“Smoke on the Mountain”: The Infamous Counterfeiting Case of Tongzi District, Guizhou Province, 1794

Jin Cao; Hans Ulrich Vogel

The earliest extant Chinese laws stipulated extraordinarily harsh punishments for forgery and impersonation, indicating that these offenses had already become grave concerns for the ruling elites more than 2,000 years ago. However, little has been written about this topic. In this well-researched and lucidly written book, Mark McNicholas not only fills a considerable gap in our knowledge but also makes an important contribution to the historiography of late imperial China. By skillfully connecting the stories of individual imposters and forgers with succinct and incisive discussions of the broader contexts , Forgery and Impersonation in Imperial China offers valuable insights on various aspects of the politics, bureaucracy, popular culture, and society of Qing China. Among the seven main chapters of this book, the first four analyze cases that involved impersonating princely and royal agents and then low-level officials and local constables. Chapters 5 and 6 study forgery cases, while the last chapter traces the history and transformation of imperial legislations on these offenses. The shifting patterns of forgery and impersonation cases reflected the changing realities of the socioeconomic and political circumstances of the time, as this study contends. The majority of the culprits in these cases were at or near the bottom of the social and economic ladder. For them, the immediate benefit apparently outweighed the potentially fatal consequence of breaking imperial laws. Revealing the motivations and life stories of these actors who otherwise have left no traces constitutes a significant contribution in itself. Moreover, what these impostors and forgers believed to be effective strategies for deceiving others and how they exploited others' greed, fear, or ignorance give us rare, useful glimpses into some widely shared ideas, sentiments, and practices of that era. McNicholas does an excellent job of explaining what different kinds of zhawei (deception and counterfeiting) cases can tell us about the social and political trends at the time. This requires not just extensive research and an impressive grasp of the vast literature on Qing China but also the skill to reconstruct a larger picture from fragmented evidence and individual cases. As this book demonstrates, the fact that imposters like Meng Guangzu—who claimed to be an emissary of the third prince of the Kangxi emperor in 1717—would try such bold moves and in some cases almost succeeded in deceiving local officials illustrated how the princely struggle for succession in the late Kangxi era made local officials feel vulnerable and eager to hedge against political risks. The religious bent of the Yongzheng emperor and the secrecy surrounding his accession to the throne explained why a number of impostors during his reign claimed

Mark McNicholas considers the significance of forgery and impersonation in imperial China from 1700 and 1820, a time span commonly referred to as the "High Qing." Drawing on archival records, dynastic histories, and the codified law, he examines the crime and punishment of individuals who forged government documents or posed as agents of the state. Situating these crimes within the social and political environment of eighteenth- to early nineteenth-century China, the author analyzes who engaged in forgery and impersonation, what they hoped to achieve, and why the government treated them so harshly if they were caught.

Much work on counterfeiting takes the perspective of brand holders and focuses on strategies for restricting the infringement of their intellectual property rights (IPR). This article takes a different approach. Based on long-term ethnographic fieldwork in a market bazaar in Shanghai, the article examines the way in which market participants negotiate the value of counterfeit goods. Brand holders attempt to control the valuation of branded goods, which are usually traded in fixed-price markets. Counterfeit goods, on the other hand, are subject to intensive bargaining in Chinese bazaar-type markets. Identifying different types of value that market participants refer to in their attempts to manipulate prices, the article argues that counterfeit goods and their markets create a more active role for both vendors and consumers in negotiating, denaturalising and temporarily re-fixing the value of goods

Money in Asia (1200–1900): Small Currencies in Social and Political Contexts Edited by Jane Kate Leonard and Ulrich Theobald LEIDEN | BOSTON This is a digital offprint for restricted use only | © 2015 Koninklijke Brill NV Contents Preface: Some Thoughts on the Nature of Money Mark Elvin Acknowledgements xl List of Tables, Figures, and Maps xlii List of Contributors xlvii ix Introduction 1 Control the Uncontrollable: The Endless Trouble with Small Cash Ulrich Theobald Part 1 Small Currencies: Theory and Comparative Perspective 1 Link-Unit-of-Account versus Ratio-Unit-of-Account Moneys: Seventeenth-Century Dutch Mint Policy 41 Dennis O. Flynn 2 The Development of Small Early Money in Western Antiquity and Early China 71 Peter Bernholz 3 Fractional Pieces and Non-Metallic Monies in Medieval India (1200–1750) 86 Najaf Haider 4 The ‘Doit Infestation in Java’: Exchange Rates between Silver and Copper Coins in Netherlands India in the Period 1816–1854 108 Willem Wolters Part 2 Small Currencies in China: Case Studies of Legal, Economic, and Cultural Aspects 5 “Silver is Expensive, Cash is Cheap”: Ofĳicial and Private Cash Forgeries as the Main Cause for the Nineteenth-Century Monetary Turmoil 143 Werner Burger This is a digital offprint for restricted use only | © 2015 Koninklijke Brill NV vi contents 155 6 The Devastation of the Qing Mints, 1821–1850 Man-houng Lin 7 Smoke on the Mountain: The Infamous Counterfeiting Case of Tongzi District, Guizhou Province, 1794 188 Cao Jin and Hans Ulrich Vogel 8 Japanese and Vietnamese Coins Circulating in China: A Numismatic Approach 220 Werner Burger 9 Copper Cash in Chinese Short Stories Compiled by Feng Menglong (1574–1646) 224 Shan Kunqin 10 Cash Crimes: Why Cash Mattered in Mid-Eighteenth Century Petty Crime 247 Roger Greatrex 11 Legal Conflicts Concerning Wage Payments in Eighteenth- and Nineteenth-Century China: The Baxian Cases 265 Christine Moll-Murata 12 Coins Which are Not Money: Cultural Functions and Symbolism 309 Werner Burger Part 3 Chinese Experiments in Monetary Policy, Military Expenditure, and Grain Transport 13 Silver, Copper, Rice and Debt: Monetary Policy and Ofĳice Selling in China during the Taiping Rebellion 345 Elisabeth Kaske 14 Monetary and Non-Monetary Military Rewards in the Early and High-Qing Period (1673–1795) 398 Ulrich Theobald This is a digital offprint for restricted use only | © 2015 Koninklijke Brill NV vii contents 15 The Fixers: The Role of the Zhili Grain Brokers in the 1826 Sea Transport Experiment 420 Jane Kate Leonard Part 4 Metals and Mint Metals in Japan: Glimpses from Trade and Diplomacy 16 Import Trade in Precious Metals and the Economy of Japan, 1763–c. 1850 443 Ryūto Shimada 17 Copper Transportation in Tokugawa Japan: Its Influence on Copper Shortage in Nagasaki 464 Keiko Nagase-Reimer 18 A Metal Dealer and Spy from Nagasaki in Manila in the First Quarter of the Seventeenth Century 489 Reinier H. Hesselink Index 511 This is a digital offprint for restricted use only | © 2015 Koninklijke Brill NV CHAPTER 7 Smoke on the Mountain: The Infamous Counterfeiting Case of Tongzi District, Guizhou Province, 1794 Cao Jin and Hans Ulrich Vogel Introduction: A First Glance at the “Old Crow’s Nest” On 30 August 1794, Fukang’an 福康安 (1753–1796), Governor-general of Sichuan, informed the Qianlong emperor (r. 1736–1795) in a memorial that a large counterfeiting enterprise had been uncovered in the border region of Guizhou and Sichuan. Apparently the site of the crime was called “Old Crow’s Nest” (Laoyawo 老鴉窩) and the scale of the bandits’ operation was increasing day by day. They had already built dozens of furnaces and shacks and, to some extent, were armed to be prepared for all eventualities. The leaders were said to ride proudly on horseback, to assemble gamblers and to commit all kinds of evil deeds, which could only be described as unscrupulous and shameless.1 * Centred on this case study a textbook on Qing documentary Chinese for students and others interested in Chinese history has been authored by Cao Jin, Sabine Kink and Hans Ulrich Vogel. It contains a great variety of primary sources of different genres and provides detailed information on the case. The book is entitled Die Falschmünzerbande vom Alten Rabenhorst (1794) in Texten und Kontexten: Ein Lehrbuch zur chinesischen Dokumentensprache der QingZeit and will be published in 2015. Apart from the presentation of a ĳirst draft of this paper during the Third International Workshop of the DFG Research Group “Monies, Markets, and Finance in China and East Asia, 1600–1900”, 1–3 October 2008, Eberhard Karls Universität Tübingen, Centre of Asian and Oriental Studies, Department of Chinese and Korean Studies, a revised version was presented to the workshop “Coin of the Realm: Money and Meaning in Late Imperial China”, 18 April 2014, sponsored by the Mahindra Humanities Center, Fairbank Center for Chinese Studies, Asia Center, and the Department of East Asian Languages and Civilizations at Harvard University. We would like to thank Ariel Fox and Michael Puett for their kind invitation as well as to the workshop participants, especially Peter K. Bol, for their helpful comments. Moreover, we would like to express our gratitude to Brian and Jane Kate Leonard from the University of Akron for editorial assistance and to Alexander Jost for his support in mapmaking. 1 Gongzhongdang zhupi zouzhe, caizhenglei 宮中檔硃批奏摺，財政類, Beijing: First Historical Archives of China, 1344–022, Sichuan, Fukang’an, ql 59/8/6. © koninklijke brill nv, leiden, 2015 | doi 10.1163/9789004288355_009 This is a digital offprint for restricted use only | © 2015 Koninklijke Brill NV Smoke on the Mountain 189 By the time this memorial was written, a vanguard of government troops led by local and regional ofĳicials from Sichuan was already on its way to the site, but Fukang’an also dispatched additional troops from Chengdu and summoned the Guizhou authorities to support the military action from their side. When the soldiers reached the place, they encountered some resistance from a group of the counterfeiters, but after a short ĳight that even involved artillery ĳire, the soldiers eventually prevailed. More than three hundred bandits were successively caught, their shacks and furnaces were destroyed, more than 293,000 pieces of counterfeit cash and 6,700 jin (ca. 4 tons) of damaged small cash (posui xiaoqian 破碎小錢) were conĳiscated, together with minting equipment, such as coin matrixes, sand moulds and crucibles, as well as broadswords, lances, wooden sticks and horses.2 This was the largest known counterfeiting case of the Qing period. It had lasted for at least ten months, and its suppression involved more than ĳifty ofĳicials from three provinces (Sichuan, Guizhou and Yunnan). Moreover, it evoked intense interest from the emperor and ultimately caused discussions about, and reforms of, China’s monetary policy. Background: Southwest China, a Hotbed of “Small Cash” Exchange Rate between Monetary Silver and Cash Coins A key point towards a closer understanding of the events in and around the “Old Crow’s Nest” in 1794 is the phenomenon of so-called small cash, which had become omnipresent in many parts of Southwest China during this time. According to the deĳinition by Frank H.H. King, the term “small cash” (xiaoqian 小錢) and its antonym “big cash” (daqian 大錢) are used to describe the relative size of coins. While daqian might then be understood as “standard cash”, or “good cash”, or “current cash coins passing at par”, xiaoqian should be translated as “counterfeit cash”, “privately minted cash”, “spurious cash”,3 or “inferior cash”. If we compare small cash to standard cash, the former is of an inferior appearance, which could include such characteristics as having a smaller diameter or a larger hole, being thinner or made of a cheaper alloy with a lower copper content and often reflecting a lower level of casting technique. Coins of earlier dynasties or reign-periods and other countries, such as 2 Gongzhongdang zhupi zouzhe, 1345–020, Sichuan, Fukang’an, ql 59/10/3. 3 Frank H.H. King, Money and Monetary Policy in China, 1845–1895 (Cambridge, ma: Harvard University Press, 1965), p. 245. This is a digital offprint for restricted use only | © 2015 Koninklijke Brill NV 190 map 7.1 cao and Vogel The counterfeiting stronghold at the Old Crow’s Nest (Laoyawo) and its immediate surroundings. (Map created with esri ArcMap based on data from the Hartwell China History Project gis at Harvard University. Frontiers of 1820.) This is a digital offprint for restricted use only | © 2015 Koninklijke Brill NV Smoke on the Mountain 191 Japan and Vietnam, could sometimes be considered to be small cash as well.4 In short, small cash consisted of coins that did not match the ofĳicial minting standard.5 Like Chinese cash coins in general, small cash also circulated mainly on the local, or at most, regional levels. For transactions over longer distances, monetary silver was the preferred means of exchange. As a consequence, the modes and patterns of cash use varied between different parts of China, allowing the largely independent development of the cash sector in different places. Southwest China at the end of the eighteenth century, in particular, was literally “flooded” with small cash to an extent that, according to Gresham’s law, bad money was driving good money out of circulation. If we want to look for the reasons for this development, one of the most important was the market exchange rate between silver and cash coins. Other than the ĳixed ofĳicial exchange rate of 1 kuping tael to 1,000 standard cash coins (zhiqian 制錢),6 which represented the ideal rate the government sought to achieve, it was the market exchange rate that actually determined how many pieces of cash could be exchanged for one tael of silver on the market of a given place. The market exchange rates of the period when the Tongzi counterfeit case took place reflected the widespread depreciation of cash coins and are thus good indicators of a possible “flooding” of certain places or regions with small cash. To approach the development of the market exchange rates and the situation of the cash sector in the region surrounding the Old Crow’s Nest in the 4 For instance, in Qingchao wenxian tongkao 清朝文獻通考, compilation ordered in 1767 (Hangzhou: Zhejiang guji chubanshe, 1988), vol. 16, p. 4996, coins from former dynasties were called “dark and small cash” (hei xiao qianwen 黑小錢文). In Gongzhongdang zhupi zouzhe, 1240–012 (ql14/7/4; Zhejiang), Fang Guancheng 方觀承 (1698–1768) called the Japanese coins Kanei tsūhō 寬永通寳 also “small cash”. 5 Zheng Yongchang’s account of siqian 私錢 (counterfeit cash) can be fruitfully consulted for a deĳinition of “small cash”. He says that siqian can be divided into three types: coins in contradiction with the government’s prerogative of minting cash; coins in contradiction with the legal standard of alloy and purity; coins in contradiction with the reign-periods of the Qing dynasty. See Zheng Yongchang 鄭永昌, ‘Qingdai Qianlong nianjian de siqian liutong yu guanfang yinying zhengce zhi fenxi: Yi siqian shoumai zhengce wei zhongxin’ 清代乾隆年間的私錢流通與方因應政策之分析—以私錢收買政策為中心, in Guoli Taiwan shifan daxue lishi xuebao 國立台灣師範大學歷史學報, 25 (1997), p. 235. 6 One can assume that, if not otherwise mentioned, in ofĳicial reports the exchange rates were expressed in the kuping silver standard, i.e., a tael of ca. 37.3 g silver and 98.7 percent purity, and in standard cash. See Endymion Porter Wilkinson, Studies in Chinese Price History (New York: Garland, 1980), pp. 47–50. This is a digital offprint for restricted use only | © 2015 Koninklijke Brill NV 192 cao and Vogel 1790s, as well as to gain insights especially into their spatial characteristics, hardly any source is as useful as the travelogue written by Zheng Guangzu 鄭光祖, who travelled up the Yangtze River from Jiangsu to Guizhou, Yunnan and Sichuan in 1795 and recorded a number of observations about money use along the way. Based on Zheng Guangzu’s account of his trip, four different cash zones can be distinguished (see Map 7.2). In Zone 1, which encompasses the region to the east of Wuchangfu 武昌府, cash of ofĳicial provenance (guanban 板) was used. In Zone 2, namely from the west of Wuchang, up to the prefectures of Jingzhoufu 荊府 and Yichangfu 宜昌府 to the border of Sichuan, “bluegreen cash” (qingqian 青錢) of the Shunzhi (1644–1661) and Kangxi (1662–1722) reign periods was in circulation, but very few coins from the Yongzheng (1723– 1735) and Qianlong (1736–1795) reigns. The exchange rate amounted to only 800 coins per one tael of silver. In Zone 3, from Zhenyuanfu Prefecture 鎮遠府 in Guizhou province downstream via the prefectures of Yuanzhoufu 沅府 and Chenzhoufu 辰府 to Changdefu Prefecture 常德府 in Hunan province, medium-sized counterfeit cash was used, but no ofĳicial coins (guanban). Map 7.3 provides a close view of Zone 4, which is the area relevant to the counterfeiting case. It took 28 days to travel from Zhenyuanfu to Yunnanfu 雲南府, the provincial capital of Yunnan province. Along the way, privately counterfeited small cash (sizhu xiaoqian 私鑄小錢) was used, but beyond [the route], even amounts in fen 分 and li ,7 had to be paid not in cash, but in silver. In Yunnanfu the money in circulation was of uniform size, but was somewhat thinner [than standard cash] and included a few pieces of heavily debased coins called “sand eyes” (shayan 沙眼). Zheng Guangzu considered these to have their origin not in private counterfeiting, but in the abuses of the provincial capital’s mint. While in 1789, the exchange rate stood at 1,500, it had dramatically risen to 3,300 in 1794. In the prefectural cities of Dongchuanfu 東府 and Zhaotongfu 昭通府, big cash (daqian), i.e., standard coins, was in circulation, the exchange rate amounting to 3,200 in Dongchuanfu and 2,400 in Zhaotongfu, the latter obtaining its cash from the Dongchuan mint. Beyond the provincial capital and the prefectural cities, however, the situation was out of control. For instance, along the 6-day journey between the prefectural cities of Yunnanfu and Dongchuanfu, privately counterfeited small cash was in use, the same holding true for the 5-day journey from the prefectural city of Dongchuanfu to Zhaotongfu. In the former case, an exchange rate of 1:5,000 was indicated. Medium-sized cash was circulating in Fuguancun 副村 (a 10-day journey from Zhaotongfu), Yanjingdu 7 1 tael (or liang 兩) of silver = 10 qian 錢 = 100 fen 分 = 1,000 li . This is a digital offprint for restricted use only | © 2015 Koninklijke Brill NV Smoke on the Mountain map 7.2 193 The four monetary zones along the Yangtze River as recorded by Zheng Guangzu in 1795. (Map created with esri ArcMap based on data from the Hartwell China History Project gis. Frontiers of 1820.) 鹽井渡, Daguanting Subprefecture 大關廳 and Zhenxiongzhou Department 鎮雄 , all of which were important places along the transport routes. The exchange rate there approximately amounted to 1:4,000. Especially serious was the situation in Yongshanxian District 永善縣, a 3-day journey from Zhaotongfu, where dramatically debased “goose-eyes” coins (eyan 鵞眼) were exchanged for silver at a rate of 1:10,000! Zheng Guangzu also describes the monetary situation more to the north along the Yangtze River in Sichuan, that is, from Xuzhoufu Prefecture 敘府 in the west to Luzhou 瀘 and Chongqingfu 重慶府 to Kuizhoufu 夔府 in the east. It is interesting to note that the coins circulating there were also of medium size, like those in Fuguancun. However, the exchange rates were This is a digital offprint for restricted use only | © 2015 Koninklijke Brill NV 194 map 7.3 cao and Vogel Detailed information on cash use and copper-silver exchange rates in Sichuan, Yunnan and Guizhou, according to Zheng Guangzu in 1795. Number of cash coins per one tael of silver. (Map created with esri ArcMap based on data from the Hartwell China History Project gis. Frontiers of 1820.) somewhat lower than in Fuguancun, namely 1:2,400 to 1:3,300.8 At the same time, we known from a memorial written by Fukang’an in 1794 that in northern 8 Xing shi yibanlu 醒世一斑錄, comp. by Zheng Guangzu 鄭光祖, 1845 (ed. https://archive .org/details/02096018.cn, access by May 10, 2014), Zashu 雜述, chap. 6, pp. 42a–43b; Wilkinson, Studies in Chinese Price History, p. 33; Hans Ulrich Vogel, Chinese Central Monetary Policy and the Yunnan Copper Mining Industry in the Early Qing (1644–1800) (Ph.D. diss., University of Zürich, 1983, revised version of 1988), Appendix C; Hans Ulrich Vogel, ‘Central Chinese Monetary Policy, 1644–1800’, in Late Imperial China, 8/2 (1987), pp. 38–39. This is a digital offprint for restricted use only | © 2015 Koninklijke Brill NV Smoke on the Mountain 195 Sichuan, i.e., in the area north of the Yangtze River, usually ofĳicially cast standard coins were circulating.9 When summarizing all this information, it is, in fact, striking that the Old Crow’s Nest, a place located in the border region between Sichuan and Guizhou, was actually situated right in the centre of an area in which the circulation of small cash was most prevalent. Scale and Background of Small Cash Circulation When following the progress of the case and the explanations of regional ofĳicials, however, it was not the counterfeiting bandits from the Old Crow’s Nest who were responsible for the excess of inferior coins in many regions of Sichuan, Yunnan and Guizhou. Rather, it seems that the criminals tried to make use of an existing situation and wanted to beneĳit by casting coins of an obviously larger size than the usual small cash, but still with a somewhat lighter weight than the ofĳicially cast standard coins (zhiqian). Their proĳit was apparently derived from the fact that these counterfeit coins, close in size to that of legal cash, could be brought into circulation at a value equal or near to standard coins and thus received a higher price on the market than the small- and medium-sized cash. Based on the ĳindings of Map 3 we may thus assume that the counterfeiters bought up heavily debased, small coins in their environment and re-cast them to coins of a quality between mediumsized coins and standard coins which they then at a premium brought into circulation in the medium-sized coin currency zone along the Yangtze River in Sichuan. What were the real reasons for the flood of small cash and high exchange rates between monetary silver and cash, which apparently stood in a direct relation with each other, in the areas along the Yangtze River in Sichuan, Yunnan and Guizhou provinces as well as in Hunan? The most important reason must have been that in the second half of the eighteenth century a surplus in the cash supply for these regions had accumulated due to patterns of over-production of provincial coinage. Aside from the capital in Beijing, where the most important mints of the empire were located, the mints of Yunnan accounted for the lion’s share of coinage in the provinces. Also the mint output in Sichuan, Guizhou and Hunan was considerable, so that the coin production of these provincial mints clearly showed a high level of regional concentration with its centre in the Southwest. While during the Qianlong period, most provinces, including Sichuan and Hunan, used to have one regular mint, Guizhou and Yunnan had as many as three and nine mints, 9 Gongzhongdang zhupi zouzhe, 1344–003, Sichuan, Fukang’an, ql 59/7/10. This is a digital offprint for restricted use only | © 2015 Koninklijke Brill NV 196 cao and Vogel respectively, although not all of them were in operation on a regular basis and at the same time.10 For the time between 1736 and 1776, Ueda Hiroyuki has contrasted the outputs of the mints in each province with their region’s respective population numbers that show great regional disparity. According to his calculations, during that time period in Yunnan, about 5,360 coins were produced per capita. In Zhili, which was supplied by the metropolitan mints, this number was 2,419, while in Sichuan it was 1,148, and in Guizhou 1,008, but then far behind only 490 in Guangxi and 315 in Hubei. On the macro-regional level, the related ĳigures are distributed as follows: Yungui (Yunnan and Guizhou) 2,777, Upper Yangtze (Sichuan) 1,148, Northeast China (Zhili, Shandong, Henan) 821, Middle Yangtze (Hubei, Hunan, Jiangxi) 201 coins (see Maps 4 and 5).11 A consequence of this was that the value of cash coins in comparison to silver fell towards the end of the eighteenth century, thus resulting in a disproportionally high increase of the exchange rate of coins vis-à-vis one tael of silver. This situation then prepared the way for a flood of inferior coins in Hunan, in Sichuan along the Yangtze River, in Guizhou and especially in Yunnan. The fall in the value of cash coins and thus rising exchange rates in relation to silver had the effect that, according to Gresham’s Law, good coins increasingly disappeared from circulation while bad coins remained in it. This means that counterfeiting flourished because good standard cash was either hoarded12 or melted down in order to be recast into coins of inferior quality, i.e., small cash. Counterfeiting enjoyed high popularity not only in Yunnan but also in Guizhou, Sichuan and Hunan—regions that provided a particularly fertile ground for such activities—because in these provinces, the most important mint metals were mined. Thus, in spite of the almost all-pervading state monopoly on the purchase of copper and zinc, these metals percolated down 10 11 12 See Vogel, Monetary Policy and Yunnan Copper, Appendix D, Table D.1. For a graphic overview of the mints in operation during this time in Yunnan, see also David Hartill, Qing Cash (London: Royal Numismatic Society), pp. 206–207. Ueda Hiroyuki 上田裕之, Shinchō shihai to kahei seisaku: Shindai zenki ni okeru seisen kyōkyū seisaku no tenkai 清朝支配と貨幣政策：清代前期における制銭供給政策の展開 (Tōkyō: Kyūko shoin, 2009), pp. 302–303. We may assume that it was hoarded either in the sense of a store of value or as a special means of payment for high-value goods. The difference between “standard coins” used for such purposes and “transactional money”, such as debased coins, was highlighted both by Richard von Glahn and Kuroda Akinobu during the workshop “Coin of the Realm: Money and Meaning in Late Imperial China”, April 18, 2014, organized by Michael Puett and Ariel Fox at Harvard University. This is a digital offprint for restricted use only | © 2015 Koninklijke Brill NV Smoke on the Mountain map 7.4 197 Relation between mint output of cash coins and population in the provinces of China proper in coins per capita, 1736–1776, according to Ueda Hiroyuki 上田裕之, Shinchō shihai to kahei seisaku: Shindai zenki ni okeru seisen kyōkyū seisaku no tenkai 清朝支配と貨幣政策：清代前期における制銭供給政策の展開 (Tōkyō: Kyūko shoin, 2009), pp. 302–303. legally or illegally from the mining regions to the markets, and thus provided raw material for counterfeiters. In 1796, it was reported that the central commercial emporium of Hankou 漢 in Hubei Province was a place where counterfeit coins from Sichuan, Yunnan and Guizhou were accumulating.13 So it is not surprising that in many imperial edicts of that time these provinces were referred to as a “hotbed of 13 Lin Man-houng, China Upside Down: Currency, Society, and Ideologies, 1808–1856 (Cambridge, ma: Harvard University Press, 2006), p. 35, referring to Gongzhongdang (palace memorials), Jiaqing 1/1/8. This is a digital offprint for restricted use only | © 2015 Koninklijke Brill NV 198 cao and Vogel map 7.5 Relation between mint output of cash coins and population in the physiographic macroregions of China proper in coins per capita, 1736–1776, according to Ueda Hiroyuki, Shinchō shihai to kahei seisaku, pp. 302–303. small cash” (xiaoqian zhi sou 小錢之藪, xiaoqian yuansou 小錢淵藪).14 In 1799, a Grand Secretary reported, that in Shizhu 石砫 to the east of Chongqing, 14 See e.g. Qianlongchao shangyudang 乾隆朝上諭檔, comp. by Zhongguo diyi lishi dang’anguan 中國第一歷史檔案館 (Beijing: Zhongguo dang’an chubanshe, 19911, 19982), vol. 18, p. 180 (no. 349), ql 59/8/30; Qianlongdi qijuzhu 乾隆帝起居注, comp. by Zhongguo diyi lishi dang’anguan 中國第一歷史檔案館 (Guilin: Guangxi shifan daxue chubanshe, 2002), vol. 42, p. 21, ql 60/1/25. This is a digital offprint for restricted use only | © 2015 Koninklijke Brill NV Smoke on the Mountain 199 copper and wood were readily available, so that impoverished people there could make a living from the casting of counterfeit coins. These coins would then be shipped by smugglers together with salt, saltpetre and “plumbum” (qian 鉛, lead or, more likely, zinc) out of the region.15 Although, as we shall see, this was not the case for the counterfeiters of the Old Crow’s Nest, it must be assumed that counterfeiting was much more rampant in those provinces than elsewhere. Origins of Small Cash Fukang’an held counterfeiters from Yunnan and Guizhou responsible for flooding with inferior small cash places close to Guizhou along the Yangtze River and in the prefecture of Ningyuanfu 遠府 in southern Sichuan, and he declared it to be his goal to deal with these regions thoroughly concerning these matters.16 But the Qianlong emperor disagreed! He clearly stated that when it came to the flood of inferior cash coins in Sichuan, it originated neither from imports of small cash by merchants from other provinces, nor from the activities of counterfeiters, but, rather, from the fraudulent practices of the state mints. In other words, the mints themselves were accused of producing small inferior cash by reducing the weight of the coins and thus being able to produce more than their ĳixed quota from the mint metals they had saved. According to the emperor’s understanding, this was a practice, which had crept in many years earlier and had turned the mints into proĳitable sinecures for the governors-general, governors and their trustees.17 Indeed, from the 1790s, dubious practices of a number of mints were increasingly criticized. They were accused of casting bad quality coins or even counterfeit, especially the mints of Jiangxi and Hunan in 1790, those of Yunnan, Guizhou and Sichuan in 1791–1794, Jiangsu in 1812 and 1820, again Guizhou in 1834, and even the baoquanju 寳泉局 and the baoyuanju 寶源局 mints in Beijing in 1809, 1839, 1846, 1850 and 1851. Either cash coins were produced so poorly that their inscriptions were hardly legible, impure copper was used, sand was added to the alloy, the copper content was reduced, and the zinc content increased, or the coins were simply underweight. For this reason, the 15 16 17 Lin Man-houng, China Upside Down, p. 35, referring to Shen Yao 沈垚, Luofanlou wenji 落帆樓文集, preface from 1858 (Taibei: Xinwenfeng chubanshe, 1989), fan 5, hou ji 2.1a. See also Qingchao xu wenxian tongkao 清朝續文獻通考, comp. by Liu Jinzao 劉錦藻, 1915 (Hangzhou: Zhejiang guji chubanshe, 2000), chap. 19, p. 7685, “The small cash in Huguang is smuggled downstream from Sichuan, Yunnan and Guizhou, which makes Huguang the gathering place of smuggled small cash.” Gongzhongdang zhupi zouzhe, 1344–003, Sichuan, Fukang’an, ql 59/7/10. Qianlongchao shangyudang, vol. 18, p. 132, ql59/8/16 (no. 260). This is a digital offprint for restricted use only | © 2015 Koninklijke Brill NV 200 cao and Vogel Qianlong emperor in 1790 entertained the suspicion that if this was the case in Jiangxi, similar abuses would surely exist at other mints as well. Therefore, in his edict he strongly emphasized that these malpractices, which he considered to be the primary cause of the apparent depreciation of cash coins, had to be eliminated.18 General Measures of the State By the end of the eighteenth century, the cash sector in Southwest China had reached a degree of deterioration that the Qing government decided to take action in order to restore a well-ordered monetary system. From Fukang’an’s memorial, it can be seen that all the measures the government took to overcome the flood of small cash were limited to the usual, conventional methods for influencing the cash sector and the copper-silver market exchange rate in such periods of low cash value. These measures can be divided into three levels: ĳirstly, strict prohibition and prosecution of counterfeiters; secondly, the output of the provincial mints was decreased and some were closed down, at least temporarily. This, however, entailed the danger that unemployed craftsmen from the mints would become involved in counterfeiting. This was, for instance, the case of Liu Ronghou 劉榮厚, one of the leaders at the Old Crow’s Nest. Thirdly, they undertook measures to reduce the amount of coins in circulation by changing the methods of distribution, such as lowering the share of cash in the defrayment of ofĳicials’ salaries and soldiers’ pay. Demonetization of small cash, i.e., the buying up of debased coins by state agencies, which will be discussed in greater detail below, belongs to this category as well.19 Small Cash Collection Campaigns In times of sustained high exchange rates and thus low value of cash, an active policy of demonetization was attempted. In other words, the use of inferior coins was forbidden, and people were ordered to deliver them to state institutions to clean up the cash sector and to reduce the overall number of coins in circulation, which would—as it was hoped—cause a fall in the exchange rate.20 This policy of the demonetization of inferior coins and counterfeit coins was also carried out at the time of the counterfeiting case of Tongzi 桐梓. 18 19 20 See Vogel, Monetary Policy and Yunnan Copper, chap. ii.3. For the illegal activities in the metropolitan mints, see Lin Man-houng, China Upside Down, p. 35. We refer here only to measures taken in times of low cash value. For such adopted in periods of high cash value see Vogel, ‘Central Chinese Monetary Policy’, pp. 9–15. For an overall account see Vogel, Monetary Policy and Yunnan Copper, chap. ii. Vogel, Monetary Policy and Yunnan Copper, chap. ii.4.b. This is a digital offprint for restricted use only | © 2015 Koninklijke Brill NV 201 Smoke on the Mountain 16 13.90 14 12 11.00 10 8 6 3.90 3.30 4 1.30 2 1.00 1.00 0.38 Sic Yu nn an 178 9‒ 95 hu an 178 9‒ Gu 95 izh ou 178 9‒ Ot 95 he rs 178 9‒ 95 Gu Jia ng xi 176 9‒ an 73 gd on g1 76 Gu 9‒ 73 an gx i1 76 9‒ Ot 73 he rs 176 9‒ 73 0 figure 7.1 Small cash collection campaigns in 1768–1773 and 1789–1795 (in millions of jin). Hans Ulrich Vogel, Chinese Central Monetary Policy and the Yunnan Copper Mining Industry in the Early Qing (1644–1800) (Ph.D. dissertation, University of Zürich, 1983; revised version of 1988), chap. ii.2., chap. ii.4.b. and Appendixes C and D; Wang Guangyue 王光越, ‘Shixi Qianlong shiqi de sizhu’ 試析乾隆時期的私鑄, in Lishi dang’an 歷史檔案, 1 (1988), p. 94. As a measure to improve the quality of cash coins in circulation, campaigns for the collection of small cash became an important instrument of governmental monetary policy in the years of 1769 to 1773 and in the period from 1789 to 1795. First, between 1769 and 1773 about 7.8 million jin (4,664 tons) of small cash were collected, i.e., about 3.5 million strings or 3,500,000,000 coins! At that time the focus of the campaign was on the provinces of Jiangsu and Jiangxi, where approximately 3.3 million (1,944 tons) and 1.3 million jin (766 tons), respectively, were collected. In Guangdong and Guangxi, approximately one million jin (589 tons) of small cash were taken from the market in each.21 A completely different picture is then offered for the campaign of 1789– 1795, where Yunnan and Sichuan were clearly targeted. A total of approximately 29.2 million jin (17,199 tons) of inferior coins were collected in these years throughout the empire, which corresponded to approximately 12.9 million strings, or about 12.9 billion coins. This was roughly ĳive times the annual 21 See Wang Guangyue 王光越, ‘Shixi Qianlong shiqi de sizhu’ 試析乾隆時期的私鑄, in Lishi dang’an 歷史檔案, 1 (1988), p. 93; Vogel, Monetary Policy and Yunnan Copper, chap. ii.4.b. and Appendix G. Wang Guangyue assumes that the average weight of small cash amounted to only 2.25 jin per 1,000 coins, in contrast to 7.5 jin for standard cash. Although this might be too low, we did not change Wang Guangyue’s calculations here. This is a digital offprint for restricted use only | © 2015 Koninklijke Brill NV 202 cao and Vogel production of all the mints of the entire empire taken together. Among the total of 29.2 million jin, the majority was collected in Yunnan (about 13.9 million jin, or 8,187 tons) and Sichuan (approximately 11 million jin, 6,479 tons, within 3 years), while the ĳigures of Guizhou with 0.38 million jin (224 tons) remained quite modest. Altogether, the total amount of small cash collected in the Southwest was approximately 25.4 million of the total 29.9 million jin or about 87 percent. In comparison, it is interesting to see that the output of Yunnan’s mints at that time was 170,000–184,000 strings annually, and thus far less than during its peak years in the 1750s and 1760s (500,000–900,000 strings per annum). Thus the collection of small cash in Yunnan represented more than 33 to 36 times its annual mint output in the years 1789–1795 and still more than 7 to 12 times the output during the mid-eighteenth century. For Sichuan, 11 million jin of inferior coins were about 25 times of the annual output of legal coins of the Chengdu mint (about 194,133 strings).22 Standard cash should weigh 7.5 jin per string, while, according to one estimate, small cash averaged only 2.25 jin.23 In department and district capitals as well as in market towns (zhen 鎮), special collection points were established, which took care of the small cash collection and the payment of the compensation price. Legal cash or silver was given in exchange for handing over small cash, the cash price varying from 88 to 100 legal cash per jin of small cash delivered.24 The silver price was tied to the ofĳicial prices paid for mint metal of the same quality.25 In 1791, the Qianlong emperor suddenly decided not to compensate the delivery of small cash any longer. He argued that people purposely engaged in counterfeiting in order to obtain silver or standard cash from the government in exchange. Moreover, he suspected that after having received large legal cash, people took it and recast it to small cash, which was again handed in to be exchanged for large legal cash, thus restarting the whole vicious cycle.26 Three months later, however, this imperial order had to be revoked because 22 23 24 25 26 Vogel, Monetary Policy and Yunnan Copper, chap. ii.2., chap. ii.4.b. and Appendixes C and D; Wang Guangyue, ‘Shixi Qianlong shiqi de sizhu’, p. 94. Here only the estimated number of the coins but not their respective value on the market is considered. Inferior coins were certainly circulating at a discount. Here all the conversions from the weight of mint metal to the number of small cash coins are based on the estimated average weight of 2.25 jin per string given by Wang Guangyue. Wang Guangyue, ‘Shixi Qianlong shiqi de sizhu’, p. 93. Wang Guangyue, ‘Shixi Qianlong shiqi de sizhu’, pp. 93–94. Vogel, Monetary Policy and Yunnan Copper, chap. ii.4.b. Qianlongchao shangyudang, vol. 16, p. 210, ql 56/3/19 (no. 514). This is a digital offprint for restricted use only | © 2015 Koninklijke Brill NV Smoke on the Mountain 203 nobody was willing to deliver any small cash without receiving a price for it.27 Here obviously market forces were stronger than the ability of the state to enforce its regulations. The demonetization policy was then modiĳied in three respects: ĳirstly, handing in small amounts of inferior cash would not be compensated; secondly, when handing over large amounts of inferior cash, it would be carefully examined to see whether or not these contained newly cast counterfeit coins; thirdly, the compensation price was generally reduced.28 It should also be noted that there were small cash coins of different quality, for which different prices would be paid. Moreover, in every province the compensation policy for the delivery of small cash varied. For example, in Chongqing the compensation price in 1795 was 52 wen 文 (“coins”) of legal cash for one jin of small cash. After small cash had been handed in, the deliverer received a receipt like the ones presented in Figure 2. In Yunnan and Sichuan, special mints were set up for the sole purpose of recasting the large amounts of collected small cash into standard cash. In 1794, Governor-general Fukang’an requested the opening of such a mint in the prefectural capital of Ningyuanfu in southern Sichuan with four furnaces.29 From 1799 to 1802, the Yunnan mints of Lin’anfu 臨安府, Dalifu 大理府, Dongchuanfu, Baoshanxian 保山縣, Chuxiongfu 楚雄府 and Guangnanfu 廣南府 were exclusively used for the recasting of small cash into standard cash.30 From melting down every 10 jin of small cash, 3 to 4 jin of metal could be obtained,31 so that in order to recast new standard cash with a stipulated copper content of 50 percent,32 new metal needed to be added. If the state did not succeed in withdrawing the small cash from circulation within a short period of time and in replacing it entirely by standard cash, the vicious cycle of cash depreciation would, however, still continue: counterfeiters would continue to melt down and recast standard cash and somewhat larger small cash into the smallest acceptable size and quality of small cash. By doing so, the smallest acceptable size and quality would constantly become 27 28 29 30 31 32 Gongzhongdang zhupi zouzhe, 1332–041, Shaanxi, Qin Cheng’en 秦承恩, ql 56/6/18; Gongzhongdang zhupi zouzhe, 1346–014, Guangxi, Yao Fen 姚棻, ql 59/11/15. Zheng Yongchang, ‘Qingdai Qianlong nianjian de siqian’, pp. 269–270. Gongzhongdang zhupi zouzhe, 1344–003, Sichuan, Fukang’an, ql 59/7/10. Vogel, Monetary Policy and Yunnan Copper, chap. ii.4.b. Gongzhongdang zhupi zouzhe, 1346–022, Yungui, Fukang’an, ql 59/11/27. During the time of the Tongzi case, standard cash coins, i.e., coins produced by the state, should have had a weight of 1.2 qian 錢 (ca. 4.48 g; 10 qian = 1 liang) and an alloy of 50 percent copper, 41.5 percent zinc, 6.5 percent lead and 2.0 percent tin. See Vogel, ‘Central Chinese Monetary Policy’, pp. 11–12. This is a digital offprint for restricted use only | © 2015 Koninklijke Brill NV 204 cao and Vogel figure 7.2 Receipts of small cash collection, 1795, Qingdai Sichuan Baxian dang’an 清代四巴縣檔案, held in the Sichuan Archive Museum, Archive-No.: 清006-002-4007. lower and lower until the quality of the cash would become so poor that coins would break within a short time and could practically not be used for circulation any more.33 Most counterfeiters appearing in the sources did exactly this: they turned good cash into more bad cash. But this was not the case for the counterfeiters of the Old Crow’s Nest. 33 King, Money and Monetary Policy, pp. 36–38. This is a digital offprint for restricted use only | © 2015 Koninklijke Brill NV Smoke on the Mountain 205 The Case in Detail The Start-Up Stage As early as 1786, Zeng Shibao 曾石保, a villager from a place which would later be known under the name “Cash Halls” (Qiantangzi 錢堂子) in the border region between Sichuan and Guizhou,34 and his three brothers secretly contacted Liu Ronghou, who previously had worked in one of the provincial mints of Guizhou. Together they came up with the idea of counterfeiting coins. By 1793, they had invited four other acquaintances to invest in counterfeiting at the Old Crow’s Nest, a mountain area close to Zeng’s home village. In the beginning their investment was quite small, only between 7,000 and 8,000 coins. They rented a piece of land on the hill from a landlord called Liang Guobing 梁國秉 and hired three workers for building shacks and furnaces. Then they bought trees from landlord Liang to make charcoal and hired more workers to produce coin matrixes (qianmo 錢模), sand boards (shaban 砂板), and other equipment necessary for minting. The raw material for the minting was provided by damaged small cash, which Zeng Shibao bought from villagers in the neighbouring area. He had learned that many people had not yet handed in their small cash to the government during the collection campaigns, especially those who lived far away from administrative centres and were thus reluctant to travel so far. He made use of this situation by paying them 400 big cash (daqian), a somewhat lower price than the government, for roughly ten jin of damaged small cash.35 At the same time, Liu Ronghou guided the others to produce new coins by melting down the small coins in furnaces and casting the melt into newly prepared sand moulds. With melting down every 10 jin of small cash, they could produce more than 1,000 counterfeited coins weighing 5 to 6 jin,36 which was signiĳicantly heavier than normal small cash but still somewhat lighter than ofĳicially cast standard cash (7.5 jin). The counterfeit cash, according to Fukang’an’s description, was bigger than the normal small cash but rough, thin, and brittle.37 After minting and after deducting the costs of reĳining loss, land rent, food and labour, the counterfeiters shared the proĳit. In the beginning, 34 35 36 37 See Tongzixian zhi 桐梓縣志, comp. by Zhou Xicheng 周西成, You Hailong 猶海龍 et al., in (Zhongguo fangzhi congshu: Hua’nan difang, vol. 154) (Taibei: Chengwen chubanshe, 1967 [1929]), chap. 7, p. 52b (p. 178). Gongzhongdang zhupi zouzhe, 1344–028, Sichuan, Fukang’an, ql 59/8/21. Gongzhongdang zhupi zouzhe, 1344–028, Sichuan, Fukang’an, ql 59/8/21. Gongzhongdang zhupi zouzhe, 1345–020, Sichuan, Fukang’an, ql 59/10/3. This is a digital offprint for restricted use only | © 2015 Koninklijke Brill NV 206 cao and Vogel when the scale of counterfeiting was still small and only a few coins were produced, “they evenly distributed the surplus of coins among themselves and circulated them by mixing [them with normal coins].”38 It seemed an easy and effective way to make money. The Expansion Stage In February of 1794, Zeng Shibao and his accomplices enlarged their enterprise. First, another twenty-six acquaintances were invited to invest in the undertaking. Moreover, two pottery producers and dealers were asked to make crucibles for minting. New workers were hired for making charcoal and carrying water. Soon, even more people invested in the scheme, building new furnaces and sharing the proĳits according to the share of capital they brought in. Four workers, who used to watch the ĳires and the pounding of the sand into the sand boards (kan huo cai sha 看火跴砂),39 also learned how to mint coins and added new furnaces with their own capital. The new investors were required to pay Zeng Shibao a fee of 400–500 coins per furnace,40 although it is not clear whether this was per time unit or per unit of cash casting. As the number of leaders and workers increased, the division of labour also became more specialized. There were specialists for all kinds of tasks and responsibilities: – Investors: They invested in and built new furnaces and kept the coins cast there for their own disposal, after having paid rent to Zeng Shibao. – Buyers of damaged small cash: They bought up worn-out small cash in the nearby villages. – Coin casters: They constructed wooden frames, sand moulds, and cast coins. – Craft suppliers: They produced crucibles for melting down small cash and provided woks, pincers and other tools (guo qian qiju 鍋鉗器具). – Construction workers: They built shacks and furnaces. – Helpers: They chopped trees, made charcoal, carried water, dug sand, and cooked. 38 39 40 Gongzhongdang zhupi zouzhe, 1344–028, Sichuan, Fukang’an, ql 59/8/21. Sand boards were wooden frames ĳilled with pounded sand into which the cash matrixes were imprinted and linked with casting channels. For more details of the coin casting technique see Werner Burger, Ch’ing Cash until 1735 (Taipei: Mei Ya Publications, 1976), pp. 21–33. Gongzhongdang zhupi zouzhe, 1345–020, Sichuan, Fukang’an, ql 59/10/3. This is a digital offprint for restricted use only | © 2015 Koninklijke Brill NV Smoke on the Mountain 207 – Coin sellers: They brought the counterfeit coins into circulation. – Dealers: They served as merchants, supplying the counterfeiters with goods, such as rice, flour, tobacco, and alcohol. – Security personnel: They were responsible for maintaining peace and order, and for surveillance. – Ferryman: He ran a raft ferry over the Pudu River 普渡河 to bring men and material to the Old Crow’s Nest and to ship counterfeit cash out.41 The local gazetteer of Qijiang District 綦江縣, which was compiled only thirty years after the event, states that as many as several thousand workers were employed at the Old Crow’s Nest of which only about three hundred were arrested.42 This would be a much larger ĳigure than that implied in the palace memorials, which speak of approximately three hundred people as the hard core of the enterprise. All necessities of daily life were thus provided for the counterfeiters. Once, when thirty-ĳive workers quit because of difĳiculties in buying food, Zeng Shibao addressed this issue. Dealers and retailers were invited to come to the Old Crow’s Nest to live and manage the supply of food and daily necessities. In a sense, the stronghold had become like a small town providing everything that was necessary. This attracted others, such as more than sixty poor people who came to offer their services to Zeng Shibao. They were hired as wage labourers and to perform different work duties.43 Due to the increasing scale of small cash purchases and counterfeit coin disposal, more people and a larger area became involved, resulting in a higher risk of exposure or betrayal. Thus Zeng Shibao, landlord Liang, and other “old” leaders established a secret society and swore blood brotherhood. This is described in the local gazetteer of Qijiang as follows: Zeng Shibao was called “external manager” (wai zhanggui 外掌櫃), Liu Ronghou, nicknamed [Liu] Bowen [劉]伯温,44 was called “internal manager” (nei zhanggui 内掌櫃), Zhang Zhonghe 張仲何 was nicknamed 41 42 43 44 Gongzhongdang zhupi zouzhe, 1345–020, Sichuan, Fukang’an, ql 59/10/3. Qijiangxian zhi 綦江縣志, comp. by Song Hao 宋灝 and Luo Xing 羅星, 1826 (Chengdu: Xi’nan jiaotong daxue chubanshe, 1991), chap. 5, “Military preparations” (Wubei 武備), p. 18b. Gongzhongdang zhupi zouzhe, 1345–020, Sichuan, Fukang’an, ql 59/10/3. Named after Liu Bowen, a military leader of the early Ming period (1368–1644), considered to be one of the most gifted strategists in the history of China. This is a digital offprint for restricted use only | © 2015 Koninklijke Brill NV 208 cao and Vogel [Zhang] Fei [張]飛.45 Another four or ĳive people were “external agents” (wai dangshi 外當 ). They swore brotherhood by blood covenant. The highest place in the yard was called Incense Hall (Xiangtang 香堂), where they worshipped to a statue of Guan Yu. Instruments of torture were placed beside it. Banners of the Five Colours were inserted into frames. Each banner had its supervising headman. Every second and sixteenth day of the month, a gun was ĳired for mustering the men. Spears and lances, encircling the yard in several layers, looked like a forest.46 The Short-Lived Heyday Under Zeng Shibao’s management, in a mere six months, the enterprise mushroomed into a criminal empire. As mentioned above, by the late summer of 1794, the counterfeiters had accumulated more than 6,700 jin of worn-out small cash coins which had not yet been melted down. With every one thousand coins produced weighing about 5 to 6 jin, the criminals could cast more than 1,000 strings of counterfeit cash from this reserve. To obtain more proĳit, they formed alliances with shopkeepers (dianhu 店戶) in the neighbouring districts. From the sale of counterfeited coins to these shopkeepers, the coins were put into circulation along the waterways of the Qijiang and Yangtze Rivers. It seems that people were at times even forced to accept these coins, as is suggested by an entry in the local gazetteer of Qijiang: The coins cast by them were brought into circulation along the way on both sides of the river bank between Chongqing and Luzhou. If there were the slightest hindrance, then they would send out their men, like ants swarming to a carcass. Like a punitive army, they would not return until they reaped their proĳit.47 From the above description, we can also see that the access to water routes made the transportation and circulation of large amounts of counterfeit cash possible. The Pudu River 普渡河, nowadays named Pu River 蒲河, joins the Qi River 綦江 to the west, which then flows directly northwards to the Yangtze River and Chongqing. 45 46 47 Zhang Fei was the famous capable and intrepid general of the period of the Three Kingdoms (ca. 208–280). Qijiangxian zhi, chap. 5, “Military preparations” (Wubei), pp. 18b–19a. Qijiangxian zhi, chap. 5, “Military preparations” (Wubei), p. 19a. This is a digital offprint for restricted use only | © 2015 Koninklijke Brill NV Smoke on the Mountain 209 The local gazetteer of Qijiang District also offers some information about the lawbreakers’ pleasant living conditions and other successful activities, especially gambling: The yard was provided with all kinds of shops, and there was no sundry good which was not available. Easy-going and relaxed youngsters, wearing silken shoes and colourfully dressed, numbered several hundreds. Some of the runners of the counties and prefectures formed alliances with them [i.e., with the counterfeiters]. When people from afar passed by, they very much liked to gamble with them. In case [the visitors] were not able to redeem their losses, they would be taken as prisoners [by the counterfeiters] and would not be released until a ransom was paid.48 This might, however, be a somewhat exaggerated description in as much as the same source reports later that those who had been arrested were all poor and destitute people with soot-blackened faces and wearing ragged clothes. As stated likewise in the memorials of Fukang’an, they were basically poor people that had engaged in this illegal activity.49 The End Eventually it was not counterfeiting itself that prompted the breakdown of Zeng Shibao’s empire, but the organisation of gambling parties by other accomplices. After one of the gamblers named Jiang Zhengran 蔣然 lost, he started to quarrel with the gambling organizers and ĳinally got beaten up. He left enraged and denounced the activities at the Old Crow’s Nest to the Magistrate of Ba District who then ĳiled the ĳirst ofĳicial report to Fukang’an.50 That was how the counterfeit case came to light, and one can only wonder at the counterfeiters’ imprudence in tolerating the existence of such a risky gambling den in their midst. The scale of the crime certainly appalled the government. Sichuan and Guizhou both dispatched troops to attack the stronghold. After a few skirmishes, the imperial army quickly gained superiority.51 In addition to the 48 49 50 51 Qijiangxian zhi, chap. 5, “Military preparations” (Wubei), p. 19a. See, e.g., Qianlongchao shangyudang, vol. 18, ql 59/10/17, p. 288 (no. 578). Gongzhongdang zhupi zouzhe, 1344–028, Sichuan, Fukang’an, ql 59/8/21; Gongzhongdang zhupi zouzhe, 1345–020, Sichuan, Fukang’an, ql 59/10/3. It is interesting to note that the palace memorials mention only very limited resistance. See Gongzhongdang zhupi zouzhe, 1344–028, Sichuan, Fukang’an, ql 59/8/21. The gazetteer of Qijiang District, however, claims that a ĳight did take place at the Monastery This is a digital offprint for restricted use only | © 2015 Koninklijke Brill NV 210 cao and Vogel counterfeiters, who were arrested on the spot, many were caught on the run. More than three hundred criminals were detained and sent to Chongqing, where they were interrogated. In Fukang’an’s concluding memorial, he summed up the severe crimes that Zeng Shibao and Liu Ronghou had committed. They were the gang leaders, who had the initial idea. They had gathered many people to counterfeit cash, formed a secret brotherhood based on oaths, assembled gamblers, extorted from people, and equipped their men with weapons. Furthermore they broke the laws at a time when the government had just begun to reform the monetary system. By their actions, they created great damage and disorder, so that it was not considered appropriate to delay their execution any further, and they thus were immediately beheaded in the marketplace as soon as the investigation was ĳinished. Besides the two main culprits, all the other accomplices were condemned separately, according to the relevant statutes: 18 (of which three had been already killed) were sentenced to be decapitated after the autumn assizes; 160 were beaten and sent into life-long military servitude or banishment to distant regions; 112 were beaten and banished for three years to a district in a neighbouring province; 8 were beaten and sentenced to wear the kang for three months.52 Consequences: Individual and General Imperial Reaction Such an extraordinary counterfeiting case certainly caught the Qianlong emperor’s attention. He ordered Fukang’an to send several samples of counterfeit coins to the capital so that he could examine them himself. After checking the samples, he made the following revealing and sarcastic comments: Monetary standards become worse and worse, and coins lighter, thinner and more fragile. This leads to the consequence that villains seize the opportunity to cast small cash into coins which match the regulations 52 of the White Clouds resulting in several of the criminals being wounded or killed. See Qijiangxian zhi, chap. 5, “Military preparations” (Wubei), pp. 19a–20b. Did Fukang’an have the intention to have the intensity of the confrontation downplayed in his reports in order not to overly dramatize the degree of potential danger inherent in this case and in order to demonstrate the efĳiciency with which he cracked down on it? For more details on the punishments see Gongzhongdang zhupi zouzhe, 1345–020, Sichuan, Fukang’an, ql 59/10/3, as well as our forthcoming textbook. This is a digital offprint for restricted use only | © 2015 Koninklijke Brill NV Smoke on the Mountain 211 [for standard cash] to make a proĳit. The fact that the counterfeited small cash presented now by Fukang’an is much better than the coins cast by provincial mints is clear evidence of this. . . . In this case presently under investigation, there is no other way than to punish the commoners according to the statutes because in seeking proĳits, they have committed a crime. However, considering the superior attributes of this counterfeit, should we not give a reward to the government mints in case they show themselves able to produce cash as good as this? Hereby I order that the counterfeit coins presented by Fukang’an shall be distributed to the governors-general and governors of those provinces with mints as well as to the minting ofĳicials. They shall examine them so as to prompt each of them to feel full of shame and regret.53 The angry emperor then commanded that the two mints of the Ministry of Revenue and the Ministry of Works send over cash coins cast by them for the purpose of comparative inspection. He found that their contours as well as the strokes of the legend’s characters were vague and unclear. Not only did they not compare with the cash samples of the Kangxi (1622–1722) and Yongzheng (1723–1735) reign-periods, but they also did not equal those from the early years of the Qianlong reign-period (1736–1795). Therefore he ordered that all Vice Ministers and Inspectors who were responsible for the management of the Coinage Ofĳice (Qianfatang 錢法堂) over the last ten years be identiĳied and handed over to the Ministry of Personnel so that strict punishment for their misconduct could be discussed in each individual case and in accordance to the length of their service in that capacity.54 The Question of Compensation in Small Cash Collections From the criminals’ confessions, it can be seen that they made use of the then current policy of small cash demonetization undertaken by the government for obtaining the raw material for their counterfeiting activities. That this was an unacceptable attack on a state monopoly is made clear by Fukang’an, who in one of his memorials angrily wrote the following: Because of the fact that small cash coins now must be handed over to the authorities in order to be recast [into standard coins], the aforementioned criminals and others have tried to avoid liability under the pretext 53 54 Qianlongchao shangyudang, vol. 18, p. 289, ql 59/10/18 (no. 582). Qianlongchao shangyudang, vol. 18, p. 291, ql 59/10/19 (no. 587). This is a digital offprint for restricted use only | © 2015 Koninklijke Brill NV 212 cao and Vogel of having purchased such coins [on behalf of the state]. This is really insidious and detestable!”55 In Fukang’an’s opinion, if the metals for counterfeiting had not been obtained from melting down other cash coins, they could only have come from two sources: they had either been secretly smuggled out of the mines in the vicinity of the counterfeit stronghold by treacherous merchants, or copper and zinc had been salvaged by divers from craft that had sunk in the Yangtze River and then sold secretly and illegally.56 This statement found support from the Qianlong emperor, who commented: “Of course it should not go beyond these [two] factors!” (Zidang bu chu ci shu tiao 自當不出數條). However, after examining carefully the Old Crow’s Nest again and without ĳinding any raw copper or zinc, but only thousands of jin of small cash, the investigators had more-or-less accepted Liu Ronghou’s confession to which he adamantly adhered even after repeated interrogation and questioning with infliction of pain: Because the territory of the Old Crow’s Nest with its high mountains and almost impassable paths is far away from the Chuanjiang 江 [i.e., Yangtze River in Sichuan], we have never known any of these divers. And if one had illegally bought copper and zinc [from merchants] for casting, the production costs would have been very high, which would have inevitably led to ĳinancial losses. That the now cast [counterfeit] coins [therefore] have actually their origin [only] in worn-out small cash coins purchased from time to time here and there and then melted in the furnace, can be checked and veriĳied by the evidence, which has now been brought to light. It was solely because we wanted to make great proĳit that we have committed these unlawful deeds.57 In order to obtain additional proof, the inquisitors ordered Liu Ronghou to re-enact their counterfeiting process in the yard of the court in Chongqing: A furnace was built and Liu Ronghou and the others were ordered to melt down small cash coins and to recast them [to counterfeit coins] as an experiment. It was indeed true that no extra copper and zinc was needed 55 56 57 Gongzhongdang zhupi zouzhe, 1344–028, Sichuan, Fukang’an, ql 59/8/21. Gongzhongdang zhupi zouzhe, 1344–028, Sichuan, Fukang’an, ql 59/8/21. Gongzhongdang zhupi zouzhe, 1345–020, Sichuan, Fukang’an, ql 59/10/3. This is a digital offprint for restricted use only | © 2015 Koninklijke Brill NV Smoke on the Mountain 213 to accomplish this. Thus, no cover-up or palliation seems to have been involved.58 The fact that the counterfeiters of Tongzi made use of the small cash collection policy provoked an intense discussion about whether or not the government should continue to give compensation for such debased coins. The emperor ordered each governor to reflect on this issue in accordance with the particular situation in his respective province.59 The feedback was quite mixed.60 After almost three months of memorials coming in and edicts being issued, the ĳinal conclusion was made that 60 wen 文 of standard cash should be given for purchasing one jin of small cash, no matter what the total amount or in which province.61 Stricter Control of the Mints A comparison of the counterfeit coins made by Zeng Shibao with those cast by the mints conĳirmed to the Qianlong emperor that the abuse of small cash was mainly due to malpractices in the mints themselves. Thus new efforts had to be undertaken to improve the quality of newly cast standard coins, which resulted in a reform of mint control measures. The debasement of cash by the mints themselves but also the fact that the counterfeiters from Old Crow’s Nest in Tongzi produced better coins than the institutions of the state, were the reasons why in 1796, when the provincial mints reopened, the system of providing casting models for provincial coin production was changed. Since 1729, it had been the case that when a provincial mint opened, the Ministry of Revenue produced a so-called “master cash” (zuqian 祖錢) made of pure copper with a weight of 2.3 qian. This coin was then used to provide the imprint for the production of the so-called “mother cash” (muqian 母錢) in the sand moulds. This “mother cash” had a weight of 1.6 to 1.7 qian and served to provide the imprints for the casting of standard 58 59 60 61 Gongzhongdang zhupi zouzhe, 1345–020, Sichuan, Fukang’an, ql 59/10/3. Qianlongchao shangyudang, vol. 18, p. 222, ql 59/9/20 (no. 451). See Gongzhongdang zhupi zouzhe, 1345–1347. The provinces which were for compensation were Zhejiang, Zhili, Sichuan, Yunnan, Guizhou, Guangdong, Guangxi, Jiangsu, Anhui, and Gansu; those which were against compensation were Shanxi, Jiangxi, Fujian, Shaanxi, Shandong, and Hubei. Hunan Governor Jiang Sheng 姜晟 (1730–1810) was actually the ĳirst during this discussion who suggested giving compensation. However, after having been immediately criticised by the Qianlong emperor, he withdrew his previous opinion and changed to the other side. Generally speaking, those provinces with serious problems with small cash opted for compensation. Qianlongchao shangyudang, vol. 18, p. 361, ql 59/12/6 (no. 774). This is a digital offprint for restricted use only | © 2015 Koninklijke Brill NV 214 cao and Vogel coins (zhiqian) with a weight of 1.2 qian each. A newly opened mint thus received one master cash, one mother cash and one standard cash in order to cast coins based on them.62 From 1796 onward, the provincial mints were only supplied with mother cash together with some already ĳinished “cash samples” (qianshi 錢式), but no longer with master cash, which was retained in the capital. The mints had to hand in the cash samples produced by themselves to the Coinage Ofĳice (Qianfatang) for inspection and, additionally, in the twelfth month of every year, ten pieces of newly cast cash coins. By this means it was intended to eliminate the problem of inferior cash production by the state institutions themselves.63 This was, however, only of limited success because complaints about mint abuses still continued to be reported after the establishment of this new system. Some Remarks in Conclusion What the counterfeiters had done was indeed to make clever use of the government small cash collection campaigns: they bought their raw material in distant villages where it was inconvenient for people to deliver their small cash directly to the ofĳicial collection points in the administrative centres. In exchange, they compensated them at a price somewhat lower than the one paid by the government. For the customers of the counterfeiters, this was, at any rate, acceptable as it saved them the trouble of travelling to the distant small cash collection points and dealing with state agents. This was a phenomenon similar to land tax collection where middlemen offered peasants the service of dealing with taxation matters on their behalf, a malpractice which, from the state’s point of view, was called baolan 包攬, i.e., “taking over responsibility” for land tax collection.64 In land taxation it was, however, members of the gentry and scholars that predominantly engaged in these practices, while in the case of Tongzi, the malpractice was committed by commoners. What was also different with land tax collection practices was the fact that the coun- 62 63 64 Burger, Ch’ing Cash, pp. 27–28. Burger, Ch’ing Cash, pp. 28–29. See the illustrative examples in Hsiao Kung-chuan, Rural China: Imperial Control in the Nineteenth Century (Seattle and London: University of Washington Press, 1960), pp. 132– 139. Cf. also Wang Yeh-chien, Land Taxation in Imperial China, 1750–1911 (Cambridge, ma: Harvard University Press, 1973), pp. 45–46. This is a digital offprint for restricted use only | © 2015 Koninklijke Brill NV Smoke on the Mountain 215 terfeit collectors did not deliver the bought-up cash to the state agencies, but kept it for themselves in order to turn it into counterfeit coins. After the recasting of small cash, a fraction of the number of fairly good coins was used to buy new small cash, the rest to pay the workers and to invest into new furnaces. By using this cash themselves and by cooperation with shop keepers and dealers along the Qijiang and Yangtze Rivers, the counterfeiters put cash into circulation. Because of this practice, the counterfeiters from the Old Crow’s Nest thus could even be said to have contributed to the slowing down of the downward spiral of cash quality in Southwest China. What made the case reckless, in the eyes of the authorities, was that they used the pretext of the government’s beneĳicial policy of small cash collection for their private proĳit and, by doing so, also usurped the governmental prerogative of coinage, thus committing a serious crime against the state. Due to a lack of detailed and reliable data, especially on the copper cashsilver market exchange rates, it is difĳicult to estimate whether or not and to what extent the different measures taken by the Qing government to ĳight against cash depreciation in the late eighteenth century were effective. Although coin counterfeiting by commoners and by mint personnel could not be completely extinguished, no case of a similar scale can be found to have occurred in the following decades. Even though the policy of demonetization did offer the counterfeiters a great opportunity for their enterprise, yet, in terms of traditional Chinese monetary policy, it was, after all, still reasonable to carry out these campaigns, and indeed we can notice a rise in the value of cash thereafter. For instance, the exchange rate of cash vis-à-vis one tael of silver went down in Sichuan by 200,65 and in Yunnanfu by up to 800 coins.66 In 1795 it was reported from Shandong that, within one year, in all departments and districts, between 300 and 1000 strings of small cash had been collected in each and that the cash sector would thus be “clean” now. This cannot, however, be veriĳied because it remains likely that the responsible ofĳicials only wanted to whitewash the situation. The daily records about the copper-to-silver exchange rate in Ningjin 晉, Zhili Province, between 1798 and 1850 show a decrease in the exchange rate after 1801 from around 1,050 to 920–970 between 1802 and 1807. Whether this was really the result of the demonetization campaigns or due to other factors, like a temporary depreciation of silver, remains unclear, not to speak of the empire’s great regional and local divergences in the monetary conditions and developments. 65 66 Qingchao xu wenxian tongkao, chap. 19, pp. 7685–7686. Gongzhongdang zhupi zouzhe, 1349–035, probably from Yungui, Fukang’an, no date. This is a digital offprint for restricted use only | © 2015 Koninklijke Brill NV 216 cao and Vogel What is clear, however, is that market exchange rates started to rise in almost all places after 1807 or so, such as the one in Ningjin reaching its peak of 2,355 in 1849. From the years between 1796 and 1807, only very little data from other provinces are available, such as from Shandong (1796: 1,250; 1802: 1,450 and 1,650) or from Xiaoshan 蕭山 in Zhejiang (1797: 1,020–1,030; 1800: 1,000; 1801: 900). It is, however, apparent that, in the 1840s all over China, exchange rates had generally increased to values between 1,500 and above 2,000.67 In other words, even if we assume that the demonetization measures might have provided a certain relief in the cash sector here and there after 1796, this would have been only a momentary phenomenon. It is, however, interesting to note that during the pronounced increase in the exchange rates over the ĳirst half of the nineteenth century, ĳigures reported from Sichuan, Yunnan and Guizhou did not exceed 1,700 and were thus not outstandingly higher in comparison to other provinces.68 For Sichuan in 1837, an exchange rate of 1,500–1,600, and one year later of 1,600–1,700 were reported.69 For Yunnan, data for the years 1825 (1,000), 1842 (1,600) and 1846 (1,580–1,640) are available; for Guizhou for 1838 (1,429), 1842 (1,587) and 1846 (1,600).70 In other words, numbers for Sichuan reached a similar level as in 1791 (1,550) and 1794 (1,550), that is, before the reform attempts by Fukang’an. This shows again that in Sichuan, if at all, only a temporary success was achieved. In the end, the governmental measures, also because of their inconstant character, could not persist against the development of the market. That traditional measures of short-term reforms proved to be ineffective had to do with the basic characteristics and limitations of the late imperial Chinese monetary system as a whole. There was a clear lack of sovereignty over silver currency because the state had control over neither the production of silver money nor silver imports from abroad.71 State monetary policy was basically limited to the cash coin sector only. The state was, no doubt, successful in alleviating the eighteenth-century cash hunger prompted by the upsurge of commercialisation by developing the copper and zinc mines in Southwest China and by increasing coin production. However, traditional policies in a 67 68 69 70 71 Vogel, Monetary Policy and Yunnan Copper, chap. ii.2. and Appendix C; Vogel, ‘Central Chinese Monetary Policy’, pp. 17–39; Lin Man-houng, China Upside Down, pp. 121–124. Vogel, ‘Central Chinese Monetary Policy’, p. 39. See also the interesting set of data from Jianwei 犍為 in Sichuan, 1830–1858, in Lin Man-houng, China Upside Down, pp. 123–124. Vogel, ‘Central Chinese Monetary Policy’, p. 39. See Lin Man-houng, China Upside Down, pp. 63, 68–71, but also King, Money and Monetary Policy, p. 45. This is a digital offprint for restricted use only | © 2015 Koninklijke Brill NV Smoke on the Mountain 217 phase of depreciated cash currency were more difĳicult to implement due to the vicious circle spurred by counterfeiting, problems related to the closing of mines and mints, as well as to the fact that demonetization campaigns were costly and difĳicult to continue over time due to the limited capacities of the pre-modern Qing state. Besides, another general problem was that it was always easy to carry out counterfeiting because of the crude minting technology that was unable to produce forgery-proof coins. In the end, only minor adjustments of the cash sector were carried out, but no major reform.72 The counterfeiters of Tongzi built an astonishingly successful criminal enterprise. From a purely economic perspective, by producing coins of better quality out of small cash, they may, indeed, be considered a useful corrective in terms of slowing down the spiral of cash debasement during their period. For the state and its interests, however, they were nothing more than criminals distorting the state’s costly attempts at purifying the cash sector and encroaching on its coinage monopoly. Moreover, because cash coins with their legends bearing the name of the current reign-period were a symbol of imperial rule, the loss of control over the cash sector and the debasement of coins constituted another symptom of the general crisis which China had increasingly to face in the beginning of the nineteenth century. References Burger, Werner. Ch’ing Cash until 1735 (Taipei: Mei Ya Publications, 1976). Cao Jin. Mint Metal Mining and Minting in Sichuan, 1700–1900: Effects on the Regional Economy and Society (Ph.D. dissertation, Tübingen University, 2012). Cao Jin, Sabine Kink and Hans Ulrich Vogel. Die Falschmünzerbande vom Alten Rabenhorst (1794) in Texten und Kontexten: Ein Lehrbuch zur chinesischen Dokumentensprache der Qing-Zeit (Forthcoming in 2015). Chen Hailian. ‘Zinc Transfer from China to Europe via Trade, ca. 1600–1800: A Transnational Perspective’, in Technikgeschichte, 80 (2013), pp. 71–94. Da-Qing Gaozong Chun (Qianlong) huangdi shilu 大清高純(乾隆)皇帝錄 [The veritable records of Gaozong-emperor Chun (Qianlong) of the Qing dynasty], comp. by Qinggui 慶桂 et al. (Taibei: Hualian chubanshe, 1964). Glahn, Richard von. Fountain of Fortune: Money and Monetary Policy in China, 1000– 1700 (Berkeley, Ca.: University of California Press, 1996). 72 For the difference between major and minor reforms see King, Money and Monetary Policy, p. 121. 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“Smoke on the Mountain”: The Infamous Counterfeiting Case of Tongzi District, Guizhou Province, 1794

“Smoke on the Mountain”: The Infamous Counterfeiting Case of Tongzi District, Guizhou Province, 1794

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