Adana and Beyond: Revolution and Massacre
in the Otto111an Empire Seen
Througrh- Dll.nish Eyes, 1;908/9
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ADANA AND BEYOND:
REVOLUTION AND MASSACRE
IN THE OTTOMAN EMPIRE
SEEN THROUGH DANISH EYES, 1908/9
MATTHIAS BJ0RNLUND
matthiasb@webspeed.dk
INTRODUCTION
5 February 1909, American missionary Dr. H. N. Barnum, of the
American Board of Commissioners for Foreign Missions (ABCFM)
Euphrates College in Harput (Kharpert), wrote a letter to Baroness Sigrid
Kurck, member of the Armenia Committee of the Danish organization
WomenMissionary Workers (Kvinde/ige Missions Arbejdere; KMA).l The
subject of the letter was partly to praise Danish KMA nurse Maria
Jacobsen in her capacity as a member of the ABCFM staff, and partly to
express hope for the situation in the Ottoman Empire after the Young Turk
(Committee of Union and Progress; CUP) revolution of 1908: "Of course,
we all rejoice in the new regime. There are many difficulties in the
way to the full realization of the new liberties which have been
granted, but I hope that these will be overcome gradually. The
prejudices of centuries, along with the want of preparation among
the people for self-government, will require much time and patient
effort, but the beginning is most hopeful.,,2
Many of Barnum's contemporaries, including many of his colleagues,
made similar expressions of hope and rejoicing. During the reign of Sultan
Abdiilhamid II, Protestant missionaries in particular had been viewed as
subversive elements, but now they could suddenly experience being called
'pioneers of progress' by Young Turks, as well as being invited as
speakers at meetings in Young Turk clubs in places like Harput,3 a town
where people, Armenians and Turks, Christians and Muslims, were singing
in the streets when the Sultan was overthrown in 1908, as recalled by
Armenian genocide survivor Sarkis Khachatrian.4
But one series of event in particular would shake the faith in the
Young Turk project of many among groups ranging from missionaries and
relief workers to Ottoman Armenians. That was the 1909 Adana massacres
or pogroms, also known as the 'Cilician Vespers' (an allusion to the
'Sicilian Vespers,' the massacre of thousands of French in 1282),5 the
'Adana holocaust,'6 or simply, as some who witnessed or survived the
blunt and numbing trauma of murder and plunder would call it: 'When the
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buffalo went mad.'7 It was a shocking series of events marked by the
utmost brutality that ensured they were widely noticed, commented on, and
analyzed around the world, including in Denmark.8
Although, for instance, cooperation between the Armenian Dashnak
(Tashnag) Party (Armenian Revolutionary Federation; ARF) and the CUP
continued,9 the two waves of massacres in and around Adana, Cilicia, in
April 1909 came to signify a notable and ominous development after the
1908 Young Turk revolution that had restored the liberal 1876 Constitution
and promised justice, fraternity, and equality, and had seemed to many to
herald a new age of brotherhood and peaceful coexistence. Some 2030.000 Armenians,lo mainly adult males, together with two US
missionaries, were slaughtered or burned to death by mobs of Turks and
Kurds with the participation of the local authorities and the army,
massacres that were initiated but not completed during the brief spell
between the 'reactionary' countercoup of 13 April to 24 April when the
Young Turks took back power.
II
It still does not seem clear if, or to what extent, (parts of) the CUP
leadership were (co-) responsible for the massacres.12 Local MuslimChristian tensions and antagonism, economic motives (i.e., the looting of
Armenian property), as well as an 'Armenian rebellion,' have at times been
blamed.13But many, if not most contemporary observers and present-day
scholars tend to underline that the main culprits were Sultan Abdtilhamid
and/or elements among the 'counter-revolutionaries.'14 They organized the
1909 massacres as a means to, among other things, provoke outside
intervention and discredit or humiliate the CUP in the eyes of the general
population and the Western world by killing Armenians who were widely
seen as representing the ideas behind and benefitting from the 1908
revolution.IS Also, the aim was to "diminish the number Of,,,16"teach a
lesson to,,,17or simply crush the Christian Armenians who were viewed by
many Islamists and conservatives ('Old Turks') as well as by Turkish
nationalists as a particularly assertive, prosperous, or subversive groUp.18A
British February 1909 report actually describes how such an Islamist
reaction to liberalism and religious equality had been taking shape since
the autumn of the previous year, resulting in disturbances and widespread
rumors of impending massacres.
19
But despite the fact that many saw Armenians as a group as supporters
or even symbols of the liberal constitution that was re-introduced by the
Young Turks in 1908, there is also strong evidence that at least partly
implicates local, perhaps also national, CUP members, cadres, and police
and regular armed forces loyal to the CUP.20This seems especially to have
been the case during the second round of massacres. In the words of
British historian Christopher Walker.
126
During the period of the killings of 13-16 April the Young Turks had
been ousted from power in Constantinople, and the reactionary regime had
been reinstated. But on 24 April, as a result of the march on the capital by
the 'Action Army' headed by Mahmud Shevket, the parties loyal to the
constitution again seized power, and compelled sultan Abdul Hamid
(whom they suspected of complicity in the counter-revolution) to go into
exile in Salonika. One of the first actions of Mahmud Shevket was to order
two regiments of Rumeliot troops - crack Young Turk soldiers - from
Beirut and Damascus to Adana. But shortly after their arrival, at dusk on
25 April, further bloodshed and fire began in the city, perpetrated in a more
thorough and brutal manner than before. A Turkish version held that the
initial firing of the second outbreak came from the Armenian quarter on the
troops' encampment. But on inspection this was found to be physically
impossible. An alternative explanation for the outbreak was that some
Turks dressed up as Armenian revolutionaries, and, declaring that a
revolution had begun, opened fire. What followed was that the Rumeliot
troops opened fire on the Armenian quarter, and, in the words of H.
Charles Woods (who visited Adana soon after these events), 'for a time at
any rate took part in the looting of houses and the killing of innocents' .21
Interestingly, newly published German diplomatic reports, containing
a wealth of important, detailed information on central aspects of the
countercoup and the Adana massacres, strongly support the assertion that
troops deployed by the CUP were crucial perpetrators, even instigators, of
the wave of massacres that took place 24-27 Apri1.22
NEWSPAPER COVERAGE IN DENMARK
In Denmark, newspapers and periodicals covered the 1908/9 events
quite closely. Humorous papers would print caricatures of the sultan, an
ever popular object of ridicule and contempt, especially since the 1890s
massacres of 100.000 Armenians or more. One of the caricatures, from
1909, depicts the now deposed despot as a tired, beaten man, thrown out of
his palace, with skulls at his feet, surrounded by his harem and leaning
against a portrait of the German Kaiser Wilhelm II, his old ally.23
Generally, most welcomed the 1908 revolution and the defeat of the
counter-revolution, with the exception of, for instance, the more cynical
among conservative observer who saw in the CUP but another example of
the triumph of idealistic, but incompetent and dangerous, liberal nationalist
theoreticians.24
Often, the revolution, counter-revolution, ensuing massacres, and their
aftermath made it to the front page of the daily newspapers, with a
predominance of sometimes conflicting or confusing news agency
127
.
telegrams during or immediately after the April massacres, supplemented
with more in depth analyses, reports, and eyewitness accounts over the
following months.25While there would eventually be little if any doubt
expressed in the Danish press about the scope and severity of the Adana
massacres, and little doubt that Armenians were the sole or main victims26
and Turks/Kurds/Muslims the perpetrators, interpretations of other
fundamental aspects of the events could vary widely, quite often in
accordance with the paper's fundamental values or political affiliations.
The following brief analysis of the coverage by two very diverse, but (to
various degrees) ideologically committed dailies will serve to illustrate that
point.
As was the case during the 1890s Hamidian massacres as well as the
Armenian genocide, Kristeligt Dagblad (Christian Daily) tended to
emphasize religious aspects of the persecution and destruction of
Armenians - a tendency that was of course to some extent related to the
paper's explicit and predominant Christian values.27 But this did not
exclude nuanced analyses, or, for instance, the publication of eyewitness
accounts by neutral observers who might emphasize other aspects. 11 June
1909, a lengthy article based on an account by German Berliner
Tageblatt's special correspondent described in grueling detail the slaughter
of Armenians in Adana, with an emphasis on mob rule, desperate
resistance, and troops deployed by the CUP as co-perpetrators/8 while this
27 August 1909 article with new information on the scope and background
of the massacres made it to the front page, describing a well-planned
political assassination on a big scale:
The number of dead seems to be much larger than what was
originally believed. According to the exact calculation 1.000
Mohammedans and 21.000 Armenians have been killed,
including 5.000 in Adana and the rest in the surrounding region
where many villages and farms have been destroyed. Although
the bloodbath has not been as encompassing as in 1895, it is,
however, horrible enough to create outrage in every
compassionate heart. This is because one must not be deceived
by the allegations that are raised against the Armenians after
each such bloodbath, namely that they have brought their
misery upon themselves. This time they were accused of having
rejoiced too noisily over the introduction of constitutionalism,
something that should have awoken the anger of the Turks. But
were not people rejoicing over the Constitution everywhere in
the Turkish Empire? One should simply recall how the Jews in
Jerusalem celebrated the introduction of the new form of
government. [...] To this it can be added that what happened in
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Adana was not a sudden outburst of passion among the people.
The massacres were meticulously prepared; several weeks in
advance the Kurds, posing as 'harvesters,' had travelled to the
Armenian towns, and with the help of coded telegrams from
Yildiz [Yildiz Kiosk, the Sultan's palace in Constantinople, MB]
the day of the bloodbath had been decided, that which had not
only been planned for the Armenians but also for the Young
Turks leaders, and which they only avoided by happy
coincidence. It was political assassination on a big scale, this
the final great bloody accomplishment of the old regime, in every
sense a parallel to the 1895 bloodbath.29
The socialist daily Social-Demokraten (The Social Democrat) had
been generally positive toward the 1908 CUP revolution like most other
Danish papers at the time, including Kristeligt Dagblad.30In the case of
Social-Demokraten, the paper's support for the Young Turks was
sometimes merely lukewarm, not just because of, for instance, what was
explicitly seen as the excessive brutality the CUP used to suppress
opposition in the wake of the countercoup - like when a 4 May 1909
article described public mass executions that were part of the "horribly
barbaric methods with which the Young Turks continue their
cleansing operation among the reactionaries." The article concluded
with the cautionary note that "[t]his spectacle reeks of the darkest
Middle Ages in the middle of the Young Turk regime's preparations
for the march of Western European culture into Turkey:03l
Social-Demokraten was far from being alone in detecting such early
signs of a reversal to the brutal era of Abdiilhamid or worse.32But what
was indeed more pronounced in the paper's coverage of the 1908/9 events
was a basic criticism of the CUP that was based on particular socialist
analyses. Such analyses led the paper to view the Young Turks as
(relatively) 'progressive,' but, after all, not 'true' but only 'bourgeois'
revolutionaries who roughly belonged to the same category as the
instigators of the 1789French Revolution.33
The socialist worldview of Social-Demokraten also thoroughly
influenced the paper's explicit and fundamental anti-clericalism in the
tradition of much of the contemporary left-wing press. This was clearly
expressed 16 April 1909, in a front page attack on the counterrevolutionaries who had declared full implementation of Muslim Sharia
($eriat) law one of their main goals34: "In good harmony with the
actions of the clergy all over the world and of all religions, the
Mohammedan priesthood has enthusiastically given assistance of
the lowest kind to the forces of reaction." According to the paper,
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besides from the Muslim clergy the 'forces of reaction' consisted mainly of
"the darkest elements of the Sultanate and of capitalism," crucially aided
by what seems to be regarded here as sort of an Ottoman equivalent to the
Marxist human category lumpenproletariat ('raggedy' or 'rabble'
proletariat), the allegedly ignorant, marginalized, often criminal bottom of
society that has no class consciousness and can thus be easily manipulated
and used as a power base by those very 'forces of reaction. ,35
Even the variant of Armenophobia expressed on the front page of
Social-Demokraten, 30 April 1909, seems to have been an early example
of a racist negative stereotype-made-' scientific' that was at least partly
influenced by a certain branch of Marxist thinking - the widespread variant
of the comprador or 'middleman' thesis which tends to brand groups like
Jews, Greeks, and Armenians as unscrupulous, provocative, parasitic,
bourgeois categories of people who allegedly act as agents of international
capitalism and imperialism, thus preventing (a certain 'progressive')
economic development from taking place in, for instance, the Ottoman
Empire.36 In a background article on Turkey, the Motley Empire,
Armenians and other Ottoman Christian 'races' were once again
designated as cold, calculating, dishonest business-minded people, this
time with the twist that they belonged to an economic class who exploited
what was described as the "honest" and "easygoing" Turks. But
Armenophobia did not keep Social-Demokraten from publishing reports
and cables describing in no uncertain terms the fate of Armenians, like the
following on Horrible Massacres in Asia Minor, from the same 30 April
1909 edition:
Mersina, 29 April. On Saturday, 2 Turkish regiments were
disembarked. The soldiers immediately marched to Adana.
During the night between Sunday and Monday they have
instigated a horrible bloodbath of the local Armenians and set
their houses on fire - 1,000 Armenians have been burned alive,
and the fleeing Armenians were shot down by the soldiers. In
the Adana province it has been estimated that 30,000 people
have been killed.The material losses are enormous.
MASSACRES AVERTED
Besides from the massacres that did take place in the Adana region, a
number of Danish and other eyewitnesses asserted that these massacres
were to be part of a far more widespread scheme concocted by 'counterrevolutionaries.' Apparently, atrocities were carried out, prepared, averted
through self-defense, prevented, anticipated, or feared from Konia and
Cesarea (Kayseri) to Kessab, Urfa, Alexandretta (Alexandrette;
Iskenderun), and beyond.37A main leader of the troops loyal to the CUP,
130
General Mahmud Shevket Pasha (Mahmut ShevketlCevket Pasa), even
asserted that Christians in Constantinople (Istanbul) were about to be
attacked by the 'reactionaries' as - or, according to some sources, if - his
CUP troops were marching into the capital.38 Some of the rumors of
massacres were probably just that: rumors. But others seem clearly to be
much more substantial. According to Danish KMA missionary Jenny
Jensen, a massacre of Armenians and missionaries of Mezreh (Elazig) and
Harput was planned to take place 26 April 1909. Jensen believed this to
have been part, not of Young Turk central or local policy, but of
Abdiilhamid's short-lived counter-revolution. Jensen and other Western
eyewitnessescontended that the otherwise conservative vali of the vi/ayet
of Mamouret-ul-Aziz hesitated in carrying out the orders from
Constantinopleuntil later that same day, when the orders were retracted
after news of the final deposition of the Sultan reached the vali by
telegram.39Perhaps the reason for the vaWs hesitation was, to paraphrase
Sir Edwin Pears, that he was one of the 'reactionaries' who chose not to
carty out his orders before he had seen which side in Constantinople would
win.40
Jenny Jensen's version of the events in Harput and Mezreh is largely
supported by the British archeologist (and Armenophobe) Gertrude Bell,
who was staying in those towns at the time, and in US missionary Grace
Knapp's collection of accounts, The Tragedy of Bitlis.41Furthermore, in a
6 May 1909 handwritten letter, Wilhelmine Griinhagen, leader of Emaus,
the Danish orphanage for Armenian children in Mezreh, described in detail
to Elise Blredel of Danish KMA' s Armenia Committee how she
experiencedthe events:
It has been troubled here for a long while and it has seemed as
if it was becoming more and more serious for each day. The
second to last Monday, then, Baron [Mr.] Ruben came up to me,
pale as a corpse, and said, "Mama, I have to tell you something
that will make you very sad. Today is as bad as it has ever
been. The shops are closed, and there is a [one illegible word]
at the town square, and this afternoon the massacres might
start. It is necessary that you send a message to the consul
asking him to send us protection." I was of course aware of the
seriousness of the situation, but at the same time I was
surprisingly calm. I promised B. Ruben to send a message to
Mr. [one illegible word, six letters, starts with an S], who had
taken over management [of the local German mission] while
Brother [Johannes] Ehmann had left with Mr. [Friedrich]
Schuchardt. Brother [?] acted in a very wrong way, though. But I
tell this only to the Committee, and I do not want them to tell it to
131
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...
others. He laughed at it all and said that there was no [four
illegible words] than normal. The Armenians, they were always
scared, and now we too were going at it, we could be absolutely
calm because he had been seeing the consul and he had
promised to send a message immediately if something should
happen.
Sister Anna [Jensen, Danish-German DH missionary] told me
this when she came home from Mr. [?], I had indeed asked her
to go to Mr. [?], I insisted that there had to be a danger, and I
was very cross at Brother [?] that he could take it so lightly. The
little ones we kept home from school, and they cried, of course,
and were scared although they did not understand much of it all.
The big children went to school in a serious mood; I think they
were slightly comforted knowing (because they think that the
Turks do not dare break into the orphanages) that they were
more secure than others. B. Ruben could not understand the
answer sent by Brother [?], but said, "Do you have a big German
flag we can raise?" I did not, I did not feel like making one either,
I would much rather make a big Danish one that signified that
we were protected by the Cross. But, you know, we cannot
always get what we want, and I quickly made a big German flag,
luckily we had both red and white and black clothes in the
house; shortly after it was finished I got a message that I should
definitely not raise it.
The afternoon was spent with quietly expecting something to
happen today. Then between 4 and 5 a telegram arrived, "the
Sultan has been toppled." How great a God we have; in the nick
of time, when it really looked like the bloodbath was about to
begin, God, our Father, removed the man who, before the hour
of God had arrived, would start a war that would be as awful as
anything. Imagine, his single last wish was to send a telegram to
all his Valis ordering them to start massacring all Christians, all
missionaries, they were supposed to go first, no one was to be
spared, houses and everything were to be destroyed, it did not
matter what nation the missionaries belonged to. Here. a lot of
Kurds were gathered, they had been distributed to all the small
towns so that they were immediately ready when the Vali gave
the order. I think you can understand that we are full of thanks
and praise. Would you believe it, our Vali had the order, but he
held it back, we do not think it is purely out of concern for our
well-being, but rather out of intelligence. Because what would
have happened when it was learned that missionaries from
132
England, America, and Germany had been killed without mercy.
[...]
It was quite strange that the very day we had expected a
massacre we ended up seeing flags raised to honor the new
King [sic], men rode around the towns and shouted it out, "the
Sultan has been deposed, we have a new one." The next day
there was to be a party everywhere; the houses were decorated
and illuminated in the evening. We had 6 Turkish flags made
and bought colored lamps, and in the evening we strolled
around with more than 30 children to look at all the decorations.
How all things can suddenly change. Only few Turkish houses
were decorated, many Turks want the old Sultan back; it is far
from calm here though the immediate danger has passed.
Imagine it was not until early Friday we learned how great a
danger we had been in. When Brother [?] had been with the
consul on Monday, the consul had said that he expected news
of the outbreak of massacres any minute, and he knew that the
missionaries would be the first to go, he invited Brother [?] with
his family to stay with him, but he could not accept this as leader
of the station. In order not to scare us he laughed at us and
pretended nothing was wrong. I think he has treated us like little
children, but I will not say more about this. God protected us all
so lovingly, if only we could learn what our dear Father wants to
teach all His children, to trust Him completely [...].42
In Malatia, about 100 Ian southwest of Mezreh, it appears that a
massacreof the city's 20.000 Annenians had also been planned. According
to German missionaries from Ernst Jakob Christoffel's Christlichen
Blindenmission im Orient (Christian Blind Mission), Annenians and
missionaries were warned previous to the planned attacks of the
government-controlledKurdish militias that they were put on death lists by
the authorities, a plot that was seemingly only averted by the actions of a
local CUP officer.43Danish KMA missionary Jensine 0rtz (Jensine Oerts
Peters), who worked alongside Christoffel in Malatia, adds that when the
Kurdish militias entered the city they gathered, as was customary, at the
market place to await orders. But since whom 0rtz calls the "resident
governor," probably the local kaimakam, had died the night before, no
orders came, and the CUP officer took command and ordered that no
Christians were to be harmed. However, according to 0rtz, the officer was
not rewarded for his deeds by the CUP when they regained control; rather,
he was imprisoned until local Annenians and Germans managed to have
him released and sent away for safety.44Seen in connection with the fact
133
that most of the many known killers of Armenians in Adana remained
unpunished, this treatment of a protector of Armenians was regarded as a
sign of how little value even the new, purportedly democratic and tolerant.
CUP government ascribed to an apparently still despised minority.
In Syria, Danish Eastern Mission (@sterlandsmissionen; 0M) doctor
Rudolf Christian Fox Maule, descendent of a Scandinavian branch of an
old French-Scottish noble family, experienced an equally tense atmosphere
during those same April days.4sAccording to the Danish doctor, massacres
of Christians in Damascus and elsewhere had been planned by 'Old Turks'
as part of a nationwide scheme of which the Adana massacres were only a
part, and had the Young Turks been held up for 3-4 more days before retaking power in Constantinople, "we would have witnessed one of the
mosthorrifyingspectaclesin the historyof the world":
.
In Damascus, the signal for the massacre was the same as in
1860, i.e. that all convicts should break out of the prisons and
start murdering Christians. A number of officers and soldiers
who sided with the Young Turks had learned about the plans
and were posted with loaded rifles near the prisons in order to
shoot down any and all prisoner who would try to break out. [...)
Even here in our otherwise peaceful country district, far away
from the big cities, people were ready to slaughter 'the infidels.'
The Mohammedans of the mountain villages were one night
ready to attack one of our stations, Jabned [Jabrud; Yabrud), a
town of 7-8,000 inh~bitants, Mohammedans and Christians, and
another night had been set for massacres here in Deratije [Dayr'
Atiyah; Dair Atiah). Afterward, we have learned everything
through the Mohammedans who are friendly toward Christians,
and the Kaimakan himself, i.e. the mayor, of the town Nebk [AnNabk; Kalamun), which lies about one hour's horseback ride
from here, has admitted to us that there would have been great
danger all over the country for serious disturbances to take
place had not the Young Turks been victorious.46
Theseevents in one of the Arab regions of the Empire are arguably an
under-researched topic. It has been asserted in a recent publication that,
besides from the Adana massacres, simultaneous "[o)utbreaks of violence
against Christians also broke out in Damascus, Aleppo, Mosul, and
Beirut as Bedouins, Arabs, and Kurds took up arms against their
religious foes."47Also, contemporaryGermandiplomaticreportsdescribe
how Christians would close shops in anticipation of massacre in the
Aleppo region,48 and, more substantially: German vice-consul at Jaffa,
Rossler, reported 26 April 1909 to Reichskanzler (Imperial Chancellor, i.e.
134
head of government) Bernhard von BUlow in Berlin that he had learned
from a reliable source that three emissaries from what he dubs the
reactionarygovernment in Constantinople had arrived in Beirut in order to
incite the Muslim population there as well as in Damascus, Hauran, and
Kerak (along the Mecca railroad in the south) against the CUP and the
Christian ideas they allegedly represented.49 Regarding Damascus, the
local US consular agent, Meshaka, reported that shortly after the
countercoup in the capital some thousands of armed members of the
Mohammedan Union gathered at a square in Damascus with the intention
of, among other things, killing members of the CUP: "A threat of military
action by the commandant induced them to disperse, but there was
nonethelessa panic among the Christians 'for the Moslems in their
war songs mentioned that the Moslem religion was one of the sword
and that being once again victorious, the Christian religion must
give way. ,"50
This still leaves doubt whether the outbreaks of violence and general
unrest that did in fact take place in the Arab regions were, in essence,
largely spontaneous, uncoordinated acts motivated by religious
chauvinism,devotion to the sultan, hatred of the CUP, and spurred on by
the countercoup. Furthermore, these acts could have been motivated by
local grievances; by news or rumors about rebellions or already ongoing
massacres of Christians elsewhere; and/or by what was widely viewed by
many Ottoman Muslims all over the Empire as an increasing and
provocativeassertiveness displayed by non-Muslim groups in the wake of
the 1908 CUP takeover. As British vice-consul H. E. Wilkie Young
reportedJanuary 1909 from Mosul in Mesopotamia, a city and a region not
quite under the control of the CUP-dominated central authorities in
Constantinople,local Christians and Jews were only tolerated "as long as
they kept their place": "Any sign of pretension to equality is promptly
repressed."51
But if the abovementioned unrest and the averted massacres of
Christiansin Syria were indeed, as it is claimed in Fox Maule's report and
elsewhere, planned, ordered by, or coordinated with central and/or local
authorities loyal to the Sultan during the short reign of the counterrevolutionaries, similar to what had been planned and/or executed in
Cilicia and Anatolia, this would add yet another dimension to the
prospectivescope of massacres of Armenians and other Christians in April
1909 besides from what observers like Wilhelmine Griinhagen reported
from regions such as Mamouret-ul-Aziz. Rossler's report, as well as the
assertion by German ambassador Von Bieberstien that massacres of
Armenians had been "prepared and ordered" from Mersin over
Alexandretta to Beirut,52seems to support that such an interpretation is
135
worthy of consideration and further research. In any case, there was
arguably widespread support in the Arab regions among both officials and
general populations for the counter-revolution and its stated goal of
Muslim supremacy,53 support which (considering the nature of the
countercoup and the legacy of local, inter-communal violence as well as of
nation-wide state-sponsored massacres many places in the Empire,
including in Beirut and beyond) could easily lead to either a large-scale
coordinated action against non-Muslim groups; 'spill over' into more or
less simultaneous yet spontaneous outbreaks of violence spurred on by
local grievances and ethno-religious chauvinism at a time of upheaval; or a
combination of both.54
HOPE AND DISILLUSION: THE AFTERMATH OF MASSACRE
The effects of the Adana massacres - more refugees, orphans, poverty
- were felt by Danish Friends of Armenians (Danske Armeniervenner;
DA) and Deutsche Orient Mission (German Mission to the Orient) relief
worker Karen Jeppe in Urfa, and by the Danish KMA missionaries in
Harput and Mezreh where Emaus received orphans such as five-year old
Lucia Arakelian from this most recent round of killings.55And for many,
this whole ordeal spelled immediate disillusion.56 But like some other
contemporary observers,57Karen Jeppe's expectations regarding the CUP
were more hopeful, at least as they were presented shortly after the
massacres in a long, detailed 31 May 1909 letter to Anders GeertJergensen - priest, progressive social activist, and later MP. The letter was
published under the emphatic headline Armenia! in the conservative
Danish daily Jyllandsposten, 26 June 1909, in order to raise further
awareness and funds for relief work in the face of the new emergency. As
an eye-witness to the Armenian genocide in Urfa, Jeppe would, however,
very explicitly and radically come to change her position regarding the
CUP, but in the summer of 1909 she still believed in the Young Turks to a
degree that she would publicly defend them:
Once again, news about massacres and horrors in Turkey reach
the ears of the European peoples. Once again, thousands have
been killed and yet more thousands have been made homeless.
This time they have not restricted themselves to killing people.
They have burned down towns and villages. The survivors are
now wandering around in the mountains, and it is their need and
misery that has moved me to reach for the pen. I dare not try to
estimate at all how many thousands are now starving. Various
numbers are given, but there are so many that it is beyond
imagination. The area that has been affected looks small on the
map, but it is actually bigger than Denmark, and it was one of
136
Turkey's most densely populated areas. I travelled through the
area a couple of years ago, and I remember so well the pretty
villages in the Amanus Mountains. The only thing that is left of
them is heaps of gravel. In those areas many of the houses are
made of wood, so they have been burned to the ground. Some
of the people have been killed, others burned to death. Those
who managed to stay alive have nothing to eat and no clothes to
wear. [...]
And the big factory towns, Adana and Tarsus, what has
happened to them? The factories have been burned, the
workers killed. Those who remained there are worse off than the
villagers. They have absolutely nothing. All of this has taken
place so close to us here in Urfa that it seems to us we have
seen it with our own eyes. We have known many of those who
were killed; we have been able to follow the details. [...]
Those massacres were the last accomplishment of Sultan Abdul
Hamid. Hopefully, he will not be able to do damage ever again.
The present government has a different view on everything.
Here in the interior, where they have succeeded in suppressing
all attempted rebellions, we have the very best impression of
them. I have read in Danish papers that their actions in
Constantinople against the vanquished are being disapproved
of. It may be that they are not beyond reproach. But we are
happy about their severity and firm hand. It was that hand that
protected Mesopotamia and Armenia proper against new
destruction. One must not forget either, that Denmark and
Turkey are not one and the same, and that desperate diseases
have desperate remedies. In any case we hope for the best.
[...]The reactionaries wanted to break the power of the Young
Turks; that is why they killed the Armenians who are the
foremost allies of the CUP. This miserable people seems to be
chosen to be the martyrs from whose blood the freedom tree of
Turkeyshallbe nourished.It is a toughdestiny
58
'The martyred people.' That was what numerous Danish observers,
from missionaries over Kristeligt Dagblad - but not Social-Demokraten to a relief worker like Karen Jeppe, would sooner or later dub the Ottoman
Armenians. Prior to WorId War I, some hoped or believed that
'martyrdom' (or, for those less inclined to use religiously charged terms:
continued oppression or destruction) could be averted through reforms.
Like so many Westerners, Danish linguist, humanist, globetrotter, and
leading member of DA, Age Meyer Benedictsen, had been optimistic
137
regarding the CUP takeover which he saw as the -culmination of a
generally progressive reaction nom large and varied parts of the Ottoman
population to the oppressive rule of Abdiilhamid and a circle of
conservative Islamists.59 He himself had travelled extensively in and
around the Ottoman Empire, and in the wake of the 1908 revolution he had
received letters nom mends and contacts in Constantinople, Van, Erzerum,
Urfa, all reporting that although acts of violence and murder still took
place, it was not as often or with the same degree of impunity as before,
"all telling about the peace that has settled upon the mind of the
farmer; he knows that the harvest he receives from the field will be
his to own. The frightened and persecuted Christians of the towns
and cities no longer need to fear prison and torture.,,60
But while Benedictsenassertedin 1909that the CUP governmentwas
not responsible for the Adana massacres, the official reaction to the
atrocities betrayed a turn once more to the worse: "In an exercise of
justice coming straight from some sort of a comic opera, the Military
Tribunal at Adana has 'perceived' the massacres perpetrated by the
Sultan and his officials as bloody street fighting between equally
guilty gangs. A number of the so-called leaders from each side have
been selected - and condemned to death. Some young Armenians
who valiantly defended the lives of their families on the one side;
some pitiful butchers of human beings among hundreds of equally
guilty on the other side.,,61Or, as Russian diplomat Anatole Nekludoff
expressed it, the Young Turk leaders expressed a "rather too obvious
mildness" in the repression and punishment of the perpetrators of the
Adana massacres.62In fact, as papers in Denmark would also report, postmassacre repression and punishment seems in many cases to have been
directed against Armenians and their institutions en bloc, with arrests of
clergy, dismissal of officials, closing of newspapers that challenged the
official position regarding the massacres, etc.63"One despotism had just
crumbled, but a new one had been founded in its place," as a liberal
Turkish observer would recall the transition from Abdiilhamid's regime to
CUP rule.64
What can be safely said in lieu of a conclusion is that regardless of the
extent of CUP involvement in the Adana massacres, the events of 1909 in
the Ottoman Empire did not bode well for the future. This is not least the
case because extreme violence with a large number of actual or, in the case
of the averted massacres, potential perpetrators directed against a
vulnerable minority, a scapegoat as it were, had once again turned out to be
a readily available remedy that was used to 'fix' or 'cure' perceived
societal ills of the political, ethno-religious, and economic kind. This does
obviously not mean that nom 1909 on, all political developments in the
138
Empire were, say, anti-democratic, authoritarian, repressive, or that
everything pointed toward disaster for Annenians and other non-Turkish
groups.
At least before the takeover of the most radical wing of the CUP in
1913,there were, for instance, signs of positive developments for many of
the Armenian refugees who had fled during or after the Hamidian
massacres. According to a comprehensive annual report written in early
1915 by Danish diplomatic minister at Constantinople, Carl Ellis Wandel,
these refugees believed the assurances given by the CUP in 1909 that the
Adana massacres were not the work of the Young Turks, they were
"merely caused by a brief period of transient anarchy"; thus, the refugees
returned to their villages where they were promised justice and security.
But as the Danish diplomat also reports, it quickly became clear that this
promise would not be kept, and that chauvinism and xenophobia were on
the rise.6SIt is not just in hindsight that it can be said that, generally
speaking, it was not justice or security that followed 1909, but renewed
impunity for mass murder, mutual distrust, and dehumanization of real or
imagined oppositional groups until such tendencies and policies reached a
climax with Wodd War I and the Annenian genocide.66
ENDNOTES
IOn KMA and on Denmark/Danes in general vis-a-vis the Ottoman Empire, the Armenian
genocide, and related issues: Matthias Bjemlund, "Before the Armenian Genocide:
Danish Missionaryand Rescue Operations in the Ottoman Empire, 1900-1914, Haigazian
Armenological Review, Vol. 26, 2006, pp. 141-156; idem, "'A Fate Worse Than Dying':
Sexual Violence during the Armenian Genocide," in Dagmar Herzog, ed., Brutality and
Desire: Warand Sexuality in Europe's Twentieth Century, Palgrave Macmillan 2009, pp.
16-58; idem, ''The 1914 Cleansing of Aegean Greeks as a Case of Violent Turkification,"
Journal of Genocide Research, Vol. 10, No.1, March 2008, pp. 41-58 (reprinted in
Dominik J. Schaller & Jfirgen Zimmerer, eds., Late Ottoman Genocides: The Dissolution
of the Ottoman Empire and Young Turkish Population and Extermination Policies,
London & New York: Routledge 2009, pp. 34-50); idem, "Karen Jeppe, Aage Meyer
Benedictsen, and the Ottoman Armenians: National Survival in Imperial and Colonial
Settings," HaigazianArmenological Review, Vol. 28, 2008, pp. 9-43; idem, "Scandinavia
and the Armenian Genocide," The Armenian Weekly, Armenian Genocide
Commemoration Special, Vol. 74, No. 16,26 April 2008, pp. 19-22 (French translation
on
http://armeniantrends.blogspot.com/2009/05/la-scandinavie-et-le-genocidearmenien.html); idem, "'When the Cannons Talk, the Diplomats Must Be Silent': A
Danish Diplomat during the Armenian Genocide," Genocide Studies and Prevention,
Vol. 1, No.2, September 2006, pp. 197-224; idem, "Denmark, the 'Armenian Question,'
and Violent Turkification in the Late Ottoman Empire," paper presented at the !NOGS
conference Genocide: The Future of Prevention, University of Sheffield, 9-12 January
2009. See also www.ermenisoykirimi.net/dansk.htm (Turkish, Danish, English). Unless
otherwise noted, all translations are the author's.
139
2 Rigsarkivet (Danish National Archives), KMA, 10.360, Pk. 13, "Armeniermissionen.
Korrespondence til og fta, Frk. Marie Jacobsen, 1907-1911", "1909". See also James L.
Barton, Daybreak in Turkey, Boston: The Pilgrim Press 1908, n. p. ("Foreword"): "To
the one who traces the entrance and development in the Ottoman empire during
the last century, of reformative ideas in the religious, intellectual, and social life of
tt)e people, the present almost bloodless revolution presents no mysteries. It is
but the fruit of the seeds of intelligence, of righteousness, and of holy ambition,
sown in good soil and now bearing fruit after their kind." On Barnum as an
eyewitness to the 1890s massacres in Harput: Edwin Munsell Bliss, Turkey and the
Armenian Atrocities, Edgewood Publishing Company 1896, pp. 428ff. On Maria
Jacobsen, see also Maria Jacobsen, Diary 1907-1919, Kharput, Turkey, Antelias,
Lebanon: Armenian Catholicosate 1979; idem, Diaries of a Danish Missionary Harpoot, 1907-1919, Princeton & London: Gomidas Institute Books 2001, ed. Ara
Sarafian, transl. Kristen [sic: Kirsten] Vind.
3 Hans-Lukas Kieser, "Some Remarks on Alevi Responses to the Missionaries in Eastern
Anatolia (19th_20thcc.)," 2000, on http://www.hist.netlkieser/pu/responses.html.
4 Verjine Svazlian, The Armenian Genocide and Historical Memory, Yerevan: Gitutiun
2004, p. 25. See also Leon Arpee, A History of Armenian Christianity: From the
Beginning to Our Own Time, New York: The Armenian Missionary Association of
America, Inc. 1946, p. 291. Incidentally, this sudden embracement by the CUP could
very well have seemed paradoxical to some missionaries, because even though they often
had a 'modern belief in progress,' missionaries usually viewed the concept of progress
with more caution than the modernist Young Turks. In the eyes of the evangelical
Christians at least, only personal salvation really mattered in the final analysis, and they
believed from viewing their own societies that progress could become not only a positive
force, like when it led to freedom from need and from religious, political, and cultural
oppression, and not least when it lead to literacy, a fundamental factor in spreading the
message of the Gospel. Progress could also lead to materialism and skepticism which
served to undermine 'authentic' Christianity: Torben Christensen, Kirkehistoriske
Afhandlinger, Copenhagen: G. E. C. Gad 1981, p. 151.
SMerill D. Peterson, Starving Armenians: America and the Armenian Genocide, 1915-1930
and After, University of Virginia Press 2004, p. 29. On the massacre of French in Sicily,
1282: Steven Runciman, The Sicilian Vespers: A History of the Mediterranean World in
the Later Thirteenth Century, Cambridge University Press 1958.
6 Z. Duckett Ferriman, The Young Turks and the Truth about the Holocaust at Adana in
Asia Minor during April 1909, London 1913; Vahakn N. Dadrian, "The Circumstances
Surrounding the 1909 Adana Holocaust," Armenian Review, Vol. 41, No.4, 1988;
Rouben Paul Adalian, "Adana Massacre," in Israel W. Charny, ed., Encyclopedia of
Genocide, Vol. I, ABC-CLIO 1999,p. 47.
7 Svazlian, p. 29.
8 For an example of a Western observer who almost demonstratively kept his faith in 'the
Turkish people'I'the Muslims' of the Empire in general well after the 1909 massacres:
Frederick Jones Bliss, The Religions of Modem Syria and Palestine, Edinburgh: T. & T.
Clark 1912, pp. 33-34.
9 Dikran M. Kaligian, "A Prelude to Genocide: CUP Population Policies and Provincial
Insecurity, 1908-14," in Schaller & Zimmerer, eds., pp. 68-69.
10As it can be seen from studying the relevant literature and sources, Armenian casualty
figures vary, but there is largely a consensus on numbers ranging from 20.000 to 30.000.
For estimates of 15-20.000 casualties: e.g. Taner Akcam, A Shamefitl Act: The Armenian
Genocide and the Question of Turkish Responsibility, New York: Metropolitan Books
140
I
~--------
2006, pp. 69-70; Bertha S. Papazian, The Tragedy of Armenia: A Brief Study and
Interpretation, Boston & Chicago: The Pilgrim Press 1918, pp. 94-95; Kevork Asian,
L 'Armenie et les Armeniens, Constantinople: Librairie Weiss 1914, p. 118. For estimates
of 30.000 or more: GeorgeHorton, The Blight of Asia: An Account of the Systematic
Extermination of Christian Populations by Mohammedans and of the Culpability of
Certain Great Powers; with the True Story of the Burning of Smyrna, London: Sterndale
Classics 2003 (1926), p. 9; Yonan Hermez Sahbaz, Islams Vrede
- En Redogorelse
Om
Turkarnes Massaker Po Kristna I Persien 1915-18, SOdertiUje:Nsibin Fl>rlag 2003
(Swedish transl. of The Rage of Islam - an Account of the Massacre of Christians by the
Turks in Persia, Philadelphia: Roger Williams Press 1918), pp. 15ff; Hayk Ghazarian,
The Genocide of the Armenian People in the Ottoman Empire, Yerevan 2005, p. 78;
Diana Agabeg Apcar, Betrayed Armenia, Yokohama: The "Japan Gazette" Press 1910, p.
51. German diplomat at the Constantinople embassy, Hans von Miquel, stated after a visit
to the Adana region that in reality the number of Armenian victims were about 40.000,
while Armenians had killed 600 Turks in self-defense: Wolfgang Gust, "Die ArmenierMassaker in Adana und Umgebung 1909. Darstellung Anhang Von Deutschen und
Britischen Dokumenten. Einfiihrung," April 2009, introduction to Emily Chorley,
Wolfgang Gust, George Shirinian, publishers, Adana 1909 - Dokumente des Deutschen
Auswartigen Amts, German and British diplomatic documents on the Adana massacres
recently published on www.armenocide.net (hereafter: Adana 1909). See also ibid., 190905-29-DE-00l, "Der Konsul in Beirut (Schroeder) an den Reichskanzler (Billow),"
including attachment (report by Hammann of the German Beirut consulate) 29 May 1909,
where German consul general at Beirut, Schroeder, and Hammann state that 40.000
Armenians had been killed, and that Young Turk soldiers, including officers, had
participated in the killings, plundering, and destruction alongside the mob. I thank
Wolfgang Gust for sharing the documents with me before they were published. On
German sources to and interpretations of the massacres, see also Norbert Saupp, Das
Deutsche Reich und die Armenische Frage 1878-1914, Koln 1990, pp. 173ff; Ernst
Jackh, Der Aufsteigende Halbmond: Auf dem Weg Zum Deutsch-Tiirkischen Biindnis,
Stuttgart: Deutsche Verlags-Anstalt pp. 133ff; Uwe Feigel, Das Evangelische
Deutschland und Armenien: Die Armenierhilfe Deutscher Evangelischer Christen Seit
Dem Ende Des 19. Jahrhunderts im Kontext Der Deutsch-Tiirkischen Beziuhungen,
Gottingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht 1989, pp. 142ff.
11Donald Bloxham, The Great Game of Genocide: Imperialism, Nationalism, and the
Destruction of the Ottoman Armenians, Oxford University Press 2005, pp. 60-62; Robert
Melson, "Provocation or Nationalism: A Critical Inquiry into the Armenian Genocide of
1915," in Richard G. Hovannisian, ed., The Armenian Genocide in Perspective, New
Brunswick: Transaction Publishers 1986, pp. 69-70; Joseph L. Grabill, Protestant
Diplomacy. and ~he N.ear Eas,t: Missionary Injluence on American Policy, 1810-1927,
Mmneapolis: UmvefSlty.ofMmnesota Press 1971, p. 50. For eyewitness accounts of the
massacres: Donald E. Miller & Lorna Touryan Miller, Survivors: An Oral History of the
12Armeni~n
Berkeley:
l!niv~rsity
ofC~lifornia
1993, pp. Genocide:
63-66.
AccordmgGenocide,
to Vahakn
N. Dadrian,
m The
HIStory of Press
the Armenian
Ethnic
Conjlic~tom the Balkans to Anatol~a.~o the Caucasus, Providence: Berghahn Books
1?97,.2 re.v.ed., p. 386, full resp~ns~b~lityfor the massacre lies with the CUP (although
hi~ discussion of ~~ ma;:sacres m. ibid., chapter 10, pp. 179-84, is more nuanced);
Richard G. Hov~isian,
Confronting the Armenian Genocide," in idem, ed., Looking
Backwar~, MOVI~gForward: Confronting the Armenian Genocide, New Brunswick:
T~sac~lO~ Publishers 200.3,p. 29, asserts that responsibility lies primarily with "an antiItthihadist msurgency by liberals and Islamists," although CUP forces were involved in
141
the massacres; while Melson, in Hovannisian, ed., 1986, p. 69, asserts that it is
questionable if the CUP are to blame. According to Hans-Lukas Kieser & Dominik J.
Schaller, "Einleitung: VOlkermord im Historischen Raum 1895-1945," in Kieser &
Schaller, eds., Der Viilkermordan den Armeniern und die ShoahlThe Armenian Genocide
and the Shoah, ZUrich: Kronos Verlag 2002, p. 17, Young Turks in the Adana region
cooperated with the perpetrators, but CUP officers elsewhere helped prevent a repetition
of the nation-wide massacres of 1894-96.
13See e.g. discussion in Vahakn N. Dadrian, Warrantfor Genocide: Key Elements of TurkoArmenian Conflict, New Brunswick & London: Transaction Publishers 2003, pp. 71-72;
Akaby Nassibian, Britain and the Armenian Question 1915-1923, London & Sydney:
Croom Helm, New York: St. Martin's Press 1984, pp. 21-22. For an assessment by a
Norwegian observer of the role of religion and economy in the massacre of Armenians,
including in Adana 1909: Anton Mohr, Kampen om Tyrkisk Asien. Bagdad-Banen,
Kristiania: Alb. Cammermeyers Forlag 1917, p. 81.
14The extent of the Sultan's control over or responsibility for the coup and perhaps, by
implication, for the subsequent massacres as going beyond the role of a mere figurehead
is disputed: e.g. S. Tanvir Wasti, "The Last Chroniclers of the Mabeyn," in Sylvia
Kedourie, ed., Turkey: Identity, Democracy, Politics, London & Portland, OR: Frank
Cass 1998,n. 36, pp. 27-28; E. J. ZOrcher,"The Ides of April. A Fundamentalist Uprising
in Istanbul in 1909?," in C. van Dijk & A. H. de Groot, eds., State and Islam, Leiden
1996, pp. 64-76. In the literature it is often (vaguely) asserted that it was "supporters of
the Sultan" who were behind the coup: e.g. Joseph R. Masih & Robert O. Krikorian,
Armenia: At the Crossroads, Harwood Academic Publishers 1999, p. xxiv; or "certain
elements from the military, the palace, and the religious establishment": Palmira Johnson
Brummett, Image and Imperialism in the Ottoman Revolutionary Press, 1908-1911, Suny
Press 2000, p. 2; or "traditionalists around Sultan Abdul-Hamid": Fatma Milge GOcek,
"Reconstructing the Turkish Historiography on the Armenian Massacres and Deaths of
1915," in Richard G. Hovannisian, ed., Looking Backward, p. 225. In "Venturing into the
Minefield: Turkish Liberal Historiography and the Armenian Genocide," in Richard G.
Hovannisian, ed., The Armenian Genocide: Cultural and Ethical Legacies, New
Brunswick & London: Transaction Publishers 2007, note 76, pp. 387-88, Bedros Der
Matossian states that "[a]ccording to the Armenian, Turkish, and Arabic newspapers
of the time the Adana massacres were perpetrated by the reactionary forces in
the Ottoman Empire. Later CUP organs blamed Abdul Hamid as the sole
instigator of the counterrevolution, which also resulted in the massacres of
Adana." See also William Miller, The Ottoman Empire, 1801-1913, Cambridge
University Press 1913,pp. 480-81; Feroz Ahmad, Turkey: The Questfor Identity, Oxford:
Oneworld 2003, p. 53; H. Jenssen-Tusch, H. Ewald, Johs. Lindbrek, H. Styrmer, eds.,
Verdenskrigen i Samtidige Skildringer, Vol. II, Copenhagen & Kristiania: Gyldendal
1916-17, pp. 240-41.
ISSee e.g. William Mitchell Ramsay, The Revolution in Constantinople and Turkey, London
1909, p. 136; popular Danish weekly journal Il/ustreret Tidende, Vol. 50, No. 32,9 May
1909, p. 386.
16Maurice Baring, Lettersfrom the Near East 1909 and 1912, London: Smith, Elder, & Co.
1913, pp. 78-79.
17 Raymond H. Kevorkian, "The Cilician Massacres, April 1909," in Richard G.
Hovannisian & Simon Payaslian, eds., Armenian Cilicia, Costa Mesa, CA: Mazda
Publishers 2008, p. 342.
142
18See e.g. Stephan H. Astourian, "Genocidal Process: Reflections on the Armeno-Turkish
Polarization," in Richard G. Hovannisian, ed., The Armenian Genocide: History, Politics,
Ethics, palgrave Macmillan 1992,pp. 65-66.
19"Extract from Annual Report for Turkey for the Year 1908. (Enclosure in dispatch from
Sir G. Lowther, No. 105 of February 1909, R. February 22, 1909)," in G. P. Gooch &
Harold Temperley, eds., British Documents on the Origins of the War, 1898-1914; Vo/.
V, The Near East. The Macedonian Problem and the Annexation of Bosnia, 1903-1909,
London: His Majesty's Stationary Office 1928, pp. 258-59: "It was at the end of
October that the first tendency towards reaction made itself sufficiently felt to
require notice in despatches. The Arabs wondered how far t~e Constitution was
in accordance with the principles of Holy Law. [...] The Armenians at Van showed
signs of arrogance and provocation, whereas the Turks were sullen, subdued,
and suspicious. Rumours were heard as the elections approached .of
contemplated massacres, none of which were however realized. Some of the
emissaries of the Committee, who were sent to Bagdad and elsewhere, went
rather far in their preaching of equality, with the result that strife was stirred up
between the different religions, and the Delegates did not seem to appreciate
that what might be good for Constantinople and the more civilized parts of Turkey
could not be applied to the remote towns and villages. The complications in the
Balkans produced their effect in encouraging critics of the Govemment. The first
overt manifestation of reaction was the posting in the Mosque of St. Sophia of
placards vilifying the Sheik-ul-Islam, and calling upon true believers to murder
him. The ringleaders of this and other similar anti-constitutional movements were
arrested, and they were to be tried and probably hanged, but nothing more has
been heard of them. There were certain factors at work directed against the
tendencies of reform. The stubborn and unyielding principle of the Moslem
religion, which though perhaps less hasty, is more fixed and unrelenting in
Turkey than in any other Mahommedan country. The idea of equality with
Christians was abhorrent to them, and there were strong evidences in the
provinces that these Moslem tendencies were coming to the fore. The crowd of
dismissed officials seemed inclined to join their ranks. The numerous strikes had
unsettled the working classes, who were prepared to present fresh demands. [...]
The police might be said to be non-existent, and it was doubtful as to how far the
military could be depended upon, especially those troops which had, under the
old regime, been living under the shadow of Yildiz in a condition of comparative
ease and luxury, thanks to the generosity of the Sultan. Moreover the attitude of
the Sultan appeared to be ambiguous, and the feast of Ramazan appeared to
offer every prospect of trouble between the strict Moslems and the adherents of
the new regime and of liberal ideas. Fears of massacres in Anatolia were almost
universal, but nothing occurred."
20Kevorkian, in Hovannisian & Payaslian, eds., pp. 339-69; Arman J.Kirakossian, British
Diplomacy and the Armenian Question, from the 1830s to 1914, Princeton & London:
Gomidas Institute 2003, pp. 303-4. See also Roderic H. Davison, "The Armenian Crisis,
1912-1914," Th~American Historical Review, Vol. 53, No.3, Apri11948, p. 482; Stanley
E. Kerr, The LIons of Marash: Personal Experiences with American Near East Relief
19~9-1922, SUNY P~ess 1973, ,Pp. 7-8;. David Brewer Eddy, What Next in Turkey:
Gilmpses of the American Board s Work In the Near East, Boston, Mass.: The American
Board 1913,pp. 31-32.
21 Christopher J. Walker, Armenia: The Survival of a Nation, rev. 2nded., London:
Routledge 1990, p. 185. According to Bloxham, p. 61, "many of the soldiers loyal to
143
the CUP who were sent to Cilicia after 24 April also took part in the massacres,
though there is no proof that this was on senior orders.. See also Kirakossian, p.
304; Helen Davenport Gibbons, The Red Rugs of Tarsus: A Woman's Record of the
Armenian Massacre of 1909, New York: The Century Co. 1917, p. 163. More on
Gibbons during the massacres: New York Times, 25 July 1909.
22 Adana 1909, e.g. reports by Richard StOckel and Franz J. GUnther of DeutschLevantinische Baumwoll-Gesellschaft m.b.H. (German-Levantine Cotton Co.), in 190905-12-DE-002, "Die Deutsche Bank (Gwinner) an das Auswiirtige Amt." For a detailed
description by German Dr. Mullerleile of a massacre of 'infidels' in the Christian village
Charne (Kharne), Adana Vilayet, that was preceded by luring the local Christians into
abandoning weapons in their possession: ibid., 1909-07-14-DE-001, "Der
Geschiiftsfilhrer in Konstantinopel (Miquel) an den Reichskanzler (Billow)."
23Blreksprutten, 1909,p. 38.
24 See e.g. Johannes 0strup, Erindringer, Copenhagen: H. Hirschprungs Forlag 1937, p.
107. As it happened, 0strup had an intimate, first-hand knowledge of the Ottoman
Empire, cultivated through journeys and research from the 1890s to the 1930s. On
0strup, a 1910 conversation with Talat Pasha, and the Armenian genocide: Bjemlund,
2006, p. 201.
25 See e.g. Frem's Aarbog over Ny Viden og Ny Virken, Vol. I, 1908-9, p. 307. On
newspaper coverage of the massacres in the contemporary Jewish press, see the chapter
''The Attitude Toward the Massacre of Armenians in the Jewish and Eretz Yisrael Press,
1894-1909," in Yair Auron, The Banality of Indifference: Zionism and the Armenian
Genocide, New Brunswick & London: Transaction Publishers 2003, pp. 122ff.
26 On non-Armenian Christian victims of the massacres: David Gaunt, Massacres,
Resistance, Protectors: Muslim-Christian Relations in Eastern Anatolia During World
War I, Gorgias Press 2006, pp. 44-45; David Wilmshurst, The Ecclesiastical
Organisation of the Church of the East, 1318-1913, Peeters Publishers 2000, p. 364.
27See e.g. Kristeligt Dagblad, 22 Apri11909.
28See also Danish conservative daily Jyllandsposten, 13 May 1909, "The Massacres in Asia
Minor", article based on detailed eyewitness account by US missionary teacher Herbert
Adams Gibbons who emphasizes, for instance, slogans cried out by perpetrators in Adana
("Turkey for the Turks" as well as "Down with the Infidels") and the role of regular and
irregular Turkish troops in the killings of Armenians.
29The number of casualties, 21.000, is most likely based on the report by Hakop Papikian
(Hagob Babikian), Armenian member of an Ottoman parliamentary commission
established to investigate the Adana massacres. In the 1909 report it is stated that of the
21.000massacredChristians,19.479wereArmenian,850 Syrian,422Chaldean.and250
Greek (probably mainly Melkite, i.e. Greek Catholic): Richard G. Hovannisian, "The
Armenian Question in the Ottoman Empire 1876 to 1914," in idem, ed., The Armenian
People from Ancient to Modern Times, Vol. II: Foreign Dominion to Statehood: The
Fifteenth Century to the Twentieth Century, Palgrave Macmillan 2004, p. 231.
30See also e.g. Illustreret Tidende, Vol. 50, No. 1,4 October 1908, pp. 11-12; No. 30, 25
April 1909, p. 362. That would often change, though, as disillusion spread after the
Adana massacres: see below, as well as, e.g., Illustreret Tidende, Vol. 50, No. 36, 6 June
1909, p. 456.
31See also Kevorkian, in Hovannisian & Payaslian, eds., p. 340.
32See e.g. Kirakossian, pp. 303-4; F. M. Leventhal, The Last Dissenter: H. N. Brailsford
and His World, Oxford University Press 1985, p. 100.
33Social-Demokraten, 22 April 1909. For a contemporary Ottoman socialist critique of the
CUP, presented in Denmark in 1910 at the Second International Socialist Congress in
Copenhagen that was hosted by the Danish Social Democratic Party, see "Annual Report
from the Socialist Workers Federation in Thessaloniki (July 1909-July 1910) to the
Meeting of the 2. International in Copenhagen," published in full in Danish as Appendix
n to Lars Nergaard, "Den Gra:ske Arbejderbeva:gelse fur 1918 og F"derationen i
Saloniki," in Lars Ba:rentzen, Lars Nergaard, Ole Langwitz Smith, Mens Vi Venter:
Studier i det Modern Grrekenlands Historie, Museum Tusculanum Press 1980, e.g. pp.
38-39: "[The CUP] works to consolidate its position and it especially favors the
Turkish population. The application of an autocratic nationalistic policy makes the
new constitution lose its Ottoman character. The counter-revolution in April
forced [the CUP] to apply restrictive methods, which made them lose the
sympathy of the liberal progressives. With the parliament under their control the
Young Turks introduced a series of restrictive police laws which violate the
Human Rights Declaration of 23 July 1908." The Saloniki Federation, as it was also
called, was founded mainly by Jewish and Slav socialists, but seems also to have had
members or allies from other groups, including Armenians, Turks/Muslims, and Greeks.
On such 'restrictive police laws' (not least Martial Law) and similar restrictive or
oppressive legislation and practices introduced after April 1909: George W. Gawrych,
"The Culture and Politics of Violence in Turkish Society, 1903-1914," Middle Eastern
Studies, Vol. 22, No.3, July 1986, pp. 322-23; Nesim Seker, "Demographic Engineering
in the late Ottoman Empire and the Armenians," Middle Eastern Studies, Vol. 43, No.3,
May 2007, p. 464; Ahmed Emin, The Development of Modem Turkey as Measured by its
Press, Columbia University 1914, pp. 98ff; W. E. D. Allen, The Turks in Europe: A
Sketch-Study, London: John Murray 1919,pp. 208-10.
34David Farhi, "The ~eriat as a Political Slogan: Or the Incident of the 31st Mart'," Middle
Eastern Studies, Vol. 7, No.3, October 1971, p. 276.
35On lumpenproletariat, see e.g. Michael Evans & Geraint Perry, Karl Marx, Routledge
2004, passim. For a largely similar negative view of the role of Muslim clergy in the
countercoup, expressed in the Viennese-based Austrian socialist daily Arbeiter-Zeitung,
14 April 1909, see Artem Ohandjanian, 1915. IrrefUtable Evidence: The Austrian
Documents on the Armenian Genocide, Yerevan 2004, p. 42. On Arbeiter-Zeitung's
coverage of the Adana massacres, and on related issues: ibid., pp. 37-46. It should be
noted that there were in fact important sections of the Ottoman Muslim clergy, most
notably the high-ranking ulema of the Society of Islamic Scholars, who opposed the
counter-revolution: Erik 1. Zilrcher, Turkey: A Modern History, London & New York: I.
B. Tauris & Co. Ltd 1997, p. 101.
36On this subject, see e.g. Hilmar Kaiser, Imperialism, Racism, and Development Theories:
The Construction of a Dominant Paradigm on Ottoman Armenians, Ann Arbor, MI:
Gomidas Institute 1997; Margaret Lavinia Anderson, '''Down in Turkey, Far Away':
Human Rights, the Armenian Massacres, and Orientalism in Wilhelmine Germany," The
Journal ~f Modem History, Vol. 79, March 2007, pp. 80-111; Mark Levene, "Port Jewry
of Salonika: Between Neo-colonialism and Nation-state," in David Cesarani, ed., Port
Jews: Jewish Communities in Cosmopolitan Maritime Trading Centres, 1550-1950,
144
145
37London & ~ortland,.OR.}rank Cass 2002, pp. 135-36.
See e.g. HIlmar Kaiser, The Ottoman Government and the End of the Ottoman Social
Forma~ion, 1915-191.1,"200 I, http://www.hist.netikieser/aghet/Essays/EssayKaiser.html;
The TI"!es, 21 Apnl 1909, in Tachat Ramavarma Ravindranthan, The Young Turk
Rev.0lutl.on- July 1908 to April 1909: Its Immediate Effects, MA Thesis, Utah State
Umverslty 1965, p. 284, where ~e author of the thesis states in addition that "[t]he
Adana massacres had been In preparation for some time, but the revolt in
-on
Available
Constantinople
ignited
the
spark",
http://ir.lib.sfu.calbitstream/1892/4710/1lbI1672420.pdf.
38Consider e.g. the following quotes and references:
For detailed descriptions of massacres allover Cilicia: Kevorkian, in Hovannisian &
Payaslian, eds., 2008, passim.
Walker, 1990, p. 186: "It appears, too, that attacks were planned throughout Asia
Minor as well as Cilicia. At Kharput there were disturbances, but the firmness of
the local governor prevented any trouble; at Kayseri a similar outbreak
threatened, but again a local official took firm action; and at Van a late snowstorm
put a blanket over the plans for killings."
Clarence D. Ussher, An American Physician in Turkey: A Narrative of Adventures in War
and Peace, Boston & New York: Houghton Mifflin Co. 1917, pp. 161-63: "But Abdul
Hamid was still the same wily old Sultan. With incessant intrigues he brought
about a reaction among the older Turks, then planned massacres in the leading
cities of the empire to discredit the new regime. The one planned for
Constantinople was prevented by the adherents of the Young Turk Party; Aintab
was saved by the determination of an officer who defied the Sultan; the Vali of
Adana was one of Abdul Hamid's supporters and for three days there was
slaughter in that city the 14th, 15th,and 16thof April, 1909. Rogers and Maurer,
two American missionaries, were killed in this massacre. The massacre in Van
was planned for the 26th.Bands of Turks armed with daggers were to be ready at
the head of each street in the bazaar or market; at the appointed moment they
were to close the gates of the market and, passing quietly without outcry or pistol
shot from shop to shop, they were to kill all the Armenians, allowing none to
escape and warn others. Having thus disposed of nearly all the able-bodied men,
they were to raise the cry that the Armenians in the Gardens were attacking the
Turkish women there in the absence of their protectors, and, enlisting the help of
the unsuspecting soldiers, they were to rush out into the Armenian quarters and
begin a slaughter which, they bound themselves by an oath, should last three
days; after that they would divide the spoil. When day dawned on the 26thof April
so violent a blizzard was raging that the Armenians did not attempt the three-mile
walk from their homes to the bazaar in the walled city, and thus were frustrated
the plans for a massacre on that day." On fear of massacre in Aintab, the Adana
massacres, etc., see also Alice Shepard Riggs, Shepard of Aintab, New York: Interchurch
Press, n. d. [c.1920], pp. 117ff.
Hilmar Kaiser (with Luther & Nancy Eskijian), At the Crossroads of Der Zor: Death,
Survival, and Humanitarian Resistance in Aleppo, 1915-1917, Princeton & London:
Gomidas Institute 2002, p. 38: "During [an] earlier stint as pastor to the Armenian
village of Ekizoluk [in the Kessab region, present-day Syria, MB], he had coped
with the effects of the 1909 massacres. During the Adana massacres many
Armenian villages in the area where Ekizoluk was situated had been burned
down by Muslim mobs. While the loss of life remained limited in comparison to
the slaughters on the Cilician plains, the already-poor villagers had serious
problems regaining their economic self-sufficiency."
Miller& Miller,1993,p. 63: "In 1909 a series of massacres occurred in the region
of Cilicia, claiming the lives of about twenty thousand Armenians. The massacres
were centered on Adana, but we also interviewed survivors from Tarsus, Kessab,
Baghche, and Dort Yol. In fact, we heard accounts of incidents that had occurred
as far away as Marash, Hadjin, and Gurin." On Hadjin (Hajen), see also New York
146
Times, 23 Apri11909; Rose Lambert, Hadjin and the Armenian Massacres, New York:
Fleming H. Revell Co. 1911.
Adana 1909, 1909-06-09, "Der Konsul von Aleppo (Tischendorf) an den Reichskanzler
(Bulow)," on killings of Armenians in Dortyol (De~-Yo.l; Dort Yol) and M:u-ash
(Kahramanmaras): "Euerer Durchlaucht beehrte ic.~mlch. In der Anlage 2 Be~~h.te
des Kaiserlichen Vizekonsuls in Alexandrette uber die Lage dort und DortJol
gehorsamst einzureichen, wonach in der Nacht ~om 30. zum 31. vJ~ts. angeblich
in Folge eines MiBverstandnisses mehrere Elnwohner von..D?rtJol und zwar
Frauen und Kinder Seitens der vor dem Dorte lagernden turklschen Truppen
get6tet worden sind. Die Schuld an diesem Vortall wird von vielen Seiten dem
Kommandanten von Dortjol Major Nedim Bey zugemessen, der ein groBer Feind
der Armenier sein soli. Der Kaiserliche Vizekonsul klagt ferner Qber die Haltung
des stellvertretenden Kaimakams von Alexandrette und offenbar zur
Untersuchung dieser Klagen ist am 5. d.Mts. der hiesige Direktor des Affaires
Politique nach Alexandrette gesandt worden. Schritte in Konstantinopel behufs
Entfemung dieses Beamten von Alexandrette, wie sie der Kaiserliche Vizekonsul
anregt, scheinen mir nach Lage der Dinge bisher noch nicht angezeigt, zumal
Herr Belfante bestimmte Tatsachen, welche sie rechtfertige k6nnten, nicht
antahrt. [...] In Marasch scheint es in letzter Zeit ruhig geblieben zu sein trotz
mancher anderslautender Meldungen. Vorgestern sind von dort 24 Gefangene
gefesselt hier eingetroffen, von denen 21 nach Budrum gebracht werden sollen.
Die Freilassung anderer verhaftet gewesener Muhammedaner in Marasch hat
AniaB zu neuen Betarchtungen Seitens der dortigen Armenier gegeben. Nach
den letzten von dort unterm 9. Juni aus den Anstalten des Deutschen
Halfsbundes tar christliches Liebeswerk, in welche nach den letzten Unruhen
mehr als 200 ganztaglich aus den umliegenden D6rtern stammende armenische
Waisenkinder gesammelt und untergebracht worden sind, mir zugegangenen
Nachrichten sollen bei den Unruhen in der Stadt Marasch selbst nur einige
Zwanzig Armenier get6tet und doppelt so viele verwundet, aber gegen 400
Manner aus Marasch, die auswarts Arbeit gefunden hatten, dort untergebracht
worden seien, woraus sich die groBe Zahl der Waisen in Marasch erklart."
Ramsay, 1909, pp. 201-3: "It appears that after the Mutiny of the 13thApril, when
the Reactionary party was in power at Constantinople, three hodjas arrived at
Konia, and preached in the mosques, urging the people to make a holy war and
to kill the Christians. Panic prevailed during several days. The Governor shut
himself up in his house for six days, pleading illness as an excuse for not coming
to business, and allowed things to drift. Hundreds of Armenian refugees gathered
in the house and grounds of the British Consulate. The Consul resides at
Mersina in the winter and spring, and comes to Konia only for the summer; but
the Dragoman, a young Armenian, was instructed by telegraph to receive every
refugee. A number of people tell the same story, people of all classes and
religions. They differ only as to the reason why the agitation failed. Some
(esp~cially Armenians and Greeks) declare that the population of Konia would
not nse, and actually arrested one of the hodjas, when he was preaching
massacre at the door of a mosque; and they maintain that no one could have
saved them, if the people had been willing to listen to the exhortations of the
emissaries. Ot~ers say that one of the officers, an Albanian named Murad Bey, a
poet and soldier, who had been an exile of Abd-ul-Hamid's time calmed the
excitem~nt
and .averted a catastrophe,
and that he was actively ~ided by the
Tchelebl Effendi, the head of the Turning Dervishes, one of the most highly
147
respected personages in Turkey, whose family has always been noted for
liberality of mind and broad views. The old custom was that every Ottoman
Sultan was invested with authority by the Tchelebi Effendi, who girt on them the
sword of Osman. [...]. Probably the truth is that all these causes combined to
produce the result. It is quite true that friendly feeling has reigned always in Konia
between Turks and Christians. But it is also true that Murad and the Tchelebi
were active in using their eloquence and influence. We hear similar accounts
from other places. In Kaisari the attempt to start riot and massacre was frustrated
by the decided and energetic action of the Mutessarif [...].In various other towns
on this side of the Taurus mountains order was maintained with more or less
difficulty. But that an organised scheme of massacre had been planned at some
centre and systematically preached by agents, who either had or pretended to
have a religious character as hodjas and dressed accordingly, is beyond dispute
or question. My few friends in Constantinople who disbelieved the reports that
arrived there about this organised attempt at a general massacre would be
convinced that those reports were true, if they came up here and heard the
evidence. Every one we meet, Turk, Greek or Armenian, knows and tells how
critical the situation was. The simultaneousness of the preaching, and the
similarity of the circumstances, demonstrate that a single plan was carried out in
many places; and it cannot either be doubted or proved that the centre whence
the plan originated was the Palace of Yildiz. Where else could it be planned, and
who would be so foolish as to leave evidence of the plan? Whether it was with or
without the cognisance of the old Sultan no proof can be discovered."
Hans-Lukas Kieser, "Ottoman Urfa and Its Missionary Witnesses," in Richard G.
Hovannisian, ed., Armenian Tigranakert/Diarbekir and Edessa/Uifa, Costa Mesa, Ca.:
Mazda Publishers 2006, pp. 416-17: "[In Urfa, shortly] before the Adana massacre in
April 1909, news arrived of the murder of twenty-two Protestant teachers and
pastors, among them Djurdji Shammas and the Armenian Protestant pastor from
Urfa. These local Protestant leaders had been on the way to their annual regional
church assembly, which was to take place in Adana. Their murderers belonged
to a circle of people who, shortly afterward, carried out the Cilician massacres in
Adana, Tarsus, Antioch, and elsewhere. [...] It was at this point in time that interreligious mistrust reached a climax. Everyone armed; the Armenian quarter
prepared for an attack; trade came to a halt; the bazaar remained closed for
many days; communication with Aleppo was severed; police patrolled the city
day and night. Young Turk officers spoke in the cathedral in an attempt to calm
the Armenians. They accused Abdul-Hamid of being the instigator of the troubles.
On the night of April 27, a telegram arrived announcing the deposition of the
sultan and the accession of Mehmed V. Already on the following morning a
public ceremony took place with gunfire salutes, a speech by the governor, and
prayers:
On massacres of Armenian men in Antioch (Antakya) in 1909: Wolfgang Gust, ed., Der
Volkermord an den Armeniem 1915/16. Dokumente aus dem Politischen Archiv des
Deutschen Auswiirtigen Amts, zu Klampen 2005, p. 279.
For the claim by General Mahmud Shevket Pasha that massacres of Christians in or
around Constantinople had been planned in Yildiz Palace: Adana 1909, confidential
report by Baron Adolf Marschall von Bieberstein, German Ambassador at
Constantinople, regarding a long conversation he had with Shevket Pasha, 1909-05-07,
"Der Botschafter in Konstantinopel (Marschall von Bieberstein) an das
Auswartige Amt": "[...] Auch die Massakres in Adana und Umgebung seien auf
148
1-,
- - -----.---------
das Palais zurOckzufOhren.Der Vali von Adana, eine bekannte Palastkreatur,
von dessen Konak die Bewegung ausgegangen sei, werde kriegsgerichtlich
abgeurteilt werden. Da Mahmud Chefket Pascha bei Ankunft in San Stefano
Nachricht erhalten, dass auch hier ein grosseres Christeri-Massakre geplant war,
hat er den Einmarsch beschleunigt und dem Sultan telegraphiert: Die Armee sei
nicht gekommen, um ihn zu enthronen, sondern um aile Schuldigen zu bestrafen.
Dem Sultan personlich werde kein Leid geschehen, falls aber hier vor oder
wahrend des Einmarsches der Armee Gewalttatigkeiten gegen Christen und
Fremde verObt wOrden, lehne er jede Verantwortlichkeit fOr das Leben Seiner
Majestat ab. [...]: For an interesting American view on Von Bieberstein and the CUP,
see New York Times, 25 July 1909.
Shevket's claim is supported by US correspondent William Eleroy Curtis in his
posthumously published travel letters, Around the Black Sea: Asia Minor, Armenia,
Caucasus, Circassia, Daghestan, the Crimea, Roumania, Hodder & Stoughton 1911, p.
172: "There is no longer any doubt that Abdul Hamid, the late sultan, planned and
ordered a general massacre of Christians in Constantinople and other parts of
the empire for Friday, the 14th[sic] of April, in order to force the Europeans to
seize and occupy the city. In that way he hoped to save his throne. This has been
repeatedly admitted by those who were in his confidence at the time. It was the
last struggle of despair, but Shevket Pasha, the commander of the troops that
were loyal to the young Turks, received notice and pushed on so that he was
able to attack Constantinople on the day previous, and thus prevent the sacrifice
of Christian lives and property at the Turkish capital, similar to that which took
place at Adana, Marash, Tarsus, Aintab, and other places in central Turkey."
See also German news agency telegram, published in Danish daily Jyllandsposten, 2 May
1909: "Berlin, 1 May. Wolff's Bureau has received the following cable from
Constantinople: "The rumor that Abdul Hamid intended last Saturday to have
Kurds and rebellious soldiers instigate a massacre of Armenians and Greeks to
provoke an occupation by the Great Powers has been confirmed by a wellinformed source; the Sultan saw the intervention of the Powers as the only way
to keep his position. This is supposedly the reason that the entry of the besieging
army took place already on Saturday."
Furthermore, Kevorkian, in Hovannisian & Payaslian, eds., pp. 339-40, states that
"[o]nce Grand Vizier Ahmed Tevfik Pasha was in control of the situation and the
armed forces returned to the barracks in Constantinople, the Ottoman Parliament
decided on April 17, 1909, to send a delegation (several Turks such as Yusuf
Kemal and the Armenian deputies Krikor Zohrab and Vartkes Serengulian) to
~ahmud Shevket Pasha, commander of the troops of Rumelia, to inform him that
It was not neces~a~ t?march on the capital and that such a move would provoke
bloodshed. Having Initially accepted the advice, Mahmud Shevket nonetheless
decided to occupy Constantinople." For an opposingview - that there was no real
threat of massacre in the capital, see Francis McCullagh, The Fall of Abd-Ul-Hamid,
Lo~don: Methuen & Co. 1910, p. 50. An Albanian liberal MP in opposition to the CUP
dunng ~ 909 va~.ely asserts that massacresand looting might have followedwhen
Shev~et s Saloniki army entered Constantinople: Ismail Kemal Bey, The Memoirs of
Isma.llKemal Bey, .London: Constable & Co. 1920, pp. 343-44. On Ismail Kemal and the
39p~hament delegatIon, see also Ziircher, 1996,pp. 69-70.
Elise Bockelund, l!Bsten er Stor: K.MA. Gennem 50 Aar, Copenhagen: KMA 1950, pp.
32-3~. See also Idem, En 1]energeming Blandt Martyrfolket: Kvindelige Missions
Arbejdere 1900-1930, KMA 1932, pp. 24-25. The Sultan was technically not deposed
149
until April 27, but in reality he was finally toppled on April 24: Stanford J. Shaw & Ezel
Kural Shaw, History of the Ottoman Empire and Modern Turkey, Vol. II, Cambridge
University Press 1977, pp. 281-82.
40Edwin Pears, Turkey and its People, n. d. [1912], London: Methuen & Co., pp. 292-93.
41 Gertrude Bell, "Letter to her parents," 10 June 1909, Gertrude Bell Archive, in the
Robinson Library, University of Newcastle, http://www.gerty.ncl.ac.uk/lettersll896.htm
"Dearest Mother. I posted a letter to you at Kharput [Harput] on Monday, since
when letter writing has been interrupted by long marches and official visits which
have taken up all my time. On Monday evening I had a visit from the Vali, a
cheerful rubicund little man who told me he had come to see me a. because it
was his duty to look after all travellers and b. because in particular I was English
and the English were the firm supporters of the new government. He then passed
on to some expressions of rejoicing at the fall of Abdul Hamid. Next came the
American consul who acts for us while Mr Rawlins is at Diarbekr [Diyarbakir
(Amida)] (the latter is accredited to both vilayets.) He was a man, was the
American consul; he sat with me for near[ly] 2 hours and gave me exactly the
information I wanted. Here, as at Diarbekr, they were on the very edge of a
terrible massacre. On April 17 the Kurds began to come in from the mountains
and threaten the villages
- there
are lots of Armenian villages round about and all
were decimated in 1895. Fortunately 2 or 3 American missionaries from the
Kharput College happened to be in a village 6 hours from Mezreh. They sent in
word to the consul who despatched some soldiers to their aid at once and
followed them up with another consignment of 20. When these last arrived (they
dawdled 24 hours on the way, observe) the Kurds greeted them thus: 'Why did
the Govt. send you? in a few hours we should have finished the whole business.'
Meantime there was a horrible panic in Kharput and Mezreh. Mr Masterson
calmed the Armenians as best he could
- they
are dogs, as we say here; they all
flocked to the Consulate leaving their wives and children to take care of
themselves and promised to protect them if need were. On Ap[ril] 25 the Vali
came to him looking like a man who was on the verge of nervous collapse. He
said that on the 17th a telegram had come from C'ple [Istanbul (Constantinople»
ordering massacres. He swore that no one but himself and the telegraphji knew
of its existence, but he added that for 4 days he had been holding the Kurds at
bay. For 4 days they had been clamouring at his gate, demanding that he should
give them the word to fall upon the Xians [Christians, MB]. This quite tallies with
other things that I have put together bit by bit. There must have been a
preliminary propaganda among the people; they all knew that massacres were to
take place; they even knew the date almost to a day. The Vali's resistance does
him all the more credit because he is a man of the old order and thoroughly
-
reactionary
-
hence the expressions
of a contrary opinion to me. I was a little
surprised at their fervour. The fact was that the order from C'ple was too
sweeping; even reactionary officials feared the consequences if they carried it
out. The news of the Sultan's abdication came on the 26th but the danger was
over on the 24th when the General of the Dersin district telegraphed to the acting
Vali at Diarbekr that if what is generally spoken of as a masaleh - an incident were to occur, he would hold him personally responsible. From the moment that
the Sultan fell, the anti Xian agitation went out like a candle, that also is a fact
worth noting. But there is no end to surprises in this country. A week ago the
chief Mufti of Kharput assembled the people, Moslem, Xian and Jew in a village
an hour or two away and then preached them a most moving sermon. All alike,
150
1---.--.----
said he, were children of one God, all were perishing from the lack of rain, and it
behoved them all to pray together and entreat God to send them beneficent
storms. Whereupon the assembled hearers, who 5 weeks before had been ready
to fly at one another's throats, prayed devoutly side by side for 3 days. The rain
came, by the way! it was that rain which caught us in the mountains, though I did
not then know the origin of it. Subsequently Mr M. has tried to get from the Vali a
copy of the C'ple telegram. But the Vali has now recovered from the strain; he
prevaricates, declares that the Consul misunderstood him, that something came
from Smyrna [Izmir], he isn't quite sure what. At the same time he was delighted
with Mr M.'s proposal that the latter had got the leading Armenians to sign a
testimonial to the Vali saying that he stood by them at a time of grave peril. Mr M.
set about this at once and behold! the Armenians won't have a word to say to it.
No, they don't know, they aren't sure that the Vali prevented anything, or that
they couldn't have done as well for themselves - men who, as Mr M. said, for ten
days could scarcely drag themselves to his house on account of the trembling of
their knees. They are an unspeakable race. At the same time you can't let them
be massacred by thousands if there are any means of averting it. Now what do
you think of that tale? The thing that puzzles me is why I was entirely out of the
panic zone during the critical days - Ap 13-Ap 26. The only reason I can give was
that I was then passing through two vilayets, Baghdad and Mosul [Mawsil, AI],
where the Valis were men of the new order. Abdul Hamid knew possibly that no
injunctions of the kind he sent to Diarbekr and Kharput would be obeyed. I also
knew that during those days the Vali of Mosul received telegrams from Salonica
[Thessaloniki (Saloniki» telling him not to obey any orders from C'ple. That looks
as if the Salonica Committee knew that something was in the air. But I fancy that
there was a close shave at Aleppo [Halab] and at Damascus [Dimashq (Esh
Sham, Damas)], though the Valis there had nothing to gain from a reversal ofthe
constitutional regime. There were several days' panic in both towns, I gather, and
as you know massacres occured at various places in the Aleppo vilayet. Here is
another tale from life that bears on those episodes. The day we left Kharput we
had a very long march through the mountains, 12 hours by the clock down to the
Euphrates. In the afternoon Fattuh and I were riding on together with a zaptieh.
Fattuh, I must tell you, is always taken for a Moslem; he looks like one, and for
good reasons he never removes the impression. He passes for a Moslem all
down to Baghdad and up to Diarbekr, for he is known on every road. Well, as we
rode we met an immense train of camels. Fattuh haled [sic] one of the camel
drivers and asked him whence he came. From the port of Beilan, he said, ie
Alexandretta [Iske~derun (Alexandria ad Issum)]. The camel string went slowly
p~st and Fattuh said to the n~xt man 'How is Kirk Khan [Kirikhan]?' Kirk Khan is a
village ~n t~e Aleppo road, SIXhours from Alexandretta. 'The infidels (giour) are
all dead said he. And the houses of the infidels?' shouted Fattuh. The next man
answered: 'They are all burnt.' 'Praise be to God!' said Fattuh. When the camels
~ad gone past I said: 'Why did you say alhamda 'Iillah?' 'Excellency' said Fattuh
th?se.me~ ~ere all ha~p~, they were all rejoicing, otherwise they would not have
said glour. But you said It too' said I. 'Not till they had said it' he answered. But
f~r an hour he told me as we rode how all the men of that village had been his
friends, all came out to greet him when he drove along the Alexandretta road,
and when. they came to Aleppo, he entertained them at his house. The masaleh
sounds gnm enough when you hear of it from the lips of the people. [oo.]."
151
In Grace H. Knapp, The Tragedy of Bitlis, London: Sterndale Classics 2002 [1919], p. 81,
the following version of the events is related: "In 1908 [sic] a massacre occurred at
Adana and Minot Rogers was killed. At that time, by grape-vine telegraphy, news
of an impending massacre came to Harpoot. [...] Convinced of the danger,
George Knapp went to the Vali of Harpoot and found the most prominent
Armenians in the city there on a like errand. The Governor pooh-poohed the idea
of any danger; besides, he had sent four soldiers out there [the nearby village of
Ichme]. Finding the missionary determined to go that night to the village where
his daughters were, the Vali gave him an .escort of twenty soldiers and one
officer. As day broke they reached Ichme to find the children and village safe.
'Why didn't you do it before? You can't, now the "Hat-wearer" is come,' said one
of the soldiers to the Moslims, not realizing how well the missionary understood
Turkish. 'The Kurds were massed in a ravine back of the town. Another company
were in the mosque. They had planned just as deadly and brutal work as actually
happened at Adana, but were forestalled."
42 KMA,
10.360,pk. 16, "Armeniermissionen,Korrespondence1907-1909,"letter from
Griinhagen to Blredel6/5 1909.
43Tessa Hofmann & Meline Pehlivanian, "'Der Schlimmsten Orte Einer...': Malatia 1915
bis 1918," 2005, http://www.aga-online.org/de/texte/malatia/malatia.pdf.
44 Jensine
0rtz,
-
Fra Armenien
Optegnelser fra Malatia, KMA No. 95, n. d. [1912], p. 12;
Jensine O. Peters [Jensine 0rtz], Tests and Triumphs of Armenians in Turkey and
Macedonia, Grand Rapids, MI.: Zondervan Publishing House 1940,pp. 35-37.
45 On Fox Maule, see e.g. Christian Siegumfeldt, fJsterlandsmissionen, Vol I-II,
Copenhagen 1923 & 1927,passim.
46Kristeligt Dagblad, 9 June 1909. See also Siegumfeldt, 1927, p. 70; Harald F. Jm-gensen,
fJrkenen Skal B/omstre
Glimt af fJsterlandsmissionens Historie Gennem 50 Aar,
Copenhagen: J. Frimodts Forlag 1947, p. 70. The local kaimakam was no mend of Fox
_
Maule and his organization
-
in fact, the Danish doctor describes him as "our enemy,
fanatic as he is" in a letter to the Swedish diplomatic minister at Constantinople,
Anckarswiird, 26 November 1909, who was in charge of Danish affairs in the Ottoman
Empire until a Danish diplomatic minister, Carl Ellis Wandel, was appointed in 1914.
Fox Maule had earlier expressed some vague hope in the CUP, but in that same letter he
describes how a new Young Turk vali, Ismail Pasha, had been appointed in the region,
which led to a regime of an "absolutely xenophobic character": Rigsarkivet (Danish
National Archives), Udenrigsministeriets Arkiver (Foreign Ministry Archives; UM), 20355, pk. 36, "Konstantinople/Istanbul, diplomatisk reprresentation. 1822-1920.
Korrespondencesager. Korrespondence om sunheds [sic] og humanitrere sager 18971920. Dansk hospitalsvirksomhed i Tyrkiet, 1909-1914." On the 1860-61 massacres of
thousands of Maronites and other Christians in Lebanon and Damascus, see e.g. Michael
Kuderna, Christliche Gruppen im Libanon, Wiesbaden: Franz Steiner Verlag 1983, pp.
21-22; A. 1. Abraham, Lebanon at Mid-Century. Maronite-Druze Relations in Lebanon
1840-1860: A Prelude to Arab Nationalism, University Press of America 1981, pp. 101ff;
Engin Deniz Akarli, The Long Peace: Ottoman Lebanon, 1861-1920, Berkeley, Los
Angeles, London: University of California Press 1993, pp. 29-30.
47 Jonathan S. McMurray, Distant Ties: Germany, the Ottoman Empire, and the
Construction of the Baghdad Railway, Greenwood Publishing Group 2001, p. 79. On
disturbances or (expected) massacres in the Arab regions of the Empire, see also New
York Times, 25 April 1909.
48Adana 1909, 1909-04-24-DE-002, "Der Generalkonsul in AIeppo (Tischendorf) an den
Reichskanzler (Biilow)".
49 Adana 1909, 1909-04-26-DE-004, "Der Vizekonsul in Jaffa (ROBler) an den
Reichskanzler (BUlow)".
50Meshaka to Ravndal, 22 April 1909,quotedin ElieKedourie,"The Impactof the Young
Turk Revolution in the Arabic-Speaking Provinces of the Ottoman Empire," idem, Arabic
political Memoirs and Other Studies, London: Frank Cass 1974, p. 148. On
Mohammedan/Muslim Union and other contemporary MuslimlIslamist groups, see also
Kemal H. Karpat, "Jfte and Kaza: The Ilmiye State and Modernism in Turkey, 18201960" in Colin Imber, Keiko Kiyotaki, Rhoads Murphy, eds., Frontiers of Ottoman
Studies. Vol.I: State, Province, and the West, I. B. Tauris 2005, pp. 37-38.
51H. E. Wilkie Young, "MosuI1909," Middle Eastern Studies, Vol. 7, No.2, May 1971, p.
232. See also Gertrude Lowthian Bell, Amurath to Amurath, Gorgias Press 2002 (1911),
p.248.
52Adana 1909, 1909-04-27-DE-001, "Der Botschafter in Konstantinopel (Marschall von
Bieberstein) an das Auswiirtige Amt." The German consul general at Beirut, Schroeder,
asserted 15 May that the persecutions of Christians in Cilicia and northern Syria had not
spread to central Syria as the local population had feared, with the exception of a reported
incident where the murder of a Muslim by a Christian led to the gathering of thousands of
armed Muslims in Beirut threatening to massacre Christians, but he seems to refer mainly
to the cities Aleppo, Beirut, and Damascus, not the countryside: ibid., 1909-05-15-DE003, "Der Konsul in Beirut (Schroeder) an den Reichskanzler (BUlow)."
53Support for the countercoup and for the sultan in general among for instance the ArabOttoman Brotherhood Society could also primarily or partly be motivated by the fact that
the CUP was widely considered to be 'anti-Arab,' although Arab nationalist (as opposed
to, e.g., religiously motivated) resistance to the CUP seems to have only become
significant after the reinstatement of the CUP-controlled administration in 1909 that
marked the beginning of more pronounced policies of Turkification and centralization.
See for various views on when and how Arab resistance to the CUP developed: Aykut
Kansu, The Revolution of 1908 in Turkey, Leiden, New York, KOIn:Brill 1997, pp. 18384; Weldon C. Matthews, Confronting an Empire, Constructing a Nation: Arab
Nationalists and Popular Politics in Mandate Palestine, I. B. Tauris 2006, pp. 13-14;
Randall Baker, King Husain and the Kingdom ofHejaz, The Oleander Press 1979, pp. 3537; Reeva Spector, "The View from Baghdad," in Reeva Spector & Eleanor H. Tejirian,
eds., The Creation of Iraq, 1914-1921, pp. 39-40; llan Pappe, A History of Modern
Palestine: One Land, Two Peoples, Cambridge University Press 2004, pp. 56ff; Sarah D.
Shields, M.0~ulBefore Iraq: Like Bees Making Five-Sided Cells, SUNY Press 2000, pp.
61-62; PhilIp S. Khoury, Urban Notables and Arab Nationalism: The Politics of
Damascus 1860-1920, Cambridge University Press 2003, pp. 59-60.
54 On active anti-CUP, pro-am:ient regime trends in the Arab regions: Ravindranathan,
1965, pp. 283-84. On Kurdish and Arab resistance to the CUP in 1909 see David
M,JDowall,A Modern History of the Kurds, London & New York: I. B. Taurls 2000, rev.
2 ed., pp. 95-98.
55KMA, 1O.3~0,pk." 112, "Prot~kol over. Plejebm-n i B0rnehjemmet 'Emaus' i Mezreh,
1?09-~917, e. g~"NO.3. Lucia ArakelJan. Accepted fall 1909. 5 years old. Father
killed In Adana. . NO..45.Makruhi Gustanjan. Accepted 1909,7 years old. Father
and a brother killed In ~he Adana massacre. Transferred from No. 42. Did not
return after summer holiday 1911; mother wanted to keep
On. reliefwork in
.a' her."
th
c'
Th V
fr
general .after the massacres:
e.g.
Victoria
Rowe
"Cili
' 0
. .".
'
. I.e lew
om e
Ie W omens
ds 2008
Constantmop
rgamzatJ.ons,m Hovannisian& P
371-90.
ayas Ian, e.,
, pp.
153
152
S6
See, besides from the alreadymentionedsources,e.g. RubinaPeroomian,"Tears and
Laughter of Cilician Armenia: Literary Representations of Destruction and Revival,
1909-1918," in Hovannisian & Payaslian, eds., pp. 392ff.
S7See e.g. Charles M. Pepper & Irving Bacheller, Life Work of Louis Klopsch: Romance of
a Modem Knight of Mercy, Kessinger Publishing 2005 (1910), pp. 50-52.
S8For an interesting, less optimistic analysis of the CUP project by a missionary observer
who had witnessed the 1909 Adana massacres (e.g. New York Times, 28 Apri11909), see
S. V. R. Trowbridge, ''The Old and the New Regime in Turkey," in E. M. Wherry et ai,
eds., Islam and Missions: Being Papers Read at the Second Missionary Conference on
Behalf of the Mohammedan World at Lucknow, January 23-28, 191/, New York,
Chicago, Toronto, London, Edinburgh:Fleming H. Revell Co. 1911, p. 170: "The
attitude of the government upon any vital question is largely determined by the
dictates of a committee outside of the government and backed by the best part of
the army. What then of the attitude of this committee? At present the leaders are
so absorbed in political affairs and in the military strategy by which their difficult
position is held that they are giving little attention to religious matters. Some have
even denounced religion as being the cause of divisions in the nation. But they
are not directly opposed to Christian missions so long as public feeling and
fanaticism are not aroused. Their instincts are so intensely political that they
resent any movement which weakens Islam. This is not in most cases from
religious faith, but from the instinct that Islam is the strongest available bond for
national unification and for defense against foreign aggression. If Christian
missions could be demonstrated to them to be an advantage to the nation and a
means of unification and progress, these 'Young Turks' would waive traditional
Mohammedan objections. But they are far from the field of faith and theology.
They are bent upon political and economic reorganization. A considerable
proportion of these 'Young Turks' are at heart agnostics, somewhat influenced by
French writers, but more influenced by the corrupt condition of Islam. It is
impossible to forecast the future. Meanwhile the history of the early Church
furnishes inspiring and suggestive studies. It does not seem likely that the
present Ottoman government will vouchsafe real religious liberty."
S9On Benedictsen and DA, see Bjmnlund, Haigazian Armenological Review, idem, "En
Excentrisk Komet," Goldberg: Magasin Om Jedisk Kunst, Kultur, Religion, SamjUnd,
October 2007, pp. 12-14.
60De DanslreArmeniervenner, Beretning 1909, Copenhagen 1910, pp. 2-3.
61Ibid., p. 4. See also Age Meyer Benedictsen, "Aarsagen til de Armeniske Rredsler," Frem
1925, p. 620; William Miller, The Ottoman Empire and Its Successors, 1801-1927,
Routledge 1966 (1927), pp. 480-81; Kristeligt Dagblad, 3 August 1909, "The Military
Tribunal is Aggressive Toward the Armenians"; George Frederick Abbott, Turkey in
Transition, E. Arnold 1909, pp. 304-5; Ephraim K. Jernazian, Judgment Unto Truth:
Witnessing the Armenian Genocide, New Brunswick & London: Transaction Publishers
1990, pp. 23-24; G. S. Graber, Caravans to Oblivion: The Armenian Genocide, 1915,
New York, Chichester, Brisbane, Toronto, Singapore: John Wiley & Sons, Inc. 1996, pp.
47-48; Karl Meyer, Armenien und die Schweiz - Geschichte der Schweizerischen
Armenierhilfe, Bem: Blaukreuz-Verlag 1974, pp. 80-81. For an interesting contemporary
analysis of the massacres and the subsequent court-martial, which was "inspired by a
conception of equity that failed to earn the gratitude of the Armenians or the
approval of anyone else": Abott, 1909,pp. 302ff.
62 A. Nekludoff,DiplomaticReminiscencesBeforeandDuringthe
63See e.g. Kristeligt Dagblad, 11 June 1909,3 August 1909;
64Quoted in Hans-Lukas Kieser, "Dr. Mehmed Reshid (1873-1919): A Political Doctor," in
Kieser & Schaller, eds., 2002, p. 255.
6SUM, 139. D. I., "Politiske Begivenheder i Tyrkiet i 1914," 26/1 1915,pp. 1-5.
66 See e.g. Peter Balakian, The Burning Tigris: The Armenian Genocide and America's
Response, HarperCollins 2003, p. 157: "As the concept of Armenian massacre was
hammered deeper and deeper into the social psychology of Turkish society, the
Armenian Question was inculcated as an issue that could only be solved by
unmitigated state-sponsored and state-sanctioned violence"; James L. Barton,
comp., "Turkish Atrocities:" Statements of American Missionaries on the Destruction of
Christian Communities in Ottoman Turkey, 1915-1917, Ann Arbor, MI: Gomidas
Institute 1998, p. 121. For a comparison of Mehmet Talat (Talaat) Pasha's attitude toward
the Adana massacres with his leading role in the Armenian genocide, see Lewis Einstein,
Inside Constantinople: A Diplomatist's Diary During the Dardanelles Expedition,
London: John Murray 1917, pp. 175-76: "[Talat] was different six years ago, when I
used to see him daily after the Adana massacre; he had a seemingly engaging
frankness, which contrasted favourably with the shiftiness of Hamidian officials.
He then told me that he wished to see the Governor of Adana hanged for
allowing the murder of 20.000 people, and praised the English Consul, Doughty
Wylie, who was wounded in trying to check it. Now he himself fosters the same
thing. All his loyalty is to his organization, and his policy is ruthless Turkification,
which will later be turned against the Germans, but has now fastened on the
Armenian as a victim. He declares openly that the persecution is revenge for the
defeat at Sarakymish [Sarikamis], the Turkish expulsion from Azerbaidjan, and
the occupation of Van, all of which he lays at the Armenian door. The Committee
of Union and Progress fear the Armenian organization. Added to this is the
conviction that they cannot assimilate, and must therefore crush them, and that
the present is the most seasonable moment, which will never again recur, and
one has a series of conditions which entail the usual reactions of brutality and
cruelty. The Germans, to their eternal disgrace, will not lift a finger to save the
Armen~ans.Their callousness is disgusting, but one's indignation rises in vain."
On Major Charles Hotham Montagu Doughty-Wylie during the Adana massacres, see
also New Y~rk Times, 3 May 1909; Adana 1909, passim; Ara Sarafian, comp., United
States OfficIal Records on the Armenian Genocide 1915-19/7 Princeton & London:
Gomidas Institute 2004, pp. 357-58; Nassibian, 1984,p. 22.
'
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