new, generous, international policy under which the horrors of war would be greatly mitigated for the non-combatant civilian populations and all high-handed interference with harmless and kindly neutrals would cease. But, in essence,

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it is a device to enable any great military power to pursue its own policy on land immune from the interference of sea-power. It would operate to increase the aggression of ambitious continental nations, to make neutrals accomplices in European wrong, and to isolate any Power—*e.g.*, Great Britain, or the United States or Japan—whose means of communication with Europe lie solely on the sea. " Military power on land is the indispensable instrument of aggressive political purposes. It has always constituted, and will always constitute, the gravest threat to international peace and the liberty of weaker nations. Sea-power, on the other hand, is comparatively inoffensive. Not only can it not be used effectively for aggressive purposes, except in so far as it is supported by an army, but its function in the history of Europe has been that of guarding the weaker nations against attack by the strongest contemporary army. British sea-power was used to check the aggression of the Spain of Philip II. and the France of Louis XIV. and of Napoleon I. As long as militarism continues to be a serious danger, peaceful neutral nations, by insisting on the emancipation of commerce from interference by sea-power, would be adopting a suicidal policy. . . . The control of commerce in war is now exercised by Great Britain because she possesses a preponderant navy. Rather than that control should be emasculated Great Britain must be allowed to continue its exercise. But Englishmen must recognise that the world will not submit to the *indefinite* perpetuation of an exclusively British dominion of the seas " (*The New Republic*, 7 August, 1915). President Wilson himself, in one of those statements which led up to the enunciation of the doctrine of a League of Nations, has carried the argument to its proper conclusion by declaring that, in the circumstances of the modern world, there must either be no war or no neutrals. And at this very moment his economic policy is the expression of his belief. He has practically given the northern neutrals the choice between Germany and himself. American supplies will be cut off utterly from them unless they cut themselves off from Germany. Herein lies the best possible comment on the German advocacy of freedom of maritime intercourse in time of war. Mr. Wilson himself has used the phrase "Freedom of the Seas" to describe the

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condition of affairs which would prevail under the rule of a League of Nations ; but when he or his spokesmen argue thus they are careful to show that the maritime policy which they have in mind is something different from anything hitherto proclaimed or practised in Europe. "The Freedom of the Seas is intended in the American mind to be something different from British maritime supremacy, German maritime anarchy, or the complicated compromise between despotism and order which is called international law."

The course by which President Wilson has reached his conclusions will repay study. I have not sufficient space here to trace it in any detail. But at the risk of challenge I will summarise it briefly. The blockade policy of the Allies was not many months old before Mr. Wilson saw that it would ultimately force America to choose between the belligerents. His unofficial spokesmen in *The New Republic* and elsewhere left little doubt of the ultimate decision ; but it had to be approached in such a way as to show the American people its real nature. Americans had to realise that "Great Britain had the sea-power and would use it, and that though they themselves possessed the power of economic reprisal they would not use it," because their legal rights against Great Britain were completely overshadowed by the great central fact of the war, that Great Britain was fighting in a just cause. Probably this was the dominant consideration in Mr. Wilson's mind from an early period, and those who read "America United for War" in No. 25 of THE NEW EUROPE will remember the motive which guided his patient diplomacy. It is obvious to us now that he could not foresee the course of events : "the cards of Providence" were not on the table for him to read ; and therefore he could not foretell the time or the occasion when America would be forced to choose between the European belligerents, or indeed whether the occasion of choice would ever arise. He occupied the period allowed him by forcing the American people to face their true international position. His friends in the press, for instance, did not hesitate to say that the Monroe Doctrine and the security of American maritime commerce alike rested on British sea-power—a state of things which could not be allowed to continue. And they pointed out that, to all intents and purposes, America is an island, and that until some valid international and supra-

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national authority is established, the American people must think of their State as linked with the other maritime States of the world, and especially with Great Britain.

American idealism did not permit the President to state the case solely in terms of *Realpolitik* but drove him to evolve his new doctrine whereby a more hopeful state of international affairs could be created. But he was well aware, all the time, that until his League came into active and effective being, there could be no international law which curtailed the defensive power of any nation; and since, in war, offence is the best defence, he perceived that he could no longer speak of the law of nations because it had no sanction behind it and because it was too imperfect an instrument to give justice to either party. As the *law* stood America had actually a better case against the Allies than against Germany; in the *moral* sphere the case was reversed and the whole weight of her judgment must fall against Germany. It was the growing consciousness of this damning antinomy between law and justice that finally brought America into the war and caused her to brush aside the elaborate case which German apologists made against Great Britain. President Wilson clearly saw that the restrictions which, under international law, he might have sought to impose upon the operation of the British blockade, must operate to assist Germany unless he could impose equivalent restraints upon German operations on land—a course which was not open to him. He was therefore compelled to suffer the "illegal" acts of the Allies because he knew their cause to be just, and consequently he left the "freedom of the seas" unchallenged in the hands of Great Britain. He used the British blockade policy as the great and convincing illustration of the necessity of placing so powerful a weapon in the hands of an authority which should represent the universal interest rather than any national interest. He argued, as a matter of course, or inspired others to argue, that "Englishmen must recognise that the world would not submit to the indefinite perpetuation of exclusively British dominion of the seas"; thereby warning Great Britain that the very completeness of her naval supremacy and the success of her blockade would, in after years, plead against her retention of the sole control of the seas in war.

The freedom of the seas is the *status quo* at all times

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except in war. Even German propagandists realise that the ships of all nations move without let or hindrance across the high seas in time of peace. Hugo Haase, on 19 July in the Reichstag, challenged the Jingoos to say what more any nation would want *unless her existence depended on the sea*, and he went on significantly to say that since in peace all nations enjoy it, and since in war the German interest in it cannot for one moment be compared to the British in terms of national existence, the German demand for freedom of the seas was a demand, not for equality of maritime opportunity between Germany and Great Britain, but for the destruction of the only line of defence which the latter possessed. A very brief consideration of the question shows that the nations have a very unequal interest in the freedom of the seas. If the world were composed of islands, separated by "the unplumbed, salt, estranging sea," each nation thus occupying a position of isolation served only by marine transport, the freedom of the seas would be an acute question in which all belligerents and all neutrals would have an approximately equal and vital interest. The problems of supply and defence would be the same for all, except in so far as some would be self-supporting and others would possess colonial obligations overseas which, while increasing their power, would also increase their liabilities. In such circumstances it is improbable that the existence of a predominant sea Power like Great Britain would be tolerated because of the menace of her naval strength to all the rest. A coalition would arise to curb her power. Such a coalition has come into being against Germany for a similar reason, namely, that German power had reached a point where it was at once a temptation to its possessor and a menace to most of her neighbours, including even those whom she calls her allies. But, despite the growth of the British Empire and the preponderant power of the British Fleet, no such coalition has ever been called into being against the United Kingdom—Napoleon's continental embargo was hardly a coalition of self defence—(1) because no Power, except possibly the Boer Republics, has ever felt that we were a menace to its existence; (2) because Europe realises that, owing to our geographical position, we can never become such a menace; (3) because, in historic fact, British sea-power has in the main saved the cause of freedom

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and security in Europe and overseas. We have only to examine the part played by the British Fleets in the Napoleonic Wars, or to consider the effect which an active British resistance to Lincoln's blockade of the Confederate ports would have had on the whole course and result of the American Civil War, to see that Great Britain has a substantial right to claim that in her use of sea-power she has deserved well of the world at large. Similarly the growth of the British Empire has conferred greater benefits on the world than any similar colonial empire the world has ever known because both in politics and in economics it was inspired by a liberal spirit. The strength of the British Commonwealth in defence, therefore, is not a matter to which the world can be indifferent.

The defence of an island state has always implied great naval power. The present war has proved that such power must not only be great, it must be supreme, if it is to discharge its function adequately. And any doctrine which, in the present state of world politics, challenges that supremacy without putting as good or a better guarantee in its place can neither gain the ear of the British nation nor secure the assent of any impartial judge. German propagandists are merely wasting ink and breath in expounding their form of the “ freedom of the seas ” which is a transparent device to destroy British security. We must make it quite clear, not only to our enemies, but to all concerned, and especially to neutrals who have unquestionably suffered through our exercise of naval power in this war, that we will not relinquish one ship or coaling station except to a League of Nations established as the effective agent of the general will. British national life depends on the British Fleet, and will continue so to depend, until the world has undergone that large change of heart which the President of the United States has prescribed as the first condition of his new world-order.

A. F. WHYTE.

Frano Supilo : A Southern Slav Patriot

PROBABLY but few of those who read the announcement of Frano Supilo's death had any perception of the man and what he stood for. And yet it is no exaggeration to

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describe him as one of the ablest political brains, not merely of his own nation, but of warring Europe as a whole—one of those who, if once assured a hearing, could not have failed to influence the deliberations of the future conference of peace. The story of his life is the story of a national idea which contributed materially to the causes of the war, and whose fulfilment must be a vital factor in any stable settlement of Europe.

Frano Supilo was born in 1870 of poor parents at Cavtat (Ragusa Vecchia), on the coast of southern Dalmatia. His political career began at the age of 14 as the result of a schoolboy prank. He and two other small boys hissed Crown Prince Rudolf on the streets of Ragusa during an official visit to the ancient republic: and this offence was visited in typically Austrian fashion by expulsion from every scholastic establishment in the Empire. One of the other culprits was the son of the mayor and deputy of Ragusa, then leader of the Croat National Party in Dalmatia: and private influence succeeded in reversing the decision, with the result that Melko Čingrija followed the usual academic career and in due course stepped into his father's place as mayor and representative of the town. But Supilo had no powerful patrons, and in his case the veto held good. He was a self-made man in the best and most literal sense of the term: his education was what his own natural genius was able to wrest from adverse circumstances. The Italian language, the medium of intercourse between a purely Slav province and the outer world, came almost as naturally to him as his native Serbo-Croat; and as with so many other Croat leaders, his mind was moulded by the teachings and example of the great Italian thinkers and patriots of the last century. At first he scarcely saw beyond the narrow limits of Ragusa, a city of magic memories, steeped in its ancient republican tradition, but living upon a dead past, in complete isolation from the world. The little town was as yet immersed in narrow party feuds, in which the national idea was too often overshadowed by religious and social motives; and oil was continually poured upon the flames by local news-sheets, whose trade was mutual incitement and invective. Supilo, then, at the age of barely 20, found himself in a subordinate position on the staff of the *Crvena Hrvatska*, which had been

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founded to represent purely Croat interests against Serbs and Italians, who had combined to capture the Commune of Ragusa. A mutual friend, who before the war took a growing part in Dalmatian politics, used to tell me that it was only some years after he returned from America in 1898 that he first heard Supilo's name mentioned at all seriously.

In 1900 a wealthy group of Croat merchants in Fiume decided to found a paper of their own, still on strictly Croat lines, but with a wider outlook than that of remote Ragusa; and Supilo was selected as its first editor. Its main aim was opposition to the intolerable *régime* of Count Khuen Héderváry, who since 1883 had governed Croatia as a Magyar satrapy by every imaginable method of corruption and repression, and especially by skilfully playing off Croats and Serbs against each other, and kindling the dying flames of religious animosity. The press throughout Croatia had been effectually muzzled and thus Fiume, which being governed direct from Budapest is not subject to the reactionary press law of Croatia, was selected as the only possible centre for an independent organ of Croat opinion. Under Supilo the *Novi List* rapidly won its spurs as the leader of the Opposition press, and became a rallying-ground for the younger generation of Southern Slavs, so many of whom had shaken off the dust of Khuen's Croatia in disgust, and found their way to Prague University. Through them the ethical teaching of Professor Masaryk and a broader and more generous outlook upon the Slav world and its essential spiritual unity, permeated to Croatia and Dalmatia, and brought once more to the surface the old idea of Serbo-Croat unity, which had been universal in 1848 and had only suffered a temporary eclipse as the result of Austro-Magyar dividing tactics. To all thinking men it was becoming more and more obvious that only common action between Serbs and Croats could save their common country from political absorption and economic exploitation.

Now and for the next decade most of the political initiative among the Southern Slavs was to come from Dalmatia; and Supilo and the office of his little paper became a natural link between his native province and Croatia—between those of a single race whom a purely arbitrary frontier divided in political allegiance between

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Austria and Hungary. Supilo found himself in the thick of the struggle at a time still known as the "Black Days," when rioting in Croatia was put down by bloodshed and wholesale arrests, and when wild tales of massacre found such universal credence as to induce the peasantry to drape their doors with black. Over thirty Croat deputies of the Diets of Istria and Dalmatia, roused by the general excitement, sought for an audience of the Emperor, in order to beg mercy for the victims of the Khuen régime. Francis Joseph's refusal to receive them—due to Magyar influence—marked a turning-point in the relations of the Habsburg dynasty and its Southern Slav subjects.

The active intervention of the Dalmatians gave a great impetus to the idea of closer co-operation between Croat and Serb; and it is worth noting that at this time such efforts enjoyed the open sympathy of the Italian element along the coast. Indeed, in 1904 Supilo was prosecuted for a series of articles in *Novi List*, urging the vital need for an accord between Italians and Slavs, if Germanism, their common foe, was not to triumph on the Adriatic. All this coincided with the rise of the Independence Party in Hungary, in whom Supilo and his friends saw a possible ally against the existing régime in both halves of the Monarchy. Nothing, they argued, was to be hoped from Vienna after the rejected audience, and it would therefore be wise to make a timely alliance with the rising power in Hungary, and thus to secure for themselves a free hand for reforms in Croatia as soon as the new régime should triumph. Such an alliance presupposed a united front, and after a series of preliminary party conferences forty Croat deputies from Croatia, Dalmatia, and Istria met in October 1905 and drew up the famous Resolution of Fiume.

This document, which marks an epoch in Yugoslav history, was drafted by the ex-Mayor of Spalato, Dr. Trumbić, the same man who last August signed with the Serbian Premier the no less memorable Pact of Corfu. Trumbić received his main backing from fellow-Dalmatians—Supilo, Milić, Čingrija, and Smodlaka. In the light of formulas which the Great War has made common property, the opening phrase of the Resolution deserves our special attention: for it asserts that "every nation has the right to decide freely and independently concerning its existence

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and its fate," and thus places on record the Croat leaders' title to political maturity. Being directly designed as a basis for close co-operation with the Magyars against Austria, it accepted the existing constitutional arrangement between Hungary and Croatia, but demanded the re-incorporation of Dalmatia in the latter and laid down an elaborate programme of reforms, alike "political, cultural, financial, and economic." Events were to prove that they had utterly miscalculated in relying upon progressive ideas among the Magyars; but this does not for a moment detract from their work among their own people.

A fortnight later twenty-six Serb deputies met at Zara and formally endorsed both the Resolution of Fiume and the principle of joint political action between the Croats and Serbs as one nation by blood and language. It was on this basis that Supilo became the principal intermediary between Croats and Magyars. In the course of these negotiations he came into close contact with all the Magyar political leaders, and deeply impressed them with his political capacity and vision, his persistence, and his rugged incorruptibility. When, therefore, the Magyar Coalition came into power in Hungary in April, 1906, and thereby brought its new ally, the Serbo-Croat Coalition, into power in Croatia, it was already obvious to Budapest that the real driving force in the Croatian capital proceeded from Supilo and his Dalmatian friends, rather than from the nominal heads of the provincial government. A year later the Magyarising frenzy of Francis Kossuth and his colleagues of the Wekerle Cabinet destroyed the short-lived friendship between Magyar and Croat; and it was Supilo who, after his impassioned appeals for compromise had failed, became the soul of the obstruction by which the forty Croat delegates held up the whole business of the Hungarian Parliament for nearly two months. His achievement was the more remarkable because, amid all the work which political organisation and journalism entailed in that busy year, he had found time to master unaided the Magyar language to such a pitch as enabled him to use it for his speeches in the Budapest Chamber.

Croat resistance was of course overpowered, and the Magyars, through their nominee Baron Rauch, introduced an absolutist *régime* in Croatia and subjected their former

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friends of the Serbo-Croat Coalition to every kind of political persecution. By this time Supilo was a name to conjure with in both halves of the Monarchy, and those in authority viewed with growing alarm the emergence of a strong popular leader who owed nothing to position, favour, or even education. "We must destroy him at all costs," said a high Austrian official in 1907 to Mr. Steed. "He cannot be bought; he must be put out of harm's way." Though Vienna was not devoid of men who realised the full significance of the Southern Slav problem for Austria-Hungary, their warnings were disregarded, and official Austria made itself the accomplice of official Hungary in a deliberate attempt to wreck the idea of Serbo-Croat unity and at the same time to use its growing popularity as a lever for discrediting and attacking independent Serbia.

The full perfidy of the methods employed to this end are still very inadequately realised in the West, though they throw a searching light not merely upon Austria-Hungary's traditional policy, but also upon one of the prime causes of the present war. The annexation of Bosnia in October, 1908, was preceded for many months by a skilful press campaign, intended to suggest that the leaders of the movement for unity were inspired, and even directly financed from Belgrade, and that thus so far from voicing any genuine national demand, they were mere venal agents of an alien dynasty. Wholesale arrests took place in Croatia, and in March, 1909, there opened at Agram a monster treason trial which was to drag on for seven months amid scandals worthy of Judge Jeffries himself. The whole apparatus of spies, informers and *agents provocateurs* with which Vienna and Budapest had flooded the Southern Slav provinces was mobilised for the occasion; and as a further means of intimidation the secret police actually organised a band of hooligan students to set upon some of the Coalition leaders in the main streets of Agram. Supilo was a victim of one of these assaults. As the Bosnian crisis dragged on and the risk of war with Russia grew, yet other poisoned weapons were employed. On Aehrenthal's own orders the Viennese Foreign Office supplied Austria's leading historian Heinrich Friedjung with a formidable array of "documents," purporting to establish the corrupt complicity of the Serbo-Croat leaders in a widespread revolu-

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tionary plot organised by the Serbian Government in Croatia and Bosnia. On the very day fixed by the Austrian General Staff for a final rupture with Serbia the first instalment of Friedjung's "revelations" appeared in the *Neue Freie Presse*. At the last moment Russia yielded to William II's demonstration "in shining armour," and the danger of an European war was averted for the time; but the news reached Vienna so late at night that Aehrenthal's attempt to suspend publication came too late. In those days it was an open secret in Vienna that one of the first steps under martial law would have been the execution of Supilo and other coalition leaders. As, however, peace was preserved, nothing could prevent them from bringing a collective action for libel against Dr. Friedjung.

The amazing revelations of the Friedjung Trial cast an indelible stain upon Austria's diplomacy, and afford crushing proof of her bad faith towards Serbia. For the "documents" upon which the defence relied were proved to be impudent forgeries, concocted by officials of the Austro-Hungarian Legation in Belgrade, and supplied *en gros*, with the connivance of the Minister, to the Foreign Office in Vienna, for the purpose of poisoning the wells of public opinion against the Jugoslavs inside and outside the Monarchy. These forgeries, which deserve a special chapter to themselves,* were far too gross to have deceived the merest child; and when Professor Masaryk on the floor of the Austrian Delegation branded the guilty diplomatist as a second Azev, the spy and *agent provocateur*, the Foreign Minister remained seated in no less guilty silence. Those who like myself were present at the Friedjung Trial will never forget its atmosphere of mingled perfidy and prejudice. Still less will they forget the venomous and concentrated attack launched against the person of Supilo, revealing as in a flash the recognition of his strength and the resolve to annihilate him at all costs. In those days Supilo stood the test of an ordeal such as comes to few men, and those who saw him in the flames could never again doubt his metal.

During the trial Supilo's colleagues loyally supported

* Full details of this sensational affair are to be found in my book, "The Southern Slav Question" (1911), and a more general survey in "German, Slav and Magyar" (1916).

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him, but after it their paths forked asunder. While most of them were too ready to rest upon their oars after so triumphant a vindication of their honour, Supilo was bent on continuing the fight with renewed energy. Henceforth he stood apart from the parties, relying more and more upon the rising generation and making of his *Novi List* a true focussing point of the growing movement for unity and religious freedom. Like the overwhelming mass of his people, he hailed the Balkan victories of Serbia as the herald of resurrection, and seemed to wait for the trumpet call that was to usher in the final struggle. To the very last the ruling factors in the Habsburg Monarchy would have none of him; none have ever known better than they how to squander or reject their national resources in men and in ideas. Supilo's whole career is a crushing indictment of their whole system. It was his unpardonable crime to combat the principle of *Divide et Impera*, and to help to join indissolubly those whom God's Vicegerent in Vienna had resolved should remain asunder.

On the eve of war Supilo was walking in Tirol, and crossed the Italian border to await events. The great storm, whose gathering electricity he and his compatriots had long felt around them, had at last burst, and for him there could be only one choice. To the Jugoslavs Austria's war with Serbia was a civil war, deliberately designed to shatter for ever the dream of unity and freedom. Supilo found his way to Rome and London, and in company with such other Jugoslav leaders as succeeded in crossing the frontier—notably his old friend Ante Trumbić of Spalato—devoted himself to pleading the cause and watching the interests of the Jugoslavs in Entente countries. The time has **not** yet come to reveal his signal services to that cause in the spring of 1915, the skill with which he elicited essential facts from the official world, the persuasive eloquence and resource of argument by which he succeeded in enlightening ignorance in high places. But on one aspect of his activity special stress must be laid. Of all the Jugoslav leaders Supilo had the clearest grasp of the Adriatic problem as a whole, and of the capital importance of an intimate understanding between Italians and Jugoslavs, alike in their mutual interests and in those of the Entente as a whole. Undeterred by the yelpings of the gutter press, he worked incessantly to remove

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the causes of friction and distrust, and had already won the friendship and confidence of many representative Italians. Thus we shall mourn him not merely as a Slav patriot, but as a true friend of Italy.

To those who did not know him it is difficult to convey the full timbre of Supilo's mind. He was a real elemental force in politics, commanding attention by sheer strength of will, even where he could not gain entrance by more personal qualities. His political *flair* was as unrivalled as the patience with which he pieced together fragments of a story, tested their truth by exploring many a devious side-track and covered up his traces as he advanced. Nothing was more fascinating than to watch him adjusting his focus anew to the unfamiliar political conditions of Paris and London, and weighing in the scales of his mind the statesmen and diplomatists of the Entente. One of the secrets of his success was the zest with which he studied the psychology of all with whom his political work brought him into contact; and here his very lack of training stood him in good stead, enabling him to apply an absolutely untouched intellect of the very first order to his study of men and events.

Like every man of genius, he had the defects of his qualities. He could not suffer fools gladly and took an almost impish delight in letting many of his weaker colleagues feel the grip of steel within the velvet of the glove. He never learnt the supremely difficult task of leading, while seeming to be led. Born of a race which is extraordinarily subjective and personal, Supilo, too, was swayed unduly by personal likes and dislikes. He had all the secretiveness of the peasant and not a little of the peasant's distrust of strangers; but, though he regarded himself as exceptionally *rusé*, there was in him also an element of *naïveté* and even of childlike simplicity which constituted much of his charm. When once he gave his confidence he did so wholeheartedly. Simple in his tastes, loyal in his friendships, he set an example of sterling honesty and straight dealing against which calumny and malice beat in vain. Behind a heavy and at first sight unarresting exterior there was hidden an amazing vitality whose magnetic force affected all around him. Having been privileged to know him for nearly ten years of stress and trial, I can only re-echo the phrase with which

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Professor Masaryk summed up his defence of Supilo in the memorable Friedjung Trial—"For him I would lay both my hands in the fire."

To the cause to which he devoted every energy, his death is a cruel loss; but to describe it as irreparable would be the worst of all reflections upon his memory. Supilo built surely, upon unshakeable foundations. He has died in exile, with the Promised Land not yet in sight, but truth is on the march, and nothing can arrest its course. That sense of spiritual unity which has been latent through centuries of oppression, has kindled into flame by the great events of our own century, and has at last passed into the consciousness of the whole race. We cannot as yet foresee the political form in which this unity will find its practical expressions; but we know that as the sparks fly upward, so in one form or another—soon or late, with us or against us—the Southern Slavs will achieve their national ideal. And in the Temple of Fame by which another great Dalmatian, Ivan Meštrović, hopes some day to commemorate the forerunners and champions of a new order, the name of Frano Supilo will assuredly not be forgotten.

R. W. SETON-WATSON.

The Next German Peace Move

"If there is any honour in ruling Germany, Belgium must be given up," writes the *Nation*. It is a big IF, but let us for the sake of argument accept this view, merely pausing to remark that the German reply to the Papal Note in itself affords ample proof that Berlin is by no means resigned as yet even to relaxing its hold upon Belgium. There never was a wilder illusion than the belief that Belgium is the key to peace; and the "End-Allers" will not delude our common-sense people into accepting it as gospel, by trying to foist the nickname of "Never Endians" upon those who insist upon regarding Europe as a whole. We have never ceased to marvel at the strange mentality of those who, while emphasising international brotherhood and the need for a League of Nations, in the same breath disclaim all interest in the fate of a whole group of martyred nations, simply because they live at the

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other end of Europe from our own. Some of these false prophets of humanity think that they have contributed to the discussion by condemning as monstrous the idea that British soldiers should bleed to liberate Slovak peasants. This sounds well enough in the mouth of an extreme Jingo to whom all foreigners are mere pawns in a British game; but it is less convincing when put forward by the advocates of a new order in which all nations are to have their share. In reality it is a cheap overstatement of fact, calculated to tickle the palate of the ignorant, and resting upon the supreme fallacy that this war can be conducted and concluded in a series of watertight compartments. On the contrary, the whole contention of THE NEW EUROPE school of internationalists is that for good or for evil, by an inexorable law of development, the fate of all the nations involved in the present struggle is interwoven to a degree such as is still very imperfectly understood, and that a settlement in which undue stress was laid upon a single aspect of the problem would certainly be bad.

Belgium was the spark which set a light to our own particular war, or perhaps even more truly the blaze which illumined the path before us and roused us to our danger. But it is no slight to Belgium to assert that her problem has become a mere fragment of a far greater world-problem. For Germany the stake lies not in Belgium, but in the East of Europe. If she can retain her hold upon Poland, Austria-Hungary and the Balkans, she need not hesitate to disgorge Belgium and Northern France, or even Alsace into the bargain. Nor would such a policy take the crude and tactless form of annexation. It would merely be necessary to stereotype existing conditions to the extent of asserting a military and economic control over the 140,000,000 inhabitants of Central Europe. From this would follow automatically Russia's enthrallment to Berlin, and Germany would dominate the Continent so effectually that Belgium and Holland would not need to be plucked, but would fall like ripe plums into her lap. There is every indication that this is the German intention. For, though the new political ferment in Germany has swept the old naked annexationist policy into the melting pot, the desire to retain all their conquests is still too strong in the ruling class to allow the Chancellor even to go half-way to meet the more pacific

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parties. The Chancellor's task, then, is to find the favourable moment for a decision. We hazard the guess that he believes that it is near; for it is beyond doubt that he reckons on angry feeling in the West towards Russia and hopes that the military weakness of the Russians may lead Great Britain and France to concentrate their political attention on Belgium and other Western problems, on the ground that, as "Russia has let us down" we need not exert ourselves to secure a good settlement in Eastern Europe which is primarily a Russian concern. By every means of propaganda, open and clandestine, the Germans are now exploiting this factor in the situation. We believe that they can only be frustrated if the statesmen and peoples of our Alliance grasp firmly the doctrine of the Single Front in politics as in strategy. Judged solely on grounds of naked self-interest, the debt we owe to revolutionary Russia is great. She overthrew her dynasty at a moment when its servants were selling the pass to the enemy; and we have only to think of the inevitable results of a separate peace between Germany and Russia last spring to see that, despite our chagrin at the subsequent military disorganisation, we must stand firm and steadfast by our Eastern Ally.

It is not difficult to guess why Berlin is exerting every effort in this direction just now. The Central Powers stand urgently in need of peace; but, being in appearance the victors by reason of the vast territories they have overrun, they cannot bring themselves to offer the only terms which can give them the peace they need. On New Year's Day, 1813, Napoleon stood where Germany stands to-day. His *Grande Armée* had swept in triumph through Europe; the nations seemed to be at his feet. But, as to-day, the conquered were unconquered, and the tide of Napoleonic fortunes began to ebb. Germany is at her Moscow. She needs peace. But unless she can strip herself and her policy of the arrogance of conquest, her Waterloo awaits her. The certainty of her defeat is far plainer to-day than ever before, and the time required to bring it about is not disproportionate if measured by the magnitude of the cause which our victory will establish. Yet it is curious to note that the doctrine that time is on the side of the Allies does not seem to find the same favour as it enjoyed not many months ago. Time is so certainly on our side, and Germany knows it so well,

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that she will make immense efforts to escape the dread effects of another winter at war. She will set peace machinery in motion everywhere in order to gain her ends; but the one thing she will not do is loyally to accept the first principle of a lasting peace, namely, the freedom of all peoples to guide their own destiny. Time and the guns and blockade of the Allies will surely and ultimately bring her to that resolve if, meanwhile, we will but use to the utmost the immense advantages we possess.

Herr Naumann on Poland

The author of the now famous book on "Central Europe," Herr Friedrich Naumann, has latterly turned his attention to the Polish problem, and gives his conclusions to the world in an interesting pamphlet entitled "*Was wird aus Polen?*" (Berlin: Reimer, 1917, m. 1.) In it he warns the Poles that to-day they have a choice between obtaining the Warsaw Kingdom or nothing. "From the German standpoint," he writes, "the rise of a new Polish life is urgently to be desired, for only a successful, active and progressive Poland will draw a clear and permanent frontier between itself and Russia." Thus, as things now stand in Europe, the Polish policy of the late German Chancellor and of the present German Governor-General of Warsaw (von Beseler) may be described as "the German national policy in the East." "The Pole who understands rightly his national development, must seek to link it with the development of Germany and of Central Europe." Poland, then, is one of the main pillars of Naumann's scheme for reconstructing Europe on a German basis.

There is more than one candid admission in these pages. He finds it necessary to tilt against "the prevailing view among the Germans in Warsaw," that General von Beseler is an admirable person, but far too mild to create an impression "upon a nation which needs the Napoleonic hand." He faces the fact that "not since the Thirty Years' War have occupied countries had to hand over so much as now" (*i.e.*, in requisitions, etc.), and pleads that "the special conditions of the war make it necessary to destroy woods and carry away many supplies," but that this will cease after the war. He also registers the conviction held by most Poles, that the wholesale removal of copper and machinery from Lodz is deliberately intended to ruin Polish industries, and condemns this as a thoroughly mistaken policy, in view of the valuable part which they will have to play as soon as peace returns. "German industry," he tells us, "will—as Helfferich has repeatedly explained—immediately after the war and in the first great period of general shortage, have to export with all its might, in order to be able to pay for raw material and raise the rate of exchange." Here he alludes to one of those fundamental factors which dominate the whole situation and on which we must fix our eyes during the coming settlement.

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Herr Naumann is right in arguing that for Poland much depends on the emergence of a strong man—much more than in the case of States already organised. He writes before his countrymen flung into prison General Pilsudski, the only man at all answering to this description. "When Bulgaria became a State once more, her constitution was at once clear, for a nation without nobility or large proprietors, and in those days virtually without capitalists, could hardly be anything but a democracy of small peasants with a king at its head. But Poland is socially far more complex, has an ancient nobility, both great and small, capitalists, intellectuals, clericals, craftsmen, peasants, workmen, traders. It has a leading nation and minor nations: it has Catholics, Jews, even Protestants, a very varied and complicated society, in which on the whole a middle-class democratic movement may be counted upon, but which would not face the problems of civil rights in so naive a manner as would a State composed of small peasant holders. In other words, there are political parties, both explicit and implicit, already in existence, before ever the State or a Parliament is there."

In conclusion Herr Naumann pleads for a bold treatment of the Polish problem, and especially for the abolition of Poland's division into two occupied provinces, since this division can only mean keeping open the possibility of a fresh partition between Germany and Austria-Hungary—a solution definitely excluded by the Imperial Manifestoes of November 1916. He tells us that the proposed Austrian solution, by which Galicia and "Congress Poland" were to form a third State under the Habsburg Crown, was abandoned mainly owing to Hungarian opposition—a statement which seems to throw some light on the recent exclusion from the Hungarian Premiership of Count Andrassy, the foremost champion of the Polish "Trialist" solution. He adds the comment that there can be no satisfactory basis for "Mitteleuropa" if Hungary's historical rights be curtailed. He thus comes into fatal conflict with the fundamental aim which he proclaims, namely, that "Mitteleuropa," acting on the precedent of the Polish proclamation, should assume the rôle of "liberator of the Western Slav nations." He must in reality be well aware that Magyar historic claims and Slav national aspirations are utterly irreconcilable.

Policy of New Hungarian Premier

[On 12 September the Hungarian Chamber of Deputies reassembled for two days to hear the new Premier, Dr. Wekerle, declare his policy. The following points in his speech are summarised from the Pester Lloyd.]

ATTACKS ON THE DUALISTIC SYSTEM.

"I can only regard as dreams the efforts originating with certain Austrian politicians, firstly, because they have no basis in the lands of the Hungarian Crown, and because we must take care that they

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shall not gain such a basis, and secondly, because they are not supported in any authoritative circles, either by the Sovereign (which goes without saying) or by members of the Austrian Government or other political personages of importance.

"Although his Majesty has not the slightest thought of making any change whatever in the dualistic form of the Monarchy, I have obtained his express assurance that the questions of nationality and autonomy which are being discussed in Austria shall not be allowed, either directly or indirectly, to influence the integrity of Hungary. Although it does not really belong to our legal sphere, I have received information from his Majesty, from the Austrian Government, and from leading politicians outside the Government circle, that the principle will be preserved unchanged, that, in the event of autonomous rights being granted, the existing frontiers of the provinces will be maintained.

"As the Austrian penal laws take no cognizance of actions which are directed against the integrity of the lands of the Hungarian Crown, and the Austrian Government can do no more than rebuke such attempts, while our penal code permits the punishment of attempts against the integrity of the Austrian State, we shall, in the forthcoming negotiations, raise the question of reciprocity.

CROATIA AND DALMATIA.

"In our relations with Croatia-Slavonia we adhere strictly to the law of 1868, Art. XXX. We shall not only respect the rights and constitutional claims of Croatia, but, as far as lies in our sphere, we shall respect her cultural endeavours and the development of her national power, and we wish to devote special care to the promotion of her industrial and commercial interests. We sincerely desire to promote the legitimate desire of Croatia for the reincorporation of Dalmatia. We believe that our standpoint here defined, and our efforts to secure a perfectly equal, fraternal treatment, will be welcomed with all the greater satisfaction, as we desire to honour Croatian national aspirations as well as our own in the reorganisation of our military forces which will take place after the war.

FOREIGN POLICY AND WAR AIMS.

"Our foreign policy remains entirely unchanged, on the basis which has been repeatedly explained to this House. I am in complete agreement with the Foreign Minister in respect of methods as well as aims and principles. Loyalty to our Allies and complete co-operation with them are the foundations of our policy. In this defensive war which has been forced upon us, we are united, not only in our common struggle, but also in our final aim, which is the unanimous and common conclusion of a reasonable and lasting peace.

"We were the first who, faithful to his Majesty's wish, in agreement with our ally the German Empire, expressed not only our desire, but also our complete readiness for the conclusion of this peace.

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" This readiness of ours was solemnly confirmed by the peace resolution of the German Reichstag, passed in agreement with the Imperial German Government, and by the official declaration of our Foreign Minister, published on 17 July. In broad outlines we indicated the conditions of an understanding by declaring that our defensive struggle aims at no conquests, that we also reject with horror the economic war of the nations, that we are striving after a reasonable and enduring peace which shall not injure our interests, and, indeed, that to prevent a recurrence of war we also consider it desirable that, in the relations between the nations, the moral empire of right shall take the place of the brute force of arms.

" We have gratefully and gladly welcomed the endeavours of the Holy Father to secure a peace of this character. Our readiness, far as it goes, can, of course, only attain its goal if it meets with the understanding that we desire in the circle of our enemies. Without the latter, in the consciousness of our strength and our invincibility, we shall continue the struggle to the uttermost with a determination reinforced by the new successes of our troops, so that, for the future, we may secure not only our vital interests, but also the blessings of abiding peace and mutual understanding."

Count Tisza on Relations with Austria

[In the debate which followed Dr. Wekerle's statement, Count Tisza made the following significant observations.]

" Our third condition " [for supporting the Government] " is that the Government shall represent with all its weight the constitutional position of our nation in all questions connected with the war, against all other factors. The reassuring declarations of the Premier must be followed by reassuring acts. There was lately a Joint Ministerial Conference at which my friend Baron Burián presided. Such an irregular proceeding makes it seem as if there were an Imperial Government to which the Premiers of the two countries belonged. Such proceedings seem to have become the fashion some time ago. I protested in a similar case when I was Premier, and insisted that in the absence of the Joint Foreign Minister the Hungarian or Austrian Premier ought to preside, according to seniority. To-day, when so much nonsense is talked about a new partition of the Monarchy, and heaven knows what else, I think heed ought to be paid to such questions.

" With regard to the symptoms in Austria, my complaint is not only that certain people are casting longing eyes on Hungarian territory—that, as the Premier recognises, is a grotesque, ridiculous symptom of conceit—but I must very earnestly warn the House that Austrian political factors make statements implying that they wish to claim the direct support of the Entente States for the regulation of the internal affairs of Austria. I am not sure whether they refer to the Austrian State alone or to the Monarchy. I do not refer to the fact that they demand Slovak *komitats*. Let them come and take them. I refer to the fact that these symptoms

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of disintegration are appearing in Austria, and that it cannot be an indifferent matter to us that in this war our Ally allows such scandalous incidents in its own State. It is not enough that, as the Premier says, we must create new penalties. For if I see seats in the Austrian Ministry offered to men who are guilty of such acts as I have described, I see symptoms against which every man must contend with all his might who supports this dynasty and wishes it to rule over a vigorous Great Power, and every man who is a supporter of the Hungarian national State, and wishes it to tread to the end the troublous paths of history with an honourable, loyal, and vigorous Ally."

Reviews

Professor C. E. Vaughan, late of the University of Leeds—who in 1915 published what will probably remain the definitive edition of the political works of Rousseau—has just done good service to the cause of a European settlement by issuing a cheap reprint of Rousseau's essay on "*A Lasting Peace through the Federation of Europe*" (Constable, 2s. net). Although Rousseau wrote this essay in 1756, it contains many wise remarks and sound principles which are singularly applicable to the present day. One warning of Rousseau might well be taken to heart by the pacifist groups of to-day: "My friends! you must allow me to tell you that you give too much weight to your calculations and too little to the heart of man and the play of passion. Your system is excellent for Utopia, for the children of Adam it is worth nothing."

Professor Vaughan contributes to this edition a most valuable Introduction, in which he applies the ideas of Rousseau to the current crisis. He points out that the basis of a Federation of the Continent and the indispensable condition of the maintenance of a lasting peace must be the reorganisation of Europe, and particularly of Central Europe, on national lines. He rightly regards the break-up of Austria as "one of the chief conditions of the coming peace," without which "the war will have been waged in vain."

F. J. C. H.

In *Bohemia's Case for Independence* (Allen and Unwin, pp. xii + 132, 2s. 6d. net) Dr. Edouard Beneš, the well-known lecturer of Prague University, gives an admirable summary of the material—historical, economic, and political—upon which is based the Czecho-Slovak claim to independence. It is a short and telling volume, which ought to be read and made known widely. The importance of Czecho-Slovak and Yugoslav liberation from German and Magyar control cannot be insisted upon too much. It is fundamental. Unless that immoral domination is broken up many of the root causes of the present war will remain untouched. Even at this stage of the war there is far too much ignorance and indifference towards this vital problem. Dr. Beneš' plea will do much to clear the air, as will also the lucid and eloquent introduction contributed by Mr. Wickham Steed.

G. G.

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Poisoned Weapons

The *Morning Post* has been notoriously unfortunate in its Budapest correspondent, now in a Manx internment camp, but apparently still permitted on occasion to contribute to its columns. Even more unfortunate (to use a mild expression) have been the utterances of its Petrograd correspondent, who has persistently glorified the Tsar and his *régime*, and denounced Mr. Kerenski and all his works. But it has been reserved for an anonymous "Polish correspondent" in its issue of 28 September to go yet one stage further. Commenting upon the undoubted fact that the Germans are at present making a final effort to win the confidence of the Poles, he goes on to assert that Berlin is endeavouring to inveigle into negotiations certain "*Poles who, having the confidence of the Russian Government, accept in principle the German solution of the Polish question.*" In other words, in order to throw discredit upon those Poles who enjoy the confidence of the Russian Government, one of their anonymous rivals seeks to persuade us that the new Russia herself is double-faced. We are aware of the intense and growing indignation in progressive Russian circles at the charges so freely levelled against Russia in misfortune, and we venture to hope that the Government will take advantage of Parliament reassembling to rebuke publicly such disloyal tactics towards our ally of the East.

The Slovaks under Magyar Rule

The following speech, delivered by the newly installed Lord Lieutenant of the Slovak county of Nitra, in North Hungary, throws a lurid light upon the methods by which Hungary still seeks to maintain the allegiance of her subject races:—

"The Slovaks must not forget that they live in the Magyar State and that they must not demand anything which conflicts with Magyar aspirations. Learn Magyar, all of you: this is the best advice I can give you, for Magyar is an universal language. Of what use would Slovak schools be to you? They are useless. The main thing is for you to guard against all idea of separatism, for the moment I perceive anywhere the slightest tendency towards upsetting the existing state of affairs I shall make the Slovaks feel my power and shall punish them with the utmost severity. I recognise the need for a policy of agreement and conciliation, but this must be in exclusive accord with the Magyar spirit. *Our sole ideal must be the Unitary Magyar State.* He who opposes it will be punished mercilessly. I repeat, I shall punish all who do not act as the Magyar State wishes."

This is the true Magyar idea of freedom in the twentieth century.

The Anglo-Roumanian Society

We extend a cordial welcome to the society which has lately been formed in this country, with the Earl of Bessborough as Chairman of the Provisional Executive Committee, for the purpose of fostering a close and permanent friendship between Roumania and Great Britain. At the end of the first year of her participation in the war Roumania finds herself in a most critical position. She has suffered as other

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small nations, our Allies, have suffered in this war. It is a fitting moment, therefore, for the people of this country to be given an opportunity of assuring Roumania that our official alliance with her represents a lasting sympathy between the two nations, based upon a common determination to secure for all nations the free choice of their own destiny. The Anglo-Roumanian Society has a definite and important task before it, and we confidently look forward to the success which public support will enable it to achieve. The Society has had the good fortune to secure the services of Lord Hugh Cecil as President of the Society. The address of the Society is 26, Buckingham Gate, S.W.1.

Light on Germany's Path

The following is a fragment of a political dialogue taken from *Die Hilfe* [Herr Friedrich Naumann's weekly organ] of 6 September. A. has been lamenting the war; B. has been arguing that it will bring the necessary political reformation of Germany without a revolution. The Prussian Conservative hegemony will have been broken, says B.; Germany is on the way to Parliamentary government. But, replies A., that is impossible because of the condition of German parties.

"A.—Educate our parties? That is impossible.

"B.—That is very easily possible if our electoral law is altered only a little. The second ballot must be abolished.

"A.—How?

"B.—It must be the same with us as in England. He is elected who receives a majority of the votes; not as at present, he who obtains more than a half of the total number of votes.

"A.—And what change will that bring?

"B.—At a single stroke our Reichstag will be in a position to conduct practical politics. All the smaller parties will have to give up their existence and enter the larger ones; they will no longer be able to play the evil rôle of the feather that turns the scale. All the negotiations that are at present conducted just before the second ballot will have to take place right at the beginning—a very beneficent education towards unity. Only a cause that can bring forward millions of votes in its support would be justified, and we should have just a few great parties: Conservatives, Liberals . . .

"A.—And Socialists. Probably we should have a Socialist Reichstag.

"B.—Probably not.

"A.—And that would be a misfortune, a danger.

"B.—There isn't any Socialist danger any more. There are Socialist parties.

"A.—But they will unite again.

"B.—Probably; but the question is, where? In a Germany without any anti-Socialist law, founded on equity that seeks to reconcile differences, Socialism will be a superfluous thing.

"A.—And what about the Centrum?

"B.—In a Germany without the Middle Ages a Centrum would be still more superfluous."

The New Europe

VOL. IV, No. 52 [REGISTERED FOR TRANSMISSION AT THE INLAND NEWSPAPER RATE] II October 1917

Kühlmann and Czernin as Converts

"THE devil was ill, the devil a monk would be," is the true diagnosis of the German state of mind to-day. The motive which prompts every manœuvre in Berlin and Vienna is the desire to escape the doom which now hangs over the Central Empires in the last stage of the war. Through every argument in the German Press and every official speech in the Reichstag, there runs a thread woven of the two strands of anxiety and cunning: anxiety for the future which daily grows darker, and cunning fruitlessly exercised on the task of casting dissension into the ranks of the enemy. Despite the transparency of German motive we cannot afford to be taken off our guard. It would be unnecessary to lay emphasis on this truism were it not that the strategy of the new German "peace offensive" is designed to create the impression in Western minds that the enemy is prepared to subscribe to the principles laid down by Entente statesmen. Two sentences from the diary of "Wayfarer" in the *Nation* show that the process is already at work. "Czernin," says "Wayfarer," "has accepted the Liberal solution of the war in language which European Liberalism can recognise as its own. And that is a great fact." We do not minimise the importance of Count Czernin's Budapest speech, but we enter a caveat by finishing the quotation with which this argument opens: "The devil got well, the devil a monk was he!"

We shall best understand the intentions of Count Czernin and Herr von Kühlmann by comparing their utterances with the real "Liberal solution" of the war which is implied in the words "reparation, restitution, and guarantees." The belated conversion of Central European statesmen to the policy of "placing Europe on a new basis of right" by means of disarmament, arbitration, and a league of nations, only serves to throw into bolder relief their refusal to take the first steps towards a new European order by acknowledging national rights. All professions of faith in internationalism are meaningless and insincere unless

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they are preceded by tangible proofs that the oppressors of nationalities have forsworn their former doctrines. Herr von Kühlmann speaks of Europe as "the small peninsula attached to the Asiatic continent, which had previously the domination of the world in its hands." He declares it to be the common interest of all the Great Powers that Europe shall not perish: but he forgets that the old Europe—"that word which sounds to us to-day like a tale of far-off times"—did perish at his master's hands in that summer night three years ago when Germany went to war. And he is so far from understanding the hopes which men now cherish that he can proclaim his desire for a restoration without offering the only pledge which any good European can accept. He is free to speak of Europe when all Europe thinks of Belgium: he declares that the opportunity to restore peace is presented by the Pope, but speaks no word of the restoration of partitioned Poland, nor any hint of reparation for the wrongs of 1871 and 1914. In a word, there is safety in generalities, and nowhere else, for the rulers of Germany. They have raised up against them not only a world in arms, but a people whom they cannot lead. Junker and Socialist alike regard the Chancellor, now as an enemy and now as a friend, and his reputation for personal strength has not lived long. Having utterly forsaken the sound Bismarckian maxim that he who pursues *Realpolitik* must know clearly his objects and limit them strictly to what is possible, the German Government is now at a loss which way to turn. The mistakes of the political strategy of the past twenty years are now coming home to roost beside the colossal blunders of military strategy of the last three years, and there is no man in Germany big enough to find a safe way out of the threatening danger. A war on two fronts was always a gamble for Germany, for in it the objectives could not be limited solely by the will of the German High Command: but a war on three fronts—the third being the naval front to Great Britain, which bears the increasing pressure of the blockade and is therefore, in the long run, the most vulnerable—is not a gamble, it is the sure road to German defeat. Germany's feet first trod that road when German policy was expanded from a European to a universal policy, from the constructive defence of German unity and interests in Europe to the unlimited

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megalomania of modern German Imperialism to which there could be but one issue. The world does not long tolerate a restless, powerful, covetous, braggart without combining to keep him in order. The imminent success of the combination against Germany is now compelling her rulers to take stock of their position and to decide whether their chief endeavours should be made in the East or in the West to save what can be saved of their conquests from the general impending ruin. The coal-fields of Briey and the control of Antwerp are being weighed in the balance against Poland and the resources of Asia Minor : though the German High Command itself would still appear to cherish the illusion that German conquests at *both* ends of Europe can be retained to pay her gigantic war debt.

That is the German position stated in general terms. Regarding it as the setting in which Herr von Kühlmann—we shall soon learn to attach more importance to him than to the Chancellor—must act and speak, we can read his real meaning like an open book. Similarly in listening to Count Czernin we must place him in his environment, bearing in mind what his German colleague has emphasised with candour and truth, that it is the atmosphere, the “circumambient air,” that gives all utterances their true significance. Now let us analyse the “circumambient air” in which Count Czernin spoke at Budapest. A Magyar banquet was the scene: the Hungarian Premier his host: and the audience a solid phalanx of that headstrong oligarchy which is one of the most sinister forces in modern Europe. And beyond the walls of the banquet chamber right to the farthest frontiers of the Dual Monarchy the landscape which provided a background to Count Czernin’s figure was scarred with wounds and want, dotted here and there with the gallows, the fit emblem of Habsburg ingratitude to its subject peoples. Standing in Budapest, the Austro-Hungarian Minister was surrounded by reminders of the great Habsburg sin against Europe: to the south, Croatia, the scene of the famous treason trials; to the east, Transylvania, the great theatre of Magyar tyranny; to the north, Poland, Slovakia, Bohemia, each telling its well-known story; and to the west? Westwards lay Vienna, the seat of the dynasty, whence Count Czernin came to the banquet as to a feast spread by his masters. The weakness

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of Vienna against the strong spirit of Budapest explains many things, but none more luminously than Count Czernin's careful avoidance of any words which could convey the slightest hint of sympathy with the Habsburg subject races. Budapest is the citadel of racial domination, and he who speaks within its walls must forswear the self-determination of peoples. He may speak, like Czernin, of international goodwill, but not of the neighbourly duty of the Magyar to the Croat; he may paint the picture of a new Europe under the rule of Right, but it must be a Europe in which the ruling race of Hungary shall enjoy for ever their "right" to exploit all the others. That is why the touchstone of Austro-Hungarian sincerity is not "peace" but "nationality." And until Vienna and Budapest can say "self-determination" we shall listen to no professions of internationalism from their spokesmen. They must be ready to lay the foundations of Europe anew in freedom and justice to all peoples, before they can hope to build any enduring structure of Public Right. And Germany must speak the word "restitution," before we pay any heed to her exposition of the new internationalism. It is strange to see how some who call themselves "Liberals" are prepared to accept Count Czernin as a friend and to forget the historic task of the Western World in seeing justice done to the little nations rightly struggling to be free. We must remind them that not so long ago "liberal" meant Mazzini, Garibaldi, Lincoln; that the union of democratic control, in our father's day, wore red shirts and died at Calatafimi; that the people that chose "peace" before "justice" was a people in decay; and that to-day the powerful (but sophisticated) peoples of the West may end in selling other men's birthright of freedom because they are too faint-hearted to carry this great struggle to the end, or too simple to read the malign motive behind fair speeches.

There are some who believe that the modern British supporters of national rights in Eastern Europe are merely diverting themselves with exotic toys, and that the question of nationality has received unmerited importance. They misread history who plead thus. "The diplomats of 1815," says M. Debidour, "spent a year in providing Europe with bad laws. It was to take Europe a century to repair the evil which they wrought upon her." And not in 1815 only :

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but in 1856, in 1871, 1878 and in 1912-13, European diplomacy prepared a great war by misreading the will and thwarting the destiny of a dozen small peoples throughout Europe. In each case the innate power of race burst the bonds of an unjust settlement; and to-day we should be blind indeed if we did not see that inherent justice and high European expediency alike impose an equitable settlement of nationality as indispensable to the future peace of Europe.

The Pact of Björkö

THE past summer has yielded a rich crop of diplomatic "revelations." In quick succession we have learnt the details of King Constantine's treachery to Serbia, the terms of M. Ribot's agreement with the Tsar, the circumstances connected with the Russian mobilisation of 1914, and the text of the messages which passed between the German and Russian Emperors at the crisis of the Russo-Japanese War. Of these disclosures the most sensational and actually the most illuminating are the last, even though they are concerned with a period of history which already seems far removed from that in which we are living to-day. The "Willy-Nicky" telegrams of 1904-5 throw a flood of light not only upon the personalities of the two chief actors in the tragedy of July, 1914, the Kaiser and the ex-Tsar, but also upon the principles by which German foreign policy has been guided ever since the present Emperor took the control of the relations between Germany and her neighbours out of the hands of the Iron Chancellor.

The circumstances which occasioned the exchange of the now famous telegrams between "Willy" and "Nicky" may be briefly recapitulated. The spring of the year 1904 was marked by two events of far-reaching historical significance—the outbreak of the Russo-Japanese War, and the conclusion of the Anglo-French Agreement. By the autumn of that year the defeat of Russia by Japan was assured: her Pacific Squadron, worsted in several encounters in the Yellow Sea, was blockaded in the harbour of Port Arthur, whilst a series of land battles, culminating in the victories of Liao-yang and the Sha-ho, had left the Japanese in control of a considerable slice of southern Manchuria. Such was the situation when the ill-fated Baltic fleet set

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sail upon its journey to the Pacific, in the course of which Admiral Rojdestvenski came into collision with the Hull fishing-fleet off the Dogger Bank on the morning of 22 October, with the resultant loss of several British lives. Relations between Great Britain and Russia, already injuriously affected by the fact that Great Britain was the ally of Japan, were strained almost to the breaking point.

It was at this moment that the influence of William II. was brought to bear upon the harassed and vacillating Tsar. The Kaiser, as his telegrams show, had watched with alarm the growth of the intimacy between England and France, dating from the visit of King Edward VII. to Paris in 1903. He feared lest the *rapprochement* between the two Western Powers should be followed by a similar reconciliation between England and Russia, and the occasion seemed to him opportune to stifle the Anglo-French Entente in its cradle by exacerbating the ill-feeling between London and Petrograd and thus compelling France to make a choice between her obligations to Russia, her ally, and her loyalty to England, her friend. Already, in a telegram of 19 October, he had hinted to Nicholas II. that England, as Japan's ally, was responsible for Russia's misfortunes ("I think the strings of all these doings lead across the Channel"); and in a later message of 27 October—the Dogger Bank outrage having occurred in the interval—he complains to the Tsar that Germany is being threatened with war by Great Britain on account of the assistance she has offered to Russia in supplying consignments of coal to the Baltic fleet, and suggests that the time has come "for this new danger to be faced in common,"—in other words, for the conclusion of a Russo-German convention against England. The Tsar is admonished "not to forget to order new ships," for which, adds the writer, "our private firms will be most glad to receive contracts." But the particular interest of this amazing telegram lies in the rôle allotted to France in the projected coalition. It is out of the question, says the Kaiser, that France, when invited by Russia, would attempt to shirk her duty to her ally. "Though Delcassé (the French Minister for Foreign Affairs) is Anglophil he would be wise enough to understand that *the British fleet is utterly unable to save Paris*. In this way a powerful union of three of the continental Powers would be formed which

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would have a double superiority over the Anglo-Japanese group." France, in a word, is to be confronted by the two Emperors with the *fait accompli* of a Russo-German alliance, and terrorised by fear of the consequences of a refusal into uniting with Germany, her hereditary enemy, against England, her newly-found friend.

Such was the genesis of the *pourparlers* which were to issue in the Treaty of Björkö. On 28 October the Tsar replied, agreeing with the Kaiser that "the only way is for Germany, Russia, and France at once to make a treaty in order to abolish English and Japanese presumption" and inviting "Willy" to lay down the outlines of an agreement; but at this point it seems to have occurred to "Nicky" that he was acting rather cavalierly by France, and before signing the draft convention submitted to him by the Kaiser he wires to the latter (23 November) asking his consent to his acquainting the French Government with the project. To this request William II. replies (26 November) with a flat *non-possumus*. To inform France, he says, would be "absolutely dangerous." Should France know that a Russo-German treaty is only projected and still unsigned "she would immediately give short notice to her friend, if not secret ally, England," and the outcome would be an instantaneous attack upon Germany by England and Japan, whose enormous maritime supremacy would enable them to "make short work of my small fleet" and upset the equilibrium of the world. "It was my special wish," continues the Kaiser, "to maintain and strengthen this endangered equilibrium through an express agreement between Russia, Germany, and France. That is only possible if your treaty becomes a fact before the previous information of France leads to catastrophe." On the next day "Willy" again returns to the charge with the warning that "there is no time to be lost. No third Power must hear even a whisper about our intentions before we conclude the convention about the coaling business."

At this point the curtain drops upon the conspirators. A convention for joint action by Germany and Russia in the event of the former being attacked by England and Japan on the score of her breach of neutrality in offering coaling facilities to the Baltic fleet, seems to have been signed immediately; but the negotiations for an alliance of wider

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scope appear to have hung fire until the summer of the following year, when the interview between the Kaiser and the Tsar at Björkö (24 July, 1905) gave the former an opportunity to use his immense personal influence over Nicholas II. to stifle the latter's scruples. The Kaiser came to Björkö armed with a draft treaty which was actually signed on board one of the Imperial yachts, the only witness to the transaction being a Russian admiral who was called upon by his master, at the Kaiser's request, to append his signature to a document of the nature of which he was left in ignorance. The articles of the Björkö treaty have not been divulged; but we know from subsequent telegrams of the German Emperor, published by the *New York Herald*, and from the recent disclosures of Mr. Isvolski in the *Temps*, that the alliance was expressly directed against England, and that it provided for the conversion of the Baltic Sea into a *mare clausum*, and for the seizure and occupation of Denmark by Russia and Germany in the event of the high contracting parties embarking upon a war against Great Britain. From Björkö the Kaiser proceeded to Copenhagen, where he found the atmosphere of the Danish court unfavourable for the prosecution of his plans. He came away, however, convinced that the Danes "realise their inability and helplessness to uphold even the shadow of neutrality against invasion, *it being evident that Russia and Germany will immediately take steps to safeguard their interests by laying their hands on Denmark and occupying it during the war*"; that they (the Danes) are "slowly resigning themselves to this alternative and making up their minds accordingly"; and that rather than broach the idea prematurely "it is better to let it develop and ripen in their heads," since "*tout vient à point à qui sait attendre*"! This telegram, despatched by the Kaiser immediately on his return from Copenhagen (2 August, 1905), concludes with a sarcastic comment on the progress of the Anglo-French *rapprochement*. "What do you say to the programme of festivities for your Allies at Cowes? The whole of the Crimean veterans have been invited to meet their former brothers in arms who fought with them against Russia. Very delicate, indeed. It shows I was right when I warned you two years ago of the re-forming of the old Crimean combination. They are warming up again with a vengeance."

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The subsequent history of the Björkö intrigue is almost farcical. The Russo-German alliance which it had taken the Kaiser the best part of a year to negotiate remained operative for little more than a month. On his return to Tsarskoe Selo the Tsar communicated the terms of the treaty to his Foreign Minister Count Lamsdorf, who, we are told, "could not believe his eyes or ears," and who at once informed the Russian Ambassador at Paris of his master's indiscretion. Upon the latter's report that it would be impossible to get France to come into the agreement, Nicholas II. seems to have been brought to realise the folly and impropriety of his act; and early in September the German Government was instructed that the Treaty of Björkö must be regarded as null and void on the ground that an essential clause, the adhesion of France, could not be carried out.

The chagrin of the Kaiser on receiving this intimation can be pictured, and it found expression in his telegram to the Tsar on 29 September, 1905. This message abounds in abuse of the Tsar's ally, although the Kaiser's persistent will to include France in the Russo-German combination appears to have undergone no diminution. The Treaty of Björkö, he tells the Tsar, "does not come into collision with the Franco-Russian Alliance, provided, of course, the latter is not aimed directly at my country. On the other hand, the obligations of Russia towards France can only go as far as France merits them through her behaviour. Your Ally notoriously left you in the lurch during the whole war, whereas Germany helped you in every way as far as it could without infringing the laws of neutrality." After a reference to the "indiscretions of Delcassé," whose resignation (6 June) he had recently brought about during the Morocco Crisis under a threat of war, the Kaiser concludes, "I fully agree with you that *it will cost time, labour, and patience to induce France to join us both*, but reasonable people will in future make themselves heard and felt. Our Moroccan business is regulated to our entire satisfaction, so the air is free for a better understanding between us. Our treaty is a very good basis to build upon. We joined hands and signed before God, who heard our vows. I, therefore, think that the treaty can well come into existence. What is signed is signed. God is our testator."

This time the Kaiser's eloquence had no effect. The

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Tsar, withdrawn from the influence of his cousin, refused to go behind his engagement to France, and the Treaty of Björkö remained a "scrap of paper." The Kaiser's objective of severing France from England, or in the last resort of opening a rift between Russia and France was not attained; on the contrary, it is probable that the Björkö intrigue contributed in the long run to hasten the *rapprochement* between Russia and the Western Powers. With the advent to office of Stolypin as Prime Minister, and Isvolski as Minister for Foreign Affairs, the Tsar was subjected to healthier influences than those which had been dragging him ever since his accession at the heels of Germany; and in 1906 Russia, like Great Britain, stood loyally by France at the Algeciras Conference. A year later, Nicholas II. accepted the Anglo-Russian Agreement of 31 August, 1907, and a Triple Entente of Great Britain, France and Russia stood over against the Triple Alliance.

The Pact of Björkö was still-born; but the story of its negotiation is of more than merely antiquarian interest, for it illustrates the characters of the autocrats of Potsdam and Petrograd and thereby throws light upon the causes and responsibilities for the present war. Nothing in the picture thus revealed is more arresting than the almost hypnotic influence which the Kaiser is shown to have exercised over the weak-willed and impressionable Tsar. The feeble "Nicky" appears as wax in the hands of the masterful "Willy," who exploits the indecision of his brother ruler until he succeeds in cajoling him perhaps not for the first time—certainly not for the last time—into subordinating the interests of Russia to those of Germany. It may be doubted whether it has hitherto been sufficiently realised how strong an asset the Wilhelmstrasse has possessed during the past twenty years in the personality of Nicholas II. In 1904-5, and again in 1909, when William II. intervened "in shining armour" at Petrograd to force Russia to acquiesce in the annexation of Bosnia, the Kaiser was successful in dictating the policy of his Eastern neighbour. In the light of the Björkö disclosures the events of the last days of July, 1914, in Petrograd, when "Willy" and "Nicky" were again in almost hourly communication by telegraph, lose the obscurity which has hitherto surrounded them;

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and the action of Generals Suhomlinov and Yanuškevič in declining to demobilise at the command of the Kaiser transmitted to them through the Tsar, calls for neither explanation nor defence.

Hardly less illuminating is the glimpse which we catch of the Kaiser's political morality. The contemplated seizure of Denmark reveals William II. in his true colours as the lineal heir of the cynicism and contempt for international law which characterised the statesmanship of Frederick the Great. In view of the cold-blooded plot against the Danes even German apologists will find it difficult to maintain Herr Bethmann Hollweg's thesis that the violation of Belgium in 1914 was the unpremeditated act of a peace-loving government driven desperate by an imminent peril. Again, nothing could illustrate better the Kaiser's conception of the sanctity of treaties than his one-sided interpretation of the obligations contracted by France and Russia under the Dual Alliance. This engagement he appears to regard as binding upon France in every conceivable eventuality, but only binding upon Russia "so far as France merits it by her behaviour." Nicholas II. is given to understand that it is quite honourable for Russia to make a secret alliance with Germany in which France must automatically acquiesce, although she is not to be informed of it beforehand, but that it is utterly unpardonable for France, on her side, to establish friendly relations with England. The statesman responsible for these "indiscretions" (M. Delcassé) must be driven to resignation by threats of war, so as to "clear the air for a better understanding" and to enable "reasonable people," in other words, advocates of a Franco-German alliance, to "make themselves heard." In the meanwhile the Kaiser plays upon the Tsar's dislike of Great Britain to breed bad blood between Russia and France by subtle sneers at the Anglo-French festivities at Cowes and insidious suggestions that France had deserted her Ally in the Japanese war. In the last resort, if France still continued to fight shy of the proposed coalition, William II. could still hope that the task of detaching Russia from France and of shattering the Dual Alliance would be one of little difficulty.

But the most interesting feature of the Björkö disclosures is the revelation of the intensity of the Kaiser's

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hostility to Great Britain so far back as ten years before the outbreak of the present war. In his telegram of 27 October, 1904, the Emperor represents to the Tsar that Germany is threatened with an attack by Great Britain and Japan on account of the assistance she has rendered to the Russian fleet, and that his projected league of Russia, Germany and France is therefore *defensive* in character. No pretence could be more hollow; for it is certain that William II., who throughout the negotiations appears as an astute, if unprincipled diplomatist, must have been perfectly conscious that the danger from England was imaginary. Had England intervened in the Russo-Japanese War she would simply have been playing Germany's game; for Russia would then have been entitled to call upon France to fulfil the terms of the Dual Alliance, and, as the Kaiser himself recognised, it was "out of the question" that France, of all countries, would fail in her duties to an ally. Great Britain and Japan would thus have been faced by a confederacy of Russia, Germany, and France—the very league which the German Emperor was trying to bring into existence. The work of years of British diplomacy would have been undone, and the Anglo-French Entente would have perished in its infancy.

William II. cannot seriously have imagined that the British Government would be guilty of such folly. His projected coalition against Great Britain was, therefore, not conceived with defensive objects:—At the same time its purpose was not actually aggressive—that is to say, not *immediately* aggressive—for, as the Emperor says in his telegram of 26 November, England and Japan, in the event of war, "would soon make short work of my small fleet, and Germany would be temporarily crippled." It is obvious that the German Government, no more than the British, desired war in 1904–5. What, then, was the *raison d'être* of the Kaiser's proposed coalition?

The explanation is a comparatively simple one. In England it was long the fashion to picture William II. as a creature of impulse, whose unstable genius was incapable of abiding by any fixed programme or policy. The revelations of the *New York Herald* show that this is a fundamentally incorrect conception of the Emperor's character.

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Alike in the matter of the projected occupation of Denmark and in his schemes for inducing France to join the Russo-German combination we find the Kaiser preaching the virtue of "time, labour, and patience" and emphasizing the necessity of allowing ideas to "develop and ripen," until other Powers are "moved of their own accord to lean upon us and fall into line with our two countries." In William II. we have to do with a Macchiavelli, not a Maximilian.

The truth is that the Kaiser's dream of a continental league of Germany, Russia, and France against Great Britain was no new scheme arising out of the problems of the Russo-Japanese war. Rather it was a reversion to an earlier policy which appears to have been conceived in the Emperor's brain at least as far back as the year 1894, and for the realisation of which he has worked consistently, if ineffectively, for the greater part of a quarter of a century. As early as 1891 William II. had begun to make advances to France, whose co-operation was essential to the success of his plans; and the accession of the young and Anglophobe Tsar, Nicholas II., three years later, seemed to offer hope that through the good offices of the Russian monarch, whose attachment to Germany was well known, France might at length be prevailed upon to forget the loss of Alsace-Lorraine and to allow the Franco-Russian alliance to be converted into a weapon of German diplomacy. It was doubtless with this object of familiarising Frenchmen with the spectacle of Franco-German co-operation that the Kaiser associated himself in the spring of 1895 with the Russo-French ultimatum to Japan, which compelled the island-empire to surrender the fortress of Port Arthur, ceded to her by China at the Treaty of Shimonoseki. The closing years of the nineteenth century were a period of greater danger to this country than is commonly realised. On no less than three occasions within as many years Great Britain was brought within measurable distance of war with a first-class Power—in 1896, with Germany herself over the Kaiser's telegram to President Kruger; in the spring of 1898, with Russia over the seizure of Port Arthur; and in the autumn of the same year, with France over the question of the Upper Nile. The idea of a European confederacy against us,

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although it never materialised, was in the air; and in view of the dependence of the Tsar upon the Kaiser and of the deference paid by President Faure to the Tsar it can scarcely be doubted that nothing save the overwhelming superiority of the British fleet over the united navies of France and Russia—German sea-power was then non-existent—saved Great Britain from being confronted at this time with the gravest danger which had threatened her since 1780. That the project of a continental league against England was again raised in the autumn of 1899–1900, at the crisis of the South African war, is well known, as also the fact that the plan was shipwrecked upon the refusal of France to accept the Kaiser's proposal that the contracting Powers should guarantee each other's territories in Europe, a step which would have amounted to a declaration upon France's part that the Republic disinterested herself in the future of Alsace and Lorraine. The formal initiative in these discussions is said to have been taken by the Tsar's Foreign Minister, Count Muraviev, but in view of the origin of the Björkö *pourparlers* we need not doubt that in 1900, as in 1904, the idea of an anti-British confederacy had its birth in Berlin.

On the failure of the 1900 negotiations the plan appears to have been pigeon-holed, to be revived, as we have seen, by William II. during the Russo-Japanese war, and again, this time apparently under the auspices of Baron Aehrenthal, at the time of the meeting of Tsar and Kaiser at Swinemünde in 1907. On the latter occasion nothing came of it. The Tsar, aware of his own weakness, took the precaution of being accompanied on this visit by his Foreign Minister, Mr. Isvolski, who, at his first interview with the German Chancellor, took occasion to remind the latter that the Russian Government regarded the Treaty of Björkö as null and void. The conclusion of the Anglo-Russian Agreement of 31 August, 1907, which set the seal to the Triple Entente of England, France, and Russia, seemed to have given the scheme its *coup de grâce*; whether it did so is not actually certain. In the course of the next two years relations between Germany and Russia became seriously strained, although "Willy" still possessed sufficient influence over "Nicky" to force Russia to acquiesce at the eleventh hour

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in the Austrian annexation of Bosnia (March, 1909). In the following year the death of King Edward (May, 1910) and the resignation of Isvolski were followed by another change in Russian foreign policy. In the autumn of 1910 Nicholas II. again visited the Kaiser at Potsdam, and the two Governments soon afterwards reached an accord upon some of the most pressing questions of the day. It was not, perhaps, coincidence that this revived intimacy between Russia and Germany was succeeded, like the Björkö understanding of six years before, by an attempt on the part of the German Government to browbeat France into a deal over the subject of Morocco. Can it be that the Agadir incident of 1911—the inner history of which has not yet been revealed—represents yet another effort on the Kaiser's part to "regulate the Moroccan business to our satisfaction" so as to "clear the air for a better understanding" between France and Germany? If so, nothing came of the experiment, for England in 1911, as in 1905, stood loyally by her partner in the Entente; whilst the reopening of the Balkan question in 1912 ranged Germany and Russia once more in hostile camps. But we need not doubt that had Great Britain stood aloof from the conflict in July, 1914, the overthrow of France and Russia would have been but the preliminary to the formation of the long-projected confederacy against this country.

Viewed in its true perspective, as but one episode in the history of a great design prosecuted consistently, if intermittently, over a number of years, the Björkö intrigue places one fact at least beyond controversy. It proves that throughout the greater part of the reign of King Edward VII. and even for some years before the accession of that monarch, to whom all good Germans attribute the design of hemming in Germany within a ring of enemies, the German Emperor himself was pursuing an *Einkreisungspolitik*, the object of which was to build up a league of Germany, Russia, and France against Great Britain. In the face of the disclosures made by the *New York Herald* it may be hoped that we shall hear no more of the legend of a peace-loving and guileless Germany condemned against her will to draw the sword to protect herself against the malice of her neighbours.

MURRAY L. R. BEAVEN.

Thaddeus Kosciuszko

DIED 15 OCTOBER, 1817

[Il fut—la Pologne elle-même. Il fut entre tous éminemment bon. La bonté extraordinaire qui fut en lui a eu des effets infiniment favorables à l'avenir de sa patrie.

Elle lui a gagné le cœur de toutes les nations convaincus que l'absolue bonté humaine s'est trouvée dans un Polonais.—Michelet on Kosciuszko.]

ON 30 May, 1797, the English press announced that Thaddeus Kosciuszko, the champion of liberty, was in London. As soon as the news was published many prominent men went to the Tablions Hotel to pay their respects to the eminent veteran. Among them were Fox, Cartright, Sheridan, Lord Grey, the Duke of Bedford, the Duchess of Devonshire and Lady Oxford. The well-known artist, R. Cosway, asked and obtained permission to paint the hero's portrait. The Russian ambassador, Count Vorontzev, by special order of the Tsar, inquired every day about the distinguished traveller's health.

Kosciuszko's stay in London was a short one. After a fortnight he left for Bristol, from which town he sailed for America. The farewell accorded to him by the British was magnificent. A guard of honour under the command of Colonel Sir George Thomas rendered military honours. People crowded all along the borders of the Avon and cheered the "Adriana" on board which Kosciuszko was sailing for America. And yet to all outward appearances there was no justification for such enthusiasm. Here was a soldier who but a few years before fought against this country in the American War for Independence, a man who had headed an unsuccessful rising in Poland, a powerless cripple who hardly possessed sufficient strength to walk and had to be carried about in a sedan chair, a prisoner who after years of captivity had just been released by a magnanimous fancy of the Tsar. And yet not only in England, but all along the road from Petrograd to America, he was everywhere received with equal marks of respect and admiration, not only by those who sympathised with him from the beginning, but also by those against whom he had previously fought.

Michelet found the secret of this personality when he said that "in Kosciuszko was incarnated the quintessence of human goodness."

THADDEUS KOSCIUSZKO

In his long and toilsome life this man never considered his own interests, never did anything with a merely selfish end in view. In all his actions he was guided by the principles of equality, liberty, and justice, and when these were in question he knew no compromise. That is why he was equally esteemed by friend and foe. He was unanimously acknowledged as dictator by the revolutionary Poland of 1794, and nobody—not even his enemies—ever dared to suggest that he was capable of abusing the powers vested in him. No wonder that rulers like Catherine II. and Napoleon called him “stupid,” and yet both of them on many occasions showed signs of a great, although obviously unwilling, respect for his moral supremacy.

This moral force was his supreme legacy to the Polish nation. After him the most important asset in the hands of Poles was the moral strength of their case. This was in the mind of Michelet when he said of Kosciuszko, that “he was the very soul of Poland.”

Only Poland could have produced a man like Kosciuszko. Only a man like Kosciuszko could have so perfectly impersonated Poland. He was the descendant of a White-Ruthenian petty boyar family, freed from the bondage of submission to their feudal Lithuanian over-lords by the application, after the Union of Lithuania with Poland, of the Polish doctrine of the equality of the whole nobility. Admitted to the ranks of the Polish nobility, the Kosciuszko family, along with other Lithuanian and Ruthenian families, were quickly Polonised. As a member of such a family, Kosciuszko incarnated in his own personality the idea of the unity of the old Republic, in which the principles of liberty and equality as far as it went, produced a phenomenon similar to that obtained by the same methods, only on a wider scale, in the British Commonwealth, where English, Scotch, Welsh, Canadians, Australians, etc., are all and equally alike British. Differences of race practically did not exist in the ancient Polish Republic. There were only differences of class. From that there was only one step to the idea of general equality.

Kosciuszko was born just at the time (1746) when, after the decline and degeneration of the seventeenth century, Poland was beginning to reform herself on a modern basis. He was brought up in the newly-opened Corps of Cadets,

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which was a model school of the time. Here he was imbued with the idea of the necessity of dutiful self-sacrifice for his country and of the obligations of the individual towards his fellow citizens. The teaching of the French philosophers of the time helped towards the formation of Kosciuszko's ideas. When he went to America to fight for the liberation of people striving for freedom, he was greatly impressed by the democratic ideas of equality prevailing there. As a Pole, however, he felt deeply for the negroes. In his last will and testament he directed that all his property in America should be employed for purchasing negroes "and giving them liberty in my name, and in giving them an education in trades or otherwise, and in having them instructed for their new condition in the duties of morality which may make them good neighbours, good fathers or mothers, husbands or wives, and in their duties as citizens, teaching them to be defenders of their liberty and country and of the good order of society, and in whatsoever other way they may be made happy and useful."

After his elevation to Dictatorship in Poland (24 March, 1794) one of his first cares was the improvement of the lot of the peasants to whom he granted personal freedom by his edict dated from Polaniec on 7 May, 1794.

At the battle of Maciejowice on 10 October he was wounded and taken prisoner. There is a widespread belief that when wounded Kosciuszko exclaimed, "Finis Poloniae." Putting aside the fact that Kosciuszko, being always very simple in his manners, was not likely, at a moment like this, to use a pompous Latin phrase, we know that Kosciuszko was pursued and taken prisoner by a group of five Russians whose names are recorded. They were all of them more or less uneducated people, and none of them was likely to have understood or repeated the statement. Moreover, we have Kosciuszko's own letter addressed to the Count de Ségur, author of the "Décade Historique," in which he categorically denies ever having used the words.

After his defeat and captivity in Petersburg (1794-1796) a new ray of hope appeared for the Poles. But could Kosciuszko have believed in it? Poland's hopes were based on Napoleon. Could a modest republican with his threefold dogma of liberty, equality, and justice, have found a common platform with Napoleon? Finding nothing

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to hope for from him, he turned again towards Alexander, whom he begged "to proclaim himself King of Poland with a free Constitution approaching that of England, to establish schools for the education of peasants, whose servitude should be abolished within ten years, and to let them enjoy the full rights of property" (Berville, 9 April, 1814). From him, as from Napoleon, Kosciuszko requested the restoration of a perfectly distinct and independent Poland in her historical frontiers, *i.e.*, with all territories belonging to her before the partitions. This request was only natural on the part of a man who like himself was imbued with the spirit of unity of all the nationalities of the ancient Republic.

From this demand he was naturally willing to make some reduction, but it was his object to keep compromise within reasonable limits. He wanted a Poland strong enough to hold her own among her powerful neighbours. He therefore equally disapproved of the Duchy of Warsaw and of the Congress Kingdom. This political conception of a Poland sufficiently strong to maintain her absolute independence still holds good to-day.

AUGUST ZALESKI.

Is Britain at War with Austria ?

[*The following article by Professor Drăghicescu, of Bucarest University, a former editor of the Indépendance Roumaine and a member of the Roumanian Senate, presents a point of view which has not yet received sufficient attention in this country.*]

It has been solemnly declared in the British Parliament that Austria-Hungary is not the principal enemy of England. Undoubtedly the British themselves know best of all who takes the first, and who the second, place among their foes. Yet those of them who know Austria-Hungary more intimately know her to be so passive an instrument in the hands of Germany, that even Bavaria or Saxony might, under given circumstances, prove more independent and less flexible in the hands of German militarist imperialism. As for the Magyars, their devotion to Germany far exceeds even that of the Austrians; and the English will surely not fall into the trap prepared by Vienna, in agreement with Berlin, which consists in Austria-Hungary assuming a certain show

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of independence towards Germany, and in internal policy a tendency favourable to her own Slavs. German diplomacy clearly aims at thus saving Austria-Hungary, by making her play a part calculated to arouse sympathy in certain political circles in Britain and France. And the Germans hope to keep Austria-Hungary intact, and thus to preserve the route by which they may eventually reach Salonica and the Persian Gulf. Thus Austria-Hungary represents a very real danger for the British Empire, a danger none the less real because it is indirect and hidden.

If, however, we accept the view that Austria-Hungary is not the principal danger for Great Britain, this does not alter the fact that it is so for three at least of Britain's allies—Italy, Roumania and Serbia—quite apart from the fact that the Dual Monarchy as at present constituted is a fatal obstacle to the reconstitution of Poland and the resurrection of Bohemia. These three allies readily admit that Germany is to them an enemy no less dangerous than Austria. It was against the divisions of Mackensen and Falkenhayn that the Roumanian army had to fight last winter; and the Roumanians know only too well that the more immediate danger which threatens them from Austria is but an intermediary phase of the German danger, which, though more distant and indirect, is none the less formidable. They know the meaning of the *Drang nach Osten*.

Moreover, between Italy and Roumania, on the one hand, and the Entente Powers on the other, there exist very precise and positive treaties, prescribing the aims of this war; and though in the case of Serbia such treaties do not exist, the most solemn public pledges have been given that justice will be done to her national claims—claims which can only be satisfied at the expense of Austria-Hungary. And quite apart from all this, when the acknowledged leaders of the French and British nations proclaimed, in agreement with President Wilson, that the supreme object of this war is to secure liberty and justice for the small nations and for peoples under foreign yoke—it is obvious that Austria-Hungary, as the country in which the oppression of smaller nationalities has reached its height, inevitably became one of Britain's main enemies, even though the latter may have no direct interests there. This is the natural result of the very close solidarity of interests which bind the Allies

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together during this war and will maintain such ties after it is over.

But let us face the fact that there is a section of opinion in Great Britain which considers that since Austria-Hungary is not the chief enemy, it has no interest in her dismemberment, and that it is all the more desirable to avert such an event, because this might simplify the conditions of peace and perhaps even contribute towards shortening this terrible war. No one will deny our contention that this attitude represents a crying injustice towards Britain's Italian, Roumanian and Serbian allies, of whom two at least were invited, and even urged, by the Entente to enter the war at its side. It was just because the Entente represented the war as one for the principles of civilisation and the liberty of the peoples, that Roumania and Italy put forward every effort on behalf of their subjected kinsmen in Austria-Hungary. In their case the abstract principles of liberty had an absolutely concrete method of expression; for to them the liberation of the Trentino, of Trieste and of Transylvania is as much a *conditio sine quâ non* of future peace, as is that of Alsace-Lorraine for France. If it were not so, for what has Italy made such sacrifices? And is Roumania still enduring all the horrors of war and invasion merely to regain the territory which she has lost? Yet that would be the sole result of all the efforts and sacrifices of the Entente's new allies, if Austria-Hungary is to remain intact on the basis of the *status quo*, and if, as certain organs of the Allied press maintain, the evacuation of Belgium, northern France, Alsace-Lorraine, Serbia and Roumania, with due reparation, is a real basis of peace.

But unjust and even dangerous as this would be alike for Italians, Serbians and Roumanians, it is no less evident, if we examine calmly the consequences of such a settlement, that the idea of saving Austria-Hungary would be equally disastrous for the Powers of the Entente. Let us assume that the invaded territories have been evacuated, and that a certain sum of money has been assigned to them for reparation and reconstruction. What will in that case be the position in the political life of the country of those men who, as devoted friends of the Entente, plunged Roumania in so disastrous a war, merely to attain the *status quo* at its conclusion? It is obvious that Mr. Brătianu and his friends

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on the one hand, and Mr. Take Ionescu on the other, but, above all, those radical elements which finally decided the King and the country as a whole for war, would simply be stoned on their return; and that Mr. Marghiloman and the little group of Germanophiles which surrounds him would be the absolute masters of the situation, and would finally yoke Roumania to the chariot of German policy in the East. An absolutely similar fate would await Mr. Pasić in Serbia. Political life in Serbia and Roumania would inevitably and completely swing round towards Germany; and public opinion, disillusioned and deceived, would turn fiercely against those whom it held responsible for such disasters. Indeed, this reaction would be likely to go to such lengths, that the few isolated theorists who hold that national unity could be best achieved by the union of Roumania with Austria-Hungary, might win over public opinion to themselves. Such a solution would, indeed, in the event of a reversion to the *status quo*, have become the sole means of achieving the union of the twelve millions of Roumanians. A similar theory has from time to time been propounded in Serbia with regard to the Jugoslavs of Austria-Hungary. In a word, in a few years after peace, with the aid of German propaganda and German diplomacy, we might perhaps have a Greater Roumania and a Greater Serbia under the rule of the Habsburgs, and, indirectly, at the orders of the Prussian General Staff. For it is obvious that while a Greater Serbia and a Greater Roumania, independent and in alliance, could resist German influence and constitute an impregnable barrier on the German path to the East, a small Serbia and a small Roumania, ruined, disillusioned and miserable, would willy-nilly be dominated and absorbed by such all-powerful neighbours as the Central Empires. German militarism would then, quite apart from its vassals of to-day, dispose of all the material and moral resources of Roumania and Serbia. From Hamburg to Salonica, Constantinople and Bagdad, Germany would rule without restraint, and would soon become an acute menace to British rule in Egypt and in India.

Such are the direct, immediate and obvious consequences of the theory that Austria-Hungary is not the principal enemy of Great Britain. It is the duty of every Roumanian to draw the attention of the British press and of British

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politicians to the dangers and injustice which such a theory involves, and to remind them that in the West such war-aims as are incompatible with the integrity of the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy are almost always passed over in silence. So far as Roumania is concerned, our enemies are never tired of exploiting these facts, in order to convince the population which has fallen into their hands that the Allies deceived Roumania by inducing her to espouse their cause for nothing. Hesitation and suspicion might well strike root in the minds of our compatriots, when it is pointed out to them that the leading statesmen of their Allies ask nothing for Roumania save the restoration of her lost territory, with due reparation for damages sustained. For men who have sacrificed everything this is little indeed; and if that were all they had to hope for, it would be hard to induce them to continue the struggle at a time when the invader himself offers to evacuate the conquered territory and to secure to them certain other advantages, if only they will conclude peace. In conclusion, it may be pointed out that the best means of sustaining and encouraging the Roumanian army—to-day the only sure *point d'appui* on the insecure eastern front—would be for public opinion in Great Britain and the statesmen who voice it, to record in their speeches and written utterances the just claims and aspirations of Roumania. This would materially contribute towards unmasking German intrigues and undermining their progress in the conquered territory. Such pronouncements are all the more desirable because the claims of Roumania are in full accord with the interests of Great Britain and her other Allies.

D. DRĂGHICESCU.

A Real Coalition in Russia

THE Democratic Conference is over and has provided no practical solution of Russia's difficulties. It has suggested remedies, but, no sooner than suggested, they have been cancelled, and the upshot of a week's deliberations has been a state of general uncertainty. It was in this atmosphere that Kerenski found himself forced to act, not as the Conference suggested, but as he himself thought necessary, and he has reverted to his old policy of forming a real

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Coalition of Socialist and *Bourgeois* parties. This is the only real Coalition, and it is the only solution which holds out any hope of success.

The fact that the former Coalition of Socialist and *Bourgeois* parties broke down is no indication that the present attempt will share the same fate, for the main cause of the earlier failure is to be removed. Last July the Cadets resigned because they found themselves constantly outvoted, and forced to subscribe to the wishes of the C.W.S.D. The settlement of the Ukrainian question was the pretext, not the cause, of their withdrawal; the real point at issue was the question of responsibility. And it is this point for which Kerenski is now attempting to find a remedy.

The object of the Democratic Conference was two-fold : to decide the nature of the future Government and to determine its responsibility. On neither of these points was any clear decision arrived at, and it remained for Kerenski to find the best solution himself. He has neither ignored nor followed the resolutions of the Conference, but has taken the road which in his opinion will best serve the interests of Russian democracy. The problem before him is to create a new Government which will be strong and at the same time democratic. To be strong it must be freed from responsibility to the C.W.S.D., which is only partially representative; to be democratic it must represent all shades of moderate opinion and act in the interests not of one class only, but of the nation. Russia wants neither a military nor a socialist dictatorship, but a national government uniting all those moderate parties, which will make it their main purpose to save their country from anarchy and disruption. Thus the new Government is to have full legislative powers, but only to exercise them so long as it enjoys the confidence of the new Provisional Parliament. The latter is to be purely consultative, but will exercise moral control over the Government; it will be drawn from all those democratic organisations in town and country that represent the new Russia.

The immediate problems of the new Government will be partly political and partly economic. The political problem that demands immediate settlement is the relations between the Government and the Maximalists. The

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infinite patience of the Russian nature has been strained to breaking-point by the noisy demonstrations of this group of visionaries and adventurers. This patience can no longer be extended to men who refuse all compromise, who owe their influence over the masses to the very fact that they proclaim themselves "irreconcilables." Hitherto Kerenski has shown more mercy than justice towards those who, in his opinion, are endangering the future of democracy in Russia. He has been feeling his way towards firmer foundations than those on which he stood, but, once he has found the necessary support, we hope that he will act as firmly against the Maximalists as he has against Kornilov. Those who, like Černov, still hope to bargain with the extreme Left, can accomplish nothing, and if Kerenski's Government is to restore order it must break with a policy that merely ends in obstruction.

The economic dangers are still more threatening than the political, and it is here that the Cadets must lend a willing hand. The new Government will, it is hoped, during the winter months, be relieved from the embarrassment of repeated military failures, but the danger of famine and all that it entails is no less threatening. If famine threatens during the winter it will be due to two main causes, lack of confidence in the Government and the breakdown of transport. A strong Government that inspired confidence could do much to remedy the present food shortage. In parts of Russia there is still plenty of corn, but the peasants refuse to part with it, partly because they are suspicious, and partly because they fail to get the manufactured goods they need in return. The breakdown of transport is more difficult to remedy, for here the whole question of the relations between capital and labour arises. Under present conditions no final solution of this question can be looked for, but the co-operation of capital and labour in the Government should do much to smooth over difficulties.

The enemies of Russia, whether open or secret, are already counting upon her disruption and are preparing to gather in the spoils. Those who hope to secure this country's support in their intrigues against our Eastern Ally, will, we feel sure, only burn their own fingers. They must understand that our alliance with Russia is not only material, and that it is not our custom to count out or to

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abandon our friends in adversity. We have no doubt ourselves that the time is not far distant when Russia will again be strong, but while she is regaining her strength she can trust to the loyalty of those who have always sympathised with her fight for liberty. **RURIK.**

Serbia's Place in History

Captain Temperley's "History of Serbia" * is a most timely contribution and in no respect is it more opportune than in helping to bring home the fact that the historic claims of her people cover a much wider area than that represented by the geographical limits of the Serbian Kingdom and Montenegro. This scholarly production, the fruit, as he tells us, "of some years' travel and study in the Near East," is the more valuable, moreover, since no general history of the Serbian people in English has as yet seen the light. Mr. Temperley, it appears from his preface, had originally intended simply to relate the story of Serbia from the revival of her independence early in the nineteenth century to the date of the outbreak of the Balkan War in 1912. He was certainly wise to take up a more comprehensive standpoint. The history of the later Serbian Kingdom is inextricably bound up with the earlier historic tradition. To the Serbian people, indeed, the glories of a remote past have been a more living reality than anything the present could offer.

The unpublished sources of British diplomacy, regarding the earlier stages of the modern Serbian kingdom, preserved at the Record Office, which Mr. Temperley has consulted, no doubt throw new and interesting sidelights on that part of the subject. But to set it in its true perspective a much deeper investigation of sources drawn from the Balkan lands themselves was necessary, involving evidence often of the most complex and conflicting kind, and with this the author has, on the whole, very successfully grappled. He has, moreover, been greatly aided by his personal knowledge of the land and people. The coronation at Užice in 1222 of Stephen Nemanja, the first Orthodox Serbian King, gains new interest, for instance, when it is described by a writer who has seen his actual effigy on the monastery walls. He gives us his picture, black-bearded, with pearl-bedecked cap and crimson robe and wearing a royal mantle on which the yellow two-headed eagles of imperial Byzantium are already seen embroidered.

The need of a broad outlook on the subject nowhere emerges more clearly than in its most recent developments sketched in part by Mr. Temperley in his concluding chapters and which are bound up with the Jugoslav movement. The Serbian Empire of the Nemanjas in its widest extent under Dušan included alien strips in Albania, Southern Macedonia, and Western Bulgaria, and embraced the whole extent of the later Serbian and Montenegrin

* "A History of Serbia," by Harold W. V. Temperley, Fellow and Assistant Tutor, Peterhouse, Cambridge. (Bell.) 10s. 6d. net.

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kingdoms together with Herzegovina and most of Southern Dalmatia. It stopped short, however, at the Danube and the Save, neither did it extend West of the Lower Drina. But by a strange turn, indeed, of the whirligig of fortune, the very disasters of the race broadened the basis of national tradition. Already a Bosnian contingent played its part in the day of Kosovo. The pressure of the Turkish invasions was productive even before the final conquest of migratory movements to the North. The first wave of migration (not mentioned in the present work) took place, in fact, as early as the years immediately succeeding the great defeat of King Vukašin by the Turks on the Maritza in 1371, which cost him his life and sounded the knell of Serbian empire. His son Demetrius was given the government of the county of Arad in Hungary, whither he brought over a numerous band of Serbian settlers. So, too, in the middle of the fifteenth century, the Serbian despot, George Branković, who had been the last great champion of national independence, peopled his large estates in Hungary with Serbian immigrants. In the four years immediately preceding 1480, King Matthias Corvinus records the settlement of 200,000 Serbs in his dominions. Finally, after the abortive insurrection of 1690, the Patriarch Arsenius Crnojević, induced by the promise of special privileges by the Emperor Leopold, gave a more formal character to the movement by heading another large contingent, estimated at some 37,000 families, into exile and transferring the seat of the Patriarchate itself from Peč in Old Serbia to Karlovci on the Danube. A large part of the Western Banat and the Sirmian counties of Slavonia received an autonomous constitution under Serbian Vojvodes.

The effects of this shifting of both the political and ecclesiastical centres of gravity North of the Danube have been well brought out by Captain Temperley. It is true that Habsburg assurances of autonomy were one after the other sacrificed to the exigencies of the Magyar State. But some liberty was still accorded by eighteenth century Hungary to the Serbian schools and churches. A considerable portion of the Serbian people was to a certain extent brought into contact in its new home with western civilization. Political emancipation was, indeed, first worked out by Kara George and his rough peasant following in the older seats of the race South of the Danube. But the intellectual inspiration of Free Serbia was drawn largely from North of the river. From that side came Obradović, the founder of the National education, Vuk Karadžić, the regenerator of the Serbian language, and Zmaj Jovan Jovanović, the chief among Serbian poets.

It is impossible in a short notice to follow out the many points of special interest suggested by Mr. Temperley's work. But this migratory movement northwards of large portions of the Serbian race has such a very present bearing on the political problems of the hour that a short statement of some of the logical consequences of the ethnographic revolution—for it is nothing less—seems to be very desirable. Some of the most obvious historical results have, in fact, been strangely ignored in certain quarters. A circular,

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indeed, has been recently distributed broadcast by politicians who even at this time of day regard the offer of "a corridor to the Adriatic"—the old Austrian suggestion—as a reasonable compensation to Serbia for her untold sacrifices in the present war! It seems never to have crossed the minds of these gentlemen that in Southern Hungary and Sirmia there lies a "Serbia Irredenta" in an even truer sense than that in which the Trentino or Trieste stands to Italy. For there lie not only the residence of the Serbian Vojvodes and the later seat of the Serbian Patriarchs but the holy places of the race where, in the monasteries of the Frušakgora, the mortal remains of the last Tsar Uroš the Younger and the last King, Lazar, who fell at Kosovo, are still the objects of national pilgrimage.

Serbia, indeed, has decided—and wisely—not to peg out any separate territorial claims on her own behalf, but to throw in her lot with that of her Croat and Slovene kinsmen. But the Serbian penetration of districts, West as well as North, outside the original area occupied by this branch of the race has an important bearing on practical politics as excluding anything but an integral solution of the Yugoslav problem. It is not only the Serbization of Sirmia and the Western Banat that has to be considered. For purposes of defence against the Turks the policy of the Habsburg Emperors favoured a methodical extension of Serbian immigration along the whole borders of Turkish Bosnia and from the Lika district of Croatia to Slavonia grouped these warlike colonists into the "Regiments" of a Military Frontier. The gradual infiltration of Serbian exiles has also formed a solid mass in Northern Dalmatia.

On the other hand, any real distinction between Serbs and Croats it is impossible to trace. At the time of their first appearance in history the two component elements of the Serbo-Croat race were as closely akin as the Angles and Saxons. Even to-day their dialects are nearer related than, say, those of Northamptonshire and Yorkshire. Their later superficial division is itself a historic accident, to be traced to Diocletian's partition of Illyricum into two halves dependent respectively on the Eastern and Western Empire. The Serbs who settled in the Eastern half came thus under the ecclesiastical influence of Byzantium, while Rome maintained her spiritual hold in the Western dioceses in which the Croats had settled. Thus, in the early Middle Ages, except for the adherents of the Western faith in the Serb maritime cities, there was a clear-cut territorial division between the Catholic Croats and Orthodox Serbs. But the process of interpenetration that has been at work from the earliest days of the Turkish Conquest, has radically altered the situation. The two elements, though retaining their ecclesiastical distinction, are at present inextricably commingled. A partial solution on the basis of a division on the old politico-religious lines is thus excluded by the root facts of the present situation. Happily this fundamental condition is now recognized by all the members of the South Slav brotherhood and the aim of integral union has received its final sanction in the Pact of Corfu.

ARTHUR J. EVANS.

Review

Das weltwirtschaftliche Problem der modernen Industriestaaten : Dr. Carl von Tyszka. (Jena: Fischer, 1916.) This book deserves attention as a sane and lucid contribution to the study of fiscal policy by a Berlin professor who has neither allowed the war to unhinge his judgment nor sold his soul to the Government. The author was already known before the war as a careful student of British social conditions. The main object of this book is to state the problem of fiscal policy in a rapidly growing industrial country, and to contrast two rival methods of dealing with it—that adopted by Great Britain in 1846 and that adopted by Germany in 1879, when Bismarck suddenly abandoned his ideal of a tariff for revenue purposes only and launched Germany into a new era of Protectionism. The argument in favour of the former solution is worked out in close detail and with much ability.

Dr. Tyszka is remorselessly frank with the German Protectionists. He points out that the change of policy in 1879 was not due to ideal reasons, but purely to the pressure of material interests, which Bismarck felt it inconvenient to resist, and that the same influences shaped the tariff of 1902, which is still in force. He tears aside the pretence that the existing policy has helped to make Germany a "self-sufficient" country. On the contrary, he says, the corn-laws and the detailed regulations connected with them are framed in the interest of the large Junker landowners in order to facilitate the export of grain and so to keep prices high. Nor is it true, as is frequently stated, that the existing tariff helps to maintain a vigorous agricultural population. It is not conceived in the interests of the peasant proprietors of South and West Germany, constituting 78 per cent. of the landlords of Germany, who have no interest in high corn prices but need cheap feeding stuffs for their animals. Still less, of course, is it in the interest of the town workmen, whose wages have by no means kept pace with the steady rise in prices. Wheaten bread, for instance, rose 31 per cent. between 1900 and 1912, as compared with a rise of 12 per cent. in this country.

It is interesting to note that the author admits that Great Britain has a substantial grievance against Germany in the matter of dumping, but expresses the opinion that it could best be met by special retaliatory measures in particular cases, without the adoption of a general tariff.

A. E. Z.

Peace Rumours

The British press has poured due scorn upon the absurd but persistent rumours which have been circulating in Berlin with regard to Entente peace overtures to Germany. The story had an obvious motive in preparations for the new German War Loan; but there is a great deal behind it, to which, as yet, there is no clue. Interesting comment upon it is supplied by the Berlin correspondent of the *Münchener Neueste Nachrichten*, who maintains that Great

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Britain made proposals not in Berlin, *but in Vienna*. He also affirms very positively, on serious neutral authority, that "England, whose representative at the Vatican, as is well known, communicated the Papal manifesto to the other Entente Powers, had detailed information beforehand as to the intention of the Pope and absolutely approved of it. The wild outcry in the English press was highly welcome to the English Government as serving to veil its real intentions." The correspondent, who, of course, takes for granted our approaching exhaustion, describes as follows the various suggestions which England's "peace-feeler" would be likely to contain. Germany would be asked to restore Belgian independence and to conclude a new treaty of neutrality. She would come to terms with France on the basis of an exchange of territory, leaving aside for the moment the question whether France was to receive a part of Alsace-Lorraine in return for a change of frontier elsewhere, or whether the equivalent was to be found by other means. "For the rest Germany should compensate herself so far as possible on the East," while she would recover most of her colonies except South-West Africa, and would perhaps also secure some of the Portuguese colonies. "On all sides special emphasis is laid on the cold-blooded manner in which Russia is sacrificed in these English calculations, and how insignificant is England's interest in the small nations, especially in the Balkans." As we pointed out last week, it is obviously the German game to represent this country as ready to desert Russia and as only interested in a solution on the Western front; but it is well to note that responsible neutrals are helping her at this game of misrepresentation.

The Muzzling of *Die Neue Zeit*

The Independent Socialist Party in Germany has just suffered another serious loss by the forcible transfer of its ably-conducted weekly organ—*Die Neue Zeit*—to the control of the Majority Party. So swiftly and ruthlessly was this "conversion" carried out that Herr Karl Kautsky, the editor, was not even permitted to bid his readers farewell or to make any comment upon "the order of his going." It is hardly surprising that the German Government, with its rooted belief in its own ability (and duty) to control opinion, should have thus attempted to silence one of its incorruptible and most outspoken critics. (For its previous action against *Vorwärts* see THE NEW EUROPE, No. 3.) Herr Kautsky has been a thorn in the Kaiser's side ever since July, 1914, and before. He took his stand against any Socialist collaboration with the German Government, and in common with Liebknecht and others, created the nucleus of the Independent Socialist Party, which is now a great power in working-class Germany. The offence, for which he has suffered a momentary eclipse, was probably the article on Belgium published in *Die Neue Zeit* on 14 September (see *The New Statesman*, 6 October), in which he exposed the hollowness of current German arguments on Belgium and challenged the doctrine that the day of small States is over. The muzzling of *Die Neue Zeit* is, in our

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eyes, telling evidence of the nervousness of the German Government which will increasingly become the moving factor in the European situation during the coming winter. We shall watch with interest to see whether a like fate overtakes the *Leipziger Volkszeitung*, which is the principal organ of the "Minority" in the daily press.

Cardinal Gasparri's Letter to the Bishop of Valence

The *Journal des Débats*, 1 October, publishes a letter from Cardinal Gasparri to Monseigneur de Gibergues, Bishop of Valence, which forms an illuminating and significant footnote to the Papal Note. The Cardinal argues that the Pope has treated Belgium and France with special favour, that the conditions laid down are those which enlightened Frenchmen accept, and that, in the matter of the reparation which France demands, the French nation should consider whether, even if they ultimately got full reparation, it is worth having as the price of another year of war. Throughout the letter there runs the insidious suggestion that France, in distinction to other belligerents, could now get all she desires—Alsace-Lorraine being left to the *dispositions conciliantes* of the parties concerned—and that she could therefore lead the way to peace by meeting the Holy Father half-way. In a word, France is invited to break up the Single Front of which she has been the effective exponent, to leave Eastern Europe to the tender mercies of its present oppressors, and to desert her Allies—British, Russian, Italian and American—merely at the word of a Pontiff who can offer her no guarantee whatever. The Cardinal's plea is too transparent.

Diagrammatic Map of a Future South Slav State

By SIR ARTHUR EVANS

Explanatory Notes

Serbo-Croat orthography:—

š = sh.

č = ch in church, or tch.

ć = ch—softer.

c = ts.

ž = French j.

j = y.

The land frontier of the future South Slav State on the Italian side is made to run almost due North from the mouth of the Arsa River, the historic boundary of Italy, to the Drave. As a matter of fact the Slavs have a more extensive claim ethnographically, since a Slovene population occupies the greater part of the upper Isonzo Valley and even extends beyond the present Italian frontier. It seems probable, however, that for strategic reasons Italy will claim the whole of the Isonzo basin.

For similar reasons certain key positions, such as the islands of Lussin and Lissa, are here allotted to Italy on the East Adriatic side. The interior of Western Istria, though preponderantly Croat, would also be required by Italy to secure Pola and the other Coast cities, where the Italians are in a majority.

NOTES

The thinner red line on the map indicates the boundary between the territory of Serbia and Montenegro as it existed before the War. and the Yugoslav area under Austro-Hungarian dominion.

The Capital itself—whether the New State be federal or more centrally governed—could only be at Belgrade. Some personal suggestions are made in the map as to the seats of Provincial Diets or "Sabors" in the future. The seats of these, as here proposed, are :—

1. Ljubljana (Laibach) for the Slovene region (S.E. Carinthia, N. Styria, Carniola, N. Istria).
2. Zagreb (Agram) for Croatia-Slavonia.
3. Spljet (Spalato) for Dalmatia.
4. Karlovci (Karlovitz); or possibly Novisad (Neusatz) for a North Serbian Province representing the W. Banat (including the greater part of the old Serbian Vojvodina) and the Serb districts of Bačka and Baranja in S. Hungary. With these it would be certainly convenient to group the Slavonian district of Sirmia, inhabited by a Serb population and for long connected with the Vojvodani.
5. Niš (Nish), or possibly Kragujevac, for Serbia proper as it existed before the Balkan Wars.
6. Skoplje (Uskup or Skopia) for the territories acquired in 1913.
7. Podgorica for Montenegro.
8. Sarajevo for Bosnia.
9. Mostar for Herzegovina, perhaps including Primorje, the old Serbian maritime tract.

The expediency is here suggested of making the Dalmatian coast towns of Zara, Ragusa, and Cattaro, where the traditions of Latin civilization are strong, free cities in the New State.

One principal object of the map is to illustrate the economic liberation of the future South Slav State by the construction of new lines of railway. The main feature of this would be the linking up of the main Save Valley line with the Simplon-Milan-Gradisca railway, by the lowest pass over the Julians once followed by the Great Roman Highway between West and East. A new and shorter overland route would be thus opened up to Belgrade, Constantinople and the East from London, Paris, and Northern Italy. By this route it will be possible to reach Belgrade from London in 39 hours, about 5 hours quicker than by the Orient Express *viâ* Vienna and Budapest before the War. Belgrade should be reached from Milan in 15½ hours.

The future connections of Central and Southern Russia and Roumania with the Adriatic ports across the New State are also shown, and the supreme importance of Belgrade as a railway centre is brought out. Free ports are suggested at Fiume, Spalato, and Ragusa-Gravosa. It is assumed that Trieste (under Italian dominion) would also be a free port, as Salonica is in Greek hands. Fiume (Rjeka) would become the nearest maritime outlet for Belgrade.

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