Joona Taipale IN H A L T Similarityand asymmetry Husserl and the transcendental foundations of empathy Cbristopbjamme.’Nachruf auf Otto Poggeler Ernst Wolfgang Ortl): Nachrufauf Thomas M. Seebohm KlausHeld: Nachrufauf Laszlo Tenguelyi . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10 . . . B EITRAGE Oscar L. Gonzalez—Castan: Overcoming Positivism: Husserl and Wittgenstein Ronny Miron: ,,The Gate of Reality“. Hedwig Conrad—Martius’s idea of reality in Realontologie Peter Andras Varga: Die Einfliisse der Brentano’schen Intentionalitéitskonzeptionenauf den friihen Husserl. Zur Widerlegung einer Legende FaustinoFal7bianelli:Theodor Lipps und die Phanomenologie ]00na Taipale: Similarityand asymmetry. Husserl and thetranscendental foundations of empathy Peter]. Rosan: The varieties of ethical experience. A phenomenology of empathy,sympathy,and compassion Peter Welsen: Gerechtigkeitssinn und Gerechtigkeitspri nzipicn. '/.u Ricoeurs Auseinandersetzung mit Rawls AlesVNova/e:Der Begriff ,Austrag‘ als Bestimmung des Seins bei Martin Heidegger Robert Hago Ziegler:Metaphysik und Phanomenologie Maxim Kares: Performativitat und Phanomenalitat. Heideggers Sprache in Der Ursprung a'erKanst'wer/ees Radi Visker: Multicultural differences in the public sphere . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 59 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1 I7 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 83 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 141 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 155 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 191 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 205 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 217 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 241 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 285 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Abstract This article suggests thatthe asymmetrical structure of the self—other relationship can be traced back to the relation between empathy and transcendental intersubjectivity. Drawing on Husserl in particular, I will first recapitulate the argument that empathyis necessarilypreceded by, and built upon, structural implications to potential others, and I will then argue thatthe empathicallyencountered actual other is bound to arrive as the fulfilment or concretization of this anonymous, emptilyappresented “anybody”. Because of this foundedness, empathyis necessarily built on expectations concerning the other’s similarity,and becauseof this initial and tacit “similaritythesis” it is bound to have an asymmetrical structure. Towards the end of my paper, I willunderline particular ethical implications of this account. Most importantly, I will be claiming that genuine intersubjectivity, and ethical relationship with others, is essentially built on disappointments of our initial subjective expectations. I. Introdnction Husserl’s account of ,,empathy“ (Einfiihlnng) has been extensively investigated and reassessed many times during the last decades. As is well—known, with this term Husserl generally refers to a special kind of experience whereby the subjectivity of the other is revealed to us as such. In comparison to our own experiential life, the alien experiential life remains barred in a peculiar sense: we are unable to experience the experiences of others from their first-person perspective. While this peculiar inaccessibilityserves as one of the constituents of the ,,otherness“ of the other, it also invokes a set of critical questions. For one, granting our inabilityto experience the other’s experiences as it is lived through by the other, how can external perception ever justify our beliefs concerning the mindedness of others? To put it differently: if the experiential life of others is somehow fundamentally inaccessible to us in thefirst—person, how is it possible that we have second-person or third-person knowledge of it? Phenomenologists have reacted to such questions in various ways. For one, it has been emphasized that our inaccessibilityto the other’s immediately lived first—person perspective is not a defect, but something that makes it precisely an I42 joona Taipale Similarityand asymmem’ experience of.1 In other words, we should not presume that a successful experiof others is one where the other’s experiential life is presented like our own. This would ence be to confuse the self and the other: as Husserl puts it, if the other’s liVed—experiences were directly accessible to me like my own experiences, they would not actuallypertain to the other but to myself instead? Secondly, what phenomenologists have been particularly eager to attack is the (often tacit) assumption that we can directly perceive only the other’s body and not their mind. This Cartesian prejudice is wide-spread: it seems to figure in all accounts of social cognition that postulate an experiential gap between the self and the other, an accordingly grasp their main task in terms of bridging this gap.3 By emphasizing that what we primarilyand directly perceive of the other is not only a physical body (Kérper) but a lived—body (Leila), it can be argued that even though the other’s subjectivity is not immediately to us in the first person, it can nevertheless be immediately present to uspresent in the second or third person. While this manoeuvre does not altogether solve the problem of empathy,it does shift the focus of inquiry. The central task is not to explain how we reach other minds beyond externallyperceived bodies, but in describing how some bodies are grasped as other lived-bodies. However, while renouncing the afore-mentioned Cartesian prejudice, another problem immediatelyrears its head. Namely,if we declare thatthe experiential life of others can actually be perceived, there is the danger of psychological states to perceivable behavior, and concluding thatreducing there is in principle nothing hidden in the other. The dilemma, accordingly,is the following: the more one pulls the psychological life of theother into the directly perceivable body, the closer one stands in relation to behaviorism,whereas the more one emphasizes the subjective, first—personal character of experiential life, the farther one seems to drift in relation to the claim of direct of the other. Since phenomenologywants to hold on to both hornsperceivability of the dilemma,it is destined to balance between a sharp mind-body division, the on one hand, and behaviorism (and reductive naturalism),on the other or, to cut a few corners, between solipsism and obj ectivism. In this paper, I will focus on something that directly relates to this dilemma, and that is the problem of asymmetry of the self—other relationship. I will introduce this problem by recapitulating the manner in which empathy,in Husserl’s — is founded on a more fundamental type Of lm€r3ubl€°tlVltY-This 315811‘ h b Ce n u Shed forward by Dan Zahavi in particular,‘ and different versiment is onso f itcanaso be found in the works of Shaun Gallagher: Klaus Held’ and Hiroshi Kojima.5 Recently, the issue has resul”faced in a numberof critical articles." In a way this debate can be said to date back all the Way to Mer1 33”‘ P 0m)’ h aslzed that there are two overlapping ten dencies in Husserl s treatwho nt 0 intersu b- e Ctivity 7 In most occasions the Husserlian approach to interwith his Cartesian Meditdtl0775 (l929)~ For 3 long time, su ec t‘1V ity is work was the only published source where Husserl eXtenSlV€lY engaged W1'th the roblem of intersubjectivity, and hence it understandably, at least up unti-1 t h e S, 1‘t 0 utlined the mainstream interpretation of Husserl’s treatment 1 a roaches the roblem of of intersubjectivity. In this work Husserl of Own from the t intersubjectivity point of View of W 3 e ca the S h ness“ which is to say that he engages in a thouglmexpenmemW ere 6 exp l_1l es out of consideration everything pertaining to’ or Orlgmanng from’ ot ers. owever, in Stead of thereby attempting to explain how our experience of others actually003195 about: the Sole P“’P°5e O fthis thou ht-ex eriment 1S to of the ob emphasize, via negatwa, the crucial role of others In the c ld. ro ach has been discussed and criticized extensively, due to the e t s a 1' 1 i y of Husserl’s writings the other tendency in his treatment of _Hmte intersu jectivi-t yus ed to be much less well known (and outside Husserlian schond the intersub ective world larship it still is). In this account, onstitutionall k 3“ recede eXperi_ t C are ta con man, 0””.d our alternative of this interpretation 1S nowaence 0 0t ers. Although account ’ T . . , .. E.g. Dan Zahavi: Empathy and mirroring: Husserl and Gallese. In: Breeur, Melle (eds.): Life, Subjectivity 85 Art: Essays in Honor of Rudolf Bernet. Berlin 2012. 217-254. 232 f. 2 Hua I, 139. The bridge metaphor can also be found in the indicative title of a recent book on social cognition edited by Bertram Malle, Sara Hodges: OtherMinds. How Humans Bridge the l )ivi de between Self and Others. New York 2005. 3 .. . ' 7 enfl .) mfg’ this] v ‘ - asslociated 3 ' _ 2 . . _ . 1p97Q’ . . . . . . . fam(})1uS}}: PPHS . . - - he1:e Ph )1 _ cithy lealyl ‘ ' . oiistitutii n _ . - - - - leCij(j',:'jN0;' d beivaba ' . . ‘ ' . _ , ' . . . . ‘ i n t e r s ubj l e ct 1 V1t Y :f thieixistencie - . ' ' - fen ho , « thefinatic , ‘ . . _ h - _ b' t' it I In: Consci:)\uIS{I1€55oit: tl(: he(Ling1)1i sticPraginaticCritique. Transl.by ElizabethBehnIoufnalbfffjectivity. Ohio d Seinsweise der transzendentalen Klaus Held: Lebendl l g e Gegel i w i a m i j f age ml i c er D: Egitproblematik Haag 1§1dmuI r — 1I ( : l ¢ I f ' I L l § s21: r I ” re(i f i l : / f r i c f e i und die Idee fi i e rstei b j e kti v i t at 16: rajglzsendenéalphilosophie Klaesges Held (eds.): PerspektivennadtrarziPh3n°men°l°$f' séelrlidenltf ipha, Hiroshi Ko]1maolfnlaurrizilnBaeai;g1g Ohio46;2000; nomel u l g l i c f i l s f g f i f d i g gsj r c Shaun Gallagher: Intersubjectivity perception. Continental PhilosophyReview 41 (2.098): 1063 of D"1V‘°'1as °P‘“§‘;1Peg‘“‘“T§“bl§°F’:iE;Oi I 11ltheln5 laniilaersoml fy ShapingShum: An} n‘iCmaCUEna1l\/I :i ‘i : VI\)fPh'l usness and the Acqulsmon of Language’ /Ierle1a:§I}()h>n:y' éonsdio.143—156. Intersu 2001' ks’ esp 5 S - [Ch h - it a en Den ‘ _ en ' h ' . D 1nH ’ ' 1972. - . v- . M0 1996. . __ einer sc an ou’ . mo- . . . in meno o - In: See Matt Bower: 6 . ‘ - _ 1 143 . _ _178. , inter I V9 - C16 ' eX_ 2014‘ Peter ’ ' . . VUI . - - ‘ ' 33 2014 _ . cc, . ., - 'l'r.msl. by Hugh Silverman. Evanston 2001. 44 f. . . Joona Taipale Similarityand asymmetry days sufficiently acknowledged in the commentary literature, its p/ailosopbical consequences to the theory of empathyhave not been spelled out extensively. I will here tacklethese consequences. I will argue that in the light of this interpretation empathynecessarilydesignates a concretizationof the emptilyimplica— ted and anonymous co-perceiver that we tacitlyco-posit in each of our perceptual experiences. By clarifying how our experience of others is consequently warranted by what I will call the similarity thesis, I will be explaining how the irreducible asymmetry in the self—other relationship is owing to its foundedness in this transcendental intersubjectivity: if the other is to be recognized as an other, he or she must be anticipated to be experiencing the same world, and hence tacitly expected to have, to a certain extent, similar abilitiesthan we do. I will further clarify thatthis similarity thesis is not a matter of empirical presuppositions or objective requirements, but something structurally anticipated by the experiencing subjectivity in Husserlian terms, I will be highlighting the fact that what is at stake is not analogical but analogizing apperception. In the end of my article, I will briefly outline the most important ethical implications of this interpretation. possible relation of empathy“.1°As is well—known, Husserl stresses throughout his writings that the fact that the world appears as being there ,,for anyone“ is independent of whether or not there actually are others: ,,the existence of fellow humans is not presupposed here“ (das Sein des M itmensc/aen gebt 144 — 2. The intersulajectivefoundation of empathy By studying Husserl’s manuscripts on intersubjectivity, it is not hard to convince oneself of the fact that in Husserl’s explicit account empathy is not the most fundamental and original form of intersubjectivity. When empathy arrives, another kind of intersubjectivity must already be operative, as Husserl repeatedly emphasizes; the former ought to be viewed not as a ,,creating“ but as a ,,disclosing accomplishment“ (entliullendes Leisten).3 As Husserl rather unambiguouslyputs it in one of his manuscripts: ,,Empathy already presupposes that intersubjectively perceivable objects have already been constituted“ (Einfziilalungsetzt sc/yon voraus, dass intersubje/etivwahrnelambare Obje/ete/eonstituiert sind).9 That is to say, paradoxically,there is a sense in which intersubjecti— vity precedes the actual encounter withothers. The idea thatHusserl struggles to express in different ways in different phases of his career can be approached in terms of actuality and potentiality. Already we constitute others as actuallypresent co—perceivers, our perceptual experiences manifest tacit references to potential and purely anonymous perceivers, to ,,an open unending multiplicity of possible pure egos [...], which stand before to me in 145 a biernic/at voraus).“ Independently of what Husserl himself does or does not explicate, however, we can build an argument for the necessity of a pre—empathic intersubjectivity. We can do this on the basis of three defendable hypotheses: (I) First of all, the constitution of the experiential distinction betweenwhat is actuallyperceived and what is merely imagined or hallucinatedcannot presuppose (simultaneous or antecedent) experiences of actual others (i.e., empathy). If by contrast this was the case, it would likewise be impossible for us to distinguish between actually perceived and merely imagined or hallucinated others. And insofar as it is presumably only the actuallyperceived others (and not merely imagined or hallucinated others) that could grant our experiences the status of actual perceptions, we would therefore have to be able to distinguish between actual and imagined others already before we experience others. Hence to deny this hypothesis would lead to a View which begs the question. (II) Secondly,theconstitution of unitary t/oings cannot presuppose (simultaneous or antecedent) experiences of others. Again, to claim the opposite would beg the question. Namely, in order to experience others we have to perceive their unitary bodies, and thus constitute particular unitary things that stand out from the environment. Therefore, if we assumed that the constitution of unitary thingsalready presupposes an experience of others, we would end up in the absurd position of maintaining that in order to be able to experience others we would have already had experienced others and so on. Accordingly,the possibilityof thing-constitution must precede the possibilityof the constitution of others as such. (III) The third hypothesis is formed on phenomenologicalgrounds. To experience something as being perceivable (as visible, as audible, etc.) to oneself exclu— sively is to experience it as something imaginary or illusory not as something actuallyperceived. This is not how real, actuallyperceived things appear. On these grounds, we can conclude the following: insofar as we perceive uni tary things, our experience tacitlyimplies potential co—percei'z2ers and such references are independent of, and necessarilyprecede, our actual and concrete cxpc — — -« Hua XI, 307. Ms. A VII 11, 12a; Hua I, 123, 124; Hua VI, 262; Hua 200. 203 f.; Hua XXIX, 332; Hua XXXIX,606, 625. ‘° 9 9 Hua Mat VIII, 436. Hua XLI, 100. " XV, 12, 17, 74 f., 110, 191-194, 146 joona Taipale Similarityand asymmetry riences of others. In short, structural references to potential co-perceivers precede empathy.” the time (in such cases I would not be experiencing the coffee cup as a real but as an illusion or hallucination). Rather, the appresented appearances are simultaneous with the current appearance or, to be more precise, they are appresented as simultaneous with the currently given ones. Merleau-Ponty has nicely reformulated this Husserlian idea by stating that it is as if the perceived thing would appear from all sides simultaneously: despite its perspectival appearance it presents itself as being currently perceivable ,,from everywhere“.17 In other but words, perception of things not only involves horizons of past and also, to use Husserl’s term from Ideas I, a ,,horizon of simultaneity“ (Horzzont 147 thing — 3. Temporalityand appresentation What this pre—empathic intersubjectivity amounts to obviously depends on how understand these ,,references“ to other potential co-perceivers. Husserl himself does not give a straightforward clarificationto this, but he discusses the issue while dealing with the horizontality of perception. The general thread of the story is well-known: we cannot perceive all features of three-dimensionalthings at one moment, and yet in each moment we experience whole things and not just facades. Perceived things appear as unities of possible appearances, not only of actualones, which is anotherway of saying thatthings are perceptually inexhaustible and have only an anticipatory or presumptive unity.” It is revealing that Husserl discusses this horizon of co—perceptions in terms of ,,appresentation“,14 a concept he also situates in the heart of his account of empathy: ,,due to its horizontal structure already each of our experiences of particular things is permeated by appresentation, that is to say, associative prefiguration and possibly validation through self-giving perception“.15 Interestingly, Husserl elsewhere notes that appresentation in this sense could also be called ,,transcendental empathy“, in separation from ,,psychological empathy“, i. e., from an actual experience of others.“ Here an obvious objection arises, however: why not simply say thatthe hidden sides of things are intended as being there for my potential perception? What justifies introducing intersubjectivity and otherness in this connection? These questions can be answered by considering the issue in terms of temporali— ty. When I perceive something, say a coffee cup, from my current position, the hither sides of the cup are constituted for me as being perceivable not only previously or subsequently instead, the thingis taken to ,,have“ its back side also at tbe moment. To put it differently, even if the thing necessarily appears in a perspectival manner, I do not experience it as existing only from one perspective at we — 11 It should be noted here that this a priori intersubjectivity is contingent on the ability to grasp three—dimensionalthings as such, which might not be somethingthatinfants are capable of from the start. In other words, a priori intersubjectivity at least in the sense presented here is not developmentallyoriginal. 13 Hua I, 82 f.; Hua VI, 167; Hua XI, 3; cf. Maurice Merleau-Ponty: Phenomenology of Perception. Transl. by Colin Smith.London 2002. 80,255,421. 14 Hua I, 139; Hua XV, 84, 87,124;Hua XXXIX, 138, 403 ff. 15 Hua XV, 26 f. 16 Hua XV, 116; cf. Maurice Merleau—Ponty: Visible and Invisible. Transl. by Alphonso Lingis. Evanston 1968. 180. — future des,gleicbzeitig Gewesen‘).13 To introduce intersubjectivity in this connection is necessary since subjectivity is limited to one perspective at a time. To put it differently,simultaneous coappearances of the thing transcend not only my actual experiences, but also'my potential experiences. I can indeed take an alternative perspective on the thing, and in the sense of this subsequent perceivabilitythe hither sides are within the range of my potentialities. Yet, to verify the simultaneous existence of the hither sides is not within my potentialities; I not only happen not to currently perceive them, but I cannot currently perceive them and yet they figure as necessary constituents of the thing. The situation must hence be described in more anonymous terms: the open infinity of perspectives of the thing is not constituted as _ _ _ — Let‘ offer simultaneity, simultanespread diffe- the correlate of an ,,I can“, but rather as the correlate of ,,one can“. me horiHusserl where few connects a explicitly exemplary quotes another: with and ,,One subject cannot one zonality, intersubjectivity to ously experience two aspects of orthologicalmultiplicity, but as rent subjects a multiplicity of aspects can exist simultaneously, and it must exist in this manner, insofar as we experience a simultaneously identical thing“.1" and primarily ,,[E]verythingobject-like that stands before my eyes in in perception has an apperceptive horizon of possible experiences, my own and those of others. Every appearance that I have is from the very beginning :1 of of endless, an although not explicitly realized apopen part these and tbe interof is subjectivity of open pearances the same, appearances thing—pcrccpsubjectivity“.2°Independentlyof any actual encounter with tion in its horizonal structure anticipates the intersubjective givenness of the thing. The perceived thing appears as being perceivable from everywhere. as experience totality possible tbe others, — 17 13 “’ 1° Merleau—Ponty:Phenomenology of Perception. 79. Hua III, 184 f. Hua XIII, 377 f. Hua XIV, 289. I48 joona Taipale bein8 P erceivable to anyone, and in this ,,already each of my perceptions 1 y inc1 udes [others] [...] as sense. [ ] co—subjects, as co—constituting“.21 nt is urel y ant" t and hence empty sense, icipa intersubjectivity serves as the on an d or our actual experiences of others. The fundamentahr of int er b. 80 why Husserl criticized his exposition of en io 116 »Sp ereo ‘ownness ,admitting that,considered more close 1 y, t h ere is already a form of ,,intersubjectivity that pertains to my primordial ' . Colpstant foundaii 0? cont e xl thzabove ms“ tlectlzlty 31 1 t ejplains . - - - - ' - . “ — ~ . . . - . . - _ experience“ (zu meiner Primordialitatzugehorigen Intersulaje/etivitat) 22 Let now connect all . of this withthe emergence of of concretization. terms in _ _ I me empathy and introduce the latter 9 4. Anonymity and similarity mea::Cei1r1r:pVe21siz(ec:;1bovethiltperceived things Ih h ' do not appear as being there for would not appear as perceived). It should be ey equa H y stressed, however, that perceived things neither exclusively appear as b h fOr comprising me‘ and a fixed number of others. group a t e thatfurtherperceivers show up, and it is this openness t of a intersubjectivity Rather targets. priori than USIVC Y, Of 1:0 a 1Xed group, things are more originally constitub te d as. eing perceivable to anyone or, highlighting the bodily foundatlons of experiencing, t0 anybody. This concept does not single out any particular perceiver or group of perceivers. Moreover, since it would obviously be misleading to say that all of our perceptions are at the same time others (i e experiences of that they would involve empathy) we should be careful not to conflate the presence of laorizonalandpotential others with the presence of actualotla ers. Before others are p res ent as thematicor marginal objects, and Independent of such forms of presence, they are present in an e mpty manner, as anonymous coperceivers. To put it metaphorically,there are always free available for the play that we are following, and anyone can buy a ticket seats in the middle of the show. The things that we per ceive are primarilyconstituted as being perceivable to to anybody in particular. In their Hot primal anonymity, to quote Husserl s wording, others remain in this sense undefined“ (unlaestimmt):they are not initially discovered in front of us (as perceived remembered, or - Y - . €1'W1Se t 0 Tilglrg elre :1 Closed 3115 1::/aybs piossibility roan; Ce:C10ve l SCU.SS€d cclincept ' * ' - - - - ' - . . - ' . . . . . — ' ii 3 ’ ' - - ‘m)’[7f’d% . . . ” , 3 2‘ 22 Hua Mat VIII, 394. Hua XXXIX,498. Simil.1i'ity and asyninictry I4‘) ' imagined objects), but ,,in the horizon“, as ,,implicata“ of our intentional lil’-c.~’»‘ ( )r, as Husserl also puts it, others are fundamentallyimplied as ,,transccndcntal others“ (transzendentalen Anderen): as ,,pure others who as yet have no worldly sense“.24 However, one should be careful not to mystify the issue. This danger can be avoided by clarifying the experiential continuum between anonymous others and empathicallygrasped concrete individuals. To emphasize the emptiness in the other’s pre-empathic manner of givenness is helpful here, since it enables us to address empathy in terms of concretization and fulfilment. Let me illustrate this continuum with the following example. When we realize that someone else sees what we do (e.g., the coffee cup on the table), we might be surprised of contingent matters related to this (e. g., we might not have realized that we had company), but we are never surprised of the fact that the other can perceive what we ourselves already perceive. The possibility of intersubjective perception is already, so to speak, beingprepared in our subjective act of seeing. By contrast, by realizing that someone else does not perceive what we do always tends to surprise us to some extent. This is because in such cases our original intention, with its tacit anticipations of perceivability to anyone, is partly disappointed. To put it more positively and generally,what we perceive we originally take as being there for anybody, and this primal and open, although empty intersubjectivity explains why we are never altogether surprised if it turns out that others sees what we see, hear what we hear, and why, by contrast, we are surprised if they seem not to. If one accepts what has been said thus far, it will be difficult to reject the following conclusion: the other as encountered in empathyis to be understood as a particular concretization of the original ,,anybody“ that was implicated a priori.35 Having said this, however, it should be added right away that it would not be convincing to maintain that others are nothing more than concretizations of anybody, nothing more than what we expect them to be. This is not what I am trying to argue here. By contrast, I am suggesting more modestly that, to some 23 Hua I, 158 f.; Hua VI, 162 f., 257, 259, 262, 275; Hua XV, 46, 74 f., 191 474, 498. 24 f.; Hua XXXIX. E.g. Hua VI, 189; Hua XV, 16, 111, 190; Hua XXXIX,485, 486. Hua I, 137: ,,dcn ,purm' Anderen ([Anderen] die noch keinen weltlichen Sinn haben).“ Cf. Merleau-Ponty:Visililcnml the Invisible, 172, where he refers to the ,,pure Others“ of Husserl’s Cartesian Meditaliom. See also Hua IV, 199. 25 See Hua XLI, 157, where Husserl discusses the nature of ,,a priori possible subjects“ (ll priori mogliclaenSub/ieleten). See also ]oona Taipale: TwofoldNormality. Husserl and the Normative Relevance of Primordial Constitution. In: Husserl Studies 28 (2012). 49-60; and Joona Taipale: Phenomenology and Embodiment. Husserl and the Constitution of Subjectivity. livanston 2014. Joona Taipale Similarity.uu|.isyumm~uv anticipations necessarily pertains to our experience of others. Namely, if the other is to be recognized as an other, he or she must at least be grasped as being related to that same perceptual environmentthat I myself already am related, and hence to the environment that is constituted for me as being therefor anybody. If this requirement is not met at all, the otherwould not be experienced as being related to the same world, and it is even questionable we could, in such cases, recognize the other as another experiencing being at all. Be that as it may, this hardly captures our normal everyday experience of others. Rather, regardless of how extensively the other surprises us and exceeds our expectations (as he or she always more or less does), the other cannot surprise us in absolutely every instance and still be experienced as another perceiver for the same world. Ratherthan being able to surprise us in absolutely every instance, the other is posited as being related to the environment like we are, and this anticipated similarity must be confirmed, to some extent, in the subsequent course of our empathic experience. If it is not, thenrather than grasping an infinitely diffethat other, had taken we be an other. In something to grasp mistakenly rent we this sense, owing to its transcendentaI—intersubjectivefoundations, empathicperception harbors a similarity tbesis: a tacit expectation of the other as a more or less similarlyequipped perceiver for the same world. To be sure, this thesis can never be fulfilled completely and altogether insofar as we are grasping precisely an otber, and yet it must always be fulfilled to some extent insofar as we are grasping precisely anotherperceiver for tbe same world. On these grounds I claim that it is necessarilythe case that the concrete other at least partly fills the place, or occupies the ,,seat“, that our perception always already tacitlyand a priori reserves to anybody. That is to say, when others actually stand out in my perceptual field due to their peculiar style of movement, already do so as co-perceivers for the environmentthat is primordially constituted for me; the other is discovered as another perceiver for the environment in which he or she is disclosed to me in the first place. It is just that this initial, empty, and anticipatory grasp can be verified (or falsified) only in the subsequent course of experience. rities with myself. On the contrary, according lo the picllirc I have pivwiiml above, the starting point is necessarily a dissyrrzmciriuilom‘: the miller is initially '50 extent, the fulfilment of whether initially. they 5. Etbicalimplications a consequence of the mentioned foundedness, the self-other relationship is bound to emerge with an asymmetric structure. Our experience of others never sets out on a neutral ground or symmetrical soil, and neither can the other initially appear to me as absolutely different, infinitelydistant from everythingthat I myself am, and hence only gradually becoming realized as having certain simila- As HI posited as similar, and realized as different only subsequently and gimliinlly and perhaps never completely. As Husserl summarizes: ,,l):1s ciiigcliililtc Ich ist leer, zunachst Analogon meines Ich“.2" ,,Die Einfiihlung, die Appriiseiitatimi fremdsubjektivenSeins, ist eine analogisierende Apperzeption. Ich verstehe den Anderen, und zwar als meinesgleichen. Das wird korrigiert, wird gemindcrt, — wird erhoht etc. Es wird zu einem Ahnlichkeitsrahmen,in dessen Mitte ich stehc als das passend abzuwandelnde Urbild. Und so verstehe ich das Kind, ebenso das Tier, und dann komme ich immer wieder darauf, dass das F ehler ergibt, dass das so nicht geht und ich es (ver)fehle im Handeln“.27 As Husserl here stresses, I indeed come to realize that the other experiences thingsdifferently,and this rc— alization has major constitutive effects on my world—experience, but all this can happen only afterl have already constituted the other as a subject who is experientially related to the world that already appears to me. In short, realizing the otherness of the other necessarilytakes time. Whilethe ,,similaritythesis“ provides empathywith a point of departure, and in this sense enables the latter, it also seems to introduce empathy with some important limitations. An obvious set of questions concerns ethical implications. If empathy is indeed asymmetric and in this sense biased by essence, what role does it in fact play and what role should it ideallyplay in our encounter with others? Can ethical appreciation of the alterity of the other be a matter of empathy at all, or is something else required for that? In the light of what I have said above it seems that appreciating the otherness of the other cannot be a matter of empathicexperience, but rather somethinglike empathicappreciation or respect. Let me consider this more closely. While it is clear thatthe status of our own experiences as the ,,primal frame of reference“ will be put into question in the subsequent course of experience," it nevertheless holds that insofar as we are to experience the other as another subjectivity for the same environment that we ourselves experience the other must fill in the slot of the anybody that we so to speak reserve for them beforehand. To be sure, our expectations concerning others always remain to some cx— tent dis—appointed, and this disappointment is exactly what motivates us to rea1« lize that the other is precisely an otber and not exclusively what we expected. — — Hua XLI, 341. Hua Mat VIII, 105. In another passage Husserl even puts it in this way: ,,Das Gru ndmall aller Einfiihlung ist der sich selbst in psychophysischer Selbsterfahrung im Gesamtrahmcn oh jektiver Erfahrung erfahrende Mensch mit seiner original erfahrenen Innenleiblichkeitund In nengeistigkeit“ (Hua XLI, 358 f.). 23 Hua XIV, 132; Ms. D 13 I, 233a. 2*‘ 27 '55 Joona Taipale Similarity aiitl 315)/l11l1l('l ry Consequently we are forced to revise our expectations concerning others, and of what one presupposes and structurally posits. 'l'li'.1t is to say, to recognize the dissymmetrical structure of empathy,where the other is assumed ‘to experiencing the world in a familiar manner and thus having familiar experiential abilities,does not destroy the possibilityof ethics, but provides the latter with a point of departure.” In this manner, the transcendental-intersub]ective foundedness of empathy is highly relevant for the ongoing discussion concerning the grounding of ethics. However, linking what I have presented here more extensively with this ongoing discussion exceeds the limits of this article. 152 this at once also alters the manner in which we grasp the world that we share with the other. And yet, in each moment, our empathic grasp of others involves tacit anticipations (although partly corrected ones) concerning how the other experiences the world, that again are bound to remain partly dis-appointed and partly verified in the subsequent course of experience. To repeat my point, even though the similarity thesis is never met altogether insofar as we are grasping precisely an other, it is nonetheless necessarilymet more or less insofar as we are grasping a co—subject for a shared world. In this sense, regardless of the established corrections, the empathicallygrasped other is bound to fill our expectations to some extent. This brings us to questions of ethics. One the one hand, as I have repeatedly stressed, there is no denying that others exceed our expectations; they are unique and singular beings, and in their novelty,alterity and otherness they are destined to manifest attributes, ways of thinking,and motivational structures that constantly defy and challenge our empathic experiences of them. On the other hand, the asymmetrical structure of empathy is not somethingthat we can overcome with a change of attitude: if we consider the other as purely incomprehensible, infinitely distant from anything we are familiar with, and in all ways incomparable to us, we simply ignore the similarity thesis, instead of overcoming it. After all, as I have argued, already while recognizing the other as such, we already tacitly posit him or her with a relation to the environment that we also experience, to the environment in which we discover the other in the first place. If so, then our appreciation, respect, and recognition of the other’s otherness rather paradoxicallyrequire that we partly build on the assumption of the other’s similarity. If asymmetry is an irreducible and essential element of the self-other relationship, as I have tried to argue here from transcendental grounds, empathy accordingly introduces us with a constant ethical challenge. In the course of experience, the anticipated similarity of the other is partly confirmed and partly renounced, and we are summoned to balance between reliance on confirmation and acknowledgmentof renunciation. As I see it, it is not by denying, repressing, or ignoring the similarity thesis that characterizes empathy,providing the self-other relationship with an asymmetric structure, but by openly facing and acknowledging it, that ethical relationships can be established. In the picture that I have here presented, the otherness of others is not an experiential starting point, but rather something to be pursued in the course of time. The most efficient way of treasuring and safeguarding the alterity of the other accordingly resides in taking a critical stance toward ourselves. As Husserl might put it. ethics is founded on ,,self—responsibility“ and ,,self-renewal“: it is .1 nmttcr of living aware _ phenomenological 6. Concluding notes I have here highlighted the relevance of the transcendental-intersubjective foundedness of empathyby elaborating some of its most crucial consequences. I star- ted off by scrutinizing what I termed the similaritythesis, thenlinked it withthe foundedness of empathy in transcendental intersubjectivity, and argued thatthe self-other relationship is bound to have an asymmetric structure because of this foundedness. On the one hand, I focused on explaining how the other is initially posited similar to oneself, and accordinglytacitly expected to prove so in the further course of experience, whereas on the other hand I emphasized that our expectations concerning others are bound to become dis-appointed more or less extensively. I accordinglysuggested that the otherness of the other can only be discovered in the course of time, whereas initially the other is necessarily anticipated as being able to perceive and experience the same things and events that we do. Our own experiential relation with the environsame meanings the which other, too, is discovered) functions as the starting point, ment (in how other’s are expenorm, and measure while building expectations concerning other emerges as a corientiallyrelated with the environment. That is to say, the subject for the same world, and as such the other is initially prefigured in the light of our subjective experiential potentialities, and can therefore be grasped as different only from a temporal distance. To be sure, this is only one side of the coin. We also learn from others, and consequently thesituation becomes more complex. Yet, as I have tried to illustra— — ,,phenomenological allies" Z9 In this sense, as Overgaard argues, Husserl and Levinas are critique of Husserl. In: Heinamaii. rather than opponents (see Siaren Overgaard: On the Nordic Ruin, Zahavi [eds.]: Metaphysics, Facticity, Interpretation. HusRudolf Bernet: s also 138. critique 115see 2004. Dordrecht 116; Countries. Levinas serl. Transl. by Dale Kidd. In: Critchley, Bernasconi [eds.]: The Cambridge Companion to Levinas. Cambridge 2004. 82-99). Levinas’ Phenomenology of. Joona Taipale 154 te, the asymmetrical structure of empathy remains. We always approach others with a range of tacit anticipations whether arising purely from our own subjectivity or from what we have already learned from others. These anticipations necessarilybot}; prefigure our empathicgrasp of others and are more or less dis— appointed in our interpersonal experiences. That is to say, like thing—perception,empathytoo is characterizedby the peculiarity that we assume more thanwhat is actually given. This ,,violence“3° is not something we can altogether get rid of no more than we are able to treating material things only with respect to the facets and features that are actually perceived at the moment. This is the ,,price“ for there being whole things and other people for us, as Merleau—Pontyputs it.“ It is our dis-appointed presuppositions thatforce us to encounter the othernessof the other in the first place; true intersubjectivity arises from dis-appointment. It is dis—appointment thatmakes it possible for us to realize and reflect upon this bias or violence in empathy,to take it into account, and hence to build an ethical relationship with the other. As goes without saying, this is not something one can establish once and for all; ethical take on others lives from constant renewal of one’s own assumptions: self-re— sponsibility. If the argument that I have here pursued is sound and well-founded, there is much more to be said of the Husserlian account of empathy. The idea of transcendental foundedness of empathy raises many issues that have not been properly considered in the tradition of Husserlian phenomenology,and it casts new light on the role and status of empathy in our interpersonal life. The important and unharnessed resources are relevant not only from the point of view of ethics, but also from the point of view of the debates on social cognition, interpersonal understanding, and intercultural encounters. 3° 3‘ Merleau—Ponty:Phenomenology of Perception. 421. Ibid. BU('.I|lH“..\'|'|(|'( ||HNHl'N Johannes F. M. Schick: Erlebte Wirklichlu-it. '/.mu Vvu Imllulu vuu lommluu "ll zu Emotion bei HenriBergson (Caterina '/.;1nli) . . . . . . . . . . . . Steven Crowell: Normativity and Phenomenology in I luswll .uu| Heidegger (TobiasKeiling) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . “ H! . Thomas Ebke: Lebendiges Wissen des Lebens. Zur Verschriinkung von Plessners PhilosophischerAnthropologieund Canguilhems Historischer Epistemologie (Burkhard Liebsch) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3l l . . . . . 32 I . 326 Klaus-MichaelKodalle: Verzeihung denken. Die verkannte Grundlagc humaner Verhiiltnisse (Peter Welsen) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . J. Powell (Hg.): Heidegger and Language (Diego D’Angelo) . . . . . . . . . . . Theodor Lipps: Schriften zur Psychologie und Erkenntnistheorie. 4 Bande. Hg. v. Faustino Fabbianelli(Karl-Heinz Lembeck) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 33 I Phéinomenologische Forschungen Phenomenological Studies Recherches Phénoménologiques Im Auftrage der Deutschen Gesellschaft fiir phiinornenologischeForschung herausgegebenVon KARL-HEINZ LEMBECK, KARL MERTENS UND ERNST WOLFGANG ORTH unter MitwirkungVon JULIA JONAS Jahrgang 2014 PhéinomenologischeForschungen ISSN 0342 8117 © Felix Meiner Verlag, Hamburg 2015. Alle Rechte,__auch die des auszu sweisen Nach- — drucks, der fotomechanischen Wiedergabe und der Ubersetzung, vorbe alten. Dies be- trifft auch die VervielféiltigungundUbertragung einzelner Textabschnittedurch alle Verfahren wie Speicherung und Ubertragung auf Papier, Film, Binder, Platten und andere Medien, soweit es nicht 53 und 54 URG ausdriicklich estatten. Druck und Bindung: Druckhaus Beltz, Bad Langensalza. Werkdruckpapier: a terungsbestéindig nach ANSINorm resp. DIN—ISO 9706, hergestcllt aus 100 % chlorfrei gebleichtem Zellstoff. Printed in Germany. wwwmeirzer. dc/plmefo FELIX MEINER VERLAG HAMBURG