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Hrsg.

**Bild und Bildlichkeit in Philosophie,  
Wissenschaft und Kunst**

**Image and Imaging in Philosophy,  
Science, and the Arts**

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Beiträge  
Papers

33. Internationales Wittgenstein Symposium

33<sup>rd</sup> International Wittgenstein Symposium

Kirchberg am Wechsel

8. - 14. August 2010

**Bild und Bildlichkeit in Philosophie,  
Wissenschaft und Kunst  
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**Beiträge der Österreichischen Ludwig Wittgenstein Gesellschaft  
Contributions of the Austrian Ludwig Wittgenstein Society**

**Band XVIII  
Volume XVIII**

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Beiträge des 33. Internationalen  
Wittgenstein Symposiums  
8. – 14. August 2010  
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Band XVIII

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## Herausgeber

Elisabeth Nemeth  
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Gedruckt mit Unterstützung der  
Abteilung Kultur und Wissenschaft  
des Amtes der NÖ Landesregierung

Kirchberg am Wechsel, 2010  
Österreichische Ludwig Wittgenstein Gesellschaft

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## Editors

Elisabeth Nemeth  
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Printed in cooperation with the  
Department for Culture and Science  
of the Province of Lower Austria

Kirchberg am Wechsel, 2010  
Austrian Ludwig Wittgenstein Society

**Distributors**

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Die Österreichische Ludwig Wittgenstein Gesellschaft  
The Austrian Ludwig Wittgenstein Society

Markt 63, A-2880 Kirchberg am Wechsel  
Österreich/Austria

ISSN 1022-3398

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Visuelle Gestaltung: Sascha Windholz  
Druck: Eigner Druck, A-3040 Neulengbach

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# Picturing Semantic Relations

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The paper presents a construction of the metalanguage of an object language endowed with an intensional interpretation, the kind of interpretation naturally associated with the picture theory. The construction is canonical and the result possesses some attractive properties. In fact, unlike Tarski's its truth conditions do not lead to an infinite regress. It is then shown how the intensional interpretation scheme fits into Wittgenstein's general conception about language and its objects.

## 1. Introduction

The domain of discourse for a language is assumed to consist of individual objects possessing properties and relations. The attribution of a property to an individual or a relation to a pair of individuals is an atomic fact expressed by an atomic sentence. There are two ways of conceiving the relation between language and domain; either that the structure of the domain is mapped into the language or that the structure of the language is mapped into the domain. The first of these corresponds to Wittgenstein's picture theory in *Tractatus* [1961] the second one is attributed to Tarski [1983] being the standard view in semantics of first order formal languages.

The conceptualisation of the structure of a domain is related to the choice of direction of the map(s). In the first case the domain is modelled as a directed graph. An individual is then represented by a node and a relation by an arrow; in the second case it is modelled as a set consisting of individuals, sets of individuals, sets of ordered pairs of individuals etc. These conceptualisations are the basis for the intensional and extensional interpretations respectively. The intensional interpretations are represented by maps, a naming map that maps the individuals (or relations) to names and observables that map an individual (or relation) to a predicate representing a property (or relation). The extensional interpretations are represented by a map that maps names to the individuals, a one-place predicates to the set of individuals possessing the property referred to by the predicate, a two-place predicate to the set of ordered pairs of individuals possessing the relation denoted by the predicate etc.

The notion of observable is a fundamental building block in the intensional interpretation scheme. An observable is simulating a kind of measurements the results of which are predicates representing properties of individuals or relations between individuals. It simulates the act of measurement and is associated with an operational definition, i.e. the specification of a standard of measure, laws on which the measurement is based and rules determining the actions to be performed to make the measurement. The possible values (predicates) of an observable represent mutual exclusive properties of individuals or relations between two individuals. Individuals can not be red and green at the same time. Thus colour is an observable. Other observables are temperature, weight, position in space etc.

The result of a measurement on an individual or relation is expressed by a predicate and stated by a sentence that relates the name of the individual or individuals

partaking in the relation. These are the atomic sentences of the language. The truth conditions are therefore particularly simple. An atomic sentence is true iff it states the result of a measurement. This is expressed in the model of the domain of the metalanguage by a set of commutative diagrams [Aaberge 2009a]

$$\begin{array}{ccc} & \pi & \\ N & \rightarrow & P_1 \\ \uparrow \nu \nearrow \delta & & \end{array} \quad \text{i.e. } \pi(\nu(d)) = \delta(d), \forall d \in D \quad (1)$$

D

where D denotes the domain, N the names, P the predicates,  $\nu$  is the naming map  $\delta$  is an observable and  $\pi$  is defined by the commutativity of a diagram.

## 2. The metalanguage

Let  $L_D(N \cup N^{(2)} \cup V, P_1 \cup P^{(2)} \cup P_2)$  stand for the object language for a domain D, i.e. the set of names, predicates, variables and sentences.  $N \cup N^{(2)}$  denotes the set of names, V the set of variables,  $P_1$  the set of predicates of the first kind,  $P^{(2)}$  the set of two-place predicates and  $P_2$  the set of predicates of the second kind.

The metalanguage for the object language is denoted  $L_G(M_1 \cup M^{(2)}, Q)$  where the domain G consists of the set  $D \cup L_D(N \cup N^{(2)} \cup V, P_1 \cup P^{(2)} \cup P_2)$  endowed with the directed multi-graph structure defined by the diagrams (1),  $M_1 = D \cup L_D(N \cup N^{(2)} \cup V, P_1 \cup P^{(2)} \cup P_2)$  the names<sup>1</sup> of the nodes,  $M^{(2)}$  the names of the relations q (arrows  $d \mapsto n$  etc. in (1)) and Q the predicates of the metalanguage. In the metalanguage D represents the symbolic model of the domain.

The names of the individuals, relations between individuals, terms, sentences and relations between these objects in the metalanguage, are given by the naming map

$$\begin{aligned} \eta : G &\rightarrow M_1 \cup M^{(2)}, \\ d &\mapsto \eta(d) = d \\ n &\mapsto \eta(n) = n \\ \bullet & \\ (\nu(d) = n) &\mapsto \eta(\nu(d) = n) = (d, n) \\ (\pi(n) = p) &\mapsto \eta(\pi(n) = p) = (n, p) \\ (\pi^{(2)}(n_s, n_t) = p^{(2)}) &\mapsto \eta(\pi^{(2)}(n_s, n_t) = p^{(2)}) \\ &= ((n_s, n_t), p^{(2)}) \\ (\delta(d) = p) &\mapsto \eta(\delta(d) = p) = (d, p) \\ (\delta^{(2)}(r) = p^{(2)}) &\mapsto \eta(\delta^{(2)}(r) = p^{(2)}) = (r, p^{(2)}) \end{aligned} \quad (2)$$

where  $\nu(d) = n$  denotes relations (arrows:  $d \mapsto n$ ) etc.

Each observable  $\alpha$  determines an atomic fact about an element of the domain G,

$$\alpha:G \rightarrow Q; g \mapsto \alpha(g) \quad (3)$$

Moreover, for each observable  $\alpha$  there exists a unique map  $\beta$  defined by the condition of commutativity of the diagram

$$\begin{array}{ccc} & \beta & \\ M_1 \cup M^{(2)} & \rightarrow & Q \\ \eta \uparrow & \nearrow \alpha & \\ G & & \end{array} \quad (4)$$

An observable  $\sigma$ , the semantic observable, has the values<sup>2</sup>  $D, D^{(2)}, N, N^{(2)}, V, P, P^{(2)}, S, H, P_v, P_\pi, P_{\pi^{(2)}},$

$$P_\delta, P_{\delta^{(2)}}$$

$$\sigma:G \rightarrow Q;$$

$$d \mapsto \sigma(d)=D$$

$$r \mapsto \sigma(r)=D^{(2)}$$

$$n \mapsto \sigma(n)=N$$

$$p \mapsto \sigma(p)=P$$

•  
•

$$(\nu(d)=n) \mapsto \sigma(\nu(d)=n)=P_\nu$$

$$(\pi(n)=p) \mapsto \sigma(\pi(n)=p)=P_\pi$$

$$(\pi^{(2)}(n_s, n_t)=p^{(2)}) \mapsto \sigma(\pi^{(2)}(n_s, n_t)=p^{(2)})=P_{\pi^{(2)}}$$

$$(\delta(d)=p) \mapsto \sigma(\delta(d)=p)=P_\delta$$

$$(\delta^{(2)}(r)=p^{(2)}) \mapsto \sigma(\delta^{(2)}(r)=p^{(2)})=P_{\delta^{(2)}}$$

informally defined by<sup>3</sup>

1.  $Dm$ ,  $m$  is an individual
2.  $D^{(2)}m$ ,  $m$  is a relation
3.  $Nm$ ,  $m$  is the name of an individual
4.  $N^{(2)}m$ ,  $m$  is the name of a relation
5.  $Vm$ ,  $m$  is a variable
6.  $Pm$ ,  $m$  is a 1-ary predicate
7.  $P^{(2)}m$ ,  $m$  is a 2-ary predicate
8.  $Sm$ ,  $m$  is a sentence
9.  $Hm$ ,  $m$  is a formula
10.  $P_\nu m_1 m_2$ ,  $m_1$  is named  $m_2$
11.  $P_\pi m_1 m_2$ ,  $m_1$  is  $m_2$
12.  $P_{\pi^{(2)}} m_1 m_2$ ,  $m_1$  is  $m_2$
13.  $P_\delta m_1 m_2$ ,  $m_1$  possesses the property represented to by  $m_2$
14.  $P_{\delta^{(2)}} m_1 m_2$ ,  $m_1$  is the relation represented by  $m_2$

The operational definition is given by the syntactic rules and interpretation of the language and the semantic value of a symbol are determined by inspection. It should be noticed that these predicates of can serve to characterise names and terms of the object language and thus makes

possible a map that to an sentence associates a syntactic description of the sentence. The metalanguage might thus serve as the basis for the construction of an ontology language.

Syntactic rules and rules of deduction are formulated in a metalanguage. The syntactic rules are of the form

$$\text{atomic sentence: } Nn \wedge Pp \Rightarrow Spn$$

$$\text{conjunction: } Hf_1 \wedge Hf_2 \Rightarrow H(f_1 \wedge f_2)$$

$$\text{univer. quant.: } Hf(x) \Rightarrow S(\forall_x f(x))$$

etc.

The rules of deduction, *modus ponens* and generalisation are in the notation introduced expressed by [8]

$$\text{modus ponens: } (Tf_1 \wedge T(f_1 \Rightarrow f_2)) \Rightarrow Tf_2 \quad (6)$$

generalisation: if it is assumed that the hypotheses underlying the derivation of  $f(x)$  does not depend on  $x$  then

$$(Hf(x)) \Rightarrow T \forall_x f(x)$$

The metalanguage is endowed with an ontology that provides implicit definitions of the terms of the vocabularies and at the same time pictures structural properties of the respective domains. It is defined by the axioms which summarise the content of the commutativity conditions (1):

Axiom: for each of the diagrams the commutativity conditions (1, 7) hold for an atomic sentence iff the sentence is true, i.e.

$$(Dm_1 \wedge Nm_2 \wedge P_1 m_3 \wedge (P_\nu m_1 m_2 \wedge P_\delta m_1 m_3 \Rightarrow P_\pi m_2 m_3)) \Leftrightarrow m_3 m_2 \text{ is true} \quad (7)$$

and similarly for the relations.

Whether an atomic sentence is true or false can be ascertained by inspection using these axioms. The inspection involves making measurements.

This gives rise to another observable  $\tau$  given by the values true  $T$ , neutral  $I$  or false  $F$ .  $\tau$  is neutral for all individuals, relations, terms and formulae, and true or false on the sentences, i.e. if  $s$  is a sentence, then the truth of  $s$  is expressed by  $Ts$ .

### 3. Concluding Remarks

The intensional interpretation of an object language and construction of its meta-language is made in the spirit of Tractatus, being based on the picture theory. There are, moreover, no sets are involved, though an extensional interpretation can be obtained by taking the inverse image of a predicate by its observable as the extension of the predicate. Moreover, a verification procedure for atomic sentences has been given. To determine whether a predicate applies to an individual we make a measurement. It consists in comparing a property of the individual with the standard of measure. The comparison determines the property of the individual that is identical to the property of the standard of measure. The predicate denoting this property in the standard of measure then applies to the individual.

The standard of measure defining the values of an observable is picturing mutually exclusive potential properties of objects. For example, the numerical values on the scale of an old fashioned thermometer are picturing the temperatures of the mercury in the thermometer. The pic-

ture is based on the law of linear increase of volume with temperature within a certain temperature range limiting the validity of the thermometer as a measuring device. To measure the temperature of an object the thermometer is brought into contact with the object. According to the second law of thermodynamics after some time the thermometer and the object will be in thermal equilibrium. The thermometer then shows the common temperature of both objects. Comparison thus means the identification of pictures; in this case the comparison is intrinsic. The following example shows other aspects of how the comparison takes place. The measurement of the colour of an individual consists in holding a colour chart representing the standard of measure for the colours against the individual. If the mental pictures that the observer gets of the colour of the individual and the colour marked red on the colour chart coincide, then red is taken to denote the result of the measurement.

The intensional interpretation scheme realises the conception of *Investigations* (Wittgenstein 1968). In *Investigations* Wittgenstein analyses how language games are used to determine meaning of words by their application to a given context. In our case, the particular sets of operational definitions can be considered as constituting a language game and the corresponding acts of measurements the context which gives the basis for the intentional interpretation. How meaning depends on the operational definitions is illustrated by the operational definitions of time and distance measurements in non relativistic physics and special relativity. In non relativistic physics one distinguishes between the measurement of a distance in space and the duration in time. Distance is measured by a rod of unit length and duration by a periodic process; one counts the number of rods that is needed to cover the distance or the number of periods that is needed to span the duration.

In special relativity only a standard unit of time is defined. The unit of length is defined as the distance covered by a light ray in a given interval of time. The measurement of time is based on a definition of simultaneity of distant events with respect to a given observer, the physical law claiming the velocity of light to be constant in vacuum and independent of the velocity of the emitting source and the Principle of Relativity which postulates that the laws of physics are the same in all inertial frames of reference. Clearly, the measurements associated with these sets of operational definitions corresponds to different language games and thus give different meanings to the notions of duration and distance.

Operational definitions are practical implementations of the axioms of the property language for the domain considered. Accordingly, a property language (theory) can not be directly tested. It is indirectly tested by means of models of the individuals of the domain formulated in the property language [Aaberge 2009a]. As Wittgenstein points out in *On Certainty* (Wittgenstein 1975) we need a ground for asserting the result of an observation, i.e. for the result of a measurement on an individual to state something about the individual. As the above discussion shows the ground is in our case provided by the comparison with a standard and the identification of properties. This is what is expressed by the truth conditions (7). The reference to the measurements then give the meaning to the terms of the object language, property language and its metalanguage based on intentional interpretations. These three languages give a complete framework for the

description of a domain. The structure of the metalanguage is here essential since it only contains the name of a sentence and not the sentence itself contrary to Tarski's truth conditions "'s" is true iff s" (Tarski 1944) which gives rise to an infinite hierarchy of languages. The truth conditions expressed by the axioms (7) are closed statements.

The meaning of the terms of a language is partially fixed by an ontology modelling the context of a language game. Partakers in a language game may test their interpretation of terms used by judging it in the metalanguage applying modus ponens and thus slowly adapt to their meaning to be in accordance with the meaning fixed by the ontology.

The objects of the domain of the metalanguage are symbolic representatives of the individuals and relations of the object language (one cannot put the objects and relations themselves into the language), the names, predicates and sentences. The naming map and the observables in the diagram (1) then express kinds of semantic relations. Moreover, the diagrams generate a directed graph model of the domain G in which the sentences are isolated nodes. The model is given a linguistic representation by the primary vocabulary and the axiom system expressing the truth conditions. The atomic facts represented by the atomic sentences in the metalanguage do not have the same ontological status as the atomic facts represented by atomic sentences in the object language which concern the acts of measurement. As shown by the example of time and space measurements their ontological status thus depends on the ontological status given to the laws used to interpret the results of the measurements and to the individuals of the domain.

## Endnotes

<sup>1</sup> I apply the convention that the symbol(s) representing an individual, a relation a term, a sentence or a formula, serves as its name. These objects are only spoken about in the metalanguage not used; they thus do not convey meaning but retain their syntactic form. Accordingly, self reference and paradoxical sentences are avoided even without the use of distinctive notation.

<sup>2</sup> Notice the reuse of symbols and also that there is a predicate  $P_{\delta}$  for each  $\delta$  etc.

<sup>3</sup> Notice that we may refine the notion of sentence by distinguishing between mutually exclusive kinds of sentences.

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# Seeing-As, Seeing-In, Seeing-With: Looking Through Images

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In the constitution of contemporary image theory, Ludwig Wittgenstein's philosophy has become a key reference. This paper would like to critically assess some of the advantages as well as some of the quandaries in using Wittgenstein's concept of "seeing-as" for addressing the plural realities of images. Three modalities of iconic vision will subsequently be analyzed in the paper: the propositional *seeing-as*, the projective *seeing-in* and the medial *seeing-with*.

## 1. Seeing-as

Despite their disparities, most contemporary image theories seem to agree on the fact that the constitution of the image's meaning is fundamentally codetermined by the gaze directed towards it. Images – thus – do not have a single sense, but can have plural meanings, depending on the perspective from which one looks at them. To illustrate this fact, one image example has been frequently invoked: the duck-rabbit-picture of which Wittgenstein makes use in his later philosophy (Wittgenstein 1993, 204sq., §118sq.). The ambiguous picture, drawn from the Polish-American psychologist Joseph Jastrow, either shows a duck or a rabbit, but never both at once. Now: what changes in the switch from one to another? Certainly not the lines on the paper. Rather (as Wittgenstein would say) their meaning, as we never just see lines, but organized lines which we see as objects. In a phenomenological vocabulary, the *as*-structure is made possible by the intentional structure: we do not only have optic impressions on our retina, but perceive trees, houses, objects. Applied to Jastrow's ambiguous figure, this implies that we *either* see the drawing as the drawing of a duck *or* the drawing as the drawing of a rabbit. *Tertium non datur*. The ambiguity of the "flip flop image" (*Kippbild*) can thus be literally brought back to *ambi-valence*, insofar as it alternates between two (and only two) possible values.

While Wittgenstein used a pictorial example to exemplify a feature of perception – its intentional *as*-structure –, many image theorists, on the contrary, applied this feature of perception to images. For Virgil Aldrich, the possibility of an image rests on the capacity of aspect seeing (Aldrich 1958), for Gombrich, the question "rabbit or duck?" is the "key to the whole problem of image reading" (Gombrich 1960: 238), for Wollheim's *Art and Its Objects*, the structure of seeing-as is sufficient for understanding pictorial representation (Wollheim 1968). Or as Goodman puts it, rather than saying that the picture of Pickwick represents Pickwick, we should say that we see the picture *as a Pickwick-picture* (Goodman 1968, ch. 5). What is more, we do not simply see Pickwick as such, we see him under a certain aspect, such as *Pickwick-as-a-clown* (Goodman 1968, ch. 6). If we wanted to sum up the image conception common to those theories, we could formalize pictorial perception as follows: *we see images as an 'x' depicting a 'y'*.

Analytic aestheticians have widely discussed the aporias of such an approach and Wollheim has revised his own position defended in the first edition of *Art and Its Objects* by replacing the concept of "seeing-as" by the concept of "seeing-in" (Wollheim 1980) which shall be analyzed in the second part of the paper. While this dis-

cussion concerns mainly aesthetic issues, it however hints at a more general problem: the argumentational fallacy which consists in identifying intentionality and propositionality. John Searle's theory of intentionality is biased by this fallacy, when from a *seeing-that*, he concludes to a *seeing-something*: "From the point of view of Intentionality, all seeing is seeing *that*: whenever it is true to say that *x* sees *y* it must be true that *x* sees that such and such is the case" (Searle 1983: 40). Such an assumption leads to stating that every *seeing-something (p)* must be understood as *seeing-that-p*: every time I see a red ball, I see that the ball is red. In this respect, any perception will have a propositional content which can be expressed as the ascription of identity or as a predicament.

In many cases, it may be true that perception corresponds to a propositional perception of the type *seeing-that-p*. Such a description, however, obliterates the fact that a) there are intentional forms of seeing that cannot be immediately translated into ascription of identity and b) that there are forms of seeing that do not have any intentional content at all.

*Intentional, but non-propositional seeing*: In many cases, seeing is directed to an object, although we would be incapable of unambiguously telling the nature of the object. We might be aware *that* we are in front of something without being able to name it. This is particularly true of images, which do not give us the possibility to vary our angle of perspective. Confronted with certain portraits or caricatures, we might say that the face "reminds" or "looks like" *x*, without enabling Searle's conclusion that every *seeing-that* is a *seeing-that-p*. Or, in other terms: every *seeing-something* is not necessarily a *seeing-something-as-something*.

*Non-propositional seeing without an object*: Many types of vision such as peripheral vision or perception in a state of fatigue, for instance, are not intentionally directed towards an object nor to its recognition. Rather, they allow a particular attention to qualitative or atmospheric dimensions. Many artists have delved into this kind of vision in their image installations, from the American Color Field Painters up to James Turrell boxes or Olafur Eliasson's *Black Horizon*. Such a visual experience *in* the immersive space of the image allows for a reflection on the visual process itself and to its performative dimension. Rather than the *what*, it is the *how* that comes into focus. The quality of vision – the "how" – does not allow for any propositional or existential claim.

However, such non-propositional and non-object-oriented types of vision are far from being unfathomable or mysterious: they rather correspond to modes of distinction that attributive logics of the concept do not adequately account for. Or as Wittgenstein would say, the "grammar" of the visual field, unlike that of language, is not based on unambiguously discrete elements. The *Big Typescript* is explicit in this respect: "the visual field does clearly not consist of discrete parts" (*Der Gesichtsraum besteht offenbar nicht aus diskreten Teilen*; Wittgenstein 2000, 2.243.4.1).

When referring to a nonconceptual gaze, classical aesthetics have often invoked the proverbial “*je-ne-sçais-quoi*” or “*non so ch *”. This gaze, however, is not a farewell to intelligence, but the opening of another, of a *visual* intelligence, crucial in approaching images. Such an attention to the “how” or – in other terms – to the *style* of the visually organized field, is albeit not restricted to the gaze of the art critic or the *connoisseur*. Experiments with pigeons (i.e. birds with a high capacity of orientation in landscapes seen from above) have shown that through specific training, the pigeons are able to distinguish between cubist and impressionist paintings (Watanabe et al. 1995). It would be hard to attribute a notion of “cubism” or “impressionism” to the birds; and it is improbable that they recognize women, fruits or rags or the fact that their representation is twisted. Nevertheless, the pigeon’s identification of the *style* of painting is almost flawless. Drawing on similar experiments, Arthur Danto thus concluded in his essay *Animals as Art Historians*: “Pictures as such are not like propositions, nor can we speak of a pictorial language, as Wittgenstein endeavored to do in his *Tractatus*, since animals demonstrably have pictorial competence while animal propositional – or sentential – competence remains undemonstrated” (Danto 1992: 20).

## 2. Seeing-in

The specific pictorial competence that can be acquired or trained is, however, different from the *seeing-as* insofar as it cannot be taught independently of the perceptive situation. While *seeing-as* can easily be translated into similar expressions devoid of any sensory dimension such as “interpreting-as” or “understanding-as”, the situated visual discrimination can *only* be made in front of the object. As opposed to linguistically mediated learning of the propositional content of the ‘as’, the discrimination is made along lines *within* the artifact. Or as Danto formulates it, beings without propositional competence but with pictorial competence like pigeons are, though not capable of *seeing-as*, capable of *seeing-in* (Danto 1992: 28).

The category of „seeing-in” has been introduced by Richard Wollheim in order to address the double problem that a) *seeing-as* is not specific to pictorial perception and b) a general structure of perception has been wrongly applied to pictorial perception. A striking case of a flawed generalization of the duck-rabbit-example to pictorial vision as such is Ernst Gombrich’s image theory. For Gombrich, the disjunctive structure of Jastrow’s figure is that of images in general: we may *either* see what is represented or be attentive to the canvas, but we can never see both at the same time: “To understand the battle horse is for a moment to disregard the plane surface. We cannot have it both ways” (Gombrich 1960: 279). Michael Polanyi contested Gombrich’s disjunctive logic, inasmuch as he showed that the *seeing-what* and *seeing-in* do not operate on the same level but correspond to a “focal” and to a “subsidiary” or “peripheral awareness” (Polanyi 1970: 153). Wollheim, in turn, not only contests the claim that “we cannot have it both ways”, he moreover maintains that images *require* “simultaneous attention to what is seen and to the features of the medium” (Wollheim 1980: 212). Images are neither fully transparent with respect to their referential object nor totally opaque, exposing their material qualities of the medium: according to Wollheim, images always imply an attentional “twofoldness” (a *trompe l’oeil* would thus not meet the requirements for being an image).

Hence, Wollheim’s concept of *seeing-in* firstly aims at readjusting the conceptualist bias of the *seeing-in* logic, which focuses on the fleshed out “recognitional” aspect, in

order to rehabilitate a “configurational aspect”. Secondly, it aims at rehabilitating the material, objective qualities of the image’s medium, *in* which something is seen. This second point, although claimed by Wollheim, can be doubted, however. By insisting on the creational aspect of *seeing-in*, referring to our capacity to seeing dragons’ heads in clouds and castles in a Rorschach inkblot, Wollheim reduces the “recognitional” dimension intrinsic to *seeing-as*. But can we distinguish *seeing-in* from a *seeing-into*? In other words: can we distinguish the perception of a form emerging from a canvas and an arbitrary projection onto a surface, regardless of its configuration? To avoid the impression of arbitrariness, Wollheim is required to introduce a further element: while in standard perception, we may virtually project everything into everything, pictorial *seeing-in* is only successful, when we see in the image what the artist wanted us to see in it (Wollheim 1980: 207).

It is somewhat curious how Wollheim, who affirms to be advocating for an “object theory” of images, counterweighs the excessive subjectivity of the spectator’s gaze by the subjectivity of an artist’s intentional gaze. But a theory of the gaze does not provide us yet with a theory of the image. Once again, the co-constitutive function of the material medium of the image is eluded. Moreover, the introduction of the artist’s intention is announced as an effort of disambiguating the multiple possible perceptions of an image. While arguments can be brought forth questioning the possibility of such a disambiguation (Lopes 1996, ch. 8.3), one could raise a further question: why does the ambiguity of images have to be reduced to the twofoldness of denotate and medium? Isn’t Wollheim’s “bivalence” theory yet another reduction to a static simultaneity of what is, phenomenologically speaking, constantly oscillating? Can we exclude *trompe l’oeil*’s from the domain of images straight away, simply because they do not meet the requirements of the simultaneous perception of figure and medium? Wollheim’s formalization of imageity must inevitably lead to what Merleau-Ponty termed as “bad ambiguity”. Can an image theory be developed which would not think images in terms either of a disjunctive logic (like Gombrich) or of simultaneous twofoldness (like Wollheim), but rather in their very manifoldness?

## 3. Seeing-with

In *L’Œil et l’esprit*, Merleau-Ponty affirms that we “do not look at [a painting] as one looks at a thing [...] Rather than seeing it, I see according to, or with it” (Merleau-Ponty 1964: 126). This *seeing-with* underscored by Merleau-Ponty has long been underestimated in contemporary image theories, which either excessively focus on images as mere things or, on the contrary, on the constitutive force of the gaze. While Merleau-Ponty elsewhere criticizes the idea of images as “second things” (*choses secondes*), devoid of any own efficacy, in this statement, he implicitly targets the dominance of a gaze theory of images, in particular that of Sartre. Sartre’s *L’Imaginaire* is thoroughly based on a concept of consciousness which can be compared to that of Wittgenstein’s “change of aspects” (*Aspektwechse*). In order to see an image, I need, according to Sartre, to “deny” the materiality of the painting. We may either look at the material qualities of the image-object in a “perceptive attitude” (*attitude perceptive*) or, by changing our consciousness state and negating the material world, we may have an image emerging in an “imaging attitude” (*attitude imageante*) (Sartre 1943). For Merleau-Ponty on the contrary, an image does not emerge *despite* its material support, but *thanks to it*. In an unpublished manuscript, Merleau-Ponty notes: “What is a *Bild*? It is manifest that we do not look at a *Bild* the way we look at



an object. We look according to the *Bild* [selon le *Bild*]” (Fonds Merleau-Ponty, BNF, vol. VIII: 346). In other words, we do not only see *in* images, rather seldom as images, never *despite* them but always *with* them and *through* them.

Seeing through images does not mean that images are transparent windows onto reality: as Wittgenstein says in another context, one thinks “that one is retracing nature over and over again, and one is merely tracing round the form through which we see it” (Wittgenstein 1993, §114, modified trans.). Stating that we see *through* images means that, rather than neutral surfaces of the beholder’s projection, images *generate* gazes which, although never ultimately fixed, are by no means arbitrary. The form of the image, its figural organization, its material ridges, dales and crests, open up a space for potential vision. Between the unambiguousness of a communicational message or an artist’s intention inscribed into the object and the image as a space of free variation of consciousness, it appears that the density of images, their material stratification and their phenomenological overdetermination demands a specific time of contemplation.

Seeing with images then means that the evidence they provide the spectator resists generalization without further ado: iconic evidence is not a ladder that could be thrown away after we have climbed it, but remains inherently situation-dependent, case-sensitive and thus, ultimately, precarious. Images help drawing distinctions, but these distinctions do not exist beyond the material medium which they organize from inside. Images thus yield a potential, but neither in the sense of a mere indetermination (the *pura potentia* of matter) nor of a preexistent form or meaning which the gaze would have to reveal, just as the sculptor releases the already inherent form from within the marble. Rather, seeing with images entails following those veins in the marble of which Leibniz said that they signify a tension inherent to matter towards certain unfoldings and individuations.

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# The Aesthetic Commitment of Philosophical Analysis

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What is Wittgenstein saying when he claims that a philosophical investigation resembles an aesthetic investigation? What do aesthetic issues and conceptual issues have in common? I would like to show that, for Wittgenstein, a certain kind of aesthetic experience is presupposed in philosophical analysis as he comes to conceive of it in the Thirties. It is the experience of becoming receptive to grammatical facts, and pursuing the exactness of expression that characterizes the language of poetry

1. Aesthetics was always paramount in Wittgenstein's thinking. In *Tractatus*, aesthetics (together with ethics) shares the transcendentalism of logic. This must be regarded as following from the picture theory of language: aesthetical propositions are meant to express value judgments, hence they do not picture anything. They are concerned with the limits of the world, though not in the same way as the propositions of logic.

Much changes in Wittgenstein's philosophy after *Tractatus*; however, even after setting the picture theory aside he claims that there is a "queer resemblance between a philosophical investigation (perhaps especially in mathematics) and an aesthetic one. (E.g. what is bad about this garment, how it should be, etc)" (CV p.25, 1936). Moreover, he declares that "I may find scientific questions interesting, but they never really grip me. Only *conceptual* and *aesthetic* questions do that" (CV p.79). What is the queer resemblance between a philosophical investigation and an aesthetic one about? Wittgenstein's philosophical investigations concern a variety of utterances from very different domains of discourse: anthropology, psychology, mathematics, traditional philosophy ("metaphysics"), ethics, and aesthetics as well. Why, then, are *only* aesthetical issues regarded as akin to conceptual ones?

2. In his *Wittgenstein's Lectures in 1930-1933*, Moore recalls that, as he wondered about the nature of anthropological understanding, Wittgenstein would deny that it could be derived from causal explanation and would insist that in anthropology we are interested in understanding *what strikes us*. Now, the question "Why does this impress us?" he took to be quite similar to such aesthetic questions as "Why is this beautiful?" or "Why will this bass not do?" (LM p.107). Thus, a first, tentative answer to our question might be that Wittgenstein regarded aesthetics as a kind of model for anthropological understanding. (Bell 1984, Dei 1991). However, this is not enough to clarify the relation between aesthetics and philosophy; moreover, it doesn't appear to be entirely accurate.

In Wittgenstein's *Lectures and Conversations* we read that in order to achieve a clear picture of what aesthetic words mean, "you have to describe ways of living" (LC p.11). "We think we have to talk about aesthetic judgements like 'This is beautiful', but we find that if we have to talk about aesthetic judgements we don't find these words at all, but a word used something like a gesture, accompanying a complicated activity" (LC p.11). Here we might say that anthropology serves aesthetic under-

standing, rather than that aesthetics is of help in anthropological understanding.

A second answer to our question would come from pointing out that Wittgenstein's aesthetical interest was so deep and pervasive to be an ever-present background ingredient of every philosophical investigation he carried out. Because of the central role he gave to the aesthetic while writing about the different philosophical topics he was interested in, "he was writing—if at one remove—about aesthetics. For questions of meaning, of perception, and of sense are all clearly central to aesthetic experience, and the writing he undertook on these subjects holds significance for questions of artistic meaning" (Hagberg 2007). It is no doubt correct to emphasize that Wittgenstein's analyses concerning meaning, perception, and the senses can be instrumental in reformulating aesthetical issues, thereby originating something like a Wittgensteinian aesthetics (see Gibson and Huemer 2004); but on the other hand, it seems wrong to claim that the philosophy of art, or of artistic experience, played such a central role in his philosophical reflection. If such had been the case, surely Wittgenstein would have done more than just jotting down a few sparse remarks about literary texts and musical works: he would have engaged the topic more persistently, as he did with mathematics, psychology, logic, colors, and certainty.

In what follows I would like to show that, although matters of meaning, of perception, and of sense are all central in aesthetic experience, there is a kind of aesthetic experience that is crucial for the kind of philosophical analysis Wittgenstein pursued and actually practiced. It is a kind of aesthetic experience that is presupposed in Wittgenstein's new method of doing philosophy.

3. Remarks in two different areas can be distinguished in the *Lectures on Aesthetics*. There are (1) remarks on the meaning of aesthetical words and our understanding of aesthetical judgments, and (2) remarks on aesthetic experience, i.e. on aesthetic disquiet/puzzlement and the satisfaction of it. As we saw, Wittgenstein tackles the issue of understanding aesthetic judgments from an anthropological and contextualist viewpoint: to understand the meaning of aesthetical words, we must describe a whole culture and the role that words occurring in aesthetic judgments play within such culture. "The words we call expressions of aesthetic judgment play a very complicated role, but a very definite role, in what we call a culture of a period. To describe their use or to describe what you mean by a cultured taste, you have to describe a culture. What we now call a cultured taste perhaps didn't exist in the Middle Ages. An entirely different game is played in different ages." (LC p.8). "What belongs to a language game is a whole culture. In describing musical taste you have to describe whether children give concerts, whether women do or whether men only give them, etc., etc." (*ib.*). Nothing of this is unexpected.

By contrast, aesthetic experience is presented and described in ways that are not entirely obvious. On the one hand we have disquiet, that consists in being affected by certain sequences of sounds, or of pictures, or words. We

feel that something is wrong. Such disquiet cannot be assuaged by causal explanation; what is needed is comparison of a particular kind. "The sort of explanation one is looking for when one is puzzled by an aesthetic impression is not a causal explanation, not one corroborated by experience or by statistics as to how people react" (LC p.21).<sup>1</sup> "What we really want, to solve aesthetic puzzles, is certain comparisons – grouping together of certain cases" (LC p.29). On the other hand we have aesthetic satisfaction, occasionally accompanied by words of approval such as 'right' or 'correct'. When we are satisfied, it is as if something "clicked" (LC p. 19). "It is as though you needed some criterion, namely the clicking, to know the right thing has happened" (*ib.*). But the picture of something clicking, Wittgenstein says, is just a simile: "... really there is nothing that clicks or that fits anything" (*ib.*).

Finding that something is the right thing may come from having developed a *feeling for the rules* (LC p.5); it may consist in agreeing with someone about the right thing being right or correct. Wittgenstein describes the case of a tailor learning the rules of tailoring and developing sensitivity to such rules, whether he is just mechanically following them or he is interpreting them. Concerning the other case, he points out that correctness and agreement support each other:

"What is in my mind when I say so and so"? I write a sentence. One word isn't the one I need. I find the right word. "What it is I want to say? Oh yes. That is what I wanted." The answer in these cases is the one that satisfied you, e.g. someone says (as we often say in philosophy): "I will tell you what is at the back of your mind: ..." – "Oh yes, quite so." The criterion for it being the one that was in your mind is that when I tell you, you agree" (LC p.18).

The last quotation once more includes explicit mention of philosophy. Indeed, in the new method of philosophical analysis Wittgenstein adopted in the course of the Thirties, *agreement* plays a crucial role: agreement that arises – or rather, ought to arise – between the philosopher and his reader on the correctness or accuracy of the philosopher's description of a grammatical problem. "Indeed we can convict someone else of a mistake if he acknowledges that this really is the expression of his feeling.// ... If he (really) acknowledges this expression as the correct expression of his feeling [*Gefühls*]" (P p165).

The many sides of Wittgenstein's philosophical method (the "morphological method", so called) have been widely investigated and described (e.g. by Hacker, 2005); such descriptions will not be repeated here. However, a few aspects of the method are still to be clarified if we are to understand how deep the relation is of aesthetics and philosophy, according to Wittgenstein.

4. Wittgenstein insists that "philosophy is a struggle against the bewitchment of our understanding by the resources of our language" (PI 109). One consequence is that the philosopher is not to introduce a new language, a technical language, to face philosophical problems. To dissolve philosophical disquiet deriving from misunderstanding our own rules, he is only to employ the language that is already in use. The difficulty a philosopher has to face is the following: on the one hand, "The aspects of things that are most important for us are hidden because of their simplicity and familiarity" (PI 129 /CV p.39). On the

other, it is thanks to such familiarity that the comparative activity that is grammatical analysis can be successful: "And this is what the solution of all philosophical difficulties looks like. Their answers, if they are correct, must be homespun and ordinary." (P p.167). To get out of the *impasse*, philosophers must develop a kind of talent, a special ability: "The capacity [the talent] for philosophy consists in the ability to receive a strong and lasting impression from a grammatical fact" (P p.183). Like the man "who is not used to searching in the forest for flowers, berries, or plants, will not find any because his eyes are not trained to see them [*sein Auge ... nicht geschärft ist*]" (CV p.29) [...], "someone unpractised in philosophy passes by all the spots where difficulties are hidden in the grass, whereas someone who has practice will pause and *sense* [my italics] that there is a difficulty close by" (*ib.*). Like the tailor who has developed a feeling for rules (of tailoring) so that he can find the right cut, the philosopher has to develop a feeling for the rules of grammar that would enable him to "express all false thought processes" so characteristically that the reader will say, "Yes, that's exactly the way I meant it" (P p.165). He has "to make a tracing of the physiognomy of every error" (*ib.*). This is what might be called the *aesthetic commitment* of this kind of philosophical analysis: the *peculiar sensitivity* or *receptivity* the philosopher has to achieve to have insights into the workings of our language (PI 109), to receive impressions from the labyrinth of paths our language consists in (PI 203). To be sure, this disposition to receive strong and lasting impressions from grammatical facts comes from the hard work of ploughing through the whole language (P p.195). "When you are philosophizing – Wittgenstein tells us – you have to descend into primeval chaos and feel at home there" (CV p.65). Moreover, since a philosophical problem "always has the form: 'I simply don't know my way about'" (P p.181/ PI 123), it is of the utmost importance that one can "depict[ing] anomalies precisely" (CV p.72); "If you cannot do it – Wittgenstein declares – that shows you do not know your way around the concepts" (*ib.*).

By making the most of the aesthetic commitment of Wittgenstein's philosophical analysis, we can also understand the new ideal of correctness he formed in connection with his new method. It is an ideal that has nothing to do with logical exactness (PI 88,89), while it is related to the search for the right word in poetry. As the philosopher "ought to be no more than a mirror, in which [the] reader can see his own thinking with all its deformities so that, helped in this way, he can put it right" (CV p.18), an important part of her work should consist in the choice of the right words, "because only the exactly aimed thought can lead to the correct track" (P p.165). Wittgenstein can be entirely explicit about the relation of philosophy to poetry: "I think I summed up my attitude to philosophy when I said: philosophy ought really to be written only as a *poetic composition* (*Philosophie dürfte man eigentlich nur dichten*)." (CV p.24) . An then he adds: "It must ... be possible to gather from this how far my thinking belongs to the present, future or past. For I was thereby revealing myself as someone who cannot quite do what he would like to be able to do" (*ib.*).

Recalling the origin of Wittgenstein's morphological method, should we see this as promoting some version of the Romantic (indeed, Goethian) ideal of depicting the secret laws of Nature in the forms of poetry?<sup>2</sup> Surely not. Wittgenstein was critical of Goethe's illusion that a scientific theory of colors could be produced just by describing

relations among colors. Aesthetic commitment cannot ground knowledge that would reveal new facts and respond, one way or another, to the world out there. It can only be an ingredient of the kind of conceptual analysis that, like Wittgenstein's, intends to put in order the rules we gave ourselves but in which we have become entangled. In this kind of analysis, one might say, we are only responsible to ourselves, or at the most to those who agree with us and, in this sense, share our community of thought.

### Endnotes

<sup>1</sup> "You could say: 'An aesthetic explanation is not a causal explanation'" (LC p.18).

<sup>2</sup> On these themes, see Richards 2002 and Steuer 2006.

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# Intention in Aesthetics

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In what follows, I will try to give an account of the concept of intention as it is used in the field of aesthetics. I will focus mainly on Wittgenstein's *Lectures on Aesthetics*, trying to explain some of the insights, I believe, he has provided on the use of this fundamental concept. This implies, that we first take into account, the various differences in the use of the concept of justification, since intention is often used in aesthetics as a form of justification. Secondly, we have to try to understand how intention could possibly be of some help in trying to understand the meaning of a certain aesthetical object or action. Thirdly, I will offer a way of looking at intention in aesthetics, as a way of manifesting an attitude, trying to claim, that this, is fundamental to this particular activity.

In the *Lectures on Aesthetics*, Wittgenstein gives the following example:

One case is, where you give the reason for your doing something. 'Why did you write 6249 under the line?' You give the multiplication you had done. 'I arrived at it by this multiplication.' This is comparable to giving a mechanism. One might call it giving a motive for writing down the numbers. It means, I passed through such and such a process of reasoning. Here 'Why did you do it?' means 'How did you get there?' You give a reason, the road you went. (LA, III, §13)

First, it is necessary to explain the analogy used by Wittgenstein that relates this case to a "mechanism". Wittgenstein is, through this analogy, trying to show us the fact that "a certain thought process", in this particular case a multiplication, only makes sense when there is necessarily one single result (or to put it in a different way: that a particular mechanism produces one single result; and it cannot produce another). Wittgenstein is not arguing here for the existence of a certain type of mental mechanism with the name *multiplication*. The paragraph starts with: "One case is, where you give the reason for your doing something"(Ibid.), that suggests that what will follow is a commentary, precisely, about a certain type of *justification*. What Wittgenstein's example implies is very important for the understanding of Wittgenstein's argument concerning aesthetics. In the *Remarks on the Foundations of Mathematics*, Wittgenstein deals with a problem that is related to the previous example. The passage is the following:

Now I am said to have multiplied when I have carried out the multiplication  $265 \times 463$ , and also when I say: 'twice four is eight', although here no calculating procedure led to the product (which, however, I could also have *worked out*). And so we also say a conclusion is drawn, where it is not calculated. (RFA, §7, 6e)

The most important aspect of this commentary is what Wittgenstein calls "to draw a conclusion". In the case of multiplication, the criteria for drawing a conclusion is a particular result (that one and no other), that makes the process (through which we got the result) necessary only in certain cases. This simply means that in the case of multiplication, "I passed through such and such a process of reasoning" (LA, III, §13) is only relevant when we are asked how we got to *that* particular answer (but depending on our situation, we could for example memorize all the

answers needed). The multiplication is the reason of our result (in the sense of constituting it) and not a justification of our result (in the sense of a possible justification, since there cannot be another). The consequence we have to extract from this difference is that "*reason/justification* doesn't always means the same" (LA, III, §16, n. 2), and in the case of aesthetics it certainly doesn't mean something similar to the case of multiplication. In aesthetics, the meaning of *reason/justification* we use is not, as Wittgenstein describes, "a report of what was done" (LA, III, §15). Being nothing similar to a report, it follows that it can be various different things and Wittgenstein mentions a few examples, "I could have gone this way" or to give a particular process "though I didn't go through this process" (Ibid.). In a footnote to the same paragraph, Rush Rhees gives a description of what we could call a reason in aesthetics, "it may be what we now see would justify it." (LA, III, §15, n. 1) The "now" in Rhees's sentence is very important and it suggests a particular attitude towards the concept of intention in the *Lectures on Aesthetics*. The "now" in Rhees's sentence, suggests that a certain explanation or *reason/justification* for an aesthetic action can change; in the case of multiplication this hypothesis is absurd.

The importance of the concept of intention as something that can solve the problem of knowing a certain *use* is questioned in the *Lectures on Aesthetics*. Wittgenstein makes up an example where his student Taylor and Wittgenstein himself are walking alongside a river when suddenly Taylor stretches out his arm, pushing Wittgenstein into the river. When Wittgenstein asks Taylor for a reason for such an action, Taylor replies: "I was pointing out something to you." (LA, III, §18) But a psychoanalyst might have a different opinion, namely that Taylor unconsciously hated Wittgenstein. In the paragraph, following this example, Wittgenstein says:

Both explanations may be correct. When would we say that Taylor's explanation was correct? When he had never shown any unfriendly feelings, when a church-steeple and I were in his field of vision, and Taylor was known to be thoughtful. But, under the same circumstances, the psycho-analyst's explanation may be correct. Here there are two motives – conscious and unconscious. The games played with two motives are utterly different. The explanations could in a sense be contradictory and yet both be correct. (LA, III, §19)

In this explanation, Wittgenstein talks about "games played with two motives"; motives that are clear and motives that are not so obvious (I would like to omit Wittgenstein's reference to "conscious" and "unconscious", although it is very important in the discussion that follows in his lecture). In the example I have just described, the hypothesis advanced by the psychoanalyst can be the correct one, and that hypothesis is precisely about something that isn't obvious, as the reason given by Taylor is. Wittgenstein does not even consider the possibility that Taylor could have more authority on explaining his action, or if the best way of knowing what happened would be to ask Taylor; he simply states that both explanations could be correct. The reason for this is partially given in the previous example. The same way we are unable to give a sort of mechanism for our answers in aesthetics, that mechanism cannot be

substituted by its supposed mental analog—intention. This simply means that the meaning of Taylor's action cannot be directly derived from any mental state he might *have* or be having at that time. The hypothesis that Taylor might *have* the key for our enigma, "which of the two explanations is the correct one", results from the fact that we attribute to Taylor's supposed mental state the meaning of his action. However, if it were simply like that, we would not have access to such mental states. Nevertheless, it would not be only us that would not have access to such mental state, Taylor also would not, in this particular sense. What makes it impossible for Taylor to have access to his mental state is that Taylor doesn't *have* anything in the sense of possessing something (as in "I have a car"). The tendency for us to think about *having* in those terms is analogous to what Wittgenstein says in *Zettel*: "Here meaning gets imagined as a kind of mental pointing, indicating." (Z, §12) This means that Taylor doesn't *have* something that he can point to, and by the same token he couldn't possibly *compare* it with his action, in the same way someone corrects a test (one consisting in writing the solutions for a set of multiplication problems) with a result sheet. Taylor does not have something he can know better by introspection. In the particular case of an intention, it is even strange to know in which moments such an introspection would come in handy or not. Since intention does not really have a duration, which makes it hard for Taylor to know when he is having an intention. In *Zettel*, Wittgenstein makes a claim that shows the absurdity of this conception:

"I have the intention of going away tomorrow. – When have you that intention? The whole time; or intermittently?" (Z, §46)

An answer to this question is impossible and Wittgenstein completes the sequence of this argument with the following claim:

"One may disturb someone in thinking – but in intending? – Certainly in planning. Also in keeping to an intention, that is in thinking or acting." (Z, §50)

The interesting point in Wittgenstein's argument is the possibility of disturbing someone who is carrying out an intention and this tells us something important about the grammar of intention. What we call intention is not a sensation (and so we cannot talk about intention in the same way we talk about pain, for instance) neither is it a particular mental state. When Wittgenstein describes the carrying out of an intention as *thinking* and *acting*, he is describing this concept as, "embedded in its situation, in human customs and institutions." (PI, §337) It follows that I can only have intentions that are relative to determined situations. Therefore, "to have the intention to talk about him" is "to talk about him" and it is in this way that the connection between my intention and *him* is established. I do not need to point at him: I don't need to point to anything at all; this particular problem is related to the Augustinian conception of language. Now if we turn back to the *Lecture on Aesthetics*, it is easier to understand the question, "When would we say that Taylor's explanation was correct?" (LA, III, §19), that leads us to another aspect in the example involving Taylor. In the case of aesthetics, we are already in a particular situation, as Taylor would be in if he were at an appointment with a psychoanalyst. Accepting to be in that particular situation is to accept that, "the psychoanalyst's explanation may also be correct." (Ibid.) A common aspect between the two games is that in both we are

expecting that someone will provide us with reasons and justifications for certain objects and actions, that do not follow necessarily (as opposed to the case of multiplication). Under these conditions, the intentions that I might have in art, that are very important, are important because of the conditions made possible by a particular situation (this is to say that the meaning of my intention depends on certain rules of that practice, that are, in turn, public). Others that are in the same situation as I am, know that importance, and can therefore understand my intentions (as well as I can). In the case of intentions in aesthetics, it is important to draw a distinction between "to understand" and "to find out" or "to guess". In the case of "to understand", we are solely talking about *giving the justification that will be accepted* (Cf. LA, II, 39), and this simply means, "to suggest a particular use". In the case of "to find out" or "to guess", the suggestion is that there is a single answer and the confusion that has to be avoided here is precisely that there is something similar to a key. It is because there is no such thing as a key (that I could hide from everybody), that I can understand other people's intentions. In *Zettel*, Wittgenstein makes some commentaries that clarify this particular point:

I might e.g. guess what continuation will give the other pleasure (by his expression, perhaps). The application of a rule can be guessed only when there is already a choice between different applications. (Z, §307)

In this commentary, Wittgenstein talks about guessing the use of a rule, which I consider an analogous case to the guessing of an intention. First, we have to understand the use Wittgenstein is making here of *guessing*. In the paragraph that precedes this one Wittgenstein says that "[t]o guess the meaning of a rule, to grasp it intuitively, could surely mean nothing but: to guess its *application*." (Z, §306) The paragraph concludes with: "And that can't now mean: to guess the kind of application; the rule for it. Nor does guessing come in here." (Ibid.) This means that Wittgenstein is not here talking about *guessing* in the sense of a *guessing game* where only one answer is possible. This aspect becomes clearer when Wittgenstein uses in his example the facial expression someone might make as a criterion for a determined use. Nevertheless, it is the second aspect of the example that is more curious. Wittgenstein says that in a particular sense I can guess the use of a certain rule if I can choose from a range of possibilities. In the case of aesthetics, we do not have such a list from which we can pick. In aesthetics we have something similar to what Wittgenstein describes in the first part of his example, namely, I make a certain use of a rule, others can smile or not.

Back to the *Lectures on Aesthetics*, Wittgenstein approaches the theme of intention in a way that clarifies important aspects about its use in aesthetics. In an example, Wittgenstein describes what he calls "two schools" (LA, IV, §10) that represent two different opinions concerning painting. The first school states that what is important is "the patches of colour." (Ibid.). The second school, on the other hand, says that, "What matters is the expression on these faces." (Ibid.). Wittgenstein asserts that "[i]n a sense, these two don't contradict one another." (Ibid.). And this is the only sense that should concern us here. The fact that both described schools are not contradicting each other is directly related to what I have said before about aesthetics not being in any possible sense analogous to calculus or "guessing games". However, Wittgenstein makes another important remark:

That tiny smile by which you change the kindly smile into an ironic one, is not a purely visual difference (Ibid.)

Further down we can read:

[Suppose you said:] 'It changes your whole attitude towards the picture.' This may be entirely true. How would this be expressed? Perhaps by the smile you make. (Ibid.)

What I intend to stress in this particular example is that the importance of both schools does not rely on them offering a solution for a certain problem (only in that case would it be meaningful to talk about contradiction). Their importance relies in the way they change our attitude towards a certain thing. The differences that can be pointed out, are as Wittgenstein says, not "purely visual" ones, and this forces both schools to reveal their own attitudes when attempting to describe the differences. This simply means that intentions in aesthetics are important precisely because they can be understood; they are part of the game. To be part of the game is more important than it may seem at first glance, because, in part, what can be asserted in aesthetics is already to manifest an attitude.

### Acknowledgment

Many thanks to the "Wittgenstein's *Philosophical Investigations*: Re-Evaluating a Project" at the Institute for the Philosophy of Language, New University of Lisbon, and especially the project's coordinator, Nuno Venturinha, for his suggestions and comments on this paper.

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# As Far as the Eye can Reach: Complete Analysis in the Intermediate Wittgenstein

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Conceptual analysis is one of the notions undergoing dramatic changes during Wittgenstein's intermediate period. There's an aspect of such changes which might prove characteristic of the new directions taken by Wittgenstein's thought after 1929: it is the notion of *complete analysis*. We believe that Wittgenstein's treatment of this notion is also an interesting indication of new concerns generated by the "new method" itself, in terms of its radical openness to dialogism and its anti-dogmatism. Our aim here will be to explore a couple of hints as to why this can be so.

In Wittgenstein's 'calculus' period, the work of conceptual analysis draws its elements from systems of rules in which the transitions between cases occur in the manner of a special kind of *automatism* (cf. PB §82; MS 209, p. 34). The inferential necessity that is internal to one system of rules, by marking a point in a transition, marks the other ones negatively – or, in a latter idiom: when making a move in the game, one makes all the other moves at once. Somehow I state that I haven't bought five peaches, if I declare having bought only three. When the notion of language games is introduced, the aspect of gradation of those systems is not eliminated: this aspect is transferred to open systems. We have, then, two steps. The first step is that of the pluralization of the logical form in the multiple forms of phenomena. This is the aspect through which the notion of rules is introduced in the early 30s. In this regard, professor Arley Moreno writes:

Each elementary fact is pictured *within* the system, i.e., by the exclusion of all the other elementary facts – and the proposition is now conceived as a *system* of representation, or better, as the closed set of all elementary propositions relative to a certain phenomenon of perception bearing gradation. (...) Although the central concern [of the *Tractatus*] remains in place, namely the idea of logical form, this latter, however, multiplies itself in the diverse logical forms of phenomena. (2007, p.71)

The second step is taken when the closure criterion of the systems of representation of phenomena bearing gradation is pluralized. In what sense, then, could we say that the idea of gradation is not completely abandoned? In the sense that the gradations now bear on the criteria themselves. The criteria now group themselves in families, whose members are then recognizable as such. However, the transitions have therein a less uniform regularity than in the case of the closed systems of rules.

What a strange idea – a less uniform regularity! Nevertheless, it becomes less offensive if we think of a system in which some intermediary spaces are *wider* than others, without thereby ceasing to be part of the *same* system. Figures of organic tissues occur to the mind, rather than figures of sets of gears. The family relation between chess and checkers is maintained when we insert in the list of relationships, say, the game of racket-ball – but in this case the relationship's intermediary links have to be a bit more stretched, so as to be based in comparative traits which are less easily surveyed. Which means that these comparative traits fit less easily in the idea of an inferential automatism. Moreover, when we look perspicu-

ously at how systems of this kind overlap, the nexuses become increasingly vaguer, more fluid, as we distance ourselves from what we could call their ideal model, which constitutes a sort of focus of view when we examine them – a sort of caricature. This doesn't mean that there isn't, at some point, a passage out of the system; but the identification of the passage out of the system is made in a manner which is constitutively vague, such as in the case of the limits of the scope of concepts like 'memory' and 'visual field'. In short: vague – but adequately delineable nonetheless. We can find at this point an aspect of what could well be characterized as the realm of completeness of conceptual analysis in the language games period. And at the same time it becomes clearer the reason for the calculus metaphor to weaken over the years.

More than 'calculus', the operative metaphor is, here, that of vision. But it must be understood not as a new problem, but in its cooperative contrast with the notion of *thinking* (PU §66). The question is one of seeing what is expressive without letting oneself be seduced by the idea of what is not expressive but is *supposed to be*, although one doesn't see how it *could*.

Nevertheless, we seem to have a tendency to mistrust grammar, in the sense of *thinking* and not just *seeing*. There we recognize the attraction of knowledge based in a systematic answer to the skeptic, in the way of the hyperbolic doubt. "Is no demon deceiving us at present?", asks Wittgenstein in the *Remarks on the Foundations of Mathematics*. "Well, if he is, it doesn't matter. What the eye doesn't see the heart doesn't grieve over" (BGM, II, §78). To be enthralled in an infinite answer to the skeptic is something that stands in the way of the vision of certain consequences of the private language argument (which is crucial to the philosophical use of the metaphor of vision), as Baker & Hacker have shown (1984). 1. It does not make sense to interpose, between recognition and judgment (or assertion), a *Scheinwesen*, a mysterious stage of private recognition of an object or property, for which a new rule would then be needed, etc. 2. The connection between rule and case is made by way of a *training* and also a *habit*.

It is the private language argument that allows to accommodate a notion of complete analysis to the expansion of the realm of conceptual analysis, by means of a radicalization of the role of rules in the grammatical regulation of experience. This radicalization of the role of rules, by the way, allows to accommodate *within conceptual analysis* not only the cases whose criterial limits are vague, but even those in which *no* rules are identified by the philosopher. This stems from the fact that, now, a line of kinship between games can be established up to a point where the very boundaries between what is meaningful and what is not become extremely vague – which is something intolerable within the framework of the calculus period.

Doesn't the analogy of language to a game enlighten us here? We can very well imagine that people in a meadow might entertain themselves by playing with a



ball; and that they might do this in such a way that they'd begin various existing games one after the other without finishing them, and in between would even throw, catch, drop the ball, etc., aimlessly. Now someone might say: These people are playing a ball game the entire time, and that is why at each throw they comply with specific rules. (...) – We can say: Let's investigate language with regard to its rules. If here and there it doesn't have any rules, then that is the result of our investigation. (TS213, p.254r, in N)

There's a threefold therapeutic process of this passage, the source of *Investigations* §83. First, the investigator assumes an unhaunted view in regard to the possibility of a domain which is supposedly without rules. The gain here is, once again, to elude theoretic hypostases populating such dreadfully empty domain: where there is a simple acting-like-that, we postulate an experience, and the postulation is then projected onto *practice* like a fog covering a landscape, allowing for glimpses of isolated, uncharacteristic areas. Second, the investigator releases his view to the determinations effectively showing up in the games but *just up to the point in which they show up to us*, the point where we can see them. Why? Because the investigator is no longer focused in the search of some automatism of the transitions or inferences. He is no longer excessively focused on refuting the agostinian referentialist, opposing to him the autonomous field of precise contours of the closed rules systems.

Finally, the negative results of the lineament of a rule-less field amidst experience are cheered. Reflecting latter on method, Wittgenstein states an approbation of a similar idea:

It seems to me I am still a long way from understanding these things; from the point, that is, at which I know what I have to talk about, & what I don't need to talk about. I still keep getting entangled in detail without knowing whether I ought to be talking about such things at all; & I have the impression that I may be inspecting a large area, simply to exclude it eventually from consideration. But even in this case these reflections would not be worthless; as long, that is, as they are not just going round in a circle. (VB, p.74; MS136, p.37a, 25.12.1947)

The risk of taking paths that lead to nowhere is inherent to the anti-dogmatism of the new method. But not as a defect of it – in the same sense in which the sign of a dead-end street is not useless to the orientation of a lost person. On the other hand, it is also inherent to the anti-dogmatism of the new method the recognition that “not everything that can be said was said”, that “not everything that can be said was circumscribed” (Salles 2006, p.52). Sometimes, the analyst is unable to recognize if something that can be said was said or not – or, in the last analysis, even if something was said *tout court*. A supposedly random gesture *can* have a meaning, inasmuch as a view is abandoned that demands from it a meaning it *must* have. There is a

subtle aspect of an attitude stated in the *Philosophical Grammar* that is relinquished here: that of considering that nothing is possible (i.e., no philosophical investigation) before the distinction between sense and nonsense (PG, VI, §81). In a way, a closer look at the use of symbolism in the clearly established context of continuous, or open systems of rules renders the precise identification of that distinction a more delicate matter, to say the least. It is not a question of diminishing the importance of that distinction, on the contrary: it is a question of turning it into an internal part of the work (instead of a starting point of the work, a sort of philosophy degree zero) precisely because it is important. An investigation on the limits of sense that ceases to dogmatically postulate the establishment of those limits now assimilates, in its continuous practice, that very establishment.

So a complete logical analysis is possible and desirable. But it is not complete in some dogmatic sense, i.e., in some sense of closure and ultimity; such would be the case if it rendered the complete grammar of the concept under exam. *This* sense of completeness is not given by the philosophical work, nor does the work intend to. When we look without thinking to the working with concepts, we do not know yet exactly in what way, and at what point, an analysis reaches its end. But we know that it must find this point in a logical *now*, so as to fulfill its function, in a localized manner, but whole nonetheless. This can be seen as an observation on method: the logical analysis in the context of the language games must be seen as an antidote against the bewilderment of the reflection on language – but stopping there, not taking the remedy too far (by extending, for instance, the reach of a clarifying comparison beyond the point of its utility). Another way of saying this is to say, with Arley Moreno (1995), that the therapy of the images does not aim at dissolving them as *images*, but purports to modify our attitude in relation to those images whose very necessity we consider necessary. It is to that end that the conceptual analysis strives to show the non-necessity of necessity *in a complete manner*.

The “new method” is not iconoclastic: “(All that philosophy can do is to destroy idols. And that means not creating a new one – say in the “absence of an idol”)” (TS 213, p. 413, in N). The description of our language games does not purport to improve them or amend them, in a virtually infinite work, but to exhibit its internal determinations. The perspicuous presentation exhibits this determinations *in the context of a suggested comparison*. Such operation must be completed in each case. For clarity as an intrinsic value is the great hope of the “new method” to bring about the complete dissolution of a disquieting of the mind that paralyzes it, preventing thought from moving on in the mode of a *und so weiter*. But this sense of completeness is not made into a new idol. It is just the right tool for the appointed job of the philosophical business. As far as the eye can reach.

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# Wittgenstein on the Question of Being: Where Kierkegaardian Paths Meet

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## 1. Introduction

Kierkegaard exerted a major influence on both Heidegger and Wittgenstein. Yet little attention has been paid to the affinities between their Kierkegaardian lines of thought. Here I will argue that through Kierkegaard we find a very important connection between Heidegger and Wittgenstein. Through this *nexus* we see that Wittgenstein puts forward an argument against the central question of Heidegger's philosophy: the question of the meaning of being. This can be understood as the result of Heidegger and Wittgenstein taking different Kierkegaardian paths that meet one another.

This argument is latent in the following mysterious and controversial remark made in conversation with Friedrich Waismann on 30 December 1929. Here we see the only occurrence in Wittgenstein's remarks of both Heidegger's and Kierkegaard's names:

To be sure, I can imagine what Heidegger means by being (*Sein*) and anxiety (*Angst*). Man feels the urge to run up against the limits of language. Think for example of the astonishment that anything at all exists. This astonishment cannot be expressed in the form of a question, and there is no answer whatsoever. Anything we might say is *a priori* bound to be mere nonsense. Nevertheless we do run up against the limits of language. Kierkegaard too saw that there is this running up against something and he referred to it in a fairly similar way (as running up against paradox). (Waismann: 68)

Wittgenstein's claim that he 'can imagine what Heidegger means' has generated much controversy. So controversial was this that when first published in 1965, the first sentence was omitted. However, little attention has been paid to the charge of nonsense that Wittgenstein appears to bring against Heidegger; thus, the supporting argument that may be latent has not been properly unearthed. I will argue that here we see Wittgenstein put forward an argument against Heidegger's question of being.

## 2. Anxiety

Following his claim that he 'can imagine what Heidegger means by being and anxiety', Wittgenstein invites us to think of 'the astonishment that anything at all exists'. We might understand this as Wittgenstein's characterisation of Heidegger's notion of anxiety. Looking at what Heidegger means by anxiety, we see that this is a possible characterisation.

Heidegger defines anxiety as Dasein's state of mind brought about not by any entity within the world, but in the face of the world as *such* (Heidegger: 230). To elucidate this he employs Kierkegaard's distinction between anxiety and fear. Fear, Heidegger writes, is always directed at entities within the world, whereas anxiety has no intraworldly object (*cf. ibid.*). For Kierkegaard, fear always has reference to some definite object, whereas anxiety does not have reference to any specific object in the world, but is brought about in the face of myself as a free being.

Kierkegaardian anxiety is the vertiginous experience we might have when becoming aware of our infinite possibilities (*cf. Kierkegaard 1980: 42, 61*).

Heidegger also employs this Kierkegaardian insight. He claims that the 'disclosure' of 'the world as world' reveals the true nature of Dasein's being to it: being-in-the-world. In anxiety Dasein is thus 'brought before itself and becomes disclosed to itself' (Heidegger: 225), because 'what [anxiety] does is precisely to bring Dasein face to face with its world as world, and thus bring it face to face with itself as Being-in-the-world' (*ibid.*: 233). This awakens Dasein to its infinite possibilities.

The crucial role anxiety plays for both Kierkegaard and Heidegger is that it discloses an important aspect of the human condition, and calls upon the subject to take up the issue of their existence (*cf. ibid.*: 32). For Heidegger, Dasein takes up the issue of its existence by raising the question of being. The disclosure in anxiety provides an avenue through which Dasein can raise this question. To raise this question is for Dasein to reach its authentic mode of being. Anxiety thus clears the path for authenticity.

We see that Wittgenstein's characterisation of anxiety as the astonishment that anything at all exists is a way of capturing this experience. Such astonishment is brought about not by any particular phenomena *within* the world, but by the very existence of the world – astonishment in the face of the world as *such*. As Wittgenstein put it in the *Tractatus*: 'Not *how* things are in the world ... but *that* it exists' (Wittgenstein 1961: §6.44). Accordingly, if Wittgenstein is seeking to characterise Heidegger's notion of anxiety by inviting us to think of the astonishment that anything at all exists, this seems like a possible way of capturing this experience.

## 3. The Question of Being & Nonsense

The passage just referred to in the *Tractatus* sheds light on the reasons why Wittgenstein claims that 'This astonishment cannot be expressed in the form of a question' and 'Anything we might say is *a priori* bound to be mere nonsense'. The full passage reads:

It is not *how* things are in the world that is mystical, but *that* it exists. (Wittgenstein 1961: §6.44)

*That* the world exists was held by the early Wittgenstein to lie in the domain of 'the mystical' (*das Mystische*): where things cannot be said but only shown. In reaching the mystical, we reach the limits of language. The proposition 'That the world exists' is nonsense because it fails to meet with the bipolarity condition of the *Tractatus*: that in order for propositions to make sense, they must be capable of being true or false.

The reasons for Wittgenstein's claiming that this proposition is nonsense are brought to light in his *Lecture on Ethics*, given only a month earlier to the 1929 remark. There Wittgenstein talks about his experience of '*wonder at the existence of the world*', and the inclination 'to use such phrases as "how extraordinary that anything should

exist" (Wittgenstein 1993: 41). Wittgenstein argues that 'the verbal expression which we give to such experiences is nonsense' (*ibid.*), because in such experiences we wonder at something that we cannot conceive to not be the case, and 'To say "I wonder at such and such being the case" has only sense if I can imagine it *not* to be the case' (*ibid.*). For an expression of wonder at the existence of something to make sense, we need to be able to conceive of non-existence of the object of the experience. We can 'of course wonder at the world [a]round [us] being as it is' – *how* the world is – but 'it is nonsense to say that [we] wonder at the existence of the world' – *that* the world is – 'because [we] cannot imagine it not existing' (*ibid.*: 41-2).<sup>1</sup>

Underlying this argument is the bipolarity condition for sense. Given that the experience cannot be put into words, it follows that it cannot be expressed in the form of a question, as Wittgenstein states in the *Tractatus*:

When the answer cannot be put into words, neither can the question be put into words.

*The riddle does not exist.*

If a question can be framed at all, it is also *possible* to answer it. (Wittgenstein 1961: §6.5)

[A] question exists...only where an answer exists, and an answer only where something *can be said*. (*ibid.*: §6.51)

This brings an interesting new element to Wittgenstein's 1929 remark on Heidegger. If Wittgenstein seeks to characterise Heidegger's notion of anxiety as 'the astonishment that anything at all exists', and claims that this is nonsense, when, in the light of these arguments, we consider Heidegger's claims about the relationship between anxiety and the question of being, we see a possible reason for Wittgenstein's claim that 'This astonishment cannot be expressed in the form of a question, and there is no answer whatsoever'. Given the integral connection Heidegger draws between anxiety and the question of being, what Wittgenstein may have in mind in the 1929 remark is Heidegger's question of being. We might understand Wittgenstein as arguing that the question of being, as raised through anxiety, is nonsense because it is the attempt to say what can only be shown. For Wittgenstein, in experiencing anxiety the practice that should perhaps instead be adopted is that which is recommended in the *Tractatus*: silence (*cf. ibid.*: §7). This seems to be the opposite course of action that Heidegger prescribes, since he claims that in anxiety we ought to raise the question of being.

#### 4. Confusing the Categories

In the 1929 remark, Wittgenstein also compares his view on the limits of language to Kierkegaard's central category: 'paradox'. The paradox is that which reason cannot accept. To run up against paradox is for reason to reach its limit. It is the point at which reason meets what Kierkegaard calls 'the Unknown' – 'the limit to which the Reason repeatedly comes' (Kierkegaard 1936: 35). The 'Unknown' Kierkegaard also calls God:

[W]hat is this unknown something with which the Reason collides when inspired by its paradoxical passion, with the result of unsettling even man's knowledge of himself? It is the Unknown. It is not a human being, in so far as we know what man is; nor is it any other thing. So let us call this unknown something: *God*. (*ibid.*: 31)

To run up against paradox is to meet with the Unknown: that which is ungraspable by reason, but graspable

through faith; for example, Kierkegaard's most important paradox: God as man, incarnate as Jesus Christ. The only option in the face of the paradox is 'a leap of faith'. To attempt to grasp the paradox with reason is, for Kierkegaard, a confusion of categories: to confuse reason with faith, since what is required is a leap of faith, not an extension of reason.

Kierkegaard's category distinction is also employed by Wittgenstein in *A Lecture on Ethics*. Later in the lecture Wittgenstein discusses miracles, and again refers to Kierkegaard's notion of paradox (Wittgenstein 1993: 43). Wittgenstein argues that if one witnessed an extraordinary event – to use his example, a case where 'one of you suddenly grew a lion's head and began to roar' (*ibid.*) – we face two mutually exclusive ways of looking at it: either as a miracle, or as something to be explained scientifically. If, for example, we were to fetch a doctor and have the zoomorphized person vivisected, we would not see the event as something miraculous. Wittgenstein says:

[I]t is clear that when we look at it in this way everything miraculous has disappeared; unless what we mean by this term ['miracle'] is merely that a fact has not yet been explained by science which again means that we have hitherto failed to group this fact with others in a scientific system. This shows that it is absurd to say "Science has proved that there are no miracles." The truth is that the scientific way of looking at a fact is not the way to look at it as a miracle. (*ibid.*)

Wittgenstein here draws upon Kierkegaard's distinction between the categories. It would be a confusion of categories to claim that you see the event as a miracle, and yet also scientifically investigate it. For, as Kierkegaard puts it, 'the Paradox is the Miracle' (Kierkegaard 1936: 42).

This is especially pertinent to our purposes here, because after the above passage Wittgenstein says:

And I will now describe the experience of wondering at the existence of the world by saying: it is the experience of seeing the world as a miracle. (Wittgenstein 1993: 43)

Wittgenstein sees the experience of astonishment at the existence of the world as the experience of a miracle. To express this astonishment in the form of a question and carry out a theoretical investigation of it is, for Wittgenstein, a confusion of categories. This may be how Wittgenstein sees Heidegger's raising and addressing the question of being: if he sees the astonishment that anything at all exists as the experience of a miracle, and characterises anxiety as the astonishment that anything at all exists, and sees the question of being as the attempt to express this as a question, then he may see Heidegger's raising and addressing this question as akin to the scientific examination of a miracle – a confusion.

This brings an intriguing new Kierkegaardian element to Wittgenstein's argument. Through reference to Kierkegaard's categories, Wittgenstein argues that the question of being involves a confusion of categories. Wittgenstein's argument appears to be that to raise the question of being is like asking for a scientific explanation of a miracle: it is to attempt to push reason into the Unknown, or to say what can only be shown. For Wittgenstein, Heidegger's raising and addressing the question of being is akin to a scientist vivisecting a man who has miraculously grown a lion's head in a vain effort to explain the miraculous away. This is a manifestation of a confusion of categories.

## 5. Conclusion: Where Kierkegaardian Paths Meet

Here we see an argument emerge through Heidegger and Wittgenstein taking different Kierkegaardian paths. Wittgenstein argues that Heidegger's question of being, a question directly linked to his heavily Kierkegaard-inspired notion of anxiety, is nonsense because it involves a confusion of categories. Wittgenstein thus employs a central Kierkegaardian distinction in order to argue against Heidegger's use of a central Kierkegaardian notion.<sup>2</sup>

### Endnotes

<sup>1</sup> Wittgenstein also discusses these issues with Waismann in early January 1930 (Waismann: 77, 93).

<sup>2</sup> Other versions of this paper were presented at the University of Reading Philosophy Graduate Discussion Group on 11 May 2010, and The 13<sup>th</sup> International Graduate Conference in Philosophy at the University of Essex on 15 May 2010, on the theme 'Become Who You Are: Kierkegaard, Literature and the Philosophy of Religion'. I am very grateful to the various seminar and conference participants for their points. I am also very grateful to Severin Schroeder, Brian Feltham and Lee Braver for their comments. The research for this was conducted with the help of a studentship from the Arts & Humanities Research Council.

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# Seeing Qualitons as Qualia A Dialogue with Wittgenstein on Private Experience, Sense Data and the Ontology of Mind

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In section 304 of the *Investigations* (1973), Wittgenstein responds to his interlocutor who asks him “But you will surely admit that there is a difference between pain-behaviour accompanied by pain and pain-behaviour without any pain? (...) And yet you again and again reach the conclusion that the sensation itself is a *nothing*”. The charge is that our basic qualitative sensory states such as the ones present when we have pain are irrelevant and can be dismissed – it is as if they were not present. One could read Wittgenstein’s interlocutor to be pressing him to endorse the denial of *qualia*. “Qualia” is a frequently used expression to refer to basic qualitative sensory states. Wittgenstein, however, responds that it is as if they were not present, but still there is something present. He writes: “Not at all. It is not a *something*, but it is not a *nothing* either! The conclusion was only that a *nothing* would serve just as well as a *something* about which *nothing* can be said.” Wittgenstein then refuses the charge of denying *qualia*. He is rather hinting at a way to understand *qualia*. Or so we argue in this work.

We believe Wittgenstein considers *qualia* to be something like *tropes*. Tropes are abstract particulars<sup>1</sup>. The friend of tropes shares the nominalist dislike of universals (and, typically, of properties). There could be one-place or many-places tropes; the former are sometimes called *qualitons* and the latter *relatons*. Instead of properties, trope theory takes every predication to involve particularity; ‘x is a book’ doesn’t predicate the same property as ‘y is a book’ – our predicate ‘book’ does no more than point at some relevant similarity between x and y; it names no property. The green of a leaf of grass is not the same as the green of another leaf – only they can be relevantly similar, similar enough to be under the same predication.

We hold that *qualia* can be seen as *qualitons*, and not as (universal) properties of a mental state (such as pain, for example). Further, we are convinced that Wittgenstein hints in this direction. Hacker’s comments (1993) on section 304 of the *Investigations* suggest that what Wittgenstein “is doing is rejecting the grammar of name and object”. Having a pain is not like to having a penny. So, pain is not concrete. Also, it does not make sense to say that we have *now* the same pain we have had yesterday. So, pain is not a universal. These together suggest that pain is an abstract particular. At the same time, a sensation is not a *nothing*, as it’s not the absence of anything. It is *nothing* only in the sense that it cannot be used unaided in predications. We will try to make this clearer and elaborate further on the view by considering bits of his *Lecture notes on “Private experience” and “Sense data”* (1968).

Wittgenstein writes:

“What if someone asked: “How do I know that what I call seeing red isn’t an entirely different experience every time?”” (p. 279).

The friends of tropes would then reply: Why do we need them to be the same? Isn’t enough that we use the same

word for what is red? Red doesn’t need to be the name of a sensation.

And Wittgenstein:

“We say here that a name is given to a particular impression. And this is strange and puzzling. For it seems as though the impression were too ethereal to be named (Marrying a woman’s wealth).” (p. 275).

It sort of escapes us until we grab it with a concept. It is as if there is *nothing* to be known until we find the resources to express it. In order for me to know I have a pain I need to speak English, otherwise I don’t know what to do with the particular sensation I have. When I learn a language, I learn to use my *qualiton* as a qualitative indication of me having a pain or me sensing something red. Such a qualitative indication works only when I am familiar with the rules that govern the use of ‘red’ or ‘pain’ in English.

“What could be meant by: truthfully calling a color impression ‘red’? Does the word fit one impression better than another?” (p. 295). Further, “[i]f I say ‘I see red’ without reason, how can I distinguish between saying it with truth and saying it as a lie?” (p. 294).

The expression of an impression is only true or false with respect to rules for concepts, with respect to usage in a public language. If there is no independent stance of judgment, my expression that I see red can always be a lie. It’s me alone with my *qualiton*. A trope, seen as a *quale*, is private. There is *nothing* in a trope that makes it fit a word better than any other. Tropes have no name – they are particulars, they are re-identified only when they are clustered together by our sensory vocabulary. Sensations are red or green, *qualia* (as *qualitons*) could be anything provided that we acquire the relevant concepts and, with them, the relevant patterns of similarity.

“But we are under the impression that we can point to the pain, as it were unseen by the other person, and name it.” (p. 276)

We can point at the pain, but not at the *qualiton*. When we point at the pain, we are pointing and naming a state that is identified through different indicators. The trope is the subjective and qualitative indicator. The same trope could indicate something very different. *Qualia* are enabling conditions for concept acquisition; a given *qualiton* is neither sufficient nor necessary for any concept to be acquired. What we mean with our words for sensations is not something of our own. Only the *qualiton* is private, but we don’t talk about it.

“The difficulty is that we feel we have said something about the nature of pain when we say that one person can’t have another person’s pain.” (p. 277)

We assume every pain is associated with a sensation – with a *quale*. Without *qualia*, we would hesitate to call it a pain. Yet, we can be easily fooled by pain-behaviour. As

you wrote in the Investigations (257), we could not learn what is meant by pain by attending solely to our qualia.

"Now whom shall we call blind? What is our criterion for blindness? A certain kind of behaviour. And if the person behaves in that particular way, we not only call him blind but teach him to call himself blind. And in this sense his behavior also determines the meaning of blindness for him. But now you will say: "surely blindness isn't a behavior; it's clear that a man can behave like a blind man and not be blind. Therefore 'blindness' means something different; his behavior only helps him to understand what we mean by 'blindness.' The outward circumstances are what both he and we know. Whenever he behaves in a certain way, we say that he sees nothing; but he notices that a certain private experience of his coincides with all these cases and so concludes that we mean this experience of his by saying that he sees nothing." (p. 285)

Yes, a blind person is detected through behavior. The qualitons of a blind person could not be suitably exploited to provide the behavior we would identify as seeing. Of course there is a physiological counterpart to blindness, but the physiological tests are designed to make sense of our common sense idea of what is blindness.<sup>2</sup> We assume also that there is a quale associated to blindness even if we cannot access it. We are constantly under the impression that we are naming brute sensations and not a complex of sensations and behaviors when we use expressions like blindness (or color-blindness, or red-blindness).

"As it were: There is something further about it, only you can't say it; you can only make the general statement. It is this idea which plays hell with us." (p. 276)

Indeed, we feel compelled to say that there is a quale (a qualiton) corresponding to each occurrence of, say, pain. We talk of pain in general, but there is a particular indicator of pain in each case – and we learn to see them as relevantly similar. We exploit the qualitons available to us when we are learning our sensory vocabulary.

I wonder "[h]ow can we point to the color and not to the shape? Or to the feeling of toothache and not to the tooth, etc?" (p. 276)

That reminds me of a case Noodhof (1998) considers. A glass is shattered as a result of a soprano singing a note. It seems tempting to say that it is the pitch and not the meaning of the singing that caused the shattering. Similarly, my feeling of pain (and not the activation of my C-fibers) is what makes me scream. It is in virtue of the pain that I scream. Gozzano (2008), for one, holds that tropes ought to be simples, that is, they must be maximally determinate. If this is so, there should be a pitch-trope and a meaning-trope. Similarly, when considering a causal process that could lead to the acquisition of two different concepts (say, tooth and toothache), one should posit two and not just one quale. The claim is that if a trope is a simple, it cannot carry two causal powers. Robb (1997), on the other hand, holds that causal powers are connected to particulars – it is a particular trope that causes the (particular) shattering of the glass. While it could be that it is better to describe the trope as having a high pitch – each trope has several similarity relations with other tropes – it is the trope qua trope that causes the shattering. Similarly, it is the trope qua trope that is part of the causal story we want to tell about learning the concept of toothache. Of course,

in this case we have troubles individuating qualitons. However, the relevant causal powers are to be found not only in qualia but also on the language learning context around the process. If this is so, a single trope can be part of causal processes of concept acquisition for several different concepts. Qualitons can even have relations of similarity among them independently of their role in our vocabulary learning, but these relations play no role in our capacity to identify sensations. Learning a language involves learning a way to exploit our qualia.

We propose to see qualia as abstract particulars, to be exploited in our process of language acquisition. In that process, we cluster qualia together when we learn similarity relations. Our view is therefore one where similarity relations are crucial for the acquisition of concepts. One could, however, fear that judgments of similarity cannot get off the ground if all they have to start out with are mere abstract particulars. Suppose one is learning a sensory concept like 'red' or 'bitter' and has to acquire the relevant similarity relations among her qualia. If one has the quale Q and is taught that it resembles quale R, but not quale P, how could one compare those qualia without having them somehow present in the mind? In other words, how can my past qualia be retrieved when I need them in order to learn similarity relations if they are not (from the beginning) available in a conceptual format? The question resembles the one Wittgenstein poses at section 342 at the *Investigations* (1973): how can a deaf-mute person recall thoughts she had before she was introduced to any language, written or otherwise? This is a troublesome area, but we believe we can sketch a way out.

Consider one's attention to quale Q. We assume attention is somehow different from predication – I can attend to Q without making a predication of the sort 'Q is  $\phi$ ' (note that the abstract particular is the subject of the possible predication). If I can attend to Q, then we can have it present to the mind, at least sometimes, together with P or R. Notice that this procedure of attention can be thoroughly private and subjective – as it can differ completely from one to another person. Still, we believe this privacy is both enough to make sure that qualia as qualitons are useful for concept acquisition and does not violate the kernel of the assault on the given. All that is required is that we can manage to attend to two qualitons at the same time so that we can start to grasp the notions of similarity and relevant difference. This should be eventually enough to get the process off the ground – a process of gradual refinement of concepts so that what is roughly red eventually gets refined into different shades of red.

We would like to finish in a less heroic tone. We assume that we can attend to more than one qualiton at a time (and register similarities in a rudimentary way) independently of our introduction to a public language. We take this to be a plausible assumption. If we are not entitled to make this assumption, maybe the account of qualia as abstract particulars loses some of its attraction. In any case, there is an interesting lesson to be learned: any talk of qualia that ascribes to them an explanatory role comes together with some commitments concerning privacy.

## Endnotes

<sup>1</sup> Williams (1953) and Campbell (1990) are seminal articles on tropes. <sup>2</sup> Cf. Sacks (1996) on cases of blindsight.

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# Literature: Picture, Language Game, Picture Again

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This paper discusses possible analyses of literature in the framework of Wittgenstein's views on language. The analysis of fiction as picture in the Tractarian sense, though interesting and possibly fruitful, is not without problems. The analysis of it as language game presents it as a defective, private-language-like type of game. However, picturing can be understood as certain function of language games, expressed especially strongly just in "literary" utterances.

## 1.

The culmination point of Ludwig Wittgenstein's early philosophical phase, his *Tractatus logico-philosophicus* (Wittgenstein 1921), provides a consequent theory of language. The language *Tractatus* talks about is language consisting of "propositions" (*Sätze*) depicting the world. A proposition is something that is – if not nonsensical – either true or false. True propositions are those that correspond to (mirror, reflect) an actual fact (*Tatsache*, matter of fact) in the world. False ones are those that correspond to a fact, which is not actual (actually present in the world).

However, several serious objections have been raised to this conception. I will confine myself only to some more specific points. The sketched notion of propositions and truth is rather narrow. Wittgenstein never provides an *example* of what exactly he considers to be a proposition. Most probably, he talks about certain ideal of language – a language consisting only of what can be "said" (which means, what can be said clearly – which means, what can be said in the manner science talks about things). The language is declarative, a-temporal, im-personal, only factual, etc. Most of the language *we know* as language is *not* considered as language here. However, if as far as language is to be understood as an isomorphic system reflecting the world, most of what we know as language could qualify – though perhaps only more or less – as such. Even in very "everyday" talk we make utterances/utter sentences ("Bob, you're damn' stupid!") that can be meaningfully thought of as either agree with reality (the world) or not (true or false in virtue of that).

But the situation is not that simple: how is – for instance – a negative true proposition true? Does it correspond to a "negative fact"? Or to the sum of all facts (which don't include the required "positive" fact)? The case of negative true proposition is probably the most painful for the Tractarian system, because it surely should somehow deal with them. But there are also others. Propositions about the past or the future must be either analyzed as a present-tense-type proposition with time coordinate added; or stated to be no genuine propositions. A similar problem concerns indexical utterances ("I am a human being.").

A particular difficulty is represented by literature. There are no doubt both true and false propositions concerning the worlds of fiction: such as "Sherlock Holmes was a detective" versus "Sherlock Holmes was a criminal villain". Can the former be denied to be true and/or the latter to be false? That is, can they be considered as equal as to their truth-value (truthfulness)? (Actually, to be no meaningful – neither true, nor false – propositions at all?)

That doesn't seem correct. Hence, in virtue of what corresponding fact is the proposition "Sherlock Holmes was a detective" true?

It cannot be a fact in the straightforward "scientific" sense: an actual constellation of objects within the only, real and objective world. Moreover, whatever fact it is, it must be the one which the proposition "Sherlock Holmes was a detective" is a *picture* of. (Let's confine here to those sentences in fiction that can be thought of as true or false (having truth-value). Of course, not all the sentences in literary works are of this nature – are about *something*, make us "see": Sherlock Holmes for instance.) As far as "Sherlock Holmes was a detective" is meaningful and true, it has a logical form which it shares with the "fact" (?) it pictures. (Certainly, the notion of shared "logical form" doesn't mean much more than the close relation binding the picturing and the pictured.) Perhaps, there is a candidate to being the "world" or the "fact" with respect to which the proposition – as its logical picture – can be true: it could be the *Opera* by sir Arthur Conan Doyle. Whoever reads through the four novels and fifty-six short stories, cannot doubt that the proposition is true, *because* Sherlock Holmes *really* was a detective (and not a criminal villain). Hence, the proposition can be understood as sharing the logical form with the Holmesian canon (as a true logical picture of one fact constitutive of the respective fictional world, contained in Doyle's books).

This world is of course much less solid than the world in more common sense. And the solidity can even decrease, depending on the degree of *canonicity* of the reference "world". This is an interesting problem in the case of Sherlock Holmes. In his short story "A Study in Emerald", Neil Gaiman presents an alternative Lovecraftian world, where Sherlock Holmes (supported by Doctor Watson, of course) can be understood – at least according to the ethical standards of this alternative reality – as a *criminal villain*. (And – both logically and paradoxically – Professor Moriarty and Colonel Moran are detectives going on Holmes' track.) Both Doyle's "Study" (in *Scarlet*) and Gaiman's "Study" are intended to be read as portraying (picturing) the same personality – can they be both true logical pictures of Holmes' character? We can perhaps refer to Doyle's writings as the deciding authority (as they are more canonical); but the same problems concerns also Ancient Greek gods and heroes – is the deciding authority Homer, who portrays Ulysses as a hero, or Vergil who portrays him as a villain? There is no canon here; yet both speaks about the same character, and with respect to these reference "worlds", both – incompatible – descriptions of Ulysses are in a sense true. This can be evidence in favour of non-propositional nature of literature: however true can sometimes "propositions" of fiction seem, they cannot count as real propositions that have one uncontested truth-value in virtue of correspondence relation to the *real* world.

This is hardly a satisfying analysis. Descriptions of features of fiction seem to be meaningful and such that can be true (or false), that is, they have to be a *picture* (a logical picture?). As a picture of something – though not in the Tractarian sense – they can be also exceptionally vivid and graphic. But their being a picture doesn't probably

consist in the correspondence with reality. Or more precisely: what they are picture of, is *not a reality* in a standard sense, as it can sometimes disturb laws of logic (such as the law of contradiction) – which reality usually doesn't do. How are we to understand this strange kind of "picture" (picturing)?

## 2.

Wittgenstein is known to have recognized himself the weak points of his older conception of language – he replaces language as a picture by language as a variety of tool sets, "language games" (Wittgenstein 1953). The meaning of so understood a language is established in public (as patterns of use); Wittgenstein emphasizes the importance of *rules* governing the usage in games; the term "rules" covers "grammatic" rules of correct formation of words and sentences, as well as complex and contextualized patterns of (linguistic) behaviour. (Whereas the former are much the same or similar in most games, the latter differ (often dramatically) from game to game.) The obliging power of rules lays in their embodiment within the linguistic practice of the speakers' community that warrants them.

Of course, when speaking of practice and embodiment, the rules in question are – expectably – *implicit* rules. However, according to Wittgenstein, philosophy should *describe* the use of language; the slogan of inferentialism (a philosophical position elaborating many of Wittgenstein's insights) is that the rules can be "made explicit" (see Brandom 1994). It doesn't have to be always equally easy to identify the rules and make them explicit, but it is assumed to be possible. This is not only a "scientific program": the ability to distinguish explicitly between following the rules and not following (i.e. playing the game correctly/well and not playing) is often very useful and sometimes even necessary.

Now let's consider the situation of literature in this new context. Apparently, fiction shouldn't be understood as picturing anything. A new, more appropriate analysis sees it as a particular language game (or type of language games). As a language game worthy to be called as such, it must have rules identifiable to the extent that literature could be distinguished from non-literature. (Insofar as in the practice of our world, there really is both literature and non-literature, which is not one and the same, however vague the borderline between them is.) Can the supposed rules of the literary game (games) be made explicit, and if so, how?

There are various definitions of what literature is, what it does, what function it fulfills or should fulfill (for them see e.g. Rexroth 1987). These apparent descriptions include often also certain *prescriptive* moment. Be they made from an *ex post* position, or establish a future program: in both cases they provide a guideline of what one *should* do, if what she/he does is to count as a piece of literature. This points to another problem: most games are not interested in their own definition and rules; literature does. As a counterweight to the demands on what literature should do, players of literary games often try to do something that *can* count as literature, yet (intentionally) *breaks* the explicitly stated rules. Hence, once some defining rules of literary game (games) are explicitly stated, they cease to be exhausting (at best).

Moreover, the situation of literature is complicated also by the fact, that it is not quite clear, whether it is a single game, few games (representing several defined types of artistic expression), or indefinitely many games. (Wittgenstein himself is not explicit in this point – it seems

that the complexity of a game can be low as well as high, and more complex games can include simpler ones.) If the last option is true, then each writer – in constituting a "literary space" on her/his own – creates her/his own game. But this would make literature close to the "private language". In fact, there *are* analogies between literature (conceived as such special type of language game) and private language. First of all, it's difficult to identify the rules of literature (as *actually* valid). And quite like in private language, the player can never be sure, whether she/he really plays the game (well, correctly), or just thinks to do so. The game displays no stability through time: does the novel I am writing now represents the same game as the novel I wrote two years ago? (Or, though I am still working on the same novel, is what I am doing now the same game as what I was doing yesterday?) Can it be uncontroversially decided?

## 3.

We have seen that though seeing the whole of language as a set of contextualized tools (language games) is probably more appropriate than seeing it as a picture of the world, this shift doesn't have to work equally well in the case of literature. And on the other hand, the view on literature as certain kind of imagery (that is, picturing) proves itself to be more intuitive (though perhaps misleading). Let's try this direction: can literature be conceived uncontroversially as a picture?

In *Philosophical Investigations*, Wittgenstein introduces a very famous and influential notion of picture: "Ein Bild hielt uns gefangen." – a picture held us captive. A picture is present within our language, and this *graphic* (pictorial) language, through which only – as a medium – we can see things, represents metaphorical "glasses". Of course, the capacity to hold its users captive doesn't have to be equally characteristic for any picture whatsoever. However, it is clear that there are pictures having this capacity, and essentially within the realm of literature.

Literature can be conceived as a picture in this sense. Like the logical picture criticized by Wittgenstein, literature, too, purports us certain seeing of things. But the notion of picture is "functional" here: picture as something that is able to hold captive, to make someone do, and perhaps see (or even aware of seeing) – something. On the face of it, this may be a characteristics of – so to speak – pictorial (depicting) language games. However, this functional characteristic refers to all types of language games. Language game is an activity adapted to a situation, in which it should serve the wished purpose. And typically, playing a language game involves an interaction (communication) with another person or persons – so to perform a successful communication means mostly to make the other do what I want her/him to do (this is quite broad – including also the simple "make the other understand what I wanted to tell with my words"). Does therefore all language (all language games) have the nature of picture? Maybe, but to say this would be not more than to generalize a metaphor, though perhaps a true one ("Life is struggle").

What makes literature a picture in a bit more sophisticated sense is the fact that this is its aware purpose: literature focuses on providing pictures (in the sketched sense). The producers of literature often want to *show* something – they may reflect on their activity as picturing in both senses, the trivial (correspondence theory-like) as well as the sophisticated (functional, pragmatic). (Though the players of other games also provides these "pictures",

it is mostly implicit and unaware, and – consequently – not equally effective.) The quality of such picture, able not only to strike the recipient, but also to keep her/him (hold her/him captive) and make her/him do something, can be described in Heideggerian way as “Ursprünglichkeit”, originality (Heidegger 1959). The literary pictures are strong, urging, attractive, vivid; what they once “show”, cannot be then easily altered, neglected or forgotten – they place the depicted world very decidedly in front of our eyes. Note that this doesn’t have to be a trademark of “literature” as an established public institution; it concerns certain quality of utterance – various utterances can have this “literary” strength, but not the ambition to be a literature (preaching, a love-letter, skillful lying). And though literature attempts such making the recipient do/see something (being the functional holding captive), its self-interpretation can oppose the pragmatic explanation; so it is rather difficult to identify the contextual function of playing literature (the purpose of it as a language game).

To sum, “picture” of “something” may be more appropriate analytical tool (at least an analytical metaphor, that is, analytical *picture*) in the case of literature, than the notorious machinery of language game is.

#### **Acknowledgment**

Work on this paper was supported by grant No. P401-10-P266 of the Czech Scientific Foundation.

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# Picturing Myself: A Wittgensteinian Conception of the Artist's Self Portrait

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It is the aim of this paper to look at the visual artistic self portrait from the point of view of the late Wittgenstein. Specifically, with his dissolution of the 'inner/outer' dichotomy, the metaphysic language which artists use to talk about their self portraits can be seen as indescribable in contrast to what is actually shown in their paintings. In order to achieve this task, notions of artists on how they talk about their self portraits will be mentioned. Consequently, it will be argued with Wittgenstein's reflections on the 'inner' and the 'outer' that, independently of what the painter claims about her self portrait, it is in the painting that she expresses no more and no less than what is there to show about herself. In correlation to this, the artistic view of the self portrait in connection to the 'introspection' will be seen from a Wittgensteinian perspective.

## 1. Introduction

The question is whether we can actually say from Wittgenstein's point of view that the intention of the self portrait is really to describe anything essential related to the painter who looks at herself. If the artist wants to show her essence, if Frida Kahlo for example wants to illustrate her pain, that is not put in doubt. All artists show something, but the philosophical problem here would be that they refer to an inadequate metaphysical language, when all they need to do is paint to show themselves.

The way we talk about ourselves, or, in the case of the artist, the way she shows herself in a self portrait, is based on what we call 'descriptions'. And we expect these descriptions to be a 'picture' of what goes on *in our minds*. But these notions of descriptions lead to many philosophical misunderstandings. We shall rather think of these descriptions as instruments used in particular instances (ref. PI 291), e.g. how we learn to use language. How do I recognize a sensation *in me*? Not by criteria, but by repeating an expression (by means of training). The word 'describe' in the context of sensations is problematic, for to "describe a state of mind" and to "describe my room" are two different language games (ref. PI 290).

In this sense, first person present tense psychological utterances are not descriptions of inner states or processes. Perhaps Wittgenstein would say of Frida's painful paintings that she is not describing her pain caused by her accident, her abortion, or her love for Diego Rivera. Rather, we would simply say that she is expressing herself in her self portraits. If we could translate the phrase "I am in pain" or "I am Frida" to Frida's variety of self portraits, from a Wittgensteinian interpretation we would have to say that she is not describing any psychological status, but expressing her thoughts and feelings symbolically. A reflection from Wittgenstein's Cambridge lectures on the nature of thoughts runs as follows (CL I, p. 25):

Thought is a symbolic process, and thinking is interpreting a plan. It does not matter where this takes place, whether on paper or on a blackboard. It may involve images and these we think of as being "in the mind". This simile of "inside" or "outside" the mind is pernicious. It is

derived from "in the head" when we think of ourselves as looking out from our heads and of thinking as something going on "in our head".

To judge linguistically whether Frida shows her pain or not, is the same discussion Wittgenstein employs on the grammar of the kind of sentences like 'I am in pain'. What is there to say can be said, and it is expressed on the canvas. A self portrait of Frida, in which she is shown crying and covered with needles could be compared to Wittgenstein's conclusions in so far as that when we say 'I am in pain', we are not trying to show the essence of our pain or of something hidden in our body, but we are just expressing how we feel. And this is what visual artists do in their self portraits.

## 2. The Dissolution of the 'inner/outer' Dichotomy

The rather intuitive and generalised statement of the artist claims that she sees herself in the mirror as something different from the rest of the objects in the world, and that is why in the self portrait she tries to show what she sees as an essence of herself. For example, about his self portrait "The son of Man" Magritte (quoted in Torczyner 1977, p.172) said:

At least it hides the face partly. Well, so you have the apparent face, the apple, hiding the visible but hidden, the face of the person. It's something that happens constantly. Everything we see hides another thing, we always want to see what is hidden by what we see. There is an interest in that which is hidden and which the visible does not show us. This interest can take the form of a quite intense feeling, a sort of conflict, one might say, between the visible that is hidden and the visible that is present.

But what does Magritte mean by 'hidden' here? Perhaps it is the claim of the private linguist, who thinks that there is something in him which only he knows and the others will never be able to know. To this dichotomy of the visible and the hidden, Wittgenstein would say something like this (RPP II, 69):

But if we ask, "What is the difference between a visual picture (*Gesichtsbild*) and an image-picture (*Vorstellungsbild*)?" – the answer could be: The same description can represent both what I see and what I imagine. To say that there is a difference between a visual picture and an image-picture means that one imagines things differently from the way they appear.

Wittgenstein claims that only in some specific cases is someone's 'inner' hidden from me, but it is not the idea of being 'inner' what makes it hidden (ref. LW II, p. 33). These particular cases are linked to the way in which we refer to the 'inner'; the cases in which it makes sense to say something about the 'inner', although it does not really refer to something inside me. He does not, for example, deny the fact that my thoughts are shown in a different

way to me and to others, and this seems to be connected to the language games. He claims (LW II, p. 34-35): "My thoughts are not hidden from him, but are just open to him in a different way than they are to me. The language game simply is the way it is." Speech, like art, can be considered in this 'different way' to let others know about my thoughts. The way in which my thoughts are open to me, or in art: the way in which the images are represented in my mind, is the mere fact that *I think them*. However, this does not mean that my thoughts or images are essentially inside of me, or that they are private. As long as they can be shown, i.e. presented on a canvas, they are open.

Although we cannot say that there is something in me that I can hide, there are circumstances when we use expressions such as 'hiding the inner', in which we do understand what is meant by this. In specific language games the idea that we hide our inner does make sense. Situations in which we have feelings that we do not want to show, thoughts that we do not want to express, or the deceit to be in pain. In this sense we can say with Wittgenstein (LW II, p. 36) that: "Evidently there is an aspect of the *language game* which suggests the idea of being private or hidden – and there is also such a thing as hiding of the inner."

Wittgenstein induces us to imagine that there is in fact something going on inside us, i.e. feelings, thoughts, pain, which could be possible to *look at*. If this would be the case, then the mere looking into this 'inner' would change the whole way in which we express ourselves, and therefore the language games regarding our feelings etc. would be completely different (LW II, p. 36): "If one were to see the working of the nerves, utterances would mean little to us and pretending would be different." That is, if this would be possible, the purpose of the artistic expression would be another; the whole language game of uttering our pains, feelings, and thoughts, and the dissimulating of these, would belong to a completely different form of life. Nevertheless, this is not the case. And therefore the real pain and its sincere expression in the painting seem to be the same thing. Or, better said, the way we understand the concept 'pain' is determined by the signs of pain and pain-behaviour which can as well be represented through the look of a human expression in a self portrait, like Rembrandt has shown in numerous cases. When I talk about being in pain, the concept 'pain' is already in the language game of my behaviour (ref. LW II, p. 37). This means that the evidence is not shown in the 'inner'. That is, the possibility of looking into someone does not give any certainty or evidence of her feelings. It could then be said that the evidence relies, if we want to express it like this, in the 'outer', in the behaviour, in the expression of the portrait.

### 3. Introspection

Furthermore, the word introspection is also thought as a process for artists to paint themselves and has in the many senses in which we use it the implicit connotation of the term 'inner'. We use this word when we mean to say that we look into ourselves. But, can we say in a Wittgensteinian way that there is a picture of the 'internal'? Gareth Evans has his own explanation for this (1982, p. 227):

[W]hen the subject wishes to make absolutely sure that his judgement is correct, he gazes again *at the world* (thereby producing, or reproducing, an informational state in himself); he does not in any sense gaze at, or concentrate upon, his internal state. His internal state cannot in any sense become an *object* to him. (He is *in it*.)

And Wittgenstein would react to this arguing against the possibility of any 'inner' or 'outer' notions but would agree with the idea that the internal state of the subject is not an object to her.

But the dichotomy 'inner/outer' is one thing, the possibility of introspection in order to represent something about ourselves quite another. Wittgenstein says (BE 115/93): "The process of introspection means recalling memories, ideas of possible situations, possible feelings etc. Introspection is a process of looking rather than seeing."

If we agree then that there is no distinction of the 'inner' and the 'outer', and that this can be applied to art, we could also talk about how the different styles would also be understood as language games in art. We can distinguish a Renaissance portrait from a cubist or surrealist paintings because in the practice of looking at all these different styles we are able to recognize the different rules of the games, even if we do not play them, i.e. even if we are not painters ourselves. Perhaps we need different criteria to call Rembrandt's or Klee's paintings self portraits. But our reference to them as self portraits can be based on the language game of art, and on the historical interpretation of the viewer.

Moreover, whether some portraits are good or bad, is also an interesting question. To mention it briefly, Wittgenstein would say of a Picasso portrait that it is a bad one, first, because it has the two eyes in the profile: "Think of the depiction of a human face from the front and from the side, just like in some modern paintings by Picasso" (BE 134/87r) and second, because he does not see in it the representation of a man: "I could say of a painting by Picasso that I don't see it as a human being." (BE 137/142a). If we would like to find a similarity between the artist and his self portrait, we could refer to the way in which we notice an aspect. In PI, p. 193 Wittgenstein says: "I contemplate a face, and then suddenly notice its likeness to another. I see that it has not changed; and yet I see it differently. I call this experience "noticing an aspect". Do we see aspects in artistic self portraits? That we can see a drawing now as one thing and then as another, can be called interpretation or an indirect description (ref. PI, p. 193). Moreover, seeing different self portraits of different artists is interpreting not only the different artistic currents, but it is also interpreting the artist's interpretation of herself. Our look at the painting is our interpretation of her interpretation of herself.

### 4. Conclusion

When the artist paints a self portrait, she is in a way saying something like 'I am pictured in this canvas'; and this makes sense for Wittgenstein (CL II, p. 62): "'I" only has meaning with reference to a body". There should be a different perception in picturing herself and in painting the rest of the world. But in a Wittgensteinian language it is confusing to say that what the artist paints is the representation of her soul, the essence of her life, or the purity of her pain. Rather, if we would want to express something like that in a Wittgensteinian way, it could be said that in art the artist shows herself completely, that she shows openly what she is, what she feels, and what she has experienced in life. Many examples of Rembrandt's self portraits show aspects of this, as well as the expressionism in Kokoschka's self portraits, and no less in Frida Kahlo's.

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# Einstellung, Aspect and Hinges in Wittgenstein's Work

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1.

Imagine that Louis and Sarah are in a museum in front of an abstract modern picture, and Louis says to his mate: "Look at that lion!" or something very similar. Call this language game 1, what Louis and Sarah should have in common to understand this first utterance (cfr. PU II, xi: p. 174)?

Imagine now a second possible language game, for example imagine that Mary is a teacher in a school trip that gives to her students an order like: "Get on the Bus!". The sentence could be understood either as "Get a seat in the bus" and as "Sit on the top of the bus" (in Italian we have a more definite case of polysemous phrase as: "Siediti sull'autobus!", that is either "Siediti *sopra* l'autobus" either "Siediti sul sedile dell'autobus"). In this case what it means to take the order correctly? Suppose that a first student is sat on the seat while a second one is on the top of the bus, on the roof. One of the two students is evidently mistaking, what she lacks to have a correct understanding of her teacher's order?

The cases above could be described in terms of different ways of understanding, or misunderstanding, a language game in Wittgenstein's terms, but someone could say that we could have two different forms of understanding: the first one is of a theoretical kind (to understand the utterance Sarah should have to know the concept 'lion') while the second one is of a practical kind (the students should know how to get on a bus correctly, or at least how to sit in a general sense).

This first distinction brings with her a nest of other philosophical conceptions, like for example that between norms and rules of thumb, or that between learning and education, or between a kind of meaning that is transmissible only through verbal language and is subject to a specialized judgement, a literal one (Cappelen-Lepore 2004), and a meaning intrinsically connected to the acting in a context, and for this reason is extrinsic to the literal judgement, belonging to its pragmatic.

My aim in this paper is to argue against these conceptions, and the other philosophical ideas connected with these, by taking into account the concept *Einstellung* as Wittgenstein applies it in his later work. In particular my principal point is to show how the *Einstellungen*, that are embedded in our form of life, are like aspects of organizations about which Wittgenstein writes in the following remark taken from PU:

How does one teach a child (say in arithmetic) "Now take these things together" or "Now *these* go together"? Clearly "taking together" and "going together" must originally have had another meaning for him than that of *seeing* in this way or that. — And this is a remark about concepts, not about teaching methods.

One *kind* of aspect might be called 'aspects of organization'. When the aspect changes part of the picture go together which before did not. PU, II, xi: p. 177

Recall now our language games, in the first one Louis is sharing with Sarah a sort of common frame or

'aspect of organization' that enables them to recognize the picture in front of them as a picture of a lion. This is quite easy to acknowledge, but what about the second language game? How could we describe the act of getting on a bus in terms of seeing aspects?

In this second case we could suppose that to appreciate the order correctly the student, as any reasonable judge (Travis 1989), should take for granted a series of things, not all completely *sayable*: the existence of the bus, with all that follows from that (i.e. the existence of the door, of the seats, and so on), a series of grammatical presuppositions about the existence of the world, and, last but not the least, the knowledge of the correct way of sitting on a bus. This is a kind of practical knowledge and has two main characteristics: it is nonpropositional, because it lacks bipolarity (the way of sitting could be correct or incorrect, but is not evaluable as true or false) (Moyal Sharrock 2007), and is unsayable, or not completely expressible through verbal language (the chain of words lacks all the *tips* that only the direct experience of involvement in a practice could give to a learner, PU II, p: 193).

These two characteristics are the main features of an *Einstellung* that we could define as a practical disposition intrinsic to the everyday behaviour. *Einstellungen* are like frames or attitudes that are shown in any behaviour; looking at the different remarks in which Wittgenstein employs this concept we could work out the following list of features connected to it:

(i) *Einstellung* could be learned through a direct process of enskillment or, better, a process of growth of the organism in a certain environment constituted by the life of a community (Ingold 2000). For example, in LSPP § 203 Wittgenstein imagines a tribe [*Stamm*] in which is unknown the *misstrauische Einstellung*, distrustful disposition, towards the manifestations of pain, suggesting that a missionary could teach them the new disposition — in general this kind of teaching is like conversion or persuasion (UG § 92).

(ii) It is not completely expressible in language. Recall what Wittgenstein says in UG about our attitude of certainty with which we say to know something — for example, Moore's absolute certainty to have two hands or that the Earth existed for many years before our birth. Wittgenstein defines this kind of certainty as "something animal" (UG § 358), as a kind of certainty that is not 'rationally' based or inferentially determined, but nevertheless is necessary for our actions as human beings; specifying: "perfect certainty is only a matter of their attitude [*seine Einstellung*]" (UG § 404). The correct disposition is taken not towards a single aspect of our life or single issue, but towards the entire mythology or framework of our life (UG §§ 95, 211). In short to *have an Einstellung* means to maintain a religious belief taking a stance towards an entire system of practices (Kober 2007).

(iii) For this reason a disposition is not something that gives us information [*Mitteilung*] about the world, it is not directed towards a state of affairs or a specific event in the world. For example, surprise or dismay are not di-

rected to supposed internal feelings (BPP I, 836), instead they are dispositions shown in a way of acting in a specific environment (*Umgebung*).

(iv) *Einstellung* is not localized in a specific area of the body neither in a specific moment: it is instead contained and expressed in the time of the entire sequence of actions and by the entire sequence of *Handlungen* that comprises the body as a whole. To make an example consider the case of excuses: to have success in the act of finding excuses we should take the right or correct behaviour in all the sequence of our apologizing towards someone else. In this case the time of *Einstellung* is the grammatical time of all the process: to make a mistake or damage someone, to say "Sorry!" and wait for the answer and so on. (We realize that the grammatical time is something different and informs the so-called material time, result of the measurement by clock and other stuff).

(v) Consequently the disposition is not a kind of sensation or internal state, because it could not have duration. It would be senseless to ask someone for how long he took the right attitude in the act of excuses, as should be considered senseless to ask someone for how long he takes the right *Einstellung* towards the fact that the earth existed for many years before his birth. The principal preoccupation for Wittgenstein is to distinguish the *Einstellung* from any kind of attempt to reduce it to an internal state or mental attitude that precedes the action, for this reason he writes as follows:

Die Einstellung ‚etwas in ihm‘ zu nennen, ist irreführend. Es ist, als gerändert hat und ‚die Einstellung‘ genannt wird. Während alles klar zu Tage liegt – die Worte „eine neue Einstellung“ aber eben nicht eine Empfindung bezeichnen. BPP I, 1110.

We are now in the condition to realize that in the second game the students behaving in different ways are showing different dispositions or *Einstellungen*, and, in more general terms, they are showing to have a different mythology or to live a different form of life. The first one has learned to sit rightly getting a sit on the bus and she embodies the correct *Einstellung* of 'getting' on the bus, correct in the "accustomed context [gewohnte Umgebung]" of our life (UG § 237); the second one shows a misunderstanding of the *Abrichtung* in which she was involved, or at least to have lived in a different form of life, one in which is normal to sit on the roof of a bus (consider how people sit on the roof of trains in many countries of the World).

The point is that these dispositions are intrinsic to the language game number 2 and function like hinges of the game (UG §§ 341-344); because the understanding of the student turns around the *possession* of the correct way of 'getting on the bus', it presupposes it.

That is to say, the questions that we raise and our doubts depend on the fact that some propositions are exempt from doubt, are as it were like hinges on which those turn. UG § 341

But it isn't that the situation is like this: We just can't investigate everything, and for that reason we are forced to rest content with assumption. If I want the door to turn, the hinges must stay put. UG § 343.

My life consists in my being content to accept many things. UG § 344

We could paraphrase the last sections saying that the meaning of our language game (2) consists in showing the acceptance of a way of getting on the bus: if I want to get there correctly, the hinges must stay put.

Now we need to go back to the first language game, what it matters with our talking of hinges and dispositions? The same Wittgenstein seems to answer to this doubt in the following remark taken from PU:

"To me it is an animal pierced by an arrow". That is what I treat it is; this is my attitude to the figure. This is one meaning in calling it a case of 'seeing'. PU II, xi: p. 175

And in the manuscript of LSPP he argues with the same tone:

So seh ich es, in diesem Sinne, also nur so lange so, als ich diese Einstellung dazu habe? Man könnte es sagen. LSPP § 667

These remarks let no doubt on the relation between *Einstellungen* and aspect of organization, and let us go to the conclusion that the grammar of our language game is intrinsically constituted by practical and behavioural aspects that are unsayable and nonpropositional. The second point is a consequence of this first one: we couldn't distinguish between practical judgement and a rational one. To judge means to understand a certain process as a whole employing a series of beliefs embedded in our life. Third and last conclusion: the analogy between aspect of organization and behavioural dispositions shows the coincidence of action and perception in human knowledge.

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# Wittgenstein über die Rolle der Aspektwahrnehmung für das Verstehen von Kunst

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## 1. Aspektwahrnehmung und Ausdruck

Wittgenstein vergleicht den ästhetischen Verstehensprozess gerne mit dem Sehen von Vexier- bzw. Rätselbildern. Auf diesen Bildern sehen wir zunächst nur Flecken. Dann wird uns bspw. gesagt, auf dem Bild sei ein Dalmatiner zu sehen. Sobald wir ihn gefunden haben, sehen wir das Bild auf eine gänzlich neue Weise. Nach Wittgenstein hat sich ein „Aspektwechsel“ (PU II, 522) vollzogen. Die Flecken haben nun eine bestimmte Ordnung, ihre „Organisation“ (PU II, 543) hat sich verändert: Einige davon gehören zusammen und bilden eine Einheit, andere sind separiert, auch wenn sie nahe bei einander liegen. Der eine Fleck gehört zum Hintergrund, der andere steht im Vordergrund.

Der neue Aspekt, die Organisation, schlägt sich, im Unterschied zur Farbe und Form dessen, was ich sehe, nicht in dem nieder, was ich zeichne, wenn ich das Bild abzeichne, sondern in der Art, wie ich es kopiere, ebenso wie in den Beschreibungen und Vergleichen, die ich wähle. Dass ich eine schematische Würfelzeichnung als Würfel sehe, zeigt sich spätestens dann, wenn ich gebeten werde, ein Modell der Zeichnung herzustellen.

Eine signifikant andere Art von Aspekten, die für das Verstehen von Kunst jedoch nicht weniger wichtig sind, bilden die *Ausdrucksqualitäten*. Ein Gesicht kann unterschiedliche Gesichtsausdrücke haben, es kann ängstlich aussehen oder erleichtert. Obwohl Angst und Erleichterung Gefühle sind und als solche unsichtbar, meinen wir die Trauer in den Gesichtszügen *sehen* zu können. Ein Gesicht kann einen traurigen Ausdruck haben, obwohl der Mensch nicht traurig ist und mit dem Gesichtsausdruck also auch keinem Gefühl der Trauer Ausdruck verleihen kann. Unaufrichtige Gesichtsausdrücke müssen allerdings die Ausnahme bleiben, denn würden sie zur Regel, so würden wir im unaufrichtigen Trauergesicht keine Trauer mehr sehen. Das Gesicht wäre nicht mehr mit den Verhaltensweisen der Traurigkeit verwoben, wodurch sich seine expressive Bedeutung änderte.

Der Ausdruck eines Gesichts liegt nach Wittgenstein in den Gesichtszügen. Ein freundliches Lächeln wird durch eine minimale Veränderung der Augenbrauen oder der Mundwinkel zu einem boshaften. Es gibt aber auch mehrdeutige Gesichter, die unterschiedliche Ausdrücke annehmen, je nachdem, welchen Kontext wir uns dazu vorstellen: Wir können uns ein lächelndes Gesicht als ein liebevolles oder als ein böses vorstellen, je nach der Umgebung, in die wir es in unserer Phantasie stellen: herablickend auf ein spielendes Kind oder auf das Leiden des Feindes. Wittgenstein schreibt dazu: „Wenn man vom rätselhaften Lächeln der Mona Lisa spricht, so heißt das doch wohl, dass man sich fragt: In welcher Situation, in welcher Geschichte, könnte man so lächeln?“ (BPP I, § 381). Nach Wittgenstein sind Imagination, Phantasie und Einbildungskraft maßgeblich beteiligt am ästhetischen Erleben, denn es handle sich sowohl bei der Produktion als auch bei der Rezeption und Diskussion von Kunst um „ein Phrasieren durchs Auge und Ohr“ (Z, § 208). Ohne Phantasie wären wir blind für das künstlerische Spiel mit Gestalten, Ähnlichkeiten und expressiven Qualitäten. Wir

wären außerstande, einem Musikstück oder einem Gedicht mit Verständnis zu folgen.

Nicht nur Menschen und Gesichter können traurig sein, sondern auch Melodien. Eine Melodie ist nach Wittgenstein jedoch weder traurig, weil der Komponist traurig war, während er sie geschrieben hat, noch weil sie den Hörer in eine traurige Stimmung versetzt: „The expression is not an effect [...] You could not say that if anything else had this effect, it would have the expression [...]“ (VüÄ, 30). Vielmehr scheint ein Gegenstand – in einer sekundären Verwendungsweise des Adjektivs – traurig zu sein, weil seine Beschaffenheit gewisse Ähnlichkeiten aufweist mit den Gesten und Verhaltensweisen eines traurigen Menschen. Der Ausdruck der Traurigkeit liegt also in einer bestimmten Form und Anordnung des Materials selbst. Auch Materialien, Farben und Klänge haben expressive Qualitäten, haben Charakter, allerdings ist auch dieser nach Wittgenstein kontextsensitiv (VB, 570).

Wie am Beispiel des musikalischen Ausdrucks bereits klar wurde, ist der Bereich der Aspektwahrnehmung keineswegs auf den Gesichtssinn beschränkt. Auch unser Ohr hört Gestalten. Dies ist für Wittgensteins musikästhetische Überlegungen von großer Relevanz. Wenn wir Musik hören, dann vernehmen wir nicht bloße Klänge, sondern hören Töne und Melodien. Wir können auch ein und denselben Akkord als Tonika oder als Subdominante hören, ja gar ein und denselben Ton als Terz- oder Grundton, Leit- oder Akkordton. Eine bestimmte Tonfolge können wir einmal als Variation eines Themas, ein andermal als eigenständiges Thema hören. In all diesen Fällen würden wir sagen, es höre sich anders an. Für die anderen Sinne lassen sich analoge Fälle konstruieren.

Das Aspektsehen liegt nach Wittgenstein gleichsam zwischen einem reinen Sehen und einem reinen Deuten: „Ein im Sehen nachhallender Gedanke – möchte man sagen“ (PU II, 549). Die Frage, ob wir dabei Verschiedenes wahrnehmen oder ob wir, was wir wahrnehmen, nur verschieden deuten, ist allerdings nicht immer eindeutig zu beantworten. Wittgenstein schreibt im zweiten Teil der *Philosophischen Untersuchungen*: „Von einem beliebigen Schriftzeichen kann ich mir vorstellen, es sei ein korrekt geschriebener Buchstabe eines fremden Alphabets. Oder aber ein fehlerhaft geschriebener; und zwar fehlerhaft auf die eine oder andere Weise: z.B. schleuderhaft, oder typisch kindisch-ungeschickt, oder bürokratisch verschnörkelt [...] Und je nach der Erdichtung, mit der ich es umgebe, kann ich es in verschiedenen Aspekten sehen.“ (PU II, 546). Der Fall des Schriftzeichens liegt sicherlich näher bei einem Deuten als die Hasen-Ente oder eine Würfelzeichnung, die man ‚kippen‘ kann. Man könnte im Fall des Schriftzeichens davon reden, dass wir es, je nach der dazu phantasierten Entstehungsgeschichte, anders *erleben*.

Unserer Phantasie sind allerdings Grenzen gesetzt. Diese sind nicht nur durch unsere biologische Verfassung vorgegeben, sondern auch durch die Kultur bestimmt, mit der wir vertraut sind. Die Gewohnheit spielt dabei eine entscheidende Rolle. Wittgenstein wählt ein Beispiel aus der Musik und fragt sich: „Was geschieht, wenn wir lernen,

den Schluss einer Kirchentonart als Schluss zu *empfinden*?" (PU, § 535). Für die meisten von uns, die wir mit der Dur-Moll-Tonalität vertraut sind, klingt ein Schluss eines Stücks in einer Kirchentonart nicht wie ein Schluss. Wenn wir uns jedoch mit Musik in Kirchentönen vertraut machen, lernen wir allmählich einen solchen Schluss auch als Schluss zu *hören*.

## 2. Ästhetisches Verstehen als Aufleuchten eines Aspekts

Wenn wir davon reden, dass wir ein Kunstwerk verstehen, so kann damit sehr Unterschiedliches gemeint sein. Eines scheint den unterschiedlichen Arten und Graden des Verstehens von Kunst, im Unterschied zum Verstehen sprachlicher Äußerungen, gemeinsam zu sein:

„Wir reden vom Verstehen eines Satzes in dem Sinne, in welchem er durch einen andern ersetzt werden kann, der das Gleiche sagt; aber auch in dem Sinne, in welchem er durch keinen andern ersetzt werden kann. (So wenig wie ein musikalisches Thema durch ein anderes.) Im einen Fall ist der Gedanke des Satzes, was verschiedenen Sätzen gemeinsam ist; im andern, etwas, was nur diese Worte, in diesen Stellungen, ausdrücken. (Verstehen eines Gedichts.)“ (PU § 531)

Bei Kunstwerken gilt für Wittgenstein: Das, was ausgedrückt wird, ist von dem, *wodurch* und der Art, *wie* es ausgedrückt wird, nicht zu trennen. Die Anweisung „Sing dies Lied mit Ausdruck! Und nun sing es nicht, aber wiederhole den Ausdruck!“ (PU, § 332) ist irreführend, wenn nicht gar unsinnig, denn „[d]as Kunstwerk will nicht *etwas anderes* übertragen, sondern sich selbst“ (VB, 533). Nach Wittgenstein gibt es ein „sozusagen, intransitives Verstehen“, bei dem „das Verstandene quasi autonom“ ist, d.h. bei dem ich das, was ich verstanden habe, nicht anders ausdrücken oder paraphrasieren kann (PG, 37). So besteht das Verstehen einer Melodie nicht darin, dass ich beschreiben kann, was sie sagt oder zu verstehen gibt, denn sie sagt gar nichts, sondern dass ich ihr „folgen“ (PG, 37) und ihre Entwicklung nachvollziehen kann. Dies kann ich nur, wenn ich sie auf mich wirken lasse und mich frage, welchen Eindruck sie auf mich macht und wie dieser zu charakterisieren wäre. Wenn wir jemandem beim Zeichnen eines Gesichts zuschauen, dann folgen wir den einzelnen Strichen mit Verständnis, wir sehen, wie das Ganze allmählich Gestalt annimmt, wie sich der Ausdruck des Gesichts durch neu hinzugefügte Linien verändert. Wenn wir nach Wittgenstein davon reden, dass wir Kunst, im speziellen Musik und Architektur, verstehen, so meinen wir damit, dass wir den in Klängen, Materialien, Farben und Formen sich niederschlagenden Ausdruck erleben, ähnlich wie bei Gesten und Gesichtszügen. So schreibt er „Architektur ist eine Geste“ (VB, 510) und – etwas überpointiert – „Ein [musikalisches] Thema hat nicht weniger einen Gesichtsausdruck, als ein Gesicht“ (VB, 523).

Kunst verstehend zu erleben heißt allerdings nicht, von Material und Form losgelöste Ausdrucksqualitäten zu erleben, sondern bedeutet in erster Linie, die formalen Qualitäten eines Werks strukturiert und organisiert wahrzunehmen. Mit Blick auf die Kirchentöne schreibt Wittgenstein:

„Eine Kirchentonart verstehen, heißt nicht, sich an die Tonfolge gewöhnen, in dem Sinne, in dem ich mich an einen Geruch gewöhnen kann und ihn nach einiger Zeit nicht mehr unangenehm empfinde. Sondern es heißt, etwas Neues hören, was ich früher noch nicht gehört habe, etwa in der Art – ja ganz analog –, wie es wäre, 10 Striche IIIIIIIIIII, die ich früher nur als 2 mal fünf Stri-

che habe sehen können, plötzlich als ein charakteristisches Ganzes sehen zu können. Oder die Zeichnung eines Würfels, die ich nur als flaches Ornament habe sehen können, auf einmal räumlich zu sehen.“ (PB, § 224)

In einer Vorlesung, die Wittgenstein 1933 in Cambridge hielt, vergleicht er das Verstehen von Kunst mit dem Finden des gesuchten Gegenstandes in einem Rätselbild.

„Aesthetics is descriptive. What it does is to draw one's attention to certain features, to place things side by side so as to exhibit these features. To tell a person 'This is the climax' is like saying 'This is the man in the puzzle picture'. Our attention is drawn to a certain feature, and from that point forward we see that feature“ (A, 38-39).

Ästhetisches Verstehen ist eine Art des Wahrnehmens und Erlebens. Möchten wir ein Musikstück verstehen, so müssen wir lernen, es in bestimmter Weise zu *hören*. Die Aufgabe der Experten und Kunstkritiker besteht darin, den Laien in einem ersten Schritt auf Details und Zusammenhänge hinzuweisen, die selbst aufmerksamen Zuhörern entgehen. Was dem musikalischen Laien in der Regel fehlt, ist *Sensibilität*, eine gewisse „Feinheit der Empfindung“ (VB, 534) und das, was man ein ‚gebildetes Ohr‘ nennen könnte. Wo ein Anfänger nur eine Folge von Tönen hört, erkennt der Experte Motive, Wiederholungen, Variationen, Trugschlüsse, Anspielungen usw. Wie aber steht es mit Ausdrucksqualitäten? Wie kann man jemanden davon überzeugen, dass eine bestimmte Stelle in einem Musikstück nicht traurig, sondern mutig, nicht unbeschwert, sondern ironisch ist? Da gibt es unterschiedliche Strategien: Man weist auf einzelne Passagen hin und hebt diese hervor. Oft reicht es, einfach zu *sagen*, man selbst höre die Stelle als mutig oder als ironisch. Danach hört man das Stück gemeinsam noch einmal und der Gesprächspartner versucht dabei, den Mut bzw. die Ironie in die einzelnen Tonfolgen hineinzudeuten. Oder man vergleicht die Passage mit einer ähnlichen Stelle eines anderen Stücks, von der auch der Gesprächspartner zugeben würde, sie habe etwas Mutiges an sich. Wer sich das zutraut, kann die Stelle auch in einer Weise nachsingen oder spielen, dass das Mutige hörbar zur Geltung kommt. Danach lässt man das Stück noch einmal auf sich wirken, im Lichte der eigenen Interpretation. Falls es dem Gesprächspartner immer noch nicht gelingen sollte, den Mut in der Tonfolge „unterzubringen“, ist es nach Wittgenstein ratsam, einen passenden Vergleich anzuführen, etwa indem man sagt: „Die Melodie ist sozusagen gleichgültig gegen die Außenwelt“. Vergleiche bereichern und vertiefen unser Erleben und Verstehen von Kunst. Wittgenstein soll in einer Vorlesung von 1933 gesagt haben: „all Aesthetics is of the nature of 'giving a good simile'“ (M, 316).

Klassische Musik hat nach Wittgenstein oft hörbare Ähnlichkeiten mit unserer Sprache. Der Eindruck, den ein musikalisches Thema macht, hängt also mit „dem ganzen Feld unserer Sprachspiele“ (Z, § 175) zusammen. Die Musik aber erinnert uns an eine Sprache, weil unsere Sprache Charakteristika aufweist, die man musikalisch nennen könnte: „In der Wortsprache ist ein starkes musikalisches Element. (Ein Seufzer, der Tonfall der Frage, der Verkündigung, der Sehnsucht, alle die unzähligen Gesten des Tonfalls)“ (Z § 161).

Die expressive Seite der gesprochenen Sprache stellt nach Wittgenstein jedoch nur einen Bruchteil der für unser Verstehen insgesamt grundlegenden Dimension expressiver Bedeutsamkeit dar. Wir sind in der Lage, in so ziemlich allem einen menschlichen Ausdruck wahrzunehmen. So können Schriftarten einen lässigen, verspielten,

verträumten, energischen oder stolzen Eindruck machen. Nach Wittgenstein haben sogar Pflanzen und Wörter menschliche Charaktere: „Die verschiedenen Pflanzen und ihr menschlicher Charakter: Rose, Epheu, Gras, Eiche, Apfelbaum, Getreide, Palme. Verglichen mit dem verschiedenen Charakter der Wörter“ (VB, 482). Es ist faszinierend, wie ästhetisch erhellend es sein kann, mit Blick auf ein Objekt darüber nachzudenken, welchen Charakter und welche Vorlieben es hätte, wenn es ein Mensch wäre. Man steht vor einem Haus und fragt sich: „Würde es lieber Chopin oder Techno hören? Wäre es ein Buchliebhaber oder ein Draufgänger?“. Erstaunlich ist, wie selten wir um eine Antwort verlegen sind, wenn wir diese Einstellung, die man als ‚hypothetischen Panpsychismus‘ oder ‚heuristischen Anthropomorphismus‘ bezeichnen könnte, gegenüber ästhetischen Objekten einnehmen. Um eine Antwort verlegen ist jedoch, wer gefragt wird, wieso wir so oft eine Antwort geben können.

Jemand, der etwas von Kunst versteht, erlebt nach Wittgenstein einzelne Werke nicht nur intensiv und differenziert, er kann die entsprechenden Werke auch charakterisieren, ihren Ausdruck beschreiben und erhellende Vergleiche ziehen: „Wenn ich von einem Schubert-Stück sage, es sei melancholisch, dann ist es so, als gäbe ich ihm ein Gesicht. (Ich drücke nicht Zustimmung oder Missfallen aus)“ (VüÄ, 14). Der sensible und versierte Kunstkritiker liefert uns oft den treffenden Ausdruck, *le mot juste*. Wir fühlen uns erleichtert, etwa so, wie wenn wir den Duft eines vertrauten Parfüms riechen, uns jedoch nicht einfällt, woher wir diesen Duft kennen, und uns dann jemand den Namen der gesuchten Person nennt. Wittgenstein spricht an mehreren Stellen in seinen Ästhetik-Vorlesungen von 1938 von ästhetischen Rätseln und Verwirrungen (*aesthetic puzzlements*), die den Anlass ästhetischer Untersuchungen und Diskussionen bilden. Wir betrachten die Gangart eines Menschen und fragen uns „Woher kenne ich diese Geste, diesen Ausdruck? Womit könnte ich den eigenartigen Eindruck vergleichen? Zu welchem Charakter passt diese Gangart?“. Die Aufgabe des Kenners und Kritikers ist es, diese Rätsel zu lösen, indem er passende Vergleiche anstellt und uns dadurch Klarheit verschafft über unsere eigenen Eindrücke, über die Weise, wie ein Kunstwerk auf uns wirkt. Eine ästhetische Erklärung muss nachvollziehbar sein. Eine Charakterisierung eines Kunstwerks als „anmutig“, „verspielt“, „bombastisch“ oder „verzweifelt“ ist dann treffend und passend, wenn der Laie ihr zustimmen kann: „You have to give the explanation that is accepted. That is the whole point of the explanation“ (VüÄ, 18). Zustimmung wird jemand dann, wenn die Beschreibung

das Charakteristische und Besondere des ästhetischen Eindrucks auf den Punkt bringt und so einem dumpfen und undurchsichtigen Gefühl Schärfe und Klarheit verleiht. Malcolm Budd schreibt dazu: „The [aesthetic] explanation is persuasive, rather than diagnostic, effecting a clarification or change in the perception of the work; it differs from the causal diagnosis of a headache, where the sufferer's acceptance of the diagnosis is unnecessary and leaves his headache unchanged“ (Budd, 1992). Wer je versucht hat, allein durch den Geschmackssinn, ohne zu sehen, zu tasten oder zu riechen, eine Substanz zu identifizieren, der kennt das beunruhigende Gefühl, einen vertrauten Geschmackseindruck nicht ‚festmachen‘ zu können. Der Eindruck bleibt verworren, uneindeutig und hält sich in der Schwebe. Sobald man sieht oder erfährt, was man geschmeckt hat, gewinnt der Eindruck an Klarheit und Kontur. Man ist beruhigt. Der ästhetische Kenner gleicht nach Wittgenstein einem Karikaturisten, der ein Auge für markante Gesichtszüge hat, diese mit zwei, drei gekonnten Strichen hervorhebt und so unseren Blick schärft für das Charakteristische ebenso wie für den Charakter eines Gesichts.

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# Wittgenstein, Grammar and Response-Dependence

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Introduction Significant similarities can be found between Wittgenstein's views on grammar and response-dependence accounts of concept use and acquisition. Such similarities may be unsurprising since Phillip Pettit's response-dependence account of concept acquisition was first developed as a response to the rule-following conundrum (in its Kripkensteinian form). However, very little further work has been undertaken at the intersections of the literature of response-dependence and Wittgenstein's work. I want here to bring response-dependence into productive conversation with Wittgenstein's work: A consideration of key aspects of a response-dependence approach in the light of Wittgenstein's remarks on grammar and on the nature and role of hinge propositions adds perspicuity and plausibility to the response-dependence approach, while also showing that that approach fits comfortably within a Wittgensteinian framework.

I begin with a brief outline of the response-dependence approach. I continue by drawing on Wittgenstein's considerations of grammatical propositions showing how the response-dependence project might be re-framed as an exercise in drawing our attention to the grammar of certain of our concepts. Finally, I extend that idea, reflecting on remarks in *On Certainty*, to show propositions capturing the relationship between our secondary quality concepts and our perceptual responses are cases of 'hinge' propositions, propositions that are part of the framework upon which our web of belief depends. By the same token, understanding those concepts as response-dependent enables a clearer picture of why our colour attributions (for example) are semantically and epistemically secure, but also demonstrates that that certainty has its limits.

1. Response-Dependence In the tradition of conceptual analysis, the response-dependence project aims to provide an elucidation of what governs at least some of our practices of classification. Secondary quality and other concepts appear to exhibit a dependence upon subjects' responses – something is yellow just in case it looks yellow, bitter just in case it tastes bitter, and so on. Over the past two decades or so, theories of response-dependence have emerged as a strategy for determining more precisely the nature and status of this dependence, and its wider implications. These theories elucidate concepts by means of a biconditional claim known as a *basic equation*. Basic equations state an a priori dependence between a concept's extension and the response its instantiation tends to elicit in appropriate subjects under appropriate conditions, and they take the following form:

For any concept F and for any object X: X is F iff X is such as to elicit some typical response (R) in appropriate subjects (S) under appropriate conditions (C)

The relation made perspicuous by this biconditional has the effect of privileging responses that occur under certain conditions. This confers a certain epistemic infallibility on those responses: if conditions are appropriate, a subject cannot be wrong or ignorant about whether or not X is F.

The biconditional claim concerns the way in which responses are involved in determining whether or not

something counts as F. In the strand of the response-dependence project that concerns us here, this claim is not that our responses are in some way responsible for things being, say, yellow, rather, they are responsible for things *counting* as 'yellow'. Indeed, to conflate the claim that our colour *concepts* are response-dependent with the claim that colours themselves are response-dependent would amount to an instance of what Wittgenstein identified in the *Tractatus* as misunderstanding the logic of language (1981a 4.003) and of what he later recognised as 'interfering with the use of language' (2001 124), rather than simply offering a description of our practices of classifying things through thought and talk.

Basic equations are theorists' tools used to elucidate how responses are crucial to the determination of certain concepts' extensions. They are not intended as a representation of beliefs that users of those concepts ordinarily form about their own practices. Rather, they represent those practices, mapping the connection between responses, conditions and a concept's extension. As such, basic equations form part of the theory of those practices and have a role only in that philosophical context. Although they don't ordinarily do so, via sufficient reflection on their practices, a user of a concept would be able to derive its basic equation a priori.

That said, theorists are required to engage in a certain amount of a posteriori theorising if basic equations are to have substantial, non-trivial content. If the theory is to deliver accurate re-presentations, the 'appropriate' placeholder must be cashed out in a non-trivial way, generating the criteria used to rule conditions of response in and out so that not just any response makes it the case that something counts as 'yellow', thereby maintaining a distinction between something's seeming yellow and being 'yellow'. Some acquaintance with the relevant practices is required to understand a basic equation. This will include being aware that in practice we discount certain conditions as inappropriate for enabling the extension-determining response and so don't count responses that occur under such conditions as reliable indicators of whether something counts as 'yellow'.

2. Grammar and Response-Dependence As an attempt to represent practices, the basic equation ensues from actions and deeds, that lie, according to Wittgenstein, 'at the bottom of our language game' (1969, 204) and, as Wittgenstein invoking Goethe, is wont to remind us, are prior to language. (1969 402) Basic equations are true by dint of facts about our classificatory practices and a priori knowable by anyone acquainted with those practices. Response-dependence theorists have tended to emphasise that the basic equation is not intended as a rule that would dictate the use of a concept. However, in the context of Wittgenstein's picture of rules, it is usefully understood as a rule. Thus understood, the rule both reflects and guides practice, but it does not dictate practice prior to any move having been made. On this picture, correct use of a concept is that which is in accordance with the rule, but it is not correct by dint of having followed the rule per se, but by dint of its being in accordance with customary use of the concept (Wittgenstein 2001 199).

The basic equation is consonant with Wittgenstein's picture of grammar as 'a description of the language ex post' (MS 109-10). When such a description is provided, it reflects our practices back to us – we (re)describe ourselves to ourselves thereby gaining new understanding of those practices. Such descriptions take us back to ourselves, making our rules visible to us. Basic equations can be understood as grammatical propositions, rules that partly constitute the meaning of their constituents; yet our acting remains at the bottom of those rules. Typically of grammatical propositions, although it looks purely empirical, the basic equation functions both descriptively and normatively, describing our practice while at the same time manifesting the standards that guide our practices. On Wittgenstein's account, such propositions, with the form of empirical propositions, but with the function of rules, 'form the foundations of all operating with thoughts (with language)'. (1969 401)

The standards to which we hold our practices are themselves part of the grammar of our language. So in response-dependent practices, the practices whereby we discount as unreliable responses that don't occur under conditions that have tended to promote intra- and inter-personal consistency in the use of a concept are also part of that grammar. Pettit's 'ethocentric' approach to mapping those practices is thoroughly consonant with Wittgenstein's picture of grammar as a practical, human enterprise. Likewise, Wittgenstein reminds us that samples such as those used to indicate the features of material objects picked out by colour words and concepts are part of our system of representation, that is, part of grammar. Their status as samples is conferred on them by dint of their role within that system (2001 150). Grammar is embedded in and derives from our practices. It is part of our knowing *how* and is manifest in the ways we act and speak (1969 395) Through their re-presentation of our practices, basic equations make that grammar perspicuous, particularly the grammatical role played by our responses in determining the use of colour words and concepts. Wittgenstein reminds us that 'A word has the meaning someone has given to it.' (1958 28) Basic equations show how the meaning of certain terms are given to them, in the case of words used to classify things in terms of secondary qualities, they are given to them on the basis of our perceptual responses under certain conditions. Basic equations show us a priori what we have put into these concepts.

3. Hinge Propositions and Response-Dependence In *On Certainty* Wittgenstein introduces the idea of 'hinge' propositions, propositions that function as points in our web of belief that hold fast, enabling other propositions to pivot around them. They are, if you will, the beliefs on which our beliefs turn, upon which they hinge. (1969 341-4, 655) In practice hinge propositions are not subjected to doubt. Although they may once have been disputed, 'for unthinkable ages' these propositions have 'belonged to the scaffolding of our thoughts'. (1969 211) In Wittgenstein's terms they are *subjectively* and *objectively* certain: From our point of view as epistemic agents these propositions *feel* indubitable, we are convinced of them, doubting them would seem somehow unnatural. They are objectively certain, in Wittgenstein's terms, because they play a role such that to doubt them would not make sense, for in doubting them we allow the possibility of undermining our web of belief in its entirety, of removing its foundations. (1969 403) Hinge propositions include those the truth of which Moore attempted to prove, propositions concerning the existence of material objects (1959). Without such propositions functioning as hinges, other beliefs have no

ground from which to become established. Keeping these pivots stable enables us to remain confident in our practices, going on without constantly second-guessing our language, concepts and judgements, plunging them into the chaos that ensues when traditional scepticism gains traction (1969 613). Our hinge beliefs form part of our Welt-Bild, the 'inherited background against which I distinguish between true and false.' Extending the language-game idea, Wittgenstein describes them as 'part of a kind of mythology', which can be 'learned purely practically, without learning any explicit rules.' (1969 94-5)

Wittgenstein implies that similar certainty and epistemic status is afforded to propositions in which the names of colours are attached to objects; we attach such words without doubt. (1969 522-531) I suggest that propositions similar to those encapsulated by the basic equation, propositions expressing a crucial relationship between the way objects look to us (under certain conditions) and their being labelled a certain colour, also function in practice as hinges acquired through initiation and involvement in practices. Specifically, in the taxonomy of types of hinge propositions assembled by Moyal-Sharrock, (2003 129) they would fall into the category of 'linguistic hinges', propositions that, earlier, Wittgenstein labelled 'grammatical rules'. Understood as hinge propositions they are of course part of the grammar of our language, but are recognised as serving a particular role in enabling language and thought.

These propositions are further characteristic of hinge propositions in that due to their empirical character, their negation makes sense. 'It is not the case that something is yellow just in case it looks yellow to us under C.' is able to be understood and is truth evaluable. But it does not make grammatical sense; it flies in the face of what we understand by 'yellow'. If this is not the correct use, and meaning, of 'yellow', then what is? If all such propositions about our colour terms are false, then, our whole web of beliefs about what colours things are begins unravel. As Glock argues (2004 71-73, n.1) a challenge to show that the ripe tomato is red is met only by appeal to grammar. According to Wittgenstein, I can know what colours things are because I can say how things are. In the colour case, I can say how things are because I can see how they are (1969 345). These moves do not constitute a response to the sceptic, Glock argues, rather they repudiate that challenge – there is nothing else to be said.

Moyal-Sharrock points out that in regular linguistic contexts, saying a hinge suggests that it does not go without saying, such a move arrests the language game (2003 135); whereas in the normal course of language, speakers' behaviour constitutes a manifestation of the rule in action. This is why the basic equation requires a philosophical context if it is to be of any practical value as a representation of practice. It is not ordinarily said by users of the concept it concerns, rather it is devised by philosophers to draw attention to particular aspects of those users' practices. It is a hinge *for us* but not for the theorist qua theorist, and not in the abnormal case in which we examine our practice because things have gone awry, such as we might when conditions conducive to colour perception are disrupted by events in our environment, such as ash clouds caused by volcanic eruptions. (Wittgenstein 2001 142)

A response-dependence analysis reveals the way in which the hinge status of propositions such as 'something is yellow just in case it looks yellow to us under C' is connected with the infallibility of our responses as to whether or not something counts as 'yellow'. The way in which we

rely upon our responses under certain conditions to determine whether or not something counts as 'yellow' shows why it doesn't make sense to doubt that the yellow-looking things are 'yellow'. Ordinarily, we don't doubt our responses, but our practice of relying on them is not something of which we are usually aware. The favourability of our responses is only revealed when something goes awry. Response-dependence analyses of certain concepts, then, map the limits of our practical certainty: while in the normal case it doesn't make sense to doubt that something that looks yellow to us is 'yellow', it is reasonable to suspend trust in our responses in cases where C doesn't obtain. And reflection on our practices confirms that we do indeed suspend trust in our responses when it is dark, say, or someone is colour-blind, or under the influence of hallucinatory substances, and theorists fill out C to exclude such cases. The basic equation, then, helps us refine our understanding of our lack of doubt in the usual case, but also illuminates the fact that there are moments at which our practices allow that certainty has its limits.

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# Wie stark hängen Mikroskopie-Bilder von Theorien ab?

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Mit Hilfe des Mikroskops produzierte Bilder sind eine fundamentale Grundlage der Zellbiologie, da sie den besten direkten Zugang zu ihrem Gegenstandsbereich bilden. Der Umstand, dass Mikroskope eine fundamentale empirische Quelle der Zellbiologie sind, birgt allerdings auch Anlass zu wissenschaftsphilosophischen Bedenken. Einerseits sind sie von technischen Instrumenten abhängig, andererseits spielt auch das Vorwissen des Zellbiologen eine Rolle bei der Auswertung von Bildern des Mikroskops. Es stellt sich daher die Frage, ob Mikroskopie-Bilder so stark von Hintergrundtheorien geprägt sind, dass ein Relativismus kaum zu vermeiden ist oder ob sie in der Lage sind, die Genese und Geltung zellbiologischer Hypothesen objektiv zu rechtfertigen.

## 1. Wissenschaftsphilosophische Bedenken zu Mikroskopie-Bildern

Die Abhängigkeit der Zellbiologie von der Mikroskopie birgt einige Schwierigkeiten, die in anderen Wissenschaften nicht häufig in dieser Form auftreten. Erstens muss man sich in der Zellbiologie nicht nur auf seine eigenen Sinne verlassen, sondern auch auf die technischen Hilfsmittel, die unsere Sinne erweitern. Aus diesem Grund fließt das physikalische und technische Wissen, um Mikroskope zu konstruieren und zu bedienen, in die Bewertung von Mikroskopiebildern mit ein. Ihre Geltung hängt somit von einem Komplex aus Hintergrundannahmen und -theorien ab. Zweitens sind die technischen Möglichkeiten von Mikroskopen begrenzt. In der Lichtmikroskopie kann man Auflicht- Hellfeld- und Dunkelfeldmikroskopie möglicherweise als Erweiterung des normalen Sehens mit dem Auge betrachten, doch diese Verfahren spielen in der professionellen Zellforschung heute nur noch eine geringe Rolle. Fortgeschrittene Mikroskopie-Verfahren produzieren dagegen niemals Bilder, die alle Aspekte des zu untersuchenden Objekts widerspiegeln, sondern beschränken sich jeweils auf bestimmte physikalische Eigenschaften des Objektes. Phasenkontrast-Mikroskopie und Differentielle-Interferenz-Kontrast-Mikroskopie nutzen die Eigenschaft der Phasenverzögerung des Lichtes beim Durchdringen des Objektes, Polarisations-Mikroskopie die Doppelbrechung des Lichts, Interferenzmikroskopie die Interferenzerscheinungen an dünnen Schichten und Fluoreszenzmikroskopie das Selbstleuchten des Objekts oder das Leuchten von speziellen Farbstoffen. In der Elektronenmikroskopie werden meist nur sehr dünne Schnitte von Zellen untersucht, die dehydriert und fixiert werden müssen. Dadurch kann es zu starken Deformationen des Objekts kommen und Untersuchungen über dynamische Prozesse in Zellen sind damit nicht möglich.

Neben der technischen Abhängigkeit spielt das Problem der Theoriebeladenheit der Beobachtung bei der Auswertung von Mikroskopie-Bildern eine besondere Rolle. Norwood Hanson beschreibt in seinem einflussreichen Buch *Pattern of Discovery* den Fall zweier Mikrobiologen, die bei der Betrachtung desselben Mikroskopie-Bildes unterschiedliche Dinge sehen: Der erste Biologe sieht ein biologisches Artefakt, dass durch inadäquate Färbung des Präparates entstanden ist, der zweite Biologe sieht die Zellorganelle des Golgi-Apparats. Obwohl beide Biologen ohne Zweifel dasselbe Objekt auf demselben Bild sehen,

bezweifelt Hanson, dass sie es lediglich anders interpretieren. Sehen und Interpretieren sind unterschiedliche kognitive Aktivitäten, denn Interpretieren erfordert eine aktive Denkleistung, Sehen jedoch nicht (Hanson 1958, 11). Hier greift Hanson auf Wittgenstein zurück, der bereits am Anfang seiner *Bemerkungen über die Philosophie der Psychologie* darauf hingewiesen hat, dass das Deuten eines Bildes eine Handlung ist, Sehen dagegen ein Zustand (Wittgenstein 1984a, §1).

Im obigen Beispiel sehen die beiden Biologen nicht erst dasselbe Objekt und interpretieren es anschließend verschieden, sondern nehmen es von vorne herein als etwas anderes wahr. Hanson weist hier auf den von Wittgenstein geprägten Unterschied zwischen *Sehen* und *Sehen-als* hin: Während beide Biologen dieselben visuellen Eindrücke vom Mikroskopie-Bild haben, sehen sie es *als* etwas Verschiedenes. Der eine Biologe sieht es als Artefakt, der zweite sieht es als Zellorganelle, ein Nicht-Biologe ist dagegen überhaupt nicht in der Lage, etwas Bestimmtes zu sehen. Das visuelle Erlebnis allein ist daher nicht genug, sondern erst durch theoretisches Wissen ist ein Laie in der Lage, dieselben Dinge zu sehen wie der Biologe. Hanson macht dies am Beispiel eines Kippbildes deutlich, welches man sowohl als Ente als auch als Antilope wahrnehmen kann. Solange man nicht über den Begriff einer Antilope verfügt, wird man auf diesem Bild stets eine Ente wahrnehmen, erst durch den Begriff und hinreichend Vorwissen über Antilopen wird ein Gestaltwandel möglich. Ebenso kann man ohne biologisches Vorwissen auf einem Mikroskopie-Bild niemals eine bestimmte Organelle erkennen. Hanson zufolge ist theoretisches Wissen aus diesem Grunde ein essentieller Bestandteil des Sehens: "Seeing is, as I should almost like to say, an amalgam of the two – pictures and language. At the least, the concept of seeing embraces the concepts of visual sensation and knowledge" (Hanson 1958, 25).

Vor diesem Hintergrund wird es verständlich, was Thomas Kuhn meint, wenn er davon spricht, „daß bei einem Paradigmenwechsel die Welt sich ebenfalls verändert“ (Kuhn 1976, 123). Ein Paradigmenwechsel hat Kuhn zufolge die Form eines visuellen Gestaltwandels, bei dem die Wissenschaftler neue und andere Dinge mit denselben Messinstrumenten sehen, die sie vorher bereits zur Verfügung hatten. Durch das Paradigma wird die Wahrnehmung des Wissenschaftlers gebildet, erst mit dem theoretischen Wissen kann er Zellorganellen als Zellorganellen sehen. Sein theoretisches Wissen bestimmt, ob er einen kaum von seinem Hintergrund unterscheidbaren Fleck als wichtige Zellorganelle oder als Rauschen und Bildstörung des Mikroskops wahrnimmt. Bei einem Paradigmenwechsel kann es zu einem visuellen Gestaltwandel kommen, so dass er diesen Fleck als etwas ganz anderes wahrnimmt. Dies ist keine einfache Neuinterpretation, da er diesen Fleck vorher meist gar nicht bewusst wahrgenommen hat und im alten Paradigma gar keine stabilen Daten zu diesem Fleck erhoben wurden.

Für Pierre Duhem sind unmittelbare Beobachtungen bei wissenschaftlichen Experimenten sogar noch tiefer durch wissenschaftliche Theorien geprägt, da erst die Theorie das Verständnis der Beobachtungen ermöglicht. Ein wissenschaftliches Experiment ist nur im Kontext einer

theoretischen Interpretation sinnvoll, „diese Interpretation ersetzt das konkret Gegebene, mit Hilfe der Beobachtung wirklich Erhaltene durch abstrakte und symbolische Darstellungen“ (Duhem 1998, 192). Beispielsweise nimmt der Experimentator in einem Labor nicht in erster Linie die Abweichung einer Nadel an einem Messgerät wahr, sondern vielmehr das Fließen eines Stromes. Unmittelbare Beobachtungen, zu denen auch Bilder des Mikroskops gehören, werden durch symbolische Darstellungen einer wissenschaftlichen Theorie ersetzt. Man kann daher nicht „die Theorie, die man prüfen will, vor der Türe des Laboratoriums lassen, denn ohne sie ist es unmöglich nur ein einziges Instrument zu justieren, eine einzige Ablesung zu interpretieren“ (ebd., 242).

Mikroskopie-Bilder sind von technischen Instrumenten, deren Leistungen, Grenzen und Hintergrundtheorien abhängig und die Auswertung von Mikroskopie-Bildern ist an wissenschaftliches Vorwissen gebunden. Deshalb stellt sich die Frage, inwiefern Mikroskopie-Bilder eine hinreichende Grundlage für die Rechtfertigung zellbiologischer Hypothesen bilden können.

## 2. Können Mikroskopie-Bilder aus ihrer Abhängigkeit befreit werden?

Sowohl die Abhängigkeit der Mikroskopie-Bilder von technischen Instrumenten und Hintergrundtheorien als auch die Abhängigkeit von wissenschaftlichem Vorwissen führen dazu, dass mikroskopische Bilder *theorieverseucht* sind. Zellbiologen stehen daher vor dem Problem, dass ihre theorieverseuchten Beobachtungen ihre wissenschaftlichen Hypothesen rechtfertigen sollen, ohne diese Abhängigkeiten zu übernehmen. Ist dies überhaupt möglich?

Um dieses Ziel erreichen zu können, besteht ein wesentlicher Schritt in der Leugnung der bloßen Unterscheidung von Beobachtung und Theorie. James Bogen und James Woodward (1988) haben darauf hingewiesen, dass Wissenschaftler keineswegs konkrete beobachtbare *Daten* voraussagen oder erklären, sondern unbeobachtbare *Phänomene*. Anstelle des Beobachtungsbegriffs tritt somit das Duo von Daten und Phänomenen:

Phenomena [...] are relatively stable and general features of the world which are potential objects of explanation and prediction by general theory. [...] Data, by contrast, play the role of evidence for claims about phenomena. (Woodward 1989, 393f.)

Ein konkreter Datensatz ist beispielsweise eine Serie von Bildern, produziert von einem speziellen Fluoreszenzmikroskop in einem bestimmten Labor, der 40 Gigabyte groß ist und auf einer konkreten Festplatte gespeichert ist. Dieser Datensatz bildet die Evidenz für das allgemeine Phänomen, dass sich ein bestimmter Einzeller bei bestimmten Umgebungsbedingungen alle zwölf Stunden teilt. Eine zweite Messung mit geringfügigen Änderungen, beispielsweise mit einem anderen Präparat, einem anderen Objektiv oder einer anderen Software würde zwar vom ersten Experiment genuin verschiedene Daten produzieren, aber dennoch dieselbe Evidenz für das Phänomen geben. Ebenso führt die nachträgliche Manipulation der Bilder mit dem Computer zu einer Modifikation der Daten, doch das Phänomen, welches aufgrund dieser Daten beschrieben wird, bleibt davon gänzlich unberührt. Eine zellbiologische Hypothese erklärt deshalb nicht die Entstehung und Struktur von spezifischen Mikroskopie-Bildern, sondern ein allgemeines zellbiologisches Phänomen, beispielsweise die Zellteilung eines Organismus.

Bogen und Woodward weisen darauf hin, dass Hanson und Kuhn den wichtigen Unterschied zwischen Daten und Phänomenen übersehen und ihre Thesen über die Theoriegeladenheit der Beobachtung durch diese Unterscheidung deutlich an Tragweite verliert. Denn theoriegeladenes Sehen spielt sich auf der Ebene der Daten ab, während wissenschaftliche Hypothesen durch Phänomene generiert und gerechtfertigt werden und diese erklären und voraussagen. Ihre Unterscheidung zwischen Daten und Phänomenen lässt sich auch auf Mikroskopie-Bilder anwenden. Damit zwei Biologen darüber streiten können, ob der Golgi-Apparat eine reale Entität oder nur ein Produkt der Messprozesse ist, muss der Golgi-Apparat bereits als stabiles und reproduzierbares Phänomen in Erscheinung getreten sein. Dafür muss es einen hinreichend großen und variablen Datensatz von Mikroskopie-Bildern geben, der als Evidenz für dieses Phänomen gilt. Zwar hat Hanson insofern recht, als dass man den Begriff des Golgi-Apparats sowie weiteres Vorwissen benötigt, um ein stabiles Phänomen aus den Datenstrom der Mikroskopiebilder extrahieren zu können. Dennoch spielte dies in der ersten Hälfte des 20. Jahrhunderts keine große Rolle in der Frage, ob der Golgi-Apparat ein Artefakt oder eine reale Zellorganelle ist. Entscheidend war vielmehr die Tatsache, dass das Phänomen des Golgi-Apparats nur bei mit Osmium oder Silber präparierten Zellen auftrat (siehe hierzu Bechtel 2006, 84-88). Kritiker und Befürworter des Golgi-Apparates hatten somit nicht nur dieselben Daten in Form von Mikroskopie-Bildern, sondern sogar dieselben stabilen Phänomene zur Verfügung und diskutierten lediglich darüber, ob diese Phänomene die Existenz des Golgi-Apparates *in vivo* hinreichend rechtfertigen können.

Dennoch benötigt man konzeptuelles Vorwissen, um auf einem Mikroskopie-Bild eine bestimmte Zellorganelle erkennen zu können. Sind symbolische Darstellungen daher für die Verwendung von Mikroskopen notwendig, setzt das Mikroskopieren stets eine Theorie voraus? Michael Heidelberger bestreitet Duhems These, dass in einem Experiment immer eine durch theoretische Interpretation gewonnene Behauptung überprüft wird, indem er ihm vorwirft, nicht sorgfältig genug zwischen verschiedenen Arten von wissenschaftlichen Instrumenten zu unterscheiden. Heidelberger unterscheidet drei Arten wissenschaftlicher Instrumente: *Produktive* Instrumente wie Vakuumpumpen, Teilchenbeschleuniger und Mikroskope erweitern die Wirklichkeit des Menschen, indem sie Phänomene erzeugen, die sonst nicht zur menschlichen Erfahrung gehören. *Repräsentierende* Instrumente wie Uhren, Waagen und Thermometer stellen die Abhängigkeit eines Phänomens von anderen Phänomenen am Instrument selbst symbolisch dar. *Konstruierende* Instrumente wie die Leidener Flasche sollen die Phänomene so beeinflussen und bearbeiten, dass sie beherrschbar werden (Heidelberger 1998, 81-83).

Heidelberger zufolge ist Duhems Analyse des wissenschaftlichen Experiments keineswegs inkorrekt, beschränkt sich jedoch einseitig auf repräsentierende Instrumente. Produktive Instrumente, zu denen auch das Mikroskop gehört, ebenso wie konstruierende Instrumente setzen jedoch keine theoretischen Interpretationen voraus, sondern sind selbständig gegenüber der Theorie. „Produktive und konstruktive Experimente werden gerade deshalb durchgeführt, um erst die Bedingungen kennenzulernen, in denen sich das Phänomen verlässlich darstellen lässt. Durch das Experimentieren sollen die Bedingungen aufgefunden werden, die die von Duhem geforderte Entwicklung hin zu einer Theorie mit symbolischen und abstrakten Begriffen erst ermöglichen“ (Heidelberger 1998, 87).



Darüber hinaus ist nicht jedes Experiment eine Überprüfung von theoretischen Hypothesen, bei der die zu überprüfende Theorie und spezifische Begrifflichkeiten bekannt sein müssen. Wenn in einem zellbiologischen Teilgebiet zentrale Kategorien und Konzepte entweder noch nicht vorhanden oder revisionsbedürftig sind, wenden Mikroskopiker häufig eine Methode an, die Friedrich Steinle (2002) als *exploratives Experimentieren* bezeichnet hat. Bei explorativen Experimenten werden experimentelle Parameter systematisch variiert, um Korrelationen und empirische Regularitäten zu entdecken. Diese Entdeckungen können oft nur durch Revision oder Neuformulierung von Konzepten und Kategorien formuliert werden. Bei explorativen Experimenten sind wissenschaftliche Konzepte daher nicht Vorbedingung, sondern Ziel der Untersuchung.

Hinzu kommt, dass Mikroskopieren kein Lehrbuchwissen voraussetzt, sondern eine Technik ist. Wenn der Biologie-Student das Labor betritt, lernt er nicht in erster Linie biologische Theorien (Wissen-dass, knowledge), sondern praktische Fähigkeiten (Wissen-wie, know-how). Michael Polanyi (1985) bezeichnet diese Form von Wissen als *implizites Wissen*, welches man nicht mit Worten ausdrücken kann. Zum Wissen, das man nicht sagen kann, zählt für Wittgenstein beispielsweise das Wissen, wie eine Klarinette klingt (Wittgenstein 1984b, § 78). Ebenso besitzt der Mikroskopiker umfassendes implizites Wissen, welches nicht in Worte zu fassen ist. Aus diesem Grund beeinflussen konzeptionelle Revisionen oder neuartige biologische Hypothesen nicht die Arbeiten des Mikroskopikers im Labor.

Zusammenfassend lässt sich feststellen, dass Mikroskopie-Bilder hinreichend unabhängig von biologischen Theorien und konzeptionellem Vorwissen sind, um biologische Hypothesen objektiv rechtfertigen zu können. Hiermit ist allerdings noch nicht ihre Unabhängigkeit von technischen Instrumenten erwiesen. Doch obwohl Mikroskopie-Bilder stets von konkreten Mikroskopen produziert werden, kann man sie in gewisser Form unabhängig von deren spezifischen Voraussetzungen machen. Entscheidend ist hierbei das Konzept der Robustheit, das durch William Wimsatt (1981) geprägt wurde und eng mit dem Konzept der multiplen Determiniertheit zusammen. Etwas ist multipel determiniert, wenn es auf verschiedene unabhängige Weisen hergeleitet, identifiziert oder gemessen werden kann. Dadurch ist eine Annahme über die Existenz einer Entität, ein Gesetz oder ein Prozess nicht von bestimmten Hintergrundtheorien abhängig. Selbst wenn sich herausstellt, dass in einem Experiment oder einer Herleitung ein Fehler aufgetreten ist, kann das Ergebnis beibehalten werden, da es weitere Experimente und Herleitungen gibt, die von diesem Fehler nicht beeinflusst werden.

Ian Hacking demonstriert diese Methode am Beispiel von roten Blutkörperchen, die man sowohl mit einem schwachen Elektronenmikroskop als auch mit einem starken Lichtmikroskop sehen kann. Hacking zufolge wäre es „ein grotesker Zufall, wenn zwei völlig verschiedene physikalische Vorgänge immer wieder identische visuelle

Konfigurationen hervorbrächten, die jedoch keine wirklichen Strukturen der Zelle sind, sondern künstliche Nebenwirkungen jener physikalischen Vorgänge“ (Hacking 1996, S. 334). Es wurde bereits erwähnt, dass auch die verschiedenen Lichtmikroskopiertechniken ganz unterschiedliche physikalische Aspekte des zu untersuchenden Objekts nutzen, um Bilder zu generieren. Da es kaum Zufall sein kann, dass unterschiedliche Methoden dieselben Phänomene produzieren, müssen die technischen Instrumente zuverlässig sein, mit denen die Bilder produziert wurden. Hierdurch wird eine gewisse Unabhängigkeit von Mikroskopie-Bildern gegenüber spezifischen Mikroskopen gewährleistet und einer objektiven Rechtfertigung von biologischen Hypothesen durch Mikroskopie-Bilder steht nichts mehr im Weg.

### Danksagung

Ich danke Dieter G. Weiss für hilfreiche Diskussionen und Anmerkungen. Diese Arbeit wurde aus Mitteln der Landesexzellenzinitiative ExZell (Ur 08 054) des Ministerium für Bildung, Wissenschaft und Kultur Mecklenburg Vorpommerns gefördert.

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# Are Images in the *Tractatus* Isomorphic to Facts?

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The notion of image (*Bild*) is a fundamental one in the *Tractatus*. This notion is immediately introduced in the text after the brief ontological section, because it serves to give an account in logical terms of our relationship with the world. The relationship between fact and image is generally considered as governed by a form of isomorphism. Here I want to maintain that it is not a matter of isomorphism, but instead of homomorphism.

The notion of *Bild* is introduced with a figurative image:

T. 2.1 Wir machen Uns Bilder der Tatsachen,

or as we find in the *ProtoTractatus*:

PT. 2.1 Die Tatsachen begreifen wir in Bildern.

In German, as in many modern languages, the notion of *Bild* has a large variety of meanings, which, however, can usefully be reduced to 2 (+1 the adult stage of insects, which here does not interest us). A representational meaning (1), whereby a certain thing is an image of another if in certain respects it preserves a certain similarity to it: a photograph is an image, a model is an image, and so forth; or in another mathematical meaning (2), the image is the set  $Y$  of the values of a function  $F(X)$ , and at the same time the value  $y$  of the function  $f(x)$  and is said to be an image of  $x$  with respect to  $F$ .

Though it may appear pleonastic, we define a function  $F$  as a correspondence between two sets  $X$  and  $Y$ , such that to every element  $x$  of  $X$  there corresponds only one element  $y$  of  $Y$ .

The set  $X$  is referred to as the domain of the function, and the set  $Y$  is said to be referred to as the co-domain or image of the function  $F$ .

Every meaning of the notion of image, both 1 and 2, can be linked to the mathematical meaning of the term, as was done by Lo Piparo (1998), showing that if a certain configuration is an image of something, a function exists that founds the correspondence. Evidently the mathematical meaning of the term does not account for all the characteristics of the image, for example representative immediateness or similarity, but to some extent it delimits its most general possibilities.

In a 1931 colloquy with Waismann, Wittgenstein says (WWK, 185):

I have inherited this concept [of image] on two sides: firstly from the drawn image and secondly from the image of the mathematician, which is already a general concept.

Most scholars interpret the relationship that links the image to the fact represented as a kind of isomorphism. Seeking to give an informal definition of isomorphism, Hofstadter (1979) writes: "a transformation that preserves all the information." We were saying that the relationship of isomorphism characterizes some one-to-one correspondences such that to every element of the set  $X$  there corresponds only one element of the set  $Y$ . The correspondence is both surjective and injective. Isomorphism is a one-to-one correspondence between two sets endowed with structures preserving structures of it. Depending on the characteristics of the correspondence, we will define the function as

one-to-one if each element of the set  $Y$  is the image of only one element of the set  $X$ .




Fig. 1  
Funzione suriettiva




Fig. 2  
Funzione iniettiva




Fig. 3  
Funzione biiettiva

If the two sets are governed by a one-to-one correspondence, then a function exists that we call inverse function, such that to every element  $y$  of  $Y$  there is made to correspond only one element of  $X$ . It is a function through which from the co-domain I can get back to the original set. It is evident that only in the case in which they are in a one-to-one correspondence, the sets must have the same number of elements, as can be seen from figures 3. A relationship of structural similarity that preserves properties and relationships, but not biuniqueness, is a relationship of homomorphism. Two structures are said to be homomorphic if, considered two non-empty sets  $X$  and  $Y$ , respectively domain and co-domain, the elements of the two sets are in such a relationship that if  $n$  elements of the set  $X$  have a certain relationship with one another, their counterparts in  $Y$  will have a corresponding relationship.

Examples of isomorphism are: A musical canon, for example, i.e. a composition in which the same theme is copied and varied in the pitch of the sounds at every entrance of a voice, as happens in Frère Jacques, is an example of isomorphic transformation. Every melodic line of the canon preserves all the information of the previous melodic line. Certainly not a variation. Two chessboards differing in size and material have an isomorphic relationship because the grid of the chessboard is the same and the number of pieces and their function is the same – the rules of chess are the same in both the chessboards. Two isomorphic structures can also be visually less similar; a topological transformation of a space can be governed by a relationship of isomorphism.

The thesis of isomorphism seems, however, at first sight, to be full of textual echoes:

T. 2.13 Den Gegenständen entsprechen im Bilde die Elemente des Bildes.

T. 2.131 Die Elemente des Bildes vertreten im Bild die Gegenstände.

T. 2.15 Daß sich die Elemente des Bildes in bestimmter Art und Weise zu einander verhalten, stellt vor, daß sich die Sachen so zu einander verhalten.

The relationship of isomorphism is certainly compatible with these affirmations, but it appears to be too strong to explain other claims by the philosopher:

T. 4.002 Der Mensch besitzt die Fähigkeit Sprachen zu bauen, womit sich jeder Sinn ausdrücken läßt, ohne eine Ahnung davon zu haben, wie und was jedes Wort bedeutet. — Wie man auch spricht, ohne zu wissen, wie die einzelnen Laute hervorgebracht werden.

Die Umgangssprache ist ein Teil des menschlichen Organismus, und nicht weniger kompliziert als dieser. Es ist menschenunmöglich, die Sprachlogik aus ihr unmittelbar zu entnehmen.

*Die Sprache verkleidet den Gedanken.* Und zwar so, daß man nach der äußeren Form des Kleides, nicht auf die Form des bekleideten Gedankens schließen kann; weil die äußere Form des Kleides nach ganz anderen Zwecken gebildet ist, als danach, die Form des Körpers erkennen zu lassen. [*italics added*]

This image is very strong and only apparently repeats Frege's sartorial famous image (1918, p. 60), which is substantially modified. One author uses the verb *kleiden* "to wear", the other the verb *verkleiden*, "to wear, disguise oneself, mask oneself":

Der an sich unsinnliche Gedanke kleidet sich in das sinnliche Gewand des Satzes und wird uns damit faßbarer.


The most enlightening example of a homomorphic application is that of the projection: a projection preserves the structural interrelations but does not necessarily preserve the equipotentiality. In this case the inverse function does not exist. I cannot always get back from the result of a projection to the original, as can be deduced from the example, where we clearly see the variety of figures that a projection can take on: the projection is compatible with different images, and indeed beginning from the result of the projection we cannot infer the fact projected. For the relationship that links objects to the origin of the projection and the result is a homomorphic relationship and not an isomorphic one: the fact is that there is not necessarily a one-to-one correspondence between the two sets of points that constitute the figures.

Wittgenstein often has recourse to the notion of projection in the *Tractatus*:

T. 3.11 Wir benützen das sinnlich wahrnehmbare Zeichen (Laut- oder Schriftzeichen etc.) des Satzes als Projektion der möglichen Sachlage.

Die Projektionsmethode ist das Denken des Satz-Sinnes.

T. 3.12 ... Und der Satz ist das Satzzeichen in seiner projektiven Beziehung zur Welt.



As you can see, despite the point  $C^2$  is a projection of the  $B^2$ , the point  $C^1$  is the projection of both the points  $B$  and  $B^1$ .

An indication of the fact that the metaphor of projection in the *Tractatus* is deliberately used to show the irreducible deformation between the level of facts and that of images comes to us from the 1929 essay *Some Remarks on Logical Form* (p.30):

Let us imagine two parallel planes, I and II. On plane I figures are drawn, say, ellipses and rectangle of different size and shapes, and it is our task to produce images of these figures on plane II. Then we can imagine two ways, amongst others, of doing this. We can, first, lay down a law of projection [...] and then proceed to project all figures from I into II, according to this law. Or, secondly, we could proceed thus: We lay down the rule that every ellipse on plane I is to appear as a circle in plane II, and every rectangle as a square in II. [...]. We can only gather from them that the original was an ellipse or a rectangle.[...] *The case of ordinary language is quite analogous.* If the fact of reality are the ellipses and rectangles on plane I the subject-predicate and relational forms correspond to the circles and square on plane II. [*italics added*]

Though through a later text, but it seems to me that an important characteristic of the relationship of projection identified by Wittgenstein consists in the fact that from what is represented it is not possible to infer what was to be represented if I do not exactly know the method of projection. And also in this case could not exist an *inverse function*.

In language, in particular, at every level of realization we are faced with different types of deformations and the relationship between the planes that those levels realize is never characterized by biuniqueness and isomorphism, but more often by non-biuniqueness.

The relationship that links written language to oral is a homomorphic relationship and not an isomorphic one; the fact is that in written language there are signs which do not correspond to any sound, like punctuation marks or letters that take on different sounds according to their position: for example in Italian the letter 'c' in the word *cicca* in the first occurrence is an unvoiced pre-palatal affricate and in the second an unvoiced velar plosive, or again there is the letter 'h' which in English often does not correspond to any sound, for instance in *eight*.

(Also non-isomorphic is the relationship between the international phonetic alphabet – though it was conceived as a one-to-one correspondence between sounds and written signs, such that to every sound there would correspond only one letter – and in any spoken language, for example Italian, to each sound there does not correspond a grapheme of the phonetic alphabet. In the previously mentioned case of *cicca*, to the first occurrence there corresponds /tS/ and to the second /k/, and so there is a double sign /tS/ for a single sound.)

In language isomorphic correspondences do not exist. The fact is that each plane of language is regulated by autonomous schemes of self-organization that modify the number of elements present.

T 4.014 Die Grammophonplatte, der musikalische Gedanke, die Notenschrift, die Schallwellen, stehen alle in jener abBildenden internen Beziehung zueinander, die zwischen Sprache und Welt besteht.

Ihnen allen ist der logische Bau gemeinsam.  
(Wie im Märchen die zwei Jünglinge, ihre zwei Pferde und ihre Lilien. Sie sind alle in gewissem Sinne Eins.)

This section takes on a particular role in the economy of the work; the whole section is a long and insistent exemplification of the idea that in order to represent a fact the image has to have in common with it a structure or a logical form, and that this is not immediately recognizable. The same thing happens to a musical theme that lives in the score, as in the performance, or in the record itself, remaining itself each time, although the musical passage in the score contains some notations that the performance cannot reproduce; for example the notational system. And instead it is possible to reconstruct a score beginning from a recording in a disk (this was done, for example, with *The Köln Concert* (1975) by Keith Jarrett), and it seems that the score reconstructed in this way is quite precise. What a traditional score cannot contain are the metronomic speeds that each performer chooses, though within a certain limit. A performance by Arturo Toscanini and one by Wilhelm Furtwängler are both images of the same score but have different metronomic speeds, so that the performance by the Italian conductor, famous for his accelerated tempos, will have a markedly shorter duration than the one by the German conductor. Performance forces the musician to give a precise value to tempos, as well as to indications relating to intensities (*piano and forte*), which cannot be written in the score but plays a fundamental role in the interpretation of the piece. Each level of representation has characteristics of its own that make the image irreducible to the fact represented.

But a musical theme does not exist beyond its realization in signs. Conversely, inside the image, the representative modalities of the image itself give rise to objects that present themselves as such in the story there are not horses, children or lilies independently of the image itself, and instead they all constitute and articulate the image together. Indeed, once the image is understood in its fullness, it little matters what the nature of the single constituents of the image is, that is to say whether they are chil-

dren, horses or lilies; they all are part of the same image, and it is this image in its unity that is understood.

Besides, we have a further sign that homomorphism is the relationship identified by Wittgenstein.

T.4.01 Der Satz ist ein Bild der Wirklichkeit.

Der Satz ist ein Modell der Wirklichkeit, so wie wir sie uns denken.

It is generally accepted as a reference to Hertz, who is the true forerunner of the idea of image expressed in the *Tractatus*, without necessarily accepting all the observations by Toulmin regarding the idea that Bild should be seen as "Model"; that Wittgenstein is here referring to Hertz is confirmed by proposition 4.04, which expressly quotes the German physicist.

Following this suggestion, in *Prinzipien der Mechanik* (§418) we find the definition of dynamic models: a material system is called a dynamic model of a second system if the connections of the former can be represented through coordinates such as to satisfy the following conditions:

- 1) the number of coordinates of the first system is equal to the number of coordinates of the second.
- 2) with appropriate rearrangement of the coordinates, the same condition equations hold for both systems.
- 3) with this rearrangement of the coordinates, the expression of the modulus of a displacement coincides for both systems.

In the language of classical physics, system equations are the equations that describe the state of a system through the appropriate coordinates. The coordinates referred to here are size, or degrees of freedom, indispensable for describing a system. A solid cannot be described by a system of two Cartesian axes, which instead perfectly describes a plane figure. A geometrical system requires the three dimensions of the plane, while in order to describe a physical system it may be necessary to consider temperature, gravitational fields or pressure, as in the case in which a system of fluids is considered. Physical models (unlike mathematical ones) are generally governed by a homomorphic relationship (the number of particles in the model is very small in comparison to the number of molecules in a fluid).

The logical multiplicity which Wittgenstein refers to is a concept closely linked to that of the degrees of freedom of a physical system. Indeed, logical multiplicity is given by the characteristics pertinent to describing a system. A model can describe a certain system if it shares its logical multiplicity. Therefore what is required is homomorphism and not isomorphism.

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# Linking Disposition Ascriptions and Conditionals: A Wittgensteinian Approach

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Our language can be seen as an ancient city; a maze of little streets and squares, of old and new houses, and of houses with additions from various periods; and this surrounded by a multitude of new boroughs with straight regular streets and uniform houses.

Wittgenstein, *Philosophical Investigations* (section 18)

To imagine a language means to imagine a form of life.  
Wittgenstein, *Philosophical Investigations* (section 19)

## 1. Introduction

Dispositions, such as fragility, solubility, combustibility, bravery, etc., are abundant in the world. What it is for an object or subject to possess a disposition, however, has deeply puzzled philosophers (Goodman, 1954). A popular approach to tackling this ontological issue begins by asking a foremost semantic question: What does a disposition ascription mean? The underlying idea is that if we do not have a minimum grip of what we are talking about when making a disposition ascription, the chance is slim that we get a clear picture of what a disposition is (see Mellor, 2000). Traditionally, the conditional account has been the most dominant approach to explicating the meaning of a disposition ascription, endorsed by philosophers such as Ryle (1949), Goodman (1954), Quine (1960), and many others. However, this approach faces serious challenges presented by Martin (1994), Johnston (1992), Bird (1998) and others. Despite a wide consensus that the conditional approach is a dead end in analyzing disposition ascriptions, philosophers such as Choi (2003, 2006, 2008) and Manley & Wasserman (2007, 2008; etc.) have recently made impressive efforts to revive the conditional accounts.

The aim of this paper is not so much to initiate an all-embracing inquiry of the prospects of the conditional approach in light of the most recent developments in the literature, but to sketch an alternative picture based on some of Wittgenstein's insights about language. By doing so, we may obtain a fresh and larger perspective to look at what a disposition ascription means and how it relates to other intriguing linguistic expressions such as counterfactual conditionals and *ceteris paribus*.

Below, we begin with a brief illustration of the conditional approach and some of the persistent difficulties which it encounters.

## 2. The Conditional Accounts and Their Difficulties

Given the obvious link between a disposition ascription and a counterfactual conditional, the simple conditional account draws an equivalence relation between these two types of statements by the following formulation:

(SCA) S is disposed to M when C iff, if S were in C, S would M.

Martin (1994) provides us with a pair of examples which are widely regarded as a knock-down argument against (SCA). The first case he asks us to imagine is this. A dead wire, though not disposed to conduct electricity when

touched by a conductor, is connected to an electro-fink, a device which makes the wire conduct electricity whenever it senses that the wire is about to be touched by a conductor. In this case, the disposition ascription "The wire is live" is false. However, its corresponding counterfactual analysis "If the wire were touched by a conductor, it would conduct electricity" is true. Hence, (SCA) comes out false. The second case is a reverse version of the first case. The wire is live, but the electro-fink renders it dead as soon as it senses that the wire is about to be touched by a conductor. In this case, the disposition ascription is true, but its corresponding counterfactual analysis is false. Again, (SCA) turns out to be false. Taken together, the two cases show that a counterfactual conditional is neither sufficient nor necessary for analyzing a disposition ascription.

Lewis (1997) has proposed a refined conditional account to avoid the problem of fink, ional analysis to avoid the problem of fink as follows:

(RCA) S is disposed to M when C iff S has some intrinsic property B such that, if it were the case that C, and if S were to retain B, then S would M because C and because S has B.

By including the idea of intrinsic property B in (RCA), Lewis' analysis can nicely predict that a live wire would conduct electricity when touched by a conductor, *if it were to retain its intrinsic property*. In a similar vein, regarding the case which involves a dead wire in the presence of a fink, (RCA) also predicts that if the wire were to retain its intrinsic property when touched by a conductor, the wire would not conduct electricity. Thus, the fink cases pose no threat to (RCA).

(RCA), however, is subjected to a grave problem. As Johnston (1992) and Bird (1998) point out, there are numerous cases where a disposition is in place when receiving its characteristic stimuli, but fails to manifest itself because of being "masked" or inhibited by some interfering factors. For example, a fragile glass may be so carefully wrapped with some soft material that it would not break if struck. Upon being struck, this glass retains its intrinsic property of fragility, but would not break, due to the presence of wrapping material playing the role of a masker. In this case, (RCA) is false, while the fragility attribution is true. As a result, (RCA) is not a correct analysis of a disposition ascription. A bit further reflection would show that the problem of mask also arises in (SCA).

In facing the problems of mask and fink, proponents of the conditional approach typically invoke the idea of normal conditions, ideal conditions, or *ceteris paribus*. By inserting such term into the antecedent of a conditional analysis, the presence of a mask or fink can be regarded as a case where normal or ideal conditions are not met. The conditional analysis can thus be rendered true (e.g., Malzkorn, 2000; Mumford, 1998). This kind of move faces a dilemma, however. One horn of the dilemma concerns how such conditions may be explicitly fleshed out, given the open-ended nature of masking factors. The other horn of the dilemma is that, if the specification of normal or ideal

conditions does not involve spelling out a substantial list of interfering factors, these conditions will be so vague that they tend to trivialize a conditional analysis which contains them (see Fara, 2005). In face of these difficulties, the prospects of the conditional approach to give a truth-conditional analysis of disposition ascriptions seem dim.

### 3. Wittgenstein on the Nature of Language

The difficulties encountered by the conditional approach are to be anticipated by the later Wittgenstein. As was vigorously shown in *Philosophical Investigations*, the nature of language is not to be revealed by the notion of truth-conditions, by stating what the states of affairs are to which statements are purported to correspond or report. Rather, it comes into view on the basis of closely observing how a statement is actually made and what purpose it serves by making it. The following are a few examples and vivid images which Wittgenstein employs to illustrate his view about language.

First, Wittgenstein asks us to consider two simple language games. In section 2, we are to imagine a primitive language which consists of only four words: blocks, pillars, slabs, and beams. Two speakers, a builder A and an assistant B, use these words in a construction site. Upon hearing a call from A such as "Slab!", B has to pass the slabs to A; if A gives the order "Blocks!", B has to bring the blocks over; etc. As children brought up in the community, the two speakers have been trained to "perform *these* actions, to use *these* words as they do so, and to react in *this* way to the words of others" (section 6, PI). If meaning is what turns a piece of linguistic item into part of the language, meaning lies in the particular ways in which a word is used, not in some mental images the word invokes in the head of the speakers and hearers, or in some objects it signifies. This way of looking at how language works is in sharp contrast to a traditional view adopted by philosophers such as Augustine and Frege, who regard the notions of reference and truth as the basic building blocks in theorizing about the nature of language.

In Section 8, Wittgenstein expands this primitive language to include i) two new words: "there" and "this", used in connection with a pointing gesture; ii) a series of letters of the alphabet used as numerals: "a", "b", "c", "d", etc.; and iii) a number of color samples. These three groups of words are used differently. For example, "there" is used to signify some location, but the location it signifies varies from context to context; it depends on the direction to which the speaker performs the pointing gesture when uttering "there". The use of "there" evidently differs from that of "slabs" whose referents do not seem to vary from context to context. The way in which a letter of the alphabet like "d" is used is in turn different from that of both "slabs" and "there"; the former requires very dissimilar training processes and reactions to quantitative properties of the objects. A color sample, on the other hand, does not belong among the words, but may be construed as part of the language in Wittgenstein's view, because it also plays a certain role in the language game.

A close look at the kinds of words in the expanded language reveals that their functions diversify. Wittgenstein draws an analogy based on the tools in a tool-box to make this point (section 11, PI). Tools in a tool-box may include a hammer, pliers, a saw, a screw-driver, a rule, glue, nails, etc. There appears to be no function which those tools share in common. Words are of a similar predicament. Wittgenstein points out that our confusion about words is due to the "uniform appearance of words when we hear

them spoken or meet them in script and print", and this confusion results in our forgetting that "the functions of words are as diverse as the functions of these objects".

In Wittgenstein's view, the section-8 language can be seen as *evolving* and *expanding* from the section-2 language, due to a more complex way of life involved in the former. The richer pool of linguistic tools is interwoven into, and partly constitutive of, a more complex way of life in the section-8 linguistic community. Our ordinary language can be compared to the section-8 language game: it can evolve and expand, so much so as to incorporate the kinds of words such as "the symbolism of chemistry and the notation of the infinitesimal calculus" (section 18, PI). It would be wrong to think that a seemingly more exact, newly developed, part of our language can be used as a model or instrument to analyze an apparently less exact, older, part of our language, and to claim that the hidden meaning of the latter can be uncovered by the former. The "broom" example (section 60) is used to illustrate this point. Suppose someone says that what "My broom is in the corner" really means is "The broomstick is there, and so is the brush, and the broomstick is fixed in the brush". By saying so, the person treats the former as concealed in the latter and brought out by the analysis. This way of looking at things is not only odd, but also misleading in revealing how our language works. Suppose someone insists that the more exact part of our language is more useful, and hence undertaking a semantic analysis by appeal to it has some indispensable advantages. Considerations of an expression "Stand roughly here" (section 88, PI) easily show where this thinking goes wrong. This expression is as inexact as it could be, and any attempt to make it more exact can only risk rendering it useless in many of the occasions.

The upshot is that the meaning of a linguistic expression cannot come from conceptual analyses. Rather, it has to come from the use in the language (section 43, PI). And the use of words lies in "a custom" (section 198, PI), or in "master of a technique" (section 199, PI), which resists any further explanation but can only be understood in terms of "form of life" (section 241, PI). Seen in light, taking the conditional approach to reduce disposition ascriptions is doomed to fail from the very start.

### 4. Disposition Ascriptions and Conditionals (Dis-)Connected

I propose that we adopt a Wittgensteinian position, which enables us not to misconceive of the link between disposition ascriptions and conditionals. My major claim is that both disposition vocabularies and conditionals are parts of our ordinary language, each possessing different types of functions, and each corresponding to distinct forms of life. Thus, it would be wrong to analyze one in terms of another.

To back up my claim, we first observe that an ordinary disposition term like "fragility" and a conditional such as "If x were struck, it would break" have dissimilar patterns of application. For example, ordinary people still apply a disposition term when its corresponding conditional fails to hold. The fact that a glass did not break when struck would not necessarily lead people to ascribe "fragility" to the glass. The world is full of masking factors, and people are aware of that. Another example is this. Some disposition term may be such that ordinary people would say that they have some basic idea of it while acknowledging that they know little of its corresponding conditional. "Superconductivity" is one such case. Ordinary people take

it to refer to some special hidden property of certain objects, without having a slightest idea of what behavior those objects would produce and under what stimulus conditions. In such a case, a disposition ascription and a conditional come apart in people's linguistic usage. People perceptibly play two different language games with these two types of sentences.

Underlying the disparity in question are some facts about human psychology that have been largely ignored by contemporary philosophers. Children evidently learn and acquire ordinary disposition vocabularies at a relatively early stage, and use them competently in the conduction and navigation of their lives on a daily basis. For example, children as young as four years old are able to use novel dispositional trait labels like "shy" or "mean" to make non-observable inferences (Heyman & Gelman, 2000). On the other hand, experimental results show that children exhibit a strong tendency to interpret a conditional (if *p*, then *q*) as a conjunction (*p* & *q*), and are unable to entertain the other three possibilities until a much later stage (Kuhn, 1977; Barrouillet, et. al., 2008). A significant discrepancy visibly exists between children's competent understanding of an ordinary disposition vocabulary and their ineptitude in grasping the meaning of a conditional.

I hypothesize that an innately endowed essentializing cognitive mechanism (Gelman, 2003) underlies children's comprehension and production of disposition ascriptions. This mental capacity enables children to think that certain categories are natural kinds, and members of a same kind have some common hidden property which accounts for the fact that they tend to behave or look in similar ways. In contrast, conditionals belong to a distinct type of words in our language, and thinking in those terms takes place at a developmentally much later stage. Once acquired, the capacity to use conditionals competently provides people with an epistemic tool to identify dispositional properties which are invisible by nature. Given that many dispositions bear pragmatic significance in our ordinary life, the employment of conditionals may become prevalent and of foremost importance for adults when processing disposition ascriptions. Nonetheless, the essentializing thinking pervades and remains basic in their use of disposition terms.

Linguistic items, such as *ceteris paribus*, normal or ideal conditions, can be viewed as belonging to a type of words further distinct from disposition vocabularies and conditionals. People realize that conditionals do not always correspond to the disposition ascriptions which they would like to retain in face of some unexpected counterinstances. These expressions thus serve to protect disposition ascriptions when simple conditionals fail. Contemporary philosophers of the sciences have an ongoing debate about the legitimacy of employing these hedging terms (Earman, Roberts & Smith (eds.), 2002). Some have tried to propose ways in which those terms can be used legitimately (e.g., Pietroski & Rey, 1995; Morreau, 1999). As far as I can see, all what these demonstrate is that terms like *ceteris paribus* belong to the newer part of our language, and that a distinct form of life pertains to it.

In short, there exist clear differences in the uses of disposition ascriptions, conditionals, and hedging terms. Hence, three distinct language games are in place. A semantic analysis such as a conditional account of disposition ascriptions tends to obscure this fact.

## 5. Conclusion

Martin (1994) once remarked that, although there is some link between a disposition ascription and a conditional, the link is clumsy and inexact. I concur, and have suggested that adopting a Wittgensteinian view of language may prove the same point. This approach leaves the ontology of dispositions untouched.

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# Seeing Styles As

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In Joan Didion's 1984 novel *Democracy*, the narrator (whose name is Joan Didion) describes a course she taught in 1975 at Berkeley. The course, she says, was on "the idea of democracy in the work of certain post-industrial writers," and class time was spent "pointing out similarities in style, and presumably in ideas of democracy (the hypothesis being that the way a writer constructed a sentence reflected the way that writer thought), between George Orwell and Ernest Hemingway, Henry Adams and Norman Mailer" (71). The way this or that sentence is written, she implies, can be directly correlated with this or that "thought" about modern socio-political practices.

From this hypothesis about the relation of "style" to "ideas" we can envision the following scenario. Imagine that Didion is teaching not in 1975 but sometime in the not-so-distant future, and that an artificial intelligence researcher has contacted her with a new classroom device. Everyone knows what it's like to consult an online dictionary, which presents information through a series of formulas: *this word* is equivalent to *these words*. This researcher, however, has compiled a dictionary not for words, but for styles. With such a dictionary, a student could take a sentence whose tone and effect were ambiguous, type it into a search bar, and in a half-second have the information necessary. Some sentences might correlate with "restrained" and "circumspect"; others might correlate with "boisterous" and "uninhibited." With enough computational capacity, the dictionary might even identify the kinds of "ideas" that interest Didion: "free market advocate" or "social democrat." To the obtuse student who mixes up (say) Hemingway and Nabokov and their differing "ideas of democracy," Professor Didion could simply say: "Consult the dictionary."

Such a scenario provokes a series of interrelated questions. First, how do people *fail* to understand a style, be it of a text or a writer more generally? To cast the question in Wittgenstein's terms, can someone be *style blind* the way that he or she might be *color blind*? And is such blindness something that can be remedied with a style dictionary? Are the meanings of Hemingway's or Orwell's styles as fine-grained and determinable as the meanings of the words that they string together? What information—what message, what communication—does the style of a text generate? Where would this information—message, communication—be stored?

These questions are obviously important for the way we understand literary texts and traditions. The problem is how we as readers either perceive or draw inferences from certain properties of a text: what allows us to move from local features of syntax and diction to something like a text's larger "meaning," as well as what *constrains* such perceptions and inferences. But such questions extend well beyond the provincial concerns of literary critics, and are deeply entwined with our overall life as concept-using creatures. Understanding literary style is akin to hearing sorrow in a piece of music, noticing the anger in a painted face, catching the wry humor in the voice of one's spouse.

One approach to these matters would be to take seriously my opening thought experiment about style dictionaries. This is roughly the view taken by what has become

known over the last two decades as "cognitivist literary criticism." Cognitivist criticism, according to one study, has made the study of literature "much less elitist," since it regards "literature not just as a matter for the happy few, but as a specific form of everyday human experience and especially cognition that is grounded in our general cognitive capacities for making sense of the world" (Gavins and Steen 1). As in all cognitive science, it does all this by formulating problems of meaning in terms of *information-processing*: what information enters the working memory, what kind of cognitive architecture treats and shapes this information, and how particular semantic contents arise from these operations. When this vocabulary is applied to literature, a style's "information" is often closely associated with what George Lakoff and others have called "conceptual metaphors." The heart of this idea, again, is that figuration is pervasive in our everyday discourse. Arguments and debates, for instance, are often described as warfare: one *attacks* another's position and *defends* one's own. Understanding these figures requires projecting a *source domain* (here, warfare) onto a *target domain* (here, arguments), which involves extracting the basic *schema* that underlies a sentence, i.e., the embodied experience that is being used to make an "abstract" idea "concrete."

Such is precisely the method used by Donald C. Freeman in an essay that Jean Jacques Weber selected to represent cognitive stylistics in his 1996 anthology *The Stylistics Reader*. In it, Freeman argues that underlying the language of much of *King Lear* is what he identifies as "the BALANCE schema." Lear's famous line "I am a man/More sinned against than sinning" (III.ii.59-60) epitomizes the king's belief that, in a just universe, his sins would balance his suffering. This notion of justice as *balancing*, claims Freeman, derives originally from our embodied experience: "we understand the abstraction justice in terms of human bodily balance." The "BALANCE schema," in other words, is a paradigmatic case of our mind's ability to project a "non-verbal, non-propositional, non-representationalist schema" onto "elements of our more abstract experience" (281). When we identify "the concept of horizontal balance [that] dominates both our verbal and non-verbal language about justice," we have "explained"—not merely *described* (292)—Lear's famous line (281). And not only this particular line. The BALANCE schema also underlies Lear's relationships with his daughters, in particular as these relationships are cast in the vocabulary of financial accounting. Lear wishes, he says, to "divest" himself of the "interest of territory," and the rhetoric of the opening scene of the play is that of a public audit, with Regan and Goneril couching their declarations in financial terms. The former says her love is "beyond what can be valued," while the latter asks, in analogous terms, that Lear "prize" her at the same worth as her sister, her love being, as she says, of the same "metal." Cordelia differs from her sisters, suggest Freeman, because her thinking is structured by alternative set of conceptual metaphors. For her, the operant conceptual metaphor is FILIAL RELATIONSHIPS ARE PHYSICAL LINKS. She loves her father, she says, according to her "bond; no more nor less" (I.i.91-2), and she emphasizes the physical closeness of her relation to Lear: "you have begot me, bred me, lov'd me" (I.i.94-5) (286-87).



Even this brief summary of Freeman's essay is enough to highlight something important. The best literary stylisticians have spent twenty-odd pages grappling patiently with the non-transitive verbs and delayed clarifications of a single paragraph from Henry James, but Freeman operates at a remarkably high level, surveying an enormous expanse of Shakespeare's text, positing a network of meanings lying beneath its lexical preferences—no matter how syntactically varied and aurally dissimilar certain phrases and passages might be. Equally noticeable, of course, is the zeal with which Freeman posits these alleged networks of meanings. He shows little interest in what Didion's narrator calls "the way a writer constructed a sentence," but like her, he seeks to move immediately and directly between "style" and "ideas." Indeed, the cognitivist apparatus he employs, with its vocabulary of "information" and "schemas" and "explanation," gives to his discussion an air of assertiveness that was, I suspect, lacking in Didion's classroom. Tough-minded empiricism can now safely replace belletristic impressionism.

A first response to this cognitivist view of style is to recall a bit of ordinary-language deflation performed by Daniel Dennett, when he notes that the word "information" is nowadays "commonly used as a mass noun, as if information were some kind of substance that could be moved, stored, compressed, chopped up." In fact, however, "we have no sound and mutually recognized understanding of what information is and what kinds of parcels it should be measured in." The "information" measured in bytes, for example, is content-neutral, so that "a single videodisc can store enough gigabytes of information to record the entire Grolier Encyclopedia—or three hours of Bugs Bunny" (205). Similarly here: Freeman implicitly conceives of "style" as a kind of substance or thing, the buried semantic seed sought in the sentential fruit. In Wittgenstein's terms, the "reminder" that needs most pressingly to be "assembled" (*PI* §127) here is the genuine puzzlement, struggle, and uncertainty that a writer's syntax, diction, and sound can engender in us as readers. There's a reason why, as I hinted a moment ago, novels and poems are so difficult to discuss in the classroom: one often *hears* a sentence differently at different times, depending on what else one has recently read, or what one has recently experienced, or what one is most closely paying attention to; students *take* a passage in unexpected ways, at times not quite *getting* the full import of a word choice or phrase, at other times noticing things that one had oneself long overlooked; and the whole discussion comes to seem more like the blind leading the blind than a progressive march toward enlightenment. If styles were substances, if styles transmitted pieces of information, it would never be possible to debate them, because everyone would agree about them.

Hearing Hemingway's restraint, noticing Nabokov's irony and worldly sophistication, getting attuned to Virginia Woolf's lyricism: these are all close kin to noticing that a drawing is of a duck rather than a rabbit. Commentators have said many things about the Wittgenstein's discussions of "seeing as," often—rightly—to underline what seems to be his emphasis on the conceptually saturated nature of human perception. But a few things in particular stand out about Wittgenstein's discussion in the present context. First and most obviously, the entire discussion of aspect-perception in *Philosophical Investigation* II.xi (and

elsewhere) is directed against various types of strongly naturalistic models ("its *causes* are of interest to psychologists" [*PI* 197]), and thus can be seen as anticipating the kind of cognitivism that Freeman exemplifies. Second and less obviously, what's attractive is the simple fact that Wittgenstein is posing *questions* about the phenomenon. Even more than ordinarily, he seems to recognize how slippery or ambivalent the phenomenon is. "Seeing as..." he says, "is not part of perception. And for that reason it is like seeing and again not like" (*PI* 197). The "flashing of an aspect on us," he notes a moment later, "seems half visual experience, half thought" (*PI* 197). Such double-sided remarks indicate, on the one hand, what cognitivist accounts of style could be said to get *right*: styles can often be grasped *immediately*. Just as there is a way of grasping a rule "that is *not* an *interpretation*" (*PI* §201), so even the most difficult styles, those of a Nabokov or Woolf, are often understood in an effortless, intuitive way. Yet at the same time, these remarks remind us how *non-intuitive* our encounter with an author's sentences can often be, how much *effort* it can sometimes take to grasp a particular style. "Aspect-seeing," says Richard Eldridge, "centrally involves doing something: mastering a technique and acting according to it (or extending it)," and Wittgenstein's discussion of it is part and parcel of his effort to defend "both the priority of practice over theoretical representation and the irreducibility of agency to material processes" (179). Casting the issue in these terms highlights how often we *don't* know what to do, how regularly our mastery sometimes *fails*, how our learned techniques can break down or fragment. The student in the classroom can look at us puzzled; the teacher can begin to doubt her accustomed ways of hearing a passage.

All of which suggests that, if understanding a style is a matter of nature, it is what John McDowell has called the "naturalism of second nature" (86), a fragile achievement that can come off well or badly, and about which it is difficult to make general claims and predictions. Good readings of style require not a dictionary, nor even a grammar book, but what Stanley Cavell describes when discussing the improvisational nature of aesthetic judgments: "at some point," we should be "prepared to say in its support: don't you see, don't you hear, don't you dig?" (93). Putting the matter in these terms is not to appeal to mysteries or the supernatural. It is instead to draw attention to the inevitable blurriness that surrounds style and the raggedness of our explanations of it. The challenge facing Joan Didion, as she leads her students through Hemingway and Orwell, is not that her students will never come to notice that a given passage is "circumspect" or "boisterous." Nor is it even that we could never point out analogies between "similarities in style" and certain "ideas of democracy"—though what counts as an "idea of democracy" will certainly be more tendentious than what counts as "circumspect." The challenge instead is to accept the sheer messiness of this entire process, the tenuousness of any of our readings. "Can someone else be a man's teacher in this?" Wittgenstein asks at the end of his reflections on aspect-seeing. "Certainly. From time to time he gives him the right *tip*" (*PI* 227). Giving tips may of course appear to lack the "hardness" for which philosophers characteristically have, says Wittgenstein, a "despotic demand" (§437). But critics would be wise to ask whether appeals to a more determinate conception of "style" actually capture our lives as commoners and as readers.

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# Gestalt Switch, Illusion and Epistemic Switch

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There is a tendency to separate (1) visual phenomena as of essence non-propositional from (2) beliefs as of essence propositional. A reason is that phenomena are occurrent, whereas beliefs can be dispositional and as such they surely lack phenomenal content. But the claim that all beliefs are exclusively propositional is false: there are perceptual beliefs which are something more than propositional beliefs added to visual phenomena. That perceptual beliefs create a species would be proved if there are genuine perceptual beliefs which do not map phenomena; if some inferential beliefs transcend phenomena but remain perceptual. A fundamental question in this context is what factors limit the range of permissible inference for perceptual beliefs. How synthetic can they be? Which inferences from perceptual premises do preserve the perceptual core of the conclusions and which violate it?

Basic thresholds of inference within the perceptual are easy to count:

1. From non-conceptual looks, to look-beliefs.
2. From look-beliefs, to object-beliefs.

There is a well known dilemma: Which beliefs are ontologically primary: look-beliefs or object-beliefs? Strawson famously claimed that perceptual object-beliefs are primary and look-beliefs have only the epistemic implication of uncertainty. The opposite view is that object-beliefs are results of inference from ontologically basic look-beliefs. The ontological dilemma often reduces philosophical curiosity to the question how object-beliefs map pieces of the external reality. I will call such beliefs "tautological" and my thesis is that we gain nothing cognitively interesting from tautological beliefs. That is why I suggest that a further stage of inference is of a special epistemic significance:

3. From tautological beliefs-*that*, to synthetic beliefs-*as*.

Not to complicate, I assume that perceptual beliefs-*that* are unproblematic and I ask a general question which, I think, is not much in focus: What are the limits of perceptual cognition? I do not contest either the view that some perceptual beliefs map phenomenal contents or even external facts *via* some propositional contents nor the view that typical beliefs are just tokens of a particular propositional attitude. Some examples, however, suggest that there are perceptual beliefs which do more because they are either (1) against phenomena, especially against something that is visible or (2) against the ontological identity of external objects. I also assume that beliefs do not modify the phenomenal content of my vision. I am interested solely in how inferences modify perceptual beliefs with a robust phenomenal content. I start with perception of ambiguous figures which somehow shake the truism that objects themselves causally determine the phenomenal content of visual experiences. My special aim is to accentuate differences between seeing ambiguous figures and correcting visual illusions. So, let us check what can go on when I look at (1) Jastrow's duck-rabbit picture and (2) Müller-Lyer lines. I think that both acts involve different forms of seeing-*as*.

Fiona Macpherson proposes the term "Gestalt switch" for what I undergo when I look at an ambiguous figure (Macpherson 2006). When I look at the duck-rabbit picture I am aware, she says, of two different phenomenal characters that are in dynamic succession and never occur simultaneously. Why not simultaneously? Because the picture is ontologically inconsistent and I cannot visually absorb an inconsistent picture as a whole. An intriguing question for her is whether this explanation covers all ambiguous pictures, i.e., whether visual ambiguity is generally based on ontological inconsistency. MacPherson answers in the negative. So-called Mach's figure, i.e., a square/regular diamond figure, is according to her (1) ambiguous and (2) ontologically consistent. I find both theses inspiring though contestable.

I would like to stress first that there is a significant epistemic difference between visually ambiguous figures and visually illusory figures. The difference is that genuine ambiguous figures are in a sense epistemically unilluminating. When I look at the duck-rabbit picture, I experience two spontaneously changing figures and to have a cognitive success, e.g., to acquire a true belief, I need simply to interpret them tautologically at every moment of the switch: it is sufficient to identify them in accordance with phenomena. In the case of Müller-Lyer illusion, however, to have a cognitive success I must interpret the lines against phenomena. In both cases I face robust phenomena, i.e., so independent of my beliefs that I cannot modify their character by making inferences. But in the second case the phenomena are distorted and I obtain a true belief only if I start believing against phenomena. Since I interpret in accordance with phenomena, in the case of the duck-rabbit switch there is no doubt whether my beliefs are perceptual. But in the case of Müller-Lyer illusion, the big question is whether I acquire a perceptual belief if I interpret against phenomena. This question becomes dramatically important always when in order to acquire a true belief I must interpret against phenomena. For example, suppose that for some reasons I already truly believe that Müller-Lyer lines are equal though they still look unequal: Do I perceptually believe that they are equal or my true belief is non-perceptual? I am faced with a dilemma of perceptual asymmetry. If I acquire a corrected belief, the belief is inferential. As far as I am solely under the pressure of phenomena I cannot start believing that the lines are equal. If my newly acquired inferential belief is non-perceptual, the consequence is that when viewing illusory pictures I cannot have true perceptual beliefs. Further, if my reasons are strong I can say: "I know that the lines are equal". Am I entitled to say: "I perceptually know that the lines are equal"? It may seem that I either have false perceptual beliefs about Müller-Lyer lines in accordance with phenomena, or I have true non-perceptual beliefs when I interpret against phenomena. I think that the dilemma is false and my corrected belief about Müller-Lyer lines remains perceptual. Anyway, the view that while looking at illusory pictures I can have either false perceptual beliefs or corrected non-perceptual beliefs seems to me counter-intuitive. I wonder why this dilemma is overlooked even by Bill Brewer, who says that both false and true illusory beliefs are results of making comparisons, i.e., both are essentially inferential (Brewer 2008).

I admit that ambiguous figures are ontologically interesting. My opinion, however, is that the ontologically determined switch is epistemically un-illuminating because it involves no phenomenal distortion and awaits, as it were, only for tautological interpretations. First, undergoing such a switch results in no cognitive success. It is a beginning but not an end of cognition. This is so because one thing is to undergo the Gestalt switch, another is to interpret it propositionally and the final thing is to draw of the interpretation some consequences. Propositional interpretation is surely a cognitive end. But only the syntheticity of consequences is a measure of cognitive success. The ontologist is satisfied when he is able to explain why I undergo the switch, whereas the epistemologist asks about (1) a propositional interpretation and (2) what can be inferred from the interpretation. If undergoing is a spontaneous fact, the epistemic question is: Does anything follow from the fact? From the fact itself nothing special. Shortly, that I see a duck and then a rabbit does not mean that I see the duck-rabbit as a duck or the duck-rabbit as a rabbit: that I recognize the phases of the switch. Further, that I recognize a duck is epistemically valuable only if the recognition motivates my activity. To undergo a switch, a phenomenal change is sufficient, to recognize the switch, a doxastic change is necessary.

No doubt, my short analysis of the duck-rabbit switch is oversimplified as I present a radically non-conceptualist view whereas the question whether concepts initiate the switch is discussed quite often. Michael Tye, for example, says that concepts trigger the switch without contaminating its non-conceptual contents (Tye 1995). But ontological discussions over whether concepts are involved when I undergo the switch do not matter much for me. What matters is the epistemic claim that to recognize phases of the switch I need concepts. I am ready to accept a simple order of priority: a phenomenal switch is prior to concepts but concepts are prior to the recognition of the switch. If I undergo the duck-rabbit switch, I also need concepts to recognize what I look at as a duck or a rabbit. For me it is important that the recognition in this case is fairly easy as it is made in accordance with phenomena and my beliefs sanctioning it are obviously perceptual.

Basing on the difference between perceiving ambiguous and illusory figures I propose to distinguish between ontological and epistemic inconsistency. Generally, I produce epistemic inconsistency when looking at an object I impose on the object an interpretation that is alternative to the tautological one. I interpret tautologically when I look at a duck and create the perceptual belief: "This is a duck". Epistemic inconsistency arises when motivated by a chain of reasons I impose an alternative interpretation that is against both phenomena and the tautological interpretation. Alternative interpretations of a seen duck would be, for example, such beliefs as "This is a four-person-dinner" made by a cook, or "This is a twenty-euro-banknote" made by a poultry-seller. Such epistemic inconsistencies radically violate ontological determinacy of objects by placing them in various teleological contexts; when the ontological question: What is this? is suppressed by the instrumental question: What can I do with this? Motivated by aims and reasons I can quite freely present ontologically determined objects as epistemically ambiguous, i.e., I have the ability to provoke their various epistemic switches. My central question is whether the re-interpreted beliefs, beliefs resulting from epistemic switches, remain perceptual beliefs. When I look at a duck, and I interpret it tautologically: "This is a duck", my belief is perceptual. Can I also see the duck as a four-person-dinner?

I classify corrections of illusory beliefs as standard examples of the epistemic switch that remains perceptual. This provokes me to ask a further question whether I can successfully produce an ontological inconsistency: perceptually absorb a new identity. That is, whether I can look at something that has an established identity and see it as something of a different identity. Another intriguing question is whether I can look at something that is phenomenally present to me and see it as something else that is phenomenally absent to me. This is a feature of epistemic ambiguity that making a switch I can go against phenomena in a radical way, namely, against what is visible. Since my switch initiates then a particular form of phenomenal inconsistency it is important to decide whether I can perceptually absorb its final phase. If some counter-phenomenal beliefs are genuinely perceptual they must be such despite the fact that the modifying factor is a genuinely doxastic rule of inference. I think that Wilfrid Sellars' examples are particularly useful to show what the problem consists in. Let us compare the following situations. First, I see a brick-like surface and I infer that this is a brick (Sellars 1977). Should I agree with the phenomenologist who claims that only my surface-belief is genuinely perceptual? Second, I am in a shop that is lighted yellow and I watch a tie that looks green. I infer that the tie is blue (Sellars 1997). Do I see a blue tie? Third, I look in the sky, I see a vapour trail and I instantly infer that there is an airplane over there (Sellars 1977). Is my belief about the airplane perceptual? If the brick-belief and tie-belief are perceptual why not the airplane-belief? Sellars describes such stories to show that perceptual situations evidently involve rules of inference that can be called "translation principles". Although he does not solve the problem of visual absorption he proposes to distinguish between "the object I see" and "what I see of the object": if I see something of the object it entitles me to say that I see the object. Following Sellars, I provisionally suggest that as far as the ontological identity of an object is not broken my epistemic interpretation imposed on the object can remain perceptual.

Discussing Mach's figure Macpherson wonders why an ontologically consistent object is phenomenally ambiguous. Even if she is right about ambiguity, she can be wrong about consistency. A reason for inconsistency would be that a square and a diamond, although internally consistent, are externally inconsistent in virtue of their alternative orientation in space. The explanation covers some external context; something beyond the object itself. The internal inconsistency would consist in having "two in one" (two inconsistent figures in one picture), the external in having "one in two" (one figure in two inconsistent contexts). The possibility of external inconsistencies is crucial for me because epistemic ambiguities concerning an object involve some intellectual contexts of translation principles that are external to the tautological interpretation of the object. These intellectual contexts may be given various labels but I think that Sellars' "spaces of reasons" is one of the best.

I hope it is clear why Sellars' examples involving inferential re-definitions of perceptual beliefs are examples of the epistemic switch. As to my provisional diagnosis which of the re-defined beliefs remain perceptual I am of opinion that the brick-belief is non-controversially perceptual if I accept Strawson's principle of object-beliefs priority. Strawson's principle teaches me that if my inference fails I see another object and not that I do not see any object. As to the tie-belief, it seems that epistemic ambiguity connected with objects' "primary" or "secondary" properties is relatively easy to absorb. If I apply the translation principle "If this yellow lighted tie looks green, then this tie

is blue", then I truly see that the tie is blue. The airplane-belief seems to me a boundary one since it is extremely difficult to decide whether looking at the vapour trail alone I can see something "of the airplane". Personally, I would say I can. Surely, the hardest to accept is a switch against the ontological identity of an object. Nevertheless, the last criterion is provisional because (1) the ontological identity of some objects can be shaky and (2) various "spaces of reasons" can exert irresistible influence on us.

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# Emerging Moral Patterns: Reading Ross in the Light of Wittgenstein

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When [someone] argues that moral expertise requires a “principled” understanding of morality, everything depends on what is meant by “principled”. If it’s read as a requirement that one possess exceptionless definitions or codified generalizations, it simply isn’t ... Generality, in short, is not just found in theoretical generalization.’ (Margaret Little)

## 1. The Rossian Position

The idea of “an ethic of prima facie duties,” which is presented by W. D. Ross (1930 & 1949) to clarify the problem of moral conflict can be regarded as a generalistic account with regard to the metaphysics of reasons.<sup>2</sup> According to Ross, the problem of moral conflict is best understood in terms of conflict between competing moral considerations. Moral conflict arises when the situation we are dealing with possesses more than one morally relevant non-moral property which pull in opposite directions. This gives us conflicting prima facie duties. In order to decide what our actual duty is, we have to find out which relevant non-moral property is more important from the moral point of view. But, says Ross, we do not have a basic general principle to say in advance which prima facie duty is overriding because the weight or importance or magnitude of the relevant non-moral features of the situation may vary from case to case, though its valence; i.e. the way in which it contributes to the moral evaluation of different cases is invariant. On Ross’s view, there are several basic non-moral properties that are morally relevant, and these cannot be reduced to one or more basic property, hence these properties are not just ‘at first sight’ epistemically, but real general types of duty. Morally relevant non-moral properties are not contextual: their deontic valence and the way in which they contribute to the moral evaluation of different cases is constant, but their effect and power may vary from case to case. We can call the former moral value, and the latter moral weight.

The Rossian says that the moral valence of a morally relevant feature and the way in which it contributes to the moral evaluation of different cases is invariant, but moral weight may vary from case to case. For instance, promise keeping is invariably a right-making feature with an intrinsic deontic valence, that is, it always works to make actions right. Its weight, however, may vary from context to context, depending on other morally relevant non-moral properties which exert their constant deontic valences in the case at hand. So, according to the Rossian, although the value of promise keeping remains unchanged, its overall weight may vary from case to case. Consider the following quote by Ross:

I suggest ‘prima facie duty’ or ‘conditional duty’ as a brief way of referring to the characteristic (quite distinct from that of being a duty proper) which an act has, in virtue of being of a certain kind (e.g. the keeping of promise), of being an act which would be a duty proper if it were not at the same time of another kind which is morally significant. Whether an act is a duty proper or actual duty depends on all the morally significant kinds it is an instance of ... There is nothing arbitrary about these prima facie duties. Each

rests on a definite circumstance which cannot seriously be held to be without moral significance ... But no act is ever, in virtue of falling under some general description, necessarily actually right; its rightness depends on its whole nature and not on any element in it (1930, pp. 19, 20 and 33).

According to Ross, different prima facie duties pick out types of act. Because prima facie duties apply to types of act, he subscribes to generalism with respect to prima facie duties. Moreover, he claims that there is no general ranking or lexical order for different types of prima facie duties. There is just a formless list of duties, none of which has priority or greater importance than the others. These morally relevant features are combined together and contribute to the moral evaluation of different cases in different ways.

In addition, in Ross’s view, the list of prima facie duties is not complete; it is an open-ended list because there is no guarantee that we have discovered all prima facie duties (i.e., all morally relevant non-moral properties). It could be the case that a new prima facie duty is discovered, following confrontation with a new moral requirement which cannot be subsumed under the prima facie duties with which we are familiar. Moreover, the list of prima facie duties is not complete and we are confronted with an open-ended list of duties. Meanwhile, there is no such thing as lexical order or a hierarchy for prima facie duties. So, according to Ross, I have to consult my intuition in every case, and I cannot generalise the result. By ‘intuition’ and ‘intuitive moral judgment’, Ross means something which we can arrive at infallibly and directly, like endorsing the validity of a form of inference which is grasped non-inferentially after acquiring adequate mental development.

Therefore, the Rossian position consists of two components: generalism about prima facie duties and particularism about actual duties. According to the first part, the way in which a morally relevant feature like promise keeping contributes to the moral evaluation of different contexts can be articulated in a pattern. The second part emphasises that the way in which we arrive at a justified moral judgment in a moral context cannot be capturable by resorting to just one moral rule. Moreover, the first component is a metaphysical claim while the second component is an epistemological one.

## 2. The Wittgensteinian Position

The Rossian can be regarded as a pluralist-generalist who subscribes to the existence of patterns to which the reason-giving behaviour of morally relevant features in different contexts is answerable and can fit. For the generalist, we are responsive to these linguistic patterns, as language-users, which show us how to go on correctly and consistently in our use of moral concepts. It is not the case that we use words arbitrarily. On the contrary, we respond to the patterns of word use which require of us to use words correctly.

Generalists who subscribe to the existence of these patterns of word use can be regarded as realists. They are

realists because according to them, language-users are answerable to these patterns. There is a normative constraint which requires of language-users to use words correctly. In other words, it is not the case that we, as language-users, use these linguistic patterns in a way that they entirely depend on us. Rather, there are patterns of word use to which we are responsive.

Before going further, I should clarify what I mean by using realism and the realistic account in this context. By realism and the realistic account, I mean the existence of some normative pattern of word use to which, we, as language-users, are answerable and responsive. This realistic account is required to make sense of the normative constraint that confines a language-user. This can be regarded as a minimal realism, for it is compatible with allowing that we, as language-users, have some role in the formation of patterns of word use. What we do with words might have some role in the formation of the normative standard of the rightness and wrongness of the use of words. As long as the role of language-user which we are discussing is not meant to undermine the notion of answerability, then a minimal realism is available.

In contrast, strong realism holds that we have no role in the formation of patterns of word use. These patterns are pre-existing, formed independently of us, and need to be followed to arrive at the rightness and wrongness of the use of words. In other words, the normative standard of the rightness and wrongness of the use of words is not grounded in what we, as language-users, do with words.

Having seen the distinction between strong realism and minimal realism, we can say that minimal realism is compatible with the metaphysics of patterns that acknowledge our role in creating and sustaining them.

Given this notion of minimal realism, we are entitled to say that according to each generalistic account, we are confronted with at least a minimal realistic situation, according to which there is such a thing as the normative standard of the rightness and wrongness of the use of words. In other words, we, as language-users, are responsive to the patterns of word use. Normativity requires of us to be answerable to these patterns and apply words correctly.

Now it is common ground among commentators on the Philosophical Investigations that Wittgenstein denies the existence of abstract and transcendent patterns in a Platonic sense. He criticises the normative standard of the rightness and wrongness of the use of words which is based upon a Platonic metaphysics. According to Wittgenstein, subscribing to the idea that word use is driven by Platonic rules is untenable. What Wittgenstein is trying to put forward in place of the idea that word use is governed by Platonic rules is contentious. In my account, unlike the sceptical and anti-realistic account<sup>3</sup>, Wittgenstein is trying to show a realistic account of meaning and normativity, according to which there are normative patterns of word use which make the distinction between the rightness and wrongness of the use of words intelligible. We could call it the metaphysical account of Wittgenstein, as a response to the anti-realistic account. According to this view, Wittgenstein gives a realistic account of the patterns of word use, according to which in the absence of pre-existing general patterns of word use, we still have normative reasons to use words consistently and coherently. For instance, although there is no such thing as a complete list of game-making features, it does not follow from this that we have no reason to regard a new phenomenon as a

game. Normativity and normative constraint are compatible with open-endedness.

In this metaphysical account, the notion of 'practice' in Wittgenstein's later work has to be taken into account in a normative sense, rather than a descriptive or sociological one. In this account, Wittgenstein is saying that meaning is grasped in a non-theoretical way and nothing we say can fix it. In other words, being engaged in the practice of using a word over time provides the normativity which is required for the whole idea of meaning. In this sense, what we do with words provides meaning. According to Wittgenstein:

How can he know how he is to continue a pattern by himself? whatever instruction you give him? Well, how do I know? If that means "Have I reasons?" the answer is: my reasons will soon give out. And then I shall act, without reasons (1953, §211).

Justification will come to an end somewhere and we cannot give an account of how the meaning of a word is formulated in a determined and articulated way. However, it does not follow from this that we do not have any reason to apply the word rightly and consistently. It only shows that we cannot articulate the meaning of a word in a sentence or proposition. Its normative constraint cannot be put into words. Yet it does not follow from this that the usage of the word is not answerable to and cannot fit into patterns at all. All it shows is that the normative standard of the rightness and wrongness of the use of words cannot be thoroughly articulated in advance. There is, however, an alternative reading of patternability which can be compatible with open-endedness. What we do with words, not what we say, brings the normative standard of the rightness and wrongness of word use. Because of this primacy to the notion of 'what we do', the 'subject' has an indispensable role in producing normativity. In other words, the source of normativity and truth-conditions of word use lies in what we do, as language-users, not what we say.

### 3. Seeing the Similarities and Emerging Moral Patterns

On the basis of what we have seen with regard to patterns of word use and the way in which we arrive at the normative standard of the rightness and wrongness of the use of words, generally speaking, one can say that the very moral patterns emerge from our ongoing practice of seeing the similarities. Let me give more detail to make the point clearer.

According to Wittgenstein, we cannot arrive at the meaning of concepts by the aid of Augustinian ostensive definition. Language has no essence or ideal formulation. Suppose that we want to know that what a leaf is, and what one means by the concept 'leaf'. According to Wittgenstein, we do not have determined or firm language templates that have been formulated independently of us, by which we will find out what the idea of a 'leaf' is. In other words, it is not the case that we need an abstract guideline according to which we can subsume what we are confronted with as new examples of the concept 'leaf'. There is no abstract pattern for the concept 'leaf' in a Platonic sense under which different examples of the general concept 'leaf' can be subsumed:

Here also belongs the idea that if you see this leaf as a sample of 'leaf shape in general' you see it differently from someone who regards it as, say, a sample of this particular shape. Now this might well be so though it is not so for it would only be to say that, as a matter of experience, if you see the leaf in a particular way, you

use it in such-and-such a way or according to such-and-such rules. Of course, there is such a thing as seeing in this way or that; and there are also cases where whoever sees a sample like this will in general use it in this way, and whoever sees it otherwise in another way (1953, §74).

All we have here is seeing the similarities: seeing this leaf like that one ... There is no such thing as a theoretical articulation of the 'concept' leaf under which new instances can be subsumed. In contrast, concepts and patterns could be characterized through only seeing the similarities and being engaged in seeing things as similar. There is nothing over and above the being engaged in the practice of seeing things as similar which could grant us the concept 'leaf'.

I suggest that the formation of a moral pattern is the same in the sense that its shape emerges through seeing the similarities. All we have here is seeing the similarities. We cannot appeal to pre-existing and articulated patterns to arrive at what the rightness and wrongness of moral vocabulary is. Pre-existing and given templates simply do not exist. There is nothing beyond being engaged in the practice of using moral vocabulary which can guide us to arrive at the normative standard of the rightness and wrongness of moral vocabulary.

Having rejected the Platonic position, we have to say that the normative standard of the rightness and wrongness of the use of words is immanent and intrinsic, not transcendent. It cannot be fully described in an abstract pattern. We have to do something instead of stating something. There is nothing hidden which can be articulated and spelled out propositionally. However, it does not follow from this that something is missing here. Neither does it follow from this that there is something here which is ineffable and mysterious. Rather, it follows from this that there is something that has to be seen, and this constitutes precisely the source of normativity. In this sense, seeing the similarities is primitive and constitutes the normative standard of rightness and wrongness. In fact, the very idea of 'practice' in a normative sense constitutes the source of normativity. This source of normativity, unlike the Platonic and transcendent source of normativity, needs to be seen. We cannot articulate it in a complete and inclusive pattern. However, it does not follow from this that there is no such thing as patternability at hand. There is another account of being articulated in patterns which can be gathered with open-endedness. In this sense, seeing the similarities constitutes the immanent and intrinsic normative standard of the rightness and wrongness of moral vocabulary.

#### 4. Reading Ross in the Light of the Metaphysical Account of Wittgenstein

As we have seen, applying the metaphysical account of Wittgenstein to moral vocabulary, moral patterns are not pre-existing and transcendent in a Platonic sense because the Platonic source of grammar is untenable. However,

Wittgenstein subscribes to the account of meaning, according to which moral patterns emerge and come out to the extent that we are engaged in the practice of seeing things as similar. The normative standard of the rightness and wrongness of the use of words lies in the way in which we are engaged in seeing things aright. In other words, there are patterns to which the reason-giving behaviour of words is answerable. The more we are engaged in the practice of seeing things as similar, the more we see what the source of normativity is.

Similarly, we can say that there are moral patterns to which the reason-giving behaviour of morally relevant features is answerable. Moreover, according to this account, we, as word users, have an ineliminable role in the emergence of moral patterns. We let moral patterns emerge by being engaged in the practice of seeing the similarities.

I wish to suggest that Rossian ethics, according to which there are some prima facie duties which state our moral obligations, can be read in the light of the metaphysical account of Wittgenstein which subscribes to the existence of emerging moral patterns. Both the Rossian position and the metaphysical account of Wittgenstein hold that there are patterns to which the reason-giving behaviour of morally relevant features is answerable. According to Ross, these prima facie duties, which have invariant deontic valences, are combined together in each concrete ethical situation in such a way that their weight can vary from case to case. In other words, if we are dealing with more than one morally relevant non-moral property in each concrete ethical situation, the way in which these prima facie duties are combined together shapes our actual duties.

#### Endnotes

<sup>1</sup> Little, M. (2001) 'On Knowing "Why": Particularism and Moral Theory', *Hastings Center Report*, 31(4), p. 35.

<sup>2</sup> The key themes of Rossian ethics are discussed in the following references: Audi, R. (1993) 'Ethical Reflectionism', *The Monist*, 76, pp. 295-315. Hooker, B. (1996) 'Ross-style Pluralism versus Rule-Consequentialism', *Mind*, 105, pp. 531-552. McNaughton, D. (2000a) 'Intuitionism' in LaFollette, H. (ed.) *The Blackwell Guide to Ethical Theory* (Blackwell Publishing), pp. 268-287.

<sup>3</sup> For more details on the sceptical account of Wittgenstein, see: Kripke, S. (1982) *Wittgenstein on Rules and Private Language* (Oxford: Blackwell).

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# Adornos Konzept mimetischen Verhaltens – ein Kommentar mit Wittgenstein

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Vermutlich wäre Adorno sich auf einem Wittgenstein-Symposium deplaziert vorgekommen. Nicht nur, dass eine sprachphilosophische Vorgehensweise ihm selbst zeitlebens fremd geblieben ist. Gerade Wittgenstein wird bei Adorno äußerst selten und wenn, dann ausschließlich als vermeintlich szientistischer Vertreter des logischen Positivismus erwähnt. Anscheinend hat Adorno die philosophische Entwicklung Wittgensteins seit den 1930er Jahren nicht zur Kenntnis genommen.

In der Forschungsliteratur wurden inzwischen theoretische Parallelen beider Denker herausgearbeitet, die den vorherrschenden Eindruck bedeutsamer Unterschiede ergänzen. Albrecht Wellmer hat drei gemeinsame Punkte zwischen Adorno und Wittgenstein benannt: „Drei für ihre Philosophie zentrale Gemeinsamkeiten fallen ins Auge: die Obsession durchs Nicht-Identische, die mit Kritik am Szientismus aufs engste zusammenhängt, die Obsession durch das Problem der Darstellung und schließlich der Gestus radikaler Kritik gegenüber der Entwicklung der modernen Kultur.“ (Wellmer 1991, S. 141) Den gemeinsamen Grundzug der Kulturkritik lasse ich hier beiseite. Die beiden anderen Punkte – Obsession durchs Nichtidentische und Szientismuskritik einerseits und Obsession durch das Problem der Darstellung andererseits – sind im hiesigen Zusammenhang von größerem Interesse. Bei Adorno sind beide Punkte eng mit seinem Konzept von Mimesis verknüpft und dies wirft die Frage auf, ob sich die Paralleltät mit Wittgenstein in diese Richtung fortführen lässt, bzw. wie Adornos Konzept von Mimesis aus der Perspektive von Wittgensteins späterer Philosophie zu beurteilen wäre.

Ich möchte hier den gängigen erkenntnistheoretischen Diskussionsrahmen von Adornos Mimesiskonzept – also etwa das „Nichtidentische“ als Reflexionsbegriff auf die Grenzen des Begrifflichen – in den Hintergrund treten lassen und stattdessen den praktischen Aspekt betonen, der in Adornos Rede von einer „mimetischen Verhaltensweise“ zu finden ist. Dies bietet sich auch durch eine neue Textlage an: Während Adornos Mimesiskonzept bisher primär im Rahmen der *Dialektik der Aufklärung* (DdA) und der *Ästhetischen Theorie* diskutiert wurde (Lima 2002, Gebauer/Wulf 1992), möchte ich hier eine Ergänzung durch Adornos Vorlesung zur Ästhetik vom Wintersemester 1958/59 vornehmen, die 2009 – herausgegeben von Eberhard Ortland – im Rahmen der Gesamtausgabe erschienen und damit der Forschung neu zugänglich geworden ist (Nachgelassene Schriften, Abt. IV, Bd. 3, im Folgenden: VÄ). Die dortigen Überlegungen zum mimetischen Verhalten führen in einer sehr klaren Sprache über die DdA hinaus und bündeln bereits wichtige Themen der monumentalen und voraussetzungsreichen *Ästhetischen Theorie*.

Zunächst einige klärende Anmerkungen zum Konzept mimetischen Verhaltens bei Adorno. In der allgemeineren Forschung zum Konzept „Mimesis“ werden drei unterschiedliche Begriffe diskutiert, die ich hier mit drei unterschiedlichen Ausdrücken kennzeichnen will: Erstens die „Nachahmung von Objekten“ im Sinne der (künstlerischen) Darstellung von realen Gegenständen. Solche Nachahmung von Objekten betrieb etwa die Malerei der

Renaissance und strebte nach dem Ideal der Vollkommenheit als „Verwechselbarkeit“ von Darstellung und dargestelltem Gegenstand. In VÄ grenzt sich Adorno hiervon ab: „Kunst ist zwar Nachahmung, aber nicht Nachahmung eines Objektes, sondern ein Versuch, durch ihre Gestik und ihre gesamte Haltung einen Zustand wiederherzustellen, in dem es eigentlich die Differenz von Subjekt und Objekt nicht gegeben hat [...]“ (VÄ, S. 70) Bei Adorno bedeutet mimetisches Verhalten also nicht Nachahmung im Sinne der künstlerischen Darstellung von realen Gegenständen.

Zweitens wird in der philosophischen Ästhetik Mimesis als *imitatio* diskutiert, als Nachahmung klassischer Vorbilder. Bis in die Neuzeit galten etwa die attischen Tragödien als Höhepunkt dramatischer Dichtung und waren strikt zu imitieren. Wer Adornos Eintreten für die jeweils avancierteste Musik kennt, der vermutet wahrscheinlich schon richtig: Der klassische Begriff der *imitatio* gehört nicht zu Adornos Konzept des „mimetischen Verhaltens“. Tatsächlich könnte man die *imitatio* als einen kontradiktorischen Gegensatz dazu bezeichnen, denn mimetisches Verhalten kann gerade erst in der Ablehnung vorgegebener formaler Schemata angenommen werden.

Ein dritter Sinn von Mimesis wird häufig anhand des Erziehungsplanes im zweiten und dritten Buch von Platons *Der Staat* illustriert (376d ff.). Mimesis meint dort etwa „szenische Darstellung ohne Erläuterung des Dichters“ (Koller 1980, S. 1396) und lässt sich der eigentlichen Erzählung gegenüberstellen. Dies scheint mir im Wesentlichen die von Adorno gemeinte Verwendung zu treffen. Sie harmoniert sowohl mit der historischen Periodisierung „mimetischer, mythischer, metaphysischer Verhaltensweisen“ aus der DdA (DdA, S. 37), als auch mit der dortigen Feststellung, schon der Mythos sei ein Stück rationalisierende Aufklärung, insofern er als Erzählung die mimetische Verhaltensweise gegenüber dem Unbekannten, dem Mana ablöse, das Inkommensurable wegschneide und so das Prinzip der Immanenz einsetze (DdA, S. 18 f.).

In der DdA findet Adorno das Modell mimetischen Verhaltens in der vormythologischen Zeit von Animismus und Magie. Statt sich die Welt durch das Identitätsprinzip zu unterwerfen, mache der Schamane sich den Dämonen ähnlich, um sie zu bannen (DdA, S. 15). Gegenüber der Herrschaft des Allgemeinen, welches in der industrialisierten Welt die Menschen zu austauschbaren Exemplaren einer Gattung mache, habe es in der Magie „spezifische Vertretbarkeit“ gegeben (DdA, S. 16). Hier situiert Adorno auch erste Sprachpraxis: „Der Ruf des Schreckens, mit dem das Ungewohnte erfahren wird, wird zu seinem Namen.“ (DdA, S. 21) Hinsichtlich des Beginns begrifflichen Denkens mag man darin eine Art dialektische Interjektionstheorie des Sprachursprungs erblicken: Ding und Name treten demnach überhaupt auseinander, weil der ursprüngliche Name erschreckter Ausruf angesichts der unbegreiflichen Übermacht der Natur ist. Dabei hat er zunächst – wie Adorno sagt – „Bildcharakter“, weil sich der Ausrufende dem Unbegriffenen durch Ähnlichwerden zu bemächtigen sucht. Ikonographie und Onomatopoesie scheinen mir die Phänomene zu sein, die Adorno hier im Sinn hat. In der

Geschichte habe sich dieser mimetisch-bildhafte Name aufgeteilt in kalkulierbares, abstraktes Zeichen im Rahmen der Wissenschaft einerseits und bloß noch nachahmendes Abbild in den Künsten andererseits (DdA, S. 23 f.). Große Kunst halte nun das magische Erbe, das verlorene mimetische Verhalten fest und könne die Entzweiung in modifizierter Form wieder aufheben – dies meint Adorno mit Kunst als Wiederherstellung eines Zustandes. Im Kunstwerk, das sich ja nach Adorno als eine abgeschlossene Sphäre der Eigengesetzlichkeit konstituiert, kann die Welt oder der historische Prozess wieder für das Unbekannte, Unbegriffene geöffnet werden. Diese Öffnung für das wirklich konstitutiv Neue begründet den innovativen Impetus des Mimesiskonzeptes im Gegensatz zu Nachahmung oder *imitatio*.

Obwohl der Künstler das Unbegriffene nicht bannen wolle, sei sein Werk doch ein mimetischer Ruf des Schreckens, ein „Echo der realen Übermacht der Natur“. Eindrucksvoll hat Adorno dieses Kunstverständnis in der *Philosophie der neuen Musik* durchgeführt. Dort steht die Phase des atonalen Expressionismus Schönbergs für eine solche Wiederkehr der Natur in der Kunst, unüberhörbar in den auskomponierten Schreckensrufen des Monodramas *Erwartung*, das in der konsequenten Absage an formale Schemata musikalische Besonderheit realisiert. Erst in der Übersteigerung des *Espressivo* bei Schönberg um 1908, in der kompositorischen Umsetzung des Einbekennens, dass sich das reale Leiden – oder das Leiden am Realen – einfach nicht mehr adäquat in Dur oder Moll ausdrücken lässt, wird das musikalische Material schließlich feinkörnig genug, um Natur authentisch im Kunstwerk wiederkehren zu lassen.

Die Konzeption des mimetischen Verhaltens hat sich in der VÄ also anscheinend nicht verändert – die weist lediglich eine erhellende Dichte auf. Über den historischen Blick der DdA hinaus hat Adorno hier seine Überlegungen zum mimetischen Verhalten noch weiter in die menschliche Frühgeschichte zurückverfolgt. Er spricht dort von der wichtigen evolutionsbiologischen Rolle der Mimi-kry, also der unmittelbaren Nachahmung für die Vorgesellschaft noch vor Magie und Animismus (VÄ, S. 68), die laut der DdA noch „im Dunklen“ lag (DdA, S. 27). Mit Bezug auf Karl Groos deutet Adorno sogar Ursprünge im tierischen Mimetismus an (VÄ, S. 74) – eine Theorie die heute noch durchaus von Biomusikologen diskutiert wird (Mithen 2006, Donald 1991).

Zusätzlich wird in der VÄ deutlich, dass Kunst als Refugium der unterdrückten Natur nicht nur durch ihre Existenz eine Begrenzung des Realitätsprinzips verspricht, sondern gelegentlich, in geglückten ästhetischen Augenblicken, in der Lage ist, durch das Ausrufen des Namens ebendiese unterdrückte Natur herbeizurufen, zu beschwören oder ihr zur Stimme zu verhelfen (VÄ, S. 80 f.). Darin liegt wiederum ein Stück Naturbeherrschung, das Adorno als Komplement zum mimetischen Ausdruck im Kunstwerk betrachtet hat: „Die Spannung zwischen diesen beiden Momenten, also der Gedanke, durch fortschreitende Beherrschung der Natur dieser zugleich zu ihrer Freiheit zu verhelfen, das ist die Spannung, die den künstlerischen Prozess eigentlich ausmacht, das heißt, den Sinn des Kunstwerks überhaupt definiert.“ (VÄ, S. 85) Dieser Gedanke war in der DdA nicht ausgeführt.

Was hätte nun Wittgenstein zu all dem zu sagen gehabt? Nach allem was man weiß, hat Wittgenstein die „Wiederkehr der Natur in der Kunst“ um 1910, etwa in Gestalt des musikalischen Expressionismus nicht gerade gutgeheißen. Und auch das „Glück der Dissonanz“, von dem Adorno sprach (VÄ, S. 66), konnte Wittgenstein bei

einer Aufführung der in dieser Hinsicht ja sehr glückvollen *Salome* von Richard Strauss nicht zum Bleiben bewegen. Abgesehen von solchen musikalischen Vorlieben spielte aber auch der ganze historisch-anthropologische Denkrahmen in Wittgensteins Philosophie keine vergleichbar zentrale Rolle. Immerhin trifft sich Wittgensteins Kritik in den *Bemerkungen über Frazers ‚The Golden Bough‘* mit Adornos Ansatz darin, dass schlichte Wissenschaftsgläubigkeit und die damit einhergehende Abwertung etwa von Magie als „Irrtum“ in ihrer Naivität entlarvt werden. Mir kommt es hier aber auf einen anderen Punkt an: Einer der zentralen Topoi von Wittgensteins Philosophie – die geteilte Lebensform, bzw. die „gemeinsame menschliche Handlungsweise“ oder einfach: das Alltägliche – kommt in Adornos Überlegungen zum mimetischen Verhalten seltenerweise nicht vor.

Im Rahmen von Wittgensteins Spätphilosophie wird ja in unzähligen Beispielen und Perspektivwechseln auf die Auffassung hingearbeitet, dass das Beherrschen einer Sprache das Erlernen vieler gemeinsamer Sprachspiele beinhaltet und letztlich praktisch in einer Lebensform wurzelt (PU 7, 23, 150, 241'). Die soziale Dimension dieses Vorgangs wird in der Forschung üblicherweise durch den Ausdruck „Institution“ betont, der eine in einer Gemeinschaft etablierte Handlungsweise meint. Dem entspricht auch Wittgensteins methodischer Hinweis, die Bedeutung von Ausdrücken zu klären, indem die sie einbettenden Handlungskontexte rekonstruiert werden, in denen sie gelernt wurden.

Für das Hineinwachsen in eine Kultur ist nun tatsächlich eine Form mimetischen Verhaltens zentral: die Fähigkeit, in hohem Maße die vielfältigen und zunächst ja unbekannteren kulturellen Praktiken anzunehmen. Jüngere Studien im Bereich der evolutionären Anthropologie – etwa von Michael Tomasello – haben gezeigt, dass sich gerade menschliche Kinder etwa gegenüber Schimpansen durch enorme Fähigkeiten zur Nachahmung auszeichnen (Tomasello 2000, S. 77 ff.). Dies scheint eine wichtige Voraussetzung zu sein, um an der Komplexität unserer Lebensform teilnehmen zu können. Zugegebenermaßen scheint dieser Begriff von mimetischer Teilnahme zunächst mehr mit der *imitatio* gemein zu haben, als mit Adornos Konzept des mimetischen Verhaltens. Die von Adorno betonte Grundstruktur – sich selbst dem Unbekannten ähnlich machen, anstatt es auf Bekanntes zu reduzieren – ist dabei jedoch voll erfüllt. Es geht dabei allerdings eher um ein selbsttransformierendes Mitmachen, als um ein mimetisches Benennen.

Vielleicht hat Adorno diese mimetische Enkulturation im Alltäglichen deshalb nicht beachtet, weil sie nicht jene Sondersphäre bildet, die sie vor dem Zugriff der instrumentellen Rationalität sichert. In der VÄ jedoch kommt Adorno auf Zusammenhänge zu sprechen, welche eine weniger strikte Deutung stützen, als sie in der DdA vorzuherrschen scheint. In VÄ leitet er die Abgeschlossenheit von Kunstwerken nicht lediglich aus der Magie und dem Tabu ab, sondern vergleicht sie auch mit dem Spiel. Dabei geht es ihm nicht um einen weiten Spielbegriff im Sinne Wittgensteins, sondern um einen engeren Spielbegriff, wie er von Karl Groos, Josef Huizinga oder schon früher von Friedrich Schiller verwendet wurde. Die Unterscheidung von Kunst und Spiel begründet Adorno dort ein weiteres Mal durch den „Bildcharakter“ im Rahmen des mimetischen Verhaltens, welches der Kunst, nicht aber dem Spiel zukomme. Diese strikte Unterscheidung abschwächend kommt er nebenbei auf mimetisches Verhalten in Kinderspielen zu sprechen: „[E]s gibt unzählige Spiele, die ebenfalls mimetischen Charakter haben, also etwa die Kinderspiele, wo ein Kind eine Lokomotive ist, ein Konditor

oder ein Flugzeug [...]“ (VÄ, S. 74) Adorno ist aber nicht dem Gedanken gefolgt, dass gerade diese oder ähnliche Spiele mit mimetischem Charakter wesentliche Elemente sein könnten, mit denen Kinder in die Komplexität der kulturellen Formen und Lebensweisen hineinwachsen. Darin könnte ebenso gut eine primäre Verhaltensweise liegen, welche von der Kunst im Erwachsenenleben bewahrt wird. Eine solche Hypothese wäre zumindest nicht schwieriger zu überprüfen als etwa die Theorie eines magischen Ursprungs der Kunst oder einer dialektischen Interjektionstheorie der Benennung.

Noch dichter an Adornos Konzeption der mimetischen Verhaltensweise scheint Wittgenstein zu rücken, wenn er – wie aus den Mitschriften zu den *Lectures on Aesthetics* hervorgeht – einen Zusammenhang zwischen ästhetischen Interjektionen wie „schön“ und den einbettenden Handlungskontexten herstellt, in denen sie erlernt werden: „One thing that is immensely important in teaching is exaggerated gestures and facial expressions. The word is taught as a substitute for a facial expression or a gesture.“ (Wittgenstein 1997, S. 2) Auch in den *Philosophischen Untersuchungen* spricht Wittgenstein davon, wie wir Mimik und Gestik einsetzen, wenn wir etwas sprachlich besonders genau zum Ausdruck bringen wollen (PU 552), dass musikalischer Ausdruck der Mimik vergleichbar sei (PU 536) und wie ähnlich das Verstehen eines Satzes dem Verstehen einer musikalischen Phrase sei (PU 527). Ein wichtiger Aspekt dessen scheint mir Wittgensteins „expressive Sprachauffassung“ zu sein, nach welcher ein ursprünglicher Ausdruck – etwa der Schmerzscrei – durch einen anderen ersetzt wird – etwa durch den Satz „Ich habe Schmerzen“. Dieser übernimmt die Rolle des vorigen Schreiens im Sprachspiel und ist nicht etwa als eine Beschreibung des Schmerzes aufzufassen, sondern als sein Ausdruck.

Wenn man sich vom Vorurteil einer identitätslogischen Auffassung von Sprache befreit, kann man die „Wiederkehr der Natur in der Kultur“ also nicht nur in der Kunst, sondern überall im Alltäglichen entdecken. Dort zeigen sich nämlich auch unbestimmter Wandel und Offenheit für das Besondere jenseits eines linearen

Fortschrittsmodells, welches identitätslogisch Gleise ins Unendliche legt. Auch nach der wittgensteinschen Therapie mag man Adornos Diagnose zustimmen, dass unsere Kultur mit Schematismen überladen ist, die wirklich Neues tendenziell ausschließen. Bei aller Hochschätzung neuer Kunst scheint es jedoch vermessen, die Fürsprache fürs Unterdrückte der Kunst allein zuzutrauen.

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# Ruhe, Vergnügen und Selbsterkenntnis in der Philosophie

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In diesem Beitrag beschäftige ich mich mit dem Philosophieverständnis Wittgensteins. Eine inspirative Betrachtungsweise könnte von Begriffen *Vergnügen* und *Ruhe* ausgehen. Dies ermöglicht uns zwei Komponenten in Wittgensteins Philosophieverständnis unterscheiden – eine sprachliche und eine persönliche, die ich existenziell nenne. Ich zeige, dass sich diese Unterscheidung gut begründen lässt und sich als fruchtbar für weitere Überlegung erweisen kann. Mit ihrer Erörterung möchte ich dann eine neue Perspektive von Wittgensteins Philosophiebegriff, sowie von der Kontinuität seiner beiden Schaffungsperioden aufschließen.

## 1. Tractatus logico-philosophicus

Im Vorwort zu der Abhandlung sagt Wittgenstein, das Buch werde dem, der es mit Verständnis liest, Vergnügen bereiten. Die Frage ist nun, worauf bezieht sich das Vergnügen und wo seine Quelle zu finden ist. Diese Frage ist gleichsam – wie ich zeige – die Frage nach der Philosophie.

Wittgenstein geht in TLP davon aus, dass der Leser die Gedanken „schon selbst einmal gedacht hat“, dass man also an dem Inhalt teilnimmt indem, dass man dieselben oder „doch ähnliche Gedanken“ (TLP S. 9) betrachtet als Probleme, als Fragen. Der Leser muss wie der Autor selbst etwas für problematisch halten.

Das Problematische ist die Quelle der philosophischen Probleme und ist in der Sprache zu finden. Wittgenstein sagt, dass manche Fragen nicht zu beantworten sind, denn sie sind einfach unsinnig. Die Sprache verschleiert nämlich den Gedanken und dann kann es nicht eindeutig aus dem Zeichen auf das Symbol geschlossen werden (TLP 3.323, 4.002). Dazu ist ein richtiges Instrument zu entwickeln, das die eigentliche Sprachlogik aufs Licht bringt, klar darstellt und damit die Eindeutigkeit ermöglicht. Das Ziel ist dann die Sprache auf die Art zu verwenden, sodass sie die Wirklichkeit richtig (d. h. der logischen Form angemessen) abbildet. Wenn die Verwendung der logisch-syntaktischen Form der Sprache entspricht, so können die „fundamentalsten Verwechslungen“ (TLP 3.324) verhindert werden. Diese Irrtümer sind eben für das philosophische Fragen charakteristisch.

Darin ist auch der Grund dafür zu finden, warum Wittgenstein im „Grundgedanken“ (TLP 4.0312) das Sagen vom Zeigen so scharf trennt. Der Zusammenhang zwischen Sprache und Welt wird auf der gemeinsamen logischen Form aufgebaut. Die Form selbst lässt sich nicht aussprechen, ermöglicht jedoch den Zusammenhang zwischen Sprache und Welt. Sie stellt die Möglichkeit dar, die „stillschweigenden Abmachungen“ (TLP 4.002) der Umgangssprache zu enthüllen. Diese Klarstellung ist die eigentliche Lösung des „Hauptproblems der Philosophie“ (McGuinness – von Wright 1980, 88), sie führt zur Grenzziehung zwischen dem Sagbaren und dem Unsagbaren.

Der Weg zur Eindeutigkeit und die Grenzziehung bilden die sprachliche Komponente in Wittgensteins Philosophieren. Er wollte damit *noch* etwas sagen, nämlich das, worüber man schweigt (McGuinness – von Wright 1980, 96). Im Weiteren Text beantworte ich die Frage, worin die-

ses Schweigen besteht. Es führt uns nämlich, so meine Interpretation, zu der anderen, existenziellen Komponente von Wittgensteins Denken.

Der *Tractatus* soll das Ethische begrenzen, was den eigentlichen Sinn des Buches ausmacht. Er ist „ein Ethischer“ (McGuinness – von Wright 1980, 96). Die Frage der Ethik beginnt mit der Frage, wie sich das Subjekt, das wollende philosophische Ich, in der Welt verhält. Es geht dann darum, die Welt richtig zu sehen (vgl. TLP 6.54). Worin besteht die richtige Weltsicht möchte ich im folgenden Text erläutern.

Wittgensteins Ethik ist stark von den Fragen nach dem Sinn des Lebens geprägt.<sup>1</sup> Die Frage nach dem Sinn bedeutet, dass er selbst nicht klar ist. Sie lautet: „Wie kann der Mensch überhaupt glücklich sein, da er doch die Not dieser Welt nicht abwehren kann?“ (TB 13.8.16) Falls dies nicht klar ist, muss es beantwortet werden. Wir stellen uns eine Frage dann, wenn uns etwas fehlt, um die Welt richtig sehen und dem Leben den Sinn geben zu können. Es gibt keine andere Möglichkeit, als die, dass dies in einer Art Erkenntnis bestehen kann. Deswegen schreibt Wittgenstein: „Das gute Gewissen ist das Glück, welches das Leben der Erkenntnis gewährt.“ Diese Erkenntnis beruht darauf, sich im Klaren darüber zu sein, dass das Leben nicht aufgrund der Tatsachen glücklich, also sinnvoll sein kann, „daß es mit den Tatsachen der Welt noch nicht abgetan ist.“ (TB 8.7.16) Die Tatsachen haben eben gar keinen Wert, weil sie kontingent sind, und was Wert hat, kann nach Wittgenstein nicht zufällig sein, muss also außerhalb der Welt liegen (TLP 6.41).

Das Ziel von Wittgensteins Streben nach dem Sinn besteht darin, sich von der Welt unabhängig zu machen, und „sie also in gewissem Sinne beherrschen“ (TB 11.6.16). Es ist jedoch kein Verzicht auf die Tatsachen, sondern darauf, dass sie etwas Grundlegendes bedeuten könnten. Wenn der Sinn des Lebens nicht mit kontingenten Tatsachen in der Welt erfüllt werden kann, dann können wir uns fragen, womit denn ist er zu erfüllen. Im Weiteren möchte ich zeigen, dass diese Frage nicht gestellt werden kann – dass wir sie also auch nicht beantworten können; und – was der wichtigste Punkt ist – das ist die einzig mögliche sinnvolle „Antwort“.

Die richtige Weltsicht ist eine angemessene Stellungnahme des Subjekts zur Welt (vgl. TB 4.11.16), sie besteht darin, dass wir nicht Tatsachen als gewiss anerkennen, denn sie sind nicht notwendig. Die richtige Weltsicht liegt in einer Anerkennung dessen, dass es überhaupt etwas gibt und dass wir darauf nicht den immer erwünschten Einfluss haben können, kurz, dass „ich auf einen Einfluß auf die Geschehnisse verzichte.“ (TB 11.6.16) So hat z. B. überhaupt keinen Sinn gegen den eigenen Tod zu kämpfen, denn er ist unausweichlich. Wittgenstein muntert den Leser auf, nicht gegen die Windmühle zu kämpfen, sondern anzuerkennen, dass der Tod „kein Ereignis des Lebens“ (TLP 6.4311) ist. Es geht dann darum, nicht vor der Zukunft zu fürchten, sondern die Gegenwart sinnvoll zu erfüllen, dann – kann man mit Wittgensteins Worten sagen – „lebt der ewig, der in der Gegenwart lebt.“ (TLP 6.4311) Der Schlüssel ist die Anerkennung von etwas, was wir nicht beeinflussen können.

Es geht darum, anzunehmen, dass ich die Frage nach dem Sinn meines Lebens nicht theoretisch beantworten kann. Es ist jedoch von grundlegender Bedeutung, dass das Aufgeben der theoretischen Suche gar kein faktisches Problem ist.<sup>2</sup> In diesem Sinne schrieb Wittgenstein in einem Brief an Paul Engelmann den folgenden Satz: „Wenn man sich nicht bemüht das Unaussprechliche auszusprechen, so geht *nichts* verloren. Sondern das Unaussprechliche ist, – unaussprechlich – in dem Ausgesprochenen *enthalten!*“ (McGuinness – von Wright 1980, 78) Wenn man dies anerkennt, dann verschwindet auch die quälende Frage nach dem Sinn, und das Ergebnis lautet: „Das *Rätsel* gibt es nicht.“ (TLP 6.5) Wittgenstein meint, es kann eben keine sinnvolle Letztbegründung der Ethik geben. Das Ethische begründet sich nämlich durch sich selbst – wie eine „tautologische Fragestellung“ (TB 30.7.16). Wenn man die Suche als sinnlos betrachtet, dann bedeutet es nicht ein sinnloses Ergebnis – es gibt eben kein Ergebnis. Die ganze Fragestellung ist unsinnig. Erst wenn man die Unsinnigkeit anerkennt, kann man sich dem Sinnvollen wenden. Dies bedeutet, dass wir dann die Welt richtig sehen, sobald wir den Leiter nicht mehr brauchen, denn wir stellen fest, dass wir schon da sind, wohin der Leiter uns führen sollte. Was sich durch die Anerkennung ändern muss, sind wir selbst. Diese Erkenntnis als Antwort auf das „Rätsel des Lebens“ (TLP 6.4312) ist kein Gedanke, es ist nichts Faktisches, sondern etwas Individuelles, es ist eine Selbsterkenntnis.

Die Selbsterkenntnis ist auch der Grund, weshalb Wittgenstein im Vorwort sagt, TLP sei kein Lehrbuch. Die Frage ist nicht theoretisch, also kann auch nicht gelehrt werden, die Philosophie ist in diesem Sinne auch keine Lehre sondern eine Tätigkeit. Sie besteht jedoch nicht im Leiterklettern sondern im Klarwerden von Sätzen, also im Klarwerden dessen, was die Sätze überhaupt ausdrücken *können*. Das Ergebnis ist dann ein Klarwerden von sich selbst – nicht wohin wir geklettert sind, sondern wo wir jetzt stehen. Das ist die existenzielle Komponente von Wittgensteins Philosophiebegriff. Dann kann das Lesen der Abhandlung dem Leser Vergnügen bereiten – denn derjenige, der es versteht, fühlt (TLP 6.45, 6.53, 6.1232), dass er die Welt richtig sieht, dass er *lebt* (vgl. TLP 5.621) und sich nicht mit unsinnigen Fragen hoffnungslos beschäftigt. Das ist ein Zwischenergebnis meiner Überlegung.

## 2. Spätphilosophie

Im zweiten Teil dieses Textes möchte ich beide oben genannten Komponenten in der späteren Philosophie Wittgensteins schildern. Wittgenstein hat nach der Drehung seines Denkens (PU § 108) zwar „die schweren Irrtümer“ (PU S. 232) der vorigen Lösungen anerkannt, das methodische Ziel blieb jedoch dasselbe. Die Irrtümer bestanden in der wissenschaftlichen Art und Weise des Denkens, nämlich in der Voraussetzung, dass die Probleme mittels einer sprachlichen Analyse zu lösen sind. Das wissenschaftliche Vorbild, das Streben nach Allgemeinheit, hat Wittgenstein anfangs der dreißiger Jahre als dogmatisch bezeichnet (WWK 182-183) und verworfen (BIB 39, PU § 116).

Das Ziel der Philosophie ist nun die Einsicht in das Arbeiten der Sprache, die darauf beruht, dass wir anerkennen, dass die Sprache auch ohne die Kristallklarheit nicht nur funktionieren kann, sondern auch *tatsächlich* funktioniert. Wäre es so, dann bräuchte man keine ideale Sprache mehr. Deswegen geht es in der Philosophie um „die Zusammenstellung des längst Bekannten“ (PU § 109). Doch eine übersichtliche Darstellung, die im Vergleichen

und Erfinden von Zwischengliedern, Zusammenhängen aufgrund der Familienähnlichkeiten besteht,<sup>3</sup> hat eine wichtige Komponente, die diese Vorgangsweise mit dem *Tractatus* verbindet. Sie betrifft wieder die Rolle des Philosophierenden.

Wie in TLP hat die Philosophie erneut eine sprachliche und eine persönliche, existenzielle Komponente. Das Individuelle möchte ich jetzt am Begriff der Langsamkeit zeigen:

„In der Philosophie darf man keine Denkkrankheiten *abschneiden*. Sie muß ihren natürlichen Lauf gehen, und die *langsame* Heilung ist das Wichtigste.“ (Z § 382)

Die „Denkkrankheit“ besteht darin, dass ich von einem Ideal gefangen bin – von dem Ideal einer wissenschaftlichen Methode (PU §§ 71, 109, 115, 192). Die Lösung liegt nun in der Anerkennung, dass die Umgangssprache funktioniert, bzw. dass eine Idealsprache keine Probleme löst. Die Lösung ist nämlich die Heilung. Die *langsame Heilung*<sup>4</sup> besteht darin, dass ich nach und nach einsehe, dass die Sprache auch ohne eine Letztbegründung auskommt und dass die Antworten eben keine solche Begründung verlangen. Wie sich das Ethische nicht durch eine Theorie begründen lässt, so lässt sich auch nicht der Boden begründen,<sup>5</sup> auf dem die Sprache des Alltags beruht. Dieser Grund für Sprachspiele nennt Wittgenstein die Lebensform. Die Sprache ist nur dann möglich, wenn man sich „auf etwas verläßt“ (ÜG § 509). Die Lebensformen sind daher „das Hinzunehmende, das Gegebene“ (PU S. 572).<sup>6</sup>

Wittgenstein zeigt, dass philosophische Probleme sehr oft eben keine lösbaren Probleme sind, und enthüllt unsere Erwartungen und Ansprüche, die sich als zu hoch und deswegen unerfüllbar entpuppen. Die Langsamkeit bedeutet sich zufrieden zu geben und nicht auf einer völlig unbegründbaren Voraussetzung zu beruhen, dass wir Antworten *irgendwann* auch finden. Die Sprache ist – wie es in TLP heißt – logisch vollkommen geordnet (vgl. TLP 5.5563), deswegen lässt auch die Spätphilosophie alles, wie es ist. Die Langsamkeit zeigt auch den Ernst des Problems – es ist nicht einfach die Suche nach dem Grund als die eigentliche Ursache von manchen zwecklosen Problemen anzuerkennen. Das Motiv findet Wittgenstein darin, dass es eben keine sinnvolle Letztbegründung geben *kann*. Überraschenderweise gelangt man zu diesem Standpunkt durch eigene Argumentation – das denkende Subjekt setzt sich selbst gewisse Grenzen, denn nur das Denken kann das Denkbare bestimmen, damit wird indirekt auch die Grenze zum Undenkbaren gezogen.<sup>7</sup> Die Lösung bedeutet nicht eine neue zu suchen, sondern eine anzuerkennen (vgl. Z § 314). Nach meiner Überlegung sind wir nun auch im Spätdenken Wittgensteins zu dem existenziellen Bestandteil der Philosophie gelangen.

Meiner Interpretation ist jedoch Folgendes einzuwenden: die existenzielle Komponente, das Klarwerden von eigener Standpunkt, ist doch keine relevante Antwort auf die Frage, die wir uns am Anfang gestellt haben. So behauptet z. B. Alan Janik, es gebe in Wittgensteins Philosophie „keine positive Botschaft“.<sup>8</sup> Ich räume ein, dieser Einwand enthält eine Menge Wahrheit: Wenn wir uns Fragen stellen, dann setzen wir voraus, dass es Antworten gibt. Und die Antwort, dass es keine gibt, ist auch eine Antwort, jedoch auf eine andere Frage (ob es Antworten gebe).

Es geht jedoch um den Unterschied zwischen der sprachlichen und der existenziellen Komponente. Fragen, von denen wir „gepeitscht werden“ (PU § 133), sind nämlich diejenigen, die uns beschäftigen, ja verführen, und

dies auf Kosten dessen, was tatsächlich wichtig sein könnte. Eine Suche nach der Letztbegründung ist ähnlich wie der Kampf gegen den eigenen Tod – eben sinnlos und daher unsinnig. Die Antwort besteht dann in der Drehung der Betrachtungsweise, Klarwerden von sich selbst, einfach im Zuwenden dem „glücklichen Leben“ (vgl. TB 8.7.). Dies führt mich zur Erkenntnis der „*Einzigkeit meines Lebens*“. Aus dieser Einzigkeit „entspringt dann Wissenschaft – Religion – Kunst“ (TB 1.8.16). Diese Erkenntnis könnte man also doch als eine positive (weil konstitutive) Botschaft betrachten.

### 3. Schlussbemerkung

Ich habe Wittgensteins Philosophiebegriff in verschiedenen Phasen seines Denkens betrachtet. Sowohl in dem sog. Früh-, als auch in dem Spätwerk habe ich zwei Komponenten unterschieden: Die eine ist die sprachliche, die in der Anerkennung der logischen Form oder der durch eine Lebensform begründete Umgangssprache besteht. Die andere ist die existenzielle. Diese ist dann eine Quelle von Fragen und Antworten. Sie bestehen jedoch nicht in einem Ergebnis, sondern in der Drehung der Betrachtungsweise – in dem Sich-zufrieden-geben, dass sich der Grund für das Ethische oder für die Lebensform nicht angeben lässt. Der Unterschied zwischen beiden Schaffungsperioden Wittgensteins besteht darin, dass die Wendung langsam – wie eine Therapie – vollendet werden muss. In dem Spätwerk gibt es kein Glanz der Kristallklarheit mehr, wohl aber gilt, dass man die Welt richtig sieht, wenn man auf sie nicht mit einer Luftgebäude-Perspektive, sondern eher von dem rauen Boden her betrachtet. Danach kann man „das Philosophieren abbrechen“, wann man will, (PU § 133), dann sieht man die Welt richtig (6.54). Wenn man die Welt richtig sieht, dann sieht man sich selbst richtig – Philosophie als Arbeit an sich selbst führt zur Selbsterkenntnis.

### Endnoten

- <sup>1</sup> Vgl. TB 11.6.16, 8.7.16 und Wittgenstein 1998b, 10-11.  
<sup>2</sup> Vgl. WWK, 117, vgl. auch WWK, 68f. und VORL, 269.  
<sup>3</sup> Zu den Zusammenhängen vgl. PU § 122, VORL, 233; zu der Familienähnlichkeit vgl. PU §§ 66-67, 164, 179; VORL, 187-188, 232, 248, 275; BIB, 59; BrB, 166, 170.  
<sup>4</sup> Dazu vgl. VB, 498, 546, 563.  
<sup>5</sup> Vgl. PU §§ 1, 217, 326, 654; ÜG §§ 110, 307, 471, 508-509.  
<sup>6</sup> Vgl. PU §§ 206f., 489, S. 489; ÜG §§ 110, 255, 358; Z §§ 567-569.  
<sup>7</sup> Vgl. VB, 459, 463-464.  
<sup>8</sup> Janik, 2009, 163.

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# Representing Attitudes: A Plea for a Relational Approach

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Apart from having attitudes, we frequently say we have them; we attribute them to ourselves and to others. When we do it, we are likely to express it in the form of a report

(1) *A v that p*

(‘*v*’ stands for an attitude verb: ‘believe,’ ‘think,’ ‘suspect,’ ‘fear,’ ‘wish,’ ‘suggest,’ etc.; ‘*A*’ stands for an agent). If attitudes are relations between agents and propositions, reports of the form (1) represent them best because they are composed of relational verb ‘*v*’, subject-expression ‘*A*,’ and ‘that’-clause. Verb in (1) stands for a dyadic relation between an agent referred to by ‘*A*’ and a proposition referred to by the clause; instances of (1) express propositions which consist of these three elements. The outlined analysis of propositional attitude reports – the “standard relational analysis” (SRA) – faces numerous problems and it is not the only available one. We can depart from it in various ways, but its problems and alternatives are too vast to be discussed here. This is why I will narrow my attention to a particular argument against SRA – the substitution failure argument – and a particular rejoinder to the argument proposed by Stephen Schiffer.

If we adhere to SRA and so commit ourselves to treat attitude verbs as standing for dyadic relations and (more importantly for the present purpose) ‘that’-clauses as picking out propositions, we should be able to explicitly state these commitments. Sometimes we do. We say, for example, “When one believes that *p*, she believes the proposition that *p*.” Now, once we take such a sentence under consideration, it is natural to say that ‘the proposition that *p*’ and ‘that *p*’ pick out the same thing – (the proposition) *that p*. If this is the case, so goes the substitution failure argument, if the two expressions do pick out the same thing, they should be intersubstitutable in instances of (1), e.g.

(2a) Buba believes that snow is white,

and the result,

(2b) Buba believes the proposition that snow is white,

should not significantly depart from (1)’s instance. And in the case of beliefs it does not (the same holds for cases of acceptance, denying, doubting, expressing, proving, rejecting, stating, etc.). But – and herein lies the problem – once we take other attitude verbs (e.g. ‘demand,’ ‘expect,’ ‘hold,’ ‘judge,’ ‘know,’ ‘recognise,’ ‘remember,’ ‘complain,’ ‘conclude,’ ‘guess,’ ‘insist,’ ‘predict,’ ‘surmise,’ ‘wish’), and execute the same substitution in (1)’s instances in which this attitudes occur, we get unpleasant results such as (3b) and (4b):

(3a) Buba fears that snow is white,

(3b) Buba fears the proposition that snow is white;

(4a) Buba hopes that snow is white,

(4b) \*Buba hopes the proposition that snow is white.

Whereas (3a) and (4a) are meaningful and, let us postulate, true reports, (3b) could be false because it differs in meaning from (3a); (4b), on the other hand, makes no sense because it is not grammatical.

The substitution failure argument is usually understood as showing that the way in which SRA treats ‘that’-clauses is wrong. Such clauses cannot be singular terms; otherwise, ‘the proposition that *p*’ and ‘that *p*’ should be inter-substitutable. As (3b) and (4b) illustrate, they are not, so ‘that’-clauses surely do not pick out anything but function differently or disappear when adequately analysed. Still, what if we could find an example of a substitution failure which does not imply that substituted expressions do not function as it was thought they function (or which does not imply that there is something wrong with the context of substitution)? Then we might argue that the case involving substitution failures in attitude reports is similar to it and should be treated accordingly. In other words, such an example would show that the above argument against SRA does not force us to abandon or modify its commitments.

As a candidate example Schiffer (2003: 93; 2006: 285) considers apposition

(5a) the Italian singer Pavarotti

in which ‘Pavarotti’ cannot be substituted by ‘the greatest tenor’ (although they pick out the same thing) because that would result in ill-formed (ungrammatical) construction

(5b) \*the Italian singer the greatest tenor.

(‘The Italian singer Pavarotti never sings Wagner’ makes sense; ‘The Italian singer the greatest tenor never sings Wagner’ does not.) Nevertheless, it does not follow that ‘Pavarotti’ is not referential or that the two substituted expressions do not pick out the same thing. Thus, co-referential expressions cannot always be inter-substituted. If it is so, from the fact that the substitution fails in certain attitude reports it does not necessarily follow that SRA’s treatment of ‘that’-clauses and attitude reports is wrong. Indeed, although ‘that *p*’ and ‘the proposition that *p*’ pick out the same thing, this by itself should not legitimate their substitution in every context. So with the case of apposition at hand, a proponent of SRA should be safe as long as it can be maintained that the substitution failure in attitude reports is similar to the apposition case.

This proposal, however, is limited. It works only for cases which result in ungrammatical reports such as (4b), and it does not affect grammatical yet meaning-altered reports such as (3b). A proponent of SRA will have to find some other way to deal with them. There are strategies for dealing with such reports, but I cannot discuss them here due to the lack of space. (For proposals that cover both ungrammatical and meaning-altered cases see King (2007: 137-163).) I will concentrate instead on the defence of SRA limited to ungrammatical cases and based on the apposition case. The question is, does Schiffer’s proposal supports SRA?

We can grant that substitution failures such as (5b) open a way out of (at least part of) the problem for SRA if they are substitution failures resulting in ungrammatical constructions. But, argues Rosefeldt (2008: 308), (8)’s ungrammaticality is only a “superficial phenomenon, and can easily be removed” when we treat (5a) and (5b) as disguised identities ‘the Italian singer who is (identical to)

Pavarotti' and 'the Italian singer who is (identical to) the greatest tenor.' By doing so the ungrammaticality of (5b) and sentences embodying it vanishes. So, as he concludes, Schiffer's example shows only that, unlike with names, we cannot construe appositions of the form 'the  $\varphi$   $\psi$ ' when ' $\psi$ ' itself is a definite description, but we must explicate them as identity statements instead. Accordingly, if the substitution in appositions does not *really* result in ungrammatical constructions, SRA is devoid of desired example.

Indeed, we may concede, *if* (5a) is a disguised identity and as such (in the process of the substitution) no longer results in ungrammatical (5b), the apposition case can no longer support SRA. But can we treat those appositions as identities? I believe we cannot. Firstly, the natural interpretation of (5a) would be to take only 'Pavarotti' as referential and 'the Italian singer' as serving simply to say something about Pavarotti, not to denote or refer to him. As such, 'the Italian singer' in (5a) would not function as singular term, but as attribute. And because of the role it has in (5a), it cannot figure in identity statements. (This echoes Strawson's (1998: 136) distinction of two uses of definite descriptions: to mention or refer to an individual and to say something about it after it was already mentioned.)

In line with the previous section, we can observe that 'the Italian singer' is fairly incomplete (or general) in its descriptive content. When we use a more complete description instead, the resulting "apposition" sounds clumsy, if not defective. Consider slightly expanded 'the only Italian singer Pavarotti' or 'the greatest tenor Pavarotti;' they somehow force us to break them with a comma, and it is not hard to hear them as identities in disguise. As descriptive content expands, "appositions" become more problematic: 'the Italian singer with ten coins in his pocket Pavarotti,' 'the Italian singer that never sings Wagner Pavarotti,' etc. And the content does not even have to be exhaustive; just consider 'the friend of Domingo Pavarotti.' I take this to show that description-parts of "appositions" listed in this section *would* be used to pick out Pavarotti and so can figure in identity statements. 'The Italian singer' in (5a) is not of the kind, but, as I already said, functions as attribute. Also, we may notice, if we wish to state the identity of a person or a thing, we would not use an apposition for that purpose. The construction by appearance closest to (5a) would include a comma – 'the Italian singer, Pavarotti' – and we would perhaps add 'namely' or 'i.e.' with it.

Finally, if (5a) is disguised identity, we should be able to substitute its first part ('the Italian singer'), just as we can the second ('Pavarotti'). But this cannot always be done. 'The Italian singer' and 'the friend of Domingo' can be co-referential, but the result – 'the friend of Domingo Pavarotti' – is ill-formed. Also, recall descriptively more complete parts of "appositions" mentioned in the previous section. This at least further complicates Rosefeldt's conclusion concerning what the apposition case actually amounts to, but I take it as a signal that (5a) should not be treated as disguised identity.

Rosefeldt further argues (*ibid.* 309) that the appeal to the apposition case cannot account for "ill-formed" sentences such as

(6) That snow is white is made up of concepts,

inferred by substitution from 'The proposition that snow is white is made up of concepts.' To my ear, however, (6) does not sound ill-formed. At one point Rosefeldt even distinguishes ungrammatical cases such as (4b) and cases such as (6) in which "the substitution of [the proposition

that snow is white]' by a supposedly coreferential ['that'-clause] violates syntactical rules" (*ibid.* 306). But is the result of such a violation supposed to be something other than ungrammatical construction? Be that as it may, I do not regard (6) as ill-formed or ungrammatical, or as a result of syntactical violation. Let me elaborate this.

Consider two simple predicate constructions

(7)  $x$  is true

(instead of 'true' – 'false,' 'possible,' 'probable,' 'surprising,' 'contingent' or 'necessary,' work as well), and

(8)  $x$  is made up of concepts.

It is natural to say that any expression placed for  $x$  that preserves (7)'s grammaticality must figure in (8) and preserve its grammaticality as well, and vice versa. If we place 'the proposition that snow is white' in (7) and (8), we get grammatical sentences. Now, take 'that snow is white' and place it in (7); we get

(9) That snow is white is true,

which is a well-formed sentence. Following the suggested principle concerning preservation of grammaticality,

(6) That snow is white is made up of concepts

should turn out to be grammatical or well-formed as well. If so, examples such as (6) cannot be used against SRA.

As I suspect, the feeling that (6) is ill-formed emerges from the fact that most people are not accustomed to see 'that'-clauses as standing for propositions – for them most sentences starting with 'that'-clause must sound unacceptable. This can be avoided. In their writings authors frequently use various conventions to indicate that they are dealing with a particular kind of entity – the sentence, the utterance, the proposition, etc. – with the intention that we as readers become fully aware of that. Following such a practice, instead of prefixing 'the proposition' to 'that'-clause as an indicator it is a proposition we are dealing with, we might use italics, underlining, or a kind of quasi-quotation marks to perform the same job. And by doing so a possibility of confusion is minimised. (I am aware that my proposal requires further elaboration primarily on "content-use" and "object-use" of 'that'-clauses, but the space does not allow it here.)

Finally, argues Rosefeldt, to preserve 'that'-clauses as singular terms a proponent of SRA ought to discredit the principle

(P2) If a singular term  $t$  in a grammatically well-formed sentence  $s$  is substituted by a co-referential  $t^*$ ,  $s$  preserves its grammaticality,

on which the substitution failure argument (among other things) rests. The apposition case was brought by Schiffer precisely for that purpose. But, on the basis of his above discussed arguments, Rosefeldt (2008: 309) concludes that (P2) should be supplemented with

(\*) unless  $t^*$  would be part of an ill-formed complex singular term,

which obviously excludes the apposition case as a support of SRA. I see some problems with the proposal.

For one thing, (P2\*) has a counterexample. We cannot without exception substitute in *indefinite* descriptions as well. 'An Italian singer Pavarotti' is fine; 'An Italian singer the greatest tenor' is not. So (\*) should at least be generalised so to cover all complex terms. This brings two



further doubts. Firstly, why stop at complex terms? Perhaps there are still other exceptions which should be added to (\*). And how can we be certain that attitude reports such as (4b) would not, in one way or another, be among those exceptions? Perhaps, in the light of the substitution failure argument, we should supplement (P2) further with

(\*) unless  $t^*$  would be part of an ill-formed complex predicate or an open sentence.

So if ' $t$ ' stands for 'that snow is white' and ' $t^*$ ' for 'the proposition that snow is white,' an example of excluded ill-formed complex predicate would be 'hoping the proposition that snow is white,' and an example of excluded ill-formed open sentence 'x insists the proposition that snow is white.' But even if this suggestion is wrong and we cannot think of further (better) examples, or adequately justify those we can think of, Rosefeldt's restriction of (P2) itself seems *ad hoc* without an additional support. He offers such a support but, I argued above, his arguments are controversial. Secondly, the apposition 'An Italian singer Pavarotti' surely is not disguised identity. However, relying

on "disguised identity" thesis was one of Rosefeldt's arguments against relevance of the apposition case. So even if he was right to treat (5a) as disguised identity (I argued he was not), 'an Italian singer Pavarotti' still serves for the kind of defence of SRA which Schiffer suggested.

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# Form und Inhalt in der Musik – Wittgensteins Beitrag zu einem zentralen musikphilosophischen Problem

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„Auf eine solche Darstellung sind wir versucht zu antworten: ‚Musik vermittelt uns sich selbst.‘“ (EPhB II, 273)

In der musikologischen Literatur sind Aussagen wie diese als Bekenntnis Wittgensteins zum sogenannten musikalischen Formalismus interpretiert worden, man ordnete ihn u.a. aufgrund seiner Nähe zu Johannes Brahms der sogenannten „Autonomieästhetik“ zu.

Einer der zentralen musikästhetischen Diskurse des 19. Jahrhunderts ist der Streit zwischen „Ausdrucksästhetik“ und „Autonomieästhetik: Auf der einen Seite wurden Ahnungen und Gefühle in der Musik zugelassen, auf der anderen verbannt. Vertreter der Ausdruckästhetik ergingen sich in mitunter grotesker Ausprägung in Programmheften und ästhetischen Betrachtungen des erstarkten bürgerlichen Konzertbetriebes. Diese Richtung brachte jedoch auch die von Franz Brendel ausgerufene „Neudeutsche Schule“ hervor, in der Richard Wagner, Franz Liszt und andere die Idee von an außermusikalische Programme und Assoziationen gebundenen sinfonischen Dichtungen entwickelten.

In der „Autonomieästhetik“ verfocht als prominenter Vertreter Eduard Hanslick die seit E.T.A. Hoffmann anhand der Sinfonik Beethovens entwickelte Idee der „absoluten Musik“: Alles, was nicht in der Musik selbst begründet lag, war als außermusikalischer Zusatz abzulehnen, statt dessen lag jeglicher musikalischer Inhalt in der erscheinenden Form begründet. In seiner Abhandlung *Vom Musikalisch Schönen* befindet er:

„Die Musik besteht aus Tonreihen, Tonformen, diese haben keinen anderen Inhalt, als sich selbst. [...] die Musik spricht nicht bloß durch Töne, sie spricht auch nur Töne“ (Hanslick 1891, 162f.).

Er beharrte darauf: „Bei der Tonkunst gibt es keinen Inhalt gegenüber der Form, weil sie keine Form hat außerhalb des Inhalts“ (ebd. 167). Seine polemisch überspitzte Formulierung von Musik als „tönend bewegten Formen“ brachte ihm den (nicht ganz berechtigten) Vorwurf des „Formalismus“ ein.

Hanslicks „Selbstbedeutung“ bleibt streng genommen nur eine *Scheinlösung* mit dem Ziel, sich von einer irrationalen Gefühlsschwelgerei fernzuhalten, wie Susanne K. Langer feststellt (ohne dann allerdings eine alternative Lösung anzubieten):

„Das Thema einer musikalischen Komposition ist ihr wesentlicher Inhalt.‘ Hanslick wußte, daß dies eine Ausflucht war; seine Nachfolger aber fanden es immer schwieriger, sich der Frage nach dem Inhalt zu entziehen, und so wurde die törichte Fiktion der Selbstbedeutung zum Rang einer Lehre erhoben.“ (Langer 1965, 233)

Eine Hanslick-Lektüre Wittgensteins ist nicht nachweisbar, wahrscheinlicher ist, dass er seine Ansichten von dem Hanslick-Schüler und „Hausfreund“ Joseph Labor geholt hat. Für seinen Beitrag zur Form-Inhalt-Debatte ist eine frühere, Hanslick und Wittgenstein gemeinsame Quelle

naheliegender, die Wittgenstein offensichtlich studiert hat: Schopenhauers Abhandlung *Zur Metaphysik der Musik*. Er bezieht sich ausdrücklich auf eine bestimmte Stelle dieses Textes (VB, 497f.), in der Schopenhauer die „Selbstbedeutung“ der Musik verhandelt, sich gegen die Aufladung bestimmter Stellen mit Gefühlsbegriffen wendet und schließt:

„daher ist es besser, sie in ihrer Unmittelbarkeit und rein aufzufassen.“ (Schopenhauer 1859, 523f.)

Diesen letzten Satz hat Wittgenstein offenbar in seinem Sinne weiterentwickelt, wenn er den Gedanken „abstoßend“ findet, dass „manchmal gesagt worden [ist], daß Musik Gefühle der Freude, Traurigkeit, des Triumphes etc. vermittelt“ (EPhB II, 237). Und er reagiert wie Schopenhauer auf das willkürliche Interpretieren mit einer offenen Formulierung:

„Auf eine solche Darstellung sind wir versucht zu antworten: ‚Musik vermittelt uns *sich selbst*.‘“ (ebd.)

Aufgrund der Bedrängnis durch falsch verstandene Gefühligkeit sei man „versucht zu antworten“ – das beschreibt genau das Dilemma, das Susanne Langer andeutet: Es bleibt eine verlockende Fiktion. Wittgenstein behauptet an keiner Stelle, eine musikalische Phrase bedeute sich selbst. Wann immer es um eine Variation dieser Bemerkung geht, steht sie in Anführungszeichen – bei Wittgenstein bekanntlich untrügliches Anzeichen dafür, dass es sich um einen noch zu untersuchenden Ausdruck handelt.

Er expliziert seine Überlegung u.a. an der musikalischen Phrase:

„Ich denke an eine ganz kurze von nur zwei Takten. Du sagst ‚Was liegt nicht alles in ihr!‘ Aber es ist nur, sozusagen, eine optische Täuschung, wenn du denkst, beim Hören gehe vor, was in ihr liegt.“ (Z, Nr. 173)

Die „optische Täuschung“ entsteht, weil es Gesprächssituationen oder Anlässe gibt, in denen tatsächlich von einer Art separatem Ausdruck gesprochen wird. So kann Wittgenstein z.B. behaupten, bestimmte Themen von Brahms hätten etwas von Keller (vergl. VÄ IV § 6). Es gibt aber, nach Wittgenstein, „zwei verschiedene Gebrauchsarten von ‚Verstehen‘“ (Vergl. PU I, § 532), denn

„Wir reden vom Verstehen eines Satzes in dem Sinne, in welchem er durch einen andern ersetzt werden kann, der das Gleiche sagt; aber auch in dem Sinne, in welchem er durch keinen andern ersetzt werden kann. (So wenig wie ein musikalisches Thema durch ein anderes.)“ (PU I, § 531)

Aspekte des Ausdrucks können verglichen werden, nicht aber der Ausdruck einer ganz bestimmten Phrase. Hier scheinen Form und Inhalt (bzw. Ausdruck) tatsächlich wie Hanslick sagt in „dunkler, untrennbarer Einheit verschmolzen“. Die zwei unterschiedlichen Gebrauchsweisen von „den Ausdruck der Phrase verstehen“ (vergl. Hobuß 1998, Schulte 1987) sind daher auf der einen Seite das Feststellen des Ausdrucks mit einer anschließenden Erklärung, die Wittgenstein *transitiv* nennt. Auf der anderen Seite gibt es aber Fälle, in der keine Beschreibung vorbereitet, sondern

eine solche geradezu verweigert wird: Eine thematische Wendung der Musik kann „verstanden“ werden, ohne dass man angeben können muss, worin dieses Verstehen besteht. Wittgenstein bezeichnet das als *intransitiven* Gebrauch.

Problematisch ist, dass der Ausdruck „diese Phrase drückt etwas aus“ sowohl intransitiv als auch transitiv verstanden werden kann; Dieselbe Oberflächengrammatik führt zur Verschleierung unterschiedlicher Gebrauchsweisen. In Bezug auf Musik liegt das zum einen daran, so Wittgenstein, dass sie kein Naturphänomen, sondern eine kulturell gewachsene Größe ist. Die Annahme, etwas liege in einer Phrase verborgen, bedingt so bereits den ersten Fehlschluss auf dem Weg einer Trennung von Form und Inhalt:

„Brahms hat alles herausgebracht, was in dem Thema liegt.“ Aber wäre es in dem Thema gewesen, wenn er's nicht herausgebracht hätte? – D.h: wenn das Ganze da ist, so ist es als habe die Entwicklung in dem Thema gelegen. ‚Es liegt schon irgendwie in dem Thema, er holt es nur heraus.‘ – Wir sind geneigt zu sagen: „diese Entwicklung liegt bereits in dem Thema.“ [...] Wir hätten auch sagen können. Dies ist die natürliche Entwicklung des Themas. – Und inwiefern ist sie natürlich? Um dies zu beantworten, dazu genügt es nicht daß wir das Thema genau anschauen, sondern (vor allem) die Entwicklungen anderer musikalischer Themen.“ (BEE, MS 121, 10. Mai 1938)

„Wir sind geneigt, zu sagen“ – Mit anderen Worten: nahelegend, aber womöglich irreführend. In diesem Fall geht es nämlich nicht um ein intransitives Verständnis der Entwicklungsmöglichkeiten eines Thema, vielmehr ist ein transitives Erklärungsmuster gefragt. Es handelt sich eben *nicht* um die „natürliche Entwicklung des Themas“. Das Thema ist kein Subjekt, das sich gewissermaßen selbst entfaltet, sondern wurde von Brahms in einem gewissen Zusammenhang konstruiert. Um zu zeigen, warum Brahms die eine oder andere Entfaltung vornehmen kann, müssen wir, so Wittgenstein, zwar *auch* das Thema „genau anschauen“, gleichsam prüfen, welche inneren Begrenzungen es zwar nicht „von Natur aus“, aber von der Art seiner Konstruktion her mit sich bringt. Vielmehr aber sollte verglichen, wie musikalische Themen *überhaupt* zu Brahms Zeiten und von ihm entwickelt werden, d.h. welchen Regelbildungen und Regelsystemen diese Entwicklung untersteht. Denn:

„Ist nicht Harmonielehre wenigstens teilweise Phänomenologie also Grammatik?“ (BEE, MS 108, 19. Dezember 1930)

Die Entwicklungsmöglichkeiten liegen demnach nicht in der Eigenschaft des Themas, sondern sind schon vorher bestimmt durch die Art der Harmonielehre, die festlegt, was überhaupt ein Thema sein kann und wie es sich entwickeln darf, um in seiner Zeit verstanden zu werden. (Harmonielehre ist für Wittgenstein eine kulturelle Setzung ohne letzte Begründung, vergl. BF I, Nr. 74.)

Intransitive Situationen zielen dagegen nicht auf Vergleichsaspekte:

„wenn wir uns eine Melodie wiederholen und sie ihren vollen Eindruck auf uns machen lassen und dabei sagen: ‚Diese Melodie sagt *etwas*‘, und es ist, als ob wir finden müßten, was sie sagt. Und doch weiß ich, daß sie nichts sagt, was ich in Worten oder Bildern ausdrücken könnte. Und wenn ich mich nach dieser Einsicht darein ergebe zu sagen ‚Sie drückt nur einen musikalischen Gedanken aus‘, dann würde das nicht mehr bedeuten als ‚Sie drückt sich selbst aus.‘“ (EPHb II, 256.)

„Mit anderen Worten, das Wort [...] scheint hier transitiv, genauer noch, reflexiv gebraucht zu sein, d.h. wir sehen seine Anwendung hier als einen besonderen Fall des transitiven Gebrauchs an.“ (EPHb II, 248)

Hierbei handelt es sich nach Wittgenstein um eine „Schleife“ des Denkens, die „begradigt“ werden muss (EPHb II, 248). Denn „wir sind geneigt“, die Frage: „welche Bedeutung?“ oder „was bedeutet diese Melodie“ mit „eben *dies*“ zu beantworten, und auf die gemeinte Stelle zu verweisen, anstatt zu antworten: „ich habe kein bestimmtes Merkmal gemeint, ich habe nur der Melodie zugehört“ (vergl. EPHb II, 248). Der erste Ausdruck erweckt jedoch den Anschein einer transitiven Deutung „und es ist, als ob wir finden müßten, was sie sagt“ (s.o.).

„Die ist nun eine charakteristische Situation für uns, wenn wir über philosophische Probleme nachdenken. Es gibt viele Verwirrungen, die auf diese Weise entstehen, nämlich daß ein Wort einen transitiven Gebrauch und einen intransitiven Gebrauch hat und daß wir den letzteren für einen bestimmten Fall des ersteren halten, indem wir das Wort, wenn es intransitiv gebraucht ist, durch eine reflexive Konstruktion erklären.“ (EPHb II, 248f.)

Ein transitiver Gebrauch fordere eine Spezifizierung ein, deren einziger Anhaltspunkt eben wieder die Melodie „selbst“ ist. Dieser Vorgang erscheint dann grammatisch analog zu der Angabe von Merkmalen. Es scheint, als würde der Melodie eine neue Eigenschaft zugesprochen, während in Wahrheit nur eine Betrachtungsweise auf sich selbst zurückgebogen wird.

Diese Handlungsweise erklärt Wittgenstein damit, dass mit der Bemerkung „diese Melodie sagt sich mir selbst“ hintergründig ein anderes Ziel verfolgt wird, als der Melodie Eigenschaften zuzuordnen:

„Wir gebrauchen die reflexive Form der Rede oft, um Nachdruck auf etwas zu legen. Und in all solchen Fällen können unsere reflexiven Ausdrücke ‚begradigt‘ werden.“ (EPHb II, 249).

Die Form der Aussage „Das ist das“ dient, so Wittgenstein, dazu, Nachdruck auf das „das“ legen (EPHb II, 250). Die „begradigte“ Version von „die Melodie drückt nur sich selbst aus“, die man reflexiv verwendet, um so viel Nachdruck wie möglich auf die Melodie zu legen, wird tatsächlich nicht anders gebraucht, als wenn man sagte: „Diese Melodie ist ungeheuer ausdrucksvoll“ oder „sie ist mir bedeutsam“. Die bogenförmig, rückgebogene reflexive Illusion ist dabei äußerst suggestiv, wie eine ohne diesen Kontext eher rätselhafte, und in der Literatur bisher ausgeklammerte Bemerkung Wittgensteins gegenüber John King unterstreicht:

„Einmal legte ich den zweiten, dritten und vierten Satz von Beethovens Cis-moll-Quartett, op. 131 auf; gespielt wurde er, wenn ich mich nicht irre, von dem Lerner-Quartett. Er [Wittgenstein] hörte sehr gespannt zu, und am Schluß der Aufnahme war er überaus erregt. Er sprang auf, als wäre ihm plötzlich etwas eingefallen, und sagte: ‚Wie leicht kommt man doch auf den Gedanken, man habe begriffen, was Beethoven gerade sagt‘ (hier greif er nach Bleistift und Papier), ‚man denkt, man habe

die Projektion verstanden' (und hier zeichnete er drei Viertel eines Kreises, etwa so:)



„und dann plötzlich' (hier fügte er eine Art Buckel hinzu:)



„merkt man, daß man gar nichts begriffen hat.“ (Rhees 1992, 108f.)

Weil man beim Hören den Eindruck gewinnen kann, „man habe begriffen, was Beethoven gerade sagt“, wird von einer transitiven Bedeutung, also einer Beziehung der Phrase zu etwas ausgegangen – in Wittgensteins Worten: einer Projektion, was nichts anderes ist als eine Abbildung von Parametern einer Sache auf eine andere. Innerhalb dieses Prozesses transitiver Bezugnahme möchte der Hörer gerne den Bezugspunkt der Projektion benennen können und kommt schließlich in einer Art „Schleife“ auf die Phrase selbst zurück. Es entsteht eine reflexive Illusion, die aber nicht aufgeht, wie Wittgenstein in seiner Zeichnung verdeutlicht: Es ergibt sich kein „rundes Bild“.

So gewendet kann Wittgenstein ohne jeden metaphysischen Hintergrund behaupten, „in diesem Sinne muss am Schluss jede Sprache für sich selbst sprechen“ (s.u.). Ausdrucksvolle Musik spricht „für sich selbst“ bzw. der Ausdruck der Musik „zeigt sich“ als Form, die auf komplexe Weise Bestandteil unserer Lebensform ist:

„Wenn man eine bestimmte Auffassung eines Musikstücks rechtfertigen will, und die Frage beantworten, warum man es gerade so gespielt wünscht, ist man versucht, zu sagen: ich verstehe es eben, ich verstehe, was es sagt. Man kommt aber in Verlegenheit, wenn man sagen soll, was es sagt. Man kann dann nur entweder einen Vorgang angeben, dem man das Musikstück vergleicht und der in irgendeinem Sinn den Rhythmus hat, der unserer Auffassung entspricht oder man führt das Musikstück in dem gewünschten Rhythmus vor uns lässt diesen für sich selbst sprechen. Und in diesem Sinne muss am Schluss jede Sprache für sich selbst sprechen.“ (BEE, TS 302.)

Was ist aber mit dem intransitiven Gebrauch anzufangen, wenn der Nachdruck auf das ausdrucksvolle oder bedeutungsvolle der Melodie nicht ausreicht und der reflexive Gebrauch zwar vermieden wird, aber das Ergebnis gerade nicht befriedigt? Wird die Redeweise von „ausdrucksvollen“ Melodien oder Phrasen nicht willkürlich und inhaltsleer? In diesem Fall wäre es aber gleichgültig, wie eine Phrase interpretiert, also gespielt wird:

„Aber wenn du sie spielst, dann spielst du sie doch nicht *irgendwie*, du spielst sie in dieser bestimmten Weise, indem du ein *crescendo* hier bringst, ein *diminuendo* hier, eine Zäsur an dieser Stelle, etc.“ (EPH II, 256f.)

Eine intransitive Formulierung „das Thema ist ausdrucksvoll“ ist deshalb nicht beliebig, sondern im Gegenteil höchst spezifisch, weil es des Hintergrundes einer großen Anzahl an transitiven Vergleichsmomenten einer musikalischen Kultur bedarf, um solche Aussagen treffen zu können.

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# A Note on the History of F. A. von Hayek's Unpublished 'Sketch of a Biography of Ludwig Wittgenstein'

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Friedrich August von Hayek (1899–1992) is best known for his achievements in economics and theory of money which were awarded with the Nobel Prize in 1974. It is less well known that v Hayek was also a cousin once removed of Ludwig Wittgenstein and that he prepared an extensive biographical essay on his distant relative. This essay has not been available for investigation nor has it been described in detail, although McGuinness (1988) refers to it as well as to related correspondence (see also v Wright, 1982) and some anecdotes that it contains have been briefly reviewed (Bayne, 2010). The von Wright and Wittgenstein Archives in Helsinki (WWA, Wallgren and Österman, 2010) keeps three drafts of v Hayek's essay together with correspondence related to its history (table 1). These documents tell a short story of Hayek's envisaged biography and shed light on its sources as well as on the reasons for its eventual abandonment.

It is not a close personal relationship with Wittgenstein that forms the basis of v Hayek's sketch. Indeed they met only a couple of times over the course of 30 years and it does not seem that the conversations between them were particularly serious, be it on philosophy, politics, economics or art (Hayek, 1977). Nevertheless, the encounter with Wittgenstein must have made great impression on v Hayek. In a later publication he remembers that he was first and foremost struck by Wittgenstein's "radical passion for truthfulness" (Hayek, 1992, p.177). Although not the main source of his biographical essay, v Hayek's personal acquaintance with Wittgenstein might therefore well be seen as the spring for the motivation to write a factual account of Wittgenstein's life.

V Hayek structures the writing process of the biographical account in several steps. He starts by gathering recollections and other biographical material from Wittgenstein's friends and colleagues to form an empirical basis for his biography. In a second step he wants to merge the obtained facts and memories into a summarizing document. This document shall, thirdly, be sent out again to friends and colleagues of Wittgenstein to ask for further corrections and remarks.[4] In accordance to this plan v Hayek writes around beginning of 1953 to a great number of possible informants telling his intentions and asking for support.

First responses to v Hayek's enquiries are positive and indeed supporting. Russell, for example, permits on his part the use a full transcript of his correspondence with Wittgenstein [9]; Engelmann provides long recollections of his encounters and sends later samples of handwriting in postcard and letter as well as photographs.[27-29] Not least Ludwig Hänsel is most informative. Apart from his personal recollections he provides further addresses and valuable documents such as Wittgenstein's dictionary, reports on Wittgenstein in his time as teacher, letters from Keynes, Ramsey and Schlick and a curriculum vitae written by Koder and Margarete Stonborough and himself.[19-26,35]

V Hayek learns from his investigations that Georg Henrik von Wright collects material for a biographical ac-

count on Wittgenstein, too.[4,19] In order to find out whether he is undertaking work that has already been done he writes to v Wright.[4] Like the others, v Wright initially reacts positive towards v Hayek's project. He affirms that it would be of great value, if v Hayek could write a short biography providing a correct account and reliable facts about main events in Wittgenstein's life, his character and his views. He also explicates that his own work on a biographical sketch would not render v Hayek's undertaking in any way superfluous.[5]

From this first supportive letter a regular exchange between the v Hayek and v Wright expands during the first half of 1953. In early Mai v Wright sends his then still unpublished biographical sketch to v Hayek who uses it to improve his own sketch.[8,9] And by the end of Mai v Hayek sends in return a first fragment of his sketch, which is then extensively corrected and annotated by v Wright.[1,9]

All in all, v Hayek's project starts very promising. Within a short period of time contact is established with many who knew Wittgenstein in different periods of his lifetime, and the inquiries show a dynamic growth. After only half a year a draft has already been produced covering Wittgenstein's life up to the year 1929. – But already in March 1953 v Hayek has received a letter that communicates a first hint of objection.

On 8<sup>th</sup> March Hänsel writes that he read v Hayek's draft together with Wittgenstein's sister Margaret Stonborough.[20] Indeed v Hayek had also written an enquiry to her. When he had not received answer, he had attributed it to her health.[5,6] But now it rather seems that her reluctance to v Hayek's overall intentions had caused first her silence and then, after having seen a first draft of the essay, an increasing activity to express her averseness. According to Hänsel Mrs. Stonborough was convinced that it is impossible to characterize her brother adequately in the way v Hayek tried to do.[20] In a letter to v Wright she makes clear that she is against any biographical sketch of Wittgenstein written by somebody who did not know him. Anyone who would attempt such a biography would lack seriousness and seriousness it is what Wittgenstein's biography would demand.[31]

Mrs. Stonborough now also answers v Hayek directly. She expresses that she as well as her sister object to Hayek's ambition on the whole. In her opinion Wittgenstein himself would have been angry about it would have done anything to prevent it. The reverence for this attitude would demand silence.[32]

In a reply v Hayek tries to appease Mrs. Stonborough, but he also makes her understand that he will go on writing in any case. Perhaps it was this fact that made her raising the matter again in a letter to v Wright. Roughly one month after mentioning her objection for the first time, she now underlines how deeply she feels about the project and how much she is against it.[32] Simultaneously, v Hayek receives a letter from Hänsel that too contains a message concerning Mrs. Stonborough's sorrows: Hänsel suggests a distanced description in the essay and with little details

from Wittgenstein's personal life; and he asks for permission to pass everything to Wittgenstein's sister before it is published.[22]

At the latest with this letter from Hänsel v Hayek must have been troubled. He now informs on his part v Wright about the affair and spells out his arguments for reassuring Mrs. Stonborough. He explains that he understands her attitude and it is therefore that he wants to collect the empirical material before publishing anything.[10] Perhaps this letter is meant to motivate v Wright to mediate in the case. But v Wright's immediate response to the indirect proposal is either silence, or not documented. The material at WWA shows that the intensity of correspondence between him and v Hayek reduces from now on and that v Wright's letters become more formal in their tone of voice.[11,13] There seems to be not any letter to v Hayek in which he explicitly takes up the conflict between Mrs. Stonborough's demand for silence and the ambition of a biographical account.

Finally, the case is decided in October 1953. In his letter from 13<sup>th</sup> October v. Wright informs v Hayek that the literary executors do not wish to permit extensive quotations from the correspondence with Russell before it is published.[13] Since Hayek's sketch rests fundamentally on quotations from this correspondence publication is thereby impossible for the time being. V Hayek does not seem to give up hoping to resume the biography. However, he sends a second draft including v Wright's first corrections together with a large amount of biographical material to v Wright. He additionally explains that he has no ambitions to compete and that he would be glad to turn over his material if the end would be best served by this.[14] V. Wright seems to be very thankful for the valuable documents and makes further corrections on v Hayek's second draft; although not as many as the first time.[2]

The denial of the permission to use Russell's correspondence is indeed the end of the v Hayek's biography. In 1954 v Wright publishes his biographical sketch which Mrs. Stonborough appreciated very much.[33] Six years later, when Russell's correspondence is still not published, v Hayek finally summarizes what he had written so far and hands it over to Thomas Stonborough together with other biographical material.[3,36] This third draft of the sketch from November 1959 is received by v Wright in 1967, around the time when he started the Wittgenstein Archives.[3] Another ten years later v Hayek publishes his personal recollections on Wittgenstein in a short impressionistic note (Hayek, 1977), a way of expressing remembrance that also Mrs. Stonborough welcomed.[20,33]

This brief episode in the history of caring about Wittgenstein's legacy is not only a historical anecdote; the example can also be viewed in its philosophical or, more precisely, ethical significance. For it is, regarding each actor involved, a story on how to use words with seriousness, sensitivity, integrity. At the bottom of this story of not publishing lays therefore the consideration of what shall and shall not be said, in this case concerning the writing of biographies (cf. McGuinness, 1988, p. xi). In this respect a comparison of a) the primary recollections that v Hayek obtained, b) his unpublished biographical essay and c) v Wright's published sketch would be of high interest. It might show differences between first hand accounts and different ways of abstracting from them when writing more objective reports. Last but not least it would give an indication not only about what v Wright wrote in his biographical sketch, but also whereof he was silent.

Table 1: Documents related to "An unfinished draft of a sketch of a biography of Ludwig Wittgenstein" kept at WWA

No.	Item	Date	Attachments	Pages	
[1]	H1	Fragment of a draft of a biography of LW, without title, carbon typescript	until mai 1953	12 *	
[2]	H2	"Ludwig Wittgenstein", carbon typescript	until october 1953	2 pages carbon typescripts of insertions by vHayek, 1 page comments	31
[3]	H3	"Unfinished draft of a sketch of a biography of Ludwig Wittgenstein" (copy of ) typescript	November 1959		45

*Related correspondence*

No.	Item	Date	Attachments	Pages	
[4]	H-W-1	typescript	1-28-1953	1	
[5]	W-H-1	2 carbon typescripts	2-22-1953	2	
[6]	H-W-2	typescript	2-27-1953	1	
[7]	W-H-2	carbon typescript	3-9-1953	2	
[8]	W-H-3	carbon typescript	5-7-1953	v. Wright's biographical sketch in swedish	1
[9]	H-W-3	typescript	5-30-1953	H1, 1 page comments on v Wright's biographical sketch	2
[10]	H-W-4	handwritten letter	7-2-1953		2
[11]	W-H-4	carbon typescript	7-31-1953		2
[12]	H-W-5	handwritten letter	8-12-1953		1
[13]	W-H-5	carbon typescript	10-13-1953		1
[14]	H-W-6	typescript	10-17-1953	H2, 3 copies of photos (by additional post: copies from Wittgenstein's letters form Ramsey, Keynes and Schlick, dictation to Moore; extracts from Pinsent's diary)	1
[15]	W-H-6	carbon typescript	11-7-1953		1
[16]	W-H-7	carbon typescript	12-9-1953		1
[17]	H-W-7	typescript	12-15-1953		1
[18]	W-H-8	carbon typescript	12-29-1953		1
[19]	Hä-H-1	copy of letter (+ handwritten duplicate)	1-28-1953	3 pages Wittgenstein's curriculum vitae	3
[20]	Hä-H-2	copy of letter	3-8-1953		2
[21]	Hä-H-3	copy of letter	5-16-1953		1*
[22]	Hä-H-4	copy of letter	6-25-1953	W.'s correspondence with Ramsey and Keynes (11 items); Schlick (5 items)	2
[23]	Hä-H-5	copy of letter	7-5-1953		2
[24]	Hä-H-6	copy of letter	7-7-1953	"Wörterbuch" by Wittgenstein, corrections, correspondence and contract with publisher	2
[25]	Hä-H-7	copy of letter	7-20-1953	4 pages recollection of J. Putre	2
[26]	Hä-H-8	copy of letter (+ 1page handwritten duplicate)	9-19-1953		1
[27]	E-H-4	copy of letter	6-12-1953		3
[28]	E-H-3	copy of letter	4-23-1953	Feldpostkarte, Brief by Wittgenstein	3
[29]	E-H-2	copy of letter	3-8-1953		5
[30]	E-H-1	copy of letter	2-16-1953		3
[31]	S-W-1	handwritten letter	5-1-1953		4
[32]	S-W-2	handwritten letter	6-12-1953	1 page duplicate of a letter to v. Hayek 1 page beginning of a letter to vWright	4
[33]	S-W-3	handwritten letter	11-30-1953		3
[34]	F-H-1	copy of letter (and handwritten duplicate)	12-4-1953		2
[35]	Suppl. 1	Reports on Wittgensteins as teacher, photocopies of typescript	5-7-1953, 3-27-1953, 3-22-1953, 4-17-1953	4 pages by J.Putre, 1 page by M. Scherleitner, 1 page by N. Rosner, 2 pages by G. Berger	9
[36]	Suppl. 2	fotocopy of typescript	November 1959	List of items sent from F.A.v.Hayek to T. Stonborough,	1

H = F.A. v Hayek, W = G. H. v. Wright, Hä = L. Hänsel, F = L. Ficker, E = P. Engelmann, S = M. Stonborough, Suppl. = supplementary item, \* = incomplete item

*F.A. v. Hayek's drafts*

### Acknowledgments

This paper has been made possible by the project "Joint Nordic Use of WAB Bergen and VWA Helsinki (JNU VWAB)" funded by Nordforsk. I am very thankful for comments from Allan Janik, Bernt Österman, Alois Pichler and Thomas Wallgren.

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# Saying and Showing in Art. The Ethical Moment in Aesthetics. Egon Schiele's Works in Prison as a Sample Case.

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Wittgenstein proposed that there was a fundamental difference between what can and what cannot be said in the last propositions of the *Tractatus* (Wittgenstein 1980a). He considered all attempts to go beyond the limits of language as preposterous and foolish. There is an insuperable abyss between what can be *said* and what can only be *shown*, given that the former is the world and the latter something else. We want to make a case that Schiele's oeuvre *shows* as well as *says* in a parallel sense to that established by Wittgenstein. In art (when it remains silent enough, when it does not preach) *what is shown* is inseparable from *the way in which it is shown*. The use the painter made of his pictorial resources is able to communicate specific contents, as propositions show their meaning and Tolstoi's tales offer moral examples to follow.

There are paintings in which the domain of the limits of the pictorial language in question is bordered or even invaded. Images can also take part in talkativeness. Sometimes the signs used to communicate the desired message are too explicit, like when contemporary art has tried to address the so-called Islamic terrorism by putting together a rifle and a woman wearing a *burkha*. Baudrillard has labelled contemporary art's tendency to hyperrealism as pornographic (Baudrillard, 1979). We agree with him that pornography is an excess of reality. In the case of sexual pornography (the easiest to recognize as such) the complete transparency of the sexual act is aimed at: it is *said* more about reality than what reality itself *says* about itself. In order to not fall for pornography, reality's secrets have to be kept. Although most of Schiele's art is silent enough to keep its distance from pornography, there are a few cases which very obviously fit Baudrillard's definition, as *Self-Portrait in Black Cloak, Masturbating* (Fig. 1).

In order to face subtler cases, we will focus on the relationship between language games and artistic programmes. Let's remember what Wittgenstein said about Frege's idea that all assertion implies a supposition: the expression "such and such is the case" is not a sentence in our language; it is not a possible move in the language game (Wittgenstein, 1980b, §22). In a language game there are moves which are possible and others which are not. Taken into account that meaning of words are in their use and that words are used in specific language games framed in a form of life, the use (and the resulting meaning) of words is not independent of the language game where it takes place. Each language game generates its sphere of possible moves, delimiting the scope of the sayable (Hagberg, 1994, p. 21). We are able to tell who painted a painting we see for the first time because we recognize in it some of the moves which are typical of the language game of that particular artist. However, if the artist does not respect the limits established by his own artistic practice, the domain of the unsayable is entered. Those moves are not part of his language. They are empty, superfluous. Repetition may have the same effect. Saying the same time and again can lead us to the transgression of the limits of the game. This is much of what takes place in the pornographic image and what we will discover in Schiele's self-portraits in prison.

Schiele's self-portraits were the ones that more often took him to the waters of *saying more than what can be said*. Introspection involves being more aware of ourselves and our relationship with the outside world than usual. Schiele probably tried to be impossibly alert and forced himself and the situation, so that, instead of listening, he ended up mumbling the unsayable. He subordinated the *depth grammar* of his pictorial language to its *surface-grammar*. For instance, he made his figures wear a habit in the cases in which he tried to portray their spiritual character. However, this does not always convince us. He tried to impose a facile definition (a picture, in the jargon of the *Philosophische Untersuchungen*) on his pictorial language. Sometimes a particular element, far from being there for the good of the composition, uses the composition as an excuse to show off. Those paintings do not surprise us. On the contrary, those pieces in which that to be communicated is *shown* by pictorial resources truly surprise us.

Just as Wittgenstein thought that those books of Tolstoi in which he expressed what life meant to him were less representative of the true character of the Russian and those in which he focused on something else are the ones that better portray where the meaning of life lay according to him, we believe that when Schiele aimed at portraying the core of life, himself or the spiritual his worldview is portrayed poorly. When representation is subordinated to an image, representation and content do not merge. And it is precisely in those paintings in which he freed his grammar from his own linguistic tangles in which he *showed* what he did not manage to express in the above-mentioned cases. The painter managed to stay within the field of *showing* when he respected his paintings' syntax and was in the ranks of *saying* too much when he subordinated his syntax to external elements. We propose that the comparative study of the cases in which Schiele was in between both shores and of those in which he did not stagger illustrates wonderfully the nature and complexity of the problem that worried Wittgenstein so much.

We will differentiate between those images which do not keep the right balance between *saying* and silence and those which are able to be silent. We will be comparing still-lives and self-portraits he did while in prison. Let's pay attention to the former. In *The Door to the Open* (1912, Vienna, Albertina) and in *I Feel Not Punished but Cleansed!* (Fig. 2) all the elements in the composition are treated equally. The same importance is given to all of them. The shortage of colour is likely to puzzle us. Colour has been applied in only a few objects. However, the application of colour pays attention to the composition as a whole and not to particular objects. The colour dots are like a few charming notes in a musical composition. For instance, in the second drawing, colour focuses on the qualities of the corridor (the whole). Its depth is underlined by the blue colour applied in the lower part of the wall. It is not coincidental that the longest broom (the one which calls our attention the most, due to the suggestive display of the bristles of its brush and because the other ones (shorter) get together around it like good disciples) touches

the ground and one of the beams in the ceiling, like if it was supporting the structure of the building. Other coloured elements also call our attention on the height: three thin brown segments whose role is unclear to us and that lamp so close to the ceiling. The up-side-down baskets which are on the floor just around the brooms also enjoy a colour strip. Apart from contributing to the base of the tallest broom, the baskets support the ground, the lowest point of that highlighted height.

Schiele paid special attention to chairs while in prison. He depicted them as entities, free from the seated ones. Let's observe the precision of Schiele's pictorial language in *Art Cannot Be Modern; Art Is Primordially Eternal* (Fig. 3), *Two of My Handkerchiefs* (Fig. 4) and *Organic Movement of Chair and Pitcher* (Fig. 5). The drawings could not be simpler. There is nothing extra or missing. The background is, at its most, a plane. For instance, in *Organic Movement of Chair and Pitcher* (Fig. 5) one cannot talk about it as a supporting surface, given that the chair and the jar do not clearly indicate its direction. How far they are from the talkativeness of *Self-Portrait in Black Cloak, Masturbating* (Fig. 1)! Let's pay attention to the way in which the objects are displayed: it is impossible for us to hold them. They are not there to be used by us, but for themselves. If in the last one (Fig. 5) both the chair and the pitcher are far from us and in complicated perspectives (the handle of the pitcher is not offered to us), in the first one (Fig. 3) chairs turn their back to us. The chairs in *Two of My Handkerchiefs* (Fig. 4) are not there for us either, but for the handkerchiefs.

It was in the self-portraits where it was more difficult for Schiele to be silent. His portraits as a prisoner do not focus on the display (the representation), but on his condition (the content). There is a clear message: that is how you misbehave with artists, the crucified ones. That is what we find in the titles he gave to these drawings (which he inscribed on the paper itself) and in those poems by him which turn around the figure of the artist. Let's take a look at *Hindering the Artist Is a crime, It Is Murdering Life in the Bud* (Fig. 6). In his self-portraits in prison Schiele was not satisfied with the effect of his pictorial grammar and took pleasure in stressing his emaciated look (what he aimed at communicating). To do this, pictorial language was not enough (pornographic in itself in this case since it is too explicit), so he kept going on about it by making use of verbal language.

Schiele was not able to relate with the same distance to his very condition than to the objects surrounding him. To see an object *sub specie aeternitatis* is one thing; to see the world *sub specie aeternitatis* requires a step further: one has to move from the artistic sphere to the ethical one. He was able to look at what surrounded him without getting closer to one object or another, taking the world as a totality. We discovered a world of equivalences in *I Feel not Punished but Cleansed!* (Fig. 2). If in this drawing the artist was in tune with the world, that was not the case in the self-portrait mentioned above (Fig. 6). In the latter the artist was so affected by his circumstances that he was not able to distance himself enough (what is obvious from its title).

In the cases in which the painter said too much, he was not able to distance himself enough from the world. We find different examples throughout his oeuvre. In those works labelled as pornographic, he was not able to distance himself from his own sexual condition (Fig. 1). He was so trapped that he fell for the most explicit representations of self-love. But form and content meet in those cases in which he was freer from his own intentions, as in

so many drawings in which he focused on a specific posture or in his landscapes and still-lives.

The fact that Schiele was able to take the view from eternity to depict objects but not to depict himself in the same moment of his life points towards a difference between ethics and aesthetics. We believe that there is a step between the two. It was easier for the artist to take the aesthetic perspective than the ethical one. The object one ought to distance oneself from while looking at the world is oneself. In the works in which Schiele said too much, he was not able to change his perspective and stayed within his circumstances. This does not contradict Wittgenstein's views. We should remember that proposition 6.421 of the *Tractatus* is not a strict identification between ethics and aesthetics.

We believe that it is helpful to speak of an interaction of relationships between the two (Barrett, 1984, pp. 17-22). Janik explains that one must talk of an ethical moment in aesthetics and of an aesthetic moment in ethics (Janik, 2007, pp. 11-19). We are interested in the ethical moment in aesthetics. In order to take the work of art as it is, the viewer has to free himself from the world. The work of art invites us to the dimension of eternity, and it is in our hands to take that perspective or not. That involves a renunciation. Furthermore, the artist's gaze is also involved. In order to let one's artistic grammar *show* whatever it has to show, an artist has to renounce his own will and take the view from eternity. We could say that the ethical moment in aesthetics is not fulfilled those times, and maybe we should not be talking of art itself in relation to those works, but of works of art in potency, as Janik suggests. The more involved one is in the subject-matter, the more difficult it becomes to leave space for the ethical moment. That was precisely Schiele's case while in prison or in those canvases where he wanted to communicate the things most important to him.

## Illustrations



Fig. 1, *Self-Portrait in Black Cloak, Masturbating*, 1911. Gouache, watercolor and pencil, 48 x 32.1 cm, Vienna, Graphische Sammlung Albertina, inv. 31159. (Graphische Sammlung Albertina.)



Fig. 2, *I Feel Not Punished but Cleansed!*, 1912. Gouache, watercolour and pencil, 48.4 x 31.6 cm, Vienna, Graphische Sammlung Albertina, inv. 31025. (Graphische Sammlung Albertina.)



Fig. 4, *Two of my Handkerchiefs*, 1912. Watercolour and pencil, 48.2 x 31.7 cm, Vienna, Graphische Sammlung Albertina, inv. 31029. (Graphische Sammlung Albertina.)



Fig. 3, *Art Cannot Be Modern; Art Is Primordially Eternal*, 1912. Gouache, watercolour and pencil, 32 x 48.3 cm, Vienna, Graphische Sammlung Albertina, inv. 31031. (Graphische Sammlung Albertina.)



Fig. 5, *Organic Movement of Chair and Pitcher*, 1912. Watercolour and pencil, 31.8 x 48 cm, Vienna, Graphische Sammlung Albertina, inv. 31030. (Graphische Sammlung Albertina.)




Fig. 6, *Hindering the Artist Is a crime, It Is Murdering Life in the Bud*, 1912. Watercolour and pencil, 48.6 x 31.8 cm, Vienna, Graphische Sammlung Albertina, inv. 31162. (Graphische Sammlung Albertina.)

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# Hume's Problem, Occam's Razor, and Wittgenstein's Standpoint of Common Sense

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## 1. Introduction

This paper aims at a rather simple and general version of a pragmatic dissolution of Hume's (1777) problem(s) of induction. (Singular or plural, depending on whether or not the problem of generalization is separated from the problem about the future; cf. Hacking 2006:176). It can be shown that this dissolution is justifiable in terms of Occam's principle of parsimony and that it is arguably in line with Wittgenstein's "standpoint of common sense".

Kripke points out some analogies between Wittgenstein's "scepticism about the determination of future usage by the past contents" of mind and Hume's "scepticism about the determination of the future by the past (causally and inferentially)", and further analogies regarding these authors' convictions that the "paradox can be resolved only by a 'sceptical solution of these doubts', in Hume's classical sense." (Kripke 1982: 107f). But a "sceptical solution of a sceptical philosophical problem", says Kripke, begins by conceding that the sceptical argument is unanswerable. "Nevertheless our ordinary practice or believe is justified because [...] it need not require the justification the sceptic has shown to be untenable." (Kripke 1982:66) Furthermore he compares Wittgenstein's appeal for "common sense" with Hume's "strain, dominant in some of his moods", not to question ordinary beliefs (p.63). But he admits that Wittgenstein was most concerned to attack Humean ideas and that he most probably would not accept the label "sceptic".

Stern (1995) also extensively discusses Wittgenstein's standpoint of "common sense" and of "healthy human understanding" (p.28) and recalls "Hume's inclination to dispel scepticism by returning to social life". But he is even more decided than Kripke regarding the differences between Hume and Wittgenstein: "As in the *Tractatus* and the early 1930s, Wittgenstein holds that what a sceptic or idealist wants to say is, strictly speaking, senseless." (Stern 1995: 25)

Concerning such senseless constructions, Wittgenstein wants to teach us "to pass from a piece of disguised nonsense to something that is patent nonsense" (2006, § 464), or, in an older edition, "to turn a piece of unclear nonsense into clear nonsense". But how to turn Hume's problem into a piece of clear nonsense?

Starting point of our attempts (in Section 2) are Hume's sceptical arguments – preferably in his own words because of some critical remarks regarding his sophisticated formulations that seem to camouflage a problem of his problem, i.e., the principle of the asymmetry in our opportunities to experience. In Section 3 follows the main attack on Hume's sceptical argument, actually a "reversal" of his arguments that can be justified in terms of Occam's razor. In the Discussion (Section 4) the results are related to other pragmatic dissolutions of Hume's problem and to the question whether the development of the knowledge inherent in "common sense", "healthy human understanding", and "ordinary language" was again guided by the principle of parsimony.

## 2. Hume's sceptical arguments and some inconsistencies

The core of Hume's problem in Hume's (1777) own words:

"If there be any suspicion, that the course of nature may change, and that the past may be no rule for the future, all experience becomes useless, and can give rise to no inference or conclusion. It is impossible, therefore, that any arguments from experience can prove this resemblance of the past to the future; since all these arguments are founded on the supposition of that resemblance. Let the course of things be allowed hitherto ever so regular; that alone, without some new argument or inference, proves not, that, for the future, it will continue so." (Hume 1993: 24).

To anticipate my personal answer (in Section 3) to his last argument: "Without some new argument or inference" it is vain to speculate that it would *not* continue so!

But let me start with an "internal" inconsistency. The term "suspicion" in the first sentence in Hume's paragraph can not really denote a suspicion or doubt inferred from concrete arguments or events. *This is because assuming that a certain cause or event could possibly indicate a change in "the course of nature" or in "the course of things" would presuppose the validity of the very same inductive principles questioned by Hume.* This problem is camouflaged by the word "therefore" (embedded in the second sentence quoted above) which does not refer to any possible reason for questioning the future success of inductive reasoning. It insinuates a deductive inference although there is nothing but a paraphrase of the preceding sceptical statements regarding the predictability of our world and the possibility of a rational foundation of inductive inference.

But so far, our principles of induction are successful, and predictive success is still improving, even in meteorology and psychology. We detect more and more of the redundancy in the organism, its environment, and in the interactions between organism and environment. Such arguments concerning "practical" success in science or in everyday life are anticipated – and rejected – by Hume (1993: 24). As an agent he claims being quite satisfied in that point; but as a philosopher he wants "to learn the foundation of this inference":

"It is certain, that the most ignorant and stupid peasants, nay infants, nay even brute beasts, improve by experience, and learn the qualities of natural objects, by observing the effects, which result from them. When a child has felt the sensation of pain from touching the flame of a candle, he will be careful not to put his hand near any candle; but will expect a similar effect from a cause, which is similar in its sensible qualities and appearance. If you assert, therefore, that the understanding of the child is led into this conclusion by any process of argument or ratiocination, I may justly require you to produce that argument" (Hume 1993: 25).

He anticipates that we would not be able to produce that argument and must, after all, "confess, that it is not reasoning which engages us to suppose the past resembling the future, and to expect similar effects from causes, which are, to appearance, similar." (Hume 1993: 25). If it is not reasoning, he says in the next section, then there must be "some other principle" guiding this kind of behavior and thinking:

"This principle is Custom or Habit. /.../ This hypothesis seems even the only one, which explains the difficulty, why we draw, from a thousand instances, an inference, which we are not able to draw from one instance, that is, in no respect, different from them. /.../ But no man, having seen only one body move after being impelled by another, could infer, that every other body will move after a like impulse." (Hume 1993: 28).

Another internal inconsistency? Hume's example of the child experiencing the heat of the flame is (meanwhile) accepted as a typical instance of learning from the first such experience, i.e., from only one, though very impressive, coincidence of a fascinating visual sensation with a painful sensation. Hume's first mention of that example (p. 25) is well compatible with such a learning from the first experience. But now, in the context of "Custom or Habit" (p. 28), there is talk about a "constant conjunction of two objects, heat and flame", and of inferences drawn "from a thousand instances /.../ which we are not able to draw from one instance". These arguments on p. 28 are at least more restrictive than those on p. 25, and they are clearly inconsistent with empirical facts, i.e., at any rate a case of "external" inconsistency: Learning from only one experience is also functional in those "brute beasts" mentioned by Hume (p.25). If, for instance, a rat gets an intestinal illness within a few hours after drinking and/or eating something, the rat will avoid anything with a similar smell in the future (cf. Garcia et al. 1966). Cases of learning from one experience may be rather exceptional and be restricted to situations endangering the organism's health. But in the face of such cases we cannot simply reduce learning to custom and habit.

### 3. Shaving off Hume's problem with Occam's razor

Hume argues, as quoted above, that a hitherto ever so regular course of nature alone, "without some new argument or inference", does not prove that "it will continue so". Let me contrast that with what I consider to be a dissolution of Hume's problem: "Without some new argument or inference" it is vain to speculate that the course of nature would *not* continue so. Apart from Hume's problem and in search for a simple and general principle „that is applicable to all kinds of reasoning under uncertainty, including inductive inference“ (Grünwald 2000: 133), a corresponding prescription was suggested elsewhere (Fenk 2008: 90): "Do without the assumption of a change as long as you can't make out any indication or reason for such an assumption!"

This objection is an application of Occam's razor: *It is vain to do with more what can be done with fewer. Or: Entities are not to be multiplied beyond necessity.* This principle of parsimony, also known as the virtue of economy or elegance, is a widely accepted criterion in the philosophy of science. Kelly describes it as a heuristic principle that keeps us on the straightest "path to the truth" (Kelly 2007 and "under review"). Laszlo (1972) suggests applying such criteria not only to the sciences, but also to "metaphysical theories". Their selfpreferential application to those meta-theories that have invented such criteria is also

in line with the demand of a fully "reflexive" theory, i.e., a theory that has, in the words of Giere (1985: 95), "itself as an instance".

If Occam's razor represents a rational heuristic principle, and if this principle also applies to epistemological questions, then the simple prescription suggested above is at the same time a rational and simple answer to Hume, i.e., a pragmatic dissolution that can be justified by using Occam's razor. Such a justification might apply to other pragmatic dissolutions as well. For instance the one outlined in Reichenbach (1938): "Hume demanded too much when he wanted for a justification of the inductive inference a proof that its conclusion is true." (p. 356). He also thinks that Hume had put his problem the wrong way:

"Hume believed that a justification of induction could not be given because *we do not know whether we shall have success*; the correct formulation, instead, would read that a justification of induction could not be given if *we knew that we should have no success.*" (Reichenbach 1938: 362).

A justification of that dissolution by using Occam's razor would also mean a refutation of Salmon's (1966: 53, 89) criticism of Reichenbach's approach.

### 4. Discussion

The way Hume puts his problem can be viewed as an attempt to conceal that what he demands is an unreasonable reversal of the burden of proof. "Unreasonable" because of a principle that I call the *asymmetry in our opportunities to experience*, i.e., an asymmetry in favor of positive effects and regularities. All our knowledge and assumptions imply the positive existence of regularity and redundancy, and never the absence of redundancy. Because all our nomological, though principally hypothetical prior knowledge was induced by positive effects. Analogously, our statisticians' 0-hypothesis is nothing more than an artificial foil used to contrast with the positive finding. While the assumption of a positive effect can, with some reservation, be corroborated in a finite set of data, there is principally no equivalent possibility for a proof of the 0-hypothesis, for a demonstration of randomness, i.e., of the *absence* of any regularity and redundancy (Fenk 1992).

Our world as we know is not a world of isolated regularities. As cognitive subjects we are part of a system whose regularities are more or less directly interconnected, thus allowing for instance abductive inferences as well as "hypothetico-deductive inferences", but rendering it definitely impossible for one single law to change or disappear. And if such a regularity disappeared without "affecting" other regularities and the whole "course of nature", then we would – if we survived that change at all – still not recognize an event corresponding to Hume's scepticism but would try to explain the changes observed by new and/or higher-order regularities.

The mechanisms underlying the detection of a connection between two different sensations are phylogenetically old and are widespread in the recent world of organisms. They must have been, and certainly still are, a powerful selective advantage, because biological selection does not permit luxurious mechanisms. Occam's razor also in "phylogenetic learning"? Such mechanisms could, however, develop only in a world that allows some redundancy to be extracted! One may compare the natural selection of genes with the "natural selection of memes" (Dennett 2009) and assume that both these developmental processes are guided by economy principles. This would

mean that the development of all the knowledge inherent in "common sense", in a "healthy human understanding", and in "ordinary language" is guided by Occam's razor. And with regard to (Humean) scepticism it would explain the convergence of the "sceptical" arguments of cognitive science (e.g. Dennett 2009), of Wittgenstein's common sense philosophy, and of several pragmatic dissolutions of Hume's problem.

The arguments in Reichenbach and in the present paper amount to a simple "re-reversal" of Hume's unreasonable reversal of the burden of proof. This re-reversal hopefully is a case of what Wittgenstein calls a transformation "of unclear nonsense into clear nonsense".

"Und so sieht die Lösung aller philosophischen Schwierigkeiten aus. Unsere Antworten müssen, wenn sie richtig sind, gewöhnliche und triviale sein. – Denn diese machen sich gleichsam über die Fragen lustig." (Wittgenstein 1979, § 111)

#### Endnotes

<sup>1</sup> Interestingly, in the article "under review at *Synthese*", dated December 2, 2008 (downloaded December 8, 2009), Hume or Hume's problem respectively appears only in the title and nowhere else in the text.

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# Imagining Scientific Objects as a Bridge Between Metaphysics and Science

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Scientific imagination is a sophisticated and controlled reverie, but not an illusion. We define “metaphysics” as a type of background thinking about the categories and principles of reality. Husserl said, in the *Logische Untersuchungen*, that “as distinctive mark of reality (*Realität*) is enough for us the temporality (*Zeitlichkeit*)” (Husserl 1968, 123). In this sense, reality includes temporality. On the one hand, metaphysics is a subset of ontology as the general theory of objects, as including not only real or actual objects, but also ideal, fictional or imaginary objects. On the other hand, empirical sciences aim to access to reality. The way to do this is through phenomena. These are real things perceived according to certain parameters imposed by a scientific observer. What does “real” mean for a scientist? In 1957, Wolfgang Pauli wrote: “That which we come upon, which is beyond our power of choice, and with which we have to reckon, is what we designate as real” (Pauli 1994, 128).

In turn, access to these phenomena is through theories, laws and observation data obtained with scientific instruments. Properly speaking, these phenomena are intelligible insofar as we have theories containing rational and order principles. Nevertheless, laws can be conceived not only as mere regularities of observation data, but also as idealizations that contain ideal objects: e.g. the ideal gas in the Boyle-Mariotte’s law, the ideal conditions concerning free fall in Galileo’s law. Scientific theories are general structures that need to be connected to some phenomena. These phenomena are the domain (model in the mathematical sense) in which those theories are true. For example, the planets of the solar system are a domain in which Newton’s theory of gravitation is true. If we appeal to this theory to understand all the characteristics of the forces governing the motion of electrons in an atom, we fail. If we consider theories purely as theories, they are networks of logical and mathematical structures. The mathematical concept of *group* applies both to the Galileo’s group of classical mechanics and to the Lorentz’s group of special theory of relativity. Nevertheless, as Pauli says, “it seems to me probable that the range of application of the mathematical group concept in physics has not yet been exhausted today” (Pauli 1994, 130). Therefore, to appeal to mathematics entails an ontology of ideal objects at work: functions, groups, geometries, complex numbers, matrices; etc.

But we need to take a new step: the connection with phenomena needs fictional objects concerning scientific imagination. For example, the enlargement of the hydrostatics and of the hydrodynamics needed a new object in Torricelli’s imagination: an air sea. And Leverrier’s hypothesis of Uranus’ anomalies also required a new object: Neptune. Wolfgang Pauli first imagined the neutrino in beta disintegration. But not all of these objects survive: e.g. Vulcan in Leverrier’s hypothesis about Mercury’s perihelion, ether, phlogiston; etc.

The scientific imagination is a special procedure that satisfies this need by means of metaphors, analogies, models and reductions. Firstly, metaphor identifies two heterogeneous objects. For instance, the air and the sea in

Torricelli – both are objects of perception, but the air as a sea is an object of imagination –; the planetary system as metaphor of the atom ; the computer as metaphor of the brain; and the clock as metaphor of the world; the pump as metaphor of the heart. Nevertheless, metaphor is yet vague imagination. The schema is:

A is similar to B

All A is C

(We know scientifically that A has certain properties C)

Therefore, all B is C.

Secondly, it compares objects and takes into account the explicit relationships of analogy between them. For instance, we have Faraday’s comparison between stressing a body, which affects the transmission of light (Brewster’s experiment), on the one hand, and electrifying it, which produces the same effect, on the other. We have also Young’s analogy between colours and sounds with respect to light as a wave. Or we have the Enrico Fermi’s analogy between the collision of slow electrons with the atom and the collision of slow neutrons with the nucleus. The schema is: A is to B, as C is to D.

Thirdly, scientific imagination yields models. We do not speak about the mathematical sense of a model: “In the mathematical sense, *models* are models of structures, and a model of a structure of a given species is any set endowed with structural features satisfying the requirements of that species (Torretti 1990, 306). We speak about a kind of pictorial representation of phenomena. In this sense, a model is an image (pictogram, diagram; etc.) that simplifies a phenomenon, defining a scale about it and controlling it by mathematical prediction. For example, the double helix model in the case of deoxyribonucleic acid (DNA), the seismological model concerning strain and subduction of tectonic plates, the pilot wave picture, the Feynman’s diagram. A classical example of a model is the moon as a perfect sphere. Being a geometrical model, we can predict its behaviour by an equation. Nevertheless Galileo has changed this representation. He imagined the moon as an irregular sphere in a space crossed by light and endowed with perspective (see G. Holton). Nowadays, after Mandelbrot, we can make a fractal model of the moon.

Fourth, the reduction as an imaginary procedure. Schwann imagined that a biological structure like a cell could be conceived as an atom endowed with physical and chemical properties. Ferdinand de Saussure has reduced language to its synchronie and he has eliminated methodologically its diachrony. As an application of Von Bertalanffy’s theory of systems, N. Luhmann reduces a complex phenomenon such as society to a system. The biological process of nutrition can be understood as enzyme changes and, in its turn, these one as energy processes. At the end, there are equations to govern them. The broadest reduction is mathematical reduction: nature should be understood in mathematical terms (Pythagoras, Galileo). The imagination concerning this mathematical



reduction has been fruitful. For instance, Euclidean geometry is exact with a margin of error less than the diameter of a hydrogen atom within the range of 1 meter (R. Penrose).

Fictional objects are established according to certain rules. For example, if "water" is replaced by "H<sub>2</sub>O", then we should first take into account only the *cognitive* structure in chemistry. That is to say, the deontic, symptomatic or aesthetic aspects of the image concerning "water" are excluded: this is firstly the rule of abstraction. For instance, see the meticulousness of Robert Hooke's drawing about a flea (Barrow 2008). Secondly, H<sub>2</sub>O as a new object is a combination of pure entities (H, O). More precisely, as a molecule it is a combination of atoms. In the case of living body, we can conceive it as a combination of cells. In linguistics, a sentence can be understood as a combination of phonemes, or morphemes. Therefore, there is a rule of combination. Thirdly, these new objects are imagined by taking some properties to the limit, that is to say, it is the case of the rule of idealization. For instance, in Newton's laws of motion of a solid body, we assume it to be quite rigid; or in the law of elasticity, it is assumed to be deformed in a perfectly reversible and linear manner.

My point is that these fictional objects constitute the horizon for the phenomena and they are linked with metaphysics concerning the sense of the reality of phenomena. From the phenomenal standpoint, an electron is only a trace on a photograph or a tiny flash on the screen, from the imaginary point of view, it doesn't exist in a real world, but it does exist in a broader sense on a map about fictional objects. These objects survive by a selection process concerning empirical verification and refutation, but also by their connection with metaphysics. Metaphysics can help firstly with the analysis of the concept of reality. For instance, is the reference to a sensation, as Mach claimed, the criterion of reality? "Atoms cannot be perceived by the senses; like all substances they are things of the thought. [...] The atomic theory plays a part in physics similar to that of certain auxiliary concepts in mathematics; it is a mathematical *model* for facilitating the mental reproduction of the facts" (Mach 1960, 588-589). Mach's assertions are extra-scientific, because they cannot be demonstrated by science, e.g. statistically. And metaphysics can help secondly by discussing the sense in which some principles of scientific research are merely useful or are grounded upon reality.

Let us review some of these principles:

1) Simplicity. Leibniz says about it: "Pour ce qui est de la simplicité des voies de Dieu, elle a lieu proprement à l'égard des moyens, comme, au contraire, la variété, richesse ou abondance y a lieu à l'égard des fins ou effets" (Leibniz 1967, 32). And he adds "car la raison veut qu'on évite la multiplicité dans les hypothèses ou principes, à peu près comme le système le plus simple est toujours préféré en astronomie" (Leibniz 1967,32). 2) Symmetry as a criterion for choosing hypotheses about phenomena. Is reality symmetrical? 3) Harmony. In what sense, do the triads of whole numbers relations govern the atomic world? A. Sommerfeld has written, in the spirit of Kepler, about the quantum theory: "It is the mysterious organon on which Nature plays her music of the spectra and according to the rhythm of which she regulates the structure of the atoms and the nuclei" (Sommerfeld 1923, Preface). 4) Order, that is to say, reality without order makes impossible scientific research. What kind of order is related to reality? However, the order underlying chaos theory is quite different from the order underlying Newtonian theory of gravity. 5) Duality.

Could reality be coupled in pairs (wave/corpuscle, position/velocity, and so on)? If we consider the duality substance/accident (see, for example, the Aristotelian or Kantian distinction), it doesn't necessarily hold true. John Bell says: "In the case of the waves of wave mechanics we have no idea what is waving... and we do not ask the question" (Bell 1989, 361). 6) Consistency. Metaphysics should take account of the extent of the principle of non-contradiction concerning reality. Kant did not accept the contradiction in the domain of thinking (denken), nevertheless Husserl accepted it in the domain of the sense: see the concept of countersense (Widersinn). With respect to N. Bohr, John Bell's interpretation is the following: "By 'complementarity' he meant, it seems to me, the reverse: contradictoriness" (Bell 1989, 363). Today we even have paraconsistent logic for it.

Notwithstanding, one difficulty for metaphysics in regard to its understanding of physics is that the philosopher is related to the ordinary experience and we don't know if the familiar notions of space, time and causality will work: "We have no right to a clear picture of what goes on at the atomic level" (Bell 1989, 362). Moreover, there is another difficulty: the quantum theoretic account of the electron gun could include the scintillation screen, the photographic film, the developing chemicals, and then the eye of the observer and, why not, his brain. And this leads us to a metaphysical problem raised by Descartes: is our mind included in this account?, is our mind quite different from our brain? (the distinction between *res cogitans* and *res extensa*)

My point is that scientific imagination builds a map of possible worlds with the objects implied by hypotheses. The problem is how to choose among these objects. The solution concerns not only the experiments or the theories, but also the connection of the new objects with metaphysical reflection about certain rational principles for understanding reality, that is to say, simplicity, symmetry, harmony, order, duality, consistency.

### Acknowledgments

This paper was written as Professor of the Faculty of Philosophy of the Pontificia Universidad Católica de Chile. I am grateful to Prof. Carlos Friedli (Faculty of Physics) for his discussions and suggestions.

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# Das Problem der Anwendung bei Gadamer und Wittgenstein

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1.

In seinem Aufsatz *Wittgenstein und das Problem des hermeneutischen Verstehens* versucht Karl Otto Apel eine Beziehung zwischen der Problematik des hermeneutischen Verstehens und der in der sprachanalytischen Philosophie zentralen Problematik des Verstehens von Sinn herzustellen (Apel 1966). Vor diesem Hintergrund untersucht Apel die philosophische Verwendung der Termini »Verstehen« und »Sinn«, die sowohl in der hermeneutischen Tradition wie auch in der Philosophie des frühen und späten Wittgensteins im Brennpunkt des Interesses stehen.

Apel stellt in Hinblick auf den *Tractatus* fest, dass die Problematik des hermeneutischen Verstehens in der frühen Phase gar nicht auftaucht, weil die weltkonstitutiven Sachverhalte durch die logische Form der Sprache abgebildet werden können und die konkreten menschlichen Subjekte auf diese Weise immer schon über die Strukturen der Welt miteinander verständigt sind. Mit der Einführung der Sprachspielkonzeption in den *Philosophischen Untersuchungen* ändert sich hingegen auch das philosophische Verhältnis zum hermeneutischen Problem. Nach Apel stelle sich nun die Frage nach dem Wesen *hermeneutischer* Sprachspiele. Interessanterweise notiert Apel an dieser Stelle in einer Fußnote, dass sich seiner Auffassung nach hinsichtlich der *Anwendung* hermeneutischen Verstehens die Möglichkeit einer Verbindung der »Sprachspiel-»Theorie« mit der philosophischen Hermeneutik von Hans-Georg Gadamer ergäbe (Apel 1966, S. 80, Fn 41).

Ich möchte im Folgenden den Gedanken einer Konvergenz Gadamers und Wittgensteins in Hinblick auf das Problem der Anwendung aufgreifen. Das Problem scheint mir ebenso in der Frage der Applikation hermeneutischen Verstehens verortet zu sein, wie auch in der Frage der Sprachanwendung, wie sie sich von der Sprachspielkonzeption des späten Wittgensteins her stellt. Darüber hinaus zeigt Gadamer mit seinem Rückgriff auf die aristotelische Ethik einen weiteren Topos auf, der die Konkretisierung ethischen Handelns betrifft. Um die Verbindungslinien zu analysieren, werde ich zunächst skizzieren, wie das Problem der Anwendung von Gadamer/Aristoteles her zu verstehen ist. In einem zweiten Schritt werde ich dieses Verständnis mit Wittgenstein einzuholen versuchen.

2.

Mit Blick auf die traditionelle Hermeneutik in der Romantik, die das Verstehen als eine Symbiose von Verstehen und Auslegung begreift, stellt Gadamer in *Wahrheit und Methode* kritisch fest, dass durch die Symbiose ein drittes Moment des Verstehens verdeckt wurde. Die traditionelle Hermeneutik ließ unberücksichtigt, dass »im Verstehen immer so etwas wie eine Anwendung des zu verstehenden Textes auf die gegenwärtige Situation des Interpretieren stattfindet« (Gadamer 1990, S. 313). In den einschlägigen Anwendungsgebieten der Hermeneutik, wie der Geschichtswissenschaft, der Rechtswissenschaft oder der Theologie geht es im hermeneutischen Sinne darum, dass sich im Zuge des verstehenden Auslegens etwas konkreti-

siert, etwa die Rechtsgeltung in der Gesetzesauslegung oder die Heilswirkung in der Predigt. Für den auszulegenden Text bedeutet das, dass er »in jeder konkreten Situation, neu und anders verstanden werden muss. Verstehen«, so Gadamer, »ist hier immer schon Anwenden« (Gadamer 1990, S. 314). Damit etwa ein Gesetz im Urteil Gültigkeit erlangt, muss unter das allgemeine Gesetz der besondere Tatbestand subsumiert und anhand von Tatbestandsmerkmalen festgestellt werden, ob ein gesetzlicher Verstoß vorliegt oder nicht. Diese Vorgehensweise gehört zum juristischen Handwerkszeug und zeigt, dass sich in der Applikation eine eigentümliche logische Struktur verbirgt, die sich im Verhältnis von Allgemeinem zum Besonderen zum Ausdruck bringt. Diese Struktur meint Gadamer auch in der aristotelischen Ethik entdecken zu können und sieht in ihr »eine Art *Modell der in der hermeneutischen Aufgabe gelegenen Probleme*« (Gadamer 1990, S. 329).

Aristoteles grenzt das ethische Handeln zu der platonischen Idee des Guten auf der einen Seite hin und zur Natur ( $\phi\upsilon\sigma\iota\varsigma$ ) auf der anderen Seite hin ab. Die ethische Tugend wird dem Handelnden durch Gewohnheit ( $\epsilon\theta\omicron\varsigma$ ) zuteil (Aristoteles 1995, II, 1). Mit der Gegenüberstellung von Gewohnheit und Natur tritt, wie Gadamer bemerkt, ein Bereich zutage, der nicht von einer natürlichen Gesetzmäßigkeit geprägt ist, sondern von einer »Wandelbarkeit und begrenzten Regelmäßigkeit menschlicher Satzungen und menschlicher Verhaltensweisen« (Gadamer 1990, S. 318). Tugendhaftigkeit zeigt sich in eben dieser Vielzahl von Verhaltensweisen, die durch eine sittliche Erziehung gefördert und zu einer Haltung ( $\epsilon\tilde{\xi}\varsigma\iota\varsigma$ ) ausgeformt werden können.

Obwohl Aristoteles betont, dass das Sittliche nichts an sich hat, was gesetzlich feststeht, muss doch der ethisch Handelnde wissen, welche Handlung in der gegebenen Situation unter ethischen Vorzeichen geboten ist. Es ist daher von philosophischem Interesse, wie es ein ethisches Wissen geben kann und auf welche Weise dieses Wissen in ethischen Handlungen zum tragen kommt. Damit ist gleichermaßen der Fokus auf das Problem der Anwendung ethischen Wissens eingestellt.

Im sechsten Buch der *Nikomachischen Ethik* beschreibt Aristoteles die Klugheit ( $\phi\rho\upsilon\nu\eta\sigma\iota\varsigma$ ) als eine Haltung vernünftigen Handelns. Klug zu sein bedeutet, über ein Wissen darüber zu verfügen, welche Handlung für die eigene Situation gut und nützlich ist (Aristoteles, VI, 5). Diese Form des Wissens grenzt Aristoteles gegenüber zwei weiteren Wissensformen ab: einerseits von dem theoretischen Wissen ( $\epsilon\pi\iota\sigma\tau\eta\mu\eta$ ) und andererseits von der Kunstfertigkeit ( $\tau\acute{\epsilon}\chi\eta\eta$ ). Man wird sich dessen schnell An-sichtig, dass sittliches Wissen nicht Teil der theoretischen Wissenschaft sein kann, denn das theoretische Wissen beschäftigt sich mit Wissensgegenständen, deren Wesen auf Notwendigkeit gründet. Hierzu gehören etwa Gegenstände der Mathematik. Demgegenüber sind sittliche Handlungskontexte nicht notwendig und unveränderlich. Sie stellen keine objektiven Sachverhalte dar, sondern finden im Menschen ihren Mittelpunkt, der um sich selbst als Handelnder weiß und Entscheidungen treffen muss, die je nach Kontext anders ausfallen können und sich daher nicht objektivieren lassen.

Zunächst weniger eindeutig scheint dagegen die Differenzierung von sittlichem und technischem Handlungsbegriff und den damit verbundenen Wissensformen zu sein. Steht nicht auch der Kunstfertige etwa bei der Herstellung eines Tisches in der Situation, sich für die richtigen Handlungsschritte entscheiden zu müssen, die zur Herstellung des Gegenstandes führen? Ist nicht auch das Wissen des Kunstfertigen über Material und Mittel der Herstellung von der Art, dass es ihm ebenso wie dem Klugen selbst zu gute kommt, wenn der Gegenstand gebrauchsfähig hergestellt worden ist? So muss doch auch der Kunstfertige in der gegebenen Situation das allgemeine Gelernte in der konkreten Situation des Herstellungsprozesses anzuwenden wissen. Gleicht diese Situation nicht dem sittlichen Bewusstsein, das sich ebenfalls in der konkreten Situation für ein sittliches Verhalten zu entscheiden wissen muss? Es stellt sich von daher die Frage, in welchen Hinsichten sich das sittliche Wissen von einem technischen Wissen differenzieren lässt, wenn die Applikation der Phronesis nicht als nachträgliche Veranstaltung zu einem vorgängigen Wissen verstanden werden soll. Gadamer markiert die Unterschiede in den folgenden drei Punkten.

*I. Die Form des Wissens.* Gegenstand der Kunstfertigkeit ist, wie Aristoteles sagt, das Entstehen und Herstellen nach Plan. Hier sei etwa an das Wissen des Handwerkers gedacht, der sich darauf versteht, bestimmte Dinge wie Tische oder Stühle herzustellen. Dieses Wissen ist über einen gewissen Zeitraum potentiell vorhanden und kann offensichtlich auch wieder verlernt werden. Demgegenüber scheint es sich mit dem sittlichen Wissen so zu verhalten, dass es weder erlernt noch verlernt wird. Als menschliches Wesen befindet man sich immer schon in Handlungszusammenhängen und scheint daher schon immer im Besitz des sittlichen Wissens sein zu müssen, um es anwenden zu können. Da man das sittliche Wissen aber offenbar nicht erlernt, kann man es auch nicht besitzen. Wie aber soll man etwas anwenden können, in dessen Besitz man nicht gelangt ist?

Offenbar ist die sittliche Handlung im Gegensatz zum planmäßig angefertigten Gegenstand nicht voll bestimmbar. So mag etwa das Gesetz in der Rechtsprechung vor seiner Anwendung bereits in allgemeiner Form vorliegen, aber die Rechtsprechung erfolgt erst in der Anwendung auf eine konkrete Situation. Das bedeutet gleichzeitig, dass das allgemeine Gesetz stets Abstriche zugunsten der konkreten Manifestation hinnehmen muss. Gegenüber der Herstellung, für die eine Abweichung vom ursprünglichen Plan immer auch Abstriche in der Ausführung und der Vollkommenheit des Hergestellten bedeuten, kommt allerdings in der Anwendung des allgemeinen Gesetzes auf die konkrete Situation das Recht erst zu seiner vollen Entfaltung. Das allgemeine Gesetz ist notwendigerweise mangelhaft, weil es die Mannigfaltigkeit menschlicher Wirklichkeit nicht in sich zu fassen vermag. Das bedeutet aber schlechterdings keinen Mangel in der Anwendung, vielmehr entsteht durch sie erst positives Recht.

*II. Der Zweck des Wissens.* Es ist leicht ersichtlich, dass das technische Wissen partikulare Zwecke verfolgt. So dient etwa das Wissen wie man einen Tisch schreinet dazu, den Tisch als fertigen Gegenstand herzustellen. Dem gegenüber verfolgt das sittliche Wissen keinen partikularen Zweck, sondern betrifft das rechte Leben als Ganzes. Das rechte Leben findet seine letzte Begründung nicht in einem Zweck, der das Leben vorgängig bestimmt.

Daraus ergeben sich Konsequenzen für die Auswahl der zum Zweck dienenden Mittel. Der Mensch verfügt nicht in der Weise über sich, wie der Handwerker über das Material, das er bearbeitet. Richtet sich das theoretische

Wissen in der Kunst auf das zu bearbeitende Material, so steht der Mensch hinsichtlich des sittlichen Wissens in einer Selbstbeziehung, die es *in concreto* auszufüllen gilt. Während die Mittel zum Bau eines Tisches durch die erlernte Methode bestimmt sind und jede weitere Reflexion über das rechte Tun überflüssig zu sein scheint, verlangt das sittliche Bewusstsein geradewegs ein »Mitsichzuratergehen« (εὐβουλία; Übersetzung Gadamer), also ein überlegendes Suchen nach der rechten Wahl der Mittel (Aristoteles, VI, 10). Gegenüber den Künsten, in denen das Wissen schon vor seiner faktischen Anwendung zur Verfügung steht, kann das sittliche Wissen »grundsätzlich nicht die Vorgängigkeit eines lehrbaren Wissens besitzen. Das Verhältnis von Mittel und Zweck ist hier nicht von der Art, dass die Kenntnis der rechten Mittel im voraus verfügbar gemacht werden könnte, und das deshalb, weil die Kenntnis des rechten Zwecks ebenso wenig bloßer Gegenstand eines Wissens ist« (Gadamer 1990, S. 326).

*III. Das gemeinschaftliche Wissen.* Neben der Klugheit, die in einen normativen Bezug zum sittlichen Wissen steht, begreift Aristoteles die Verständigkeit (σύνεσις) als beurteilend-deskriptive Fähigkeit. Auch sie hat es mit dem Gegenstand des Zweifels und Überlegens zu tun, der sich in der konkreten Handlungssituation zeigt und daher nicht mit theoretischer Wissenschaft oder Kunstfertigkeit zu verwechseln ist. Klugheit und Verständigkeit treffen sich im »Augenblick der Konkretion« (Gadamer), in der der Verständige den Handlungsvollzug des Anderen für sich selbst nachvollziehen kann. Das sich zeigende, gemeinsame Wissen ist nicht das Resultat eines vorgängigen und planmäßigen Wissens. Die Verständigkeit zeigt sich darin, dass der Verständige zu dem Handlungsvollziehenden in einem gemeinsamen Verhältnis steht, dessen Mittelpunkt der gemeinsame Wille zur Rechten Handlung ist. Das gemeinsame Wissen gründet auf der Tatsache einer Handlungsgemeinschaft, in der sittliches Handeln nach gewissen Mustern vollzogen wird, so »dass der, der Verständnis hat, nicht in einem unbetroffenen Gegenüber stehend weiß und urteilt, sondern aus einer spezifischen Zugehörigkeit mitdenkt, die ihn mit dem anderen verbindet, als wäre man mitbetroffen« (Gadamer 1990, S. 328). Menschen stehen demzufolge immer schon gemeinsam in sittlichen Zusammenhängen und machen sich von daher ihr Bild von der Sache des Sittlichen. Aus den gelebten Handlungskontexten bilden sich Leitbilder heraus, die aus den konkreten Situationen der Handelnden erkennbar werden und vermittelbar sind. Das ethische Verständnis wird nicht von unveränderlich feststehenden Normen her bestimmt, sondern über die Wahrnehmung sich konkretisierender Handlungsmuster, die als sittlich anerkannt werden.

### 3.

Mit dem Differenzierungsangebot, das Gadamer und Aristoteles hinsichtlich der Anwendung sittlichen und technischen Wissens gemacht haben, soll nun das Problem der Anwendung von Sprachspielen in den Blick genommen werden, um zu sehen, ob Gadamers Interpretation für das Verständnis des späten Wittgenstein fruchtbar gemacht werden kann. Der Sprachspielbegriff impliziert, dass eine gewisse Regelmäßigkeit in der Sprachanwendung vorhanden ist, denn für eine sinnvolle Verständigung ist es notwendig, dass es in der Sprache nicht ungerichtet zugeht. Zu wissen, wie man ein Sprachspiel sinnvoll anwendet, bedeutet demzufolge zu wissen, nach welchen Regeln es gespielt wird. Analog zu einem sittlichen oder technischen Wissen können wir im Folgenden von einem Regelwissen sprechen<sup>1</sup> und nach Form, Zweck und Gemeinschaftlichkeit dieses Wissens fragen.

Gegenüber der Feststellung, dass wir immer schon in Handlungszusammenhängen stehen, scheinen wir uns nicht immer schon in Sprachzusammenhängen zu befinden. Sprachkompetenz muss erworben werden. Man könnte daher analog zur griechischen *Techné* davon ausgehen, dass das Regelwissen vor dem konkreten Sprachgebrauch existiert und die Anwendung über ein Regelwissen erlernt wird, indem die Regel die Anwendung erklärt. Allerdings setzt eine Erklärung bereits voraus, dass sie als solche verstanden werden kann, was beispielsweise impliziert, dass man nach ihr fragen kann (vgl. PU §6). Ein Kind, das noch keinerlei Sprachkompetenz besitzt, könnte eine Regel demzufolge gar nicht verstehen.

Es zeigt sich, dass die Kompetenz zur Anwendung eines Sprachspiels nicht durch die erklärende Regel erworben wird, sondern durch das Hineinwachsen in eine soziale Handlungsweise (vgl. Schneider 2002, S. 142ff). Kinder werden durch das Nachahmen von Tätigkeiten, die mit sprachlichen Äußerungen verflochten sind, in Form von Abrichtung (vgl. PU §§5, 198) in die Sprache eingeführt. Die Anwendung eines Sprachspiels wird demzufolge nicht durch Regeln bestimmt, sondern durch regelmäßige soziale Handlungsweisen. Die Bedeutung von »regelmäßig« beruht daher gewissermaßen selbst auf konkreten Handlungen und muss an konkreten Beispielen erlernt werden (vgl. PU §208). Was eine allgemeine Regel ist, kann ohne »Konkretion« nicht verstanden werden.

Ebenso wie das sittliche Wissen, so verfolgt auch das Regelwissen keinen partikularen Zweck, sondern betrifft die Sprache als Ganzes. Wittgenstein behauptet, dass man die Regeln »willkürlich« nennen kann, denn ihr Zweck ist nur der der Sprache (vgl. PU §497). Demzufolge wird nicht der Sprachgebrauch durch Regeln bestimmt, sondern praktische Zwecke bestimmen den Sprachgebrauch, aus dem heraus dann Regelmäßigkeiten erkennbar werden, die je nach Sprachgemeinschaft so oder auch anders ausfallen könnten. Die gewünschten Zwecke werden nicht mittels Regelwissen erreicht, sondern über einen bestimmten Gebrauch der Sprache. Die Wahl der richtigen Mittel erfolgt daher nicht über die Befolgung von Regeln, sondern über die gesellschaftlich anerzogenen Handlungsweisen. Vor diesem Hintergrund kann Wittgenstein sagen: »Ich folge der Regel *blind*« (PU §219).

Es zeigt sich, dass das Wissen zur Anwendung eines Sprachspiels kein partikulares Regelwissen ist, das die Funktionsweise von Sprache erklärt, sondern dass die Funktions- und Gebrauchsweise durch eine öffentliche und soziale Handlungspraxis bestimmt wird. Insofern ist das Wissen zur Sprachbeherrschung notwendigerweise ein gemeinschaftliches Wissen. Darüber hinaus zeigen Wittgensteins Argumente gegen die Möglichkeit einer Privatsprache, dass die das Verstehen konstituierende regelgeleitete Sprachanwendung überhaupt nur dann möglich ist, wenn die Möglichkeit einer öffentlichen normativen Beurteilung des Sprachspiels besteht.

Insofern lässt sich abschließend feststellen, dass die Anwendung sittlichen Wissens in der aristotelischen Ethik, die Anwendung des hermeneutischen Bewusstseins und die Anwendung der Sprache in der Spätphilosophie Wittgensteins eine Reihe von gemeinsamen Strukturmerkmalen auszeichnen, die hier unter den Aspekten der Form, des Zweckes und der Gemeinschaftlichkeit des Wissens skizziert wurden.

## Endnoten

<sup>1</sup> Wittgenstein selbst nennt die Sprachbeherrschung das Beherrschen einer »Technik« (vgl. Wittgenstein 1984 [nachfolgend PU genannt], §§150, 199). Das ist allerdings nicht im Sinne der griechischen *τέχνη* zu verstehen.

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# Über mehrdeutige und nicht mehrdeutige Bilder

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Warum ist es so, dass ich zwar mehrdeutige Bilder sehen kann, ich aber keine für mich mehrdeutigen Bilder zeichnen kann? Zugegeben, schon diese Frage zu stellen könnte für Verwirrung sorgen, weshalb es vielleicht besser wäre mit vorbereitenden Erläuterungen zu beginnen; andererseits ist es sicherlich sinnvoll und auch zielführend die bestimmende Frage dieses Beitrags an den Anfang zu stellen, denn anhand dieser Frage soll hier das Phänomen der mehrdeutigen Bilder erschlossen werden.

Was sind mehrdeutige Bilder? Ein Bild ist, im einfachsten und allgemeinsten Sinn, eine wie auch immer geartete Darstellung eines Gegenstandes. Diese Definition, die im Übrigen auch in der Alltagssprache zur Anwendung kommen könnte, kann als Ausgangspunkt dienen. Etwa so, wie Wörter einen Gegenstand bezeichnen können, so stellt ein Bild einen Gegenstand dar, allerdings ohne etwas zu bezeichnen und auch ohne dass es dabei eines Wortes bedürfe. Wörter und Bilder stehen indessen in derselben Beziehung zu Begriffen, beide können einen Begriff hervorrufen, d.h. wir hören ein Wort oder sehen ein Bild, was sogleich bewirkt, dass wir eine Vorstellung des bezeichneten bzw. dargestellten Gegenstandes haben – den Begriff. Es ist überdies beachtenswert, dass es Schriftzeichen gibt, die außer zu bezeichnen, ursprünglich auch etwas darstellen; dieserart ist z.B. der Großteil der chinesischen Schriftzeichen; im Schriftzeichen für ‚Baum‘ kann man, mit ein wenig Phantasie, einen Baum erkennen, im chinesischen Schriftzeichen für ‚Wald‘ Bäume; solche Schriftzeichen stellen also einerseits etwas dar und können andererseits auch dazu dienen etwas zu bezeichnen, und zwar insofern, als sie Schriftzeichen sind. Der Vergleich von Bildern und Wörtern, die damit gezogene Analogie, soll an dieser Stelle nachdrücklich auf die enge Verwandtschaft von Bildern und Wörtern bzw. im Folgenden auf die enge Verwandtschaft von mehrdeutigen Bildern und mehrdeutigen Wörtern hinweisen. Da die lexikalische Mehrdeutigkeit einfacher ist als die Mehrdeutigkeit von Bildern, d.h. einfacher im Sinne von leichter zu handhaben, bildet erstere hier auch den Ausgangspunkt der Überlegungen.

## 1. Mehrdeutige Wörter

Ein Wort ist mehrdeutig, wenn es, sei es in seiner geschriebenen, sei es in seiner gesprochenen Form, in einer bestimmten Sprache für dieses Wort mindestens zwei voneinander verschiedene, meist unvereinbare Weisen gibt es zu deuten. Die Mehrdeutigkeit von Wörtern, die lexikalische Mehrdeutigkeit ist die einfachste Form der Mehrdeutigkeit, wobei hauptsächlich zwei Unterarten vorkommen, die für Verwechslungen verantwortlich sein können, nämlich Homonymie und Polysemie. Beispiele für dieserart mehrdeutige Wörter sind ‚Ball‘, ‚Bauer‘, ‚Ring‘ oder ‚Tau‘. Zwischen zwei homonymen Wörtern, z.B. zwischen ‚Tau‘ (starkes Seil) und ‚Tau‘ (kondensierte Luftfeuchtigkeit), gibt es weder einen etymologischen noch einen anderen Zusammenhang; es besteht eine bloße Namensgleichheit. Die Tatsache, dass sowohl ein starkes Seil als auch die kondensierte Luftfeuchtigkeit am Morgen ‚Tau‘ genannt werden können, ist eine rein zufällige Ähnlichkeit. Zwischen polysemantisch mehrdeutigen Wörtern gibt es eine wortgeschichtliche Verbindung. Zwischen der

geometrischen Figur Ring und dem Schmuckstück Ring gibt es eine Ähnlichkeit; das Schmuckstück hat die Form der geometrischen Figur, weshalb es wie diese genannt wird. In dieser Beziehung zur geometrischen Figur stehen auch der Ring, in dem Boxkämpfe ausgetragen werden oder ringförmige Straßenzüge um das Zentrum einer Stadt.

Was aber ist genau gemeint, wenn man sagt, dass ein Wort mehrdeutig ist? Es sei vorausgeschickt, dass in der Antwort auf diese Frage schon ein wesentlicher Teil der Antwort auf die Ausgangsfrage zu finden ist. Man stelle sich beispielsweise vor, ich versuche „Ring“ zu denken; dann denke ich entweder an ein Schmuckstück oder an einen Straßenzug oder an irgendetwas anderes, was ebenfalls ein Ring sein könnte. Ich könnte denken „Ich suche den ...“ und in diesem Moment nicht wissen, wie der Gegenstand heißt, den ich suche. Ich habe aber keinen mehrdeutigen Gedanken, sondern ich denke dabei zweifellos an etwas konkretes, denn wenn mir zunächst das Wort nicht einfällt, kurz darauf aber schon, dann weiß ich plötzlich und mit aller Klarheit woran ich zuvor dachte und woran nicht und woran ich dachte ist in diesem Fall eindeutig. So etwas kann mit lexikalischer Mehrdeutigkeit also nicht gemeint sein. Und ich behaupte daher, dass, wenn ich trotzdem versuchen würde mehrdeutig „Ring“ zu denken, es mir auch auf keine andere Weise gelingen wird, denn ich denke immer entweder an beides oder an nichts. Ich gebe zu, dass es mir gelingen kann an das mehrdeutige Wort ‚Ring‘ zu denken. Aber auch in diesem Fall denke ich entweder an beides oder an keines von beiden. An beides denke ich, wenn ich mir der Mehrdeutigkeit bewusst bin und an keines von beiden, wenn ich nur an das Wort denke. Ich denke dabei aber nicht an einen Ring, sondern, wie gesagt, an das Wort ‚Ring‘.

Damit bin ich an einen wesentlichen Punkt angelangt, weshalb ich meine, dass eine weitere Klarstellung angebracht ist. Ein Wort für sich genommen ist nicht mehrdeutig, bzw. stärker, kann gar nicht mehrdeutig sein. Zu einer solchen, inadäquaten Auffassung der Mehrdeutigkeit von Wörtern kann man überhaupt nur gelangen, wenn man sich der Tatsache, dass ein Wort, also ein linguistischer Gegenstand, niemals außerhalb eines Äußerungskontextes steht, nicht klar genug bewusst ist; analoges gilt für Sätze. Denn wenn ich einen Satz oder ein Wort äußere, dann gibt es genau zwei Möglichkeiten. Entweder ich habe eine klare Vorstellung davon, was ich sagen will, oder ich habe eine solche klare Vorstellung nicht. Habe ich eine klare Vorstellung davon, was ich sagen will, dann ist der geäußerte Satz bzw. das geäußerte Wort immer eindeutig. Habe ich hingegen keine klare Vorstellung davon, was ich sagen will, dann kann ich zwar etwas Mehrdeutiges sagen, sage aber streng genommen gar nichts, ich drücke keinen Gedanken aus, sondern mache nur Lärm. Bewusst einen mehrdeutigen Satz zu äußern kann nur dann sinnvoll sein, wenn ich über den Satz spreche, nicht wenn ich ihn verwende. Wenn ich also etwas sage und auch weiß, was ich sagen will, dann wird das für mich immer eindeutig sein.

Wenn man nun die Seite wechselt und denjenigen betrachtet, der mir zuhört, dann sieht die Sache gleich ganz anders aus. Die Mehrdeutigkeit entsteht nämlich

dann, wenn ein Satz gehört oder gelesen wird, also beim Übergang vom Sprecher zum Hörer. Der Grund dafür ist, dass derjenige, der mich hört, nicht wissen kann, was ich sagen will, sondern er weiß nur, was ich sage. Da es in den natürlichen Sprachen vorkommen kann, dass ein Satz in mehrfacher Weise interpretiert werden kann und dass ein Wort dazu dienen kann mehrere Gegenstände zu bezeichnen, kann ein Hörer oder Leser nicht wissen, welche Interpretation bzw. welche Bedeutung ich im Sinn habe, wenn ich einen Satz bzw. ein Wort ausspreche. Der Kontext gibt in dem meisten Fällen darüber Auskunft, jedoch nicht immer oder nicht klar genug. Für eine andere Person kann das, was ich sage mehrdeutig sein, nicht aber für mich.

## 2. Mehrdeutige Bilder

Wenn man nun daran geht, sich über mehrdeutige Bilder Gedanken zu machen, dann gibt es zwei Antworten, die das Thema erschließen. Die erste dieser Antworten ist die Antwort auf die Frage, inwiefern Bilder mehrdeutig sein können und inwiefern nicht. Die zweite Antwort erklärt den scheinbaren Widerspruch zwischen der Tatsache, dass es für mich selbst keine mehrdeutigen Bilder geben kann und meiner Wahrnehmung mehrdeutiger Bilder.

Ich glaube, dass mehrdeutige Bilder mehrdeutigen Wörtern sehr ähnlich sind, und dass vieles, was für mehrdeutige Wörter gilt, auch für mehrdeutige Bilder gilt. Ein mehrdeutiges oder, wie es auch genannt wird, bistabiles Bild, ist z.B. der Hasen-Enten-Kopf Wittgensteins (vgl. Wittgenstein 1984, 520) oder der Necker-Würfel. Grundsätzlich ist zu mehrdeutigen Bildern anzumerken, dass diese überbestimmt oder unterbestimmt sein können; das sieht man daran, dass ich den unterbestimmten Hasen-Enten-Kopf mit nur wenigen weiteren Linien zu einem eindeutigen Bild vervollständigen kann. Den überbestimmten Necker-Würfel kann ich zu einem eindeutigen Bild machen, indem ich einige Linien ausradiere und diese stattdessen punktiert zeichne. Ein Würfel der sich von einem Necker-Würfel nur dadurch unterscheidet, dass dessen unsichtbare Linien punktiert gezeichnet sind, wäre ein eindeutiges Bild. Hinzuzufügen ist noch, dass kompliziertere mehrdeutige Bilder mit Über- und Unterbestimmtheit spielen.

Nun ist auch der Zeitpunkt gekommen, die oben begonnene Analogie zwischen mehrdeutigen Wörtern und mehrdeutigen Bildern ans Ende zu führen. Auch im Fall der Bilder scheint es sinnvoll zu sein, zu unterscheiden, ob ich ein Bild zeichne oder ob ich ein Bild vorfinde. Wittgenstein, der sich dem Hasen-Enten-Kopf gegenüberfand, konnte sagen, dass man ihn entweder als Hasenkopf oder als Entenkopf sehen kann. Das kann ich nicht tun, wenn ich daran gehe ein Bild zu zeichnen, denn wenn ich etwas zeichne, dann gibt es wieder genau zwei Möglichkeiten. Entweder ich weiß, was ich zeichnen will oder ich weiß es nicht. Wenn ich weiß, was ich zeichne, dann wird das Resultat zwar von meinen zeichnerischen Fähigkeiten abhängen und mehr oder weniger gut gelingen, aber schließlich denjenigen Gegenstand darstellen, den ich abbilden wollte – oder ich werde zum Schluss kommen müssen, dass mir das Bild nicht gelungen ist. Ich werde z.B. feststellen, dass ich zwar versucht habe einen Hasen zu zeichnen, dieser aber aussieht wie eine Ente und ich werde nicht sagen, dass ich eine Ente gezeichnet habe. Und ich werde, wenn ich die Zeichnung als fertig betrachte, kaum Zweifel dahingehend haben, was die Zeichnung darstellen soll. Die Zeichnung ist für mich völlig eindeutig. Eine andere Person kann jedoch unmöglich wissen, was meine Intentionen beim Zeichnen waren und es kommt

hinzu, dass der Interpretationsspielraum bei Bildern viel größer ist als bei Wörtern oder Sätzen, weshalb es sein kann, dass eine Zeichnung nicht immer als das erkannt wird, was sie ist. Eine andere Person könnte sehr wohl glauben, dass ich eine Ente gezeichnet habe, wenn sie meine Hasenzeichnung sieht. Ein gutes Beispiel dafür sind auch abstrakte Kunstwerke; einerseits kann der Künstler eine sehr konkrete und detaillierte Vorstellung davon haben, was sein Kunstwerk darstellen soll, was aber andererseits keineswegs unverträglich mit der Tatsache wäre, dass ein Betrachter völlig ratlos vor dem Kunstwerk steht und nicht weiß, was es darstellen soll. Das Bild ist für den Betrachter mehrdeutig, denn er kann das Bild in mehreren Weisen interpretieren, nicht aber für den Künstler.

Wenn ich nicht weiß, was ich zeichnen will, und das ist die zweite Möglichkeit, dann wird das Resultat in einem gewissen Grad vom Zufall bestimmt sein. Dieserart sind Zeichnungen, die beim Telefonieren entstehen oder die Gebilde, die entstehen können, wenn ein Behälter mit Farbe umfällt. Auch wenn dabei zufälligerweise etwas entsteht, was eine Ähnlichkeit mit einem Bild im Sinne eines Abbildes (also nicht im Sinn von Kunstwerk) irgendeines Gegenstandes hat, so sind es doch im Grunde nichts anderes als Farbflecken, in denen ich jedoch im Nachhinein etwas sehen kann und die ich interpretieren kann; und ich kann sie so betrachten, wie ich die Zeichnungen einer anderen Person betrachten würde, denn in gewissem Sinne treffe ich nur darauf. Ich glaube, dass es zumindest zu einem Teil die Intention ist, die ein Bild zu einem Bild macht und unabhängig davon, ob es sich nun um Schriftzeichen oder Bilder handelt, man muss in beiden Fällen die ontologische Betrachtungsweise von der epistemologischen Betrachtungsweise trennen. Mit dem folgenden Beispiel kann vielleicht besser erläutert werden, was gemeint ist: Ein Waldläuferzeichen ist nur dann ein Waldläuferzeichen, wenn es von jemandem gemacht wurde und nicht, wenn es zufällig entstanden ist. Ich kann darüber im Zweifel sein, ob etwas ein Waldläuferzeichen ist. Ich kann eine zufällige Ansammlung von Stöcken und Steinen für ein Waldläuferzeichen halten und umgekehrt. Ich kann mich irren und der Irrtum kann schwerwiegende Folgen haben. Diese Frage ist aber verschieden von der Frage, wann etwas ein Waldläuferzeichen ist; eine Bedingung dafür ist, dass jemand es angefertigt hat, und zwar mit der Absicht, dass eine andere Person es finden sollte.

Wenn nun jemand mit voller Absicht einen mehrdeutigen Hasen-Enten-Kopf zeichnen wollte, dann kann er das freilich tun und das ist so, wie das Reden über mehrdeutige Sätze, denn in diesem Fall fehlt die Absicht einen Gegenstand darzustellen, so wie beim Reden über mehrdeutige Wörter und Sätze die Absicht fehlt etwas zu bezeichnen oder mitzuteilen.

Zur zweiten Antwort. Ich habe den Eindruck zwei Bilder zu sehen, wenn ich den Hasen-Enten-Kopf betrachte, den ich selbst gezeichnet habe, meine Wahrnehmung ist bistabil. Es scheint also so zu sein, dass ich doch Bilder zeichnen kann, die für mich selbst mehrdeutig sind. Dazu muss vorab gesagt werden, dass dieser subjektive Eindruck im Fall der Bilder stärker ist als im Fall der Wörter, aber auch dort auftritt. Auch wenn ich ein Wort schreibe und betrachte kann es sein, dass ich im Nachhinein entdecke, dass das von mir geschriebene Wort dazu dienen könnte einen Gegenstand zu bezeichnen, der verschieden ist von dem Gegenstand, den ich ursprünglich damit bezeichnen wollte. Hier wären auch monographe Wörter verschiedener Sprachen zu nennen; man wird sicherlich nicht behaupten wollen, dass ich, wenn ich das deutsche Wort ‚Gift‘ schreibe und entdecke, dass dieselbe Zeichenfolge in der englischen Sprache etwas anderes bedeuten

kann, ich das englische Wort für ‚Geschenk‘ geschrieben habe oder auch Wörter irgendwelcher anderer Sprachen, die aus denselben Buchstaben bestehen könnten.

Der Grund warum sich beim Betrachten eines mehrdeutigen Bildes eine bistabile Wahrnehmung einstellt ist physischer Natur (Vgl. Pöppel 1989, 29) und sie stellt sich außerdem ganz automatisch ein. Die Fähigkeit zu bistabiler Wahrnehmung, die Frequenz des Wechsels etc. sind abhängig von physiologischen Faktoren des Betrachters und daher ist klar, dass derselbe Reiz, d.h. dieselbe Zeichnung, dieselbe Wahrnehmung auslösen wird, wobei es nicht relevant ist, wer der Urheber der Zeichnung ist. Unabhängig davon gilt aber, dass das so ist, wie das Sprechen über mehrdeutige Wörter. Ich meine daher, dass die Wahrnehmung mehrdeutiger Bilder kein Einwand gegen die hier diskutierte These ist.

### 3. Abschließende Bemerkungen

Bei der Beschreibung mehrdeutiger Bilder sollte man beide Ebenen betrachten, nämlich die Ebene desjenigen, der ein Bild zeichnet und auch die Ebene desjenigen, der ein Bild sieht. Die erste ist die Ebene der Darstellung, die

zweite ist die Ebene der Interpretation. Beim Übergang von der ersten zur zweiten Ebene kann etwas hinzukommen oder wegfallen, es kann z.B. irgendein Detail nicht beachtet oder, ganz im Gegenteil, überbewertet werden. Aus diesen Gründen kann es sein, dass man ein Bild als mehrdeutig empfindet. Ich meine, dass es für eine adäquate Beschreibung wesentlich ist zu wissen, von welcher Seite aus man das Phänomen mehrdeutiger Bilder betrachtet und beschreibt.

Von meinem Standpunkt aus gesehen komme ich zu folgender Konklusion: Ich kann mehrdeutige Bilder finden, ich kann mehrdeutige Bilder sehen, aber ich kann keine für mich mehrdeutigen Bilder zeichnen.

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# Independence vs. Compossibility

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## 1. Leibniz' Possible Worlds

It is well known that Leibniz introduced the concept of a possible world in an attempt to prove that the world as it is does not contradict the claim that God is all-mighty, all-knowing and all-good. The principle of an infinitude of possible worlds is part of his theodicy.

"I call 'World' the whole succession and the whole agglomeration of all existent things, lest it be said that several worlds could have existed in different times and different places." (Theodicy, p. 128)

Notoriously, Leibniz held that this is the best of all possible worlds. This seemed to many a not very plausible view, but the interesting observation is that Leibniz thought that there were other worlds imaginable. He was contradicting Spinoza and Hobbes who believed that everything possible must exist.

Everything possible would indeed be existing (real) if it were the case that all possibles were "compossible". Two individuals are said to be compossible if they are not only possible in isolation but also "capable of joint realization". "A possible world is a set of mutually compossible complete individual concepts". (Mates, p. 340). "The actual universe is the collection of all existent possibles [...] and as there are different combinations of possibles, some better than others, there are several possible universes, each collection of compossibles constituting one." (Gerhardt, 1965, p. 573, quoted in Parkinson 1995, p. 213)

Thus, out of all possibles a subset of compossibles constitutes the world. According to Leibniz "all things which are possible, or express essence of possible reality, tend by equal right towards existence in proportion to the quantity of essence or reality which they include, or in proportion to the degree of perfection which belongs to them." (Ultimate, p. 138) This could mean that the largest number of mutually compatible things exists. If there were 4 things A, B, C, D that were in essence similar and D were incompatible with A and B, but A were compatible with all but D, and B and C were also compatible then the series of ABC rather than CD would exist. (cf. Wahrheiten, p. 177) This is probably an overly simplified example, as Leibniz claims in other papers that the perfect world is determined instead of by the number of things by variety and simplicity. There is always, he says, "to be found in things a principle of determination which turns on considerations of greatest and least; namely, that the greatest effect should be produced with [...] the least expenditure." (Ultimate, p. 138)

The question how a world must be constituted in order to be brought to existence, interesting as it is, is of secondary importance. In another line of reasoning Leibniz comes to the conclusion that the fact that this world exists is a proof that it must be the best of the possible worlds. This is a result of the principle of sufficient reason.

If God, so the argument goes, has to choose among the infinity of possible worlds, one to bring to existence he must of necessity choose the best one as only the best sticks out. For Leibniz (in contrast to Descartes) there can be no arbitrary choices, not any made by us and certainly not made by God. If we were told to draw a triangle, we

would, says Leibniz, draw an equilateral triangle. If we have to go from a to b we take the shortest route, if there are no further qualifications. (Ultimate, p. 138).

This means that "if there were not the best (optimum) among all possible worlds, God would not have produced any". (Theodicy, p. 128) And it also follows that God cannot just create anything but that He is restricted to possibles that "exist" independently of Him (although they are only ideas in His mind): "God's decree consists solely in the resolution he forms, after having compared all possible worlds, to choose that one which is the best, and bring it into existence together with all that this world contains, by means of the all-powerful word *Fiat*." (Theodicy, p. 151)

Leibniz gives the following example: "It is very much like what happens in certain games, in which all the spaces on the board have to be filled in according to certain rules: unless you show some ingenuity you will find yourself at the end kept out of certain refractory spaces, and thereby compelled to leave empty more spaces that you need have done, and more than you wished." (Ultimate, p. 138) – The game Leibniz alludes to here is Solitaire.<sup>1</sup>

Obviously only possible Solitaire games with a solution, i.e. one peg in the center of the board are candidates for "best possible" solitaire world. Consecutive jumps with one peg are called moves. So a further objective might be to find a solution with as few moves as possible. Whatever the constraints might be the point is that given the solitaire rules, there is a fixed number of possible games and if God wants to *realize* one of them He must pick out the one that is the best – if there is one.

Since only a complete world is chosen by God it does not make much sense to ask for alternatives within a world. After move 5 in the Dudeney world there must come the move from top left to top right. Otherwise it would be by definition another world.

Leibniz addresses the problem though when he talks of *mediate knowledge*, that is a knowledge of the possible but not actual. "Instance is given of the famous example of David asking the divine oracle whether the inhabitants of the town of Keilah, where he designed to shut himself in, would deliver him to Saul, supposing that Saul should besiege the town. God answered yes; whereupon David took a different course." (Theodicy, p. 145)

This example is rather complicated since it asks for the hypothetical reaction of the inhabitants of Keilah to a counterfactual condition. Leibniz thinks he can use the possible world concept to handle it: "For the case of the siege of Keilah forms part of a possible world, *which differs from ours only in all that is connected with this hypothesis*, and the idea of this possible world represents that which would happen in this case." (Theodicy, p. 146)

But actually the problem starts with the first step: Will Saul besiege the town or not. Or put in a different way: Are there possible worlds in which Saul besieges the town and others in which he does not? Now, given the principle of sufficient reason this cannot be because it would sup-



pose two possible worlds that are exactly alike until Saul takes an arbitrary decision to siege in world A and not to siege in world B. Since every decision must have a sufficient reason it means that something in world A must have been different from B before Saul makes his decision. Whatever the difference might be, something must have caused this again and so back to the very beginnings of worlds A and B. In other words for two worlds to be different it is necessary that they differ at the start.

This means there can be no “trans-world-identity”. Leibniz, of course, is well aware of this. This is why he speaks of an “approximation” of Sextus when imagining a Sextus who did not rape Lucretia. And about “counterparts” of Adam he says: “When considering Adam we consider a part of his predicates, as for instance that he is the first man, set in a pleasure garden [...] and we give the name »Adam« to the person to whom these predicates are attributed, all this is not sufficient to determine the individual, for there might be an infinity of Adams ...” (Correspondence, p. 55)

But if there are an infinity of Adams, or of Sauls, by whatever loose criterion, then God’s answer to David’s question could only be something like: Out of the infinity of reasonably “similar” possible worlds the inhabitants of towns similar to Keilah would deliver you in 52% of them.

If only “our” Adam has all the predicates to determine the individual, how can any (description of one) of his actions be called contingent? Or, what comes to the same thing, in what sense can his actions be of free will, if any alternative action would by definition not be his and thus not be one of this world?

For Leibniz in every universal affirmative truth the predicate is in the subject (Specimen, p. 75) or formulated slightly differently the “notion of the predicate is in some way contained in the notion of the subject.” (Primary, p. 87). Every truth can in the end by analysis of its notions be reduced to a primary truth, that is, to an identity like “A is A”. An absolutely necessary truth is one whose opposite implies a contradiction, like truths of mathematics. A truth like “Adam is rational” can be shown to be true since Adam is a man and man is by definition a rational animal. That is, the truth can be resolved to truths of identity in a finite number of steps. These truths are also called metaphysical or geometrical.

A truth of fact on the other hand, or a contingent truth, is one whose contradiction is not impossible. But its truth is just as certain. The essential distinction between necessary and contingent truth - and Leibniz calls this a “wonderful secret” (Primary, p. 88) - is that it takes infinitely many steps to reduce a contingent truth to a primary truth. In the case of contingent truths “the reduction proceeds to infinity and is never terminated. So the certitude and perfect reason of contingent truths is known only to God.” (Speciman, p. 75)

## 2. Wittgenstein’s Possible Worlds

In the case of Wittgenstein it is less obvious that he had a concept of possible worlds. It is not mentioned in the *Tractatus* at all and only in passing in the Notebooks where he uses “possible” as an alternative to imagined world. He does not seem to use it as a technical term when he says: “In every possible world there is an order even if it is a complicated one.” (NB, p. 83)

In the *Tractatus* he sometimes seems to speak of *world* in a metaphorical sense, e.g. in 6.43 (“The world of

the happy is quite another than that of the unhappy.”) or in 5.6 (“the limits of my world”).

But in the “ontological” section at the beginning of the *Tractatus* where he introduces the objects, he says that the objects form the substance of the world (2.021) And he goes on: “It is clear that however different from the real one an imagined world may be, it must have something - a form - in common with the real world.” (2.022) This form consists of the objects. (2.023)

What this suggests is that the World in 2.021 is to be understood as “the totality of possible worlds”.

Although interpretations vary wildly even as to the meaning of the most basic of Wittgenstein’s concepts the ontology of the *Tractatus* is really quite simple if taken literally.

1. All possible worlds share a common substance - simple objects.
2. An object can stand in configuration with some others (can be concatenated with them) and together they form a “state of affairs” (or “atomic fact”).
3. A state of affairs either exists or not.
4. The sum of all existing states of affairs constitutes the (actual) world.

Whatever the nature of an object and whatever the nature of a state of affairs, Wittgenstein is crystal clear about one thing: the objects determine the number of possible states of affairs. Every subset of possible states of affairs (including of course the empty set) can exist. If the states of affairs (in a subset of all states of affairs) do exist they build the actual world, if not, they form a merely possible world.

The sum of existing states of affairs determines the ones that do not exist. That any subset can be seen as a possible world is of course due to the wonderful property of the state of affairs, namely, to be independent of one another. Wittgenstein says so explicitly in 2.061: “States of affairs are independent of one another.” And more prominently right at the beginning: “Each item can be the case or not the case while everything else remains the same.” (1.21)

The independence thesis has never been very popular, perhaps because it seems to be just as implausible as the claim that this is the best of all possible worlds. Raymond Bradley calls it the “myth of independence”. (Bradley, p. 101)

Attempts have been made to make sense of the thesis, the most obvious one by distinguishing a logical from an ontological independence. Bradley provides the rather lukewarm solution that only “entirely different” states of affairs are independent. (Bradley, p. 120)

A strict reading of the *Tractatus* is not made easier by the well-known fact that Wittgenstein himself had later some serious doubts about the truth of some of the main assumptions of the *Tractatus*.

But on the positive side, I for one, find it rather difficult to resist the charm of the *Tractatus*, where it says, that given a fixed form (the objects) that can combine to  $n$  states of affairs, all possible worlds can be established. If there are  $n$  possible states of affairs there are  $2^n$  combinations of states of affairs (4.27) and thus  $2^n$  possible worlds. And since there is a one-to-one relationship between states of affairs and elementary propositions, I can take any logical product of elementary propositions to describe

a possible world. The truth of an elementary proposition does only depend on the existence of the depicted state of affairs. So while it takes an infinite number of steps to prove the truth of a contingent proposition according to Leibniz, the truth (or falsity) of an elementary proposition is immediately given. (Of course, how to analyze a sentence of ordinary language like "the watch lies on the table" is quite a different question.)

If we have two states of affairs *a* and *b* we obviously have four possible worlds, the empty one, the one where *a* exists, the one where *b* exists and the one where *a* and *b* exist. We can visualize them like this: [*a*], [*b*], [ ], [*ab*]. We might call them *A*, *B*, *C*, *D* respectively. Let *p* be the proposition that says that *a* and *q* be the proposition that states *b*, then *p* is true in *A* (or *A* is a truth-maker of *p*) and in *D*. Instead of saying that *p* is true in two possible worlds one could take it one step further and say that *p* is made true by the set of possible worlds consisting of *A* and *D*. In this way any logical combination of the two elementary propositions is made true by one of the 16 sets of combinations of possible worlds. The tautology if *p* then *p* and if *q* then *q* is made true by {[*A*], [*B*], [*C*], [*D*]} the contradiction by {[ ]}. Instead of using logical constants or truth tables we could take any number of elementary propositions and point to one set of sets of possible worlds that is a truth-maker of any logical connection between them.

### 3. Conclusion

We have seen that Leibniz and Wittgenstein are at opposite ends with regard to the ontological status of the world and to the logical status of a contingent truth. For Leibniz every tiny piece of the world is essentially connected to every other: "For it must be known that all things are connected in each one of the possible worlds: the universe, whatever it may be, is all of one piece, like an ocean: the least movement extends its effect there to any distance whatsoever, even though this effect become less perceptible in proportion to the distance." (Theodicy, p. 128) To understand one contingent sentence, you must fully understand the whole universe.

So because of the interconnectivity only on the level of complete worlds there is a form of independence.

With Wittgenstein, on the other hand, we have total compossibility on the level of the states of affairs. Instead of an ocean his world resembles a jigsaw puzzle. Any piece might be missing, we still have a complete picture of the world. A missing piece does not affect the other pieces at all. We can totally understand a contingent proposition without knowing anything about the rest of the world.

The price to pay is rather high for both of them. Accepting Leibniz' view means to accept a world that is fully determined. Accepting Wittgenstein means one has to be totally agnostic as to the question how an ordinary sentence is analyzed, what is the nature of an object. One can only say that all attached properties to objects must somehow emerge from a concatenation of real objects, including colour and a position in space and time.

### Endnotes

<sup>1</sup> Characteristically he says: "The game called Solitaire pleases me very much. I take it in the reverse order. That is to say that instead of making a configuration according to the rules of the game, which is to jump to an empty place and remove the piece over which one has jumped, I thought it was better to reconstruct what had been demolished, by filling an empty hole over which one has leaped." (quoted in Berlekamp et. al., p. 711) Of course this is logically just the same game with only "hole" and "peg" reversed or a game played backwards in time.

### Illustration




Fig. 1: Best of all possible Solitaire worlds? Henry Ernest Dudeney's elegant 19-move solution.

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# Throwing Away the Ladder *Before* Climbing it

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## 1. Introduction: Historical Ladders

As the New Wittgenstein debate testifies, the penultimate remark of the *Tractatus* (6.54) remains one of the work's most discussed propositions. Although the *Tractatus* lacks a reference concerning its origin, the ladder metaphor employed in 6.54 has been widely used in the philosophical tradition. Chronologically close to Wittgenstein are Fritz Mauthner – one of the few philosophers mentioned by name in the *Tractatus* and one who actually uses the metaphor in a similar way in his writings (see Weiler 1958, p. 80) – and Arthur Schopenhauer (see Schopenhauer 1909, p. 256), by all accounts a major influence on Wittgenstein's early thought and a possible influence not only for Wittgenstein's, but for Mauthner's use of the metaphor as well. Much earlier, Sextus Empiricus uses it in an analogous way (see Sextus Empiricus 2005, p. 183 (2:480-81)) while utilizations of a similar image can be also found at various places in Nietzsche (see Nietzsche 2006, p. 167-168 (§20); 1976, p. 472 (§42)), as well as in Hegel (see Hegel 1977, p. 14-15 (§26)).<sup>1</sup>

There are two characteristics of the metaphor that we should notice. First, from a philosophical perspective, the ladder metaphor is a heavily loaded one. It is widely used in the philosophical tradition by prominent philosophical figures and has raised a lot of discussion. Second, we can discern two main uses of the metaphor. The first (Sextus Empiricus, Mauthner, the non-metaphysical readings of Hegel) emphasizes the “negational”, “skeptical”, “de(con)structive” or “therapeutical” aspects of climbing and subsequently abandoning the ladder. The second (Schopenhauer, Nietzsche, the metaphysical readings of Hegel) stresses the “elevational”, “surmounting”, “transcendental” character of this overcoming and the allegedly privileged view that is the result. Bearing these two points in mind, we shall move now to a discussion of some of the characteristics of the New Wittgenstein debate, a central aspect of which is the issue of continuity in Wittgenstein's thought. As we shall see, the distinction between the two interpretations of the ladder metaphor might shed a new light on some of these issues.

## 2. Wittgenstein's Later Rejection of the Ladder Metaphor and the Issue of Continuity Regarding his Metaphilosophy

I might say: if the place I want to reach could only be climbed up to by a ladder, I would give up trying to get there. For the place to which I really have to go is one that I must actually be at already.

Anything that can be reached with a ladder does not interest me. (MS 109, 6-7/11/1930; Wittgenstein 1998, p. 10)

This remark suggests that by 1930 Wittgenstein had come to repudiate the place that the climbing of the ladder leads to. Neither the linguistically transcendental, panoptic standpoint to which we are lead – via showing – by the “deep nonsense” of the *Tractatus*, as traditional readers of the work have it, nor the liberated position that the purportedly cured reader occupies after the demystifying dialectic therapeutics of the work has been put into play, as the resolute readers hold, is what Wittgenstein thinks we

should strive after. Varying on 6.54, we could say that now Wittgenstein wants us to throw away the ladder *before* we have climbed up on it. It is of crucial importance that Wittgenstein decides to attack the ladder metaphor and, consequently, the image(s) that it suggests. For the resolute readers, remark 6.54 of the *Tractatus* constitutes not only the frame proposition par excellence, that is a proposition that Wittgenstein intends to be recognized as having sense and as providing instruction on how the whole work is to be read, but also the very climax of the work (see Conant 2007, p. 42).<sup>2</sup> So, what the above remarks actually challenge is the resolute readers' conception of a strong continuity in Wittgenstein's thought. This continuity is tracked down by resolute readers – and especially by those who acknowledge the significance of the differences between the early and later phase of Wittgenstein's thought – paradigmatically, but not exclusively, in Wittgenstein's conception of the aim of philosophy and, in general, in his metaphilosophy, i.e. in his remarks *on* philosophy (e.g. Conant 2007, p. 66-71, 105-107).

It is in this respect that resolute readers think that Wittgenstein's metaphilosophy has priority over his philosophical positions themselves and accordingly the continuity of his thought is highlighted. However, this emphasis on Wittgenstein's metaphilosophy and the claim that, no matter the (profound) differences between his early and his later philosophy, his metaphilosophy remains, by and large, the same, are not unproblematic. For, despite the apparent similarities between the metaphilosophical positions of the young and the mature Wittgenstein, there are also deep discontinuities to be found. On the one hand, Wittgenstein's metaphilosophy (both early and later) is linguistically oriented – and this is a sign of continuity of course. On the other hand, his conception of language changes profoundly; and with this change in his views about language, his (linguistically oriented) metaphilosophy becomes different as well. Key terms in Wittgenstein's (meta)philosophy, such as ‘language’, ‘activity’, ‘practice’, ‘nonsense’, ‘clarity’, ‘elucidation’, etc., have a certain meaning in the philosophical context of the *Tractatus*, and gain another meaning in that of the Philosophical Investigations. So, it is not “Wittgenstein's view of philosophy, rather than his view of meaning, that plays the pivotal role in his thought” (Horwich 2004, p. 107), but actually the interaction of the two. Wittgenstein's shift from the metaphysical (standard readings) or unwittingly metaphysically committed (“weak” resolute readings) point of view of the *Tractatus* to the anthropological perspective of his later works is not without consequences for his metaphilosophy.<sup>3</sup>

## 3. Metaphysics, Ethics and Therapy in the *Tractatus*

One thing the resolute readers must do is combine their resolute readings with the undeniable discontinuities in Wittgenstein's work. Being resolute, they hold that the text of the *Tractatus* does not contain philosophical positions that Wittgenstein willingly endorses. Yet, in order to account for the discontinuities, they do allow that Wittgenstein unwittingly was committed to certain implicit philosophical preconceptions (see Conant 2007, p. 85-86). So, as far as the views of early Wittgenstein on language and

logic are concerned, this resolute schema of reading the Tractatus holds: i) that Wittgenstein was in fact metaphysically committed in the Tractatus; ii) that, nevertheless, he was only implicitly metaphysically committed; iii) that despite the fact that these metaphysical commitments emerge from or reveal themselves in the text, we should still maintain that these philosophical positions are to be understood as empty resolute nonsense that Wittgenstein intends to reject in an absolute way.

Regarding ethics, things are not much different, since Conant maintains that the ethical point of the book lies outside of what its "ethical" propositions say (Conant 2005, p. 72). But what he provides as candidate expressions for describing this ethical point are actually views that are already contained, directly or indirectly, in those parts of early Wittgenstein's writings (i.e. his wartime notebooks and the Tractatus up to the 'Lecture on Ethics') that are concerned with ethical issues. It is, thus, very hard to see how this resolute construal of the ethical point of the Tractatus differs not only from the ineffable ones, at least as far as their starting points are concerned,<sup>4</sup> but also from the relevant "ethically oriented" remarks, such as Tractatus 5.632, 5.633, 5.641, 6.44 and 6.45 among others, that the resolute readers treat as austere nonsensical.

This exclusively negative conception of ethics, and of Wittgenstein's philosophy in general, not only gives rise to an image of Wittgenstein as merely a member of the "language police" who patrol the limits of the meaningful, it also fails to illuminate the wide scope of Wittgenstein's distinction between sense and nonsense (Wittgenstein 2001, §499 p. 117-118). In particular, it fails to acknowledge the conception of ethics and philosophy as a struggle against "the boundaries of language" (Wittgenstein 1993, p. 44; 1979a, p. 68-69). The same seems to hold for the resolute conception of (philosophical) therapy, for although it embraces some of the epistemological aspects of Pyrrhonism, as has been often observed by resolute and non-resolute readers alike (e.g. Plant 2004 and Sluga 2004), the resolute view is not equally sensitive to the ethical aspects of it that revolve around the notion of *ataraxia* (tranquility). Interestingly enough, a conception of the ethical akin to that of tranquility seems to run through early Wittgenstein's "ethical" oeuvre, as is evident from remarks such as "the world is independent of my will" in the wartime notebooks (Wittgenstein 1979, p. 73, 6/7/16), or the experience of "feeling absolutely safe" discussed in the 1930 'Lecture on Ethics' (Wittgenstein 1993, p. 41-43).<sup>5</sup>

#### 4. Wittgenstein's Early Thought in Context and Resolute Readings

The observations sketched above highlight some of the problems which resolute readings face. We could add remarks regarding the way resolute readers conceive of the Tractatus as a piecemeal work and as a formal (and not substantive) whole; on their uneasiness with the essentially paradoxical character of the work; concerning the differences between Wittgenstein's early and later conception of therapy and the relation of the Tractatus to the tradition of modernity. Regarding this last point, the following can be noticed. The signs of scientism that the resolute readings detect in the Tractatus – through their own underlying scientism (see Stokhof 2010) – are indeed clearly discernable, along with other characteristics of modernity such as essentialism and dogmatism. However, we should keep in mind that these signs are at the same time indicative, as Wittgenstein's later, self-critical remarks on these

issues show, of his radical opposition to the Tractatus. It is a radical opposition for it breaks the (vicious) circle of trying to fight modernity from within, by its own means.<sup>6</sup> And this radical opposition to some of the main tenets of the tradition of modernity that Wittgenstein's later writings give voice to need not be reduced to the rather trivial motto of the "end of (substantial) philosophy" that the negatively constituted scientific conceptions of (Wittgenstein's) philosophy, either resolute or standard, adopt; an attitude that if anything, is not original, as it can be found throughout the history of philosophy in its various skeptical manifestations.

#### Endnotes

<sup>1</sup> An extensive discussion of the ways in which Hegel conceives of the nature and function of the ladder in the *Phenomenology of Spirit* can be found in Harris (1997). One point of debate is whether "the ladder" is dispensable for Hegel or not. The two positions square with "orthodox" traditional (metaphysical) readings and the "heretic" non-metaphysical ones that can be distinguished in contemporary Hegelian scholarship. The resemblance with the contemporary state of Wittgensteinian scholarship, especially in relation to the New Wittgenstein debate, is striking, but discussion of it must be left for another occasion.

<sup>2</sup> Even resolute readers who do not ascribe to the idea of "frame propositions" still recognize in 6.54 the culmination of the whole text (see Hutchinson and Read 2006, p. 23, n. 37).

<sup>3</sup> At least so far as metaphilosophy is not conceived as a foundational enterprise (a second-order philosophy), but as flesh of philosophy's flesh (see Wittgenstein 2001, §121 p. 42).

<sup>4</sup> See for example Stokhof (2002, p. 186-249) where Tractarian ethics is treated as both a certain way of viewing or living in the world and as being intrinsically related to action.

<sup>5</sup> For an exemplary construal of the ethical in the Tractatus, which also draws interesting parallels with the Eastern philosophical tradition where tranquility (as detachment from the world) is again a central ethical goal, see Stokhof (2002).

<sup>6</sup> What the Tractatus and the resolute readings of Wittgenstein's philosophy actually share is the false consciousness of scientism/modernity. Wittgenstein, in direct reference to remark 4.5 of the Tractatus, puts it like this: "A picture held us captive. And we could not get outside it, for it lay in our language and language seemed to repeat it to us inexorably" (Wittgenstein 2001, §115 p. 41). The author of the Tractatus and the readers that understand him, as the resolute readers tend to emphasize this specific point, come to believe – in a typical modernist matter – that their conception of philosophy goes against the tradition, when in fact it is its outcome and manifestation. But in early Wittgenstein's case, and this is the crucial point, these aspects do not exhaust his philosophical stance, since the tradition is also incorporated in a direct way, as we can see this for example in its metaphysics, its conception of language and logic, and the remarks on ethics.

#### Acknowledgment

I would like to thank Martin Stokhof for his crucial contribution in the preparation of the paper.

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# Darstellungsweisen.

## Eine Notiz zum § 50 der *Philosophischen Untersuchungen*

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Was heißt es nun, von den Elementen zu sagen, daß wir ihnen weder Sein noch Nichtsein beilegen können? – Man könnte sagen: Wenn alles, was wir »Sein« oder »Nichtsein« nennen, im Bestehen und Nichtbestehen von Verbindungen zwischen den Elementen liegt, dann hat es keinen Sinn vom Sein (Nichtsein) eines Elements zu sprechen; sowie, wenn alles, was wir »zerstören« nennen, in der Trennung von Elementen liegt, es keinen Sinn hat, vom Zerstören eines Elements zu reden. (PU 50a)

Der Paragraph §50 der Philosophischen Untersuchungen beginnt mit der Frage, was es heißt, wenn wir sagen, „Einem Element kann weder Sein noch Nichtsein beigelegt werden“, und liefert umgehend eine mögliche Antwort darauf. Diese besagt, dass wir nicht sinnvoll vom Sein eines Elements sprechen können, wenn wir nicht festgelegt haben, was „ein Element ist“ bedeutet. Nehmen wir beispielsweise an, wir sagen immer und nur dann „diese Elemente sind“, wenn mehrere Elemente in einer Matrix (gemäß § 48) gegenübergestellt werden und wir sagen „diese Elemente werden zerstört“, genau dann, wenn eine solche Gegenüberstellung aufgelöst wird. Wenn wir jetzt von einem Element sagen, dass es ist, dann stellen wir uns vielleicht dieses eine Element vor und sonst nichts. Diese Vorstellung beinhaltet aber eine Anwendung des Begriffs „Sein“, auf einen Fall, der durch unsere Annahmen nicht abgedeckt war, nämlich den, wo ein Element nicht mehr in Verbindung mit anderen in einer Matrix auftritt. Möchte man darauf erwidern, dass Element stehe in einer Verbindung, und zwar mit den Leerstellen der Matrix, die gleichsam die Möglichkeit ausdrücken, in Verbindung mit anderen Elementen zu treten, so zeigt die unterschiedliche Modalität dieser Aussagen, wie verschieden die beiden Verwendung des Wortes „Sein“ hier tatsächlich sind.

Betrachten wir nun etwas genauer, wie Wittgenstein den Absatz aufbaut. Er beginnt mit der Frage, was es heiße, von den Elementen zu sagen, man könne ihnen nicht Sein beilegen. In der Antwort auf diese Frage geht er dazu über, zu sagen, es habe keinen Sinn, das zu tun. D.h. im ersten Moment scheint es so zu sein, als setze Wittgenstein die Ausdrücke „von etwas nicht sagen können“ und „von etwas nicht sinnvoll sagen können“ gleich. Der Gedankenstrich nach der Frage, wie auch die Einleitung der Antwort mit den Worten „Man könnte sagen“ lassen hieran allerdings Bedenken aufkommen. Diese werden durch die Weise in der Wittgenstein fortsetzt bestärkt:

Aber man möchte sagen: Man kann dem Element nicht Sein beilegen, denn wäre es nicht, so könnte man es auch nicht einmal nennen und also gar nichts von ihm aussagen. (PU 50b)

Daran ist zunächst bemerkenswert, dass Wittgenstein den nächsten Gedanken wiederum mit Worten beginnt, die einen gewissen Vorbehalt zum Ausdruck bringen. Zum einen wird angedeutet, dass die frühere Antwort nicht gänzlich befriedigend ist; man möchte hier noch etwas anderes sagen. Zum anderen erweckt die Formulierung unweigerlich den Eindruck, dass am folgenden Gedanke zwar etwas Verlockendes sein mag, aber wohl auch etwas

Verkehrtes ist. (Andernfalls man Formulierungen wie „Aber man sollte sagen“, „Aber besser wäre es zu sagen“, etc., erwarten würde.)

Ich möchte nun zunächst versuchen zu klären, was das Verlockende am Gedanken ist, dass man dem Element nicht Sein beilegen kann. Dafür ist nötig, sich darüber zu verständigen, woran man denkt, wenn man meint, man könne ein Element weder benennen, noch etwas darüber sagen, wenn es dieses nicht gäbe. Überlegt man sich beispielsweise, dass wir Sätze wie „Pegasos existiert nicht“ oder „Es gibt eine Königin von England“ im Alltag durchaus für wahr oder falsch halten, stellt sich die Frage, wer die von Wittgenstein geschilderte Auffassung verführerisch findet. Das folgende ist eine mögliche Erklärung: Wenn ich behaupte „Pegasos existiert“, dann läge im ersten Moment nahe zu sagen, dass meine Behauptung falsch ist. Stellen wir aber die weitere Frage, worüber hier etwas Falsches behauptet wurde, so scheint es, dass ich mich auf nichts beziehen habe können, also auch nichts Sinnvolles über irgendetwas ausgesagt habe. Es scheint dann gerade so, als könne man nur deshalb von Pegasos sprechen, weil es ihn gibt. Entsprechend können wir ihm auch nicht sinnvoll Sein beilegen, denn dass es ihn gibt ist vorausgesetzt. Unsere Zuschreibung wäre völlig inhaltslos. Dieser Überlegung liegt die Vorstellung zugrunde, dass die Bedeutung eines Namens der Gegenstand sei, für den er steht und dass Wittgenstein diese Vorstellung für verlockend hält, ist angesichts des Anfangs der Philosophischen Untersuchungen unbezweifelbar.

Nun mag man diese Auffassung zur Bedeutung eines Namens selbst überhaupt nicht reizvoll finden, aber dass wir die Bedeutung eines Namens im Alltag in einer großen Zahl der Fälle so erklären, dass wir auf denjenigen Gegenstand hinweisen, für den der Name steht, ist nicht von der Hand zu weisen. Unser Problem scheint damit das folgende zu sein: wir machen im Alltag sinnvolle Existenzaussagen, zugleich ist aber das Bild der Sprache, welches aus unserer intuitiven Auffassung der Bedeutung eines Namens herrührt, damit nicht in Einklang zu bringen. Wenn dies tatsächlich unser Problem ist, so würden wir uns erwarten, dass entweder eine Darstellung folgt, weshalb Zuschreibungen von Sein im Alltag zwar für sinnvoll gehalten werden, dies aber nicht wirklich sind, oder dass erläutert wird, inwiefern das sich uns aufdrängende Bild der Sprache verkehrt ist. Wittgenstein fährt im § 50 jedoch auf eine Weise fort, die anzeigt, dass es ihm um etwas anderes geht:

Betrachten wir doch einen analogen Fall! Man kann von einem Ding nicht aussagen, es sei 1 m lang, noch, es sei nicht 1 m lang, und das ist das Urmeter in Paris. – Damit haben wir aber diesem natürlich nicht irgend eine merkwürdige Eigenschaft zugeschrieben, sondern nur seine eigenartige Rolle im Spiel des Messens mit dem Metermaß gekennzeichnet. (PU 50b)

Der Umstand, dass hier überhaupt nicht mehr von der Zuschreibung von Sein oder Nichtsein die Rede ist, zeigt, dass Wittgensteins Interesse von vornherein nicht irgendwelchen Behauptungen der Existenz gegolten hat. Das

wirft aber sogleich die Frage auf, worin die Analogie der beiden Fälle liegt, die Wittgenstein anspricht. Beschränkt man sich für einen Moment bloß auf die verwendeten Worte, so wird ersichtlich, dass in beiden Fällen Überlegungen dazu angestellt werden, was von einem bestimmten Gegenstand ausgesagt werden kann. Die Frage, mit der wir uns beschäftigen, wäre demnach die Frage nach möglichen Zuschreibungen von Eigenschaften. Darauf deutet auch Wittgensteins Bezugnahme auf Platon im § 48 hin. Im Theätetus spricht dieser vom Sein und Nichtsein der Urbestandteile mittels des Ausdrucks 'ousia', worüber die Frage, was etwas ist, nicht ob es ist, Auskunft gibt.

Wenn die Behauptung nun ist, dass man vom Urmeter weder sagen kann, es sei einen Meter, noch es sei nicht einen Meter lang, dann muss es eine Antwort auf die Frage geben, wodurch diese Möglichkeit ausgeschlossen ist. Saul Kripke reagiert darauf, indem er die Behauptung zurückweist, womit sich die Notwendigkeit hier eine Antwort zu liefern, nicht ergibt. Dies ist aber wenig befriedigend, wenn wir herausfinden wollen, was diese Bemerkung eigentlich soll. Gordon Baker und Peter Hacker versuchen demgegenüber eine solche Antwort in ihrem ausführlichen Kommentar zum § 50 zu geben. Sie notieren, „[t]he sentence 'One metre is the length of the Metre Bar' is not the result of a measurement“ (Baker/Hacker 2005:196), sondern „gives the meaning of the phrase 'one metre'“. (Baker/Hacker 2005:197) Zwischen den beiden Ausdrücken „ein Meter“ und „die Länge des Urmeters“ besteht demnach ein Identitätsverhältnis. Dieses erlaubt uns den einen Ausdruck im Satz „Das Urmeter ist einen Meter lang“ durch den anderen zu ersetzen, womit wir eine Antwort geben können, weshalb wir vom Urmeter weder sagen können, er sei einen Meter lang, noch, er sei nicht einen Meter lang. „[T]o say that the Standard Metre Bar is one metre long is to say that the Standard Metre Bar is the length of the Standard Metre Bar, i.e. to say nothing at all. And to deny that it is one metre long is to deny that it has the length it has, i.e. to talk nonsense.“ (Baker/Hacker 2005:199) Baker und Hacker sind also der Auffassung, dass wir deshalb vom Urmeter nicht sagen können, es sei einen Meter lang, weil diese Aussage keinen Inhalt habe. Diese Analyse liefert prima facie auch eine Erklärung dafür, inwiefern es sich hier um einen analogen Fall zu jenem der Zuschreibung des Seins handelt. In beiden Fällen wird eine scheinbar sinnvolle Aussage als sinnlos aufgedeckt.

Erinnern wir uns aber, wie Wittgenstein seine Aussage zum Urmeter einführt. Er beginnt den Absatz mit den Worten „Aber man möchte sagen: Man kann dem Element nicht Sein beilegen, denn wäre es nicht, so könnte man es auch nicht einmal nennen und also gar nichts von ihm aussagen“ gefolgt von einem Gedankenstrich und der Aufforderung, einen analogen Fall zu betrachten: den Fall des Urmeters. Daran ist folgendes bemerkenswert. Wenn die Darstellung von Baker und Hacker richtig wäre, dass also weder dem Element Sein beigelegt werden kann, noch vom Urmeter ausgesagt werden kann, es sei einen Meter, dann gäbe es keinen Grund die Worte „man möchte sagen“ voranzustellen. Dass Wittgenstein aber so beginnt lässt zweifelhaft erscheinen, dass die Analyse von Baker und Hacker angemessen ist. Zudem ist nicht klar, inwiefern die Analyse im Fall des Seins derjenigen ähnelt, die Baker und Hacker für den Fall des Urmeters vorschlagen. Denn, auch wenn wir in beiden Fällen zum Schluss kommen, dass die Aussagen eigentlich keinen Inhalt haben, so ist es doch nicht so, dass wir im Fall des Seins zu diesem Ergebnis durch Einsicht in die Synonymie zweier Ausdrücke kommen. Inwiefern macht der Fall des Urmeters also die Sache klarer? Diese Bedenken im Kopf behaltend, kehren wir zurück zum § 50:

Denken wir uns auf ähnliche Weise wie das Urmeter auch die Muster von Farben in Paris aufbewahrt. So erklären wir: »Sepia« heiße die Farbe des dort unter Luftabschluss aufbewahrten Ur-Sepia. Dann wird es keinen Sinn haben, von diesem Muster auszusagen, es habe diese Farbe, noch, es habe sie nicht.

Wir können das so ausdrücken: Dieses Muster ist ein Instrument der Sprache, mit der wir Farbaussagen machen. Es ist in diesem Spiel nicht Dargestelltes, sondern Mittel der Darstellung. - Und eben das gilt von einem Element im Sprachspiel (48), wenn wir, es benennend, das Wort »R« aussprechen: wir haben damit diesem Ding eine Rolle in unserm Sprachspiel gegeben; es ist nun Mittel der Darstellung. (PU 50b-c)

Die Analogie, die Wittgenstein zwischen den beiden Fällen ausmacht, ist demnach an Überlegungen zur Unterscheidung von Dargestelltem und Mitteln der Darstellung gebunden. Diese Unterscheidung hebt er zu verschiedenen Zeiten als wichtig hervor. Im Februar 1932 etwa notiert er „Die Legende zu einer Landkarte ist so eine Anweisung zum Gebrauch — oder zum Verständnis — einer Beschreibung. [...] Diese Legende sagt jedenfalls nichts über die Geographie des Landes aus. Sowenig, wie der Satz »1m ist die Länge des Urmeters in Paris« etwas über die Länge eines Gegenstandes aussagt.“ (Ms 113, 23r) Einen damit verwandten Gedanken finden wir im sogenannten Blauen Buch: „Ich hebe das hervor, um ein für allemal die Vorstellung zu beseitigen, dass die Wörter der hinweisenden Definition etwas über das Definierte aussagen; die Verwechslung des Satzes »Das ist rot«, der einem Gegenstand die Farbe rot zuschreibt, mit der hinweisenden Definition »Das wird rot« genannt.“ (BB, 16) An dieser Erklärung ist nun vor allem eigenartig, dass wir nicht einen x-beliebigen Gegenstand heranziehen, um zu erklären, was 'rot' bedeutet, sondern darauf achten werden, dass er rot sei. Das heißt aber, sobald ich das Wort beherrsche, muss in einem gewöhnlichen Sinn gerade von diesem Gegenstand ausgesagt werden können, dass er rot ist. Wittgenstein selbst trägt am 17. November 1930 in das Manuskript 109 die Bemerkung ein: „Auch im Fall des Urmeters muß Etwas 1m lang sein.“ (Ms 109, 243) Ich nehme an, eine Vertreterin der Position, die Baker und Hacker in ihrem Kommentar entwerfen, würde versuchen diesen Konflikt dadurch aufzulösen, dass sie die letzte Aussage als inhaltsleer zeigt. Die Anmerkungen, die den § 50 abschließen, scheinen mir jedoch einen anderen Umgang damit vorzuschlagen:

Und zu sagen »Wäre es nicht, so könnte es keinen Namen haben« sagt nun so viel, und so wenig, wie: gäbe es dieses Ding nicht, so könnten wir es in unserem Spiel nicht verwenden. - Was es, scheinbar, geben muß, gehört zur Sprache. Es ist in unserem Spiel ein Paradigma; etwas, womit verglichen wird. Und dies feststellen, kann heißen, eine wichtige Feststellung machen; aber es ist dennoch eine Feststellung unser Sprachspiel – unsere Darstellungsweise – betreffend. (PU 50c)

Der Satz „Man kann vom Urmeter nicht sagen es sei einen Meter, noch es sei nicht einen Meter“ ist demnach eine Feststellung unsere Darstellungsweise betreffend. Schön und gut, ließe sich hier sagen, aber im Gegensatz wozu? Nun, es ist keine Feststellung im Sprachspiel über den Gegenstand, der dort als Paradigma dient. (Man könnte hier, wenn auch etwas missverständlich, sagen: wir kümmern uns nicht um den alltäglichen Sinn dieser Aussage.) Wir müssen deshalb aber nicht sagen, dass Aussagen, die aufgrund von Bedeutung allein wahr oder falsch sind, keinen Inhalt besitzen. Wir erkennen nur an, dass derartige Aussagen keine Aussagen über empirische Gegenstände

sind. Dies ist einsichtig, wenn wir Aussagen wie „ $2 + 3 = 5$ “ und „Junggesellen sind unverheiratete Männer“ betrachten. Im § 50 werden uns jedoch Fälle vorgeführt, an denen empirische Gegenstände teilhaben. Wittgenstein weist nun darauf hin, dass auch die hinweisende Definition keine Beschreibung irgendeines Gegenstands ist, sondern eine Feststellung unsere Darstellungsweise betreffend. (Wie auch der Satz „Entweder es regnet, oder es regnet nicht“ keine Aussage über das Wetter ist, sondern eine Feststellung darüber, wie wir über das Wetter sprechen.) Wir haben also zu unterscheiden zwischen Aussagen, die der Darstellung dienen und Aussagen über die Art und Weise, wie wir etwas darstellen.

Wenn das richtig ist, dann ist die Leistung des § 50 gerade nicht, die Unmöglichkeit einer bestimmten Aussage zu beweisen, sondern lediglich darauf hinzuweisen, dass mit der Aussage „Der Urmeter ist einen Meter lang“ verschiedenes gemeint sein kann. Als konkrete Darstellung aufgefasst handelt es sich um eine Zuschreibung, an der nichts Verkehrtes ist. Als Feststellung über unsere Darstellungsweise mit dem Metermaß hingegen informiert sie nicht über die Eigenschaften irgendeines Gegenstands,

sondern eben über unsere Darstellungsweise. Stellt man hier nun die Frage, was das heißt „eine Feststellung unsere Darstellungsweise betreffend machen“, so könnte man im gegebenen Fall sagen: Die Einsicht ist, dass wir für bestimmte Beschreibungen Gebrauch von Gegenständen machen, ohne welche der Sinn der Beschreibung ein anderer wäre. (Es wird gleichsam das Ausmaß des Unterschieds zwischen dem Messen mit dem Metermaß und dem Messen mit dem Augenmaß hervorgebracht, denn in einem Fall machen wir von einem Paradigma Gebrauch, im anderen nicht.) Nicht mehr, aber auch nicht weniger leistet der § 50.

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# Bild, Sagen, Zeigen. Wittgensteins visuelles Denken

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Insbesondere die Paragraphen der *Philosophischen Untersuchungen*, die kleinen Beobachtungen und prägnanten Beschreibungen und nicht zuletzt die Bemerkungen zum Aspektsehen, sind in der zuletzt immer wichtiger gewordenen Bilddiskussion häufige Referenz. Der späte Wittgenstein wird dabei als der für das eigentlich Ikonische, das ästhetisch Dichte interessante dem logischer Klarheit und allenfalls schematischer Bildlichkeit verpflichteten Autoren des *Tractatus logico-philosophicus* gegenübergestellt. Allerdings ist diese Trennung letztlich zu einfach. Schon die tractarianische Bild- bzw. Abbildtheorie und die an sie gebundene Unterscheidung von Sagen und Zeigen sind Denkfiguren, die, gerade weil sie im Rahmen der äußerlich rein logischen Sprachphilosophie scheinbar wenig mit tatsächlicher Visualität zu tun haben, für Wittgensteins eigenes visuelles Denken entscheidend sind. Im Folgenden will ich versuchen, diese Verbindung von abstraktem Strukturdenken und irreduzibler Sinnlichkeit als Herz Wittgenstein'scher Philosophie mindestens anzudeuten.

## 1. Die tractarianische Bildtheorie

„Wir machen uns Bilder der Tatsachen“ heißt es mehr feststellend als behauptend in Satz 2.1 des *Tractatus*. Wie selbstverständlich versteht Wittgenstein den Menschen als bilderproduzierendes Wesen. Allerdings ist die dahinter stehende Idee von Repräsentation keineswegs gewöhnlich. Wittgensteins Bildverständnis ist Teil der ganz eigenen tractarianischen Sprachphilosophie. In dieser aber funktioniert Abbildung nicht über Ähnlichkeiten, sondern über strukturelle Identitäten: das Bild gleicht dem Abgebildeten nicht, es teilt dessen logische Struktur.

Wie ist das zu verstehen?

Obwohl der *Tractatus* zunächst nicht mehr als eine Abhandlung über den Satz sein will (vgl. von Wright 1986, S. 109), wird er zum Manifest einer neuen Philosophie (vgl. Puchner 2005).

1. Die Welt ist alles, was der Fall ist.

1.1 Die Welt ist die Gesamtheit der Tatsachen, nicht der Dinge.

[...]

1.13 Die Tatsachen im logischen Raum sind die Welt.

[...]

2. Was der Fall ist, die Tatsache, ist das Bestehen von Sachverhalten.

2.01 Der Sachverhalt ist eine Verbindung von Gegenständen. (Sachen, Dingen.)

Der dogmatisch-apodiktische Duktus<sup>1</sup> des Textes macht schon auf den ersten Seiten deutlich, dass es hier um mehr geht, als um die Diskussion eines wichtigen logisch-semantischen Problems. Hinter dem vordergründig so neutralen, scheinbar um objektive Exaktheit bemühten dezimalnumerierten Aufbau steckt eine Wittgensteins gesamte Frühphilosophie tragende Neudefinition von Welt: nicht physikalische Vorhandenheit, logische Form ist entscheidend. Die Welt ist nicht die Anhäufung voneinander

unabhängiger Gegenstände. Sie baut sich nicht aus Atomen auf. Ihre Grundeinheit ist der Sachverhalt, das, was der Fall ist, die Tatsache. Noch am Ende ihrer Analyse, der Aufspaltung in ihre Elemente steht eine Konstellation, eine Konfiguration von Dingen (vgl. Wittgenstein 1984, § 2.0272). Diese Konfiguration aber hat, besser: sie ist eine logische Struktur. Denn die Tatsachen, welche die Welt sind, sind eben die „Tatsachen im logischen Raum.“

In diesem Kontext steht nun Satz 2.1: „Wir machen uns Bilder der Tatsachen.“ Das Bild aber besteht darin, darin, „dass sich seine Elemente in bestimmter Art und Weise zu einander verhalten.“ (Wittgenstein 1984, § 2.14) Die eigentliche Abbildung liegt somit auf der Ebene der internen Differenzierung des Bildes. Es kann sein, was es ist, weil seine Teile in identischer Weise konfiguriert sind, wie die Dinge der von ihm abgebildeten Tatsache. Wittgenstein erläutert diese Idee in seinen Tagebüchern mit dem Verweis auf die Möglichkeit, einen Autounfall mit Hilfe von Puppen nachzustellen.<sup>2</sup> Dabei müssen die Puppen keine Ähnlichkeit mit den tatsächlich Beteiligten aufweisen. Entscheidend ist, dass sie deren Position innerhalb des Vorgangs exakt vertreten, so dass die Struktur des Aufbaus der Struktur des Ereignisses der Möglichkeit nach entspricht. „Die Form der Abbildung ist die Möglichkeit, dass sich die Dinge so zueinander verhalten, wie die Elemente des Bildes.“ (Wittgenstein 1984, § 2.151) Nur wenn eine solche Strukturidentität vorliegt, kann man mit Wittgenstein überhaupt von einem Bild sprechen: „Was jedes Bild [...] mit der Wirklichkeit gemein haben muß, um sie überhaupt – richtig oder falsch – abbilden zu können, ist die logische Form, das ist, die Form der Wirklichkeit“ (Wittgenstein 1984, § 2.18). Als Konfiguration im logischen Raum ist das Bild dann aber ontologisch gleichwertig mit dem von ihm Abgebildeten. Oder wie Wittgenstein es selbst formuliert:

2.141 Das Bild ist eine Tatsache.

Wittgensteins Bildbegriff ist somit, wie Stefan Majetschak hervorgehoben hat, symmetrisch und reflexiv (vgl. Majetschak 2000, S. 47). Im Unterschied zu ‚normalen‘ Bildtheorien steht keineswegs fest, dass die Landkarte das Bild der Landschaft ist. Auf der Basis der Strukturidentität könnte das Abbildungsverhältnis ebenso in entgegen gesetzter Richtung verlaufen.

Als Zentrum seiner frühen Sprachphilosophie sind diese Überlegungen entscheidend für das gesamte tractarianische Denken. Die Hauptsätze 3 und 4 bestimmen zunächst den Gedanken als Bild und dann als sinnvollen Satz. Auf halber Strecke durch den Traktat hat man so eine strukturelle Identität von Welt, Bild, Gedanke und Satz. Die Unterscheidung von Bild und Sprache, ja, die Lücke zwischen *mind and world* ist kollabiert.

## 2. Die Unterscheidung von Sagen und Zeigen

Damit wird aber auch eine andere, zunächst wenig verdächtige Unterscheidung Wittgensteins problematisch: die Unterscheidung von Sagen und Zeigen. Bertrand Russell gegenüber nannte Wittgenstein sie einmal das „Hauptproblem der Philosophie“ (Wittgenstein 1984b, S.88) – schon das sollte stutzig machen.

In Satz 4.1212 des *Tractatus* heißt es kategorisch: „Was gezeigt werden kann, kann nicht gesagt werden.“ Doch wenn zeigen die Mitteilungsart des Bildes ist, der sinnvolle Satz aber das logische Bild der Tatsache – wie können sagen und zeigen dann so fundamental geschieden sein? Tatsächlich gewinnt die zunächst simpel erscheinende Unterscheidung im Folgenden ungeahnte Komplexität. Das ‚Zeigen‘ wird ein zentraler, vielleicht der zentrale Begriff des *Tractatus* (vgl. Gmür 2000, S. 30). Er lässt sich auf mindestens drei Ebenen differenzieren.<sup>3</sup>

Gemäß der tractarianischen Bildtheorie hat der sinnvolle Satz die logische Struktur mit der von ihm beschriebenen Tatsache gemein. Das Satz-Bild ‚sagt‘ mithin etwas, weil es etwas abbildet. So gelangt Wittgenstein zu dem nach Punkt 4.1212 zunächst irritierenden Diktum, dass der „Satz zeigt, was er sagt“ (Wittgenstein 1984, § 4.461). Dieses Zeigen kann deskriptives oder sagendes Zeigen genannt werden.

Das transzendente Zeigen zeigt die Möglichkeitsbedingung der Abbildung überhaupt. Die logische Form der Tatsachen ist Grundlage des deskriptiven Zeigens und damit selbst nicht wieder abbildbar. Kein Standpunkt außerhalb ihrer ist möglich. Logische Sätze sind sinnlos, weil sie keine Konfiguration im logischen Raum beschreiben. Ihr Zeigen ist kann somit nichts beschreiben, ist aber transzendental.<sup>4</sup>

Ein drittes Zeigen wird gegen Ende des *Tractatus* immer wichtiger. Es ist weder sinnvoll noch sinnlos. Wittgenstein nennt es auch – im Unterschied zu Satz Sinn und logischer Form – explizit das „Unaussprechliche“ (Wittgenstein 1984, § 6.522).<sup>5</sup> Als sich entziehendes Unaussprechliches ist dieses Zeigen allerdings keines mehr, das der Souveränität des Sprechers unterstünde. Es zeigt sich.<sup>6</sup> Satz 6.44 nennt dieses sich-Zeigen das mystische und in Satz 6.45 heißt es: „Die Anschauung der Welt sub specie aeterni ist ihre Anschauung als – begrenztes – Ganzes.“

Im Unterschied zum sinnvollen Satz, der einen Ausschnitt der Welt, eine Tatsache, abzubilden im Stande ist, erlaubt das mystische sich-Zeigen eine Einsicht der besonderen Art: die Ein-sicht in die Faktizität der Welt, ihr Dass.

Dieses Dass ist nicht mehr mit normalem Auge zu sehen. Es lässt sich nicht anschauen wie ein Bild an der Wand, die Landkarte auf dem Tisch oder irgendeine Tatsache der Welt. Die Anschauung sub specie aeterni verlangt eine andere Sensibilität. Wittgenstein spricht vom „Gefühl der Welt als begrenztes Ganzes.“ (Wittgenstein 1984, § 6.45). Was sich zeigt, sieht man in einem Gefühl.

Wittgensteins Auffächerung des Zeigens hat entscheidende Folgen für das Verständnis des *Tractatus*. Eine auch für sein weiteres Denken bis zu den *Philosophischen Untersuchungen* und *Über Gewissheit* grundlegende ist die implizite Revaluierung der Sinne für die philosophische Erkenntnis. Die tractarianische Unterscheidung von Sagen und Zeigen steht nicht im Bann einer Tradition, welche die reflektierenden Funktionen des Verstandes hierarchisch über der Sinnlichkeit ansiedelt. Sie ist keine Differenz zwischen abstrakter Konzeptualität und konkreter Wahrnehmung, sondern eine der Sichtbarkeit selbst. Mit ihr trennt und verbindet Wittgenstein die ideale Eindeutigkeit der naturwissenschaftlichen Sprache von der propositional uneinholbaren ästhetischen Wahrnehmung mit allen Sinnen. In einiger Nähe zu Roland Barthes' *studium* und *punctum* kann man mit Wittgenstein von der sagenden und der sich-zeigenden Dimension des Bildes sprechen. Ist erstere die eindeutig erkennbare Struktur so ist letztere jene Irritation, die als das *je ne sais pas* ästhetischer Er-

fahrung nicht auf den Begriff gebracht werden kann. Es scheint diese unscharfe Sicht auf die Welt als begrenztes Ganzes zu sein, von welcher Wittgenstein am Ende seines *Tractatus* als der richtigen Sicht, des eigentlichen Ziels der Philosophie spricht (vgl. Wittgenstein 1984, § 6.54).<sup>7</sup>

Was dieser tendenziöse Schnelldurchgang durch einige zentrale Gedanken der Wittgenstein'schen Frühphilosophie zeigen soll, sind vor allem zwei Dinge: zum einen birgt Wittgensteins frühe Bildtheorie – obwohl explizit als Abbild gedacht – bereits den Kern der Spätphilosophie. Das symmetrisch reflexive Verhältnis zwischen Bild und Abgebildeten führt zu einem funktionalen Verständnis des Bildes: Was Bild ist, hängt nicht primär an intrinsischen Qualitäten des Artefakts. Stattdessen wird es, was es ist, nur in Bezug zum Standpunkt dessen, der sich durch es auf Welt bezieht (vgl. Majetschak 2000, S. 51).<sup>8</sup> Im Rahmen der Sprachspielphilosophie wird dieser Aspekt der Kontextbindung deutlicher, das Abbild durch das Bewegungsbild, die Geste ersetzt.<sup>9</sup> Entscheidend aber ist, dass schon der *Tractatus* den ontologischen Niveauunterschied zwischen Bild und Abgebildeten einebnet und beides primär als Moment innerhalb eines konkreten Weltbezugs versteht. Das bringt eine zweite wichtige Konsequenz mit sich: die hierarchische Trennung zwischen Sprache und Bild ist aufgelöst. Und zwar so, dass weder das Bild einfach Text wird noch umgekehrt. Ob Wortsprache oder Malerei – in beiden Medien gibt es die Dimension des Sagens und des sich-Zeigens.

Gerade weil er besetzte Begriffe wie Bild, Sagen und Zeigen in höchst eigener Art und Weise gebraucht scheint mir Wittgenstein nun interessant für die Diskussion über die Rolle des Bildes für den Menschen, wie sie mit den sogenannten Bildwissenschaften über die letzten Jahre immer wichtiger geworden ist.

Schon 1980 hat Gottfried Boehm die Korrektur des am Abbild orientierten Bildverständnisses gefordert (vgl. Boehm 1980, S. 120). Bilder sind gerade nicht auf eine positivistische Kopie in der Wirklichkeit vorfindbarer Strukturen zu reduzieren. Die Konzentration auf das Abbild vernachlässige eine andere, genuin ästhetische Form der Deixis, ein nicht aus der Wahrnehmung abstrahierbares sich-Zeigen. Sie ist eine eigene Wissensform, nicht in lineare Sprache rückübersetzbar. Der „fließenden Komplexität“ des Bildes, so Boehm noch in seinem 2007 erschienenen Band *Wie Bilder Sinn erzeugen*, ist eine auf „die logischen Mittel der Identifikation angewiesene Sprache nicht gewachsen.“ (Boehm 2007, S. 206). Die dynamische Dichte des Ikonischen wird so der statischen Differenziertheit der Sprache gegenüber gestellt und ein medial-ontologischer Unterschied aufgemacht, der, wie wir gesehen haben, bei Wittgenstein sekundär geworden war. Wenn es aber gerade das Bild als Abbild ist, welches einer nicht genuin ästhetischen Erkenntnis vorbaut, „den Fluss sinnlicher Erfahrung [...] im festen Umriss des Eidos oder des Begriffs“ zum Stehen bringt (Boehm 1980, S. 118), dann kann die mediale Differenzierung so endgültig nicht sein.

Nicht um Wittgenstein gegen die Bildwissenschaft auszuspielen, sondern um deren Überlegungen ihre breit möglichste philosophische Relevanz zu sichern, müsste man prüfen, in wiefern die medienindifferente Bildtheorie des *Tractatus* die Möglichkeit bereitstellt, immer noch bestehende Gräben zwischen Verfechtern des *linguistic* und des *iconic turn*, der Sprachwissenschaft und der Kunsttheorie zu überbrücken. Wittgenstein ist gerade da ein visueller Denker, wo er scheinbar ohne Bilder auskommt. Die mehr als 1300 Skizzen und Graphiken in seinem Nachlass sprechen eine deutliche Sprache (vgl. Mersch 2006, S.

925) – und sind doch letztlich nicht entscheidend. Der Witz des *visual thinking* ist nicht, dass man abstrakte Gedankengänge durch graphische Darstellung abkürzt oder erleichtert, sondern die Annahme, dass Denken überhaupt anders funktioniert als häufig vermutet. Anstatt sinnliche Eindrücke in abstrakte Daten zu transformieren und anschließend als solche zu prozessieren steht *visual thinking* für die Vorstellung eines konkret sinnlich funktionierenden Denkens. Es richtet sich gegen die künstliche – wenn auch in vieler Hinsicht sehr wichtige und erfolgreiche – Komplexitätsreduktion rationaler Vereindeutigung. Von seinen Anfängen an war Wittgensteins Denken gegen eine solche Reduktion gerichtet. Die tractarianische Bildtheorie und die Differenzierung von Sagen und Zeigen ermöglichen ihm nicht nur, Russells Antinomie, den Ausgangspunkt Wittgenstein'schen Philosophierens, aufzulösen. Sie sind zentrale Aspekte menschlichen Weltverhältnisses und somit nicht auf ihre materielle, kontingente Erscheinung zu reduzieren.

Wittgenstein vermeidet so die Gefahr, ikonische Erkenntnis, das Sehen des sich-Zeigenden für ein bestimmtes Medium oder gar eine bestimmte gesellschaftliche Praxis, die Kunst, zu reservieren. Und macht zugleich das, was die Philosophie traditionell aus dem Erkenntnisvorgang rauszuhalten versuchte, zu dessen Zentrum.

## Endnoten

<sup>1</sup> Im Gespräch mit Friedrich Waismann beschreibt Wittgenstein 1931 seinen Duktus im *Tractatus* rückblickend als dogmatisch (vgl. Wittgenstein, *Wittgenstein und der Wiener Kreis*, S. 182).

<sup>2</sup> wie er es in einem Pariser Gerichtssaal gesehen haben soll...Ludwig Wittgenstein, *Tagebücher 1914-1916*, S. 94/95, Eintrag vom 29.9.14.

<sup>3</sup> Die folgende Unterscheidung der verschiedenen Modi des Zeigens übernimmt weitgehend diejenige Gmürs in: *Ästhetik bei Wittgenstein*, S. 32f.

<sup>4</sup> „Die Logik ist transzendental.“ (Wittgenstein 1984, § 6.13).

<sup>5</sup> Dieses Unaussprechliche ist dadurch, dass es nicht gesagt werden kann, keineswegs weniger real. Vielmehr liegt der Rede vom Unaussprechlichen, wie Majetschak hervorhebt, die Erfahrung zugrunde, dass es mit den Tatsachen der Welt noch nicht getan ist (vgl. Majetschak 2000, S. 117).

<sup>6</sup> Dieter Mersch macht gleich zu Beginn seiner Studie *Was sich zeigt* auf den Charakter des Sich-zeigens als ein sich notwendig Entziehendes aufmerksam. (vgl. Mersch 2002, S. 9).

<sup>7</sup> Vgl. auch Gmür, *Ästhetik bei Wittgenstein*, S. 60.

<sup>8</sup> „Die Unterscheidung von Bild und Abbild beruht nicht auf einer ontologischen Struktur der Welt, sondern ist eine Frage der Situierung der Betrachtung“ schreibt Gunter Gebauer 2004, S. 37. Somit wäre, was Dieter Mersch in Bezug auf die Spätphilosophie die Gebrauchstheorie des Bildes nennt, im Kern schon im *Tractatus* vorhanden (vgl. Mersch 2006, S. 938).

<sup>9</sup> Zur Bedeutung von Bewegungsbild und Geste in der Spätphilosophie Wittgensteins vgl. Gebauer 2009, Kapitel 3, insbesondere Abschnitt 1 und 6, sowie Goppelsröder 2007.

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# Wittgenstein's Conception of Language in Teaching and in the Comprehension of Concepts

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In *Philosophical Investigations* (PI), Wittgenstein explicitly presents his new language conception, describing, right at the beginning of this work, some simple situations about the use of words, such as when we ask someone to bring us "five red apples" from the market, or, when a building constructor asks his helper to bring him different materials. The comprehension of these orders presupposes the mastery of different techniques employed in the use of each word, techniques which are *learned* within a determined form of life (PI 1-2). After describing the acts involved in these primitive processes of the use of words, he makes an unusual analogy between these described situations and the idea of a game, proposing that we think of these primitive processes in the use of words "as one of those games by means of which children learn their native language". These are then referred to as "language-games", in the sense that they form a totality, consisting of the verbal language as well as the activity into which it is woven (PI 7).

Wittgenstein begins to employ the expression "language-game", instead of merely "language", throughout his later work. This apparently simple and innocuous change radically breaks off from the Platonic tradition of thinking, and alters profoundly the referential concept of language, both rooted in the image<sup>1</sup> that there would be autonomous meanings, of an extralinguistic nature, communicated through the different tongues. That is exactly the image I aim to argue against, keeping in mind its implications in current educational theories and practices.

## 1. Platonic Essentialism versus "Family Resemblances"

The Platonic dialogues make evident Socrates' efforts to investigate, with his interlocutors, the essence that would be behind concepts like virtue, justice, courage, knowledge, among others. Nevertheless, even strictly following the dialectic laws, they do not attain an exact and precise definition of the concepts they investigate. In *Meno* (1966), the enquiry into the possibility of teaching virtue ends with the following words from the master of maieutics to his interlocutor Meno: "On our present reasoning then, whoever has virtue gets it by divine dispensation. But we shall not understand the truth of the matter until, before asking how men get virtue, we try to discover what virtue is in and by itself" (100 B).

As we see in this aporetic ending, a precise and exact definition of virtue is an unequivocal condition to deduce any sense that results from the application of this concept: whether it is possible to be taught, or acquired as divine dispensation, among other possibilities. An essence of the concept is therefore assumed, that does not depend *a priori* on any use that has been made of the word virtue. It is against this essentialism that Wittgenstein rebelled, when he realized that this manner of thinking was impregnated in all the areas of knowledge, including in *Tractatus*, whose pretention was to exhibit the logical form, a common fixed essence to language and to the world

(PI 23). Hence, he was opposed to the Platonic essentialism, observing (*schau*) how concepts are effectively employed in their different contexts of application:

I cannot characterize my standpoint better than by saying that it is opposed to that which Socrates represents in the Platonic dialogues. For if I was asked what knowledge is, I would list items of knowledge and add "and suchlike." There is no common element to be found in all of them, because there isn't one. (TS 302 14)

We can already see, in this passage of the intermediate phase (1930-32), the concept of "family resemblance", that will clearly be expressed in PI, in opposition to the idea of an essence of concepts: we only have different applications of words, related among each other, in several manners, without there being something in common to *all* of them (PI 67). To believe that there is a precise sense of a concept, regardless of its effective application, leads to misunderstandings and confusions, like the belief in the existence of meanings situated in ideal, mental or empirical domains, which could be reached through the application of a teaching method.

## 2. The Criticism to the Referential Conception of Language

One of the first philosophers to be interested in the relationships among language, teaching and meaning, as we know, was Augustine. In the last of his dialogues, titled *The Teacher*, he delves into the purposes of language and reaches, at least, one conclusion that would influence the greater part of the current pedagogical guidelines: language should essentially teach and recall the meanings that were already *a priori* in some manner within the spirit of whoever listens. Although it is not through language that you *learn*, because words become empty of meaning if there is no contemplative attitude, back to within oneself, the necessary condition so that there is a true access to the contents taught:

But men make the mistake of calling people "teachers" when they are not that at all, because there is generally no interval of time between the moment of speaking and that of knowing, and because their coming to learn from within follows quickly upon the suggestive force of the speaker's words, they think that they have learned externally from him who spoke those words. (Augustine 2004 59)

It is as if the word had only the function to refer to that which already exists in some manner in the external or internal world. The role of language would only be to evoke these meanings *a priori*. The influence of Platonic essentialism can be perceived clearly in this referential conception of language. However, in Augustine's work, these meanings take the form of supposed mental entities, located in an interior world, which are covered by language with more or less precision. We can see here, a sketch of the possibility of a private language; characterized by Wittgenstein in the following manner:

Someone coming into a strange country will sometimes learn the language of the inhabitants from ostensive definitions that they give him; and he will often have to guess the meaning of these definitions; and will guess sometimes right, sometimes wrong.

And now, I think, we can say: Augustine describes the learning of human language as if the child came into a strange country; that is, as if it already had a language, only not this one. Or again: as if the child could already *think*, only not yet speak. And "think" would here mean something like "talk to itself". (PI 32)

Going against that concept of language, Wittgenstein resorts to a banal, and at the same time clarifying example, that unmistakably expresses the public character of thought:

Look at the blue of the sky and say to yourself "How blue the sky is!" – When you do it spontaneously – without philosophical intentions – the idea never crosses your mind that this impression of colour belongs only to you. And you have no hesitation in exclaiming that to someone else. And if you point at anything as you say the words you point at the sky. I am saying: you have not the feeling of pointing-into-yourself, which often accompanies 'naming the sensation' when one is thinking about 'private language'. Nor do you think that really you ought not to point to the colour with your hand, but with your attention. (Consider what it means 'to point to something with the attention'.) (PI 275)

Thus, if we do not *think*, but *look* (PI 66) as we act when uttering perceptive states, we ascertain that we have no doubts of being understood. We just follow rules that were learned in our forms of life and constitute the meaning of the words "blue", "sky", etc. When we teach a child the color blue, we point to different objects with different shades of blue, until the child, when faced with a shade of blue not yet known, is capable of saying: "this object is also blue!" At this moment, you no longer employ the word blue as a label, but establish the concept of blue. In other words, the perception becomes *conceptual*. To understand the exclamation "How blue the sky is!" is simply being able to, before a new situation, operate techniques and procedures already learned.

Therefore, there is not one essential meaning, as Plato and Augustine thought, of blue, common to all, prior to the naming of this color. Some communities do not even distinguish blue from green: simply because they did not *learn* to make this conceptual distinction. They use the same name to express both what we perceive as blue or green. This does not mean that they cannot learn new rules and, therefore, also make these distinctions.

It is in this sense that our perception of the blue sky does not express an interior state as Augustine would declare. *We learn* the language game of colors by following rules of a conventional nature, which were constituted in a practice that is common, *public* and not private. It is the mastery of different techniques and procedures, obtained by teaching and training that allows the construction of the senses. However, Augustine was a pioneer in mentalist theories of meaning, that still have an impact on the contemporary pedagogical theories of the western world.

### 3. Rousseau's Ideas and the New School

In 1762, Rousseau published a pedagogical treaty that would influence almost all modern and contemporary educators: *Emílio*. Although this work is essentially a reflection about education, the naturalist philosopher also delves into the issues of language and its relationship with teaching, with echoes of Augustine and Plato throughout this work, as can be seen in these two passages:

Whatever the study, without the idea of the represented things, the representative signs are nothing. However, we always limit the child to these signs, without ever making her understand none of the things they represent (1964 106).

It is from the first word that the child is satisfied, it is from the first thing it learns trusting on the word of another person, without having itself noticed its utility, that its judgement is lost: it will be a long time to shy in front of the fools before repairing such lost. (1964 109)

In these and other passages, Rousseau introduces new guidelines to teaching for the next two centuries: the child must learn through things themselves and not through symbols that represent them. His basis was an essentialist and referential conception of language, assuming, like his great masters, Plato and Augustine, that thought precedes language. However, he moves away from them, when affirming that thought does not have an *a priori* nature, but is developed by stages, which are described by him throughout *Emílio*. In this sense, he is considered a pioneer in the psychology of development, which would inspire several pedagogical trends of the new school, such as the pragmatism of Dewey, Piagetian constructivism and the pedagogy of competencies proposed by the sociologist Perrenoud, predominant guidelines, also in the official documents for education of the Brazilian government.

Heirs to the ideas of Rousseau, these pedagogical conceptions adopted the idea that the development of children's cognitive competencies come about in a natural manner, sufficing the provision of suitable learning situations. Besides this principle, Dewey and Perrenoud also incorporated Rousseau's maxim as well as his teaching method: we must teach what the child perceives as *useful*, and it is from experimentation and empirical observation that meanings are built, seen by them as instruments that are perceived to be more or less efficient to solve the problems demanded by the society in which he or she lives.

Nowadays, these principles have condensed themselves into the idea that there would be a natural rationality within the human being to be developed, which permits the comprehension of meanings common to all, which leads to the same Platonic image of extralinguistic autonomous meanings, reached in a natural way. In other words, there is a *naturalization* of the process of knowledge as can be seen in the following passages of one of the official documents for high schools in Brazil:

The new society, arising from the technological revolution and its consequences in production and in the area of information, presents characteristics that make it possible to assure to education autonomy still not reached. This occurs when the development of the cognitive and cultural competencies required for full human

development begins to coincide with what that we expect in the sphere of production.

The new paradigm comes from the understanding that, more and more, the desirable competencies for full human development approximate themselves to the ones necessary to the insertion in the productive process. (Brasil 1999)

Although this passage can be seen as an isolated voice in this Brazilian document, other texts<sup>2</sup>, in the most diverse places on the planet, only reiterate this tone, at same time, boastful and dangerously ideological, presenting in a dogmatic manner a fictitious confluence: the development of the most diverse competencies is proposed as if these referred themselves to something from the natural, empirical or mental world, not considering the diverse techniques and methods *invented*, constitutive parts of the senses which are in reality built within language games. From a Wittgensteinian perspective, understanding what was taught does not come from the development of cognitive competencies that assure the maximum effectiveness of the productive systems. It is only the ability to dominate procedures, that is, be capable of following rules of a *conventional* nature, which could be others, in other forms of life.

## Endnotes

<sup>1</sup> Moreno's interpretation of the Wittgensteinian concept of image (1993), as the application of words or expressions which force us to think in only one direction.

<sup>2</sup> See, for instance, the Jacques Delors and Gardner reports, written in the nineties and eighties respectively.

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# Thinking with the Environment. Language, Pictures and Other Guides for the Extended Minds

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## 1. Introduction

In their much-discussed manifesto of a thorough, “active” externalism in the philosophy of mind, titled “The Extended Mind”, Andy Clark and David Chalmers (1998) highlight “the active role of the environment in driving cognitive processes” (7), and they argue that there are situations in which “... the human organism is linked with an external entity in a two-way interaction, creating a *coupled system* that can be seen as a cognitive system in its own right” (8, emphasis in the original).

While this externalist position, in its general outlook, shall be endorsed here, two questions concerning the concept of the coupled system are discussed in this paper, on the background of the authors’ choice of examples. The entities listed by Clark and Chalmers as examples – memory devices, such as notebooks and pocket calculators, on the one hand and language on the other – appear as the paradigmatic extensions of a mind that recruits features of its environment as cognitive resources or “epistemic tools” (Sterelny 2004). But, firstly, do these examples really support the idea of a coupled system, as they make their appearance as external instruments of cognition? Secondly, in which ways could other kinds of cognitive resources in the environment function as extensions of the mind – probably even as their paradigm? Part of the argument of this paper will be to demonstrate how these two questions are interrelated.

## 2. The Tale of Inga and Otto

Clark and Chalmers illustrate their point with two examples. The first one involves the use of cyborg implants as candidate extensions of the mind – which is an interesting choice of imagery in its own right. The more basic point however is made in the second example, which consists in a comparison between two imaginary figures.

First there is Inga, who uses her memory to find her way to a museum, mobilising internal cognitive resources, as she retrieves beliefs about her current location and the location of the museum. Interestingly, it seems implied in this example that she knows her way around town, so she neither has to actively use a map nor to read and memorise detailed indications, as she would in an unfamiliar place. Thus, most of her beliefs in this situation remain non-occurrent. Nor does she need to mobilise beliefs about her memory to tell her that *this* is the memorised item to be used for *that* purpose (Clark 2010). Other beliefs or meta-beliefs would only be explicitly mobilised – i.e. made occurrent – if unexpected circumstances intervened that misguided her (e.g., foggy conditions that create momentary disorientation), or if some error in information retrieval occurred (e.g., “wait, this is not the street I remember!”).

Otto, on the other hand, suffers from an imaginary form of Alzheimer-induced amnesia, which allows him to hold certain general beliefs and desires but fails at reliably

retaining most of the others. More precisely, Otto is able to decide to go to the museum and to keep this goal in memory, and he knows how to store and retrieve information on the museum’s whereabouts using his pocket notebook.

What Clark and Chalmers seek to demonstrate by this example is that there is nothing privileged about Inga’s way of cognitively accessing, and purposefully steering through her environment. The mere fact that some of the resources used by Otto are placed within his environment does not disqualify them as genuine cognitive resources. Just as Inga can reliably store and retrieve information on how to go to the museum by using her physiologically implemented memory, Otto is able to reliably pin down and retrieve the same kind of information by using his notebook. Doing so, the authors argue, amounts to delegating some of his core cognitive capacities to an entity in his environment.

## 3. How to become an Epistemic Tool

While the debates that followed Clark and Chalmers’ paper mostly focused on the notion of the human mind being extended into its environment, thus trying to demarcate the extension of the mind, as it were, from within, less attention has been paid to the possible active role of the environment itself in cognitive processes. To begin with, the authors identify four criteria for any entity to become part of cognitive processes (Clark 2010; Clark and Chalmers 1998: 17):

- i. The resource should be of reliable availability, and should be used on a frequent basis.
- ii. The information provided by that resource should be directly available.
- iii. This information should be endorsed automatically, i.e. without requiring further reflection on its reliability.
- iv. Present endorsement of this information should be based on successful endorsement in the past.

Normally, cognition should operate along these criteria, regardless of whether the physical location of the cognitive resources in question, and the information contained therein, is within the human body. If no empirical restrictions on the scope of the extended mind hypothesis to a certain set of cognitive resources are implied, these criteria should be both necessary and sufficient for the identification of suitable cognitive resources. However, provided that the argument in Clark and Chalmers’ paper is that a wide variety of external resources may meet these criteria (of which the notebook is just one example) just as reliably as internal resources (of which memories are the paradigm) will do, and if these criteria are indeed supposed to be both necessary and sufficient, not only the image of cognition that emerges is considerably broader than suggested by the notebook example, but also the image of the role of the environment.

#### 4. Three Cheers for the Environment

There are three directions in which environmental factors appear to be only partly factored into Clark and Chalmers' equation. The first direction concerns cognitive resources that are intentionally produced and publicly used. Such cognitive resources are accessible to a variety of individuals in a variety of ways, depending on their antecedent beliefs and desires; in consequence, the complexities implied by public use may actually increase rather than decrease the cognitive load incurred by the actors (Sterelny 2004). This observation is likely to be accurate for the public use of artefactual resources of all sorts, such as language and intentionally produced signs, as these have to be used in a co-ordinated fashion towards goals of different individuals that only partly overlap or converge. For linguistic items, their proper way of usage will be fixed and occasionally modified in the very course of public usage and, to some part, by explicit definitions. Moreover, the rules thus established can be explicated and reconstructed by using the very same cognitive resource. Even so, deceptive, parasitic or erroneous usages remain frequent occurrences that, proportional to the number of actors involved, compound to make the public use of language as a cognitive resource a more complex task than resorting to one's notebook in private. In this latter case, a completely idiosyncratic code invented by Otto by and for himself could, in principle, achieve the same result as notes written down in natural language.

The complexities of publicly shared cognitive resources are likely to further increase in the case of symbolic forms of representation that are less articulated and rule-governed than language. While maps or graphs are likely to show relatively narrow margins of interpretation even compared to language, as they are usually equipped with instructions on how to read them (e.g., captions or legends that reveal what type of symbol stands for what type of referent), most pictures, even if naturalistic, require that sufficient information about their context is present to the user. Such information may or may not be explicit, and it may not be accessible to all users to the same extent and with the same ease (the reference of some symbol may have been secretly negotiated by a number of individuals), and it may not be of the same kind (some commentary in natural language; a picture's placement within a series of pictures; memory of the event depicted). Similar observations are likely to apply to gestures and facial expressions (if not innate) as well as to all sorts of improvised signs. It may be argued that such asymmetries in contextual information pertain to linguistic forms, too, but such asymmetries are easier to track in language, as they can be explicitly addressed within the same medium. It would be much more difficult to comment a picture with a picture, so as to disambiguate its content, and to do so within a publicly accessible, explicit framework of reference that would still remain pictorial.

Would these complexities rule out the possibility that external cognitive resources of the latter kind might work as extensions of the mind? As pictures and their kin have a long tradition of publicly representing world affairs, a negative answer to this question, based on the four above criteria, would at best be counterintuitive.

The second direction in which the role of the environment might be clarified concerns the possible role of external cognitive resources that operate on a sub- or pre-linguistic level and that are found in the environment rather than being intentionally produced. Such resources may operate in a more direct and, indeed, active fashion than

both the notebook example and the claim that "the biological brain has [...] evolved and matured in ways which factor in the reliable presence of a manipulable environment" (Clark and Chalmers 1998: 10) would suggest: The authors observe that many if not most of our internal cognitive resources are used in direct and implicit fashion, in the sense of "non-occurrent beliefs" that guide behaviours without entering consciousness (Clark and Chalmers 1998: 10). Inga just uses her memory, "transparently as it were" (Clark 2010). However, if the analogy proposed by the authors really holds, external resources may in likewise direct fashion guide behaviour without their users becoming aware of it. The perceivable structure of the environment, with its specific patterns and arrangements, is normally used without the involvement of explicit inference or meta-beliefs about what is being perceived.

The image that emerges bears some resemblance to that drawn in ecological psychology (most prominently, Gibson 1986). One might not share Gibson's assumption that behaviour is not guided by representations at all, but by patterns of ambient energies impinging on the sense organs that are directly translated into action. Instead, one might conceive of representations that detect patterns in one's environment and direct appropriate behaviours towards them at the same instance, while neither having to be image-like nor articulated in any way; this concept has been introduced by Ruth Millikan (2004) under the rubric of "pushmi-pullyu" representations. In either case, firstly, cognition does not work by storing and retrieving *explicit* representations, whether image-like, map-like or other, while, secondly, the direct and directive force of what is encountered in the environment remains. These observations about the implicit and directive nature of cognition are true to the four above-cited criteria: The information encountered in the environment is available in direct and reliable fashion, and it is endorsed automatically on the basis of past encounters (through learning or through evolutionary mechanisms). One may pause to reflect on the information thus taken up, and one may then resort to other sources of information, but doing so remains a special case mostly reserved for cases of interference or error, and for (re-) assessing the goals of one's actions. Put differently, the mobilisation of meta-beliefs is reserved for cases in which fulfilment of some of the above criteria has become uncertain. In a familiar and well-behaved environment, one does not need a map, neither of the physical nor of the mental kind, nor does one need a definition or description of what one sees.

The third direction in which the role of the environment may have to be more precisely circumscribed is complementary to the second: If the environment is to be conceived of as an active contributor to cognition, and if the organism uses patterns within its environment as a cognitive resource, and if the organism is to form a genuinely coupled system with its environment, that organism will not only be guided by the patterns it detects in that environment. The effects of doing so will also loop back and modify the patterns by which it is guided. Consequently, those resources would be insufficiently described if they were seen as mere instruments to an apparatus of cognition that, in its structure and function, remained indifferent to the presence or absence of these resources. Michael Wheeler (2004) argues that there is a tension between the acknowledgment of a close coupling on the developmental level, i.e., in processes of individual learning (see, for example, Clark and Chalmers 1998: 12), and the notion of language as an external tool ("the ultimate tool") that complements, but does not become an intrinsic part of human cognitive capacities – although it may have



contributed, like the use of physical tools, to the evolutionary growth of these capacities (18).

To clarify this issue, the concept of “niche construction” in evolutionary biology may be helpful (prefigured by Lewontin 1982; introduced by Odling-Smee et al. 1996). On this account, ecological niches are not to be conceived of as a static, pre-existing set of external conditions into which organisms will adapt by means of natural selection. Both by their goal-directed behaviours and by the side-effects of such behaviours, organisms modify the conditions in which their further courses of action will be placed. They also modify the conditions under which some of their own traits will be naturally selected. Thus, niches may be constructed both on the evolutionary level, by modifying conditions for the natural selection of traits, and on the developmental level, by modifying the conditions under which further cognition, action and interaction will take place. Whether purposefully or not, organisms act as “ecological engineers” (Magnani and Bardone 2010). Delegating cognitive tasks to the environment may thus change the way in which that environment will henceforth be encountered. The effects of such modification may, but need not be anticipated. As examples, one may cite the ways in which information technologies of all sorts, from the mechanical clock via notebooks and mobile phones to the cyborg implants envisioned in the opening sequence of Clark and Chalmers (1998), have, or may, become parts of human environments.

## 5. Conclusion

To sum up: Human beings, by using cognitive tools *and* by doing so collectively *and* by being guided by their environment, modify the environment in which cognition and action take place. If human beings are so coupled with their environments, a wide variety of cognitive resources will be part of that coupling, of which language is but one. Language, the paradigm cognitive resource in Clark and Chalmers (1998), may actually be the resource with the highest potential for *decoupling*, as it allows for public use in a multitude of, partly unanticipated, contexts and for various degrees of abstraction (Sterelny 2004). Thereby, cognition may be partly removed from practical needs, and it may be refined and adapted in the face of novel and unfamiliar situations that do not provide direct guidance.

So, contrary to one concluding observation in Clark and Chalmers' essay, the human mind, without language, would *not* be “much more akin to discrete Cartesian ‘inner’ minds, in which high level cognition relies largely on internal resources” (1998: 18). If we may call our evolutionary kin as witness, our minds would be coupled with their environments in considerably tighter and more direct fashion, in that there would be little exception to being directly guided in our behaviours by what we encounter there. Generating and using pictorial representations might not achieve the same degree of decoupling as long as there were no publicly available and highly refined tools of putting them into context. Ultimately, we might have been left with modes of cognition that would achieve little in terms of helping us to abstract from matters of immediate practical relevance in our environments.

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# Wittgenstein's Picture Theory of Language as a Key to Modern Physics

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The early Wittgenstein can help us to understand modern physics. This may be unexpected, although we know that *Tractatus* was inspired by Wittgenstein's study of the philosopher-physicists Heinrich Hertz and Ludwig Boltzmann. Wittgenstein often referred to Hertz and planned to study under Boltzmann, but was prevented from doing so by Boltzmann's sudden suicide. The problems facing those who want to understand modern physics are, however, more fundamental than those of the classical physics of Hertz and Boltzmann. In *Wittgenstein's Vienna*, Janik and Toulmin (1973) outline a development where the Viennese intellectual's critique of language in the Kantian spirit was combined with the approach to physics of Hertz and Boltzmann and the writings on logic by Frege and Russell into general philosophy of language, which found its expression in the terse statements of *Tractatus*. For our aim we need this elaborated philosophical synthesis. Wittgenstein's early philosophy has been generally overlooked by both physicists and philosophers of physics. However, we will see that the philosophical insights found in *Tractatus* may be just the key we need for understanding the strange epistemological situation in which we are placed by new physics.

The first scientific revolution was caused by the discoveries of Copernicus, Kepler, Galileo, and Newton. The new world view became universally known and accepted, and has since become a part of both our cultural heritage and what we now consider to be common knowledge.

The next revolution in physics took place in the twentieth century and consisted of three main steps. The first and second steps were the special and general theories of relativity. The third (and even more revolutionary) step was quantum physics, starting with quantum mechanics in 1925. Except for a short period of newspaper headlines in 1919–20 making Einstein the most famous scientist ever, one can safely say that the man in the street never noticed that any change had taken place. The reason was not that these new developments were less revolutionary than the Copernican Revolution. The main reason is the fact that the new theories are inaccessible to people without a solid background in mathematics. Moreover, experts – including the creators of the theory – have been discussing throughout an entire century what it truly says, without reaching any conclusion upon which all parties can agree. Nonetheless, the theory's mathematical structure has been established beyond discussion as being consistent, highly developed, and, according to physicists, beautiful.

Should philosophers care about these questions? Yes, for at least two good reasons. One compelling reason is that new physics challenges our most obvious assumptions about the material world. For instance, we take it as obvious that what is present in time exists, while neither the past nor the future exists. Likewise, it appears obvious that when a physical object moves in space, it maintains one position there, having as it does only one velocity. Theories that challenge these assumptions are certainly of philosophical interest. The second reason for philosophers to be interested in the new physics is the possibility that

philosophical theory contains the key to the correct understanding of modern physics. There are good reasons to suspect that physicists trying to develop the correct interpretation have built-in philosophical assumptions of which they remain unaware and which may even prevent them from arriving at the right answers.

This paper focuses on quantum mechanics as a philosophical case, although a similar reasoning may be completed concerning the theories of relativity. My hope is that other philosophers than myself will find this to be an interesting and challenging case, allowing them in turn to catch a glimpse into a surprising, strange and beautiful part of the world into which, according to Heidegger, we are thrown.

The approach I recommend regarding the interpretation problem of quantum mechanics is similar to the more or less implicit view of one of the pioneers behind the theory, Paul A. M. Dirac. Dirac shared the Nobel Prize with Schrödinger and Heisenberg for creating the theory, but is much less known outside the physics community than the other two scientists. He has a reputation among physicists for refusing to comment on the interpretation of the theory. I think that his silence can be interpreted as exactly the type of silence recommended by Wittgenstein in *Tractatus* 7. Dirac was, unbeknownst to himself, essentially a *tractarian*. He also happened to be at Cambridge at the same time as Wittgenstein, although there is no indication of intellectual contact between them. Dirac wrote a textbook entitled, *The Principles of Quantum Mechanics* (Dirac, 1930) which Einstein praised as “the most logically perfect presentation of quantum mechanics” (Farmelo 2009, 179), and which is an important source of Dirac's views. In the book's third edition, he invented his own mathematical notation which John von Neumann calls “Eine Kürze und Eleganz kaum zu überbietende Darstellung der Quantenmechanik ...” characterised by its “Durchsichtigkeit” (Neumann 1932). Brevity, elegance and transparency were Dirac's trademark.

Quantum mechanics is perhaps the most consistent application of Galileo's thesis which states that the book of nature is written in the language of mathematics. Quantum mechanics is exclusively written in mathematics, and is not translatable into any ordinary language. We therefore have a very clear-cut situation for examination.

In quantum mechanics, some of the properties of a physical object often have names which are known from classical mechanics. A quantum particle has properties like position, velocity and energy. However, in quantum mechanics, these properties do not always have specific numerical values; they may instead be associated with mathematical distributions, indicating that the quantity in a sense has many values simultaneously. Thus, a particle which is in several places at one time, or has many velocities simultaneously (even velocities pointing in opposite directions) is impossible to imagine, and the existence of such strange objects is not easy to accept. Nevertheless, this is essentially what quantum mechanics says, the details of which will be specified later.

One striking feature of what we may call Dirac's interpretation of quantum mechanics is that it is not an interpretation made "from the outside". In the spirit of *Tractatus*, Dirac always lets the theory express itself "from the inside", and in the clearest possible way, even developing his own mathematical notation that is notable for its "brevity, elegance, and transparency". In this way he let the logical structure of the theory be displayed, lets it "show itself" as clearly as possible, and then said nothing about it.

This has placed Dirac outside the discussion on the interpretation of quantum mechanics. The research activity growing out of this discussion, starting with early discussions between Bohr, Einstein and other pioneers, has always tried to interpret quantum mechanics from the outside in terms of the space-time-causality structure of classical mechanics, in terms of experiments, in terms of hidden variables, or in terms of existing language. Because Dirac did not participate in these discussions, he gave the impression that he did not have any view on the interpretation problem.

I now turn to the *Tractatus*. Since this work have been interpreted in so many different ways, I will make some commitments. One of my main secondary sources of interpretation is Allan Janik's and Stephen Toulmin's classic *Wittgenstein in Vienna* (Janik & Toulmin 1973). A recent study which has influenced my own thinking is *Wittgenstein's Tractatus* by Alfred Nordmann (Nordmann 2005). Nordmann has shown that today *Tractatus* can be considered as still valid. preferences should indicate my attitude towards *Tractatus*.

Following Janik and Toulmin, I see *Tractatus* as an attempt to solve the general problem of language by generalising the physics of Hertz and Boltzmann into language in general. It is then reasonable to ask if, by applying this philosophy to quantum mechanics, one is not just taking one step backwards from general linguistic philosophy to the specific case of model physics, which inspired it. This is, however, not the case. Quantum mechanics has placed physicists and philosophers in a completely new situation compared to the classical physics of Hertz and Boltzmann.

Inspired by Hertz' model for the presentation of physics, Wittgenstein considered the sentences of language to be models or pictures of *state-of-affairs*. Hertz' concept of a mathematical model is already an abstract notion, and a means to perceive the logical structure of the theory by observing the logical structure of the model. Wittgenstein made a new step in abstraction when he generalised this notion to language in general. The sentence is a kind of picture, but this picture cannot be directly compared with the *state-of-affairs* of which it is the picture by looking at each of them and then making the comparison. Only through the picture we are able to grasp and to express the *state-of-affairs*. To get a clear understanding of some fact, it is necessary to have a clear picture, a clear expression in language.

Wittgenstein tried to specify the limits of language "from within" by specifying what can be *said*, and only by implication, what cannot be said. He was therefore able to perform a critique of language yet save it for use whenever appropriate. It is appropriate when we deal with facts; therefore language is adequate for "science", when we take "science" in the widest possible sense to mean any field of knowledge which is concerned with facts. Wittgenstein thereby operates with such a wide concept of science that it includes many subjects of study which other philosophers than Wittgenstein would call philosophy.

In classical mechanics, the mathematics is assumed to be translatable, not only into ordinary language, but into a system of images, where we imagine stones that fall, planets orbiting the sun, water flowing in a pipe. This is an extraordinary situation, different from general language, and also different from quantum mechanics. Therefore quantum mechanics needed the general language problem to be solved before it could be understood. It needed the *tractarian* notion of a picture which is the only means to grasp some fact and its logical structure. The fact itself is said, and the logical structure displayed by the sentence.

Dirac (1930) interprets quantum mechanics in a similar manner by giving clear expression of what can be *said* within his theory, and the clearest possible display of its logical structure. Thus he exhibits its logical structure, which cannot be said, only shown, and even what can be said is exclusively expressed in mathematical language. Consequently, the mathematical symbols should be treated as analogies to ordinary word-signs, and the mathematical equations to sentences. In the same way that a sentence is a picture (in Wittgenstein's notion) of a state-of-affairs, so is the mathematical equation. Furthermore, in the same way that we are left with the linguistic picture to grasp the content or meaning of a state-of-affairs, we are also left with the mathematical symbols and equations of quantum mechanics.

Wittgenstein also rids the physicist of the apparently unanswerable question of meaning of each single symbol. Applied to quantum mechanics: instead of asking the meaning of "position" in a theory where one no longer can imagine a particle as something confined to a single place, we must accept that

Only propositions have sense; only in the nexus of a proposition does a name have meaning.  
(*Tractatus* 3).

In quantum mechanics the nexus have changed. The new meaning of the old word in quantum mechanics is the meaning it acquires through its logical relationship to other symbols (names) in the logical (mathematical) structure of the theory itself.

Nonetheless, quantum mechanics is not only a propositional structure, but is supposed to be true about the world, even empirically verifiable. Does this coupling to the external world prevent us from thinking from the "inside"? It is true that traditional experimental equipment has, historically speaking, often been described by classical mechanics to such an extent that Niels Bohr thought that this was a necessity. However, it is not. The simplest and perhaps most widespread kind of quantum measurement is spectroscopy. This has traditionally been thought of as an interaction between a quantum object (such as an atom) and a classical electromagnetic field. However, although inconvenient, the electromagnetic field can be described within an extended quantum theory, and the interaction as well as the outcome can be described within the quantum language. Such a measurement serves as an empirical confirmation of both quantum mechanics and quantum electrodynamics, representing the end points of Wittgenstein's measurement gauge:

Only the end points of the graduating lines actually touch the object that is to be measured  
(*Tractatus* 2.15121).

Today, there is great activity in developing models for experimental measurement within the theory. Models are even being developed for understanding why classical mechanics appears from within quantum theory (the so-

called “decoherence phenomenon”). This how we see it today: quantum theory is universal in nature, while classical mechanics is a specific case found within this theory.

Finally, what about people – such as philosophers – who do not have a sufficient mathematical education to understand quantum physics from within? In order to deal with this problem, we need to put Wittgenstein's notion of “nonsense” into use. Outside the proper mathematical language, we are left to talk nonsense; however, nonsense is, in the philosophy of Wittgenstein, far from meaningless. E.g. “the particle is in many places simultaneously” or “have many velocities simultaneously” are useful and informative nonsensical statements. I find Wittgenstein's notion of nonsense very illuminating in cases like this. Such statements are both correct and slightly incorrect at the same time, and are used with a slight uneasiness by physicists. Nevertheless, they remain the best way of expressing the strangeness of the quantum world. Informed nonsense brings linguistically inaccessible truths about nature back to “the man in the street”, including the philosophers.

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# Development of Picture Statistics in Czechoslovakia in the 1930s

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The picture statistic development in Czechoslovakia is connected with the name of Augustin Tschinkel (1905-1983). He was invited to cooperate with Peter Alma on charts creation for the book „*Gesellschaft und Wirtschaft*”. (Neurath, Kinross, 2009). After the completion of this task, Tschinkel collaborated with the Gesellschafts- und Wirtschaftsmuseum – Ge-Wi-Mu (Social and Economic Museum), returned back to Czechoslovakia and became a pioneer of this method. The aim of this paper is to describe the situation in former Czechoslovakia and Tschinkel's contribution.

A short presentation of Augustin Tschinkel's activities clarifies his position and approach to the techniques used in the Ge-Wi-Mu. In 1928 he worked on preparing the Czech exhibition on tradeshow Pressa in Köln, Germany. (Kapounová, 2009). On that occasion, he met Franz Seiwert a leading member of the movement „Die Gruppe der Progressiver Künstler”, which he soon joined as a free associate member. Members of this group were Heinrich Hoerle, August Sander and Gernt Arntz (the leader of graphics staff in the Ge-Wi-Mu and a member of permanent staff since January 1929). The general concept of this association was a pictorial documentation of human and social structures of that time. Under their influence, Tschinkel began to use a so-called social graphics. „*The social graphics should have a utility that transforms art into a political weapon, and is ideal for visualization of social relations.*” (Kapounová, 2009). Social graphic uses black and white and factually constructivist style, deals mainly with a focus on injustices of capitalism and war. Under Seiwert's leadership, the group tried to be as simple as possible and expressed reality unambiguously, which should lead to a universal understanding. The graphics are without a prospective arrangement and the characters do not have faces details. This technique helped spread radical leftist views of this movement between groups of workers.

In his own graphics, Tschinkel focused on the theme of industrialization and the depersonalization of human masses (Kapounová, 2009). Industrialization is a treat, as well as the uniformity of workers. The repetition of certain elements appears here already, which point out depersonalization and feeling of the collectivity. This is compounded with the idea of Otto Neurath and completes the visual representation of the Vienna method. Graphic style of designers working for the Ge-Wi-Mu was not identical. The style was only similar and therefore also took random variations of symbols used in the Vienna method (Neurath, Kinross 2009). It could also happened that standardization has not been taken into account at all in my country, because of the late emphasis on symbols standardization.

Pictorial statistics in the Czechoslovakia was associated mainly with education, both the dissemination of information about itself, as well as a subject in some schools. New minister of School Education and National Enlightenment, Dr. Ivan Dérer began to implement extensive reforms. A book named „*Školství za ministra Dérera*” (Educational system under Minister Dérer) by Vladimír Ryba informs about the reforms (Ryba, 1935). The diagrams in this book were design by Augustin Tschinkel. (Figure 1) Pictorial statistics introduced in this book is a

vague mixture of standard methods of statistics (curve graphs) and an attempt of using a graphic picture language. Although at first sight these symbols resemble those used in the application of the Vienna method, on closed inspection there is a serious infringement of the system. The principle of the repetition, the simplicity of symbols and distinguishing by essential features (different headgear) remain. Clustering in smaller logical parts (for example 10 peaces), as well as graphically distinct difference is not indicated (for example for state and non-governmental education). Although the difference in the number of schools is recognizable at the first sight, it is not shown in the state and non-state geographic distribution. The difference between this style and the Vienna method is the representation of the parts of symbol. A visually inaccurate horizontal division is used every time instead of a vertical distribution. Psychologically, division at the waist of figure suggests rather a greater part of the image, not a half. Poorly selected symbols can be seen as a character of one-class schools and more-class schools, which was not possible to understand without the verbal description in any way. To this helped even the absence of any explanatory legend, which Neurath used in the early Vienna method. It can be considered positive for at least the repetitive use of the same symbol for school children in the Slovak Republic. The data are barely legible in well-performed charts.

In 1930 (Ryba, 1935), Dérer as a minister introduces the first single uniform curriculum for all primary schools in the country. Shift occurred from memorization to encourage children to self-education, from the submission of ready knowledge to stimulate the preparation of separate tasks. In this direction a textbook by Sutner, Mendel and Tschinkel was released, called „*Malá vlastivěda*” (Small homeland study), a teaching material approved by government for the general and civic education. This book is the first unified example of the use of the Vienna method. Unfortunately, even here we do not find compliance with all principles. If we compare it with the book „*Die Bunte Welt*”, we can find substantial differences, repeating from the book „*Školství za ministra Dérera*”. Using expressive graphics in „*Malá vlastivěda*” (for example, black background) comes in front of purity of a method. (Figure 2) Similar effect has the use of non-standard quarters figures for the representation and differential cascade of export and import commodities. Visual effect (from the largest to the smallest) prevails here over the same shift so that cannot be quickly compared. Despite all these shortcomings, this small publication is the best example of the use of pictorial statistics in the early 1930s.

In Czechoslovakia, to complement the image statistics of precise numbers was a trend. Although this provides the viewer more accurate information about absolute values, there is a significantly slower perception of graphs and worse possibility perception differences of „inaccurate” figurative representation. It lacks the advantage of quick and easy relationship remembering. However, his method was taught in schools in accordance with the approved curriculum.

Tschinkel focused on the overall visual communication characters and the psychological effect of the symbol

and published his article in „Československý kreslíř“ in years 1938 and 1939. Generally he integrated custom elements like symbol consisting of concrete elements with abstract phonetic symbols. His contribution to visual communication is already very far from the original Neurath's idea of mass dissemination of information for the less literate or illiterate population.

Dissemination of pictorial statistics was practiced more within the meaning of development of graphical methods of work as a separate block of education in schools. This was mainly focused on the dissemination of production teaching of the pictorial statistics. A teacher Vladimír Konvička from Zlín was highly active and as the editor of „Československý kreslíř“ in the early 1930s he brought a series of articles about creating and possibility of using pictorial statistics. As he states, he visited the Ge-Wi-Mu in Vienna and met with this method directly. Yet he later went to the Soviet School. He did not deny Neurath's contributions in establishing Isostat, but saw Soviet approach for advanced. Questions that the Soviet pictorial statistics at that time dealt with concerned expressions as accurately as possible the number of units, which can provide the addition of numbers and graphs of flat or spatial representation. (Konvička, 1935).

To my knowledge, only one article was written directly by Otto Neurath in the Czech language. It is „Obr

*zová statistika – metoda zrakové výchovy“* (Visual statistics - a method of visual education). Besides other, it attempts to weaken preference for creating graphic images and noted its importance for educational work with pre-finished boards. „*Misleading is the view that the activity of students lies in converting the numbers in a number of drawing characters. A ready-made statistics board - like the map – gives a picture of reality from which you can read a lot of relationships.*“ (Neurath, 1935) Even this article is not accompanied by the original method of Vienna charts, but by the work of school children of the Experimental Burgess School in Zlín. (Figure 3) Not an arrangement, but some signs are closed (workers) or identical (cattle) with the Vienna method used in „*Die Bunte Welt*“. This further obscures the original pure idea of a standardized visual language and professional development of characters.

It can be conclude that Augustin Tschinkel did not promoted idea of the Vienna methods in Czechoslovakia. His work shows just the spread of pictorial statistics ideas but not precise and sophisticated model of Otto Neurath. It was probably not about misunderstanding of the nature of this method, because his article from 1929 about Ge-Wi-Mu was all right (Tschinkel, 1929) and accompanied with original images. We can find its grounds possibly in their own clear idea of the graphic representation of reality, focused on graphic, not on education.



Figure 1 – Ryba, Vladimír 1935 *Školství za ministra Dérera*, Praha: Ú.D.K.N. A. Svěcený, p. 25




Figure 2 – Sutnar, Ladislav and Mendl, Bedřich and Tschinkel, Augustin 1935 *Malá vlastivěda*, Praha: Státní nakladatelství, p. 17




Figure 3 – Production of third grade school children at Experimental Burgess School in Zlín taught by Josef Císar. Neurath, Otto 1935 „Obrazová statistika – metoda zrakové výchovy”, *Československý kreslíř* 4, 210-214, p. 213

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# The Philosophical Relevance of Wittgenstein's Discussion of Experiences of Meaning

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It is often assumed that the discussion of the experience of meaning marks a shift of interest in Wittgenstein's writings after finishing Part 1 of the *Investigations* in 1945. Yet there is abundant evidence of an early interest in this topic in writings from the first half of the 1930s. Thus, Wittgenstein distinguishes between meaning as use and William James's conception of the experience of meaning as early as 1932. In the same period he devotes a long discussion partly published in *Philosophical Grammar* to the relation between understanding in the sense of experiencing the meaning of a word and what he later calls 'aspect seeing'. Finally, in the second part of the *Brown Book*, his most sustained treatment of the experience of meaning at the time is to be found.

Wittgenstein's early discussion of the experience of meaning goes hand in hand with a treatment of the concept of understanding as applied both to language and pictures, e.g. genre pictures, portraits of human faces. Thus, he notes:

'The different experiences I have when I see a picture first one way and then another are comparable to the experience I have when I read a sentence with understanding and without understanding' (*PG*, p. 42).

Thus, I can see the drawing of a cube as if it projects away from the paper, but also as if it projects back, or again as a flat design. Likewise, I may see four points within a circle now as a face, now not as a face. Or I may see a watch as a watch, i.e. as a dial with hands (*PG*, p. 42). As the latter example vividly makes clear, understanding here is different from the ability to use the watch as a watch. Rather, understanding 'is like seeing Orion as a man striding across the sky' (*PG*, p. 42). When we see the watch as a watch we do not merely put a different interpretation upon the same sense datum of a physical object as if we first take the (same) object one way then another way; rather we see both times a different object. Similarly, we can speak of conceiving of signs in a particular way, 'reading something into them'. Thus, we can conceive of signs as signs, apart from the specific meaning we attach to them. Unlike the seeing of pictures, however, understanding language as language seems reserved for special, almost experimental conditions. For instance, when we try to see our native language as if for the first time: 'I tell myself: I want to try to look at a printed English word and see it as if I hadn't learnt to read, as if the black shapes on the paper were strange drawings whose purpose I couldn't imagine or guess. And then what happens is that I can't look at the printed word without the sound of the word or of the letter I'm actually looking at coming before my mind' (*PG*, p. 176). As Wittgenstein takes great pains to show, this 'experience of understanding' occurs simultaneously with reading or hearing the signs and hence seems radically different from understanding in the sense of the ability to use words. Hence, we cannot look at a word of our native language without the experience of understanding it, e.g. without hearing the sound of the word as we know it. Like the seeing of aspects conceiving of a sign in a particular way is easily misconstrued when it is described in purely cognitive terms: as if a particular word is first interpreted

one way, then another way. Anticipating Wittgenstein's discussion of the physiognomy of individual words and syllables, when we are asked to say the word 'March' and 'mean it at one time as an imperative at another as the name of the month' (*PI II*, p. 215), we see or experience it as a different word, e.g. a verb rather than a substantive.

The philosophical importance of the discussion of the experience of meaning and understanding, I suggest, is part of one of the most central concerns of Wittgenstein's later philosophy. To point out potential confusions caused by a failure to see the distinction between empirical propositions and propositions about the rules for the use of words, i.e. 'grammatical' propositions. The experiential notion of meaning and understanding is no exception to this pervasive confusion. Consider this passage:

'We can call a "sentence" ("Satz") that which is conceived first in one way and then in another way; but also this or that conception itself. This is a source of confusions' (*PG*, p. 43).

The fact that one may have difficulty in understanding what the confusion might be here only testifies to the enormous yet deceptive similarity between a proposition describing a physical object or pattern and a proposition 'about' an experience. To spell out the distinction more explicitly: we may define 'what is read' as the string of letters on the display, but we may also define it in terms of the impression the letters make on us, as when we read the sentence 'with understanding'.

As the preceding examples showed, experiences of meaning are simultaneous with processing language, hence the enormous temptation to consider propositions about such experiences as reporting them. Moreover, the explanatory force of experiences of meaning seems further derived from the fact that when one fails to understand a sentence they are typically lacking, such as reading or hearing a sentence in a foreign language.

In *Part II* of the *Brown Book*, Wittgenstein discusses the use of the word 'particular' related to cases that either explicitly or implicitly refer to experience of meaning. He speaks of a transitive and an intransitive use of 'particular'. In the first case, the word 'particular' or 'peculiar' is used preliminary to a further specification. To the question 'In what way peculiar' an answer can be given which explains this way in different words. For instance, I may describe the peculiar smell of a cup of coffee by saying that it has 'a smooth mellow brightness with hints of dark chocolate, berries and a touch of citrus'. In the second case, however, the word 'particular' is used without any further specification or comparison. As the smell-of-soap case illustrates, this can be a non-controversial intransitive use of the words 'particular' and 'peculiar' in daily life.

It is important to note that Wittgenstein also introduces a third term which is related to the preceding distinction of the transitive and the intransitive use of words. This is what he calls the reflexive use of words. He says that we often use 'the reflexive form of speech as a means of emphasizing something' (*BB*, p. 161). Like the intransitive use



of words, the reflexive form of speech is a matter of emphasis, but unlike the former it can always be 'straightened out' (BB, p. 161). With this Wittgenstein means that we can always rephrase what we say in more straight terms. Thus, we may say in the reflexive mode 'That's that', meaning 'That is settled'. But we use the former expression rather than the second because we want something to stand out. Especially when we want to say with 'That's settled' something like 'The matter is closed', we may express this more firmly by saying 'That's that', which lays a certain emphasis on the second 'that'. The reflexive form of speech therefore is a case of the transitive use of words.

Back to the use of the word 'particular'. Consider these two examples:

- (1) 'Each of these handwritten words has a particular character that differs from the same words in print.
- (2) 'Each of these written words has its own particular character'

In (1) the phrase 'that differs from the same words in print' is used as a further specification of 'particular'. It explains the use of 'particular' by opposing it to, hence comparing it with, the words as they appear in print. Someone else may be informed by this further specification. The case is different with (2). Here too it may seem that the sentence prepares for a further specification: 'a particular experience, namely ...' At the same time, it may not be meant as saying that e.g. the words prompt the same feeling as another handwriting, or that it feels different now from the way it felt a few moments back. In this latter case, the sentence is not used transitively but intransitively.

Now in the context of a philosophical discussion the fact that a particular sentence may both have a transitive and an intransitive use may put the mind in a whirl. As Wittgenstein says, 'we are regarding its use as a special case of the transitive use' (BB, p. 160). That is, although the word 'particular' is actually used as a matter of emphasis it may seem to us that we are using the word transitively and, in particular, as a reflexive case of the transitive use. In the reflexive-transitive treatment of what is actually an intransitive use we think of ourselves as denoting by 'particular' an elusive experience which escapes the net of language. A 'something' which we 'cannot' further describe. The very question, however, is whether there is anything to describe.

For instance, consider James's remark that '... no word in an understood sentence comes to consciousness as a mere noise. We feel its meaning as it passes ...' (James 1890, vol. I, p. 281).

James may have meant this remark in such a way that each time when he attends to a letter of his brother Henry in original handwriting the words have an effect on him which they fail to have when they appear in typescript. Or he may have found that the handwriting sometimes has this effect but not always. Put in this context, James's propositions about experience of meaning would be transitive (and temporal). Obviously this is not how he means them. It is crucially important to note that in the discussion about the experience of meaning the various concepts, e.g. 'comes' or 'particular way', are not supposed to distinguish or to describe a particular experience in contrast with other experiences or with experiences at different times at all. Indeed, if it were, it would be contrary to the purposes of the discussion. For if it were e.g. a reading experience at time *t* one referred to, one would thereby concede that this experience need not occur every time one reads the word. But at the heart of James's discussion about phe-

nominal consciousness is that *any* experience is invested with a subjective character. The word 'comes' therefore does not have the meaning it has when it is used transitively, as when one says that e.g. 'the word 'red' "... always comes quicker than the word 'two' when I'm counting colored objects", or "It always comes with a shock", etc.?' (BB, p. 158). 'Comes' is used intransitively yet James thinks that a genuine act of comparison or recognition is involved, one which matches the word with a template in the mind.

Now it remains to be seen how the potential confusion of the intransitive use and the reflexive case of the transitive use of words bears on the issue of the meaning-experience. As this remark shows, Wittgenstein sees an analogy between the sort of mistake we make here and the mistake we are liable to make in the case of ostensive definitions:

'I am in fact going through the acts of attending which could accompany the use of a sample. And this is what makes it seem as though I was making use of a sample. This error is akin to that of believing that an ostensive definition says something about the object to which it directs our attention' (BB, p. 175)

The 'error' in the case of the ostensive definition is to think that in defining the word we establish a connection between language and reality. Thus, the definition 'The color which this book has, is called "red"' is taken to forge a connection between the word 'red' and a property of the book. But the idea that in giving an ostensive definition we make a step from the area of signs to reality is an illusion. What creates this illusion is that we interpret the transition from the *verbal* sign to the gesture of pointing at the book as an application of language, i.e. as a description of what we perceive. Yet the object at which we point functions as a further sign and as such is part of the grammar of language. An ostensive definition, therefore, is still a rule of language.

Now in taking what is actually an intransitive use of words for a reflexive case of the transitive use we come to think that we are applying language, i.e. describing an experience by means of a paradigm, whereas we only 'compare' the paradigm with itself.

In fact the link between the confusion of the transitive and intransitive use of words and the 'error' related to the ostensive definition is more direct than the preceding quotation suggests. It is not just that there is an analogy between the two sorts of confusion, rather the one gives food to the other. In particular, the confusion of the transitive and intransitive use of words is one of the pitfalls in language which deceives us into thinking that we are using a word or expression for the description of an object whereas the object actually functions as an 'object of comparison', a paradigm or sample. Qua paradigm the object is part of the rules of language and is not one of the objects to which the ostensive definition is applied. Rather it enables speakers to make such applications. Now in taking what is actually an intransitive use of words for a reflexive case of the transitive use we come to think that we are applying language, i.e. describing an experience by means of a paradigm, whereas we only 'compare' the paradigm with itself.

Consider now again sentences (1) and (2). In (1), the words in print are invoked in order to say something about the feeling the handwriting gives. Similarly, it might be said here 'Her handwriting gives me a special feeling, namely ...', thereby giving a sample of a gesture expressive of the feeling. But how about (2), 'Each of these writ-

ten words has its own particular character'? As noted before, this sentence is not supposed to distinguish or describe a particular character in the way (1) does. The following remark is relevant here: 'It is as though we could say: "This face has a particular expression: namely this" (pointing to something). But if I had to point to anything in this place it would have to be the drawing I am looking at' (*BB*, p. 162).

This remark makes clear that the problem Wittgenstein identifies has to do with the way we represent sentences about experience rather than the nature of experience and its relation to outward behavior. In mixing the transitive and intransitive use of the word 'particular' we end up in giving what I call, an additive representation of the notion of 'particular' in sentence (2). As the term aptly conveys, an additive representation represents the notion of 'particular' as if it is like any other description of an expression - only 'particular'. That is, sentence (2) is as much about a feature of the expression as (1). The expression may be warm, the same as yesterday, indifferent and besides all this it may also be particular. But this would require giving an explanation of the word which we are not prepared to give: we do not mean to say by 'particular' 'indifferent', 'business manlike', or whatever. Hence, we are in the predicament that we want to give a further explanation or specification of our experience but without being prepared to attach a description of something other than the experience. What we say therefore when we say e.g. 'This room looks familiar to me' amounts to no more than 'The familiar look of this room', thereby pointing at the room, 'is this', pointing again at the room'. Wittgenstein

says that we are using the object 'at the same time as the sample and that which the sample is compared with' (*BB*, p. 174). Put otherwise, we say of the room that it looks familiar to us and, at the same time, *explain* what we mean by 'familiar' by referring to his room. In the reflexive case of the transitive use therefore the experience of the room is treated simultaneously as a *sample* of the experience and as an instance of *having* the experience.

What this reading of the discussion of the experience of meaning shows is at least three things: (1) the discussion of the experience of meaning is not meant to repair a defect in the 'meaning-as-use' approach. Rather, it is meant to expose a 'primitive' notion of understanding which tempts us to get beyond particular uses or explanations of 'experience'. (2) The confusion at the heart of the experience of meaning is analogous to the confusion of an object-as-comparison and the object described in the case of ostensive definition. (3) The later discussion of experience of meaning, such as the 'if-feeling' in *PI II* has to be seen as an attempt to account for the intransitive use in more adequate terms.

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# Know-How: Certainty, Mastery or Both?

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The majority of philosophy conducted, and published, in the field of epistemology presumes that knowledge is one and the same as propositional knowledge. What is it for S to know that *p*? How is knowledge of *p* justified or reliably produced? What is the difference between true belief and knowledge, and why might the latter be more valuable than the former? Acknowledgement that there may be more types of knowledge, such as know-how, ability knowledge, or acquaintance knowledge, tends to be, at best, cursory. This *propositional presumption*, as I shall call it, is one of the main shapers of the predominantly intellectualist climate that informs most current epistemological practice. It is a presumption, however, that is coming under threat. For in the last decade, or so, there has been a resurgence in the debate amongst contemporary epistemologists, along with philosophers of mind and action, about the nature of, and relation between, propositional knowledge and know-how. Is our knowledge-*that* one type of knowledge, whilst our know-how another? Or is there only one type of knowledge, after all? Perhaps our knowledge-*that* is just some kind of know-how, or, conversely, our know-how is some species of, or is subsumable, in some way, under our knowledge-*that*.

In *On Certainty*, Wittgenstein's own grammatical investigations suggest quite a different way of engaging in this know-that/know-how debate, one that continues to pressurise this propositional presumption. OC 204:

Giving grounds, however, justifying the evidence, comes to an end; but – the end is not propositions' striking us immediately as true, i.e. it is not a kind of *seeing* on our part; it is our *acting*, which lies at the bottom of the language-game.

According to Daniele Moyal-Sharrock's Third Wittgenstein reading of *On Certainty*, these foundational ways of acting are a kind of non-propositional, non-intellectual *know-how*. This Wittgensteinian conception of know-how has, however, played no role, to date, in any of this ongoing exploration of the relation between knowing-how and knowing-that. In this paper, I aim to motivate this option of bringing a Wittgensteinian perspective to bear on the question. I start with a quick sketch of the current debate.

There are three basic positions around which recent discussion revolves.

The first position takes its core commitment from Gilbert Ryle's original 1940s attack on the so-called Intellectualist Legend. This position, a distinctness thesis, holds that there are two separate, mutually irreducible kinds of knowledge: our propositional knowledge or knowledge-*that*, and some kind of non-propositional ability knowledge or know-how. The second position holds there is only one kind of knowledge; propositional knowledge, which is known under different modes of presentation: including, but not limited to, demonstrative and practical modes. This is the claim Jason Stanley & Timothy Williamson make in their debate-igniting paper of 2001. In this, they directly attack Ryle's distinctness thesis, arguing for their own self-professed intellectualist view that our know-how is just a species of know-*that*, albeit known under a practical mode of presentation. The third position is that recently staked out by Stephen Hetherington with his 'knowledge-as-ability'

hypothesis. He, too, takes a reductionist, one-knowledge view, but runs the reduction in the opposite direction; claiming all our knowledge-*that* is 'knowledge how to perform various actions' (2006: 72). There is a new, fourth position that (forthcoming in 2011) which I will characterise later.

This debate tends to be conducted with the help of a fairly narrow range of activities which are taken, uncontroversially, to be examples of know-how: riding a bicycle, playing chess, fishing, cooking and skating, and the like ... Stanley & Williamson's own expositional preference is for Hannah and her bike-riding knowledge. Hannah's knowledge how to ride a bicycle, is, they claim, nothing other than her knowledge that *w* is a way to ride a bicycle, known under a practical mode of presentation. This circumspect selection of particular activities and abilities tends to be the focus of the debate, and only rarely do any of these main positions explore their commitments by directly engaging other, broader fields of knowledge, such as religious, mathematical, moral or semantic knowledge.

What happens, though, when the debate is taken into, for example, semantic knowledge? We talk about *knowing* a language, say, English, *knowing how to speak* English, *understanding* English, *being able to speak* English. These familiar locutions suggest that semantic knowledge offers an illuminating arena for continued exploration of the know-how/know-that debate. Yet the *modus operandi* of the epistemology of language, firmly mired in its truth-conditional theories of meaning and semantic-theoretic approaches, takes the propositional presumption as a pre-requisite. Jason Stanley's own view that "semantic competence amounts to grasp of a compositional semantic theory for that language." (2005: 136) fits entirely comfortably with his claim that knowledge how to speak a language is just propositional knowledge known under a practical mode of presentation. On those rare occasions when our linguistic know-how, understanding or abilities are tabled, (eg. Hornsby 2005) they are either immediately dismissed or succumb to Dummett's intellectualist orientation. He claims that what a speaker knows when he knows a language is 'practical knowledge, knowledge how to speak the language: but', he continues, "this is no objection to its representation as propositional knowledge; mastery of a procedure, of a conventional practice can always be so represented." (1976: 36)

I suggest this points to the likelihood that were the propositional presumption to be undermined, with regard to activities of the *huntin'*, *shootin'*, and *fishin'* variety, there is such a fundamental commitment to the propositional presumption of our *semantic* knowledge, that this whole area may well remain invulnerable, behind its own *cordon sanitaire*. Given the rich and pertinent resources on offer from Wittgenstein in this field, I would like to argue that it makes strategic sense to focus anti-intellectual challenges directly on this intellectualist stronghold.

The Wittgenstein of the *Philosophical Grammar* is already exploring the idea that, "What a word means a proposition cannot tell". (PG: 208) The propositional presumption is already being threatened by an entirely different approach to knowledge and meaning: "I can use the

word 'yellow' is like 'I know how to move the king in chess.' "(PG 49) This involves an appreciation of the deeply integrated nature of the semantic, the practical and epistemic dimensions of our linguistic abilities: "Understanding a word may mean: knowing how it is used; being able to apply it." (PG 47).

In the *Investigations*, Wittgenstein prepares the reader for the discussions about 'knowing how to go on' when one continues a series correctly (PI 151) by reminding us that there is a set of relevant family resemblance terms which are all intimately related: "The grammar of the word "know" is evidentially closely related to the grammar of the words "can", "is able to". But also closely related to that of the word "understand". (To have 'mastered' a technique.) (P1 150)

In *On Certainty*, the text rings throughout with the resonances of Wittgenstein's *cri de coeur*, taken from Goethe: "In the beginning was the deed." (OC 402) The propositional presumption is shown to harbour a profound misunderstanding about the extent to which those propositions that look like empirical propositions, need actually be empirical propositions, or indeed *propositions* at all. These insights undercut theories such as Stanley's semantic-theoretic account, which harvest their epistemological pickings from the shared syntactical forms of sentence.

Such is the very briefest of glimpses of just a tiny part of the vast array of different points of contact and entry which Wittgenstein's work offers the know-how/know-that debate. In this short paper, I will limit myself to taking a closer look at just one of those points: the nature of hinge certainty in *On Certainty*. On the one hand, *On Certainty* looks to confirm the different categorial status of knowledge and certainty (OC 308), yet on the other hand, if we are to understand our hinge certainty as a kind of know-how, we might see this categorial difference as highlighting *not* the distinction between our know-how and an undiscriminated knowledge, but rather the distinction between our know-how and, more specifically, our propositional knowledge.

In the Third Wittgenstein reading of *On Certainty*, proposed by Daniele Moyal-Sharrock, she articulates Wittgenstein's distinction between empirical propositions and those hinge 'propositions' such as 'Red is a colour', 'There are objects in the world', as, actually, a distinction between propositions and non-propositions, i.e. between propositions with truth-values and hinges certainties. These hinges certainties are enacted or shown in our ways of acting, in our thoughtless ways of taking-hold, in our animal attitude to, and ways of being-in, our world. In the activities of collecting books, picking up towels, closing doors, selecting red apples from green, etc. Such certainty is manifest in our human nature, in our form of life. It is, "ensured by nurture and furthered by culture". (2004: 6) Furthermore, this hinge certainty, is a kind of a kind of basic belief. Not, however, a propositional belief-*that*, but a *hinge* belief; neither propositional nor intellectual: not belief-*that*, but rather belief-*in*. Such belief-*in* is a basic, foundational, un-evaluative because unreasoned, trust. It is our foundational ways of acting, our non-propositional certainty; our non-propositional, non-intellectual *know-how*.

In contrast, Peter Hacker's reading keeps to a propositional view of (some of) these hinge certainties, choosing instead to articulate what he takes to be Wittgenstein's enriched notion of propositions. He holds that though our *grammatical propositions* are no longer bipolar propositions they can, none the less, be *a priori* necessary truths. Bipolarity gives way to bivalence, but the proposition pre-

sumption is maintained. What it is to know a necessary truth, such as say, 'Red is a colour' is not to have some kind of propositional knowledge, in the way that one has when knows a true empirical proposition or description, but rather it is to know a *norm* of description, or a rule. But to know a norm of description, or a rule, is, of course, as Hacker is the first to agree, is to master a technique: to know-*how* to do something.

So Hacker arrives at know-how via propositional, bivalent grammatical propositions, and *mastery*; whilst Moyal-Sharrock arrives at know-how via non-propositional beliefs-in, foundational ways of acting, and *certainty*. Though the range of propositions Hacker takes to be grammatical norms and rules, are not a direct match with Moyal-Sharrock's hinges, both agree on the enabling or framework role, of the *grammatical propositions* of our language (Hacker), or our particular *linguistic hinges* (Moyal-Sharrock.) So there is a consensus between both the Second and Third Wittgenstein readings that what we know, when we know a language, is, *contra* Dummett, Stanley and the rest of those intellectualists in the grip of the propositional presumption, a type of know-*how*.

But yet, according to the Third Wittgenstein reading, this know-how is not epistemic. The very anti-intellectualist, non-propositionality of hinges and their failure to have any truth-value, entails that this know-how of our hinge certainty is, supposedly, non-epistemic. Eschewing any epistemic status for this Wittgensteinian know-how, is, I want to argue, a mistake: one that indicates the extent to which the propositional presumption controls the conceptual space in which the current know-how debate occurs. For it is indicative of the power of the propositional presumption to insist that only that which aims at truth is and can be epistemic. But whilst the debate about what types of knowledge there are and how they are related to each other, is still ongoing, is it not pre-emptive to so limit the applicability of this notion? If what is, or is not epistemic, is guided, instead, by what is and isn't *knowledge*-pertinent or related, rather than simply *truth*-pertinent, then one need not rule in a favour of the propositional presumption, whilst the jury's still out. Claiming epistemic status for Wittgensteinian know-how also makes sense, if one considers Hacker's alternative reading of linguistic grammatical propositions. For even the most hard core propositional intellectualist would, I imagine, be loathe to deny epistemic status to *a priori* necessary truths. By either account, then, I suggest there are good reasons to claim that Wittgensteinian know-how should be considered part of the epistemic family. I also suggest that this is not just a matter of nomenclature, but is important in paving the way for encouraging Wittgensteinian insights and resources to enter this more mainstream debate. Something most devoutly to be wished.

I would like to finish by offering the briefest of introductions to a new intellectualist account of knowing-how, which is due to appear next summer in the first-ever anthology of articles about knowing-how. This is the proposal by the collection's editors, John Bengson & Marc Moffett, who attempt to provide what they call a non-propositional intellectualist account, thus supposedly cutting across traditional lines of thought on the subject.

On this view, to know-how to  $\phi$ , is understand how to  $\phi$ . To understand how to  $\phi$ , is to be in 'a cognitive state, distinct from propositional knowledge, which can guide action'. Such a cognitive state is one which 'grasp[s] a correct and complete conception of a way of  $\phi$ -ing'. (B&M forthcoming). Bengson & Moffett eschew, however, a role for ability, claiming that ability is neither necessary nor

sufficient for know-how. They simultaneously provide an account which helps itself to the notions of understanding, grasping, cognising, concept-mastery, and being in informational states, whilst all the while insisting their account is firmly non-propositional. If one considers the impact of their view on semantic knowledge, not something they have yet done, it would appear that according to Bengson & Moffett it is possible that one know-how to speak a language, without actually being able to. From this view it is but a short hop to Chomsky's Theory of Competence, "If ... to know a language is to be in a certain mental state comprised of a structure of rules and principles ... then in theory one could know a language without having the capacity to use it." (1980: 51). Our acting and our activities are the baby that is thrown out with this latest intellectualist bath water. Perhaps this is inevitable when epistemology is hi-jacked by the philosophy of mind, knowledge is usurped by cognition and instead of elucidating epistemology, it gets naturalised.

I hope this brief glimpse at the increasingly befuddled know-how debate confirms that the time has come to bring a Wittgensteinian approach to the matter.

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# Logik als Spiegelbild der Welt. Das Problem des Isomorphismus und der Autonomie der Logik im *Tractatus*

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## Einleitung

In These 6.13 lesen wir: „Die Logik ist keine Lehre, sondern ein Spiegelbild der Welt. Die Logik ist transzendental.“ Diese effektvolle Metapher weckt Zweifel und provoziert Fragen. Was bedeuten diese Worte, welche die Logik mit dem Spiegelbild der Welt gleichsetzen? Die Bezeichnung „Spiegelbild der Welt“ wirft zwei Fragen auf: (1) die Frage nach dem Isomorphismus und (2) die Frage nach der Sekundarität der Logik gegenüber der Welt. Auf den ersten Blick scheint, dass die Welt hier als etwas Ursprüngliches behandelt wird, als Urbild, die Logik hingegen als ihr Abbild. Daher liegt der Schluss über die Sekundarität der Logik, ihre Abhängigkeit von der Welt nahe. Aber ist diese Metapher wirklich so deuten? Der zweite Teil der These 6.13 scheint nämlich etwas Gegensätzliches zu besagen: Die Logik als Transzendente scheint nicht sekundär gegenüber der Welt zu sein. Angesichts dessen wird die Relation ‚Logik – Welt‘ im Lichte dieser These problematisch.

Es stellt sich die Frage, ob die Metapher, die von der Logik als „Spiegelbild der Welt“ spricht, überhaupt zutreffend ist. Ist sie mit den anderen metaphorischen und nicht-metaphorischen Bestimmungen kompatibel, derer sich Wittgenstein im *Tractatus* und den *Tagebüchern* bedient? Steht doch dort auch, dass die Logik „ein Gerüst der Welt“ sei (TLP 6.124), „die Grenze der Welt“ (TLP 5.61), oder sie „erfüllt die Welt“ (TLB 5.61). Stehen diese Bezeichnungen im Einklang mit dem „Spiegelbild der Welt“? Oder bilden sie, zusammen genommen, eine gewisse Dissonanz?

Beachten wir auch zwei weitere Aussagen Wittgensteins, die einen anderen Status der Logik suggerieren: „Die Logik muss für sich selbst sorgen“ (TLP 5.473); „die Philosophie besteht aus Logik und Metaphysik: die Logik ist ihre Basis“ (AÜL, in: Wittgenstein 1984, 206). Aus These 5.473 lässt sich der Schluss über die Autonomie der Logik ziehen – die Logik hat keinen Grund außer sich selbst (vgl. auch TLP 6.123). Das Zitat aus AÜL dagegen hebt den Vorrang der Logik gegenüber der Metaphysik hervor. Das legt weitere Fragen nahe: In welchem Sinne spricht Wittgenstein über diesen Vorrang? Wie versteht er die Metaphysik – traditionell, also im Sinne Aristoteles', oder nach der Interpretation Kants? Es ist zu überlegen, ob nicht die Titelmetapher umgekehrt und die Welt als Spiegelbild der Logik betrachtet werden sollte. Warum bediente sich Wittgenstein nicht dieser Formulierung?

## 1.

Es ist zu bemerken, dass die Rede vom Spiegelbild die Frage nach dem Spiegel selbst nahelegt, in dem ein derartiges Bild vorkommen kann. Die Metapher des Spiegelbildes gibt uns zu verstehen, dass das Bild als getreues Ebenbild des Abgebildeten zu betrachten ist. Es ist mithin ein Beispiel einer isomorphen Relation. Dieser Isomorphismus besteht darin, dass die Relationen zwischen Gegenständen dieser abgebildeten Tatsache bzw. des

Sachverhaltes auf die Relationen zwischen Repräsentationen der Gegenstände übertragen werden. Allerdings geht es Wittgenstein nicht um die getreue Ähnlichkeit – im ikonischen Sinne – der Logik und der Welt, sondern um die symbolische Ähnlichkeit, d.h. um die strukturelle Ähnlichkeit zwischen ihnen.

Wittgenstein spricht generell über den Isomorphismus des Satzes und der Tatsache. Dann wird die Aufmerksamkeit jeweils auf den konkreten begrenzten Fall gelenkt. Wenn der Satz getreu den gegebenen Sachverhalt abbildet, dann tritt zwischen ihnen ein struktureller Isomorphismus auf, der mit der Wahrheit gleichgesetzt werden kann. Wenn wir hingegen einerseits die Welt, andererseits die Logik als ihr Spiegelbild haben, dann ist dieser Fall weit komplizierter. Wenn wir die Welt und die Logik betrachten, ist dies nicht mehr eine lokale, sondern eine gänzlich globale Auffassung des Problems des Isomorphismus.

Die Metapher des Spiegelbildes bringt uns zu den Fragen: Worin spiegelt sich dieses Spiegelbild? Was bildet, anders gesagt, den Spiegel für die Logik als Spiegelbild? Die Antwort lässt sich in These 4.121 finden: „Der Satz kann die logische Form nicht darstellen, sie spiegelt sich in ihm. Was sich in der Sprache spiegelt, kann sie nicht darstellen. Was sich in der Sprache ausdrückt, können wir nicht durch sie ausdrücken. Der Satz *zeigt* die logische Form der Wirklichkeit. Er weist sie auf.“ (TLP 4.121) Es ist klar, dass der Satz die Rolle des Spiegels für die logische Form spielt. Die Gesamtheit der Sätze, d.h. die Sprache, ist wiederum der Spiegel der Gesamtheit der logischen Formen. Vorausgesetzt, dass die Logik keine Lehre, sondern das Spiegelbild der Welt ist, ist sie auch die Gesamtheit der logischen Formen. Kurz gesagt: die Logik = die Gesamtheit der logischen Formen = das Spiegelbild der Welt.

Die Welt, deren Spiegelbild die Logik ist, ist wiederum die Gesamtheit der Tatsachen, d.h. der bestehenden Sachverhalte (TLP 1.1 und 2.). Die Tatsachen sind jedoch sowohl bestehende Sachverhalte, d.h. Urbilder, als auch Sätze, die deren Abbilder sind (TLP 4.021). Deswegen würde sich die Gesamtheit der Sätze, d.h. die Sprache, in der Welt enthalten oder einen Aspekt der Welt bilden. Insofern wäre die auftretende Relation zwischen Welt und Sprache eine interne, d.h. eine transzendente Relation im scholastischen Sinne.

Wittgenstein interessiert sich mehr für das Verhältnis der Logik selbst zur Welt, als für jenes der Sprache zur Welt. In den einzelnen Sätzen spiegeln sich die logischen Formen, in der Gesamtheit der Sätze hingegen – die Gesamtheit der logischen Formen, d.h. die Logik. Es geht also um eine möglichst klare Auffassung der Relation der Gesamtheit der sich spiegelnden logischen Formen zur Welt, d.h. zur Gesamtheit der Tatsachen. Die Relation ‚Sprache – Welt‘ ist ein verallgemeinerter Fall der transzendentalen Relation ‚Satz – Tatsache‘. Das Verhältnis ‚Logik – Welt‘ kann man wiederum für eine transzendente Relation, in

einem sublimierten Sinne, halten. Das ist die supertranszendente Relation. Wenn die Logik das ist, was sich in der Sprache widerspiegelt, dann ist sie auch ein Aspekt der Sprache. Daraus folgt aber nicht, dass die Logik nicht autonom ist. Die Welt wird aber auch als Glied dieser Relation in einem besonderen Aspekt aufgefasst. Dieser Aspekt ist die Struktur der Welt. Demzufolge kommt die Relation ‚Logik – Welt‘ zwischen zwei sehr sublimierten Aspekten dessen vor, was im Wesen eine Einheit bildet.

Es gibt eine andere Stelle im *Tractatus*, wo Wittgenstein sich auf die Metapher des Spiegels beruft: „Wie kann die allumfassende, weltspiegelnde Logik so spezielle Haken und Manipulationen gebrauchen? Nur, indem sich alle diese zu einem unendlich feinen Netzwerk, zu dem großen Spiegel, verknüpfen.“ (TLP 5.511) Die Logik erscheint hier nicht als Spiegelbild (der Welt), sondern als der Spiegel selbst. Dieser Unterschied lässt sich so interpretieren, dass in These 5.511 Wittgenstein die Autonomie der Logik hervorhebt, und man hier sogar von einem Vorrang der Logik gegenüber der Welt sprechen kann. Ähnlich wird der Vorrang der Logik gegenüber der Sprache sichtbar. Sofern vorhin die Sprache als Spiegel erschien und die Logik als Spiegelbild, wird jetzt die Logik selbst zum Spiegel.

Entscheidet die These 5.511 tatsächlich über die Autonomie der Logik und deren Vorrang gegenüber der Metaphysik und der Welt? Ein Hinweis auf die Beantwortung dieser Frage lässt sich in folgender These finden: „Die Erfahrung, die wir zum Verstehen der Logik brauchen, ist nicht die, dass sich etwas so und so verhält, sondern, dass etwas *ist*. aber das ist eben *keine* Erfahrung. Die Logik ist *vor* jeder Erfahrung – dass etwas *so* ist. Sie ist vor dem *Wie*, nicht vor dem *Was*.“ (TLP 5.552) Die Erfahrung kann mit der Gesamtheit der Tatsachen, d.h. mit der Welt, gleichgesetzt werden. Daher ist die Logik „vor“ der Welt, sie ist *a priori*. Die Logik ist aber nicht vor dem „Was“, d.h. vor der Substanz der Welt. (TLP 2.0231; 2.024). Das Argument dafür findet man in der nächsten These: „Und wenn dies nicht so wäre, wie könnten wir die Logik anwenden? Man könnte sagen: Wenn es eine Logik gäbe, auch wenn es keine Welt gäbe, wie könnte es dann eine Logik geben, da es eine Welt gibt.“ (TLP 5.5521). Anders gesagt, es gibt oder es gilt Logik, trotzdem kann es sein, dass die Welt nicht existiert. Das heißt, dass es einen leeren logischen Raum geben kann, in dem keine Sachverhalte, d.h. Tatsachen, existieren. Trotzdem gibt es die Substanz der Welt; sie dauert ewig, also gibt es die Gesamtheit der einfachen Gegenstände (TLP 2.021). Die einfachen Gegenstände sind so apriorisch und notwendig wie die Logik.

## 2.

Die Frage nach dem Verhältnis: ‚Logik – Substanz der Welt‘ muss jetzt näher betrachtet werden. Das ist zugleich die Frage nach dem Verhältnis der Logik zur Ontologie (und der Metaphysik). Es ist dabei nicht ganz klar, ob Wittgenstein die Ontologie von der Metaphysik unterscheidet oder sie beide gleichsetzt. Auf jeden Fall erscheint der Terminus „Ontologie“ weder im *Tractatus* noch in den *Tagebüchern* noch in anderen frühen Schriften.

Lassen wir jetzt diese Frage beiseite und kehren zur Relation ‚Logik – Substanz der Welt‘ zurück. Es gibt drei Hauptlösungen:

(1) Die Logik und die Substanz der Welt sind apriorisch und voneinander unabhängig. Das ist eine Einstellung, die Leibniz metaphysischem Realismus nahe steht. Die Substanz der Welt und die Logik müssen in einer Art einander prästabilierten Harmonie bleiben, damit die Welt rational

erfassbar sein kann. Bei dieser Interpretation besteht die Schwierigkeit darin, dass die Logik auf die Substanz der Welt oktroyiert zu sein scheint – und folglich auf die Welt. Die Logik würde sich mithin als transzendent erweisen. Wittgenstein sagt hingegen deutlich, dass die Logik nicht transzendent, sondern transzendental ist (TLP 6.13). Außerdem sollte man bei dieser Interpretation konsequent annehmen, dass der transzendente Gott der Ursprung der Logik oder identisch mit ihr ist. Es ist jedoch nicht klar, ob es im *Tractatus* und in den *Tagebüchern* eine hinreichende Grundlage gibt, diese Deutung anzunehmen.

(2) Die Substanz ist ursprünglich und unabhängig, die Logik hingegen ihre Konsequenz. Diese Voraussetzung führt zu einer Deutung im Stile des Monismus Spinozas. Diese Einstellung könnte man auch mit Aristoteles Realismus vereinbaren. Diese Art der Deutung des Verhältnisses ‚Logik – Substanz der Welt‘ ist bei Hintikka (1996) zu finden. In diesem Fall versteht man unter der Logik die Gesamtheit der logischen Formen, die aus den Formen der einfachen Gegenstände abgeleitet wurden (TLP 2.026). Überdies repräsentieren die logischen Konstanten, Wittgenstein zufolge, nichts (TLP 4.0312), was heißt, dass es keine logischen Gegenstände gibt. Anders gesagt, man kann logische Funktoren eliminieren. Das ist Hintikka zufolge gleichzusetzen damit, dass die gesamte Logik des *Tractatus* die Logik der einfachen Gegenstände ist und keine Logik der Tatsachen oder der Sätze. Die Logik wird mithin völlig auf die Ontologie (d.h. auf die Substanz) reduziert; sie wird durch die Gesamtheit der einfachen Gegenstände determiniert (Hintikka 1996, 154).

Derartige realistische Interpretationen im Geiste des Aristoteles (oder Spinozas) sind ziemlich überzeugend und finden ihre Grundlagen in vielen verschiedenen Thesen im *Tractatus* und in den *Tagebüchern*. Es gibt jedoch einen schwachen Punkt dieser Auffassung. Derartige Interpretationen erklären jedoch nicht die wichtige Eigenschaft, dass in diesem Prozess eine Abbildung der Tatsachen in Gestalt ihrer logischen Bilder, d.h. Sätze, erfolgt. Diese einfache und grundlegende Fähigkeit, dass „wir uns Bilder der Tatsachen machen“ (TLP 2.1.), ist der hier besprochenen Interpretation vollkommen fremd. Kurz gesagt: Das Erscheinen des Subjekts, das die Fähigkeit zur Bildung von Repräsentationen der Tatsachen besitzt, bleibt unerklärt; es lässt sich nicht einfach auf die Substanz der Welt reduzieren. Die realistisch verstandene Substanz der Welt und die Annahme der Existenz vom Subjekt scheinen hier im Konflikt zu stehen. Der von Hintikka unternommene Versuch, das Subjekt mit der Gesamtheit der Sätze gleich zu setzen, scheint ebenso wenig ausreichend. Deshalb ist nach einer noch anderen Interpretation zu suchen, die im Gegensatz zu den bereits besprochenen frei von Schwachpunkten ist.

(3) Das, was ursprünglich ist, ist das transzendente Subjekt. Dieses gibt es nicht in der Welt, sondern es ist „eine Voraussetzung ihrer Existenz“ (Tgb 2.08.1916). Es ist ebenfalls Ursprung nicht nur der Welt, sondern auch der Sprache. Das transzendente Subjekt, das manchmal auch das metaphysische Ich (TLP 5.641) genannt wird, bildet „die Grenze der Welt“ und die Grenze der Sprache. Die transzendente Behandlung bedeutet das Abbrechen des realistischen Verstehens des *Tractatus*. Ishiguro (1990) und McGuinness (1981) verweisen auf Schwierigkeiten, die im Falle der realistischen Auffassung der einfachen Gegenstände auftauchen. Es gibt Argumente, welche die transzendente Interpretation der Gegenstände unterstützen und gegen ihre realistische Deutung sprechen. Die Bedeutung ist ein intensionaler Begriff und Gegenstände lassen sich endgültig als semantische Äquivalenzen definieren. Darüber hinaus behauptet McGuinness,

dass „die Bedeutung (reference) nicht unabhängig von unserem Verstehen des Sinnes erkannt werden kann“ (ebenda). Diese Auffassung reduziert sich darauf, die metaphysische oder ontologische Deutung der Gegenstände durch eine andere, d.h. eine epistemische oder eigentlich antirealistische Interpretation zu ersetzen. Die Erzählung über Gegenstände samt der ganzen so genannten Ontologie des *Tractatus* hat etwas Mythosartiges an sich, das von Wittgenstein nur eingeführt wurde, um anschließend seine Falschheit beweisen zu können (McGuinness 1981). Auch die Tatsache, dass Wittgenstein von Gegenständen als formalen Begriffen spricht (TLP 4.126; 4.127), legt keine realistische, sondern eine transzendente Deutung nahe.

Eine noch radikalere und konsequent transzendente Betrachtung präsentiert G. Frey (1981). Welt und Sprache erweisen sich Ergebnis des transzendentalen Bewusstseins. Dieses Bewusstsein ist das transzendente Subjekt und zwar das transzendente oder metaphysische Subjekt/Ich (TLP 5.641). Diese Voraussetzungen, welche die Bedingungen der Möglichkeit der Welt sind, haben ihren Platz im transzendentalen Subjekt. Die Bedingungen bilden den Inhalt des Wesens des Subjekts. Es ist weiter zu beweisen, dass die ontologischen und sprachlichen Voraussetzungen eine Grundlage im intentionalen Aspekt des transzendentalen Subjekts haben. Dieses Subjekt als das transzendente Bewusstsein bildet nämlich das Schema ‚Name – Bedeutung‘. Die intentionale Identität des Namens und der Bedeutung, d.h. des Gegenstandes, ist für die Erzeugung der ontologischen und semantischen Aspekte verantwortlich. Es ist, der oben vorgeschlagenen Interpretation zufolge, im Wesentlichen eine transzendente bzw. antirealistische Betrachtung. Es gibt keine fertige Welt, so Putnam. Die intentionalen begrifflichen Schemata, welche die Welt bilden, bewohnen das transzendente Subjekt, das transzendente Bewusstsein.

### Schlussbemerkungen

Der transzendentalen Interpretation zufolge wird die Logik mit dem transzendentalen Subjekt identifiziert. Die Logik stellt sich als die Grenze der Welt und der Sprache und

zugleich als der für sie endgültige Spiegel heraus. Die Logik als Subjekt und der Spiegel ist das, was gemeinsam für die Welt und die Sprache ist – ihre „kategoriale Zustimmung“ – die Harmonie. Die Harmonie ist wiederum der Isomorphismus der Strukturen – *Dasselbe*, anwesend in Welt und Sprache. Dasselbe ist nichts anderes als die Form der Wirklichkeit. Es gibt bereits keine Möglichkeit mehr, Dasselbe abzubilden, es gibt keinen Rekurs. Es gibt keine sprachliche Metaebene, in der sich Zustimmung abbilden könnte; ein reflexiver Selbstbezug ist unmöglich. Im transzendentalen Subjekt zeigt sich jedoch, wie im Spiegel, das Bewusstsein dieser Zustimmung. Das transzendente Bewusstsein, das die Rolle des Spiegels spielt, zeichnet sich durch seine Intentionalität aus. Es ist der Ursprung der Einteilung in Welt und Sprache und ebenfalls eine Art des Erkennens der strukturellen Identität von Welt und Sprache.

Um zu den am Anfang des Beitrags gestellten Fragen zurückzukehren: Was ist das Ursprüngliche? Die Logik oder die Welt (die Substanz der Welt)? Die Logik, verstanden als die transzendente Logik bzw. die Ontologie (Perzanowski 1988), ist ursprünglich. Sie umgreift den Logos und das Sein und ist zugleich der endgültige transzendente Spiegel.

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# Aesthetics and a Secondary Use of 'Meaning'? On Stephen Mulhall's Vision of Wittgenstein

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## 1. 'Secondary' sense as a limitation to the appeal to ordinary language

In the *Excursus on Wittgenstein's vision of language* within his book *The Claim of Reason* Stanley Cavell tries to account for the 'generality' of ordinary language terms – combining the flexibility to be used in various, even unforeseen ways with being constant and rule-governed – by proposing the notion of their *projection* into new contexts (cf. Cavell 1979, p. 169 & 180). Following caveat is made at the end of this section:

It is of immediate relevance to what I have been asking about Wittgenstein's view of language, and indicates one general and important limitation in my account, to notice that in moving, in Part II of the Investigations, to "figurative" or "secondary" senses of a word (which Wittgenstein explicitly says are not "metaphorical senses", cf. Investigations, p. 216), Wittgenstein is moving more concentratedly to regions of a word's use which cannot be assured or explained by an appeal to its ordinary language games (in this, these uses are like metaphorical ones). Such uses have consequences in the kind of understanding and communication they make possible. I want to say: It is such shades of sense, intimations of meaning, which allow certain kinds of subtlety or delicacy of communication; the connection is intimate, but fragile. (Cavell 1979, p. 189; PI 184)

In the case of 'figurative' or 'secondary' use of words the tie to ordinary usage, which following Cavell's conception guides the application of words in new contexts, loses its explanatory power. Such a way of employing words is no longer supported by well established conventions. Even though they mark a limitation of Cavell's account of how innovation and variation in language use are rooted in ordinary usage, those 'shades of meaning' – as well 'intimate' as 'fragile', – do play an important role notably in his writings on aesthetics. Here they are discussed within the context of the relationship between individual and society, as it is expressed in our usage of and attitude towards language. (For an account how the dialectic of uniqueness and commonness appears in literature and philosophy cf. Cavell 1988, p. 132.)

Mulhall's picture of language as 'second nature'

Whilst Cavell in his philosophical response to scepticism in *The Claim of Reason* points out that 'secondary' meaning, as it is discussed in Part II of *PI*, invokes a limitation of the appeal to the authority of ordinary language, Stephen Mulhall takes the remarks on 'experience of meaning' and aspect-perception to be pivotal within the "Vision of Language" (Mulhall 2001, p. 28), which he attributes to Wittgenstein. This is exemplified by Mulhall's reading of *PI* in *Inheritance & Originality*, which directly proceeds from the discussion of rule following in part I of *PI* to the matter of aspect-dawning and aspect-perception. Those concepts, according to Mulhall, provide the key to a profound understanding of the former. Mulhall's treatment of the contro-

versy between Hacker/Baker and Malcolm on rule following, which he conceives to illustrate different "aspects of the specifically mathematical idea of an iterative series" (2001, p. 145), shows similarities with an unfinished essay of Gordon Baker, who suggests an analogy between aspects and Wittgenstein's use of the term *Auffassung* (conception) (cf. 2006, p. 283). More than being merely one subject matter among others Mulhall takes the concept of aspect-perception to be of major relevance to Wittgenstein's way of approaching philosophical problems.

Mulhall's emphasis on aspect-perception as a central theme of Wittgenstein's philosophy is motivated by Wittgenstein's remark stressing "the connexion of 'seeing an aspect' and 'experiencing the meaning of a word' " as the important point about the discussion of aspect-blindness (PI 214d). Mulhall claims that *all* the conceptual distinctions drawn "in the realm of general relationships towards pictorial symbols find an analogous application in the field of attitudes towards linguistic symbols" (1993, p. 35; PI 182). Taking the ambition of *PI II xi* to be more than just to clarify some specific uses of the concepts of 'seeing' and 'meaning' he seeks to give "deeper reasons" and to account for a more general philosophical importance of Wittgenstein's remarks on this issue (1993, p. 34).

Mulhall's reading finally amounts to the picture of a general human attitude towards language, which results from the acquisition and habituation of linguistic behaviour to an extent, that provides us with a deep and pervasive awareness of words' linguistic and non-linguistic contexts while language at the same time becomes so tightly integrated into the behavioural repertoire, that words gain the implicitness of gestures (cf. 2001, p. 165 & 169). Thus "linguistic behaviour is second nature to us" and "to acquire language is to acquire a second nature." (2001, p. 170) Mulhall's interpretation invokes the ambiguity of Wittgenstein's notion *Lebensform* (form of life), which can refer both to natural (hence physiological) and cultural features of a community. As Mulhall considers aspect-dawning to be the manifestation of the more general capacity and attitude of continuous aspect-perception, phenomena such as 'experiencing a word's meaning' or making 'secondary' use of it analogously result from a 'naturalized' attunement to a language. Thereby he is ascribing the ability to employ words in secondary senses a possibly creative role within human culture:

But acquiring forms of linguistic behaviour does not just provide us with new instruments for achieving our practical purposes; it also shapes and informs our nature, making possible the genuine inhabitation of human culture, and the self-transformative potential that this talking form of life opens up. In particular, this mutual information of nature by culture can create a new realm of spontaneous linguistic reactions – responses to our experience that are possible only because we have acquired language, and that themselves form the basis of new language games, a further extension of our range of linguistic behaviour. (Mulhall 2001, p. 170)

## 2. Two critical questions

Besides general concerns, if the state of the text of Part II allows to regard the discussion of aspect-perception as the focal point of an interpretation of *PI*, objections can be made against Mulhall's reading in so far as it claims to represent Wittgenstein's position: Mulhall suggests that section xi of *PI II* presents an implicit critique of the conception of language employed in Part I, which advances the conception of meaning-as-use and therefore conceives words as principally substitutable (cf. Mulhall 2001, p. 178). This can be countered by pointing out that Wittgenstein's argumentation is consistent with Part I in respect to the concept of meaning and the main purpose of the text is concept clarification, as it has been done by Oliver Scholz (cf. 1995). To avoid possible confusion – Mulhall doesn't propose a mentalist concept of meaning and but states clearly: "The importance of the experience of meaning cannot therefore reside in a putative contribution to the phenomena of conferring or grasping linguistic meaning. Perhaps, then its interest lies rather in the attitude towards language which it exemplifies." (Mulhall 1993, p. 38). However Scholz' reading gives little support to assume such a shift of focus, neither do Wittgenstein's previous writings on the philosophy of psychology or biographical evidence: Mulhall's demand for 'deeper reasons' underlying the extensive examination of aspect-perception apparently is not contented by seeing the intention of *PI II xi* just in clarifying the morphology of certain psychological concepts, going back to earlier plans of a more comprehensive classification (cf. Scholz 1995, p. 214-217; Schulte 1984, Ch. 3).

A second point of attack is Mulhall's notion of 'continuous aspect-perception' and in consequence his newly coined term 'continuous meaning-perception'. Whereas aspect-dawning is linked to a specific linguistic expression (seeing-as) and presents a rather rare phenomenon, its opposite – "the 'continuous seeing' of an aspect" (*PI 166e*) – is not manifested by specific verbal utterances. Mulhall argues that 'continuous seeing' of an aspect is not just an expression limited to the small range of cases were it could be used to mark the difference between having the experience of aspect-dawning and not having it, but it points at a nearly ubiquitous attitude in perception (see Mulhall's discussion of *Glock*: Mulhall 2001, p. 175). The main evidence he gives for this view is the position of the term within Wittgenstein's text: preceding the discussion of picture-objects and the attitude towards pictures, which criticizes the idea of a process of interpretation involved in seeing depicted objects that is separable from perception itself (cf. Mulhall 1993, p. 20).

In his discussion of Mulhall's account of aspect-perception Justin Good acknowledges Mulhall to have correctly emphasized this critical point. But Good objects that in postulating continuous aspect-perception as a feature of a general human relationship towards pictures and other objects of perception Mulhall exceeds the limits of grammatical investigation and raises a metaphysical claim (cf. Good 2006, p. 35). Mulhall relates the concept of continuous aspect-perception to Heidegger's term of *readiness-to-hand* (cf. Mulhall 1993, p. 24). Good doubts that Mulhall succeeds to provide a reading that connects Wittgenstein to Heidegger while at the same time refraining from claims that reach beyond being mere remarks on grammar. This concern appears to be even more imminent in respect to the picture of language and culture given in *Inheritance & Originality*.

Apart from the difficulties of an encounter between Wittgenstein and Heidegger's ontological project, the disputable point concerning Wittgenstein's text remains

whether a shift in the conception of language, as Mulhall suggests, takes place. In respect to the relationship towards pictures Good argues against taking the grammatical clarification to endorse the assertion of continuous aspect-perception as an ubiquitous, general condition: "Where Mulhall goes wrong, however, is by interpreting Wittgenstein's attack on that picture as the affirmation of a different picture." (Good 2006, p. 35)

## 3. Mulhall's view within a plurality of conceptions of language

An answer to the question if and to what extent Mulhall's interpretation is supported by Wittgenstein's text itself is related to one's conception of Wittgenstein's method. Rather than to attribute Wittgenstein to imply a philosophical vision of language and culture in this section of *PI II*, as Mulhall does, it seems more plausible to me to regard Mulhall's interpretation as rooted in and inspired by the openness and sensitivity Wittgenstein exhibits towards the phenomena and linguistic expressions he examines. While his argumentation consequently undercuts a relapse into mentalist conceptions of meaning, he acknowledges the inclination to use the word 'meaning' ("figuratively") in connection with the game of experiencing a word and introduces the notion of 'secondary' meaning to account for a further divergent use of it (cf. *PI 183-184*). Wittgenstein elucidates the temptation posed by these uses of the term to draw misleading conclusions for a conception of meaning. At the same time he explores the ramifications of the use of 'meaning' deep into the realm of aesthetics, matters of *Sprachgefühl* and, as Cavell puts it, those "shades of sense, intimations of meaning, which allow us certain kinds of subtlety or delicacy of communication" (Cavell 1979, p. 189).

In his late text on the analogy between *aspects* and *conceptions* (*Auffassungen*), which I mentioned briefly earlier, Gordon Baker characterizes *conceptions* to be "essentially plural" (2006, p. 284). Baker's examples of conceptions are the Augustinian picture of language and the conception of *meaning-as-use*. Although those two conceptions cannot be applied simultaneously or combined with each other, none of it can be claimed to present the only possibility. The aim Baker attributes to Wittgenstein's philosophizing is therapeutic: to dissolve the fixation to a single conception and make alternatives available. Mulhall's reading of Wittgenstein can be understood in this sense as developing one more conception of language: one that assigns such phenomena as the 'secondary' use of words a more central role, stressing our attitude towards words, and addresses different philosophical (and cultural) problems than the conception of meaning-as-use, while still trying to stay coherent with it. In respect to the realm of aesthetics and to the question, how the notion of meaning can be applied there, Mulhall's *Vision of Language* and the importance it attributes to 'secondary' meaning provides an inspiring prospect. Although it is not without risks of getting into metaphysical claims.

One further merit of Mulhall's reading is that it paves the way for an encounter between Wittgenstein and the Continental phenomenological traditions. There are not only connections to Heidegger and Kierkegaard which can be explored. Mulhall's emphasis on a gestural dimension of language use suggests possible intersections with Maurice Merleau-Ponty's account of language as gestures (1945, Ch. 6) and Ernst Cassirer's treatment of language in *The Philosophy of Symbolic Forms* (1956, Ch. 2). Examining those writings with a Wittgensteinian view of language and his way to deal with psychological concepts in

mind could bring a dialectical exchange between those approaches or at least show them to be working out an alternative picture within the plurality of conceptions of language.

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# We Should Be Certain or We Are Certain?

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As it is known, Wittgenstein in his *On Certainty*, while presenting Moore's claim that he knows 'Here is one hand', speaks about beliefs which, while are not knowable, it is inconceivable for us to be mistaken about them. He ascribes a special status to these propositions in our epistemic system and sees the possibility of thinking and judging and having a language depended on believing in them. He likens them to hinges on which our questions and doubts turn (OC, 341). Thus they have been called somewhere hinge-propositions (see Cook). Of course, as Rhees refers, we cannot classify them or find out what they all have in common (Rhees, p. 78), so calling them by a name is a problem for us. Since I am observing McGinn's discussion, I will call them, following her, Moore-type propositions.

Wittgenstein has made a comparison between Moore-type propositions and mathematical ones. This is the point which has been advanced excellently by Marie McGinn in her *Sense and Certainty*. She argues that Wittgenstein provides the philosophical understanding that is crucial to a philosophically satisfactory rebuttal of the sceptic (McGinn, p.161).

McGinn shows that Moore-type propositions are not knowledge claims, but they have a function like that of mathematical ones:

According to traditional epistemologists, if our system of beliefs is to be well-grounded, the regress of justification should be halted, that is, we should come to the beliefs that we can know indubitably that they are true. The ideal of such beliefs were the propositions of logic and mathematics.

Now, on the one hand, in Wittgenstein's view, the reason of absolute certainty which is attached to mathematical propositions 'is not that they "certainly correspond to the truth" – or something of the sort – no, it is just this that is called "thinking", "speaking", "inferring", "arguing"' (RFM, I, 156).

On the other hand, Wittgenstein rejects the idea that the meaning of a word consists in some sort of interpretation of it. 'The *meaning* mustn't be capable of interpretation, it is the last interpretation' (BB, p. 34). But interpretations always can be interpreted. This paradox 'shows us that there is a way of grasping a rule which is not an *interpretation*, but is exhibited in what we call "obeying the rule" and "going against it" in actual cases' (PI, 201). Thus, 'To understand a language means to be master of a technique' (PI, 199).

According this account, McGinn says, we can interpret the certainty of Moore-type propositions in more or less the same way that we understand the certainty of mathematical or logical propositions. Our certainty concerning them, as in the case of mathematical propositions, has 'the form of "This is what I do"; it represents my practical mastery of the practice of speaking the language. It is not, therefore a variety of certainty for which the question of justification arises' (MacGinn, p.144). Thus, this account unravels undogmatically the sceptic problematic.

## Criticism

MacGinn's interpretation of Wittgenstein's account seems very profound and interesting, but I am uncertain about its being just what had been meant by Wittgenstein. I think that at least two objections can be raised against her interpretation:

The main point of the argument which is set up by McGinn on behalf of Wittgenstein for dissolution of scepticism is an analogy between the role which is played by Moore-type propositions and the propositions of logic and mathematics in our life. In both cases, it is their very special usage, that is, their being the very criteria of being true or false, which makes them infallible; because, then, they are pre-epistemic and can be known with certainty *apriori*.

It seems that McGinn, considering the similarity which Wittgenstein sees between these two types of propositions, neglects an important point. In some passages which suggest this similarity, Wittgenstein sees a similarity between them not in respect of the certainty, but of the uncertainty, of both of them. He is going to say that mathematical propositions are also suffering from the uncertainty which empirical propositions are; remarks such as 651 and 447 specify this, especially 651, to which McGinn astonishingly does not refer (so far as I know) throughout her discussion:

I cannot be making a mistake about  $12 \times 12$  being 144. And now one cannot contrast *mathematical* certainty with the relative uncertainty of empirical propositions. For the mathematical proposition has been obtained by a series of actions that are in no way different from the actions of the rest of our lives, and are in the same degree liable to forgetfulness, oversight and illusion.

Wittgenstein always refers to empirical propositions *which are involved* in the mathematical ones. He compares the certainty of two kinds of propositions and sees them as having the same degree of certainty, but not because of ascribing mathematical certainty to Moore-type propositions, but for noticing that there is no difference between them. But making no difference does not only mean regarding the latter as certain as the first; but, in view of what he says in those remarks, we can easily say that what may make Moore-type propositions uncertain applies to mathematical propositions as well. He says: 'In so far as this proposition [ $12 \times 12$ ] rests on our not miscalculating and our senses not deceiving us as we calculate, both propositions, the arithmetical and the physical one, are on the same level' (OC, 447). The comparison is between two propositions, mathematical and non-mathematical, which both have an empirical aspect and are liable to forgetfulness and the like, and he says: 'If the proposition  $12 \times 12 = 144$  is exempt from doubt, then so too must non-mathematical propositions be' (OC, 653). None of remarks which refer to this similarity explicitly propose a similarity of the kind which McGinn asserts.

Of course, I am not saying that both of these two kinds of propositions are, in Wittgenstein's point of view, doubttable; it is never true. But it cannot be said, I think,

that their certainty is of the kind of mathematical certainty. That a mathematical proposition is actually certain depends on there being some certain empirical proposition, since the mathematical propositions, during educating and applying, are associated with experience. In fact, there is not any merely mathematical proposition, that is to say, a mathematical proposition which is entirely separated from experience.

So it can be said that the certainty of Moore-type propositions does not lie parallel to that of mathematical ones, but the latter includes the first. It is because mathematical propositions should also be expressed by words of our language.

There seems another objectionable claim which is based on the similarity which McGinn sees between those two kinds of propositions. She concludes that our certainty about Moore-type propositions only represents our practical mastery of the practice of speaking the language (McGinn, p.144). But it can be asked whether we can say about both kinds of these propositions, when we use them and apply them to our world, that we are concerning with nothing other than some techniques established for practices. It is true that Moore-type propositions, just as mathematical ones, have a special function in our language and it is this usage which constructs their total identity and meaning, but *using* them is something which we do newly in every case. We apply these propositions and this application involves something more than merely the meanings of the words. It is true, again, that we suppose that we cannot make a mistake in this application, which means that our being mistaken is logically (in the sense of the word which is meant by Wittgenstein) impossible, but at the same time our being wrong about them is not impossible. It is not impossible that it happens some time that, knowing the meaning of the words, I find that I have been wrong about a belief of this kind. Finding this, of course, is possible on the ground of some other beliefs of this kind. But having a faultless set of propositions is different from having a set of faultless propositions. This faultlessness belongs to a set (a nest, as Wittgenstein put it in OC, 225) of propositions without any determined boundaries and not to any of those propositions. In fact, it is this set which plays a special logical role in our system of beliefs. It is impossible for this set to be destroyed, because being destroyed needs a ground and there is not any other ground; but one of those propositions can be removed.

We should not forget that the propositions in question are propositions about the reality by referring to which we correct our mistakes. Reality is what *the set* of our beliefs shows; and although the reality is inseparable of our language, but it is important that the facts may buck and throw us down from the saddle (cf. OC, 616). Yet, we are certain about those beliefs and we live up to them. But we cannot conceive them as necessary, in the sense that mathematical propositions are necessary and *a priori*. Though there is something necessary and *a priori* both in Moore-type and mathematical propositions, but necessary and *a priori* propositions are universal, while a Moore-type proposition such as 'This is my hand' when we use it in a certain case, just as a mathematical proposition when we use it in a case such as 'Apples in these two basket are totally 38', are individual. Though there is something necessary and *a priori* in Moore-type propositions, but what is expressed by them is not wholly necessary and *a priori*. So, despite my mastery of using words, it is possible that I make a mistake about them, as I may commit an error in

counting the apples, in spite of my perfect mastery in mathematics.

McGinn compares the necessity of Moore-type propositions with the necessity of the Metre Rod being one metre, and sees them alike. But, such a proposition is a tautology while Moore-type propositions are not tautologies. I have known the meaning of 'hand' by aid of 'This is my hand'; but when I use it again for referring to my hand, I *apply* this word to something anew. This is something which I do, and the meanings of the words are not the only judge of the truth of what I say. Likewise, when we call the measure of a rod one metre, and come back to it and say: 'This rod is one metre', then it will not be a tautology; because it might be changed with another rod, or a piece of it might have been broken; and then our proposition is not only unnecessary but wrong.

As for the difference which McGinn recognizes between the mathematical and Moore-type propositions, such a question arises. She sees this difference resulting from the fact that Moore-type propositions 'in exceptional circumstances may function as genuine empirical propositions' (McGinn, p.155). I want to say that these propositions always may have this function. We cannot know which function they have in every case. In other words, there is not a clear boundary between cases in which one proposition functions as an empirical proposition and those in which it does not (cf. OC, 98,318- 319). Someone may come to her senses in a hospital and say 'Take my hand' and if so, she regards 'This is my hand' so certain that does not need to be expressed. She has the right of being certain about this belief as much as any other one has; but she may be wrong and the hand she supposes as her own\_ the hand she was writing by which several days ago\_ be a hand which has been grafted skillfully to her body after her losing her hand in an accident. She will change her belief about her hand when she becomes aware of its being, say, A's hand grafted to her body. Even with regard to the meanings of the words of our language, however we never doubt them, but if we doubt them we should stand before the abyss (OC, 370), yet it may happen that we have been misled even in learning the meanings of the words. It can be shown by many examples.

Thus, it can be said that what we should say against the sceptic is impossibility of doubting a set of propositions and not of every single one of them. (It refers to a distinction between these propositions and propositions of logic and mathematics which never turn out to be wrong, except when they are applying to the world and combine inevitably with Moore-type propositions.) It is this set which constructs the reality for us. But we don't doubt even every one of them in our life. The logic of our language which is our tools for thinking and judging and even doubting gives us the right of being certain about them. This right is not based on an argument, but on what *there is* in the course of our acting and living. It's not an argument which makes us to be certain about them, but this certainty is the manner of our acting.

I think, considering all of what Wittgenstein says on this matter, that it cannot be said that he presents an *argument* which refuses the possibility of any doubt about those propositions. But his remarks show that we don't doubt them, and we are quite right to do so; rather, we are reasonable when we don't doubt them, which means that we call it 'reasonable' ( OC, 219, 220, 252, 254, 323, 325, 327, 556).

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# Imaging Meaning

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This paper is part of a larger project aiming at the conception of a theory of meaning and speculates on the specific importance of imagination as a milestone for such a theory. The subject is introduced by an account of customary uses of the concept of imaging, followed by the presentation of alternative senses as they will be used in this context to elucidate how an analogy between imagination and meaning may be constructed. This is to present the contention that both realms of imagination and meaning are analogical.

The terms 'imaging' and 'imagination' are generally conceived in their visual sense, as the action or the ability to form mental pictures. The reason for this preference is grounded both on a traditional hierarchy of the senses, clearly instantiated in Locke's (1690) model of sense perception (the stand and validity of which will not be analyzed here), and on the orientation of our language towards objects (Reed 2003). If due to the structure of our language, we tend to think of imagination in terms of the objects which are visually represented by it; this essay presents two additional senses for this family of concepts: (1) the action of making explicit spatial relations, and (2) the dimension where all other senses are rendered.

Imaging as spatial relations can be well understood in pictorial terms, like composition in a painting; but in order to throb any prejudice that may accompany the visual conception of this word I suggest, for this exercise, that we use our imagination to form a mental conception of spatial relations acoustically. Firstly because it helps to situate ourselves as a referential point for those relations, which makes it clearer that we understand them in relation to us and how we perceive the relation between the different elements. Secondly, because the difficulty in limiting this imaginative space is more concrete as there is no horizon compared to that of the visual field, but rather sounds fade in the distance without us being able to draw the line where they become inaudible; thirdly, because an acoustic conception brings forth phenomena like echo, which reveal something about the importance of the form of space as a defining characteristic; and finally, because perhaps this notion can help conceive of the world as relations which are (or not) the case; and these, in turn, as events taking place, instead of thinking of the world as composed of static things standing in certain relations.

So, just as 'imaging' may be conceived of beyond its object-oriented connotation, also 'meaning' can be understood not as an entity standing somehow before words or sentences like Aristotle's essences stood before things, nor as metaphysical referents, like Platonic ideas, to which words return to obtain their characteristics; but rather, meaning can be understood as spaciousness: as the absolute dimension upon which languages are patterns of edification and texts are constructs. This dimension, then, is what may be made explicit by the imaginative superposition of languages, the translations and creation of texts, and the passing between modes of presentation, just like space is made explicit by that which occupies it.

This proposition is a threefold notion of imaging, as explained above:

Firstly there is the recognition and consequence of our own position with regards to meaning: in the sense in which the meaning of words is the use they are given in a particular context; moreover, regarding the idiosyncratic connotations that the speaker and interlocutor bring, as well as the possibility of interpretation before malapropisms, or of misinterpretation of the intentions linked to the meaning (provided we are not solipsists, of course). Take Austin's (1962) example of marriage: the event is sensed as unique and inimitable, yet its success can only be guaranteed by the repeatability of the institution, of the convention and of language. Of course, there's the performance, prompted by one intention or other, yet only citing 'I do' in the correct context guarantees the success of the matrimony.

Secondly, the space of meaning is infinite; not only in temporal terms, which are understood with regard to the evolution that meaning goes through as language, by the introduction of new intentions and new idiosyncratic connotations and the such, but if we think about the multiplicity of languages and the infinitude of modes of presentation of the meanings, which is what Walter Benjamin (1923) calls the kinship of languages, we begin to comprehend the magnitude of this spatial dimension, and how it expands in its infinity.

Thirdly, regarding the relations, imaging, as we have mentioned before, consists in making explicit spatial relations. We can think of a musical composition, for example: what makes the construction work is the dynamic relationship between the possible patterns of composition (and the intentions which prompt them). And as soon as the opus begins, silence is altered just as much as the notes which come to form the structure, and just as much as the mental state of the performers or the audience. This is to say that all which is the case (as well as that which is not the case) is found in a never-ending reciprocal relation with the space which it produces and in which it is produced. By the same token, the space or realm of meaning is an initial complex network from which each and every singularity of language is derived, where the simple elements are defined by the relations of the system as a whole, instead of there being basic simple independent elements which come together forming the network. (De Saussure 1959)

If we think about what imaging is, as an implementation of our faculty of imagination, we may conclude that it is a cognitive exercise that takes us from the informational to the descriptive. For example, to say that the temperature is 0°C is an informative proposition about a state of affairs, it may be empirically verified and what not, but to imagine that the temperature is 0°C is to evoke the meaning of such a statement, namely, that it is cold. Still, there is no absolute cold, things can just be cold in relation to something else, to the fact that our body temperature is around the 36°C. Imagination avails meaning. The metaphor 'the temperature is ice-cold' is only meaningful for whoever can understand the description. And again, this is a way of saying that something can be meaningful in as much as it can be differentiated from other elements of the system without loosing its pertinence to the system.

Now, this claim that the act of imaging affords something with meaning is not new; it can be derived from many propositions that have been put forth before in different forms many times: for instance, Hume (1739) says, that if we may conceive of something then it is not logically impossible; while Wittgenstein (1921), explains how language can be senseless and say nonsense, and only the sentences which form a picture, an image of the world, i.e. only that which may be imagined, has sense or is sensible.

But the point can be carried beyond the above: the imagined is unique and exclusive in its mode of presentation. It is harder to appreciate this element in philosophy, because we seek to translate the ideas from one mode of presentation to another, to ensure they are sound or that we understand them; because if they are, and if we do, then we should be able to present the same relation from different perspectives, bypassing the mode of presentation, and the relation should remain sound. There is a similar tendency in the scientific process that leads from a hypothesis to a natural law by parting inductively from the gathered evidence. This, of course, has its advantages, most of them practical, some even ethical, but we should not lose sight of the fact that every universalization neglects the uniqueness of every particular instance even when it precedes the possibility of actual visualization; like the scientific diagram, for example, that succeeds in expressing or evoking universality. Imagine Bohr's atomic model, the nucleus at the center, protons and neutrons, and the electrons orbiting around it, much like the planets orbit around the sun. This illustration was meant to schematically represent a universal construction which was impossible to capture by any perceptual means (either the atom or the universe). By doing so, however, it limits our conception of the system to what the model expresses (within the model). In other words, the very success of the depiction is what makes it unique as an image, even if the meaning is supposed to be universal. This is acceptable if the claim of such a portrayal is normative, because then we need only to multiply it infinitely, and we have reached the proposed universality, but as Wittgenstein's *Philosophical Investigations* (1953) clearly exemplifies in its album-like construction, the character of universality is quite problematic if we do not imply essentialism.

Let us explain: it is possible to assert a universal proposition which is descriptive and not normative. Of course this requires the introduction of modality into logic, but granted this possibility, the assertion does not fall before the problem of induction, because the proposition does not claim that things will continue to be the way they have been, but rather, it just says that they have been so thus far. Still, the universal proposition is only imaginable as the totality of the instances that constitute it, and not as a whole, since the proposition is not claiming an essential necessity of a Platonic ideal concept. Wittgenstein's *Philosophical Investigations* are thus written as an album, because he recognizes the uniqueness that may only exist in the particular. Each context, each language game, each instantiation is unique, just as each mode of presentation, even if that which is presented can be reiterated. Even when it is precisely the fact that it can be repeated, like the ceremonial 'I do' by which people are wedded, that makes it successful at all.

It doesn't take Nietzsche's proposition that language is intrinsically metaphorical to understand that this applies to every mode of linguistic presentation as well, but the present author agrees with this proposition, which also strengthens the suggestion furthered here.

Now, let us recapitulate: the tendency of language in philosophy is to bring us beyond its arrangement into the realm of meaning, as if meaning was a transcendental referent which could be reached and unchanged. This realm of meaning can be alternatively understood as the network created by the relationships between the different modes of presentation in different languages, as well as within the languages themselves; and this network is in an ongoing process of inexhaustible construction and change, where each instance is in fact unique, and cannot really be represented, but only presented. For when they are symbolically represented in some other way, the mode of presentation has changed, and so have the sense, the particular meaning, and the state of mind to which it relates in the intention of the interlocutors. This is quite clear in art, for it is a form of arrangement that is concerned solely with the perceptible, with the symbols' presentation, what they are in form, and not what they represent as symbols. The representation and exemplification of anything other than their formal characteristics remains as part of the idiosyncratic weight that enriches the experience, but it is part of the aesthetic appreciation only in as much as this experience can result from the very mode of presentation.

Now, this context may be clarified through imaging in any of its forms (visual, acoustic, sensory, etc.). Precisely by the understanding of the multiplicity of modes of imagination, and the uniqueness of each description which contains the three elements mentioned before: the intention – the presence of the agent for which this relationship may be meaningful; the infiniteness of the process – seen in the fact that new masterpieces are still being written despite the fact that they use the same finite vocabulary, along with the continuous evolution of language and thought and finally, the relationships which are determinant of the particular elements (including the agent of intention) – these define and are defined in terms of the meaning they are made to evoke by those who understand them.

There is a fourth element which was briefly mentioned at the beginning of this essay, and has somewhat remained concealed, intermingling. And that is the performative element, the act of imagining. The importance of the actual exercise of imagination is linked to the conception, also briefly presented, that reality is a conjunct of events and not of objects. This action may also be said to be what bridges the gap between the intentions of the speaker and the actual linguistic construction. But it can already be seen that this element invites issues which demand much more attention than can be presently given, such as the problem of translation, and even, if expanded enough, the problem of consciousness. If these are mentioned here, it is only as a tempting enticement towards further thinking on the subject, and will be given full attention in due time.

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# Warum sind die Gegenstände des *Tractatus* einfach?

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Es sei eine These des von Russell und Wittgenstein vertretenen logischen Atomismus, dass Gegenstände einfach (simple) sind, ist oft zu lesen. Die Gegenstände seien die Atome, die dem logischen Atomismus den Namen geben. Sie seien einfach in dem Sinne, dass sie keine Teile besitzen und damit unzerstörbar sind. Das Argument dafür wird in Wittgensteins *Tractatus* 2.02–2.0212 verortet. Im Folgenden soll es genauer untersucht werden. Zuerst werde ich die Darstellung des Argumentes, wie sie in vielen Texten zum *Tractatus* zu finden ist, wiedergeben. Ich werde zeigen, dass diese als Interpretation des *Tractatus* nicht taugt. Meines Erachtens macht sie nicht deutlich, warum Wittgenstein behauptet, Gegenstände seien einfach. Ich werde zeigen, dass ein adäquates Verständnis der Gründe, aus denen Wittgenstein die Einfachheit der Gegenstände ableitet, auch seine Bildtheorie des Satzes erhellt.

## 1. Das Argument

In 2.02–2.0212 argumentiert Wittgenstein dafür, dass Gegenstände einfach sind. Das Argument ist schwer verständlich. Das liegt zum einen daran, dass Wittgenstein in ihm den Begriff der Substanz einführt, der nicht unbedingt klärend ist, sondern eher noch undurchsichtiger macht, welche Überlegungen hinter dem Argument stecken und warum es schlüssig sein soll. Zum anderen drückt sich Wittgenstein an einer Stelle unbestimmt aus: Ohne Substanz würde der Sinn eines Satzes davon abhängen, ob ein anderer Satz wahr ist (2.0211). Es ist alles andere als klar, in welcher Beziehung die beiden Sätze (im Folgenden p und q) zueinander stehen, noch warum p nur dann Sinn hat, wenn q wahr ist. Das Argument sieht folgendermaßen aus:

2.02 Der Gegenstand ist einfach.

2.0201 Jede Aussage über Komplexe lässt sich in eine Aussage über deren Bestandteile und in diejenigen Sätze zerlegen, welche die Komplexe vollständig beschreiben.

2.021 Die Gegenstände bilden die Substanz der Welt. Darum können sie nicht zusammengesetzt sein.

2.0211 Hätte die Welt keine Substanz, so würde, ob ein Satz Sinn hat, davon abhängen, ob ein anderer Satz wahr ist.

2.0212 Es wäre dann unmöglich, ein Bild der Welt (wahr oder falsch) zu entwerfen.

Das Argument hat die Form einer Reductio ad absurdum: Wenn die Gegenstände zusammengesetzt wären, würden sie nicht „die Substanz der Welt“ bilden. Ohne einfache Gegenstände hätte die Welt keine Substanz. Daraus ergeben sich zwei Konsequenzen: Ohne Substanz würde der Sinn eines Satzes p davon abhängen, ob ein anderer Satz q wahr ist. Und ohne Substanz wäre es nicht möglich, ein Bild der Welt zu entwerfen.

Mit dem Argument präsentiert Wittgenstein meines Erachtens das Resultat von Überlegungen, die einen Wendepunkt in seiner Auffassung des Satzes bewirkten. Er präsentiert hier den Grund, der ihn dazu bewog, eine erste Auffassung, die noch nahe bei Russell war, zu ver-

werfen, und der ihn dazu brachte, die Namen zu den einzigen Bestandteilen des Satzes zu machen. In knappen Sätzen findet sich hier also eine Schlüsselstelle zum Verständnis des *Tractatus*. Um sie recht aufzufassen, ist es wichtig festzustellen, in welcher Beziehung p und q zueinander stehen.

## 2. Die Standardauffassung

In der Wittgensteinliteratur findet sich eine Standardauffassung des Argumentes. Dabei besteht Einigkeit in der Frage, in welcher Beziehung p und q zueinander stehen. Als Beispiel für die Standardauffassung sei hier die entsprechende Stelle aus Pears *The False Prison* angeführt.

„If there were any complex things named in the complete analyses of ordinary factual sentences, then the analysing sentences would have senses only if certain other sentences, not included in their analyses (they have no analyses), were true. For complex things would not be there to be named unless it were true that their components were arranged in the way required for their existence. But the sense of a sentence about a complex thing cannot possibly depend on the truth of another sentence about its components. So the analysis must go on down to the next level and include the further sentence in the sense of the original one, and this process must continue until all words for complexes have been replaced by genuine names standing for simple objects.“ (Pears 1987, S. 66)

Pears fasst die Reductio ad absurdum wie folgt auf: Er setzt voraus, dass in jedem Fall der vollständig analysierte Satz aus Namen besteht. Angenommen, Gegenstände sind nicht einfach. Dann bezeichnen die Namen zusammengesetzte Gegenstände, also Komplexes. Sei p ein Elementarsatz, der aus Namen  $n_1, n_2 \dots$  für Komplexes besteht. Pears identifiziert den „anderen Satz, der wahr sein muss“ mit Sätzen  $q_1, q_2 \dots$  über die Bestandteile der benannten Gegenstände, die aussagen, dass diese Bestandteile auf bestimmte Weise zusammengesetzt sind. Die Namen  $n_i$  referieren auf Komplexes, die, so Pears, nur dann existieren, wenn sie auf eine bestimmte Weise zusammengesetzt sind. Wenn die Gegenstände existieren, ist es also wahr, dass sie auf diese bestimmte Weise zusammengesetzt sind. Da wir angenommen haben, dass die Sätze  $q_i$  genau das aussagen, folgt also, dass sie genau dann wahr sind, wenn die von den  $n_i$  bezeichneten Gegenstände existieren, und damit, wenn die Namen  $n_i$  Bedeutung haben. Daraus folgt, dass p nur dann Sinn hat, wenn alle  $q_i$  wahr sind. Da es ausgeschlossen ist, dass ein vollständig analysierter Satz von anderen Sätzen abhängt, ist die Annahme, p sei vollständig analysiert, falsch.

Die Standardauffassung findet sich in Variationen unter anderem auch in (Glock 1996), (Schröder 2006), (Frascolla 2007). Alle Autoren stimmen darin überein, dass sie die  $q_i$  mit Sätzen über die Bestandteile der durch die Namen bezeichneten Gegenstände identifizieren. Sie setzen also voraus, dass es auch dann Namen gibt, wenn die Gegenstände nicht einfach sind. Namen bezeichnen dann Zusammengesetztes statt Einfaches. Überdies wird vorausgesetzt, dass die Bedeutung der Namen neben der

Referenz auf etwas auch beinhaltet, auf welche Weise dieses zusammengesetzt ist. Der Name erhält so eine beschreibende Funktion und es wird also vorausgesetzt, dass ein Name genau dann referiert, wenn das, was er beschreibt, existiert. Namen bekommen so eine zweifache Funktion: Sie referieren und sie beschreiben. Doch das widerspricht Wittgensteins Verständnis von Satz und Name: Nur ersterer beschreibt, Namen referieren bloss (vgl. 2.20201, 3.144, 3.211, 3.24). Die Zeichen, die in der Standardauffassung als Namen bezeichnet werden, sind scheinbare Namen: Sie stehen für Komplexes und sind gemäss der Standardauffassung eigentlich Abkürzungen für die Sätze  $q_i$ , die dieses beschreiben.

Es stellt sich schliesslich die Frage, warum die Sätze  $q_i$  wahr sein müssen, damit  $p$  sinnvoll ist. Denn in 3.24 hält Wittgenstein fest, dass Sätze, die von Komplexen handeln, falsch sind, wenn diese nicht existieren, und nicht unsinnig. Wittgenstein übernimmt also in Grundzügen die Kennzeichnungstheorie Russells. Diese präsentiert eine Lösung dafür, wie Ausdrücke, die scheinbar auf Nicht-existentes referieren, zu analysieren sind. Ich halte es nicht für plausibel, dass Wittgenstein in 2.0211 das Gegenteil der Bemerkungen in 3.24 behauptet, nämlich, dass Sätze, die von Komplexen handeln, unsinnig sind, wenn diese nicht existieren.

### 3. Der andere Satz, der wahr ist

Die Standardauffassung lässt sich also weder mit Wittgensteins Begriff der Namen noch mit seiner Analyse von Sätzen über Komplexe in Einklang bringen. Damit bleibt die Frage unbeantwortet, warum Wittgenstein in 2.02 behauptet, dass Gegenstände einfach sind. Ohne einfache Gegenstände, ohne Substanz, gäbe es nur Aussagen über Zusammengesetztes, soviel ist klar. Nicht mit der Konsequenz, dass Namen dann Zusammengesetztes bezeichnen würden, sondern dass es *keine* Namen im Sinne des *Tractatus* gäbe. Zu fragen, warum Gegenstände einfach sind, heisst also eigentlich zu fragen, warum es Namen gibt, was Namen in der Sprache leisten. Die Frage, die es zu beantworten gilt, um das Argument 2.02–2.0212 zu verstehen, ist: Warum ist es ausgeschlossen, dass es gar keine echten Namen gibt, sondern nur Beschreibungen von Komplexen, mithin also Kennzeichnungen? Eine Aussage über einen einfachen Gegenstand lässt sich im Gegensatz zu einer Aussage über Komplexe nicht in weitere Aussagen zerlegen. Was ist damit gewonnen? Ich behaupte, dass Wittgenstein hier nicht darauf hinaus will, dass die Gegenstände als Gegenstücke zu den Namen existieren müssen, sie also nicht zugrunde gehen können und deshalb einfach sein müssen. Was aber soll gesichert werden? Substanz, sagt Wittgenstein in 2.021. Hätte die Welt keine Substanz, müsste es Sätze geben, die wahr sind, damit andere Sätze Sinn haben. Um das Argument 2.02–2.0212 zu verstehen, gilt es also zu nachzuvollziehen, was Wittgenstein tut, indem er den Begriff der Substanz einführt. Mit der Substanz bringt Wittgenstein die Form ins Spiel. Die Substanz bestimmt eine Form (2.0231). Sie ist das, was unabhängig von dem, was der Fall ist, besteht (2.024). Sie ist Form und Inhalt (2.025). Die Form ist die Möglichkeit der Struktur (2.033). Und die logische Form ist schliesslich dasjenige, was der Satz mit der Tatsache, die er abbildet, gemein haben muss (2.18, 4.12).

Den Begriff der logischen Form verwendet Wittgenstein um zu bestimmen, was ein sinnvoller Satz ist: Nur Zeichenreihen, die eine logische Form aufweisen, sind sinnvoll. Willkürlich aneinandergereihte Zeichen sind es nicht. Der Begriff der logischen Form würde weiterer Erläu-

terungen bedürfen, die im Rahmen dieses Beitrags keinen Platz haben. Wenn Wittgenstein in 2.021 festhält, dass die Gegenstände die Substanz bilden, behauptet er damit, dass die logische Form in den Gegenständen zu verorten ist und damit in den Namen, die diese „im Satz vertreten“ (3.22). Denn dass ein Name eine logische Form hat, heisst so viel wie, dass er einen Gegenstand vertritt, dass er referiert. Wittgenstein verortet also die logische Form in den Namen und nicht in den Sätzen. Sätze als Ganze haben nur insofern eine Form (oder eine Struktur), als die Namen, aus denen sie gebildet sind, eine Form haben.

Warum aber gäbe es keine logische Form ohne einfache Gegenstände? Ohne einfache Gegenstände gäbe es keine Namen, sondern nur Beschreibungen von Komplexen. Die Frage ist also die, warum laut Wittgenstein die Namen eine logische Form haben und nicht die Sätze als Ganze. Was ist damit gewonnen, wenn es Namen gibt? Namen können nicht durch Definitionen auseinandergelagt werden (3.261). Ohne Namen gäbe es nur Sätze über Komplexe, also solche, deren Bestandteile durch die Analyse wiederum in Sätze zerlegt würden (2.0201) Der Begriff der logischen Form müsste also aus dem Satz als Ganzem gewonnen werden. Tatsächlich glaubt Wittgenstein anfänglich wie Russell in *Theory of Knowledge*, dass Sätze als Ganze eine logische Form haben. Worin besteht diese dann aber? Diese Frage findet sich auch in einem Tagebucheintrag Wittgensteins: „Die Schwierigkeit ist die: wie kann es die Form von  $p$  geben, wenn es keinen Sachverhalt dieser Form gibt? Und worin besteht diese Form dann eigentlich?!“ (*Tagebücher*, 29.10.14). Der Satz hat Sinn, auch wenn es den Sachverhalt, dessen Bestehen er aussagt, nicht gibt. Er hat dann also auch eine Form. Doch worin besteht diese Form? Die logische Form scheint etwas zu sein, was alle Sätze derselben Form gemein haben. Aber nicht nur die Sätze, sondern auch die Tatsachen, welche diese Sätze abbilden. Eine Bedingung dafür, dass etwas ein Bild sein kann, ist ja eben die, dass es dieselbe Form wie das Abgebildete hat (2.18). Die logische Form hat ein Satz  $p$  nicht an sich, sondern nur, insofern er ein Bild der Welt ist. Aber offensichtlich ist seine Form nicht diejenige der Tatsache, die er abbildet. Denn wäre das so, dann gäbe es die logische Form nur, wenn es der Fall ist, dass  $p$ . Wäre  $p$  falsch, hätte der Satz auch keine logische Form und wäre unsinnig. Es scheint also vorausgesetzt, dass  $p$  nur dann sinnvoll ist, wenn es überhaupt Tatsachen derselben Form gibt – nicht notwendigerweise die von  $p$  ausgesagte, aber eine andere von irgendeinem Satz  $q$  ausgesagte. Und dieser Satz  $q$  würde dann wahr sein. Wenn die logische Form also etwas wäre, was Sätze als Ganze aufweisen, dann hätte  $p$  nur dann eine logische Form und damit Sinn, wenn irgendein anderer Satz  $q$  wahr wäre. Diese Überlegung findet sich in einem weiteren Tagebucheintrag: „Ich dachte, die Möglichkeit der Wahrheit eines Satzes  $\varphi(a)$  ist an die Tatsache  $(\exists x, \varphi)$ .  $\varphi x$  gebunden. Aber es ist nicht einzusehen, warum  $\varphi a$  nur dann möglich sein soll, wenn es einen anderen Satz derselben Form gibt.  $\varphi(a)$  braucht doch keinen Präzedenzfall.“ (*Tagebücher*, 21.10.14). Hier sagt Wittgenstein, dass er zunächst davon ausgegangen ist, dass ein Satz  $\varphi(a)$  nur dann Sinn hat – es also möglich ist, dass er wahr ist – wenn es eine Tatsache derselben Form gibt: Wenn es irgendeine Eigenschaft und irgendeinen Gegenstand gibt, so dass der Gegenstand diese Eigenschaft hat. Er fügt an: „Denn angenommen, es gäbe nur die beiden Elementarsätze „ $\varphi a$ “ und „ $\psi a$ “ und „ $\varphi a$ “ sei falsch: warum soll dieser Satz nur dann einen Sinn haben, wenn „ $\psi a$ “ wahr ist?!“ (op. cit.) Diese Bemerkung hallt noch in 2.0211 nach: „Hätte die Welt keine Substanz, so würde, ob ein Satz Sinn hat, davon abhängen, ob ein anderer Satz wahr ist“

Damit ist also deutlich geworden, was für ein Satz dieser „andere Satz“ aus 2.0211 ist. Der Satz  $q$ , der wahr

sein muss, damit  $p$  Sinn hat, ist keiner über die Bestandteile des Komplexes, von dem  $p$  handelt, sondern es ist ein Satz derselben Form wie  $p$ . Damit ein Satz Sinn hat, muss er eine Form haben, muss es also eine logische Form geben. Das heisst aber, dass es eine Tatsache dieser Form geben muss. Der Satz, der das Bestehen dieser Tatsache aussagt, ist dann wahr. Und eben das will Wittgenstein, wie er in der Bemerkung vom 21.10.14 notiert, nicht einleuchten. Wenn er in 2.02 sagt, dass Gegenstände einfach sind, so meint er damit, dass Sätze wesentlich aus Namen bestehen. Es gibt nicht ein Nebeneinander von Beschreiben und Benennen, so dass das, was die Namen im Satz leisten, auch mittels Beschreibung geleistet werden könnte. Dass Gegenstände einfach sind, heisst, dass Namen nur vertreten. Namen können nicht durch Beschreibungen ersetzt werden. Denn eine Beschreibung beinhaltet Eigenschaften, mittels denen der Gegenstand herausgegriffen wird. Doch in der Bedeutung der Namen sind keine Eigenschaften eingeschlossen. Namen verweisen bloss auf Gegenstände, ohne ihnen eine Eigenschaft beizulegen. Gegenstände sind in diesem Sinne einfach oder „farblos“, wie Wittgenstein in der Passage 2.0232–2.02331 ausführt.

Es sind also die Namen, die in erster Linie eine logische Form haben: Sie haben die logische Form der Gegenstände, welche sie im Satz vertreten. In 2.0212 „Es wäre dann unmöglich, ein Bild der Welt (wahr oder falsch)

zu entwerfen“ weist Wittgenstein darauf hin, dass ohne die Voraussetzung, dass die Gegenstände einfach sind und es somit Namen gibt, die Bildtheorie nicht möglich wäre. Nur, wenn es in der Sprache auch Zeichen gibt, die nicht beschreiben, sondern ausschliesslich benennen, lassen sich Sätze als Bilder auffassen.

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# Ethics as a Primary Form of Linguistic Inquiry

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“Traditional”<sup>1</sup> commentaries about the *Tractatus* perceive Wittgenstein’s work on language to display a philosophical theory on the relation between language and world as constituting the possibility of meaning. In this sense, we can find a similar attitude towards the ethics of the *Tractatus*, that is, we can reach a correct perspective from which to view the world rightly and still preserve the idea that this attitude cannot be formulated in meaningful sentences. Hence, “traditional” commentaries will usually take the approach of trying to figure out what *it* is that Wittgenstein is really trying to say but cannot, because it cannot be meaningfully uttered.<sup>2</sup>

Other commentaries have created what has become known as the “austere” reading.<sup>3</sup> In this view, Wittgenstein’s philosophy, from beginning to end, is animated by an anti-metaphysical vigor, which prohibits any possibility of an external viewpoint on language. In other words, it is not that what is seen from a transcendent perspective cannot be put into words and is instead shown through language; rather, the mere possibility of such transcendence is a fantasy. Seen in this light, Wittgenstein’s remarks on ethics are part of the overall disorientation that the *Tractatus* wants us to see as a whole. If there is any ethical guidance, it is not to be found *in* the text, that is, in its content, but rather, in its unique form and procedure.

It seems that the “austere” approach, although inspiring in its vigor and accuracy, has some serious cracks in it. On the one hand it appears that the rigid conception of nonsense is exactly what Wittgenstein had in mind when he wrote of *Unsinn*. On the other hand, it is not clear whether Diamond’s imaginative activity or Conant’s dissolution of metaphysics demonstrate an *ethical* point for the book. Above all, the “austere” approach demonstrates a harsh criticism of philosophical doctrines and metaphysical systems. But what in these nonsensical remarks attracts our imagination so that these propositions don’t lose their attractiveness even when we recognize them to be nonsensical?

Both “traditional” and “austere” readers of the *Tractatus* miss an important distinction between the nonsensicality of philosophical and ethical propositions. Philosophical propositions attempt to explicate the relations between language and world without actually *employing* signs. The philosopher assumes that there is an external perspective from which we can disclose the world, but we cannot substantiate this disclosure in meaningful propositions.

Ethical propositions, on the other hand, are not used to say something about the relation between language and world. On the contrary, they are used to transcend the facts of the world. In this sense, ethical propositions represent an urge to go beyond the world, to disclose it by an attempt to exceed it. Therefore, whereas philosophical propositions fail to draw the limits of language from the outside, ethical propositions draw the limits of language by a *deliberate* attempt to go beyond meaningful language, to evade and break it. Delimiting the ethical from within thus preserves this important distinction, which makes the ethical what it is. “All of that which *many* are *babbling* today”<sup>4</sup> either confuses ethics with factuality or sees ethical propositions as meaningful.

In contrast to philosophical language, which perceives itself in the form of God’s *plan*, ethical language takes the form of *praying* to God, of *wanting* a God (God=transcendence). Thus, the *Tractatus* eventually ends with the conclusion that the ethical dimension could only appear on the ruins of metaphysics:

Colloquial language (ordinary talk) > Facts of the world  
> No value > Averageness

Philosophical language > Beyond the world > Nonsense

Spiritual language (devoted silence) > Beyond the world  
> Value > Religiousness

Now let us turn to Wittgenstein’s later thought. It is almost an acceptable fact that Wittgenstein’s quoting Augustine at the beginning of *Philosophical Investigations* is meant to criticize Augustine’s conception of language. But the interesting fact is that Wittgenstein admired Augustine’s spiritual journey in the *Confessions*, which seems to echo with the *Tractarian* conception of the ethical: the detachment of ethical-religious expression from ordinary talk, the silent commitment to an urge for transcendence, etc. Augustine contends that the rules of grammar are given by those who speak prior to us, whereas the rules of ethics are received from God.<sup>5</sup> Religious understanding seems to share nothing with colloquial language; it is a sort of a spiritual tendency which connects human beings directly to God.

But something is troubling here. Wittgenstein’s approval of Augustine’s spiritual journey appears to clash with his criticism on Augustine’s implicit conception of language. How can we reconcile Wittgenstein’s acceptance of Augustine’s direct, almost private, language with God to undermining the possibility of private language in general?

It may well be that Wittgenstein begins *Philosophical Investigations* with the words of Augustine not only to criticize Augustine’s view of meaning, which correlates to Wittgenstein’s old way of thinking, but also to preserve the sense in which Augustine’s expressions of the ethical are illuminating and authentic. And so, it is only through the realization of how Augustine’s spiritual expressions emerged from his life *within* language that we see their depth and profundity. Only by their relation to, in contrast to their detachment from, ordinary language can we see how they spring from life rather than freeze it, as metaphysical theories tend to do.<sup>6</sup> This is why the *Confessions* is such an important book; not merely because it contains illuminating religious insights but because it depicts a whole life. This is the transformation Wittgenstein suggests:

Colloquial language > Value in life > Religiousness

From this point, surveying the themes of *Philosophical Investigations* we begin to see a sort of aspect of our everyday existence which explicates and manifests ethics in its utmost significance. In this sense, the grounds for distinguishing colloquial language and religious expression collapse. There is no colloquial language that is merely based on social conventions and lacks the possibility of individual expression. No average everydayness stands in contrast to the religious life. There is, above all, the possi-

bility to recognize the significance of everydayness and the meaning of sharing a form of life. Even the deepest religious or ethical thought must be expressed in everyday life, and so cannot be explicated in a single moment of revelation or instance of enlightenment. The meaning and significance of everyday life cannot be instantly grasped. It can only be recognized in its complexity, in its endless grammatical relations, logical affinities, and differences.

Therefore, Wittgenstein's teaching, with its ethical inclination, is not meant to bring us to a *certain* understanding in relation to God, religion, the good, etc. Nor is it meant to show us the way to a leap of faith. On the contrary, religious and ethical revelations are expressed by gradual attentiveness to the workings of ordinary language and the exact places where it is *lost and retrieved*. It is not just that this sort of ethics or religiousness must be accessible and open to everyone;<sup>7</sup> we are bound by it.

*Philosophical Investigations* begins with what seems to be not only an admission of the grave mistakes in the *Tractatus*' view of meaning but also a glance towards the ethical point of Wittgenstein's early thought. This recognition is manifested in realizing that *use* is the foundation of a form of life with language. Wittgenstein recognized the importance of use in his earlier work, but then the differences between several discourses (such as ethical propositions vs. factual propositions) were analyzed in terms of reference to simple objects. When Wittgenstein recognized the redundancy of such metaphysical requirements, he replaced the attempt to devise a general form of propositions with one that conceived the important notion of "form of life."

When Wittgenstein writes that "to imagine a language means to imagine a form of life," he is not merely referring to our praxis as the origin of meaning. He is presenting the notion of a form of life that *identifies the kind* of language it is. In other words, he asks us to realize what aspects of life are opened through this language. When we meet a language in which we cannot identify or imagine a form of life, or perhaps, feel that the life within this language is poor and unsatisfying, we might sense that there is a problem in it. And thus, all the scenes of *Philosophical Investigations* invite us to see and examine our life within language as an *expression* of the ethical. In this sense, as with the *Tractatus*, the point of *Philosophical Investigations* is ethical.<sup>8</sup>

"*The limits of language*" are actually an inspection of the limits of our form of life we share with our concepts. Instead of seeing these limits as grammatical "places," we *experience* a loss of meaning through realizing the sort of practice they underwrite. I claim that Wittgenstein's unique conception of the ethical not only requires a transformation in the way we see morality: from a system of principles, ethical laws, moral judgments etc., to values that stem from understanding the expansion or reduction of our form of life with concepts. But also, that Wittgenstein's unique conception of the ethical requires a transformation in the way we grasp his thoughts on grammar.

Take the notion of private language for instance. According to this paper's view, interesting in this scene is not necessarily the familiar question of the possibility of such a language, but rather, the question of its nature. Without entering the familiar debates about the problem of criteria, the correctness of memory, Kripke's well-known paradox, etc., it would be best to indicate our difficulty in imagining what this person is doing by denoting a certain sensation for his or her private use. What I wish to emphasize is not the problematic nature of such a reference that

contains no criterion for correctness, but rather, *the complete distortion of our common responses towards sensations*. Wittgenstein shows the emptiness of one's denoting his or her sensation without expressing it to others, describing, sharing, or even concealing it. What do we learn of this sensation by privately mentioning it for our own use, how is it accumulated in our life, and what would this life consist of? All these questions remain vague and peculiar. The understanding of such a language is shut not only for us, but also for the person who forms it.

There is, in fact, a very useful source for Wittgenstein's view of ethics that has been ignored throughout Wittgenstein's literature. In *Discussions of Wittgenstein*<sup>9</sup>, Rhees presents us with a conversation he shared with Wittgenstein on ethics. To be brief, Rhees suggested a problem facing a man who has concluded that he must either leave his wife or abandon his work on cancer research. Thus, in the context of Rhees' question, instead of arguing what is the right deed for such a man to commit, Wittgenstein claimed that "whatever he *finally* does, the way things then turn out may affect his attitude" (my emphasis), and immediately afterwards he suggests that this is a *solution* of an ethical problem.

But how can it be a solution to an ethical problem? Isn't ethics supposed to tell us what would be the right thing to do? Wittgenstein says that if the man had a certain ethics, e.g., a Christian, it would have been clear to him that he must stay with his wife. He then argues that when someone says that a certain ethics is the right one, it only means that this man had adopted this system. Obviously, this sort of reply might insinuate towards moral relativism. But this would be a completely shallow response to an extremely deep insight.

By claiming that this man's attitude towards the problem is a solution to an ethical problem, Wittgenstein guides us to realize that this man's perspective will manifest his relation to the relevant concepts. It will show the broadness of his thought and the extension of his heart: what things he is considering, what things he is avoiding, on what grounds he conducts his decisions, etc. It will demonstrate how these concepts are intertwined in his life. What things are really important to him and on what basis such importance rests.

I hope it is clear that I'm suggesting here an ethical *inquiry*. I dare to say that this inquiry can be *objective*. Although the form of this inquiry is not scientific, it can show the emergence of moral deformation. And even if this inquiry cannot be formulated in questions, it can deliver many answers. I keep hearing Cavell's voice, from his unique reading of *The Structure of Scientific Revolutions*: "Only a master of a science can accept a revolutionary change as a natural extension of the science."<sup>10</sup> In this spirit, to recognize a need for a moral change as a natural extension of morality one must be a complete master of ethics. Hence, by developing a gradual sensitivity to the ethical dimension of language, we can sense whether a certain attitude is a natural extension of morality, or a complete loss. Of course, this method is yet to be explored.

To sum up, *Philosophical Investigations* aims to manifest the nature of a form of life, expanded or narrowed, within language. Most commentators survey Wittgenstein's conception of the ethical *after* realizing his thoughts on language. Ethics is usually perceived by them as a *consequential*, rather than a *foundational*, aspect of his thought.

But we cannot simply bring words back from their metaphysical to their ordinary use by forming a theory. We cannot interpret passages in Wittgenstein's later period by adhering to the use of several propositions in inappropriate contexts. From the perspective of this paper what is most important to realize here is not necessarily the meaningfulness or nonsensicality of such sentences, but rather the complete emptiness of such utterances compared to the variety of possibilities and aspects of life which are opened through the ordinary use we have with concepts. Metaphysics is designated not simply by an inappropriate context or the misuse of an expression but by the depletion of the form of life in which we ordinarily use a certain expression.

Therefore, bringing words back from their metaphysical to their everyday use is, in essence, an ethical journey of identifying the aspects of life which are opened or shut by several uses. In this sense, the avoidance of direct dealing with ethics or religion in *Philosophical Investigations* is a deliberate and intentional choice. It is the answer to the question: whatever happened to ethics?

## Endnotes

- 1 I distinguish "traditional" from "austere" commentaries by their treatment of the saying-showing distinction. In this sense, "traditional" commentaries will think that what cannot be said in meaningful propositions (the propositions of the *Tractatus*) can be shown through meaningful propositions, and "austere" commentaries will think that what cannot be said cannot be whistled either. Due to the familiarity of these positions I will be very brief in presenting them.
- 2 Thus, Wittgenstein's ethical position is often assimilated to some themes in Schopenhauer, Eastern philosophy, Tolstoy, Spengler, Kraus, Kierkegaard, Dostoyevsky and Christianity.
- 3 Some call it "resolute," others call it the "Conant-Diamond" reading.
- 4 Monk (1991), p. 178
- 5 Augustine, *Confessions*, book I, chapter XVIII
- 6 Mulhall (2001) writes: "Rather than accepting the idea of a radical discontinuity in the *Confessions* between nine autobiographical books and four metaphysical ones, we might argue that Augustine deliberately sited his metaphysical questionings at the end of his text in order to present them as the culmination of the preceding nine books of autobiographical exercises, in order to imply that those questions somehow emerged from (were invited or made unavoidable by) those exercises—as if autobiography necessarily tended towards the metaphysical, or had revealed itself to him as having an ineliminably metaphysical and hence philosophical dimension" (p. 31). It is surely possible, then, that Wittgenstein wants to show the true sense of Augustine's religious expressions without the urge to seek it in the metaphysical realm.
- 7 In contrast to many existential theories which focus on the possibility for authenticity destined for individuals.
- 8 Cavell (1995) writes: "As my earlier description of the builders in section 2 was meant to bring out, the clear view we are supposedly initially given is one which not "merely" the language is primitive, but in which the corresponding life of its speakers is clearly expressed in the language ... I imagined them alone, and in an otherwise deserted landscape. As though they were building the first building. Was this arbitrary?" (pp. 158-59).
- 9 Rhees (1970).
- 10 *The Claim of Reason*, p. 121.

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# Poetic Seeing in Wittgenstein and the Contemporary Avant-Garde Theatre

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## 1. Introduction

Ludwig Wittgenstein, “the philosopher of poets and composers, playwrights and novelists” (Perloff 1996: 94), insightfully pointed out that “philosophy ought really to be written only as a form of poetic composition” (Wittgenstein 1980: 24e). Bertolt Brecht, the theatre philosopher and practitioner, insightfully declared that “the theatre’s future is philosophical” (Brecht 1989-2000: 53). This paper puts forth the hypothesis that both these claims are potentially actualized with the turn to philosophy through poetry in the contemporary avant-garde theatre. Taking Wittgenstein’s philosophical undertaking as an enactment of the vision for the philosophy of the future just mentioned, it posits that the (re)turn to poetry in philosophy presupposes a poetic mode of seeing. After mapping out the notion of poetic seeing from the perspective of several Wittgensteinian remarks, the paper uses Botho Strauss’s *Die Zeit und das Zimmer* as a case-study for exploring the poetic seeing in operation in the avant-garde theatre performance today. At stake in this exploration is a renegotiation of mimesis grounded in a reconfigured memory-image associated with poetic seeing. The paper performs a “meandering journey” (to extrapolate Wittgenstein’s expression, 2009: 3e) in-between the past, the present, and the future casting light on potential effects as well as on the utility of Wittgenstein’s philosophical thought in realms traditionally seen as exterior to philosophy.

## 2. Poetic Seeing in Wittgenstein

Notwithstanding Wittgenstein’s reference to himself as “someone who cannot quite do what he would like to be able to do” in philosophy (Wittgenstein 1980: 24e), I argue that Wittgenstein’s (especially later) philosophical writing has a distinct poetic dimension. This dimension is defined by extreme compression, ambiguity, and repetition with difference. In this sense, for instance, Wittgenstein notes that in *Philosophical Investigations* “the same or almost the same points were always being approached afresh from different directions” (Wittgenstein 2009: 3e). This approach is grounded in the performance of an act of seeing to which Wittgenstein refers repeatedly throughout his own “long and meandering journeys” (Wittgenstein 2009: 3e). In what follows, I shall term this act poetic seeing.

Importantly, poetic seeing is not thinking. As Judith Genova justly notes, in Wittgenstein, “*thinking* tends to *see* identities and essences, where *seeing*, in contrast, *thinks* differences” (Genova 1995: 57). Remark 66 from *Philosophical Investigations* makes this distinction clear:

Consider, for example, the activities that we call “games”. I mean, board-games, card-games, ball-games, athletic games, and so on. What is common to them all? – Don’t say: “They *must* have something in common, or they would not be called ‘games’” – but *look and see* whether there is anything common to all. – For

if you look at them, you won’t see something that is common to *all*, but similarities, affinities, and a whole series of them all. To repeat, don’t think, but look! (Wittgenstein 2009: 36e)

More than simply emphasizing the difference between thinking and seeing, the cited remark also offers suggestions as regards the nature of poetic seeing. Thus, poetic seeing entails seeing multiplicity rather than unity (“something that is common to *all*”). At the same time, poetic seeing in effect emerges as a mode of formal seeing. It is a seeing of relationality in the form of “a complicated network of similarities (and, by implication, of differences) overlapping and criss-crossing” (Wittgenstein 2009: 36e; brackets added) rather than of given, stable entities.

The same point concerning poetic seeing as a function of relation is iterated in an earlier remark: “What is the relation between name and thing named? – Well, what *is* it? Look at language-game (2) or at some other one: that’s where one can see what this relation may consist in” (Wittgenstein 2009: 22e). Interestingly, seeing the relation is not necessarily limited to sensorial vision, for the relation to be seen may very well be established between “the hearing of a name” and the mental “picture of what is named” triggered by the hearing (Wittgenstein 2009: 22e). Yet, if in Wittgenstein’s language-game seeing is emptied out of sense experience, what could the nature of poetic seeing then be?

Importantly, poetic seeing is intimately associated with linguistic performance. The remark cited above, for instance, supports this claim: poetic seeing begins with the act of calling something “games”. In turn, poetic seeing itself triggers an act of speaking: “Don’t apologize for anything, don’t leave anything out; *look and say* what it’s really like – but you must see something that throws new light on facts” (Wittgenstein 1980: 39e; emphasis added). Where poetic seeing is, it seems, there is also a corresponding act of saying.

Noteworthy in this Wittgensteinian formulation is also the condition of seeing “something that throws new light on facts”. This requirement potentially implies that poetic seeing makes possible a defamiliarizing experience by means of which “facts” are revealed in a “new light”. But what does this defamiliarization presuppose? Conciseness makes Wittgenstein’s insight ambiguous in this sense. To gain a better grasp of this aspect, I now turn to another Wittgensteinian remark: “In order to see more clearly, here as in countless similar cases, we must look at what really happens *in detail*, as it were from close up” (Wittgenstein 2009: 30e). If seeing facts in a new light and seeing clearly are both modes of poetic seeing, then the defamiliarizing experience is achieved by looking “from close up”. This is an active looking, a seeing as doing from the inside of a specific language-game. Seeing inside and from the inside of a language-game in a sense entails entering the realm of forms and relations, operating within a structure.

### 3. Poetic Seeing in the Contemporary Avant-Garde Theatre: A Case-Study

As practitioner of and writer about poetic seeing, Wittgenstein is a forerunner of emblematic figures of the contemporary avant-garde theatre such as the German playwright and inheritor of Brecht's legacy, Botho Strauss. To support this claim, I now turn to Strauss' *Die Zeit und das Zimmer* and read it as an enactment of poetic seeing within the language-game of memory and as an actualization of the turn to philosophy through poetry in the avant-garde theatre today. Even though Strauss does not fully adopt the poetic form in this play, *Die Zeit und das Zimmer* is nevertheless defined by a poetic dimension realized mainly through compression, linguistic performances, and self-reflexivity.

*Die Zeit und das Zimmer* is an elaborately encoded language-game of memory, whose rules are laid down in the first act and played out in the second. According to Wittgenstein, memory is a complex "language-game" (Wittgenstein in Hacker 2000: 417) that "lacks experiential content" (Wittgenstein 1968: 231). This lack of "experiential content" is coextensive with the *Ausleerung* that grounds Strauss' play. Here, Strauss plays on a reduction to form bordering on the extreme, identifiable in recurring mirroring patterns as well as at the level of the characters. More rigorously discussed in terms of "figures" (Pfister 1991) rather than of stable, autonomous, and developing characters, the players in Strauss's *Zimmer* are enactors and producers of language-based acts of memory. As pure forms, Frank Arnold and Der Völlige Unbekannte of the first act can become Erster Man and, respectively, Zweiter Man, in act two, just as Das Mädchen von der Strasse can spontaneously transform herself into the central figure of the play, Marie Steuber. Just as in Wittgenstein's theory of memory, on the site of the memory Strauss negotiates in his play, the way is open for synchronic proliferation.

The first rule of the language-game of memory is stated by Die Mädchen von der Strasse shortly after Julius performed his ritual of looking out of the window. Importantly, this rule is formulated in terms of seeing:

DAS MÄDCHEN VON DER STRASSE: Besagtes Leben, um noch einmal darauf zurückzukommen, wir haben ja nur unsere Erinnerungen. Alles übrige: am Fenster stehen und hinausschauen, bis man vom Erdboden wieder verschwunden ist. (Strauss 1991: 323)

This citation casts light on the role of the second constitutive term in the title: "das Zimmer". Given that the only modes of being in Strauss's play-world are either "am Fenster stehen und hinausschauen" or "ins Zimmer blicken" and that looking out is "alles übrige" with the exception of "unsere Erinnerungen", "das Zimmer" reveals itself as a *Gedächtniszimmer*.

A few lines later, the act of seeing re-appears in a stage-direction that helps elucidate the first component of the title, "die Zeit". Thus, in response to Der Man ohne Uhr's question ("Wie spät haben Sie übrigens?"), all the figures "gehen zum rechten Fenster und blicken hinaus" (Strauss 1991: 324). In light of the decoding of the first term, "die Zeit" emerges as coextensive with "alles übrige" and, thus, antithetical to the *Gedächtniszimmer*. The memory-image activated in the *Gedächtniszimmer* therefore presupposes the elimination of the rigid and tri-partite temporal dimension measurable by the clock ("Uhr"). In its place, an alternative temporality defined by simultaneity comes to dominate Strauss' *Gedächtniszimmer*, best captured by the concept of "Gewärtigen": "Zustand zwischen

Vergangenheit und Zukunft" that "schliesst doch beide ineinander ein" (Thomas 2003: 214).

After the first rule is enunciated, the second one follows shortly:

"Sie reden es herbei. Vorsicht!" (Strauss 1991: 328).

In light of this rule, seeing inside the *Gedächtniszimmer* is intimately associated with the act of saying. Underlying this rule is a series of relations of mirroring: between utterance and utterance, between action and action, or, the most unsettling of all, between language and action. Particularly interesting in this sense is the pattern of coming-into-being grounded in the language-action mirroring type, activated in apparently descriptive – but, given the second rule, effectively prescriptive – acts of speaking that recur consistently during the first act. Of these, I mention, for instance, Julius's description of the girls in the street followed by Das Mädchen von der Strasse's entry into the room. Another example is Marie Steuber's account of the man who carried in his arms a sleeping woman, out of a hotel on fire succeeded by the appearance of Der Man im Wintermantel carrying Schlafraja in his arms, both of whom have just escaped from a fire. As far as the utterance-utterance mirroring is concerned, the word-for-word reproduction of part of Julius's introductory speech by Olaf towards the end of the play generates a particularly defamiliarizing effect.

As regards this second rule, the explicit discourse of memory in Strauss's play-world is also worth discussing. In *Die Zeit und das Zimmer*, the marker of memory, the utterance "Ich erinnere mich" is repeated several times by different figures. Julius, for example, exclaims "Ich erinnere mich" (Strauss 1991: 327) after carefully examining Schlafraja's finger. Marie Steuber likewise utters "Ich kann mir voll erinnern" when asked "Was haben wir bloß voneinander gewollt" (Strauss 1991: 331) by Der Man ohne Uhr. Importantly, however, "Ich erinnere mich" remains empty in most cases, for nothing is actually being remembered. From the perspective of Wittgenstein's conception of memory, to utter "Ich erinnere mich" means to play a game through which "I" create the past: "Man learns the concept of the past by remembering" (Wittgenstein 1968: 231). This "learning" entails the conflation of past and present in the temporality of *Gewärtigen*.

Characterized by simultaneity and intense mirroring, the memory-image played out inside the *Gedächtniszimmer* takes the form of what Karl Bohrer termed "poetisches Gedächtnis" (Bohrer 2001). Deeply anti-teleological, purely formal, and paradoxically subjective, *poetisches Gedächtnis* is the alternative to the chronologic memory with objective referents. In the place of "Gedächtnis als Traditionsbewusstsein", *poetisches Gedächtnis* is defined by a "komplizierte Reflexionsstruktur" (Bohrer 2001: 113) realized through a move between parallel, simultaneous forms. These forms come into being through *Ausleerung*. As in that of Bohrer, in Strauss's conception of memory the temporal dimensions are conflated: in the *Gedächtniszimmer* "a reflective relationship with the past" that "articulates an experience of simultaneity between the past and the present" is established (Denman 2004: 275).

If where *poetisches Gedächtnis* is, theatre is, then indeed "what is mirrored in memory is the mirror" (Blau 1986: 19) in the case of Strauss's inherently self-reflexive theatre. This reflection is essentially poetic, for it is "in poetry" that "the sign refers to itself" (Roland Barthes cited in Ekegren, 44). Within *Die Zeit und das Zimmer*, this mirroring of theatre in the play is blatantly revealed in the apparently out-of-place Medea-scene of the second act. Here, a revolted Rudolph shouts out the question "Wo ist die Pa-

rallele zwischen mir und dir einerseits, zwischen Medea und Jason andererseits" (Strauss 1991: 339). To this he soon answers himself in a somewhat desperate tone:

Sie (Medea and Jason) sind mitten in einer Tragödie!  
(...) Wir befinden uns dagegen keineswegs in einer Tragödie. (Strauss 1991: 340; *brackets added*)

In the end of the scene, Marie Steuber casts doubt upon Rudolph's certainty regarding the distinction between the Medea-Jason world and the Marie-Rudolph one, when she asserts that "Du scheinst nicht zu begreifen, dass Medea da ist. Dass sie ihr Recht fordert" (Strauss 1991: 341). Through Rudolph and Marie Steuber – ultimately mere forms themselves – the theatre-play points to itself as theatre.

#### 4. Mimesis and the Digital

This self-reflexivity and simultaneity that ground it presuppose a renegotiation of mimesis. In a traditional conceptualization, mimesis entails a temporal removal of the imitation from that which is imitated. Such a removal requires a tri-partite temporality as well as unity instead of multiplicity. Thus, according to Plato, "no one man can imitate many things as well as he would imitate a single one" (Plato 2008: 339). In the contemporary avant-garde poetic theatre like that of Strauss, however, imitation is replaced by reflection. The theatrical performance as a complex structure of reflection challenges the audience to practice the intensely defamiliarizing Wittgensteinian poetic seeing: to enter the network of relations and multiplicity, to look from close up inside a specific language-game.

From this perspective, the avant-garde poetic theatre today can be seen as a "'training centre' (for) new standards of processing and structuring" (Peter Boenisch cited in Barton: 577) a new logic of vision. This new structure of vision, I suggest, is that of the digital associated with the "multiple-'window'/multiple-screen format" configured "only in the last two decades" (Friedberg 2006: 3). Characterized by multiplicity and self-reflexivity, the new logic of vision is grounded in ambiguity and presupposes transformations of time. Operating by means of metaphor (Friedberg 2006: 15), it determines a new relationship to language and can be defined as a looking inside specific language-games and seeing networks of relations. On account of these points, the hypothesis that remains to be further explored is whether Wittgenstein's formulation and practice of poetic seeing can indeed be seen as a "training center" for the logic of vision framed by the digital.

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# Why Did Wittgenstein Choose Augustine?

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Wittgenstein's return to Cambridge in 1929 was preceded by a long silence of over eight years. Different opinions have been expressed concerning the reasons for this silence and we could continue to debate *ad nauseam* on the reasons for Wittgenstein's return. Wittgenstein, however, leaves at least one textual clue in his preface to the 'Philosophical Investigations' that accounts for the return of Wittgenstein to philosophy, namely, 'his recognition of grave mistakes in what he had written in his first book'.

But to the reader's surprise, Wittgenstein begins his *Philosophical Investigations* with a passage from Augustine's *Confessions* rather than from his own first book and leaves us to wonder as to why choose Augustine's work for the mistakes in his book and more importantly, why single out Augustine's work?

It has been a generally accepted position that this is done to bring out a certain picture of language which portrays a conception of meaning through denoting (Let us call this standard position *O1* for the sake of later referencing). This stance (*O1*) is anchored in what Wittgenstein writes in the immediate passage following the quote from Augustine's *Confessions*. Wittgenstein's lines are,

These words, it seems to me, give us a particular picture of the essence of human language. It is this: the individual words in language name objects – sentences are combinations of such names. – In this picture of language we find the roots of the following idea: Every word has a meaning. This meaning is correlated with the word. It is the object for which the word stands.  
(Wittgenstein 2001, §1)

Adherents of *O1* interpret this passage to mean that Wittgenstein intends to bring to the fore the fact that the Augustinian picture of language upholds the idea that every word has a meaning by virtue of the object co-related with it. This position (*O1*) is however mistaken, though widely accepted as the standard interpretation.

If we are to take the claim made by *O1* seriously, then it would have been better for Wittgenstein to have presented his own aptly summarized view in his *Tractatus* that 'the name means the object. The object is its meaning...' (Wittgenstein 1955, 3.203). The *Tractatus* strictly upholds a denotative theory of meaning and both its exposition of, as well as the defense provided for the theory is far more rigorous and precise than the account provided by Augustine in the excerpted passage. Furthermore, it must be noted that the work from where Wittgenstein has extracted the passage, viz., Augustine's *Confessions* is not a work on the philosophy of language at all.

Adherents of *O1* tend to overlook the fact that their position does not really answer the question as to why Augustine was singled out but merely postpones it. We can always ask but why single out Augustine's view for this purpose? Why not Russell's? Why not Wittgenstein's own view as outlined in the *Tractatus*? What is it that makes the Augustinian passage the most suitable candidate?

The answer, I argue, resides in the view that the passage from Augustine is quoted not to give us a picture of language with respect to a theory of meaning at all, but

is quoted to serve the purpose of providing us with an account of how meanings are learnt. What Wittgenstein intends to highlight through this passage is not a philosophical theory of meaning but a philosopher's understanding or presumptions about how language is learnt. The passage from Augustine has been deliberately chosen by Wittgenstein for two reasons;

1. neither the Wittgensteinian account nor the Russellian account of meaning stand up to the call of depicting how the meaning of a word is learnt, and
2. the Augustinian picture constitutes the general outline of how the meaning of a word is learnt for any theory of meaning that is in conformity with a denotative theory of meaning.

It appears to me that *O1* is based on misreading of the quote and interpreting it in isolation from the lines that immediately follow it where Wittgenstein writes,

Augustine does not speak of there being any difference between kinds of word. *If you describe the learning of language in this way you are, I believe, thinking primarily of nouns like "table", "chair", "bread", and of people's names, and only secondarily of the names of certain actions and properties; and of the remaining kinds of word as something that will take care of itself (italics mine).*  
(Wittgenstein 2001, §1)

When read in its proper context, the picture that Wittgenstein intends to bring to our attention through the Augustinian passage is the generally held notion that since language is constituted of words, and since a word means by virtue of an object that it correlates to, learning of a language is constituted in our learning of the different objects that correlate with different words constituting a language. All words are thus names naming objects. That is, learning a language is synonymous with the learning of these correlations between words and their respective objects since the object is the meaning of the name. Thus the Augustinian picture portrays this 'object-word correlation' as the essence of language and learning a language as the learning of these correlations.

This is emphasized more clearly in *The Brown Book* where Wittgenstein writes,

Augustine, *in describing his learning of language*, says that he was taught to speak by learning the names of things. It is clear that whoever says this has in mind the way in which a child learns such words as "man", "sugar", "table", etc. He does not primarily think of such words as "today", "not", "but", "perhaps" (emphasis mine). (Wittgenstein 1969, p. 77)

Wittgenstein is not at all interested in whether Augustine upholds the denotative theory of meaning or not. He is rather interested in the fact that every theorist who upholds that 'the meaning of a word (name) is the object it denotes' (denotative theory of meaning), must uphold the Augustinian account of how language is learnt. Though the Augustinian account appeals to us instantly and appears as a natural response to the question 'how do you learn the meaning of words?'; it cannot withstand close scrutiny. The

fundamental mistake on the part of the denotative theorist (philosopher), that is highlighted by the Augustinian passage, lies in his negligence to see that his theory of meaning does not account for the learning of the meanings of all the words constituting a language in use. The Augustinian picture, which is in its essence, a picture that a denotative theorist assumes as a natural and an apt account of his learning a language, is mistaken. The Augustinian account which is assumed by the denotative theorist is mistaken because it assumes that all the words (signs) constituting the language that I use are names of things. His account fails to explain the learning of words like 'not', 'if', 'and', 'or', as these words do not denote any object. Even if we do take a stance akin to the one that the *Tractatus* takes, and argue that these words are logical constants or logical connectives and hence they do not stand for any object as these are non-representational signs of a language (Wittgenstein 1955, 4.0312), two difficulties would still follow. First, one would still have to account for my learning of these logical constants even if they are non-representational signs. Second, one would have the task of locating objects for words like 'the', 'today', 'here', 'there', 'this', 'that' which I otherwise use in my language meaningfully.

Thus even if it is not the case that the philosopher erroneously reduces these words to object-words but rather does not bother about these words at all, then it is still blameworthy on the part of the philosophers to treat these words as words that somehow take care of themselves. Even if the Augustinian picture does hold true for some words constituting our language, it fails to depict the whole of it. Wittgenstein writes,

Augustine, we might say, does describe a system of communication; only not everything that we call language is this system. And one has to say this in many cases where the question arises "Is this an appropriate description or not?" The answer is: "Yes, it is appropriate, but only for this narrowly circumscribed region, not for the whole of what you were claiming to describe." It is as if someone were to say: "A game consists in moving objects about on a surface according to certain rules ..." – and we replied: You seem to be thinking of board-games, but there are others. You can make your definition correct by expressly restricting it to those games. (Wittgenstein 2001, §3)

The mistake that Wittgenstein intends to highlight through the Augustinian picture is the negligence on the part of philosophers to pay due attention to the relation between the 'language' they seek to explain through their theories and the language that we use. This negligence results in a chasm between the two. They are thus blind to the fact that when we turn our gaze to the learning of a language, what they hold to be a true description of language in general is applicable but only to a circumscribed region of language (this act of alienating language from 'language as it is' is also true of the *Tractatus*).

A failure to observe this precedence of use over naming leads the philosopher to construe the picture that any meaningful word in language must be a name since it is naming that bestows meaning to a word. Thus words become synonymous with names. And language is assumed to be populated by a single kind of word or sign, viz., names. Consequently, language has only one use or a single function, 'to describe'. The philosopher is thus caught up in his own picture of language that is far removed from the actual language that is in use. Intoxicated with his own picture of language in his ivory tower, the philosopher fails to see the multiplicity of uses of words. Though he sees that words are used, but the picture of language that he has constructed misleads him to believe that it has a single use, viz., to signify, to denote.

Thus Wittgenstein's beginning of the *Philosophical Investigations* with the Augustinian picture is a carefully chosen move to elucidate the chasm between the actual learning of our language in use by us and the way as it was assumed by the philosopher (denotative theorists) for their theories of meaning to stand.

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# On the Invention of Reasons that do Not Motivate A Wittgensteinian/Sellarsian Take on Humeanism

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## I. Introduction

When David Hume said that reason is (and ought to be) only the slave of the passions (Hume 1978 [1739], II.iii.3, p. 415), he started a tradition of thought which has become known as Humeanism. Although Hume's own dictum can be read both as a thesis about explanation and as a thesis about justification, Humeanism has always been mainly concerned with *explanation*. A satisfactory explanation of an action, Humeans insist, must involve an appeal to a passion, or else remain incomplete.

Humeans' main argument for their thesis starts with the finding that agents sometimes fail to act, *although* they have, and know that they have, reasons to act. From this thesis, it is inferred that if an explanation is to be complete, it must appeal to something else besides the agent's reasons. From here, the way to the passions – or so Humeans think – is not far.

Instead of directly going into the debate over Humeanism and playing out the well-known arguments, this paper aims for an indirect contribution by placing the debate within a larger setting. In particular, it aims to trace a few interesting analogies between Humeanism and two doctrines which have come to be the targets of famous pragmatist attacks during the last century: the conception of doubting as an inner doing, famously attacked by Ludwig Wittgenstein; and the idea of sense-data as the foundation of all empirical knowledge, famously attacked by Wilfrid Sellars. The paper argues that in all three debates, the insistence on an invisible extra something (passions, in case of Humeanism) is tied to a blindness to the *pragmatic* role played by the relevant attributions – attributions of beliefs and doubts (in Wittgenstein's case), of perceptual evidences and seemings (in Sellars' case), and of practical reasons that do or don't motivate (in the Humean question). In all three cases, the attraction of the classical, pre-pragmatist, theory vanishes once we pay attention to that pragmatic role, because doing so yields a reversal of our view of what is the background, and what is the aberration in need of explanation. In the case of Humeanism, we learn that motivating reasons are the ordinary case, while reasons that *fail* to motivate are the strange things in need of explanation.

The essay will proceed in three steps. The next section will sketch Wittgenstein's treatment of doubts and doubting, and give some first hints about how talk of non-motivating reasons is like talk of doubtful beliefs. The third section will discuss Sellars' critique of sense-data and seems-talk, and sketch out some further analogies. The last section will give a fuller account of the analogy, establishing that doubtful beliefs, seemings, and non-motivating reasons are all in the same boat with respect to the pragmatics of their attributions. In particular, all three attributions can plausibly be seen as late additions to our linguistic tool-box which are logically dependent on more fundamental attributions, and all three deal, in different ways, with human limitations.

## II. Wittgenstein on doubting

From the earliest to the latest stages in Wittgenstein's intellectual development, an important part of his philosophy has been the insistence that some sentences cannot meaningfully be doubted. This is not because of their subject matter, as one might think. Rather, the reason for which certain statements cannot be put in doubt is that they have *no* subject matter at all. Wittgenstein's point concerned the *logical* – or, in his later thought: the *grammatical* – statements, whose role is not to convey information about the world, but merely to settle the meanings of the symbols or expressions appearing in them, in a way just like truth tables. These statements cannot meaningfully be doubted, because they express nothing less than the conditions of meaningful speech.

Of course, this philosophical insight of Wittgenstein's is usually presented as a lesson about different kinds of statement. But it can also be presented as a lesson about the activity of doubting: doubting, whatever exactly it is, cannot – as a matter of logics, not psychology – take just *any* statement as its object.

As Wittgenstein's philosophy matured during and after the *Philosophical Investigations*, this idea slowly grew into a large-scale project, namely a detailed study of the grammar of doubting. The grammatical aspects uncovered by Wittgenstein within this project are essentially threefold. (See, among many other passages, Wittgenstein 1972, §§ 67ff., 74ff., 105, 115, 122, 140ff., §§ 231, 275ff., 325, 333, 354, 472, 609ff., 648) Firstly: doubts over a statement (also doubtful beliefs) can only be attributed to a speaker to whom *undoubted* beliefs are also (already) attributed. Secondly, something similar is true for the attributor: only someone who already masters talk of (undoubted, ordinary) beliefs can learn to master talk of doubting (of doubtful beliefs). And finally: the doubter (as well as, trivially, the attributor of doubt) must belong to the sort of agents who can *articulate* their beliefs – they must be speakers, in other words. (At least close relatives: I do not mean to deny that we often treat some non-speakers as quasi-speakers.) Wittgenstein repeatedly warns that a violation of any of these constitutive rules would amount to changing the subject from doubts to mere *doubting behaviour* like scratching one's head or raising one's arms.

The upshot of Wittgenstein's findings, which we can mark with the slogan "doubt comes after belief" (Wittgenstein 1972, § 160), is that doubting must not be conceived as an inner doing whose attribution does not commit the attributor to any more than, say, the predication of a colour does. It is a rather more complex manoeuvre, and whatever exactly it is, it rests, in some way, on the simpler manoeuvre of attributing un-doubted beliefs.

Why is all this relevant to the debate over reasons and motivations? To speak cautiously: as a hypothesis, it is not implausible that the very same grammatical features structure talk of non-motivating reasons, as well. Firstly:

you can only attribute to an agent non-motivating reasons if you *also* attribute to her ordinary, motivating, reasons. Secondly, you can only *master* talk of non-motivating reasons if you also master talk of ordinary, motivating, reasons. And thirdly, someone who has reasons, and knows about them, but remains unmotivated by them (and also, trivially, someone who attributes such a state to someone) must be a speaker. They must generally be capable of articulating a great deal of their reasons, rather than *just* act on them. Again, failing to adhere to any of these constitutive rules amounts to changing the subject from reasons to the outward behaviour which characteristically accompanies the following of reasons.

If true, the hypothesis of an analogy between doubts and non-motivating reasons in the sketched way has important philosophical consequences for the debate over Humeanism. Since the Humean view of motivation is that reasons by themselves do *not* motivate, it seems that Humeans are committed to the reverse of the priority theses just sketched. For them, non-motivating reasons are the baseline, and motivation is something which is explained later. Might it be that Humans get the priority theses wrong in an analogous way to those who take doubting to be an inner doing?

### III. Sellars on Seems-Talk

Let us keep this question in mind as we continue to Wilfrid Sellars' discussion of perception and seems-talk at the centre of his *Empiricism and the Philosophy of Mind*. In his discussion, Sellars takes aim at two common opinions: firstly, the view that (all of) our perceptual beliefs are ultimately justified by sense-data, and secondly, the view that the subject matter of ordinary seems-claims is nothing else than these sense-data. On this opinion, seems-talk is not only logically independent from, but actually *prior* to is-talk: we can only attribute is-beliefs if we are also prepared to attribute seems-beliefs; and we can only *learn* is-talk if we also (already) master seems-talk.

Not unlike Wittgenstein, Sellars argues that the common view of the relationship between is-talk and seems-talk gets it exactly wrong. However, Sellars, who is less resistant to systematic philosophical theorising than Wittgenstein, gives a much fuller account of seems-talk which includes a characterisation of its characteristic *point* – and which, it turns out, can help to clarify our understanding of both talk of doubts and talk of non-motivating reasons. According to Sellars, seems-talk essentially enables the conveying of rich information regarding the score of the language game.

Sellars' idea can be studied in the following sequence of claims. "Peter sees a red tomato" — "Peter sees a tomato which seems red to him" — "It seems to Peter that there is a red tomato" (This is adapted from Sellars, 1997, pp. 50ff.). In all three examples, Peter is credited with the (non-inferentially elicited) propositional attitude (belief) that there *is* a red tomato in front of him. But the speaker – the *attributor* of the propositional attitude – takes on very different commitments regarding the *appropriateness* of Peter's belief. In the first sentence, the attributor endorses the proposition that there *is* a red tomato; in the second one, she endorses only the proposition that there is a tomato but resists commitment to the proposition that it is red; while in the third one, she endorses no part of the proposition she attributes to Peter. It is the transmission of *this* information which seems-talk makes possible, and which makes seems-talk into a powerful pragmatic manoeuvre.

It is obvious that the dependence of seems-talk on is-talk (in other words, the negation of the classical idea that seems-talk is independent from, and indeed prior to, is-talk) is directly implied by Sellars' characterisation of the pragmatics of seems-talk. After all, making seems-claims, on Sellars' view, *involves* the (self-)ascription of is-beliefs. But this is not the only way in which Sellars goes beyond Wittgenstein. Unlike Wittgenstein, Sellars clearly shows that the logical pull towards the insistence on sense-data is the consequence of a misunderstanding of seems-talk (which includes a wrong view about its logical priority). Sellars' big idea is that the point of both is-talk and seems-talk is to render speakers' or agents' conduct understandable by tying it to relevant practical aspects of the world, but in crucially different ways. While is-talk works in ordinary situations without informational imbalances, seems-talk is adapted to situations in which some third parties *lack* access to data on which the *commenter* can draw. The function of seems-talk is to render these parties' conduct intelligible, *although* it is, or at least might be, ill-adapted to its practical surroundings. Why does Peter grab the stone? He grabs it because it seems to him that it is a red tomato. We know that it isn't, and yet we have successfully demystified Peter's formerly mysterious action by tying it to the tastiness of ripe tomatoes.

### IV. Conclusion

It is here, I want to suggest, that the three debates touched on in this paper have their shared core. In all of them, we have pairs of a simple attribution and a complex attribution. Both serve to tie an agent's conduct to practical aspects of her surroundings, while the more complex one is adapted to a specific human limitation. We do not always have reliable perceptions (although many people can often rely on their perceptions) and we sometimes have contradictory evidences (although many people often have good, simple, evidence). Seems-talk deals with the former limitation, doubts-talk deals with the latter. Both render human conduct intelligible *in spite of* this limitation. And both are logically posterior to the simple manoeuvre from which they have been developed.

An analogous story, now, can be told with respect to talk of reasons that do not motivate. The human limitation that this kind of attribution is meant to deal with is weakness of the will. Peter ought not to eat meat and knows it. His understanding of his reasons shows not only in what he says, but also in what he does. He does not mistreat dogs, he donates money to animal welfare groups, he never throws food away and actively tries to minimise his ecological footprint. And yet he violates his reasons in his practical life by eating meat: he just cannot resist the taste of bacon. Does the taste of bacon constitute a good, countervailing reason for Peter? No – not even Peter himself would claim that. Peter is locally irrational, and it is this human limitation for which talk of reasons – genuine reasons! – that locally fail to motivate has been invented. It is a remodelled version of talk of ordinary, motivating, reasons, and it reflects the view that sometimes, the best interpretation of an agent is one that does not portray him as rational, and yet that falls short of seeing him as completely crazy. Sometimes, we make most sense by attributing the reasons we endorse to people who fail, through complex defects of their characters, to act on them as one normally would (for *ordinarily*, that's what reasons do: they motivate).

It seems that this story not only vindicates our hypothesis of an analogy between the grammar of doubting

and the grammar of reasons. It also supports the thesis that seeing the pragmatic *point* of non-motivating-reason-talk aright erases the temptation to postulate *passions*, just like seeing the point of seems-talk aright erases the temptation to postulate sense-data. We can elucidate action without appealing to the passions, just as we can elucidate perception without appealing to sense-data.

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# On the Truth of Pictures in Science

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## 1. Introduction

Once, philosophers of science were almost exclusively preoccupied with theoretical statements and observation statements and the relations between them, elaborating e.g. various accounts of verification or falsification and of scientific explanation. Times have changed. The role of theories has been downplayed in favor of models. The roles of visual representations in science, like diagrams, graphs or structural formulas, have caught philosophers' attention. Students of scientific instrumentation have long been aware of the importance of drawings or photographs. In recent years, the interest in models has been extended to computer simulations and questions about their epistemic status.

There are many issues concerning the role of these various forms of scientific representation. There also is the related question about their distinctive characteristics in terms of the immediacy of the information they yield (see Kulvicki 2010). One of the questions, which also has led to some debate, is whether visual representations can or should be accorded truth and falsity. This is a challenging question, since philosophers have traditionally reserved these qualities all but exclusively for propositions or sentences, and also because there clearly are many kinds of pictorial representations, such as abstract art, where any question of their truth (in a non-figurative sense) is out of place.

It is only this question and discussions of it that I shall comment on here. My conclusion will be that, depending on the context of their uses, scientific visual representations can justifiably be accorded truth or falsity.

## 2. Roles in Scientific Arguments

It is very common that scientists use graphs and other visual representations in presenting their findings and arguing for their claims. It is in this respect that Laura Perini (2005, 262) asserts: "Since the logical understanding of arguments involves the truth or falsity of the representations involved, visual representations must have the capacity to bear truth in order to be genuine components of arguments." As a reinforcement, she adds that arguments are assessed in terms of validity or strength and soundness, which criteria "are understood in terms of the truth conditions of premises and conclusions" (2005, 263).

One can get the impression that this is an attempt to settle the question very directly, by stating that scientific argumentation, which as an undeniable matter of fact occurs all the time, just implies that its components can be true or false. One could agree, for instance, that valid deductive arguments are defined as truth preserving concerning all of their components. Yet, one could now object that this is a rather formal-hypothetical kind of truth, which when replaced by the value of '1', as opposed to '0', just means that valid deductive arguments are '1'-preserving.

Yet, Perini deals with truth in science, which is far from being merely formal. Still, her line of argumentation seems to invite some other straightforward objections. William Goodwin (2009, 375), e.g., while leaving it open

whether some visual representations in science may be bearers of truth, counters the claim that representational components of arguments must be capable of being true or false by means of a parallel case: shouldn't the fact that mathematicians use numerals in their arguments then imply the numerals must be capable of being true or false? This conclusion would of course be nonsensical.

However, Perini's line of argumentation so far under discussion is merely her particular way of presenting the issue. After having somewhat misleadingly asserted that, for the reason stated, visual representations 'must' be capable of being true or false, she rather independently addresses the question of whether they can be true or false. I can only mention a few ideas of her rather differentiated treatment of this question.

She rightly observes that not only linguistic and mathematical representations in science, but also visual ones always are part of whole symbol systems. Relying on Nelson Goodman's analysis of the languages of art, she works out syntactic and semantic differences between such systems and stresses, as he did, that the meaning of the symbols is fixed by interpretational conventions. Furthermore, in analogy with Alfred Tarski's definition of truth, she articulates concepts of truth for visual representations.

I do not think she succeeds in this last-mentioned endeavor. The references of Tarski's definition are only formalized languages. Correspondingly, the counterparts she comes up with can only support verdicts like 'it is true that in this representation two lines intersect'. Though Perini does not seem to be aware of this, they do not involve any reference to observations or things in the real world.

Perini herself points out that her counterpart concepts of truth might or will apply, e.g., to the very articulated diagrams or graphs of enzyme mechanisms, but not to electron micrographs of cell membranes and the like, with their diffuse shades of black and grey and white. Such shadings make it all but impossible to name symbolic characters in terms of their form and express content linguistically in terms of form, these being presuppositions of her Tarskian approach. While upholding her general assertion, she here abandons this approach and turns to a relation between representation and things in reality: "an electron micrograph is true IFF the shape of the micrograph is a geometric projection of the shape of the sample scanned in producing the micrograph" (Perini 2005, 281).

Geometric projection establishes a correspondence. So, Perini at this point employs a correspondence view of truth, while a Tarskian conception of truth is quite neutral with respect to substantial theories of truth.

Let me mention here Mauricio Suarez' (2004) approach, concerned not so much with the question of 'how does a graph manage to represent its target truthfully and completely?', but rather with the question: 'In virtue of what is the graph a representation (however incomplete or inaccurate) of its target?'. Focusing less than Perini on the role of pictorial representations in scientific arguments, he treats his question in terms of the inferences one can draw from them. Nevertheless, he thinks that his approach

sheds light on truth: he proffers the idea that a "representation is true if it licenses no inferences to false conclusions about the target". Clearly, this is at best a criterion of truth rather than a definition of truth for pictorial representations.

### 3. Different Uses in Scientific Practice

Goodwin opposes Perini's views, furthermore, by presenting examples of scientific visual representations that "play a genuine role in the explanations and arguments of science without bearing truth" (Goodwin 2009, 372). That the roles scientific representations, visual or non-visual, can play depend decisively on their particular kinds of uses becomes rather obvious in Bas van Fraassen's (2008) recent amazingly rich book *Scientific Representation*, although, probably in line with his anti-realist leanings, the topic of their truth is hardly touched on in it. Also, the significance of interpretational conventions for symbol systems, stressed by Perini, concerns their meaningful use.

Goodwin's (2009, 377ff.) examples are structural formulas in organic chemistry. He distinguishes two of their major roles. Firstly, according to him, they are being used as labels, or descriptive names, for chemical kinds, e.g., for caffeine. As support for this account of their use, he mentions the circumstance that, as descriptive names, they are substitutable by their systematic names – in the example of caffeine, by '3,7-dihydro-1,3,7-trimethyl-1H-purine-2,6-dione'. In other (my) words, you could go to a suitably knowledgeable distributor of organic chemicals and order so much caffeine, either by just showing him the structural formula or giving him the systematic name.

His point now is: "A descriptive name is not a claim; it is not capable of being true or false." (Goodwin 2009, 380). However, this conclusion is not as straightforward as it sounds. Of course, in my caffeine-shopping case, no obvious claims are involved. Yet, although claims are supposed to get tested, and thus are the most exciting candidates for being true or false, truth and falsity cannot be restricted to claims. Goodwin (2009, 378) himself states that "structural formulas describe the composition, connectivity, and spatial arrangement that a compound would need to have in order to be appropriately named by the formula". To me, notions of appropriateness or correctness (unless used in purely practical-normative ways) always involve some idea of truth: Proposals of structural formulas, as descriptions, can quite clearly be false.

Secondly, according to Goodwin (2009, 380ff.), structural formulas can be used as models, in which role they are not substitutable by systematic names. They then are 2-dimensional versions of their corresponding 3-dimensional physical models; they can help explain and, since they can be manipulated, help discover, properties of the compounds concerned. Goodwin (2009, 388) concludes: "When used as a model it is facts that are true of, or in, the structural formula that make it so useful in the discourse of organic chemistry. So when a structural model is used as a model, it is not true or false. Rather, certain claims are true or false in virtue of the structural formula, and these claims license conclusions, perhaps by way of assumed similarity relations that obtain between the relevant objects, about the chemical compounds it denotes. The role of structural formulas in this context is therefore that of truth maker, not that of truth bearer."

Goodwin seems to confuse two things. For, certainly again, given a model, certain claims are 'true of, or in, it'. In this respect, models are 'truth makers', and notice well that this is so also when they do not refer to anything. But the

models themselves can also be true or false, to the extent that those 'similarity relations', which presuppose a reference or denotation relation, actually obtain or not. Being a truth maker does not preclude that the thing concerned also is a truth bearer. Just think of observational statements: they can confirm, 'make true', theoretical statements and they also are true or false themselves.

### 4. Concluding Considerations

Imagine you are considering buying an apartment, particularly because the drawing of its layout presented to you shows two bedrooms; yet, when on actual inspection, it turns out that there in fact is only one bedroom, the drawing just was false. If the same drawing is one of apartments of a high-rise still to be build, questions of truth or falsehood about their having one or two bedrooms will not arise. This will be similarly so, if you happen to see such a drawing blowing in the wind on the street. And another drawing which just shows a jumble of lines might raise all kinds of questions about its meaning or intention, but hardly right away and maybe never about its truth or falsity.

I think that meaning, reference and possible truth or falsity of scientific visual representations equally depends on particularities of their contexts of presentation and use. In fact, I think, this goes for all scientific representations. Linguistically and mathematically formulated scientific theories, for instance, also have their meaning fixed by 'interpretational conventions' (Goodman, Perini) of the standard use of language and mathematics, and their reference is given through a variety of manners of indicating the domains of phenomena they are intended to apply to. And, given these determinations, questions of their truth or falsity can be sensibly treated.

I have said little explicitly so far about candidate theories of truth to be used in connection with scientific visual representations. From my comments, it should have become apparent that, to me, only some version of a correspondence theory is suited for accounts of the truth of scientific visual representations. A Tarskian conception of truth, as I mentioned, is insufficient; it concerns formalized languages, is meant to circumvent the liar's paradox, and lacks any special reference to the real world. Coherence theories of truth seem to be formulated so far only for systems of propositions or sentences. I leave it an open question, whether they can include pictures, being rather convinced that such a theory for pictures alone would make little sense. Deflationary theories, like disquotational theories, can by their nature not apply to representations that are not analogous to sentences.

Perini (2005, 283) comments on people who might "wish to reserve the concept of truth for verbal and mathematical representations" and "use the term 'accuracy' to express the relationship between visual representations and states of affairs". Without identification of how this relationship is supposed to differ from that between statements and states of affairs, she sees "no warrant for such a terminological distinction". I myself think that it is often very appropriate to speak of 'accurate pictorial representations'. Predicates like 'accurate', 'correct', 'faithful' etc. can felicitously or pertinently connote specific qualities of the relationships meant. This also holds, by the way, for expressions like 'is a good description', 'is an adequate computer simulation', 'is a successful explanation' etc. Yet (as already indicated), to me, siding to this extent with Perini, all such predicates also connote or imply the notion of truth.

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# Über die Transformation der Mimesis in Hermann Brochs Romantheorie

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In Hermann Brochs romantheoretischen Schriften lässt sich eine kohärente Theorie des Romans rekonstruieren. Diese kohärente Konzeption ist gleichzeitig auch eine *radikale Erneuerung des Mimesisgedankens* auf dem Feld der modernen Epik, d.h. heisst der Romanliteratur. Unsere Rekonstruktion versucht es, für die Erschliessung von dieser Transformation des Mimesisgedankens *zwei Modelle* der Literaturtheorie bei Hermann Broch zu vereinigen.

Das eine ist im engeren Sinne mit den Namen von Georg Lukács, bzw. Lucien Goldman, in etwas breiteren Sinne mit denen von Roman Ingarden und Hermann Broch selbst verbunden. Dieses Modell arbeitet mit der Annahme einer *Isomorphie* zwischen einem (philosophisch, soziologisch, existentiell interpretierten) „Weltzustand“ und einer (ebenfalls vielfach zu interpretierenden) „Weltanschauung“. Im wesentlichen gehören alle ästhetischen, bzw. kunsttheoretischen Vorstellungen in diese Gruppe, die im Kunstwerk komplexe *mimetische* Strukturen sehen, die durch ihre Mimesis von komplexen und ganzheitlichen Strukturen die gegebene Welt selbst zur Darstellung bringen.

Dieses theoretische Modell ist beim reifen Broch so thematisch geworden, dass das Ergebnis des Aufeinanderbeziehens von „Weltanschauung“ und „Romanstruktur“ insofern stets ein negatives geblieben ist, dass im „weltanschaulichen“ Zustand des *negativen Universalismus* eben keine einheitlich und transparent strukturierte Welt im Kunstwerk erscheinen kann. Man muss nichtsdestoweniger eindeutig sehen, dass *das negative Ergebnis dieser Operation gerade literaturtheoretisch nichts gegen das Modell selber aussagt*.

Dies ist auch der konkrete Grund, warum die Romantheorie des jungen Georg Lukács oder von Lucien Goldman bei der Analyse der *par excellence* polyhistorischen Romanwerke selbst dann nicht relevant werden kann, wenn diese Konzeptionen sowohl intellektuell wie auch in der tatsächlichen Rezeptionsgeschichte bei der Wiege dieser Romangattung gestanden haben.<sup>1</sup>

Das *zweite Modell* ist bei Hermann Broch auch schon deutlicher ausgearbeitet und lässt sich aus den grossen romantheoretischen Aufsätzen und Essays der dreissiger Jahre unschwer rekonstruieren. Ohne viel sichtbare Vorarbeiten entstand dieser theoretische Entwurf bei Hermann Broch, wobei man mangels anderer Spuren und im Besitz vieler dafür sprechender Dokumente an seine Joyce-Rezeption denken muss, die neben seiner erfolgreichen psychoanalytischen Behandlung endlich entscheidend dazu beitragen konnte, den Roman der neuen Einsamkeit und des negativen Universalismus verfassen zu können.

Elias Canetti, der Einzige, der in Broch schauen konnte wie kein anderer und ihn aus der Nähe kannte, wird nicht müde, *die einmalige Qualität von Hermann Brochs Fixierung an James Joyce* herauszustellen: „...begriff ich, dass Joyce für ihn ein Vorbild geworden war, eine Figur, der man nacheifert und die man nie wirklich los wird ...Was ihn interessierte, war die entschlossene Art, mit der Joyce seinen Ruhm trug, es gebe keinen Ruhm, der so ausgesucht und so nobel sei wie der seine. Ich

begriff, dass es Broch um diese Art von Ruhm zu tun war, um keinen anderen. Es gab gewiss nichts, was er sich mehr gewünscht hätte, als von Joyce beachtet zu werden und die Hoffnung, es zu einer sozusagen parallelen Leistung zu bringen ...“<sup>2</sup>

Logisch geht diese Konzeption auf die Analogie der einzelnen Wertsysteme (Subsysteme) zurück, in welchem das „System“ *seine Elemente nicht nur „auswählt“, sondern auch „definiert“*. Das von der „Syntax“ eines Kunstwerkes integrierten „Wirklichkeitsvokabeln“ ergeben ein Ganzes, welches als System rein literarisch, d.h. nicht ethisch oder politisch bestimmt wird.

Es versteht sich von selbst, dass die Konzeption der „Wirklichkeitsvokabeln“ und ihrer „Syntax“ ein spezifisches und unverwechselbares Konzept der *ersten* Romantheorie von Broch ist, die *zweite* Romantheorie, die ausser den eigenen historischen und schöpferischen Motiven grundsätzlich auf Franz Kafkas literarischer Praxis, sowie auf die Jungische Symbolik aufgebaut ist, lässt sich jedoch nur mit äusserst bedeutenden Schwierigkeiten mit dieser Konzeption in Übereinstimmung zu bringen.

Diese beiden Ansätze der Brochschen Romantheorie enthalten in sich die Möglichkeit einer Integration. Von der einen Seite enthält die erzielte strukturelle Isomorphie zwischen „Welt“ (sozialer Struktur, etc.) und Kunstwerk bereits die Konsequenz einer vollzogenen „Selektion“ und „syntaktischen“ Integration von bestimmten „Wirklichkeitsvokabeln“. Von der anderen Seite lässt sich diese Möglichkeit auch nachweisen. Gerade die vollzogene Integration der Wirklichkeitsvokabeln lässt sich nämlich ohne das Moment der im theoretischen Sinne genommenen „Weltanschauung“ überhaupt nicht denken.

Die heuristische Bedeutung der Auswahl der Wirklichkeitsvokabeln als der Grundeinheit dieser romantheoretischen Konzeption besteht vor allem darin, dass sie *die Grundeinheit des Kunstwerkes definiert*. Eine scheinbar einwandfrei legitime Überlegung der Literaturtheorie ist es beispielsweise, dass man in und auf der Ebene der Sprache die wirklich bestimmende Referenz, die näher noch nicht definierte *eigene Gegenständlichkeit* der literarischen Objektivation findet. Nun kann es bald klar werden, dass eine in den praktisch in den ausschliesslichen Mittelpunkt der Reflexion gestellte grammatische und syntaktische Analyse auch dann nicht über einen erheblichen heuristischen Wert hat, wenn man die literarische „Entwicklung“ vornehmlich als *par excellence* sprachliches Phänomen, etwa als „Deformation der Sprache“ definiert. *Die Ebene der Realitätsvokabeln ist tatsächlich die wirklich bestimmende Ebene*, sie macht unter den verschiedenen Schichten des Kunstwerks die wesentlichste Schicht aus. Einerseits steht sie der thematisch-sprachlichen, gegenständlichen Schicht am nächsten (ohne dass sie rein sprachlicher Natur wäre), andererseits erscheinen bereits auf ihr aber auch Elemente des „Kunstwollens“, d.h. der von der im breiten Sinne des Wortes verstandenen Weltanschauung geleiteten Konstruktion.

Eine optimale Einsicht in Hermann Brochs romantheoretische Konzeption ist gleichzeitig auch noch eine

Option, durch welche die charakteristischen Fehlkonzeptionen der literarischen Interpretation korrigiert werden können. Wir wählen hier deshalb drei wichtige und in der Geschichte des Literarischen sich als bestimmend erwiesene Fälle heraus:

A) Eine unerschöpfliche Fehlerquelle der mangelhaften Interpretation des literarischen Kunstwerkes ist die *Verabsolutierung der Realitätsvokabeln* in dem Prozess der Analyse. Nicht nur für den puritanischen Zensor (ein exzellentes Beispiel von René Wellek) war es charakteristisch, dass für ihn nur gewisse Worte, bzw. Ausdrücke von Belang waren, er beurteilte ganze Kunstwerke auf der Grundlage, ob einige Worte in ihnen vorkommen oder nicht. Es ist leicht einzusehen, dass eine Anwendung von Brochs Romantheorie in der Gestalt von Realitätsvokabeln und ihrem Syntax diese Eindeutigkeit wie von allein ausschliesst. *Eine Beurteilung, geschweige denn eine Interpretation eines Kunstwerkes auf der Grundlage der in ihm vorkommenden Realitätsvokabeln* ist unter Zuhilfenahme der Brochschen Theorie so gut wie unmöglich. Von heute aus zeigt die Fragestellung der Verabsolutierung der Realitätsvokabeln ein merkwürdiges Bild. Auf der einen Seite ist es eine Unmöglichkeit geworden, dass einzelne Realitätsvokabeln in der Interpretation eines Kunstwerkes oder gar in seiner zensuren Behandlung noch eine nennenswerte Rolle spielen. Auf der anderen Seite spielen thematische Dimensionen bei der Beurteilung eines Kunstwerkes trotzdem eine relevante Rolle. Erstens artikulieren sich so gravierende „thematische“, „inhaltliche“ oder „gegenständliche“ Erwartungen sowohl im Kreis der sog. „höheren“, wie auch im Kreis der Massenkultur, dass ihre Bestimmungen indirekt durchaus stark auf die Interpretation eines Kunstwerkes auswirken. Wendet man dieses Problem in die Sphäre der mediatisierten (Massen-) Kultur, so muss es bald klar werden, dass „thematische“ und „inhaltliche“ Bestimmungen, die ja mit der Verabsolutierung der Realitätsvokabeln durchaus viel zu tun haben, schon bei der „Geburt“ so eines Werkes eine entscheidende Bedeutung haben.

B) Ein anderer Fall von typologischer Relevanz ist, dass die Beurteilung des Kunstwerkes zwar auch auf der Grundlage von einigen „Realitätsvokabeln“ geschieht, man aber aufgrund dieser Vokabeln kurzgeschlossene Konsequenzen über die ganze „Weltanschauung“ des Autors zieht. Mit anderen Worten geht es in diesem Fall um die *Verabsolutierung der Weltanschauung* in der Analyse. Die führende Intention der Untersuchung ist, die „Weltanschauung“ des Dichters oder des Romanciers als *zusammenhängendes Ganzes* exakt auszuweisen. Es versteht sich von selber, dass in *durchpolitisierten* Zeitaltern diese Intention der literaturtheoretischen Analyse durchaus favorisiert vorkommt. Es wäre aber ein Missverständnis, die auf die „Weltanschauung“ konzentrierende Intention einzig mit politischen Zielsetzungen in Verbindung zu bringen. Denn neben etwa gewissen Richtungen der II. Internationale oder des Neomarxismus gehören etwa die Anforderungen von jungen Kritikern in Budapest und Wien, von Rudolf Kassner und von Georg Lukács, die es zum deklarierten Hauptziel der literaturtheoretischen und literaturkritischen Anforderungen gemacht haben, herauszufinden, wie der Dichter von der Welt ganzheitlich dachte, in der er lebte. In dieser reich ausgeführter Konzeption erscheint die „Weltanschauung“ als *letztes Ergebnis*, als ein *Derivat jeglicher literarischen Analyse*.

C) Die *Verabsolutierung der Struktur des Kunstwerkes* (nach derselben der Realitätsvokabeln, sowie der Weltanschauung) führt zu einer *extremen* und *besonderen* Form der immanenten Interpretation. Die Analyse der Struktur, ohne Hinsicht auf die „Weltanschauung“, bzw. auf die wei-

teren Komponenten der Konstitution des Kunstwerkes, kann nie als ausreichend angesehen werden. So ist es, um nur ein konkretes Beispiel zu nennen, schwerlich möglich, die *Schlafwandler*-Trilogie auf eine Weise zu analysieren, dass man den Roman als ein „Weiterschreiben“ der Literatur, als ein Buch über Bücher interpretiert<sup>2</sup>, wodurch wie erwartet, eine Art *Metaliteratur* entstanden sein sollte. Mit dem Untergang der strukturalistischen Richtung als eines hegemonen Ansatzes in der Interpretation der Literatur, ist selbstverständlich auch die Möglichkeit der Verabsolutierung der Struktur in der Analyse weitgehend reduziert, wenn nicht eben minimalisiert worden. Es bedeutet aber nicht, dass die so gestaltete Reduzierung der Architektur der Brochschen Literaturtheorie in leicht veränderten Variationen und Formen seitdem nicht öfters in der literaturtheoretischen Diskussion hochgekommen ist. Denn eine Verabsolutierung der Struktur kann ohne weiteres auch bei einem reduzierten, wenn nicht eben minimalisierten Begriff der Struktur praktiziert werden. Man kann nämlich das, was man „Struktur“ nennt, auch als „Werk“, „Text“ (-komplex) und anders nennen und es sogar auch als „Prototyp“ und „Variationen“, nichtsdestoweniger auch als *Versionen eines literarischen Kultes* oder anderswie *rezepstionsästhetisch* oder gar *hermeneutisch* interpretieren. Denn ob es (d.h. die fehlerhafte Verabsolutierung der Struktur, bzw. eines wie immer auch kategorisierten Werkganzen) gerade strukturalistisch ausgedrückt und ausgeführt ist oder nicht, die Verabsolutierung der Struktur bedeutet eine Erkenntnisintention, in der ein wie immer auch gedachtes und rekonstruiertes *Werkganzen als das Ziel der Analyse* angegeben ist und es kann anders nicht möglich sein, nur wenn das Werkganze – vertikal oder horizontal – mit anderen Werkganzen analytisch in Verbindung gebracht wird.

Eine ähnliche Fehlinterpretation erfolgt, wenn man die entweder im Kunstwerk selber oder ausser ihm artikulierten „Weltanschauung“ des Dichters mit der Aussage des ganzen Werkes identifiziert. Es geht in diesem Fall um eine weitere Art der Verabsolutierung der „Weltanschauung“, wie eine andere Art der Verabsolutierung allerdings, wie es unter Punkt B) soeben ausgeführt worden ist. Hier geht es nicht darum, dass das letzte Ziel der theoretischen und kritischen Analyse eine im Prinzip vollständige Rekonstruktion der Weltanschauung des Dichters oder des Schriftstellers um ihrer selbst willen ist, hier geht es vielmehr darum, zwei unterschiedliche (und auf unterschiedlichem Wege zu rekonstruierenden) Weltanschauungen miteinander identisch zu setzen. Paradebeispiel dafür ist etwa die Identifizierung der Aussage der *Schlafwandler*-Trilogie mit dem ins selbe Werk eingebauten Zerfall-Essay unter jener (an sich ebenfalls einer weiteren Beweisführung bedürftigen) Bedingung, dass dieser Essay ein Ausdruck der „persönlichen“ Weltanschauung von Hermann Broch ist.<sup>4</sup>

Wir wollten zeigen, dass Broch eine ernstzunehmende *Transformation des Mimesisphänomens* schuf. Wir wollten auch zeigen, dass die Verabsolutierung nur eines einzigen Elementes dieses Mimesisphänomens mit Notwendigkeit zu Fehlinterpretationen führt.

Die rekonstruierte Literaturtheorie Hermann Brochs vereint auf eine exemplarische Weise heuristische Momente, die sowohl einzeln wie auch in anderen Kombinationen von grosser Produktivität sind. Es ist eine andere Frage, dass diese Literaturtheorie *in klarem Gegensatz* zu der Entwicklung der letzten Jahrzehnte Momente nicht die literarische Gegenständlichkeit, und dadurch den Mimesisbegriff aufgrund verschiedenster Motivationen eliminieren will, sondern alles tut, *die literarische Gegenständlichkeit nicht nur komplexer zu definieren, wie es vor ihm möglich*

war, sondern auch sie geeignet zu machen, bis dahin unvorstellbar neue Inhalte aufzunehmen und zu artikulieren.

Hermann Brochs Mimesisbegriff ist aber auch geeignet, dass man auf ihrer Grundlage auch noch ein *Entwicklungsmodell* des Literarischen umreißen kann.

Die „*Entwicklung*“, die qualifizierte Veränderung der Literatur wird in gewissen Perioden durch dieselbe der „Realitätsvokabeln“ getragen. Im achtzehnten Jahrhundert hatten die bewussten bürgerlichen Autoren, wie bekannt, einen förmlichen Kampf geführt, um bürgerliches Leben, bürgerliche Lebenswelt und Konflikte in die höhere Literatur einzubringen. *Lessing* und *Diderot* haben diese Konzeption auf die expliziteste Weise betont. Wie dieses Beispiel zeigt, gibt es also Fälle, als die Dynamik des Literarischen von einer Dynamik der Veränderung der „Realitätsvokabeln“ diktiert und getragen wird.

Das Aufkommen neuer Weltanschauungen und Wertssysteme ist aber auch fähig, die „*Entwicklung*“ des Literarischen in anderen Fällen voranzutreiben. Die einzelnen Wellen der europäischen Moderne liefern dafür unzählige konkrete Beispiele. Und letztlich kann ebenfalls vorkommen, dass Momente des Strukturellen oder des literarischen Ganzen überhaupt zur Quelle von neuen Konstitutionen werden kann. Der (von welcher Motivation

auch kommende) Wille, ganze Strukturen zu verändern, zu dekonstruieren oder deformativ neuzukonstruieren, ist in der Geschichte der Literatur (und der Kunst im allgemeinen) alles andere als selten. Eines aus den vielen möglichen Beispielen dafür ist jenes Phänomen, welches die Literaturwissenschaft und dann die postmoderne Philosophie als *Dekonstruktion* kategorisiert.

### Endnoten

<sup>1</sup> Ein Beispiel bei Lucien Goldmann für eine erfolgreich durchgeführte Parallelisierung der Struktur eines Kunstwerkes mit derselben der „Gesellschaft“: „La forme romanesque nous paraît être en effet la *transposition sur le plan littéraire de la vie quotidienne dans la société individualiste née de la production pour le marché*. Il existe une *homologie rigoureuse* entre la forme littéraire du roman... et la relation quotidienne des hommes...“ S. *Pour une sociologie du roman*. Paris, 1964. 36.

<sup>2</sup> *Das Augenspiel*. München/Wien, 1985 (Carl Hanser Verlag). S. 200.

<sup>3</sup> Gerade dies geschieht aus der neueren Broch-Literatur, in Ulf Eiseles kritischen und kreativen Broch-Studien auf eine extrem intensive Weise (*Die Struktur des modernen Romans*. Tübingen, 1984). Beispiele für diese Anschauung: „Nicht auf einen zu Porträtierenden wird die Aufmerksamkeit primär gelenkt, sondern auf das Porträtieren an sich... auf den...Malvorgang“ (64); „Es handelt sich nicht um Romane des Zerfalls schlechthin, sondern... um Texte, deren Voraussetzung es ist, dass der Zerfall der vorgegebenen realistischen Form des Romans als Zerfall der Realität überhaupt gedacht und dargestellt wird“ (69).

<sup>4</sup> Es versteht sich von selbst, dass diese Vereinfachung und Absolutisierung des Brochschen literaturtheoretischen Modells zu einer der Hauptgrundlage der Diskussion über die „affirmative“ Broch-Forschung geworden ist.

# About Pictures which Held Us Captive – Richard Rorty Reads Wittgenstein

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## 1. The Cartesian picture

According to Rorty philosophy underwent deep changes in the 17<sup>th</sup> century. At this time a certain picture became central to philosophy as a professionalized discipline as we know it today. This was the picture of philosophy as discussion of “perennial, eternal problems – problems which arise as soon as one reflects.” (Rorty 1979, 3) Philosophy of this kind was a successor to theology. It was the search for a neutral standpoint, a place outside of all contexts which wasn’t just one more context. In the words of Thomas Nagel it was a search for the “view from nowhere”. To achieve this goal to provide that sort of foundation, philosophy has to have a special method, purer than the methods of nonphilosophers. John Locke, René Descartes and Immanuel Kant were searching for such pure methods, to find “‘foundations’ to which one must cling, frameworks beyond which one must not stray, objects which impose themselves, representations which cannot be gainsaid.” (Rorty 1979, 315)

The early Wittgenstein also thought that he had made the method of philosophy so pure that philosophy was finally brought to an end. With the *Tractatus*, Wittgenstein hoped to show everything that could be reasonably said and to demarcate it from nonsense. He tried to find “foundations to which one must cling” in language. In Rorty’s opinion, the later Wittgenstein wanted to get away from this picture, which held philosophy captive since Descartes. Rorty calls this picture the “Cartesian picture”. This picture has four main themes. Rorty’s continuous critique of different labels like realism, essentialism, representationalism, platonism, metaphysics, epistemology and many more is always related to those four signs of the Cartesian picture.

(1) Truth is a central theme in philosophy, and it consists in some sort of correspondence between subject and object, between the self and a reality.

The traditional view is that there is a core self which can look at, decide among, use, and express itself by means of [...] beliefs and desires. Further, these beliefs and desires are criticizable not simply by reference to their ability to cohere with one another, but by reference to something exterior to the network within which they are strands. Beliefs are, on this account, criticizable because they fail to correspond to reality. (Rorty 1989, 10)

(2) There is one way the reality is and we are obliged to speak in certain ways about it.

I am defining Platonism as the claim that the point of inquiry is to get in touch with something like Being, or the Good, or Truth, or Reality – something large and powerful that we have the duty to apprehend correctly. (Rorty, 1992, 511. Translation modified to fit the German original, S.K.)

(3) The problems of philosophy are eternal problems which arise as soon, as someone starts to reflect.

One has to think of philosophy as a name for the study of certain definite and permanent problems – deep-lying problems which any attempt at vision must confront: prob-

lems which professors of philosophy have a moral obligation to continue working on, whatever their current preoccupations. (Rorty 1976, 31)

(4) The aim of philosophy is to transcend our cultural limitations to get in touch with certainties which come from reality as it is in itself.

My suggestion that the desire for objectivity is in part a disguised form of the fear of the death of our community echoes Nietzsche’s charge that the philosophical tradition which stems from Plato is an attempt to avoid facing up to contingency, to escape from time and chance. (Rorty 1983, 32)

To conclude, the Cartesian picture suggests that there is a way the world is and our thinking has to correspond to this world. In doing so, we close the gap between subject and object. This gap and the problem of how to correspond to the world correctly, arises as soon as someone starts to reflect. So the philosophical problems are deep problems, with which humans have the obligation to struggle.

In his essay *Keeping Philosophy Pure: An Essay on Wittgenstein*, Rorty describes Wittgenstein’s struggle with the philosophical notion of necessity. This is obviously a central part of the points (2) and (4) of the Cartesian picture. Rorty asks: “Can Wittgenstein actually be interpreted as talking against ‘necessity’ rather than about it?” (Rorty 1976, 27) and he gives the answer: “Yes, about half the time”. I want to expand the question: “Can Wittgenstein be interpreted as talking against the Cartesian picture?” and try to answer it with an eye on *On Certainty*. My answer will be: “Yes, about half the time.”

Wittgenstein never mentions Descartes in *On Certainty* but he explicitly deals with a central problem of the Cartesian picture as described by Rorty. Also Moore himself, one central target of Wittgenstein’s comments, wanted to dismiss the sceptical doubt which arises out of the Cartesian picture. There are some paragraphs where Wittgenstein explicitly deals with Cartesian problems. In paragraph 90 for example, Wittgenstein is thinking about the similarity of “I know” and “I see” which is a main feature of the Cartesian picture (Other paragraphs are for example: §178, §199, §230).

The Cartesian picture holds that knowledge – justified true belief – is something that is generated in picturing the facts in the right way. In *On Certainty* Wittgenstein suggests in contrast, that there are different meanings of our term “knowledge” and that it seems that “‘I know’ did not tolerate a metaphysical emphasis.” (Wittgenstein 1969, §482) If we use “I know” with such a metaphysical emphasis, as some kind of foundation, we misuse it. Wittgenstein suggests that it is exactly Moore’s mistake to search for an introspective certainty of our knowledge. In this light, Descartes made the same mistake that is now preserved in the Cartesian picture. But the foundation of our quest for truth and knowledge is not to be found in “certain propositions’ striking us immediately as true, i.e. it is not a kind of *seeing* on our part; it is our *acting*, which lies at the bottom of the

language-game.” (Wittgenstein 1969, §204) If put this way knowledge has more to do with judgments than with perceived facts. So the question of knowledge is about permissible moves in language games and not about minds mirroring the essential structure of the world.

But Wittgenstein argued in some ways for thesis (3). In his view philosophical problems arise as soon as we misuse our language and overlook similarities and dissimilarities amongst our expressions. That also explains Wittgenstein’s excessive usage of the concept of “nonsense” and why Rorty was arguing indefatigably against this concept. This usage of the concept of nonsense still suggests that we have to talk in certain ways because of the structure of our language (and not because of the structure of the world or the mind).

So I conclude that the later Wittgenstein really could be interpreted as arguing against important aspects of the Cartesian picture. But that’s not the whole deal. To interpret Wittgenstein the way Rorty does leaves aside central areas of Wittgenstein’s philosophy.

## 2. Rorty’s picture of Wittgenstein

For Rorty Wittgenstein wasn’t just a therapist, who fought in the “battle against the bewitchment of or intelligence by means of language” (Wittgenstein 1958, §109). He also had a view of “how the things in the largest sense of the word hang together in the largest sense of the word”. (See Rorty 1976, 29) This simply means that Wittgenstein had some new ideas of how to talk about certain philosophical problems. For Rorty Wittgenstein’s main achievement was that he helped us to get away from the idea that we have to gain a “view from nowhere”. He helped us to get away from a central point of the Cartesian picture – the search for the points, where our concepts and the world correspond – and let us understand language as a set of tools. The main arguments Rorty picks from Wittgenstein are the arguments against the ostensive definition, the private language argument and the rule following considerations.

But on the other hand, Rorty ignores large parts of Wittgenstein’s philosophy, because they are not fitting in his view of Wittgenstein arguing against the Cartesian picture. For example Rorty doesn’t think that the concept of nonsense plays any interesting role in philosophy. Furthermore he can’t make any sense of Wittgenstein’s early attempts in the *Tractatus*, especially the ending passages, and he sees fragments like the paragraphs 89 – 133 of the *Philosophical Investigations* simply as leftovers from Wittgenstein’s positivistic views. (Rorty 2007, 164 and Rorty 1976, 29) Beside his favorite arguments Rorty isn’t interested in further reconstruction of Wittgenstein’s original thinking.

Pragmatic readers of Wittgenstein are not much interested in his selfimage – his claim to be doing something radically different from what other philosophers do. [...] Pragmatic Wittgensteinians do not see him as exemplary, either morally or methodologically. But they do think that he formulated an assortment of powerful and original criticisms of Cartesian–Lockean views. (Rorty 2007, 164)

On other occasions Rorty suggests reading Wittgenstein as a satirist who is making fun of philosophical ideas like the concept of necessity. (See Rorty 1976, 27 and 34) But in my opinion, pragmatic readers of Wittgenstein *should* see him as morally and methodologically exemplary. I want to understand the term “methodologically” in a wider sense and capture Wittgenstein’s whole style of doing philosophy with this term. It then contains his rather

serious struggle with philosophical problems, ethics and religion. Given this background, is it then plausible to read Wittgenstein as a satirist?

The question is not so much “Do we laugh, when we read Wittgenstein?”, the question is rather “Did *he* laugh when he wrote it?”. The *Lectures on Aesthetics* suggest a “No” as answer to the latter question: “I am in a sense making propaganda for one style of thinking as opposed to another. I am honestly disgusted with the other.” (Wittgenstein 1967, 28) So he makes a kind of serious propaganda for a certain style of thinking in the *Investigations*, in *On Certainty* and elsewhere.

I think that Rorty’s propaganda contains satire, but Wittgenstein’s is not. But for sure there is irony in the examples of the *Investigations* and even more in *On Certainty*. Philosophers always liked to see themselves as the intellectual guidance in a world of unreasonableness and Wittgenstein compares them to children and natives. But behind this irony Wittgenstein’s intention is very serious. There is a difference between lighthearted, not all too serious satire and profound irony. I think the latter is part of Wittgenstein’s propaganda while the former isn’t.

In my opinion, the attempt to read Wittgenstein as a satirist, who made fun of philosophical ideas is a compromise to handle the inconsistencies which arise of ignoring large parts of his philosophy. Rorty tries to explain his airy handling of Wittgenstein in the following way:

Admirers of Dewey like myself think that the point of reading philosophy books is not self-transformation but rather cultural change. It is not to find a way of altering one’s inner state, but rather to find better ways of helping us overcome the past in order to create a better human future. (Rorty 2007, 169)

But maybe such a cultural change can only be achieved through self-transformation. The roots of the Cartesian picture may lay much deeper than Rorty suggests. To possibly get rid of the Cartesian picture it needs a change of the whole style of thinking, an ironic propaganda to see new aspects which are needed for a better human future. Rorty seems to try kind of hastily to get rid of pictures were Wittgenstein was a very serious investigator. In my opinion, Wittgenstein’s careful approach will be of much more help to eventually get over the Cartesian picture than Rorty’s satiric “No problem rhetoric”.

Ultimately I share Rorty’s opinion that some of Wittgenstein’s ideas are very helpful to get over the Cartesian picture but I think that Rorty is wrong about the relevance of Wittgenstein’s moral and methodological approach. With the abandonment of the Cartesian picture comes the abandonment of philosophy as a professionalized, science-like discipline. Wittgenstein’s thinking is a possible way of how philosophy could look like after the Cartesian picture. I want to give a short outlook of some features of this new picture. Clearly there is a renunciation of unifying theory-building. This is a renunciation of the view, that science is the paradigm for philosophy. That is why Wittgenstein tried to replace explanation with description, why he concentrated on different examples and showing diversities rather than theoretical or metaphysical unification. Strictly speaking there are no conclusive philosophical arguments in his later philosophy, just maps and sketches which could be used in different ways. But if unification plays such a minor role in Wittgenstein’s picture, it is not surprising that the same goes for his writings. In my opinion, Rorty is ignoring the ambiguities of Wittgenstein’s picture, when he condemns everything that isn’t usable against the Cartesian picture. But maybe this irreducible



diversity is central to philosophy after the Cartesian picture and Rorty is in his unifying and eliminative argumentation closer to the criticized picture than Wittgenstein.

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# Wittgenstein, Toulmin and Implications of Rethinking Art and Science's Histories for 'Should Do' Questions in Science and Technology Policy Processes

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## 1 Introduction

As long as science led to the description of nature as an automaton, ideals of truth and human freedom were contradictory. It is a contradiction that we are beginning to overcome. (Prigogine 1997: 71)

In every day life we acknowledge that we do not know everything; that what is said to be unavoidable never happens, while the unexpected always occurs; and that plurality of perspectives is crucial for collective learning and diverse hopes for the future (Wittgenstein 1958; Toulmin 1990; Nowotny 2008). However, until quite recently few are likely to have expected that research on non-linear dynamic systems capable of performing transitions in far from equilibrium conditions would intersect with efforts to rethink art and science's histories in ways, that relate to arguments that "technologies of humility" would help prevent 'can do' orientations from eclipsing 'should do' questions in science and technology policy processes (Jasanoff 2003). Likewise few would have embraced suggestions that contextualising highly problematic settlements of 'crises over representation' in art and science's histories would show how important these arguments to "needs of a world in which simplicity is a memory of a bygone age" (Funtowicz and Ravetz 1997). In retrospect negative responses to these suggestions should not surprise us. In this presentation, examples from a new course in art history are used to explore:

- reasons for negative responses
- changes suggested by recent International Wittgenstein Symposia (henceforth IWS)
- overlaps and contrasts in Wittgenstein and Toulmin relating to 'can do' and 'should do' questions,
- implications of contrasts for relating insights of non-linear dynamics and art and science's histories to arguments that 'technologies of humility' would stress the importance to techno-science policy of asking: "what is the purpose; who will be hurt; who benefits; and how can we know" (Jasanoff 2003: 235).

## 2 Contextualising Vexed Options of Utopic and Dystopic Images of Art, Science and Modernity

A detailed account of factors impeding such explorations lies beyond this presentation's scope. But it is useful to mention several examples. Perhaps the most immediate factor is that such explorations challenge presuppositions shared by the most influentially opposed paradigms for 'reduction and elimination' in philosophy and science, including:

- that beneath (or above and beyond) the variability of human experiences, the world is reducible to the 'simplicity' of immutable entities and operations
- that science's ultimate task is 'quest of certainty' by reducing experience to context independent 'foundational laws'

- about universalisable obstacles to such 'quest of certainty' (limited instruments, social interests, cultural constructions, and so on).

In contrast, non-linear dynamic processes, rethinking art and science's histories, and attention to 'should do' questions in policy processes indicate that:

- complexity and emergent novelty are normal states for reality, and crucial for the world's intelligibility (Polanyi 1965),
- there are no such things as context independent problems (Dewey 1938),
- dichotomising nature-culture, and the real versus the historically contingent prioritises the *least* tractable problems, and impedes appreciating the importance of plurality of perspectives for collective learning and sustaining diverse human life ways (S. Koerner 2010).

Another factor is that polemical disputes over "yoking together or pulling apart" art and science eclipse the extent to which these have become paradoxically both the *most* and the *least* historicised themes in the humanities and social sciences (Jones and Galison 1998; cf. Feyerabend 1962; Kuhn 1977). Universalising chronologies treat art and science's histories' iconic figures as indicators not only of modernity, but of forces of propulsion behind all other aspects of history (Daston 2006). Polemical interpretations of modernity as triumph or tragedy; and of artistic invention versus scientific inventions treat contextual circumstances as irrelevant. Likewise problematic have been portraits of science as "surrounded by a kind of semi-permeable membrane" with results flowing outward (*ibid*), which eclipse the possibility of radical change coming from the humanities and policy processes.

## 3 Changing Circumstances Suggested by Themes of Recent International Wittgenstein Symposia

Recent IWS themes draw attention to connections motivating this presentation. Today the roles of physical and life sciences, social sciences and humanities in the dynamics of universities and public affairs are undergoing change - perhaps as deep as those that divided disciplines dealing with nature and society in early modern times (Toulmin 1990). Reflexivity about problems with policy processes governed only by instrumental rationality is spreading across disciplinary boundaries and the 'public participation turn'. Expert advisors on techno-science policy exhibit increased awareness that focusing only on what technologies *can do* eclipses '*should do*' questions (IWS 2006, "Cultures: Conflict – Analysis – Dialogue"; 2007, "Philosophy of the Information Society"; 2008, "Reduction and Elimination in Philosophy and the Sciences"; 2009 "Language and the World"), as well as of the bearing that the unpredictability of the future has upon:

- uncertainties about sustainable development under conditions of 'globalisation',

- the growth of global computer technology based 'information society' at the expense of the relative autonomy of politics, law and university research and teaching,
- unresolved inequalities shaped by race, class, ethnic, gender and religious difference,
- multi-cultural citizenship and trans-locational social movements.

Light can be thrown on where physical and life sciences are weak and the humanities and social sciences are strong by "value rationality" based approaches to: "Where are we going? Is this desirable? What should we do?" (Flyvbjerg 2001). Today, the humanities and social sciences are experiencing increases both in demand for the sorts of orientations they can offer; and in awareness of problems posed for addressing this demand by their most influentially opposed paradigms. Many fields are imbued with 'post-modern relativism' that can play highly problematic roles in new strategies of rule Hall 2005).

#### 4 Wittgenstein, Toulmin and Relating to 'Can Do' and 'Should Do' Questions

It is not coincidental that highly problematic supposed settlements of 'crises over representation' in art and science's histories have become foci of much interest. Toulmin would not have been surprised. In what follows, we first consider overlaps and contrasts in Wittgenstein and Toulmin, before exploring their implications. Throughout his extraordinary career, Toulmin stressed what Robert Brandom describes as *The Philosophical Investigations*' (Wittgenstein 1958):

- "insistence on the normative character of language and intentionality,"
- "pragmatist commitment" to understanding the efficacy of norms "in terms of practices,
- emphasis on the social and historical contingency of norms (Brandom 1994: 55).

But for Toulmin (1990, 2000) many advantages of Wittgenstein's work have been eclipsed by difficulties. An example was the clash between Wittgenstein's arguments for treating language (and all other human activities) as normative practices embedded in particular cultural contexts, and his highly a-historical orientations: "the most influential philosopher active in Cambridge in 1945 was Wittgenstein, and his only known comment on history is the solipsistic observation, "What is History to Me? Mine is the First and Only World" (Toulmin 2000: 8; Wittgenstein [1916] 1961). Thus, although Wittgenstein was very critical of claims about context independent truths, he left unexplored the specific historical circumstances under which such claims acquired authority. Further, for Wittgenstein, many contradictions in science and philosophy are due to certain categories being taken as 'given'. On the other hand, Wittgenstein and many of his followers' vision of human experience as encapsulated by such categories eclipses contributions the world's indeterminacy makes to its intelligibility and change in 'forms of life'. For Toulmin, all this relates to the problem that Wittgenstein avoided relating his work to pressing social and political issues (a key theme in Hacker's 2006 IWS Plenary Lecture).

#### 5 Insights of the Indeterminacy of the Future, and Efforts to Rethink Art and Science's Histories

These contrasts relate to the connections we are exploring. Prigogine (1997) noted the importance of Toulmin's

work for illuminating the specific historical conditions under which science has portrayed nature as an automaton. Consequences are not been restricted to envisaging "ideals of truth and human freedom" as contradictory (Prigogine 1997: 71). They include contradictions between:

- ideas that a distinguishing feature of modernity is awareness knowledge's contingency and the future's unpredictability (Lévi-Strauss 1973; Blumenberg 1983),
- the importance of portrayals of nature as an automaton (as well as highly problematic caricatures of 'others' and publics') to the tenacity of the idea that only 'foundational laws' go 'beyond mere appearances' (Prigogine 1997).

To illuminate these problems, we need to explore the circumstances under which it has been possible for *some* to supposedly settle 'crises over representation' around the 'myth of the clean slate' – the claim that the 'state of emergency' of contemporary affairs necessitates demolishing everything that went before and 'pursuit of certainty' altogether from scratch (Toulmin 1990). After the horrors of 1914-1918, such settlements played crucial roles in new 'quests of certainty'. The situation had considerable predecessors. Writing on the worsening conditions of the Thirty Years War (1618–1648), Toulmin (1990: 54) notes that the longer the bloodshed persisted, the more contradictory things became. All that mattered was devout belief in problems with the beliefs of others. Perhaps then, in the midst of 20<sup>th</sup> century conflicts and now it is not until those in power such orientations that they turn to supposedly settling 'crises over representation' by reducing 'should do' questions to 'can do' claims (Nowotny 2008), and eclipsing the importance of plural perspectives to anything like a 'common good'. Toulmin's approach compares with recent efforts to contextualise 'the canon' by replacing:

- assumptions that the categories 'art', 'science', 'objectivity', 'subjectivity', and 'publics' are somehow 'given' by research on context-dependent meanings (Crombie 1996),
- foci on ideas by inquiries into social contexts of practices and controversies (Alpers 1983; Hacking 1983),
- assumptions that 'collective representations' are determined by nature or by culture, by research on how agreements are achieved and contradictory ideas endure.

#### 6 Some Implications for Humanising Modernity

These efforts' value is not restricted to critique or to academic concerns. Problematic settlements of 'crises over representations' eclipse valuable dimensions of modernity rooted in humanist approaches to 'should do' questions. They also eclipse how research on the non-linear physical, organic and cultural processes relates to such questions. Although we cannot analyse these connections here in detail, we can venture some hypotheses relating to arguments concerning the importance to policy making of 'should do' questions, diverse perspectives and collective learning. One is that the history of highly problematic settlements of 'crises over representations' may also be the history of major transformations of problematic models of objectivity (Daston and Galison 2007) and caricatures of 'others' and 'faceless publics'. Another is that rethinking humanism's history may be crucial for reframing science and technology policy processes (Toulmin 1990). Unfortunately, during the 20<sup>th</sup> century, humanism was attacked largely on the basis of mistaken assumptions from both sides of debates over "two cultures" (Snow [1959] 1962), and utopic

and dystopic interpretations of modernity (J.L. Koerner 2004). Contrary to mistaken caricatures, many humanists have stressed the importance of contingency for the worlds' intelligibility and social solidarity; and especially that there is no such thing as a clean slate. Instead:

The terms in which we make sense of the past, and the ways in which our view of the past affects our ... historical foresight or horizons of expectations. Those horizons mark the limits to the field of action in which we see it possible to change human affairs, and decide which of our most cherished practical goals can be realized in fact (Toulmin 1990:1).

### Acknowledgment

This work is dedicated to Stephen Toulmin

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# Contemplation of the Variety of the World

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In this paper I shall discuss some central questions concerning the method of philosophy in the Wittgensteinian philosophy of religion, but will not directly deal with Wittgenstein's own views. I am primarily concerned with D. Z. Phillips (1936–2006), who has been the leading exponent of the Wittgensteinian approach to philosophy of religion in recent decades.

During the past fifteen years Phillips has developed a notion of philosophy as a form of contemplation. This conception is inspired by Phillips's former teacher in Swansea, Rush Rhees. After Rhees's death in 1989 Phillips edited several volumes of Rhees's previously unpublished papers. Rhees's interpretation of Wittgenstein has strongly influenced Phillips's thought, and he sees contemplative philosophy as "truly" Wittgensteinian philosophy.

I will start by describing two conceptions of philosophy which collide with Phillips's and Rhees's contemplative conception of philosophy. These are labelled "philosophy as a guide to life" and "the underlabourer conception of philosophy". After that I explore some central tenets of contemplative philosophy. Finally, I deal with problems that have to do with the alleged neutrality of contemplative philosophy of religion.

## 1. Two rival views

a) *Philosophy as a guide to life.* Pierre Hadot in his well-known book *Philosophy as a Way of Life: Spiritual Exercises from Socrates to Foucault* argues that in ancient thought philosophy was regarded as a way of living. For ancients, philosophy was not only a theoretical matter but "a method of spiritual progress which demanded a radical conversion and transformation of the individual's way of being" (Hadot 1995, 265). Thus, for the ancients, philosophy was not only what philosophers say – i.e. abstract philosophical discourse – but also what they do, their way of life.

Nowadays philosophers in Western universities do not see philosophy as a spiritual matter: for them philosophy is not "a way of life" in Hadot's ancient sense of the word. Nevertheless, the idea of philosophy as a guide to life has not wholly vanished. Many philosophers still think that philosophy transforms life and they have – in the name of philosophy – advocated and criticised various kinds of political, moral and religious views.

Phillips's contemplative conception of philosophy stands in sharp contrast to the conception of philosophy as a guide for living. According to him, philosophers whose interest is to offer answers and solutions to substantive questions in ethics, politics, and religion go beyond what philosophy can offer. He insists that the ethical and religious judgements offered by philosophers are not, in fact, grounded on philosophy. Phillips is not denying that philosophers have, of course, their own views on ethical and religious matters, but he holds that these are personal value judgements, which are not "underwritten by philosophy" (Phillips 1999, 160).

b) *The underlabourer conception of philosophy.* Phillips's also rejects the purely negative conception of philosophy, which is referred to as the "underlabourer conception of philosophy". According to this conception, philosophy does not offer any positive understanding of reality. Philosophy merely helps us to understand conceptual difficulties in other areas of thought, e.g., in science, politics and religion, but it has no subject matter of its own. According to Phillips, some philosophers influenced by Wittgenstein, such as James Cavell and Stephen Mulhall, advocate the underlabourer conception of philosophy. These philosophers see philosophy as therapeutical techniques which aim only at clarifying conceptual confusions without dealing with fundamental philosophical questions. Phillips finds this interpretation of Wittgenstein's philosophy inadequate (Phillips 1999, 25. See also Phillips 2007; Mulhall 2007). Although one task of philosophy is to clarify confusions by distinguishing between different uses of words and sentences, it is not philosophy's main concern.

## 2. Fundamental Problems of Philosophy

Phillips argues that philosophy has its own problems and its own positive subject matter. In his book *Philosophy's Cool Place*, he points out that from the times of pre-Socratic philosophers, a central question in philosophy has been "What is reality?" or "What is the reality of all things?" (Phillips 1999, 3). The question of the nature of reality is also a central concern of contemplative philosophy, and, following Rhees, Phillips holds that this concern is entangled with the question of the nature of language. Thus, to understand what language is is to understand the central ideas of philosophy, such as those of reality and truth (Rhees 1969, 135). Philosophy's chief concern is, as Rhees often says, with "what it means to say something" or "the possibility of discourse" (see, e.g., Phillips 2007, 50; Rhees 1998). The deep philosophical question is what makes language possible or what is involved in speaking language at all?

In asking "What does it mean to say something?" Rhees and Phillips are not in search of the epistemological, metaphysical or transcendental foundations of human discourse. Rather, contemplative philosophy is opposed to the normative tradition in philosophy. Philosophical investigation of reality does not tell us whether scientific, moral or religious claims are true or not, instead it is concerned with the various senses which these claims can have.

Philosophical contemplation is not a matter of determining what can or cannot be said. Instead, it is concerned with what is actually said. Phillips borrows the term "world picture" from Wittgenstein's *Certainty* and says: "To ask what it means to say something, for Wittgenstein, is the question that leads him, in the end, to a contemplation of the world pictures which are constitutive of how people think, act, and live" (Phillips 1999, 55).

According to Phillips, an analogy exists between contemplative philosophy and literature. A contemplative philosopher, like a great writer, shows the variety of the

world and tries to do justice to different ways of speaking, acting and thinking. The task of great literature and the task of contemplative philosophy is to show the world in all its variety and complexity.

In accomplishing this task the contemplative philosopher also seeks to do justice to moral and religious views which are at variance with his or her own. Following Winch, Phillips stresses that this makes hard ethical demands on a philosopher and on a writer who has strong moral or religious commitments of his or her own. (Phillips 2001, 245; Winch 1996, 173.) Thus, although Phillips is against advocacy in moral philosophy and philosophy of religion, he holds that there are ethical demands in philosophical inquiry, which have to do with its own distinctive kind of interest, i.e., doing justice to the variety of the world.

### 3. Philosophical Contemplation and Personal Religious Commitments

According to Phillips, the task of philosophy of religion is not to provide rational justification for religious beliefs or views, it is instead concerned with the meaning or the sense of religious talk. It aims to do justice to the variety of religious life and to the possibilities of religious sense and tries to be neutral with respect to personal religious and ethical commitments.

Several kinds of questions arise from Phillips's allegedly neutral and descriptive approach to philosophy of religion. One of them has to do with the philosopher's ability to understand perspectives other than his own.

According to Richard Amesbury, Phillips seems to hold that fair-minded philosophers can, in principle, overcome their limitations in contemplating possibilities that are at variance with their own. Phillips seems to think that obstacles to the contemplation of the variety of the world are obstacles of will, e.g., prejudice (Amesbury 2007, 212). (On a more general level, 'obstacles of will' have to do with unwillingness to give up a certain way of thinking.)

Amesbury argues that Phillips's description of the philosopher's ability to understand different perspectives is misleading. Incomprehension of foreign perspectives are not always due to obstacles of will, but sometimes "an incomprehension of certain perspectives can be constitutive of others" (Amesbury 2007, 213). Therefore, according to Amesbury, Phillips misrepresents the atheist's perspective: "An atheist who claims not to be able to 'see the point' in religion is not implicitly acknowledging that there is a point to which she is blind". Whether religious beliefs "have a point is not simply a disinterested question. The answer will vary with the perspective in question". The atheist's inability to appreciate religion is, according to Amesbury, "simply a condition of her perspective – not a misunderstanding, but a feature of how she *does* understand the world" (Amesbury 2007, 214).

Amesbury sees limits of understanding (or Kierkegaard's "conditions of existence") as the conditions that make contemplation and description possible. Thus, one cannot distinguish sharply between the personal and the philosophical, and Phillips is wrong, "to conclude that one's life should not be allowed to shape how one philosophises" (Amesbury 2007, 215). As Kierkegaard noted, philosophers are human beings too. (See also Mulhall 2007.)

However, it is somewhat unclear what Amesbury means by the conditions or limits of understanding: why should we think that the *inability to understand* certain

views or perspectives is a condition of human existence? I do not see why Phillips or anyone else should see conditions of understanding in this way at all. Of course our religious and ethical perspectives differ in many ways, and sometimes these differences and distances between us are so huge that we do not understand what others do and say. But there are no necessities involved in that. In the Phillipsian/Wittgensteinian view, our limitations of understanding are not fixed and are subject to change. In addition, it is important to note that the notion of the "unity of language" plays a central role in Phillips's and Rhee's thought. Therefore, Phillips does not have to see different perspectives as radically incompatible.

The inability to understand religion is not a general condition of adopting atheism. It is possible that in some cases an atheist has a better understanding of religious beliefs than those who regard themselves as believers. In fact, Phillips claims that Nietzsche gave a better account of Christianity than some of its friends (Phillips 2004, 20).

Amesbury's criticism is, however, on the right track. Phillips himself was puzzled by the same problem. He wondered whether the contemplative conception of philosophy did "not conjure up a picture of the philosopher hovering over the limitations and indeterminacy of our comprehension ... understanding all he surveys"? And he asked, "If our actual situation makes such transcendence impossible, why make it the aim of philosophy?" (Phillips 2001, 318-319).

Phillips thus admits that, e.g., the lack of religious sensitivity may make philosophical contemplation or religious possibilities impossible, and in this way, the philosopher's personal perspective gets in the way of philosophical contemplation. Therefore, there are good reasons to doubt that in religious matters the personal and the philosophical can be distinguished from each other so sharply as Phillips sometimes seems to do. (For a recent discussion on this theme, see Schönbaumsfeld 2007, Chapter 2.)

However, we can still make a distinction between 'understanding religion' and 'being a religious believer'. The former is, in principle, possible also for those who are not religious. The sense of religious beliefs can also be available to those who do not commit themselves to these beliefs. But this implies, as Phillips has suggested, that philosophers have some sort of "the possibility of belief" in them (Phillips 2005a, 172-173). Acknowledging this possibility is, however, not a confession of faith, but rather it has to do with Wittgensteinian anti-scepticism, i.e., the thought that at least some uses of first-order discourse in religion are in order. Contemplative philosophy of religion is thus a denial of the view that *all* religious beliefs are meaningless and incoherent (see Phillips 2005b, 371). Only then, does it make sense to speak about philosophical wonder at the possibilities of religious sense.

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# Perception and Depiction in the Light of Embodiment

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We can approach different depictive systems (*i.e.*, pictorial and linguistic) from the perspective of cognitive capabilities. The difficulty, which arises from the logically encoded incapability of expressing the relation between the depictive system and the depicted world within the given depictive framework, can be eliminated only by stepping beyond the depictive system and taking into account its cognitive background. Within this cognitive background, the notion of embodiment provides the leitmotif. That is, I suggest a relation between pictorial/linguistic capabilities and the world they depict on the basis of bodily experiences and evolving cognitive capabilities. Within this framework, it becomes possible to highlight how a picture can display its pictorial form (TLP 2.172), and how propositions mirror their logical form (TLP 4.121). In this paper I will focus on pictures.

## 1. Embodiment

Wittgenstein touches upon the question of bodily sensations and movements, underscoring the riddles we face when trying to either relate them to mental states or describe them in minute detail. We can also find remarks on the bewitching character of language giving rise to unsolvable anomalies in philosophy, and on the lack of “the requisite nomenclature” for being able to depict certain mental states or bodily sensations such as pain. (Wittgenstein 1998: 482) Wittgenstein speaks about the difficulties encountered when we try to describe the location of pain or joy, and suggests that emotions and sensations have a common feature, namely “they have characteristic expression-behaviour. ... And this itself implies characteristic sensations too.” (Wittgenstein 1998: 488) Here emerges the question of how sensation and its manifestation relate to each other. We can think of James’ often-quoted idea that emotional consciousness is “not a primary feeling, directly aroused by the exciting object or thought, but a secondary feeling indirectly aroused... [by] ...the organic changes, muscular and visceral, of which the so-called ‘expression’ of the emotion consists.” (James 1969: 346) Wittgenstein refers several times to this idea of James’ and despite his criticism<sup>1</sup>, he seems to accept it. “There is a particular interplay of movements, words, expressions of face, as of manifestations of reluctance or readiness, which are characteristic of the voluntary movements of a normal person.” (Wittgenstein 1998: 594) Some paragraphs later, Wittgenstein suggests that we have no sufficient reason to directly connect thought-processes with brain-processes. “The idea of thinking as a process in the head, in a completely enclosed space, gives him something occult”. (Wittgenstein 1998: 606) That is, mental states/dispositions, muscular activity, and words belong together in the course of human activity, although their relations are not as direct as one would expect. “The feeling of an unbridgeable gulf between consciousness and brain-process: how does it come about that this does not come into the considerations of our everyday life?” (PI 412)

I believe that the notion of embodiment and the enactive approach might help to resolve this situation. Embodiment, unlike Cartesian dualism, suggests that human rationality and conceptual capacity is determined by hav-

ing a body. Perceptive capabilities, the muscular system, and different aspects of the human body and its experiences provide the ground for the development of higher cognitive functions. As Bergson suggests in *Matter and Memory*, “[o]ur daily life is spent among objects whose very presence invites us to play a part: in this the familiarity of their aspects consists. Motor tendencies would, then, be enough by themselves to give us the feeling of recognition. But we hasten to add that in most cases there is something else besides. ... our past physical life is there.” (1991: 95) That is, motor responses and the recollections of earlier bodily experiences yield the ground for creating a responsive relation with our environment. And, as Merleau-Ponty later highlighted, perception of the external world is possible only via the perception of one’s own body; there is no other way to access things in our environment.<sup>2</sup> Valera *et al.* stress the importance of the body and its embeddedness into its environment in their discussion of embodiment as something that “highlights two points: first, that cognition depends upon the kinds of experience that come from having a body with sensorimotor capacities, and second, that these individual sensorimotor capacities are themselves embedded in a more encompassing biological, psychological, and cultural context.” (Valera *et al.*, 1993: 172f.)

The importance of the cultural context is quite obvious in light of the Wittgensteinian notion of *form of life*. Though Wittgenstein does not conspicuously emphasize the importance of bodily engagements, we can find hints suggesting its importance. As he wrote, “[t]here is no need of a theory to reconcile what we know about sense data and what we believe about physical objects, because part of what we mean by saying that a penny is round is that we see it as elliptical in such and such conditions.” (Wittgenstein 1980: 69) According to the enactive approach, we perceive things around us because we bear motor skills which provide the possibility of being able to act in the world without any reflection to paradoxes constructed in the framework of language.<sup>3</sup> That is, at first sight the paradoxical situation described by Wittgenstein can be easily resolved if we take into account the role of motor skills, namely, the possibility of touching a coin and the recollection of earlier experiences of touching. “Perceiving how things are is a mode of exploring how things appear. How they appear, is however, an aspect of how they are. To explore appearance is thus to explore the environment, the world. To discover how things are, from how they appear, is to discover an order or pattern in their appearances. The process of perceiving, of finding out how things are, is a process of meeting the world; it is an activity of skilful exploration”. (Noë 2004: 164)

## 2. Image Schemas and Mapping

Skilful exploration of the environment, which at the same time is the perception of our own body, presupposes a basic cognitive capability that enables us to identify and individuate things and situations. This capability is the distillation of certain recurring patterns, schemas. These schemas make the most mundane acts possible, as well as conceptual processing and depiction of the world either through pictorial or linguistic means.



As Arnheim posits, “[t]he artificial distinction between perception and conception has been superseded by evidence that perception does not start from particulars, secondarily processed into abstractions by the intellect, but from generalities. ‘Triangularity’ is a primary percept, not a secondary concept. The distinction between individual triangles comes later, not earlier. Doggishness is perceived earlier than the particular character of any one dog.” (Arnheim 1974: 167) This emphasis on generalities has gained further evidence thanks to experiments with infants. Experiments with young children in their first year show that they distinguish more and more kinds of things, so-called sortals, along their development. “A sortal is a concept that provides principles of individuation and principles of identity. ... Sortal concepts enable us to enumerate and to track identity over time”. (Xu 2007: 400) Young children develop sortals gradually: first the sortal of “object”, then that of a “person”, and only afterwards do basic-level sortals emerge, such as “ball”, “duck”, “cup”, and the like. That is, these basic-level categories emerge later than some super-ordinate categories, unlike the Lakoffian conceptual metaphor theory.

Beside sortals or categories, kinaesthetic image schemas play a crucial role in cognition. They create (beside basic-level categories) the other crucial pillar of conceptual metaphor theory. Kinaesthetic image schemas make transparent the importance of embodiment, namely, that embodiment yields “a *nonarbitrary* link between cognition and experience”. (Lakoff 1990: 154) Propositional and image-schematic models characterize the structure of the cognitive model, while metaphoric and metonymic models feature the way we use structural models. (Lakoff regards language as being a symbolic model.) In this process, image schemas are decisive since they “are concepts that have directly-understood structures of their own, and they are used metaphorically to structure other complex concepts.” (Lakoff 1990: 283)

Image schema is a gestalt structure, *i.e.*, “an organized, unified whole within our experience and understanding that manifests a repeatable pattern or structure.” (Johnson 1990: 44) These patterns are independent from linguistic skills. However, they can be refined by a conceptual system, which is possible thanks to language.

The idea of mapping emerges even with Merleau-Ponty when he calls attention to the parallelism of bodily experiences and the meaning of words. As he puts it, “if the words ‘enclose’ and ‘between’ have a meaning for us, it is because they derive it from our experience as embodied subjects. In space itself independently of the presence of a psycho-physical subject, there is no direction, no inside and outside. A space is ‘enclosed’ between the sides of a cube as we are enclosed between the walls of our room.” (Merleau-Ponty 1962: 236)

### 3. Perception and Depiction

According to Arnheim and conceptual metaphor theory, bodily experiences provide the ground for schemas which enable us to act in and perceive the world. And we can add: they provide the necessary background for depiction. Relations to pictures, such as recognizing a picture as a picture of something, or drawing a picture of something, highlight some key characteristics of the mechanism of how pictures depict the world.

Pictures have exceptional status regarding recognition. Since they represent something that is not present, we can speak about the riddle of pictures: that they are the pre-

sence of an absence.<sup>4</sup> Accordingly, a picture is a kind of wedge in both spatial and temporal order. (Brandt 2005: 43) “[B]ecause infants do not understand the nature of pictures, they sometimes respond to depicted objects as if they were real objects.” That is, young children do not recognize this wedge-like character of pictures<sup>5</sup> with a realistic depiction and thus they try to resolve their uncertainty by manual exploration of the picture. Experience with pictures by 18 months of age results in a decline in the manual exploration of depicted objects, *i.e.*, the recognition of picture-like entities gradually evolves. (DeLoache 2004: 68)

An interesting phenomenon, often quoted by anthropologists, is that “in groups unfamiliar with photography people have trouble identifying human figures in the kind of picture that looks so ‘realistic’ to us because we have learned to decipher their devious shapes”. (Arnheim 1974: 44) This demonstrates the importance of image schemas in the process of recognizing pictures. I suggest that this situation is generated by a difference of schemas. Tribesmen have a certain schema of the human body, but this schema is not as detailed as what we can see on a photo. Also, because they lack technology, less complicated and detailed schemas provide the patterns of depiction.

Investigating children’s drawings, we can recognise a tendency whereby younger children are satisfied with simple schemas of persons and things, and they gradually become capable of adding details for the sake of recognisability. The drawings nicely mirror the schemas they have: people are round-shaped entities with two arms and legs, often depicted as tadpoles without a trunk; for a four-year-old child, there is no significant difference between the figure of the experimenter and him/herself when depicting them, but s/he is capable of adding details when it turns out that the drawing is for communication. (DeLoache 2004: 68) “As the mind becomes more refined, the patterns it creates become more complex, and the two growth processes constantly reinforce each other.” (Arnheim 1974: 170) That is, if in a tribe the depiction of a human figure does not reach the level of minute detail found in a photo, and/or a special emphasis dominates the image schema of the man, then even though the wedge-like character of the picture is recognized, the figure in the photo does not meet the accustomed schema, and thus it is unrecognizable.

According to the idea of embodiment, “a person’s visual concept of an object is generally based on the totality of observations from any number of angles. Yet it is a visual concept, and not a verbal definition obtained by intellectual abstraction. Intellectual knowledge sometimes helps form a visual concept, but only to the extent that it is translatable into visual attributes.” (Arnheim 1974: 107) When we see a child’s drawing, we see the manifestation of “an invisible universal”. (Arnheim 1974: 461) But in order to be able to draw an invisible universal, we need to know the form. As Arnheim aptly states, “‘The difference’ ... ‘is not primarily between perception and representation, but between perception of effect and perception of form, the latter being needed for representation.’” (Arnheim 1974: 170)

We perceive the effect on the basis of previous experiences, and we learn to perceive the form on the same grounds. Form and effect are bound together by physical and cultural embeddedness.<sup>6</sup> We perceive the effect when we see a building or a figure “comfortably poised” because we “know from the muscle sensation in [our] bodie[s] ... that things on our planet are pulled downward.” If we recognize the pattern, *i.e.*, “[e]nough weight at the bottom makes the object look solidly rooted, reliable, and stable”, we perceive the form as well. (Arnheim 1974: 31)

## Endnotes

<sup>1</sup> See PI 413

<sup>2</sup> "Every external perception is immediately synonymous with a certain perception of my body, just as every perception of my body is made explicit in the language of external perception" (Merleau-Ponty 1962: 239)

<sup>3</sup> I have in mind topics like change- or inattentional-blindness, and visual presence. For more details, see Noë 2004: 52, 59-65.

<sup>4</sup> See Mitchell 1987: 17, Belting 12.

<sup>5</sup> It is important to note that young children are not prepared for dual representation, *i.e.*, to understand how symbols work. For details, see DeLoache 2004: 69

<sup>6</sup> Arnheim relates certain compositional rules to literate cultures. (Arnheim 1974: 33-36) The influence of culture on the manner of depiction is clearly visible in the case of a tribesman who does not recognize his mate in a photo because he lacks an institution of detailed depiction.

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# Das Problem des Abbildes

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Das Verhältnis zwischen erkennendem Subjekt und dem Gegenstand der Erkenntnis ist ein Grundproblem der Erkenntnistheorie. Eine wichtige Rolle spielt in der Betrachtung solcher Erkenntnisbeziehung die Reihenfolge der beiden Bezugspunkte: Entweder kann man vom Gegenstand zum Subjekt gehen oder umgekehrt – vom Subjekt zum Gegenstand. Die älteste und einfachste ist eine Auffassung, die das Erkennen als das Abbilden des Gegenstands durch das Subjekt versteht. Diese Ansicht ähnelt dem alltäglichen, vorwissenschaftlichen Erkenntnisbegriff. In der Geschichte der Philosophie kann man viele Darstellungen der Abbildtheorie finden: von Leukippos und Demokrits Atomismus, von Aristoteles und Thomas von Aquins Realismus bis zu John Lockes und David Humes Empirismus. Diese Philosophen sind der Meinung, dass die Erkenntnis einen abbildenden Charakter hat: Die Wirklichkeit wird vom Subjekt im Erkennen nur nachgebildet.

In diesem Vortrag möchte ich einige – vielleicht nicht alle – Argumente darstellen, die gegen die Abbildtheorie sprechen und zu ihrer Ablehnung führen. Der Ausgangspunkt ist die erkenntnistheoretische Analyse des Abbildbegriffs. Das Ziel dieses Vortrages ist es, auf die Schwierigkeiten mit der Abbildtheorie hinzuweisen, nicht jedoch ihre Lösungen zu finden.

Die allgemein angenommene Ansicht zum Erkenntnisbegriff setzt die folgende Aussage voraus: „Ich fasse nun auch meine Vorstellungen als ein Abbild meiner Umgebung auf, und selbstverständlich sehe ich die Umgebung als etwas auch von meinen Vorstellungen völlig Verschiedenes und Unabhängiges an“ (Rickert 1892, 44). Obwohl der Mensch unabhängig von der Umgebung ist, kann sie auf ihn paradoxerweise Einfluss ausüben, und damit die Erkenntnis überhaupt erst ermöglichen. Wie ist ein solcher Einfluss bei gleichzeitiger Erhaltung der Unabhängigkeit des Menschen von der Umgebung möglich?

Ludwig Wittgenstein hat dieser Beziehung im *Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus* folgenderweise aufgefasst:

„Wir machen uns Bilder der Tatsachen“ (2.1).

Diese Auffassung gründet sich auf Voraussetzungen, dass man das Bild mit der Wirklichkeit vergleichen kann und es sie abbilden soll:

„Um zu erkennen, ob das Bild wahr oder falsch ist, müssen wir es mit der Wirklichkeit vergleichen“ (2.223).

Wir nehmen dann an, dass wir die verschiedenen Elemente der Wirklichkeit und des Abbildes irgendwie zusammengesetzt auffassen und erkennen. Die Abbildung kann sich dann nicht auf die Elemente der Wirklichkeit beziehen, sondern das Bild muss ihre Anordnung der Tatsache abbilden. Wittgenstein zerlegt das Bild in zwei Bestandteile: a) die „Elemente des Bildes“ und (b) „seine Struktur“ (2.15). Die Bildelemente können als die materiellen Bestandteile des Bildes und die Bildstruktur als die formalen charakterisiert werden. Die grundlegende Bedeutung hat für Wittgenstein die Form:

„Was das Bild mit der Wirklichkeit gemein haben muß, um sie auf seine Art und Weise – richtig oder falsch – abbilden zu können, ist seine Form der Abbildung“ (2.17).

Das Bild muss also mit der Wirklichkeit die gemeinsame Form der Abbildung haben: Sie gibt nur die Möglichkeit für diese Kongruenz (cf. 2.151), die mathematischerweise in der Isomorphie besteht (cf. Stegmüller 1989, 542).

Diese Abbildtheorie setzt jedoch eine Gliederung unserer Erfahrungswelt in zwei nah beieinander liegende Dimensionen voraus: eine Welt der Originale und eine andere Welt, die aus ihrer Kopie besteht. Zur Welt der Originale gehören die Tatsachen, demnach sind ihre Kopien Bilder. Die Originale sind eine unerschöpfliche Quelle für alle möglichen Abbilder, also für die Kopien in unserem Bewusstsein. Der Modell der Erkenntnis für die Abbildtheorie ist ein Spiegelteleskop, das als Objektiv einen Hohlspiegel besitzt.

Die abbildende Erkenntnis besteht im Kopieren der originalen Wirklichkeit durch den Menschen. Je echter die Kopien der Dinge sind, desto richtiger, objektiver etc. ist unsere Erkenntnis der Welt. Es kann auch in Analogie zum Spiegelteleskop erläutert werden. Je deutlicher das einfallende Licht vom Hauptspiegel reflektiert wird, desto besser sind unsere Spiegelteleskope für astronomische Beobachtungen.

Wenn von uns ein Gegensatz zwischen Sein und vorstellendem Bewusstsein vorausgesetzt wird, können wir zum gewohnten Erkenntnisbegriff kommen, der annimmt, dass „wir eine an sich vorhandene Ordnung zu entdecken vermögen“, die unabhängig vom theoretischen Subjekt ist (Rickert 1892, 42). Die tatsächliche Wirklichkeit ist so ein Original, das wir in unseren Vorstellungen abbilden müssen; unsere im Bewusstsein vorgestellten Kopien werden umso objektiver, je ähnlicher sie dem Original sind: „Ein vorstellendes Erkennen bedarf einer absoluten Wirklichkeit, weil wir mit Vorstellungen nur dadurch ein vom erkennenden Subjekt Unabhängiges zu erfassen vermögen, dass sie Abbilder oder Zeichen einer Wirklichkeit sind“ (Rickert 1892, 43). Das Erkennen besteht im Imitieren der originalen Wirklichkeit; das Sein muss echt sein und sein Abbild wird immer seine Imitation bleiben.

Diese Abbildtheorie muss viele erkenntnistheoretische Schwierigkeiten überwinden. Ein erstes Problem tritt auf bei der Gleichheit zwischen der Wirklichkeit und dem Bild. Die Wirklichkeit ist verschiedenartig und bildet ein „heterogenes Kontinuum“, das heißt, eine »intensive« und »extensive« Unendlichkeit von eigenschaftlichen und relationalen Bestimmtheiten des gegebenen Materials. Das Problem besteht darin, wie das stetige und unerschöpfliche Original vom begrenzten Subjekt kopiert werden kann. Es muss auswählen, um das Erkennen aufgrund der bestimmten Prinzipien der Erkenntnis zu ordnen und zu vereinfachen.

Dieses Problem kann man auch auf Grund unseres Beispiels der Spiegelteleskope darstellen. Für die kurzen Wellenlängen der Röntgenstrahlung ist hier kein geeignetes spiegelndes Material bekannt und deshalb sind unsere astronomische Beobachtungen in diesem Spektralbereich beschränkt. In Analogie dazu kann man feststellen, dass unsere menschliche Unvollkommenheiten die Gleichheit zwischen der objektiven Wirklichkeit und ihrem Abbild ausschließen. Die Erkenntnis könnte also nicht in der vollstän-

digen Übereinstimmung bestehen, weil sie keine totale inhaltliche Gleichheit des Bildes und der Tatsache erreichen kann.

Das zweite Argument, das als das erkenntnislogisch bezeichnet wird, hat verschiedene Varianten. Dieses Problem betrifft die Erkenntnis der Wirklichkeit des Urbildes: Wie kann man die Erkenntnis so nachbilden, dass das Original dem Subjekt als wirklich erscheint? Diese Frage kann nur so beantwortet werden, dass man die Wirklichkeit des Urbildes nicht abbilden kann: Wir können die Wirklichkeit der Originale nur voraussetzen. Unsere Voraussetzung der Abbildtheorie, dass es eine wirkliche Welt gäbe, kann man abbildtheoretisch nicht begründen (cf. Krijnen 2001, 209). Man kann in der Analogie zu unserem Beispiel der Spiegelteleskope sagen, dass wir die Wirklichkeit des einfallenden Licht von vornherein annehmen. Um wissen zu können, dass der Gegenstand der Erkenntnis wirklich ist, müssen wir schon wissen, dass das abgebildete Objekt wirklich ist. Wir haben es mit einem *Circulus vitiosus* oder mit der „Tautologie“ des Gedankengangs von Positivismus und Empirismus zu tun:

„Die Antwort, daß der Gegenstand dieser Wirklichkeitserkenntnis das wirkliche Tatsachenmaterial selbst sei, (...) käme auf die Tautologie hinaus, daß der Maßstab für die Form der Wirklichkeitserkenntnis das als wirklich Erkannte ist“ (Rickert 1928, 145)

Mit Tautologie ist hier so viel gemeint wie zweimal dasselbe sagen; sie wird als Stilfehler im Sinne eines Pleonasmus (wie zum Beispiel „kleiner Zwerg“) verstanden: das wirkliche Tatsachenmaterial vom Gegenstand der Wirklichkeitserkenntnis. Im streng logischen Sinne haben wir aber hier einen Zirkelschluss, der eine Art von Beweis ist, bei dem man das, was man beweisen will, schon voraussetzt: Der beweisende Schluss (S) „der Gegenstand der Wirklichkeitserkenntnis ist das wirkliche Tatsachenmaterial“ beruht auf der Voraussetzung (V<sub>1</sub>) „es gibt eine wirkliche Welt“, die durch die Annahme (V<sub>2</sub>) „der Maßstab für die Form der Wirklichkeitserkenntnis ist das als wirklich Erkannte“ zu beweisen ist. Der „Maßstab für die Form der Wirklichkeitserkenntnis“ ist selbstverständlich gleich mit dem „Gegenstand der Wirklichkeitserkenntnis“. So bedeutet auch „das wirkliche Tatsachenmaterial“ dasselbe wie „das als wirklich Erkannte“; angesichts dessen ist der Satz (V<sub>2</sub>) mit dem Satz (S) gleich zusetzen, bei dem also das zu Beweisende in der Voraussetzung enthalten ist.

Die transzendente Abbildtheorie setzt voraus, dass es die Spaltung der Realität in eine bewusste unwirkliche Welt und eine unbewusste wirkliche Welt gibt; das, wessen wir uns bewusst sein können, gehört zum unwirklichen Teil der Welt, während die wirkliche Welt der Originale, über die wir uns klar werden müssen, außerhalb unseres Bewusstseins liegt. Die Argumente gegen die vorausgesetzte transzendente nachbildende Relation zwischen dem Abgebildenden und der Wirklichkeit ist folgende:

„Es ist nicht einzusehen, wie ich zu einer solchen Ansicht hätte kommen sollen, denn ich kenne ja nur die Vorstellungswelt oder den Bewußtseinsinhalt, und ich weiß, so lange ich mich nur an mich selbst halte, weder etwas von einem abbildenden Verhältnis zu einer von ihr verschiedenen unbewußten Wirklichkeit noch etwas von dieser Wirklichkeit selbst“ (Rickert 1928, 121).

Die Erkenntnis begrenzt sich bloß auf den immanenten Bereich, das heißt, auf die Welt der Vorstellungen oder auf die Welt der Bewusstseinsinhalte. Die Transzendenz, derer man sich nicht bewusst sein kann, ist nicht erkennbar, und zwar in zwei Aspekten: (1) das Nichter-

kennbare ist die „Wirklichkeit“ außerhalb des Bewusstseins, und (2) das Nichterkennbare ist die Abbildrelation selbst, die zwischen der Transzendenz und der Immanenz bestehen soll. Wenn jemand die transzendente Abbildtheorie voraussetzen würde, könnte er nichts über die Erkenntnis behaupten.

Mit anderen Worten wird für die transzendente Abbildtheorie die Voraussetzung angenommen, dass das Urbild, das nachgebildet wird, „wirklich“ ist, und dass die Wirklichkeit des nachgebildeten Originals eine Garantie für die Richtigkeit des Erkennens ist. Welches ist dann das Kriterium für die Trennung der wirklichen Inhalte des Bewusstseins von den nichtwirklichen kopierten Inhalten? Es gibt keine Gründe dafür, das direkt Gegebene als wirklich anzuerkennen, weil wir es nicht als wirklich erkennen können.

Zur Liste der Argumente gegen die Abbildtheorie kann man noch ein weiteres Argument hinzufügen. Dem „naiven“ Erkenntnisbegriff, der in der Gegenüberstellung der realen Wirklichkeit und des Bildes besteht, mangelt es an anderen Grundlagen. Wenn wir das Erkennen mit dem Nachbilden identifizieren, werden das Abgebildete die Objekte der Erkenntnis. Die Erkenntnis besteht dann in der Beziehung der zwei Objekte zueinander: das originale Objekt der Abbildung und das kopierte Objekt des Bildes. In der Analogie zu unserem Beispiels der Spiegelteleskope kann man jedoch die folgende Fragen stellen: Wer ist der Beobachter? Ist er in der Erkenntnisprozesse ganz neutral?

In der Abbildtheorie ist also kein Platz mehr für das Subjekt. Das führt uns zu den folgenden Aporien: (a) Jedes erkennende Subjekt muss ein Objekt sein und, wenn wir dem Subjekt eine Position zuweisen, erhalten wir (b) eine unendliche Reihe erkennender Subjekte.

Die Erkenntnistheorie kann man nicht nur auf sich selbst begrenzen, sondern man muss auch die „Mitmenschen“ einbeziehen. Zwar weiß ich von mir selbst, dass ich Vorstellungen habe, aber ich kann erst aus der Beobachtung anderer Menschen erfahren, wie die Vorstellungen zustande kommen und was sie bedeuten: „wenn ich dabei an einen fremden Menschen in Raume denke, oder wenigstens mich selbst so betrachte, als wäre ich auch als erkennendes Subjekt ein Objekt, und zwar ein von den Gegenständen der Erkenntnis [sic!] räumlich getrennter Körper“ (Rickert 1892, 44) Wenn wir nun die erkennende Subjekte, das heißt, für uns selbst und andere Mitmenschen, als Objekte betrachten, müssten wir gleichzeitig unsere Vorstellungen in sich selbst wie die Dinge außerhalb von uns behandeln; es würde dann das *principium identitatis* gebrochen.

Die zweite Aporie kann man folgendermaßen darstellen:

„Es würde immer noch ein Subjekt nötig sein, um die Übereinstimmung zu erkennen, und diese Erkenntnis könnte nicht wieder eine Vorstellung sein, weil dann eine neue Übereinstimmung erkannt werden müsste u. s. w. bis in's Unendliche“ (Rickert 1892, 46-47; 1928, 135).

Wenn man die immanente Abbildtheorie annehmen würde, so entstünde die Objektivität und die Wahrheit erst bei Angabe der Beziehung von Vorstellungen und Wahrnehmungen; es mangelt schon wieder am Subjekt, das die Relation der Originale und der Kopie feststellen könnte. Die Abbildtheorie erklärt nicht, wie das Subjekt das Objekt erkennen kann, weil entweder das Subjekt aus dem Erkennen total beseitigt wird oder, wenn es hinzugefügt wird, zur Unendlichkeit führen muss.

Die Ablehnung der Abbildtheorie hat nicht nur Folgen für den Empirismus und ähnliche Doktrinen, sondern auch für den Wahrheitsbegriff, was im weiteren Verlauf noch dargestellt wird. Die Antwort auf die Frage, ob die Erkenntnis in der Abbildung bestehen kann, ist auch von besonderer philosophischer Bedeutung für den Wahrheitsbegriff (cf. Prauss 1988: 30). Der Zusammenhang zwischen der Abbildtheorie und Wahrheitsbegriff besteht darin, dass die sogenannte klassische Wahrheitsdefinition mit dem Übereinstimmungsbegriff (*adaequatio*) die Abbildtheorie voraussetzt. Die korrespondenztheoretische Übereinstimmung und ihre Kongruenz erfordern die Nachbildung, in der die Dinge die Vorbilder für unsere Vorstellung darstellen.

Im Kontext des Wahrheitsbegriffs kann man noch ein Problem mit der Abbildbeziehung finden. Wenn die Erkenntnis im Kopieren der originalen Wirklichkeit besteht, muss seine Richtigkeit und seine Objektivität von der Deutlichkeit abhängen; je echter die Kopien der Dinge sind, desto richtiger, objektiver etc. ist unsere Erkenntnis der Welt. Die Unterschied zwischen Deutlichkeit und Undeutlichkeit hat nur den „graduellen, quantitativen und damit relativen“ Charakter. Dieses Problem hat Gerold Prauss klar dargestellt:

„Zwischen Wahrheit und Falschheit einer Erkenntnis besteht vielmehr ein qualitativer und damit absoluter Unterschied, der durch einen quantitativen und damit relativen Unterschied wie den von Deutlichkeit und Undeutlichkeit eines Abbildes prinzipiell nicht wiederzugeben ist“ (Prauss 1988: 31).

Die Abbildtheorie erklärt dann nicht, in welcher Weise die Wirklichkeit ins Bewusstsein treten könnte. Die vorgeschlagene Lösung der Abbildtheorie führt zum Dualismus

der transzendenten Welt der Tatsachen und der im Bewusstsein immanent abgebildeten Welt. Die Folge dieses Dualismus ist das unlösbare Problem der Brücke zwischen ihnen. Wenn dieser Dualismus der Wirklichkeit und des Bildes besteht, muss man fragen, in welcher Weise man überhaupt erkennen kann.

Die dargestellten Probleme mit dem Abbild stellen Forderungen der kritischen Arbeit zum Erkenntnisbegriff. Kritischer Ansatz bedeutet vor allem eine eingehende Betrachtung der offensichtlichen Ansichten. Die Kritik besteht jedoch nicht in der vollständigen Ablehnung der umgangssprachlichen Meinungen. Diese Vorwürfe sollen nur der Ausgangspunkt für die kritische Erkenntnistheorie sein.

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# Toward Wittgenstein as a Common Sense Philosopher

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## 1. Introduction

Following R. Fogelin, D. Stern proposed a general classification of the readings of Wittgenstein:

"The principal fault line separating Wittgensteinians is over a question of philosophical method: whether or not a radical philosophical change – putting an end to philosophy – is possible. Robert Fogelin draws a helpful distinction between 'Pyrrhonian' readings of the *Investigations*, which see the book as informed by a quite general skepticism about philosophy and so as aiming at bringing philosophy to an end, and 'non-Pyrrhonian' readings, which construe the book as a critique of certain traditional theories in order to do philosophy better.[...] Another way of putting the distinction is to say that Pyrrhonian Wittgensteinians believe philosophy, properly conducted, should not result in any kind of theory, while non-Pyrrhonian Wittgensteinians maintain that Wittgenstein's criticism of traditional Philosophy leads us to a better philosophical theory, albeit not the kind of theorizing we find in the philosophical tradition."<sup>1</sup>

Here, we want to propose a non-Pyrrhonian reading. More specifically, we want to point out that there are several significant resemblances between Wittgenstein's second Philosophy and a program of common sense philosophy.

## 2. What is Common Sense Philosophy?

Let's begin by raising the question "What is Common Sense Philosophy?" In his book *Common sense*, N.Lemos sums up Chisholm view on the common sense tradition. He writes:

"As we have seen, Chisholm takes to be characteristic of the common sense tradition to hold that we do know much of what we ordinarily think we know. Not surprisingly, some of what we think we know must be considered common sense. But what does it mean to say that some proposition is "common sense"? I think the notion of common sense proposition is rather vague, and that one could take it to mean many things. But suppose we take a common sense proposition to be one that is deeply and widely held. If this is what we mean by a "common sense proposition," then the common sense tradition holds that there are common sense propositions."<sup>2</sup>

So following N.Lemos and R.Chisholm one can say that a common sense philosopher is someone who believes in the existence of propositions that are deeply and widely known. I think that the following examples shall not be controversial:

- a) Things we clearly perceive by our senses generally exist and correspond to our perceptions.
- b) Things could have been otherwise.
- c) Material objects have a mind-independent existence.
- d) We know past events.
- e) Concrete particulars persist through time and qualitative change.

f) It is not possible that the same object be in two distinct places at the same time (at once).

g) It is not possible that two numerically distinct material objects be in the same place at the same time.

h) Concrete particulars are contingent beings.

i) Concrete particulars have a temporally bound existence.

j) Human beings have limited cognitive powers.

If the common sense philosopher is right, propositions like these (at least most of them) are indeed knowledge. This means such propositions, which do not come out of specialized researches, which are sometimes said to be ancestral and trivial, are not just convenient beliefs that human species have used to survive until today. These are not beliefs that could be refuted either by empirical investigations of nature or by philosophical critics. The common sense philosopher holds that propositions such a-j nonetheless are temporally anterior to those of sciences and philosophy but are presupposed by them. These are the essential background on which all other human thoughts shall raise. Here is, we believe, the core of Common Sense Philosophy. However, it needs some further developments.

According to the core, a common sense philosopher held realism (rejects anti-realisms). By 'realism' we mean a picture of our relationship to reality that can be presented as follows:

"A certain picture of our relationship to the worlds is intuitively appealing. According to this picture, the world is a mind-independent structure: it consists of objects whose existence, character, and relations are fixed independently of what we happen to say, believe or desire. We, in turn, respond to that world by fixing beliefs and making statements about it. Those beliefs and statements are assertoric: they make claims about the worlds, saying that things are this way or that."<sup>3</sup>

By contrast, antirealisms are the views rejecting this picture either by denying the existence of a mind-independent world, or by denying that we have cognitive access to it, or both. Antirealism is a wide category, it includes as well Kant's idea that there is a noumenal reality that is inaccessible to us as Goodman's claim according to which there are as many worlds as symbolic systems and no reality in itself.

The core has as well methodological consequences. In philosophy, we have no choice but beginning in *the middle of things*. This, as says L.Rudder-Baker, has three main significances:

*Semantical*: "We cannot philosophize without a language, and any language that we have embeds a picture of the world. To learn a language is to learn the way the worlds is (or might be)".

*Epistemological*: "The Cartesian ideal of finding an absolute starting point without any presupposition is illusory." Philosophical investigations do not have to begin

with radical sceptical doubts about our usual way of thinking.

*Ontological*: “the objects of interest at least initially are medium-size thing – primarily people, but also nonhuman organisms and other natural objects, and artefacts and artworks.”<sup>4</sup>

Since the common sense philosopher begins and wants to stay in the middle of things, ontologically speaking, his worlds can be seen as a kind of ontological juggle, a populated ontology. For a nominalist who believes that applying Occam's razor is the good philosopher's first duty, who tries to reduce or eliminate whatever he could, this attitude toward ontology would appear to hardly admissible. Thus, a common sense philosopher does not favour ontological economy and rejects reductionism.

Since the common sense philosopher also begins in the middle of things, epistemologically and semantically speaking, he believes, when asking for “what is knowledge?” or “What is understanding?” for example, that he can pick out ordinary uses of words to answer. We do not have to give a definition before asking what counts as “knowledge”, “concrete objects”, etc. In other words, his strategy is not methodist but particularist.<sup>5</sup>

Common sense philosophy rejects as well naturalism in its methodological, epistemological, and ontological senses. Methodological naturalism holds that philosophy should use natural sciences methodology. Epistemological naturalism is the view according to which natural sciences are the most reliable in our web of beliefs; they have to be the ultimate arbiter of epistemological conflicts. Finally, ontological naturalism hold that the ultimate structure of the worlds is what the natural sciences say it to be. One should not infer that common sense philosophy is closely linked with instrumentalism. A. Rosenberg defines instrumentalism as:

“the thesis that scientific theories should be treated as heuristic devices, tools for organizing our experiences and making predictions about them, but their claims about unobservable things, properties, processes and events should not be taken as literally true or false”<sup>6</sup>

It is in principle open to a common sense philosopher to hold that the sciences and common sense do not compete (at least always) with each other.<sup>7</sup>

Common sense philosophy rejects the epistemological ambitions of traditional philosophy and denies its role towards other forms of thinking could be strongly foundational. Traditionally, Philosophy was conceived as an *a priori* study aiming at absolute certainties. These knowledge were conceived as the foundations of all our other knowledge of reality. In other words, Philosophy was supposed to justify the fundamental assumptions of sciences (and possibly to common sense). Philosophy thus conceived is closely linked to the epistemic norm according to which we should not assent to beliefs without evidence or justification. But a common sense philosopher denies both that Philosophy can give us such results and that it can founds our other knowledge. Moreover, he rejects the latter epistemic norm.

### 3. The second Wittgenstein and Common Sense Philosophy?

In his lectures on the foundations of Mathematics, one of his pupils once writes the following remarks:

“During this lecture Wittgenstein referred to his slogan. ‘Don't treat your commonsense like an umbrella. When you come into a room to philosophize, don't leave it outside but bring it in with you.’”<sup>8</sup>

One would be right to say that it is not enough. A philosopher could think that our common sense is useful in philosophical practice, that, for example, we have to accept globally our common sense data, without holding that data correspond to reality. One can hold an instrumentalist conception of common sense beliefs. So we need to show that the second Wittgenstein's works gives a more significant role to common sense, and that its conception of philosophy closed to the common sense philosopher's one. That's what we will do. We will refer to textual evidence from the *Blue Book*, *The Investigations* or *On Certainty*. We will also raise objections to our interpretation. But we will not probably have time to develop convincing answers to them. One of these objections is the following; The second Wittgenstein is often seen as one of the philosophers who undermined the myth of the given. This myth is usually associated with realism, as defined above. If these two statements are true, it seems false to believe that the second Wittgenstein is realist. One can also argue against the idea that the second Wittgenstein holds a realist position by pointing his conventionalist conception of grammatical rules and necessary propositions. According to him, propositions such as a-j do not reflect the structure of reality but constitute our grammar, these are rules determining the meaning of terms like “past”, “material object”, etc. Another objection could be raised by the Neo-Wittgensteinian which see him as a radically destructive philosopher. They could claim that Wittgenstein held no philosophical position at all. All these objections are fair. We hope for we will have time to discuss them, at least during the discussion.

### Endnotes

<sup>1</sup> Stern (2004), p.34-6.

<sup>2</sup> Lemos (2004), p.4.

<sup>3</sup> Loux (2001), p.539.

<sup>4</sup> The last three quotations are from Rudder-Baker (2007), p.13.

<sup>5</sup> See Sosa (2000), ch. 14.

<sup>6</sup> Rosenberg (2005), p.197.

<sup>7</sup> For an attempt to argue that relationship between scientific discourses and common sense, see Thomasson (2007) and also Pouivet (2006).

<sup>8</sup> Wittgenstein (1995), p.59.

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# Das Zebraproblem

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Nichts geht heute ohne Computer, auch die wissenschaftliche Beschreibung der Welt nicht. Dabei produzieren diese Maschinen Sätze, die wahr und falsch sein können. Dieser Aufsatz weist nach, dass aus für uns unüberwindbaren technischen Gründen ein Großteil, ja vielleicht sogar alle diese Sätze ihren Wahrheitswert nicht allein der Welt verdanken, über die sie sprechen, sondern willkürlicher Festlegung. Ist angesichts dessen eine exakte Beschreibung der Welt mit maschinenlesbaren Sprachen möglich? Wir wollen dieser Frage mit einem Gedankenexperiment nachgehen. Um uns nicht in den Feinheiten der vielen maschinenlesbaren Sprachen zu verlieren, werden wir in der Umgangssprache bleiben und ein Merkmal der maschinenlesbaren Sprachen auf sie übertragen.

TND-Kriterium: Jeder Satz trifft entweder zu oder nicht, aber nicht beides.

„TND“ heißt dieses Kriterium, weil es an das aussagenlogische Gesetz des Tertium Non Datur erinnert. Es ist jedoch metasprachlich formuliert und passt darum auf viele Sprachen. Z.B. kommt „ApNp“ nur in einigen polnisch notierten aber nicht in allen maschinenlesbaren Sprachen vor.

Beginnen wir mit dem Experiment und stellen uns ein Zebra namens „Ziggy“ vor. Wir wollen entscheiden, ob der Satz „Ziggy ist schwarz“ wahr ist. Einige Teile von Zebras sind schwarz und einige nicht. Wenn Ziggy schwarz ist, dann muss das etwas mit seinen schwarzen Teilen zu tun haben, denn sonst könnten auch Zitronen, die keine schwarzen Teile haben, schwarz sein.

Nehmen wir an, Dinge stimmen in allem mit ihren Teilen überein. Demnach wären Zebras schwarz, weil sie schwarze Teile haben und sie wären auch nicht schwarz, weil sie auch andere Teile haben. Ein Widerspruch! Nehmen wir deswegen an, Dinge stimmen in nichts mit ihren Teilen überein. Folglich wären Zebras, weil sie solche Teile haben, nicht schwarz. Weil sie aber auch Teile haben, die nicht schwarz sind und mit diesen nicht übereinstimmen sollen, müssen sie nicht nicht schwarz sein. Folglich sind sie schwarz. Ein Widerspruch! Widersprüche folgen nur aus Falschem. Die Annahmen, Dinge stimmen in allem bzw. sie stimmen in nichts mit ihren Teilen überein, sind darum falsch. Demzufolge stimmen Dinge in manchem mit ihren Teilen überein und in manchem auch nicht. Doch worin stimmen sie überein und worin nicht?

Gibt es eine Regel, die festlegt, welche Eigenarten Dinge von ihren Teilen erben und welche nicht? Michelangelo David ist aus Marmor. Er enthält aber auch Spuren anderer Mineralien wie z.B. Hämatit. Doch der größte Teil des David ist aus Marmor, weswegen wir das dem ganzen David auch zusprechen. Wir wenden also das Mehrheitsprinzip an. Doch wir bezeichnen ein Hemd mit nur einem Fleck, bei dem 99 % des Stoffes noch sauber sind, als schmutzig. Bei dem Hemd gilt das Mehrheitsprinzip nicht. Es gibt keine Regel, die sagt, ob ein Ding mit den Eigenarten seiner Teile übereinstimmt oder nicht.

Wir wollen die Dinge, die eine solche Regel benötigen, „zebrig“ nennen. Etwas ist also *zebrig* gdw. es verschiedene Teile hat. Verschieden sind die Dinge, auf die verschiedene Sätze zutreffen. Dahinter verbirgt sich das Ersetzbarkeitsprinzip nach Leibniz. So sind Schnee und Kohle verschieden, weil sich in dem wahren Satz „Schnee brennt nicht.“ „Schnee“ nicht durch „Kohle“ ersetzen lässt, ohne dass der entstehende Satz falsch wird.

Allgemein gesagt: Nehmen wir ein zebriges z an. Nun gibt es ein x und ein y, die seine Teile und verschiedenen sind. Es gibt also einen wahren Satz S aus dem ein falscher entsteht, wenn wir darin den Namen von x durch den von y ersetzen. Was uns fehlt, ist eine Regel, die bestimmt, ob der Satz wahr ist, der aus S entsteht, wenn wir den Namen von x durch den von z ersetzen.

Die Wahrheit eines solchen Satzes im Allgemeinen und „Ziggy ist schwarz“ im Speziellen können wir nicht logisch deduzieren oder empirisch entdecken, sondern müssen sie willkürlich festlegen. Je nachdem, wie wir wollen, ergeben sich verschiedene Beschreibungen von Ziggy. Dieses Problem, dass die Beschreibungen zebriger Dinge auch von Willkür abhängt, soll „*Zebraproblem*“ heißen. Das Zebraproblem betrifft nicht alle Sätze und alle Dinge, sondern nur das Aufeinandertreffen bestimmter Dinge und Sätze. Ein Teerklumpen hätte zwar auch Teile, aber eben nur schwarze, weswegen hier die Zuschreibung einfach ist. Eine Zitrone löst das Problem in Bezug auf die Schwärze auch nicht aus, weil sie überhaupt keine schwarzen Teile hat. Zebras, Schachbretter und die Seite dieses Textes lösen sie jedoch für die Schwärze aus.

Wir wollen uns das Zebraproblem bei echten maschinenlesbaren Sprachen am Beispiel einer primitiven Digitalkamera klar machen. Der Einfachheit halber wollen wir annehmen, die Kamera könnte nur schwarz und weiß abbilden. Das Argument wäre aber mit jeder anderen Zahl von Farben wiederholbar. Denn wesentlich ist, dass ein Pixel eine bestimmte Farbe hat oder nicht aber nicht beides. Auch wenn sie nicht so aussehen, Pixel sind Sätze. Was wir auf dem Display oder auf den Druckbogen sehen, ist nur eine Umsetzung eines Satzes. Im Rechner werden keine Bilder umhergewälzt, sondern Listen von Beschreibungssätzen. Eine Beschreibung von Ziggy im Dateiformat TIFF mit CCITT Codierung [Lipp 1997] könnte so aussehen:

```
0111 010 000111
10 000111
000111 010 000111 010
```

Wie ein normaler deutscher Satz kann eine solche Beschreibung auf das Abzubildende zutreffen oder nicht. Die Liste oben würde übrigens als die Pixelgrafik unten links in der Skizze angezeigt werden.




Abb.: Ein Zebra als Pixelgrafik

Im Extremfall, z.B. bei einer sehr schlechten Kamera oder wenn das Zebra weit weg ist, steht für das ganze Zebra nur ein einziges Pixel zur Verfügung und wir haben das Zebra-Problem in der besprochenen Form. In milderer Fällen tritt es nicht für das ganze Zebra, sondern nur Teile davon auf. Hier muss ein Pixel einen Teil des Zebras abbilden, das seinerseits zebraig ist, weil es z.B. weiße und schwarze Teile hat. Der vom Programmierer festgelegte Algorithmus in der Kamera muss entscheiden, wie dieses Pixel gefärbt wird. Das Aussehen des Bildes wird also nicht nur vom Zebra, sondern auch vom Programmierer bestimmt. Je nachdem, wie der Algorithmus aussieht, ergeben sich verschiedene Abbildungen desselben Gegenstandes.

Der kluge Programmierer wird deswegen so vorgehen, dass er einen Algorithmus schreibt, dann mit dessen Hilfe Bilder macht und diese mit dem Original vergleicht. Er wird die Regeln für die Farbzuweisung der Pixel im Algorithmus dabei zunehmend so verfeinern, dass das Bild einem Zebra immer ähnlicher wird.

Bedrohlich wird das Zebra-Problem für wissenschaftliche Abbildungen. Denn hier kann das Bild meist nicht mit dem Abgebildeten verglichen werden. Das tiefste Innere der Zellen und die äußersten Weiten des Weltraums kennen wir nur noch aus Pixelgrafiken. Ein Vergleich der Bilder mit der direkten Anschauung der Dinge, die sie zeigen, ist nicht mehr möglich. Wir wissen so nicht einmal, ob ein zebraiges Objekt abgebildet wurde oder nicht, weil das von Willkür geprägte Bild immer schon zwischen uns und den Dingen in der Welt steht. Der Biologe, der Zellen mit digitalen Bildern erforscht, ist in einer ähnlichen Lage wie ein Kollege, der Sonnenblumen nur auf Grundlage von van Goghs herrlichem aber sehr willkürlichem Gemälde erforschen würde. Er sieht den Gegenstand nicht mehr selbst, sondern nur noch dessen Gemälde und er kann nicht entscheiden, was daran van Gogh oder Natur ist.

Was hat Ludwig Wittgenstein mit all dem zu tun? In seinem *Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus* [Wittgenstein 1963] skizziert er eine das TND-Kriterium erfüllende Sprache und stellte eine Theorie auf, wie eine exakte Beschreibung der Welt mit so einer Sprache möglich sein soll.

Die Welt ist vollständig beschrieben durch die Angaben aller wahren Elementarsätze, plus die Angabe welche von ihnen wahr sind. [TLP 4.26]

Mit „vollständig“ meint Wittgenstein, dass sich keine weiteren Informationen über die Welt geben lassen. Eine

vollständige Beschreibung passt nur auf eine einzige Welt. Träfe sie auf zwei verschiedene Welten gleichermaßen zu, dann würde sie die Unterschiede zwischen diesen beiden Welten vernachlässigen und wäre damit nicht vollständig beschrieben. Vollständige Beschreibungen treffen also niemals auf mehrere verschiedene Dinge zugleich zu. Allgemein gesagt: Eine Satzmenge  $S$  ist eine vollständige Beschreibung von  $x$  gdw. es kein solches  $y$ , dass  $S$  einen falschen Satz enthält, wenn man in jedem ihrer Sätze den Namen von  $x$  durch den von  $y$  ersetzt.

Wir könnten uns vorstellen,  $S$  enthielte alle wahren und die Negationen alle falschen Elementarsätze. Dann wäre  $S$  nach Wittgenstein eine vollständige Beschreibung der Welt. Wie ermöglichen uns die Elementarsätze dies?

Ist der Elementarsatz wahr, so besteht der Sachverhalt, ist der Elementarsatz falsch; so besteht der Sachverhalt nicht. [TLP 4.25]

Die Gesamtheit der bestehenden Sachverhalte ist die Welt. [TLP 2.04]

Ist alles über alle Sachverhalte gesagt, dann ist auch alles über die Welt gesagt. Alle wahren Elementarsätze sagen alles über alle bestehenden und die Negationen aller falschen Elementarsätze alles über die nicht bestehenden Sachverhalte.

„Ziggy ist schwarz.“ ist kein Elementarsatz. Denn er könnte bei der selben Konstellation der Sachverhalte je nach Festlegung wahr oder falsch sein. Demnach sollten die Elementarsätze nicht von zebraigen Dingen sprechen. Das ist der Fall, denn Sachverhalte sind in Wittgensteins Theorie Verbindungen von Gegenständen [TLP 2.01] und über Gegenstände schreibt er:

Der Gegenstand ist einfach. [TLP 2.02]

Gegenstände im Sinne Wittgensteins sind folglich nicht zebraig. Sonst hätten sie verschiedene Teile und wären aus diesen zusammengesetzt. Zebraige Dinge würde er „Komplexe“ nennen. „Ziggy ist schwarz.“ ist also auch deswegen kein Elementarsatz, weil Ziggy kein Gegenstand, sondern ein Komplex ist. Propositionale Beschreibungen von Komplexen, so Wittgenstein, lassen sich aber immer in Elementarsätze zerlegen. Damit entgeht er tatsächlich dem Zebra-Problem. Denn komplizierte Dinge wie Zebras, Bäume, Planeten und am Ende die ganze Welt werden beschrieben, indem man ihre nichtzebrigen Teile beschreibt.

Dazu muss er zwei Annahmen machen. Erstens, dass die ganze Welt restlos in nichtzebrige Dinge zerlegt werden kann. Zweitens, dass die zebraigen Dinge ohne Informationsverlust durch die Beschreibung ihre kleinsten nicht zebraigen Bestandteile ebenfalls beschrieben sind. Atomismus und Reduktionismus sind die passenden *Ismen*.

Beide Annahmen sind keine These über die Sprache, sondern über die Welt. Wittgenstein scheint folgende Überlegung zu leiten: Die Sprache, die die Welt beschreibt, ist ein Teil von ihr. Dadurch ähnelt sie ihr. Ohne diese Ähnlichkeit könnte die Sprache nichts in der Welt bezeichnen. Da die Sprache aus Elementarsätzen aufgebaut ist, muss die Welt folglich aus etwas den Elementarsätzen korrespondierendem – nämlich Sachverhalten – aufgebaut sein. Aus der Form der Sprache entnimmt er also Erkenntnis über die Form der Welt. Dem kann zweierlei entgegenhalten.

Erstens ist Sprache nicht zwingend ein Teil der Welt über die sie spricht, auch wenn dies Quine [Quine 2003] ebenso wie Wittgenstein behauptet. Z.B. wurde in *Der Herr*

der Ringe von Tolkien auf Englisch eine Welt beschrieben, in der es kein Englisch gibt. Die Sprache ist nicht Teil der Welt, die sie beschreibt, sondern der Welt, in der wir leben. Sie kommt nur zufällig in der Welt vor über die bisweilen gesprochen wird, weil wir dort vorkommen. Die Sprache ist nicht direkt an eine Welt geheftet, sondern an uns, weil es unsere Sprache ist. Die Sprache ist nicht dort, worüber, sondern dort, wo geredet wird.

Zweitens muss die Sprache nicht unbedingt den Atomismus mit der Welt gemeinsam haben. Der Aufbau von Idealsprachen mit Elementarsätzen oder atomaren Sätzen und Pixeln hat nichts mit der Beschaffenheit der Welt zu tun, sondern ist unserer beschränkten Fähigkeiten zu lesen und schreiben geschuldet. Die Sprache muss so beschaffen sein, dass wir sie sprechen und schreiben bzw. hören und lesen können. Was für den weißen Mann der Ruf eines Käuzchens ist, ist für die Indianer das Signal zum Angriff. Ein Stamm taubstummer Indianer täte jedoch dumme daran, den Käuzchenruf zum Angriffssignal zu bestimmen, weil er dieses Signal weder geben noch wahrnehmen könnte. Menschen und ihre Maschinen sind endlich und können nur endlich viele Wörter mit je endlich vielen Buchstaben in ihrem Leben lesen oder schreiben. Wörter, die z.B. zwischen je zwei Buchstaben einen dritten enthalten, wären für uns unleserlich, unschreibbar und deswegen unbrauchbar, so wie der Käuzchenruf es für taubstumme Indianer ist.

Die Aneinanderreihung von endlich langen Zeichenfolgen zwingt zu einfachsten Zeichen, deren Teile selbst keine Zeichen mehr sind. Folglich enthält jede für den Menschen les- und schreibbare Sprache nur abzählbar unendlich viele verschiedene Ausdrücke. Um jeden Unterschied zwischen Dingen in der Welt festhalten zu können und jede Information über die Welt zu erfassen, bedarf es aber ebenso vieler verschiedener Zeichen wie Dinge in der Welt. Im besten Fall ist kein Ausdruck der Sprache leer, sondern die Beschreibung eines Dings in der Welt, die wir bewohnen. Wenn diese Welt nur abzählbar unendlich viele Dinge enthielte, wäre eine vollständige Beschreibung zwar für keinen Menschen machbar, aber zumindest mit seiner Sprache denkbar. Umfasst unsere Welt dagegen mehr Dinge, dann ist eine Beschreibung der Welt mit menschlichen Sprachen weder mach- noch denkbar. Eine vollständige Beschreibung ist also nicht eigentlich eine, bei der es nichts mehr über die Welt zu sagen gäbe, sondern eine, bei der unser Vorrat an Zeichen ausgeschöpft ist.

Man könnte Wittgenstein ein anthropomorphistisches Weltbild nachsagen. Der Elementarsatzaufbau der logischen Sprachen ist der Verfassung des Menschen und heute auch seiner Maschinen geschuldet. Er behauptet, die Welt hat sich auf strukturell gleiche Weise für den Menschen zurecht gemacht.

Die Speicher der Computer, denen sich die bereits erwähnten Mikro- und Teleskopiker bedienen, sind sämtlich endlich groß und Rechner sind auch endlich. Die Bremermann-Grenze zeigt das Ausmaß dieser Endlichkeit. [Bremermann 1967] Deswegen unterliegen die maschinenlesbaren Sprachen denselben Beschränkungen. Jede tatsächlich ausgeführte Beschreibung hat endlich viele Sätze oder Pixel. Demnach steht jeder brauchbare Beschreibung einer Mannigfaltigkeit gegenüber, die größer

als ihre eigene ist. Dadurch ist jede Beschreibung gezwungen, entweder viele Dinge gar nicht zu beschreiben. Oder aber sie fasst viele Dinge zu einem zusammen und beschreibt sie als zebrigen Komplex en bloc. Eine exakte Beschreibung der Welt, in der wir leben, ist also weder mit unseren Mitteln noch mit Hilfe von Maschinen nicht möglich.

Könnte man die Mittel ändern und das TND-Kriterium beseitigen? „Ziggy ist schwarz“ wäre dann entweder weder wahr noch falsch, oder gleich beides. Es ist ziemlich egal, was von beidem wir zulassen. In einer Pixelgrafik muss das Pixel, um einen dieser Fälle anzuzeigen, eine Signalfarbe erhalten. Wir hätten also schwarz, weiße und einige Signalpixel. Wäre Rot diese Signalfarbe, würden alle unsere Digitalkameras, seien sie in Mikroskopen, Teleskopen oder nur im Urlaubsgepäck, nur noch rote Bilder machen, denn alles, was diese Geräte aufnehmen, ist zebrig. Zudem müsste die Kamera, um ein Pixel als Abbild eines zebrigen Dings zu markieren, feststellen, dass es zebrig ist. Der Sensor dieser Kamera müsste deswegen für jedes Pixel des Bildes zwei Sensorelemente haben. Messen beide Verschiedenes, dann liegt Zebrigkeit vor. Damit hat das Bild maximal die halbe Auflösung des Sensors und ist unnötig grob.

Dass wir in der Lage sind, trotz des Zebra-blems einem Zebra sehr ähnliche Bilder zu erzeugen, zeigt, dass das Zebra-Problem nicht das Ende der Wissenschaft ist. Wir brauchen eine Strategie zum Umgang mit dem Zebra-Problem. Die Wissenschaftler, die Maschinen in der Forschung anwenden, werden diese Strategien oftmals richtig anwenden, jedoch ohne Sie und die Fehlerquellen vollständig und allgemein zu kennen. Hier ist weiterer Forschungsbedarf.

#### Widmung

Für Gunnar

#### Danksagung

The research was financed in the framework of the Program of Scientific Excellence of the Ministry of Education, Science and Culture of the Federal State of Mecklenburg-Vorpommern, Germany. Project Title: *Transformation of scientific knowledge in the life sciences: Our changing understanding of the living cell* (UR 08054)

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# Keim and *Bereitschaft*: Readiness and Embodiments

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On the ground of a remark Wittgenstein made in his *Remarks on the Philosophy of Psychology* on *Bereitschaft*, and discussing the readiness at stake in cognition defined by Varela as embodied, this contribution supports a plea for a better understanding of readiness in embodiment.

Bach y Rita's (1962) paradigmatic experience has emphasized the fact that skill is a must. For a blind person to experience "visual" content when using a camera that can stimulate points in the skin by electrically activated vibration, images formed with the camera made to correspond to patterns of skin stimulation, the individual must actively direct the camera. Varela's "preliminary formulation" of enaction, is drawn in two points: "(1) perception consists in perceptually guided action and (2) cognitive structures emerge from the recurrent sensorimotor patterns that enable action to be perceptually guided." (Varela et al., 1991)

Yet, the former paragraph that explains what is meant by the phrase *embodied action*, and justifies the use of both terms put together, synthesizes the intuition slowly unfolded by Varela from the very first lines of his book: as much as cognition is enacted, action is embodied. Because it is the case, he urged "for a sense of common ground between cognitive science and human experience" (*Ibid.*) that would reach a more satisfying and complete level of understanding of cognition. In studying embodied action, his intention was "to study cognition not as a recovery or projection" (*Ibid.*) but as such. When *embodied* is meant to highlight the dependance of cognition "upon the kinds of experience that come from having a body with various sensimotor capacities" (*Ibid.*), themselves "embedded in a more encompassing, biological, psychological, and cultural context" (*Ibid.*), action emphasizes the inseparability of the sensory and motor processes, perception and action, as well as their co-dependant evolution.

Attention paid to a change in description, such as the one blind persons coming to experience a content as "visual" through Bach y Rita's apparatus made, may sound familiar to Wittgenstein readers: alteration is described like a perception "quite as if the object had altered before my eyes" (Wittgenstein 1953). Ultimately, using "Varelian" terms, an evolution of both motor and sensory processes altogether is experienced in embodied action. Would at *the same time*, its expression be that of a new perception as much as of a perception been unchanged? If so, in setting forth the formulation of enactive approach, the evolutive feature of embodied action has been dismissed. Current models favor debates on skills, change blindness, filling-in of visual perception blind spot. Yet, I would like to open a possible approach of enaction thanks to the evolution embodiment is granted in embodied action that is, cognition.

In his *Remarks on the Philosophy of Psychology*, Wittgenstein writes: "It might be said that one experiences *readiness* for a particular group of thoughts. (The germ of them.)" It is often in terms of readiness that the codependency of sensory and motor capacities relation to context or environment are discussed. Contra Dennett, who

proposed the brain actively occurring "filling-in to make up for the absence of information at the blind spot" (Noë, 2001), region in the retina where there are no light sensitive receptors, Alva Noë argues for example "It is outrageous to suppose that it seems to us, naïve perceivers, as if there is filling-in at the blind spot. It is true that we take ourselves, even with one eye shut and our gaze fixed straight ahead, to be aware of the uniform expanse of the red wall." (*Ibid.*) The germ of the uniform expanse of the wall is, whatever the case, an experience of awareness, readiness. Be it the variations of its sensorimotor capacities – here: the fixation of the gaze, the eye shut – or context, environment, the experienced germ of lived cognition is the readiness experienced of embodiment itself, from which recurrent sensorimotor patterns enable the perceptually guided action enaction is.

To conclude, questioning the implications of readiness and accordingly enactive, such an open trend of attention to germs can be found in Hintikka's *Principles of Mathematics Revisited*, when the distinction is drawn between two epistemic statements, the former:

$K(\exists x)S[x]$

Depending only "on what is true in different worlds considered alone [...] enough to specify the semantics of *knowing that*, but not to compare different worlds" (Hintikka, 1996) compare embodiment's readiness to another, a germinating  $x$  for instance. The latter:

$K(\exists x/K)S[x]$

Depending "also on what counts as the same individual in different worlds [...]" specifying "the semantics of *knows+wh-* constructions needed to determine what counts as *knowledge of individuals*" (*Ibid.*).

Not fixed by what is true in each world taken alone, but related to a cross-world identity criteria, such a statement can also be understood as a means for the necessary reconciliation of embodied readiness and plurality or changes in embodiments and contexts, a theory of enaction that gets rid of embodied action simply makes the economy of.

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# Wittgenstein's Progress: From "Phenomenology" to "Grammar"

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It has been a half-century since the problem of Wittgenstein's phenomenology emerged<sup>1</sup>. However the early attempts at relating Wittgenstein to phenomenology were intermittent and unsatisfactory due to both the lack of documentary support, and that their main focus was on comparison and listing the literal similarities between Husserl and Wittgenstein. After the *Philosophische Bemerkungen* was published in 1964, Herbert Spiegelberg called attention to the significant fact of Wittgenstein's explicit use of the term "phenomenology" in the article in 1968 and its 1979 supplement. The puzzle of Wittgenstein's phenomenology, as Spiegelberg formulated this problem, gradually validates itself to be a real theme. The discussion of this topic has continued on and eventually mushroomed, along with the availability of other works and especially the publication of the *Big Typescript*.

## 1. Wittgenstein's Phenomenology

Wittgenstein always sees himself as a "logician" who takes care of the way we use language to describe immediate experience, which can only be grasped and understood by means of language; language functions as the ultimate *medium* through which we understand the world. The empirical aspect of experience is thus not of his concern.

According to the *Tractatus*, Logical syntax or "logical grammar" (Wittgenstein 1961 3.325) is the rule-system for the use of signs which lies hidden behind the surface of language and needs to be discovered by logical analysis. Ordinary language begets confusion, because it "disguises thought" (Wittgenstein 1961 4.002). Wittgenstein somehow maintained this position when he returned to philosophy in the 1920s:

*The idea is to express in an appropriate symbolism what in ordinary language leads to endless misunderstandings. That is to say, where ordinary language disguises logical structure, where it allows the formation of pseudo-propositions, where it uses one term in an infinity of different meanings, we must replace it by a symbolism which gives a clear picture of the logical structure, excludes pseudo-propositions, and uses its terms unambiguously* (Wittgenstein 1929 p. 163).

But Wittgenstein's mind has been changing rapidly during that time. Later in the *Big Typescript*, pages 437-528, entitled *Phänomenologie* and *Idealismus*, etc., contain the most occasions within which the terms "phenomenology" and "phenomenological" are employed. His conception of "phenomenology" lay in his belief about the possibility of establishing a "phenomenological or primary language" in favor of representing the immediately given phenomena. At the beginning he assumed that the language of physics might be more practical because of its greater simplicity. He soon gave up this idea and then conceived a type of phenomenological language, a language embodying no assumptions about the structure of the world and supposedly capable of expressing things that natural language cannot express. Nevertheless, his further exploration propelled him to acknowledge that any attempt to realize the representation of immediate experience would itself inevitably suffer from involving the expressions of physical lan-

guage, and thus undermine the independence of the "phenomenological language". This realization eventually led him to abandon the idea of "phenomenology". The destruction of phenomenology not only convinced Wittgenstein of the nonsense of "sense-data" but also drove him from the negation of ordinary language to the confirmation of "ordinary language is all right as it is" (Wittgenstein 1969 p. 28). Accordingly, the "logical syntax/grammar" in *Tractatus*, became problematic through the investigation of phenomenology.

Sometime around 1950/51 Wittgenstein asserted: "There is no such thing as phenomenology, but there are indeed phenomenological problems." (Wittgenstein 1977 I §53) This claim can be seen as his final verdict since he died on 29 April 1951. The problem here is the fact that Wittgenstein had never given a full, explicit account of what he means by his "phenomenology" or "phenomenological problems". Although the literal meaning of each single word is clear, the whole sentence is far from conspicuous to us.

Why is there no phenomenology but phenomenological problems? The answer depends on a proper understanding of this assertion. Generally speaking, a "why-question" may allude to different aspects, the answers to which can therefore be stated in several ways. Street lamps, for example, went out and one asks why. One is complaining when one wonders who is in charge of the lamp controlling or repairing; one is seeking a scientific causality or explanation when he wants to learn the mechanism behind it; One is simply enquiring a fact when one again wants to know if there was an electrical fault or it was the time to extinguish lights. "Philosophy is purely descriptive" (Wittgenstein 1968 p. 109), a synoptic view of what has led Wittgenstein's transition is not a causal explanation but a pure description. Wittgenstein's aphoristic style brings us difficulties to gain holistic view and immediate clarity, since he was traveling around and making sketches (Wittgenstein 1968 preface). Nevertheless, we probably want a systematic interpretation of Wittgenstein's unsystematic writings rather than an unsystematic interpretation of his unsystematic writings. A "geographic map" (in a Wittgensteinian sense) of the problem is needed here.

## 2. Phenomenology as Grammar

Some argue that Wittgenstein's phenomenology was not just a momentary lapse, but that the underlying method continued throughout all his later works as "grammar". Wittgenstein's writing concerning phenomenology and grammar during the period 1929-1933 tends to support this assumption (Wittgenstein 2000 pp. 295-323; Wittgenstein 2005 pp. 320e-345e; Wittgenstein 1975 pp. 51-3).

It seems to Wittgenstein that "phenomenology" has no fixed usage: He sometimes mentioned Goethe's concept of phenomenology, sometimes used it in a negative way, and sometimes made a positive use concerning his own account. It is nonetheless obscure for readers to understand Wittgenstein's use of "grammar", which apparently does not totally agree with the school grammars. Generally speaking, his phenomenology as grammar does

not deal with truth or falsity, but with the possibility of sense. Grammar "shows the possibility of constructing true or false propositions but not truth or falsehood of any particular proposition" (Wittgenstein 1980 p. 13). There is no way to acquire a better understanding of Wittgenstein's "grammar" without a full knowledge of his framework. Thereby the elucidation of "grammar" is temporarily suspended. The reasons why Wittgenstein replaced "phenomenology" with "grammar" take precedence. Compared with using "phenomenology", one may find the use of "grammar" beneficial for Wittgenstein in several ways:

#### A. Coherent

The idea of grammar draws on the fact that speaking a language is, among the other things, to engage in a rule-guided activity. Understanding a language involves mastery of techniques concerning the application of rules. This normativist concept of grammar is suitable within Wittgenstein's framework of philosophy. Philosophy is an activity (Wittgenstein 1961 4.112) aimed at clarification, not the discovery of facts. It is an activity of conceptual clarification of the intellectual entanglements with which our fellow men are liable to be obsessed. It is in this sense a set of therapies (Wittgenstein 1968 § 133) for diseases of the intellect, the nature of whose task is negative. Within philosophy there is no accumulated progress in the sense of natural science (Wittgenstein 1961 4.111). Achievement in philosophy is the eradication of conceptual confusion and dissolution of philosophical problems on the one hand, and a request for a survey of a segment of our grammar, for a perspicuous representation of a segment of our language on the other hand.

Similarly, what grammar normally does is to correct mistakes, place words in a certain order, and transform unintelligible sentences into intelligible ones, a task which is likewise negative. Grammatical capacity is again a passive one, for "correct use does not imply ability to make the rules explicit" (Wittgenstein 1980 p. 53). Just like the conceptual confusions, grammatical mistakes will not be removed once and for all.

#### B. Ordinary

Phenomenology, which is common in philosophy, has little use in ordinary language, to which "grammar" belongs. An ordinary word can be viewed as an instrument with multiple uses. Different types of glasses are designed to be used for different types of wine and liquor, whereas it is often difficult to customize an ordinary word to meet one specific purpose. Signs of ideal symbolism may be efficient; meanwhile we have got onto slippery ice where there is no friction enabling us to walk. An enclosure with a hole in it is still workable; "grammar" brings us back to the rough ground (Wittgenstein 1968 §§ 99, 107).

Nevertheless, the normative character of grammar guarantees that the use of an ordinary word is constant, significant though somewhat ambiguous. Wittgenstein compares language to a city with streets old and new, with decrepit sections and developing suburbs (Wittgenstein 1968 §18); "phenomenology" lies in new suburbs whereas "grammar" is located in the old quarter.

#### C. Non-empirical

Phenomenology, which is derived from the word "phenomenon", is misleading in that it suggests physical phenomena: "You have a new conception and interpret it as seeing a new object. You interpret a grammatical movement made by yourself as a quasi-physical phenomenon

which you are observing" (Wittgenstein 1968 §401). Traditional philosophy goes wrong by focusing the immediately given (auditory or visual) features of words, while paying no attention to their overall use (Wittgenstein 1968 §§ 10-14).

Grammar, on the contrary, deals with the conceptual configuration of language segments. This is because "essence is expressed in grammar"; grammar determines "what kind of object something is", since it specifies what can be meaningfully said about it – "Green is a color" is a grammatical proposition (Wittgenstein 1968 §§ 371-3). "Empirical investigations into the physical nature of an object or stuff X presuppose the grammar of 'X', since the latter determines what counts as X. The answer to the Socratic "What is X?" is given not by inspecting essences (abstract or mental objects), but by clarifying that meaning of 'X', which is given by the rules for the use of 'X' (PI §383)" (Glock p.153).

#### D. Flat

Wittgenstein distinguishes between the "depth grammar" and "surface grammar" of words (Wittgenstein 1968 § 664). The metaphor of depth is misleading, since it implies hierarchy. Grammatical investigations are not geological but geographical. There are no immanent grammatical propositions functioning as permanent criteria. Whether a sentence expresses a grammatical rule depends on its role within our linguistic practice. In other words, there is no such thing as a meta-linguistic statement determining how an expression is to be used.

"Grammar", other than "phenomenology", counteracts the suggestions that there would be such a thing as meta-philosophy or second-order philosophy. A ruler is used to measure, meanwhile itself has a length (see also Wittgenstein 1968 §50). "One might think: if philosophy speaks of the use of the word 'philosophy' there must be a second-order philosophy. But it is not so: it is, rather, like the case of orthography, which deals with the word 'orthography' among others without then being second-order." (Wittgenstein 1968 §121)

### 3. Phenomenological Interpretations

In 1930 Wittgenstein once told a friend: "You could say of my work that it is 'phenomenology'" (Drury 1981 p. 131), which is in sharp contrast to the assertion that "There is no such thing as phenomenology, but there are indeed phenomenological problems". This challenges us with the question of whether it makes any sense at all to consider Wittgenstein a phenomenologist.

The latest way of treating the puzzle is to conduct a phenomenological interpretation of the middle and later Wittgenstein. That is, if investigating phenomenology is to shed light on the philosophical problems from a perspective involving conventions, culture, history, etc., later Wittgenstein was then no more than practicing "phenomenology", irrespective of whether Wittgenstein himself admitted it or not. Indeed, what Wittgenstein was concerned with was philosophy rather than philosophical labels. Accordingly, it was simply a conventional, therefore less significantly philosophical, reason for Wittgenstein to abandon the term "phenomenology".

It might be illuminating to make such an interpretation of Wittgenstein's philosophy by the identification of phenomenology and grammar. While in philosophy "doing the right things" precedes "doing things right". I do not sympathize with the idea that Wittgenstein's middle period

comprises a significant juncture, when Wittgenstein was trying to formulate a doctrine that can be characterized as "phenomenology". At the same time, it is simply inappropriate to ignore Wittgenstein's own words referring to "phenomenology".

Theoretically, the argument of phenomenological interpretation has presupposed that Wittgenstein's later work hardly can be identified with phenomenology in the strictest sense. We can not make, for instance, a phenomenological interpretation of Husserl's work. We are directly reading phenomenology when reading Husserl. Further, though the Husserlian work differs with not only Wittgensteinian but also Heideggerian, the contrast between Husserl and Heidegger is different from that between Husserl and Wittgenstein.

If we keep in mind that Wittgenstein's disagreeable attitude to the fact that people attributed logical positivism to him and associated him with the Vienna Circle, we see he probably would not be happy with being considered as one of the phenomenologists; neither would he accept any labeling of any of his ideas.

#### Endnotes

<sup>1</sup> C. A. van Peursen was presumably the first researcher who set out to articulate this theme, apart from some relevant remarks made by others before. (Van Peursen 1959)

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# Between writing and picturing: The square of opposition in formal logic and formal axiology of alethic and deontic modalities

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From some point of view, the famous "Square of Opposition" in the formal logic has nothing to do with squares and other geometrical objects which can be pictured, shown and seen. All the rational formal logic contents of the "Square of Opposition" could be written, read, said and understood without any picturing and showing. The well-known picture is really useful only in mnemonic relation: the scheme supports the mimesis. Assuming this abstract-language-form viewpoint in the present paper, and using the hypothetic-deductive method, below I develop the mentioned assumption (hypothesis) with respect to one particular case, namely, in relation to alethic and deontic modality interpretations of the "Square". According to the hypothesis under examination, all the formal rules making up the rational contents of the "Square" are to be adequately formulated and expressed in a written language without picturing.

Which language is implied above: the artificial or natural one? According to Wittgenstein both language types entail problems. I agree with Wittgenstein and hence before attacking the specific topic of this paper it is worth making some remarks concerning linguistic philosophy. The paper submits quite a new idea of mathematical philosophy of formal semantics of natural languages. I think that it is not adequate completely to reduce the formal semantics of natural languages to their formal logic one dealing with descriptive-indicative meanings. In complement to the formal logic semantics there is a formal axiological one dealing with evaluative meanings – moral-legal evaluation-functions (Lobovikov 2007; 2009a; 2009b). However, mathematical philosophy of formal logic semantics is our starting point. Moving towards a formal axiological semantics one has to depart from the formal logic one. According to the history of philosophy, originally just formal logic generated the precedent of mathematical philosophy. This historical fact was necessary because at first only logic was recognized as formal one. All the rest philosophical disciplines were considered as material ones on principle. However, today the situation is significantly changed. Contemporary information technologies require a substantially new paradigm of philosophizing. A kind of digital philosophy is required. In this respect it is worth inventing and elaborating a digital simulation of metaphysics and ethics (a mathematical representation of morals). Nowadays, in spite of the pessimistic beliefs and expectations, the mathematical philosophy of morals (symbolic ethics) is naturally emerging from the contemporary symbolic logic – the mathematical philosophy of thought. This is so because, according to prominent logicians and philosophers Charles Sanders Peirce, Jan Łukasiewicz and Frank Ramsay, "logic is nothing but morals of thinking". Thinking is a particular case (kind) of human acting. Hence algebraic system of thoughts is a subsystem of an algebraic system of acts. The "true" is a particular case of the "good". The "false" is a particular case of the "bad". Starting from this heuristically important basis in present paper I construct and investigate a discrete mathematical representation of the rigorist ("black-and-white") system of

formal ethics. Thus I prove that, in principle, there is a possibility to go from machine simulation of formal logic of human thinking to machine simulation of formal ethics of human conduct (Lobovikov 2009a).

The possibility of machine simulation of human moral-legal conduct is demonstrated by the basic mathematical ethics – two-valued algebra of good and evil. This algebra is based upon the set of acts. By definition, acts are such and only such operations, which are either good, or bad ones. Algebraic operations defined on the set of acts are moral-legal evaluation functions. Variables of these functions take their values from the set  $\{g, b\}$ . The functions take their values from the same set. Symbols  $g$  and  $b$  stand for moral-legal values of acts "good" and "bad" respectively. The symbols:  $x$  and  $y$  stand for moral-legal forms of acts. Elementary moral-legal act forms – independent variables. Compound moral-legal act forms – moral-legal evaluation functions of these variables. In the two-valued algebra there are 16 mathematically different binary operations defined by tables 1 and 2 (see Appendix).

The symbol  $Kxy$  stands for the moral-legal operation "combining (uniting)  $x$  and  $y$  (in the conduct as a whole)".  $Sxy$  – moral-legal operation "separating  $x$  and  $y$ ".  $Axy$  – "non-excluding choice of the best among the acts made up by  $x$  and  $y$ ".  $Wxy$  – "abstaining from both  $x$  and  $y$ ".  $Uxy$  – "excluding choice of the best between the acts  $x$  and  $y$ ".  $Txy$  – "identifying  $x$  and  $y$ ".  $Hxy$  – "offensive, attack, assault of  $y$  on (against)  $x$ ".  $Dxy$  – "defending  $x$  from (against)  $y$ ". Symbol  $Cxy$  stands for the moral-legal operation "doing  $y$  in response to  $x$ ".  $Vxy$  – "counter-offensive (counter-attack) of  $x$  on  $y$ ".  $Lxy$  – "independence (freedom) of  $x$  from  $y$ ".  $Qxy$  – "independence (freedom) of  $y$  from  $x$ ".  $Fxy$  – "independence of destruction (termination) of  $x$  from  $y$ ".  $Ixy$  – "independence of destruction (termination) of  $y$  from  $x$ ".  $Gxy$  – identically (constantly) good moral-legal form. (This kind of forms represents immutable universal laws of morals, which are common for all times and peoples).  $Zxy$  – identically (constantly) bad moral-legal form. (It represents moral-legal evaluation forms of violating immutable universal laws of morals).

Below some unary moral-legal operations of algebra of ethics are considered. Symbol  $Ex$  stands for "consolidation, unity of  $x$ ".  $Rx$  – "division (split) of  $x$ ".  $Bx$  – "abstaining from  $x$ ".  $Yx$  – "independence (freedom) of  $x$ ".  $Jx$  – "destruction (termination) of  $x$ ".  $Xx$  – "violence against  $x$ ".  $Px$  – "punishment (retribution) for  $x$ ".  $Mx$  – "encouragement (award) for  $x$ ".  $Nx$  – "non-existence (non-being) of  $x$ ".  $Ox$  – "blame for  $x$ ".  $A:x$  – "approval of  $x$ ".  $I:x$  – "(moral-legal) indifference to  $x$ ", i.e., "unprincipled attitude to  $x$ ".  $P:x$  – "principled attitude to  $x$ ", i.e., "adherence to (moral-legal) principles in relation to  $x$ ". The evaluation-functional sense of these operations is defined by table 3 (see Appendix).

In algebra of formal ethics the equivalence relation is defined as follows. Moral-legal act forms  $x$  and  $y$  are formally-ethically equivalent (this is represented by



the symbol " $x=+=y$ ", if and only if they acquire identical moral-legal values (from the set  $\{g, b\}$ ) under any possible combination of moral-legal values of the variables. By means of the above-given definitions one can obtain interesting equations: 1)  $Ex=+=Kxx$ . 2)  $Rx=+=Jx$ . 3)  $Ix=+=BAxBx$ . 4)  $Rx=+=Sxx$ . 5)  $Px=+=Xx$ . 6)  $Ix=+=KOxMx$ . 7)  $Bx=+=Wxx$ . 8)  $Px=+=Cxb$ . 9)  $Ix=+=KAxPx$ . 10)  $Yx=+=Lxy$ . 11)  $Mx=+=BPx$ . 12)  $Nxx=+=XXx$ . 13)  $Jx=+=Fxy$ . 14)  $Mx=+=HBxg$ . 15)  $Px=+=AxBx$ . This list is open.

Taking the above considerations seriously, it is easy to see that there is a fundamental interconnection between algebra of logic and algebra of ethics. From the two-valued ethics viewpoint, there is a metaphysical unity of the "true" and the "good" acts: true is good (but, generally speaking, the converse statement is false). And also the similar (analogous) type of unity exists between the "false" and the "bad": lie is evil (but, generally speaking, the converse statement is false). Consequently, from the two-valued ethics viewpoint, the truth-tables of Boolean algebra of logic are particular cases of corresponding moral-legal evaluation tables of two-valued algebra of the rigorist formal ethics. This is because thought activity studied by logic is a particular case of activity (in general) studied by ethics (in its own specific relation).

In the present paper I discuss a specific theme of formal ethics as generalization of formal logic, namely, "a square of opposition of moral-legal evaluation functions in formal ethics" as the formal-axiological generalization of the square of opposition in formal logic. Moreover in the given paper I have restricted my investigation to alethic and deontic interpretations of the system of formal rules called "Square of Opposition". Let us start investigating such a severely reduced paper domain by dealing with its part – the alethic-modality interpretation. For doing this, in the given paper departing from the modalities of thought to modalities of activity in general, I submit a novel modal interpretation of the "square of opposition" by means of treating the alethic modalities "necessity", "possibility", "impossibility", "being avoidable" and "contingency" as *moral-legal evaluation functions determined by two variables* (Lobovikov 2007). As in the two-valued algebra of formal axiology there are 16 mathematically different binary operations (defined by moral-legal evaluation-tables in (Lobovikov 2009a; 2009b)), all the *alethic-modality-making* operations considered as *binary moral-legal evaluation-functions* are among the 16. Let us introduce and define the *alethic-modality-making* operations as moral-legal evaluation-functions by means of the below glossary.

*The glossary for the following table A:* The symbol  $L^{\ast}xy$  stands for the moral-legal evaluation function "making  $y$  necessary for  $x$ ". The symbol  $M^{\ast}xy$  stands for "making  $y$  possible for  $x$ ".  $S^{\ast}xy$  stands for "making  $y$  impossible for  $x$ ".  $U^{\ast}xy$  – "making  $y$  avoidable (not-necessary) for  $x$ ".  $A^{\ast}xy$  – "making  $y$  accidental for  $x$ ".  $D^{\ast}xy$  – "y's being *alethically determined (alethically not-neutral)* for  $x$ ".  $V^{\ast}xy$  stands for "y's violence to (against)  $x$ ". The above-mentioned moral-legal evaluation-functions are precisely defined by table A (see Appendix).

Using the above-given definitions, it is easy to demonstrate the following.

(16) The *subordination* between "necessary" and "possible" exists: the moral-legal function  $CL^{\ast}xyM^{\ast}xy$  is *formally-axiologically (constantly) good* one, but  $CM^{\ast}xyL^{\ast}xy$  is not.

(17) The *subordination* between "impossible" and "avoidable" exists: the moral-legal function  $CS^{\ast}xyU^{\ast}xy$  is

*formally-axiologically (constantly) good* one, but  $CU^{\ast}xyS^{\ast}xy$  is not.

(18) The *opposition* (contradictoriness) between "necessary" and "avoidable" exists: the moral-legal functions  $NTL^{\ast}xyU^{\ast}xy$ ,  $UL^{\ast}xyU^{\ast}xy$ ,  $AL^{\ast}xyU^{\ast}xy$  are *formally-axiologically (constantly) good* ones.

(19) The *opposition* (contradictoriness) between "impossible" and "possible" exists: the moral-legal functions  $NTS^{\ast}xyM^{\ast}xy$ ,  $US^{\ast}xyM^{\ast}xy$ ,  $AS^{\ast}xyM^{\ast}xy$  are *formally-axiologically (constantly) good* ones.

20) The *contrariness* between "necessary" and "impossible" exists: the moral-legal function  $NKL^{\ast}xyS^{\ast}xy$  is *formally-axiologically (constantly) good* one.

21) The *sub-contrariness* between "possible" and "avoidable" exists: the moral-legal functions  $NKNM^{\ast}xyNU^{\ast}xy$ ,  $AM^{\ast}xyU^{\ast}xy$  are *formally-axiologically (constantly) good* ones.

The above statements (16-21) make up "the alethic interpretation" of the system of formal rules called "Square of Opposition". But it is very interesting that the statements (16-21) are *formal-axiological* ones. This is in accordance with the main idea of the present article.

Taking into an account that in the given paper I have limited (reduced) my investigation to alethic and deontic interpretations of the so-called Square of Opposition, let us begin investigating the second part of this severely reduced domain – the *deontic* interpretation of the "Square". As in the given paper I depart from the modalities of thought to modalities of activity in general, below I submit a novel modal interpretation of the "square of opposition" by means of treating the deontic modalities "obligatory", "permitted", "forbidden", "facultative" and "deontically indifferent (normatively not-regulated)" as *moral-legal evaluation functions determined by two variables* (Lobovikov 2007). As in the two-valued algebra of formal axiology there are 16 mathematically different binary operations [defined by moral-legal evaluation-tables in (Lobovikov 2009a; 2009b)], all the *deontic-modality-making* operations considered as *binary moral-legal evaluation-functions* are among the 16. Let us introduce and define the *deontic-modality-making* operations as moral-legal evaluation-functions by means of the below glossary and evaluation-table.

*The glossary for table B (see Appendix):* Below the symbol  $O^{\ast}xy$  stands for the moral-legal evaluation function "making  $y$  obligatory for  $x$ ". The symbol  $P^{\ast}xy$  stands for "making  $y$  permitted for  $x$ ".  $F^{\ast}xy$  stands for "making  $y$  forbidden for  $x$ ".  $Y^{\ast}xy$  – "making  $y$  facultative (not-obligatory) for  $x$ ".  $\#^{\ast}xy$  – "making  $y$  *deontically neutral (normatively indifferent)* for  $x$ ".  $R^{\ast}xy$  – "y's being *normatively regulated (deontically not-neutral), principled* for  $x$ ".  $V^{\ast}xy$  stands for "y's violence to (against)  $x$ ". The above-mentioned moral-legal evaluation-functions are precisely defined by the following table 2.

By means of the above definitions, it is possible to substantiate the following statements.

(22) The *subordination* between "obligatory" and "permitted" exists: the moral-legal function  $CO^{\ast}xyP^{\ast}xy$  is *formally-axiologically (constantly) good* one, but  $CP^{\ast}xyO^{\ast}xy$  is not.

(23) The *subordination* between "forbidden" and "facultative" exists: the moral-legal function  $CF^{\ast}xyY^{\ast}xy$  is *formally-axiologically (constantly) good* one, but  $CY^{\ast}xyF^{\ast}xy$  is not.

(24) The *opposition* (contradictoriness) between “obligatory” and “facultative” exists: the moral-legal functions  $NTO^{\circ}xyY^{\circ}xy$ ,  $UO^{\circ}xyY^{\circ}xy$ ,  $AO^{\circ}xyY^{\circ}xy$  are *formally-axiologically (constantly) good ones*.

(25) The *opposition* (contradictoriness) between “forbidden” and “permitted” exists: the moral-legal functions  $NTF^{\circ}xyP^{\circ}xy$ ,  $UF^{\circ}xyP^{\circ}xy$ ,  $AF^{\circ}xyP^{\circ}xy$  are *formally-axiologically (constantly) good ones*.

26) The *contrariness* between “obligatory” and “forbidden” exists: the moral-legal function  $NKO^{\circ}xyF^{\circ}xy$  is *formally-axiologically (constantly) good one*.

27) The *sub-contrariness* between “permitted” and “facultative” exists: the moral-legal functions  $NKNP^{\circ}xyNY^{\circ}xy$ ,

$AP^{\circ}xyY^{\circ}xy$  are *formally-axiologically (constantly) good ones*.

The above statements (22-27) make up “the deontic interpretation” of the system of formal rules called “Square of Opposition”. But it is very interesting that the statements (22-27) are *formal-axiological ones*. Thus the system of formal-axiological statements about the deontic modalities of activity is necessary and sufficient for strict formulation of the system of formal rules called “Square of Opposition (of the deontic modalities)”. Hence drawing the picture of square is excessive. However the picture of square is very useful for quick and effective memorizing and remembering the formal rules. The square is psychologically significant for mimesis and hence pedagogically important for knowledge-organizing.

**Appendix**

Table 1. Binary operations

x	y	Kxy	Sxy	Axy	Wxy	Uxy	Txy	Hxy	Dxy
g	g	g	b	g	b	b	g	b	g
g	b	b	g	g	b	g	b	b	g
b	g	b	g	g	b	g	b	g	b
b	b	b	g	b	g	b	g	b	g

Table 2. Binary operations

x	y	Cxy	Vxy	Lxy	Qxy	Fxy	Ixy	Gxy	Zxy
g	g	g	b	g	g	b	b	g	b
g	b	b	g	g	b	b	g	g	b
b	g	g	b	b	g	g	b	g	b
b	b	g	b	b	b	g	g	g	b

Table 3. Unary operations

x	Ex	Rx	Bx	Yx	Jx	Xx	Px	Mx	Nx	Ox	A <sup>1</sup> x	I <sup>1</sup> x	P <sup>1</sup> x
g	g	b	b	g	b	b	b	g	b	b	g	b	g
b	b	g	g	b	g	g	g	b	g	g	b	b	g

Table A: *Alethic-modality-making operations* as moral-legal evaluation-functions determined by two variables

x	y	L <sup>A</sup> xy	M <sup>A</sup> xy	S <sup>A</sup> xy	U <sup>A</sup> xy	A <sup>A</sup> xy	D <sup>A</sup> xy	V <sup>A</sup> xy
g	g	b	g	b	g	g	b	b
g	b	b	g	b	g	g	b	b
b	g	g	g	b	b	b	g	g
b	b	b	b	g	g	b	g	b

Table B: *Daeontic-modality-making operations* as moral-legal evaluation-functions determined by two variables

x	y	O <sup>D</sup> xy	P <sup>D</sup> xy	F <sup>D</sup> xy	Y <sup>D</sup> xy	I <sup>D</sup> xy	R <sup>D</sup> xy	V <sup>D</sup> xy
g	g	b	g	b	g	g	b	b
g	b	b	g	b	g	g	b	b
b	g	g	g	b	b	b	g	g
b	b	b	b	g	g	b	g	b

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# Das Kunstwerk als Aspekt der Kultur

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Wie kann man eigene Gefühle beschreiben, um sie jemandem zu übertragen? Für einige Gefühle gibt es eine charakteristische Ausdruckweise, sei sie eine sprachliche oder eine physiognomische. Es gibt jedoch Gefühle, welche so sonderbar sind, dass ihnen keine konventionellen Bezeichnungen zugeordnet werden können und auch kein charakteristisches Benehmen entspricht. Tolstoi war der Meinung, die Kunst sei das Mittel, um besondere oder wertvolle Gefühle zu kommunizieren. Eine solche Kommunikation könnte sich wie folgt abspielen: Der Künstler hat Gefühle, die er jemandem – seinem Publikum – übertragen möchte. Um dies zu erreichen, schafft er ein bestimmtes Kunstwerk. Daraufhin nimmt der Rezipient das Kunstwerk wahr, und dadurch, dass er es schön findet, entstehen bei ihm dieselben Gefühle, welche den Künstler zum Schaffen anregen. Für gängige Gefühle wie Furcht, Hunger oder Lust gibt es sprachliche Ausdrücke; wenn ein Gefühl komplexer oder seltener ist wie etwa Liebe, Vergleichen oder Angst vor dem Tod, muss man *künstlerisches* Talent einsetzen und sich Mühe geben, um es mitteilen zu können. Nach dieser Auffassung ist die Kunst der Sprache ähnlich, nur statt Gedanken werden komplexe Gefühle kommuniziert. Diese Theorie der Kunst ist intuitiv überzeugend und besonders unter theoretisierenden Künstlern so verbreitet, dass in ihr ein Körnchen Wahrheit stecken muss.

Ein ausschlaggebendes Argument gegen diese Auffassung stammt von Frege (1892, 29ff.). Subjektive Vorstellungen, zu denen auch Gefühle zu zählen sind, können verglichen werden nur, sofern sie in einem Bewusstsein verbunden vorkommen. Gefühle verschiedener Menschen sind es jedoch nicht, und daher ist jede Behauptung ihrer Identität oder Nichtidentität sinnlos. Frege glaubte trotzdem, subjektive Vorstellungen („Färbungen und Beleuchtungen“) seien die Basis der Kunst, und der Leser oder Hörer müsse „sie sich selbst nach den Winken des Dichters oder Redners hinzuschaffen“ (1892, 31). Die Kunst ist demnach keine Kommunikation, weil die kommunikative Absicht des Künstlers nie genau ermittelt werden kann. Philosophie der Kunst war für Frege kein wichtiges Thema, und er skizzierte diese Bemerkungen nur in groben Zügen, um sich von diesem Bereich abzugrenzen. An Freges Auffassung der Kunst lastet nämlich eine gewisse Spannung: Vorstellungen einerseits gehören nicht zum Gedanken und können so nicht kommuniziert werden, andererseits können doch durch „Winke“ in der Kunst teilweise mitgeteilt werden.

Nun möchte ich argumentieren, dass die Auffassung der Kunst bei dem späten Wittgenstein sich in diesem Rahmen bewegt und in der Aufhebung dieser Spannung besteht. Es muss geklärt werden, welche Rolle „Färbungen und Beleuchtungen“ spielen und wie die „Winke“ des Künstlers zu verstehen ist. Wittgensteins Verständnis der Kunst wird besser zu begreifen sein, wenn man es sieht als Fortsetzung dieser Überlegungen von Tolstoi und Frege, mit denen er vertraut war. Der Anknüpfungspunkt an Tolstoi besteht in dieser Bemerkung:

Aus Tolstois schlechtem Theoretisieren, das Kunstwerk übertrage ›ein Gefühl‹, könnte man *viel* lernen. – Und doch könnte man es, wenn nicht den Ausdruck eines Gefühls, einen Gefühlsausdruck nennen, oder einen gefühl-

ten Ausdruck. Und man könnte auch sagen, daß die Menschen, die ihn verstehen, gleichermaßen zu ihm ›schwimmen‹, auf ihn antworten. Man könnte sagen: Das Kunstwerk will nicht *etwas anderes* übertragen, sondern sich selbst. [...] (VB, 533, 1947)

Aus dieser Formulierung lassen sich mehrere Züge von Wittgensteins Ästhetik ablesen. Erstens, das Kunstwerk bezeichnet kein Gefühl, sondern ist sein Ausdruck. Auch Lachen ist ein Ausdruck von Freude oder düsteres Gesicht ein Ausdruck von Kummer (vgl. V&G I.10). Zweitens, es sind menschliche Reaktionen auf das Kunstwerk, worum es geht. Wenn hier von einer Gleichheit oder Identität die Rede sein kann, so handelt es sich um die Identität von Reaktionen auf das Kunstwerk, nicht um die Identität von Gemütszuständen. Oder anders formuliert: Dass Menschen das Kunstwerk verstehen, zeigt sich, indem sie auf eine bestimmte Art und Weise reagieren. In diesem Sinne kann man sagen, sie reagieren *richtig*. Der Begriff der ästhetischen Richtigkeit ist ohne Frage zentral in Wittgensteins Ästhetik. Unter dieser Richtigkeit kann man jedoch zweierlei verstehen. Entweder ist es eine *immanente* Richtigkeit innerhalb des Kunstwerks<sup>1</sup> oder eine *transzendente* Richtigkeit einer ästhetischen Reaktion auf das Kunstwerk (vgl. V&G II.10). Ein Kunstwerk ist richtig oder korrekt, wenn er gängigen ästhetischen Regeln (z. B. Harmonie, Komposition, ideale Proportionen) gerecht wird. Solche Regeln gewährleisten die Einheit des Kunstwerks.<sup>2</sup> Nun, diese immanente Richtigkeit beeinflusst die Richtigkeit einer ästhetischen Reaktion, wobei diese sich jedoch auf jene nicht zurückführen lässt. Das äußerst komplizierte Verhältnis der beiden möchte ich im Weiteren untersuchen.

Die ästhetische Reaktion beschränkt sich nicht auf die Prädikate „schön“ und „hässlich“, welche Wittgenstein eher als Interjektionen versteht (V&G I.9). Es handelt sich um ein komplexes Sprachspiel, das außersprachliche Aktivität<sup>3</sup> einbezieht. Ferner sagt Wittgenstein, dass zu diesem Sprachspiel die ganze Kultur einer Epoche gehört (V&G I.26; Z §164). Eine richtige ästhetische Reaktion auf ein Kunstwerk zustande zu bringen, setzt voraus, mit der (aktuellen) Kultur vertraut zu sein. Der Ausdruck „Kultur“ wird hier erstmal ganz lose gebraucht; es muss noch untersucht werden, wie ein ästhetisches Urteil in ihr verstrickt ist. Kultur kann man verstehen als Netz von Zusammenhängen. Das Kunstwerk passt aufgrund seiner immanenten Richtigkeit in dieses Netz hinein, und ein ästhetisches Urteil bringt dieses Passen zum Ausdruck.<sup>4</sup>

Unter den Begriffen „zusammenhängen“ oder „zusammenpassen“ kann man ebenso mancherlei verstehen; alles hängt mit allem irgendwie zusammen. Aber Wittgenstein wendet viel Mühe auf, um diese Art von Zusammenhängen zu verdeutlichen. In V&G macht er einen Unterschied zwischen der Ursache und dem Motiv oder Grund: „Für das ästhetische Unbehagen gibt es ein ‚Warum‘ und nicht eine ‚Ursache‘.“<sup>5</sup> Den Begriff „Ursache“ behält Wittgenstein nur der kausalen Ursache vor und argumentiert, dass eine ästhetische Erklärung keine kausale sein kann (V&G II.38). Wenn man nach einer kausalen Erklärung suchte, so müsste das menschliche Gemüt als Mechanismus (oder „Super-Mechanismus“) aufgefasst werden, denn der Begriff der Ursache hat seinen Platz nur inner-

halb eines Mechanismus. Dies mag zwar gelingen, aber würde dennoch nicht ästhetische Reaktionen erklären. Eine solche physikalische Erklärung beschreibt nur Begleitphänomene („concomitance“, V&G II.31) und würde Ästhetik auf Psychologie reduzieren.

Wir müssen nach einem Grund suchen, und das bedeutet, eine „grammatikalische“ Untersuchung anzustellen, deren Resultat eine Feststellung grammatikalischer Verwandtschaft (Z §437) zwischen dem Kunstwerk und einer ästhetischen Reaktion sein sollte. Zwei Phänomene können also kausal verbunden sein oder unabhängig davon auch eine (innere) Verwandtschaft haben oder – anders ausgedrückt – *zusammenpassen* (siehe LS §75). Der Begriff des Zusammenpassens spielt eine wichtige Rolle in Wittgensteins Philosophie der Psychologie, und ich möchte argumentieren, dass er der Unterschied zwischen der Kausalität und dem Zusammenpassen der zwischen der *externen* und der *internen Relation* ist.

Mit dem Begriff des Zusammenpassens beabsichtigt Wittgenstein hauptsächlich, einen Gegensatz zu dem Begriff der psychologischen Assoziation auszubauen.<sup>6</sup> (Psychologische) Assoziation ist kausal (also extern), Zusammenpassen hingegen formal (somit intern) zu verstehen. Dass zwei Phänomene zusammenpassen, erklärt Wittgenstein an zahlreichen Beispielen: der Name Schubert passt zu seinen Werken (PU, 555), Beethovens Gesicht passt zu seiner Neunten Symphonie (BPP I, §338), das Wort „Goethe“ passt zu seiner „Atmosphäre“ und zur braun-gelben Farbe (Ms 131, 149), mein altbekanntes Möbelstück passt in mein Zimmer hinein (BPP I, §339) oder jeder Fleck passt in seine Umgebung (PU §216). Man muss sich im Klaren darüber sein, dass diese Zusammenhänge keine psychologischen (somit kausalen) Assoziationen darstellen, obwohl auch solche zwischen den Phänomenen vorhanden sein können.<sup>7</sup> Joachim Schulte (1990, 84) gleicht dies der Situation an, wenn mehrere Einzelstücke eines *Puzzles* zusammenpassen und ein Ganzes bilden. Die Pointe dessen, dass zwei Dinge zusammenpassen und somit intern verbunden sind, besteht darin, dass sie ein solides Ganzes bilden (BPP I, §341).

Wir untersuchen immer die Natur der ästhetischen Reaktion auf das Kunstwerk. Sie müssen zusammenpassen oder zwischen den beiden muss eine interne Relation bestehen. Nun diese Reaktion braucht nicht eine verbale zu sein, sie mag eine Gebärde sein oder sogar ein anderes Kunstwerk sein – etwa wie man eine passende Musik zu einem Gedicht findet oder mit einem Tanzschritt auf eine Melodie antwortet.<sup>8</sup>

Nun erhebt sich die Frage, wie man eine richtige ästhetische Reaktion identifiziert und erkennt, oder anders formuliert, wie man ein zusammenpassendes Phänomen findet. Die Antwort lässt sich aus Wittgensteins Auffassung des Aspektsehens herleiten. Die Wortverbindung „etwas als etwas anderes sehen (oder hören)“ benutzt man häufig in der Kunst (Z §208), z. B. „Du mußt diese Takte als Einleitung hören.“ (*ibid.*) Das Aspektsehen, bzw. die Möglichkeit eines Aspektwechsels befindet Wittgenstein sogar als wesentlich für die Ästhetik (LS §634). Die Begriffe des Sehens-als und des Zusammenpassens sind eng verwandt. Wenn etwas als etwas anderes gesehen wird, dann passen sie zusammen.<sup>9</sup> Ein Phänomen wird jedoch nicht ständig als ein anderes gesehen. Der Aspekt muss aufleuchten, und in diesem Aufleuchten des Aspekts nimmt man eine interne Relation wahr (PU II, 549 oder LS §506). Die Richtigkeit einer ästhetischen Reaktion wird also im Aufleuchten des Aspekts und im damit verbundenen Stauen bestätigt (PU II, 528). In einer ästhetischen Reaktion wird ein Aspekt des Kunstwerks ausgedrückt.

Diese Beschaffenheit der ästhetischen Reaktion ermöglicht uns, den Zusammenhang der immanenten und der transzendenten Richtigkeit zu erörtern. Im Aspektsehen wird das Gesehene *organisiert*. „Im Aspekt bemerke ich einen Zug der Organisation.“ (LS §515). Ein Phänomen zu organisieren heißt, dass seine Teile auf eine bestimmte Art und Weise – d. h. *richtig* – zusammenpassen. Hier geht es jedoch um das (immanente) Zusammenpassen von Teilen des Kunstwerks, das eine Basis für das (transzendente) Zusammenpassen zwischen dem Kunstwerk und einer ästhetischen Reaktion bildet. Eine ästhetische Reaktion ist insofern richtig, als sie einen Aspekt des Kunstwerks ausmacht.<sup>10</sup>

Dass zwischen zwei Phänomenen – zwei Kunstwerken – eine interne Relation besteht, bedeutet, dass sie Teile eines Ganzen darstellen. Sie werden zu einem Gesamtkunstwerk, möchte man beinahe sagen. Auf ein Kunstwerk kann man jedoch verschiedenartig reagieren, es kann mit vielen diversen Phänomenen intern verbunden werden. Diese Reaktion kann ganz einfach („Das ist herrlich!“) oder auch ziemlich kompliziert sein; sie kann etwa eine tiefe Verwandtschaft zwischen zwei Künstlern – z. B. zwischen Brahms und Keller ausdrücken (Ms 183, 59 oder V&G, S. 50). Ein Netz solcher Zusammenhänge und menschlicher Reaktionen nennt Wittgenstein die *Kultur*. Sie ist das ganze Kunstwerk und ausschließlich sie als Ganzes schreibt sich selbst Regeln vor. Ein Objekt wird zum Kunstwerk nur, insofern es ein Aspekt der Kultur ist.<sup>11</sup> Damit wird freilich nicht behauptet, dass ein Kunstwerk allen herkömmlichen Regeln gerecht werden muss, sondern dass sie ästhetische Reaktionen beeinflussen (vgl. hierzu V&G I.16).

Schließlich möchte ich noch andeuten, wie sich die Kultur verwandeln kann. Wittgenstein räumt ein, es gebe Kunstwerke, die nicht nach ihrer Richtigkeit beurteilt werden können: „Wenn wir über eine Symphonie von Beethoven sprechen, reden wir nicht von Richtigkeit. [...] Man würde nicht sagen, daß man die *gewaltigen* Dinge in der Kunst schätzt.“ (V&G I.23) Solche Werke kann man nach geläufigen Regeln beurteilen, dies ist jedoch nicht der Grund für ihre außergewöhnliche Stellung. Sie werden „gewaltig“ genannt, weil sie die herrschende Kultur so geändert haben, dass andere Werke an ihnen gemessen werden. Impressionistische Gemälde sind zunächst abschätzig beurteilt werden, denn sie waren damaligen akademischen Regeln nicht gerecht. Es hat jedoch nicht einmal eine Generation gedauert, und sie wurden zum Kanon nachfolgender Kunstbewegungen. Ein Kunstwerk wird „gewaltig“ genannt aufgrund dessen, dass es einen gewaltigen Teil der Kultur einnimmt und ausmacht. Joachim Schulte wollte eine klare Grenze „ziehen zwischen den Maßstäben, nach denen ein »normales« Kunstwerk als richtig oder unrichtig beurteilt werden kann, und den Maßstäben, die von einem großen Kunstwerk gesetzt werden und mithin nur für es selbst gelten.“ (1990, 79f.) Die Maßstäbe sind freilich verschieden. Aber ein gewaltiges Kunstwerk setzt Maßstäbe der *Richtigkeit* (nicht der Gewaltigkeit) für andere normale Kunstwerke. Und umgekehrt: Ein normales Kunstwerk, da es Teil der Kultur ist, kann als Maßstab für andere Werke dienen. Man kann hier eine Analogie zu dem Urmeter in Paris sehen (PU §50). Von ihm kann man nicht sagen, er sei 1 M lang, oder er sei es nicht. Aber er dient als Maßstab für andere Dinge. Die Behauptung, der Urmeter sei 1 M lang, drückt eine interne Relation aus (siehe Avital 2008, 322).

Das Kunstwerk ist Wittgenstein zufolge kein Vehikel zur Mitteilung von Gefühlen, wie Tolstoi meinte. Wenn die ästhetische Reaktion auf das Kunstwerk einen Aspekt von ihm ausmacht, so wird im Aspektwechsel ein irreduzibel

subjektives Element hervorgerufen, das Wittgenstein mit dem Staunen identifiziert. Dieser Aspektwechsel spielt sich auf der Seite des Rezipienten und wird freilich nicht übertragen. Ein Kunstwerk überträgt sich selbst, indem es sich als Kunstwerk, d. h. als Teil oder vielmehr Aspekt der Kultur behauptet.

## Endnoten

<sup>1</sup> Vgl. V&G I.8: „Man sagt, ‚Betrachte diesen Übergang‘, oder ‚Diese Passage ist inkohärent.‘“

<sup>2</sup> Man kann sagen, dass diese Regeln ermöglichen, das Kunstwerk als Organismus zu sehen. Vgl. LS §677.

<sup>3</sup> V&G I.35: „eine Geste [...], die eine komplizierte Handlung begleitet“.

<sup>4</sup> Vgl. BPP II, §501, wo es heißt, dass das ästhetische Urteil „Ist das nicht herrlich!“ voraussetzt, „gewisse Zusammenhänge“ zu verstehen.

<sup>5</sup> V&G II.19, siehe auch III.16 und LS §908.

<sup>6</sup> Siehe BPP I, §337 oder LS §76.

<sup>7</sup> Siehe hierzu LS §76: „Zusammenpassen und Assoziation gehen oft zusammen“.

<sup>8</sup> Vgl. Ms 137, 20b, wo eine Geste oder ein Tanzschritt als einfache Erklärung einer musikalischen Phrase aufgefasst wird.

<sup>9</sup> In LS §654 schreibt Wittgenstein: „Wenn ich es so sehe, so paßt es wohl dazu, aber nicht dazu.“ (Vgl. LS §634 und §655.) Das „so sehen“ ist eine Variation des Aspektsehens.

<sup>10</sup> Die Bedeutung des Aspektsehens und interner Relationen wird in von Stefan Majetschak (2007, 60ff.) betont. Durch ein ästhetisches Urteil wird eine interne Relation zwischen dem Kunstwerk und *anderen Objekten* zum Vorschein gebracht. Ich beziehe unter diese Objekte auch ästhetische Reaktionen ein und spreche eher von Phänomenen.

<sup>11</sup> Vgl.: „Die Kultur ist gleichsam eine große *Organisation*[...] die jedem[...] der zu ihr gehört[...] seinen Platz anweist [...] und seine Kraft kann mit gewissem Recht an seinem Erfolg im Sinne des *Ganzen* gemessen werden.“ (Ms 109, 205, meine Hervorhebung).

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# Eye See

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*Who can decide hastily whether, in the process, the intellect needs images? For example, I can say 'stone' or 'sun', without these things being present for my senses – yet certainly, when I do, their images are present in my memory. (St Augustine, Confessions, XV.23)*



## 1. facing time

Challenged by a colleague to 'depict the contemplation of self as "I"', Ernst Mach *responds* with a picture: he draws what he sees of himself when he squints with one eye. We see parts of his eye socket, nose and beard, and – again only partly – his arms and legs, the seat, the room in which he is drawing, and the distant view out of the window. Outside this, opposite the nose, the white of the background flows out of the picture and around it like a giant question mark. The aim of this presentation is not to reconstruct Mach's conception of his answer, or probe for the 'subject as boundary of the world'. Rather, taking this image as such (and viewing it through the lens of certain writings and statements of Wittgenstein from 1929-31), what is attempted here is to ask: what is this saying? And, if anything at all is being said: how is it said?

As Wittgenstein writes in paragraph 47 of his *Philosophical Remarks*, the fact that the phenomena of our everyday movements – walking around, being aware of our own body – seem so natural to us is already demonstrated by the fact that nothing about them particularly strikes our attention. 'We do not perceive that we see space in perspective, or that the image we see is in some way or other blurred towards the periphery of vision.' Moreover this *cannot* strike our attention, because it is *the* form of perception, and it is impossible to contemplate it, because there is no antithesis to the form of our world. 'By

this I mean, that it is remarkable that those who ascribe reality only to things, not to our conceptions, move so unquestioningly in the world of conceptions, and never yearn to transcend it. In other words, how self-evident is the world as given. All hell would have to freeze over before we admitted this was only a tiny image seen from a crooked angle.' And indeed, this drawing by Mach seems ironically to suggest such a devilish conjuring trick (although, admittedly, long before it was prophesied in the *Philosophical Remarks*). I still recall how, seeing this picture for the first time, I could not work out what it was supposed to depict. On second viewing it became clear to me. On my third viewing I was struck by the omission of one side, and on the fourth the whole surrounding of the drawing appeared to me to be one single omission. But what is being omitted here? The eye? The head? The edge of the picture, or the background against which the artist's lines stand out? Finally, my attempt to read the relationships from my own perspective, screwing up my eyes, achieved the most success. I found the attempt successful since it led me to two invisible boundaries. 'Invisible', because on the right – looking with the left eye – the boundary disappeared into darkness; while on the left, because I had to turn my head in the effort of searching, the boundary vanished. To be sure, I was unable to find the 'antithesis' to my field of vision in this way; and yet it is the most pleasant conceit to place a mirror in front of Mach *inside* his drawing.

How then can only one actuality be described in Mach's picture, as finite as it is boundless? At the end of paragraph 88 Wittgenstein suggests a qualification of this question; for 'if only the *whole* field of vision may be described, then why not only the *whole* flux of visual experiences, since a field of vision *can only* exist in time?' Earlier (paragraph 48), Wittgenstein has already stated that, in this flux, our propositions are verified only for the moment, only in the present. And they are not verified *in spite of* their spatio-temporal nature; rather, the latter must function as the physical actuality of a ruler does to the spatial extension by means of which it measures, when it is applied to reality. *One* distinction, already made in the conversations with Schlick and Waismann, is a *temporal* one: the distinction between a time of memory, in which one proposition or image emerges from another through an internal relationship, and a time of physics, in which we might for example enquire (of someone) how things behave. Wittgenstein also makes use of a metaphor, that of the 'laterna magica', and says that it is not the soundtrack which accompanies the film, but the music; the soundtrack accompanies the filmstrip in the same way that language accompanies the world. In paragraph 51 of the *Philosophical Remarks* he writes: 'If I may compare the facts of immediate experience to the images on the screen, and the facts of physics to the images on the film, then on the film there is a present image as well as past and future images; on the screen, however, there is only the present.' And it is *this* present which seems to support that very bold assertion that only the experience of the present moment possesses reality. However, in opposition to what does it possess this reality *as present* experience? Here, according to Wittgenstein, the word 'present' – like the word 'I' in other contexts – must already be superfluous; or alternatively,

something different is meant by it, something which is not *in* a space but is a space itself, not delineated from something else. This seems to me to suggest one initial aspect of what Mach's drawing might be saying, or how it might reveal itself to be a response. The continuation of Wittgenstein's thought is made clear in paragraph 55: 'The fact that, if I am awake, I always see out of my eyes is, by contrast, a remarkable and interesting fact.' Unlike the perspective Mach has drawn, my field of vision is hardly threatened with paralysis. But how, therefore, does it come about that, despite every alteration, it remains *my* perspective? "'I" obviously means my body, since I am in this room; and "I" is essentially something which occupies a position, a position in the same space in which the other bodies are situated.' (Wittgenstein adds: "'Realism", "Idealism", etc. [...] indicate that their adherents believe they can express something definite about the essence of the world' – which means *measuring* the adequacy of a ruler, as though perceiving *'the form of perception'*.)

## 2. *hic et nunc*: in fact


An irritating feature of Mach's drawing, it seems to me, is the fact that it *is* drawn: in other words, that a certain period of time was necessary to create this (partial) 'snapshot' of a field of vision. At the same time, I find myself asking about Mach's drawing hand, the one holding the pen – is it to be found *on* the picture's surface, as the hand which *draws*, or *in* the picture itself, as the hand which *is drawn*? These two observations might appear trivial, and additionally they might already have been made more explicitly by artists elsewhere; nevertheless, here they lead me on to investigate further aspects of the subject.

In Waismann's transcripts of their discussions, Wittgenstein states his concept of the image clearly when he writes the following: "The proposition is a logical picture of the fact", he proposed. "I can insert a picture into a proposition – moreover, a picture which is drawn – and then continue with the proposition. I can, therefore, utilise a picture like a proposition." This, indeed, is because in a sense both things concur with one another, and it is this common property to which Wittgenstein gives the name 'picture'. However, as he says in the same passage, he could equally well have used a ruler as a symbol. The distinction which emerges in his explanations during these years is that between the complete and the incomplete picture. This arises in consequence of a further development of his concept of elementary propositions. In the final analysis of propositions, it is true, these still emerge always in the form of a direct connection between objects, without logical constants; but they are not independent of one another. If, for example, we replace the symbols in the logical constants ' $p \cdot q$ ' by the symbols 'red' and 'blue', this can give rise to the problem – much discussed by Wittgenstein – that this pair determines the same co-ordinates twice over, in other words, that the same point is both red and blue. Syntax forbids this use of words, and in this respect the system of colours reveals itself as like a ruler on which a scale division which agrees with reality, in so doing (to a certain extent) negates the others.

In order not to lose the theme of the field of vision completely from our own field of vision, I will once again refer to paragraph 88 of the *Philosophical Remarks*, already mentioned earlier. 'If I do not describe the field of vision completely, but only a part of it, then it is obvious that there is a kind of lacuna in the facts. Obviously something has been omitted. If I were to paint this field of vision, then I would allow the canvas to peer through in certain places. But canvas also has a colour and occupies space.


I could not leave *nothing* on the spot where something is missing. It is essential, therefore, that my description should contain the entire field of vision, even its coloration; even if it does not say which colour is found in each place. That means, it must say that there is a colour in each place. Does that mean that, insofar as the description does not fill the space with constants, it must fill it with variables?'

In conversation with Schlick and Waismann, Wittgenstein states that an incomplete picture consists of one in which variables appear in the proposition; the picture must show that it is incomplete. Examples are: 'I saw two materials of the same colour' or 'I saw a square with a circle in it'. Neither of these are enumerations of the kind found in 'both green, both blue...' or '*this* circle or *that* circle or ...' These are just variables, in contrast, for example, to exact numerical data for radius and centre of the circle; and they comply with the form of an incomplete proposition, which is comprehensible as such. Wittgenstein suggests that we think of a portrait from which the mouth has been omitted. This may mean one of two things. First, the mouth is white, like the blank paper. Second, whatever the mouth is like, the depiction is always correct. (But even if I describe completely everything which is in the room, this is still not a complete picture, since I can ask myself what is outside the room.) By contrast, a complete description is given when I say:



For here we can describe 'colour boundaries in the field of vision'. In the present case this occurs, for example, through 'equations of lines and colour indices'. The space is complete, and although one can indeed alter the description, one cannot add anything else to it. The same holds true, however, if I describe a room (completely), for example where the table and chair are positioned; later on I cannot also say 'and there is also this and that there'. The more incomplete the picture, the more *probable* it is that it agrees with reality. The fact that the proposition 'all circles in the square are black' is not an enumeration of circles, and that it does not have to be concluded with 'and these are all the circles (in total)', is connected with the fact that Wittgenstein's concept of the picture is derived on the one hand from graphic images, on the other from mathematical ones. (Concerning the use of the word 'all' in this case, he speaks of a complete induction, which does not afford proof for all elements, but in the first instance presents its own criterion for 'all'). I can, therefore, leave one term in a proposition open, and in response to the question 'How do I know such a proposition?' I can answer with an

endless disjunction of elements. The misleading temptation is to compare the proposition about all the circles in the square with that about all the persons in the room. In this case it seems obvious that one should enumerate the persons, including those who are not in the room. If however I were to allocate names to circles, it would also have to make sense to assert of a particular circle that it is in the square, even if it is not (to give an analogy: 'this circle is dead, but I still have a photo of it'). Now, certainly many circles are not in *this* square, and if all are not in it, *which* 'all' are then outside?



'Three rather dark grey circles'

In paragraph 71 of the *Philosophical Remarks* Wittgenstein writes: 'It might, for example, even be a practical idea to give proper names to my hands and those of other people, so that, when speaking of them, one did not always have to speak of their connection to a person, which is inessential to the hands themselves; and also because the conventional mode of expression might give the impression that the hand's connection with its possessor was something which formed part of the hand's essence.'

'Visual space essentially has no owner'. What if it transpired, from the discovery of a letter or note by Mach, that the hands in the picture did not belong to him, but that a friend had modelled for him (for example by squatting behind Mach, holding his hands stretched forward), so that Mach had his hands free for drawing? Would we then, in the future, have to describe the picture with the words 'Mach's legs, Mach's upper body, not his arms ...', or would we not rather say: 'We can see two legs, ... two arms (elements of the representation). Concerning this last, however, we know today that for the drawing a friend ...'? Would this perhaps weaken Mach's response to his colleague's challenge? Wittgenstein continues: 'Let us now assume that I always see a specific object along with all the others in my field of vision – that is, my nose. Naturally another person does not see this object in the same way. But does that not mean that the visual space of which I am speaking *belongs to me*? That it is, therefore, subjective? No. Here it is merely grasped subjectively, and an objective space is placed in opposition to it, which, however, is only a construction, with the visual space as its basis.' It is only in our language of objective space that our visual space is *called* subjective – or alternatively, that what is directly equivalent to our visual space is called subjective. Mach's picture is only *one* possibility of representing this. 'The essential point is that the representation of visual space represents an object and contains no indication of a subject.' Even the phrase 'visual space' is, according to Wittgenstein, inappropriate, since it contains a reference to a sense organ which is just as inessential to this space as

it is inessential to a book that it belongs to a particular person. The fact that I could turn around, and to use such a picture to find out where I am, only means that I am establishing a definite structure of visual space.

If, however, one's visual space is now to be isolated as a phenomenon from everything else, what kind of time is appropriate for this visual phenomenon? The time of our conventional mode of expression? 'It is clear,' writes Wittgenstein, 'that the description of memory as a picture is only a metaphor, and does not imply a physical image which we can compare to other things.' Later, in paragraph 67, he continues: 'Let us assume that my memory were so good that I could remember all my sense impressions, or that I could produce models of what I see in another – e.g., plastic – form as rapidly as I remember them, i.e. by means of omission or colouring ... [I]f in these models I could indicate what I had seen and what my visual impressions could no longer retain, and if by this means the position of my eyes could also be exactly deduced from the model – would this not be the most direct description imaginable, so that any attempt to capture the phenomenon even more directly would no longer be a description, but rather like an attempt to start before the beginning?' This could be a further aspect of how we read Mach's picture as a response. The language with which we attempt to describe language itself proceeds in physical time. 'With language,' says Wittgenstein in paragraph 70, 'we find ourselves, so to speak, not in the realm of the projected image, but rather in the realm of the film. And if I want to make music to the events on the screen, then what it evokes must once again play itself out in the realm of the film.' On the other hand it is clear for Wittgenstein that we need a form of expression with which we can depict the phenomena in our visual space as such in isolation. "I see a lamp standing on the table", as it must be understood in our everyday speech, says more than a description of visual space: I would add: 'it appears to me to be so' does not mean that nothing real is being described, but rather that I am uncertain whether in future I will be able to describe further events like that of seeing the lamp as special cases of the same rule. As Wittgenstein says (paragraph 69), 'I think that what I call a "sign" must be what is called a "sign" in grammar: something on the film, not the screen'.

(Translated from the German by Peter Burt)

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# Pictures and Souls.

## On knowing Oneself by Outward Criteria (PI II iv)

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“The human body is the best picture of the human soul.” The famous quotation from the second part of the Philosophical Investigations (if such a “second part” does exist is a different and well-discussed question) presents a philosophical problem not to be confused with emphatic existentialist thinking about the self. The self Wittgenstein is talking about is characterized by contingent ascriptions rather than inner processes constituting our language use. If someone is in possession of a soul, this “soul” is not an abstract entity to be respected under all possible circumstances, it is the outcome of common attitudes governing individual linguistic approaches to other individuals and vice versa. The deepest feelings can be silenced by not reacting to them; “deep” is a word expecting certain reactions of compassion and consolation, where there are no common “attitudes” to expressions affirming their existence as undoubtedly, they will gradually peter out. This petering-out is known to be the consequence of a specific, non-mentalistic understanding of how linguistic meaning comes into being. Wittgenstein’s paragraphs in PI II iv refute the intuitive emphasis of the personal in contrast to the impersonal side of things. The soul as a philosophical entity becomes, in Wittgenstein’s hands, also a realm of contra-intuitive emphasis on the public quality of feelings sorting our self-images into kinds of an ontological relativity we tend to forget, imagining us as agents of self-constituting actions not connected to other people’s changeable, sometimes capricious perceptions. If we are bound to other people’s perceptions insofar as they constitute what cannot be constructed by ourselves, their different “attitudes” gain a quality far away from Platonic (and Aristotelian) *doxa*, exhibiting arbitrariness and lack of information in important fields of discourse. Wittgenstein in PI II iv: “My attitude to him is an attitude towards a soul. I am not of the *opinion* that he has a soul.” The notion of “attitude” itself undergoes a change and it is likely that this change is connected with a serious perception of alter being the owner of something fragile, which is yet, as a contextual disposition, open to discussion. Possessing a soul is fugitive. It depends on strong attitudes not altering too often, not changing in too short a time. What is problematic in having the *opinion* that someone has a soul? Opining follows the logic of the marketplace, where reasons (with the implication of their exchangeability) can only serve as reminders of actions for a certain time. The action of treating somebody as someone possessing a soul therefore needs something stable to make up for the fleeting quality of our opinions. Having a soul is not open to discussion. The discussion (viz. when someone is treated badly) has to be closed before it begins on a level as contingent as fundamental. The important ingredient of this fundamental view of the other being the owner of a soul consists, as I shall point out, in the notion of the “picture”. Pictures are not only universal tools of making images communicable, they are what we see when looking at another person, wondering how the opponent might feel in a situation of disappointment or happiness. “The expression on her face says more than words.” The expression “saying” something is referring to a mode of comparison. Something is visible as something, if it can be perceived in a form fulfilling two conditions: Firstly, this form is reliable and expres-

sive at the same time – if the expression were wildly different when appearing at different times on a human face, it could not guide any behaviour claiming constancy and adequacy. Constancy and adequacy are virtues that need to be attached to something. Secondly, the single perceptions need to be framed, a possible realm of perceptions needs to be limited to secure the applicability of the most different perceptions in one language naming them. Pictures are meeting both requirements: They are reliable and expressive, because their similarity-based attraction guides perceptions with reference to content – that is the conventional attitude of *mimesis eikastike*, *Ebenbildlichkeit*, *imitatio* – and with reference to form, viz. to *mimesis phantastike*, adding not only, as Plato suggested, a capacity of imagination, but the possibility of adapting our perceptions to different circumstances. That the picture-like quality tells us about the other having a soul is not accidental. Pictures are the essence of what we can believe to be non-deceptive, because the picture already concedes a certain amount of deception as its constitutional element. Not because pictures show what painters did imagine for themselves in times of exaltation, but because they are a picture of something else. The deception is not Platonic – the lying poet cast out from the state – but entailed by spatial relations: two properties cannot individualize at the same point and time.

### 1. Pictures and Actions

The first words of PI II iv set the problem of the soul as a problem of belief and disbelief: “I believe that he is suffering.’ – Do I also believe that he isn’t an automaton? It would go against the grain to use the word in both connections. (Or is it like this: I believe that he is suffering, but am certain that he is not an automaton? Nonsense!)”

Not being of the *opinion* that someone has a soul means to rely on the picture someone gives while acting in worldly circumstances and, secondly, to believe that the picture he is a part of is worth to be constituted. The automaton cannot be touched by our conviction that something is the case. Believing is as we know (from *On Certainty*) the other side of doubting. Our knowledge that someone is not an automaton is as obvious as convincing: We do not treat the other as such. The word “someone” would not be possible, we would feel inclined to speak of a different, non-human kind of object, questions of similarity of objects and human beings (and anthropomorphisms) would dominate the discussion. Having a soul is not simply to be equated with consciousness as Descartes did (Dilman 1974, 162). Distinctions – being treated as someone equipped with a soul – seem to be the result of being looked at in a certain way. The soul we “have” (it is not a possession) is action-based, conversation-based, based on guided perceptions. These perceptions combine to build a net of convictions, which then, after a process of normative play of testing them, leads to attitudes conceding a soul. And the word “conceding” is probably too strong: an attitude does not concede, it treats someone in a certain way after having conceded. And the aspect of time needs to be clarified: The action of conceding a soul and the action

confirming it coincide. To do one after the other (conceding, then confirming) would open a space of metaphysical shallowness: this empty space has no place in real communication. The aspect of action is intertwined with the aspect of time. Descriptions need to address one thing after another: that is the contiguity of things in written word. Again the fact that two properties cannot individualize in the same point plays a decisive role in talking about the human soul being a question of attitude, not of opinion. Actions taking place in a certain spatial environment exercise a right to take place there. If only one action can occupy one place in one moment, an *attitude* extrapolates a right to assert the emphasis of this action later on in other contexts – in words. Believing that someone has a soul would open this question to fundamental doubt – not as fundamental as things belonging to our given frame of reference (like time passing), but fundamental in a sense of putting the whole notion of soul into question. Seemingly, it is not possible to believe an attitude. This sentence is not strange, but explaining the difference of an opinion (one imagines a quarrel on something, people looking for the most convincing argument, trying to defend their point of view) in contrast to having an attitude. An attitude is something not put into question so openly – and not put into question by the one's holding it without deep changes (in society, entailing changes in the use of language etc.). Furthermore an attitude (being shared by many, an important point in the question of the soul) has the implication of entailing a stable behaviour towards *alter*, saving him from sudden change of mood, weak-mindedness, disease-like uncertainty.

The hidden equivalent to the word "attitude" is "reliance". Reliance covers a certain time in which actions are taking place – it does not mean that there are no exceptions from the rule, because this infallibility were an idol not to met by worldly speakers – but it makes, being action-based itself, these actions predictable. The soul is, so to speak, built up by condensing strong expectations. And these expectations are mutual. Actions confirm what could become an expectation by actions implying it. What is the role of the picture in this scenario? The human body being a picture of the human soul performs the actions on which the idea that someone has a soul is based. It has a twofold role of embodying its soul and behaving in a way confirming this soul via confirming the souls of others. *Ego* switches to *alter* to switch to *ego* to confirm a need in form of action-based judgements. An attitude is a constant judgement.

May the "human being" be favoured in contrast to the "person" (the latter implying a dualistic account of consciousness) (Teichman 1974), human beings also need concepts confirming their identity. The picture as a concept helping to find information about the other without having them talk is less technical than the open dualism, but lives on the difference between body and soul – the connection (someone being able to read in another one's face) is done by those perceiving the human being as someone having a soul. To say that having a soul is action-based means to invent and re-invent this soul by acts of caring, talking and taking someone seriously. That you can "take" him in one way or another shows the power of individual appraisal; the "attitude" is a combination of many (prospective) appraisals over a longer time.

Interesting is the sentence in PI II iv: "I believe that he is not an automaton", just like that, so far makes no sense." The expression "just like that" implies that in a certain context the words would make sense – this context

comes into being through actions, not statements. The content of "I believe that he is not an automaton" is uttered rightly in a language of looking and agreeing with what you see. When uttered in *such* a language the sentence is not ridiculous, but part of a body language which is, of course, the language of the soul. Only "just like that" the sentence is questionable, because nothing is made the just-like-that-way in a language used by many. The attitude toward a human being having a soul therefore is part of a practice of translation: Sentences making no sense alone are embedded in actions constituting and confirming them; what a single sentence cannot express without being misleading, can be said by nonverbal behaviour (entailing and confirming the linguistic *façon de parler* conceding a soul). Opinions deny the implication of *durée* attitudes have; they are the just-like-that-equivalent to just-like-that-thoughts. Attitudes being connected with reliance deny the just-like-that quality of sentences standing alone without linguistic counterparts: this quality (or its impression) is borrowed from the character of a spoken language being not just-like-that at all – this impression stems from many rules defining language use elsewhere, contingent, but serious. When the body is the picture of the human soul (not the only one, because it can be the "best") its picture-like quality is based on actions (perceiving as an initial action) securing the reliability of the picture. It is framed by the one's looking at it in order to discern humanity, to discern the soul – and the worth of one's own actions implying it.

## 2. Pictures and Reactions

The information that someone is not an automaton can serve as an information only in very special circumstances: "... and to whom would it be an information? To a *human being* who meets him in ordinary circumstances? What information *could* it give him? (At the very most that this man always behaves like a human being, and not occasionally like a machine.)" Firstly, the second question is rhetoric. The expression *human being* is written in italics; it seems to be not quite plausible that two of a kind should face such deep necessity of clarification in ordinary discourse. Only in circumstances where doubting is possible and reasonable, someone can feel uncertain about the ontological status of one, who, after all, belongs to the same kind. The information contained in the sentence "He isn't an automaton" can only be one of securing correct language use in the future – stressing again the aspect of reliance being the hidden equivalent of having an "attitude". When pictures are showing the condition of the soul they can only do so because the readers of the picture of the soul are human beings perceiving the one showing the soul-like signs as another human being. The actions implying a soul start very early: as early as comparing oneself to someone else (having a soul too). Being able to compare two things does not mean that the alternative is plausible. The non-human entity, the automaton, the mechanical monster, which threatens because of a similarity, not a difference, is rather a collective projection than a fact arousing difficulty. If it were totally clear that it were a kind of its own, the comparison would make no sense. Nevertheless emphasizing that someone is not an automaton serves a function: to remind the one perceiving this fact of a similarity-based capacity of reliance. The information of the sentence "He is not an automaton" is, so to speak, not information about content, but information about a formal prerequisite met by two speakers. This seems to be the reason why the actions implying a soul (accepting, confirming, admitting someone as similar) are also reactions in

a relation to the one showing his soul in bodily expression and the one's reading it: Expression behaviour and reaction behaviour are intimately connected. This connection is what is confirmed by reading the soul; being constituted by good actions the reaction behaviour shows that these acts of acknowledgement are not only a benign expression of humanity chosen by friendly speakers, but a necessity not open to discussion and choice. This can be illustrated by an example: If someone is ill and cannot mirror the behaviour of another in their face (or can only mirror it by inadequate openness exposing what others can conceal) the relation between expression (action) and reaction is distorted. It is equivalent to constant doubt, doubting the presence of the opponent to be a serious one, doubting their words. I am telling a fact and somebody answers thoughtfully: "Probably". This answer puts into question everything which has been said before, it is an example of not having understood the difference between fact and telling a fact and opening a discussion. To *tell* someone something is not speculating with the other. This difference is one of denying someone a reaction that would have confirmed their behaviour. The human body can only be the best picture of the human soul, because we read this picture as a picture of a painter we trust. The picture of the soul is not open to the fancy of *mimesis phantastike*, *Einbildungskraft* – it is the good side of *imitatio*, with a touch of sobriety knowing the limits of imagination where speakers try to meet the expectations of others. Seeing the soul is reacting appropriately. This is also part of the dissolution of the problem of other minds – *Fremdpsychisches* – in PI II iv (ter Hark 1995).

What happens when the inadequate reactions silence the initial action? The speaker will wear a mask, acting as if he *had* received reasonable reactions confirming themselves. This mask can be seen as a form of politeness – the attempt to cover a face in which no one reads properly. Trusting in speaker S, then, means trusting in their capacity of reading. Pictures not being read are no pictures anymore – there is a bit of *esse est percipi* in the human body being a picture of the human soul.

### 3. Pictures and the Soul

Pictures and spoken words can serve the same function. This is Wittgenstein's point in the example of religion: "Religion teaches that the soul can exist when the body has disintegrated. Now do I understand the teaching? – Of course I understand it – I can imagine plenty of things in connexion with it. And haven't pictures of these things been painted? And why should such a picture be only an imperfect rendering of the spoken doctrine? Why should it not do the *same* service as the words? And it is the service which is the point."

As an "image of him" is not an image of him because it resembles him, or because of a similarity (PI II iii). The image of the soul existing after the death of man is not an image of the soul because we know how such a soul looks like and we confirm a similarity, but because we are living in a culture where certain images of the soul are used. They form a standard we are used to. The standard itself needs not to be accepted explicitly. "And it is the service which is the point" means: The role of the picture of a soul living after one's death can be equated with the role of words saying so. The picture is, of course with more freedom of an artist's genius, as convincing as a spoken or written word. The reason lies in the distributing channels being the same and in looking at tales and pictures of the

immortality of the soul as a piece of information. Modern times often need to explain what they are used to; the *Gepflogenheit* is not always self-evident.

The picture of the soul doing a *service* ties in with a religious understanding: Now it is grammar, and the aim of grammar is "nothing but that of a language" (PI 497), doing a service and constituting what is meant by the term. A service in a church is a ritualistic approach to what people perceive as being the truth. This connotation of the word is still present when talking about the service of a picture of the soul. The idea of perfection ("And why should such a picture be only an imperfect rendering") lies at the core of the idea of a good creator only wanting the good. In times describing language grammatically, made up by language use, the picture of something is a constitutional element of a (scientific) explanation (taken as a description, PI 109) only insofar as it postpones the factor of similarity. Similarity is an important aspect of pictures only at first glance – would it be the constituting element in using the human body as the best picture of the human soul one would have to stick to a conception of *imitatio* not letting in the grammatical point.

PI II iv continues: "If the picture of thought in the head can force itself upon us, than why not much more that of thought in the soul?" That "an 'inner process' stands in need of outward criteria" (PI 580) is fundamental to Wittgenstein's later philosophy emphasizing the public side of things and the arguments explaining them. The private language argument is only one example. Philosophy after its grammatical turn denies the implicit privacy of essentialist thinking; everyone seemed to be alone with the *Wesen* of things (god, reason, friendship, liberty) to consider it thoroughly. This museum of things held in the eyes of an individual was a pale reflection of the real world. And "reality" is not an essentialist entity by itself, but an equivalent to the soul being made of strong expectations condensing. As what we call the soul is constituted by these expectations, reality described with reference to grammar is not stable (its ways of description being valid only temporarily), but stable enough. What else could one expect? The "thought in the soul" Wittgenstein is talking of in PI II iv can force upon us because our grammatical ways of conveying knowledge and a non-essentialist certainty (viz. certainty not being based on essentialist descriptions (of the self)) encourage it. Where the soul can be constituted by contingent, but binding ways of describing it, it is not an authority needing other authorities to explain its expressions, but available to action-based, conversation-based, language-based behaviour shared by many. When we use the human body as the best picture of the human soul it is "not a figure that we choose, not a simile, yet it is a figurative expression." The final sentence of PI II iv describes the picture of the soul – it is as inevitable as pointing to one's heart when understanding something "in my heart". "Of course one means it" But one means it because others do so too and did so in former contexts. Reliance being the hidden equivalent to having the attitude that someone has a soul is also one of constant gestures, having transformed an individual experience of some to criteria of many. The criteria we understand are part of a modern way of explanation: "Grammar tells what kind of object anything is (Theology as grammar.)" (PI 373) The notion of the soul transforms its religious coinage to something more open to public discourse: PI II iv reminds us of a representation existing because there are ways of reading it. Action, reaction and seeing the soul in the body being the best picture of it form a secular set of instruments meeting

the necessities of the modern view of language as the language of human beings. The *darkness of this time* cannot be highlighted by single expressions of *joie de vivre*. It is the grammatical foundation of our language use which corrects inconsistencies of the holy and the profane. It is the foundation we have and the foundation we need. Having a foundation is an old idea, which stems from a time where language was considered to be a sign of the life of god. Now the founding is made by *ego* and *alter* and their mutual perceptions entailing conventions (Lewis). The criteria exist in their fleeting, worldly way. Believing is something else. The soul being made of expectations condensing (readable as a picture) is not only an expression of the self – it is where the self begins.

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# Familienähnlichkeit als Analysemethode von Spätwerken Beethovens und Wittgensteins

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## 1. Familienähnlichkeit

In den Debatten um Wittgensteins Spätphilosophie tauchen immer wieder bestimmte berühmte Komposita auf: z.B. „Sprachspiel“ und „Familienähnlichkeit“. Ersteres kommt in den „Philosophischen Untersuchungen I“ insgesamt achtzigmal vor und zieht sich durch das ganze Werk. Letzteres erscheint dagegen nur ein einziges Mal und zudem in Anführungszeichen: „Ich kann diese Ähnlichkeiten nicht besser charakterisieren als durch das Wort »Familienähnlichkeiten«; denn so übergreifen und kreuzen sich die verschiedenen Ähnlichkeiten, die zwischen den Gliedern einer Familie bestehen: Wuchs, Gesichtszüge, Augenfarbe, Gang, Temperament, etc. etc. – Und ich werde sagen: die ›Spiele‹ bilden eine Familie.“ (PU 67) Auch Spiele – insbesondere Sprachspiele – sollen in analoger Weise „familienähnlich“ sein. Auch hier können wir verschiedene Ähnlichkeitskriterien anführen, die jedoch niemals für alle Spiele zutreffen: *Brettspiele*, *Ballspiele*, *Gewinnspiele*, *Unterhaltungsspiele*, *Einzelspiele*, *Zweierspiele*, *Mannschaftsspiele* usw. Wittgenstein führt diese Begrifflichkeit ein (1) um eine Alternative zum philosophischen Begriff „Wesen“ einzuführen, der auf die Suche eines gemeinsamen Merkmals bzw. von Universalien abzielt und (2) um seine Untersuchung als eine philosophisch-kritische und nicht theorieorientierte anzuzeigen. Theoriebildung beinhaltet in vielen – wenn auch nicht in allen – Fällen das Finden bzw. Erfinden von Invarianzen.

Häufig wurde der Begriff „Familienähnlichkeit“ zum Anlass genommen, einen neuartigen Begriff der Ähnlichkeit zu formulieren, der von den bekannten abweicht. Dann entbrannte der Streit z.B. darüber, ob dieser Begriff transitiv oder nicht-transitiv sei: (I) (ba), (ca), (da) würde z.B. eine transitive a-Ähnlichkeit aufweisen. (II) In (ba), (ca), (cd) wäre (ba) a-ähnlich zu (ca) und (ca) c-ähnlich zu (cd). Zwischen (ba) und (cd) würde sich aber kein gemeinsamer Bestandteil aufweisen lassen. Wenn Familienähnlichkeit nur die (beliebige) Merkmalsgleichheit von benachbarten Komplexen bedeuten würde, so wäre zwar (ba) familienähnlich zu (ca) und (ca) wiederum familienähnlich zu (cd). Da dies jedoch bezüglich unterschiedlicher Merkmale/Dimensionen geschieht, erhielten wir keine Transitivität, d.h. (ba) wäre nicht familienähnlich zu (cd).

Nun bietet Wittgenstein in PU 67 ein Bild an, welches darauf hindeutet, dass Familienähnlichkeiten viel komplexer verstanden werden sollen: „Und ebenso bilden z.B. die Zahlenarten eine Familie. Warum nennen wir etwas »Zahl«? Nun etwa, weil es eine – direkte – Verwandtschaft mit manchem hat, was man bisher Zahl genannt hat; und dadurch, kann man sagen, erhält es eine indirekte Verwandtschaft zu anderem, was wir auch so nennen. Und wir dehnen unseren Begriff der Zahl aus, wie wir beim Spinnen eines Fadens Faser an Faser drehen. Und die Stärke des Fadens liegt nicht darin, daß irgend eine Faser durch seine ganze Länge läuft, sondern darin, daß viele Fasern einander übergreifen.“ Zunächst finden wir hier die spannende Unterscheidung zwischen „direkter“ und „indirekter Verwandtschaft“. Zudem unterscheidet Wittgenstein zwischen den „Fasern“ und dem „Faden“. Eine mögliche Interpretation besteht darin, die „Fasern“ mit dem Begriff

der „direkten Verwandtschaft“ und den des „Fadens“ mit der „indirekten Verwandtschaft“ zu koppeln. Die *direkte* Verwandtschaft erinnert an eine *transitive* Ähnlichkeitsbeziehung: Es gibt dann *Grundmuster* von beliebiger Komplexität (atomar, molekular, mehrdimensional komplex usw.), die die jeweilige *Faser* konstituieren. Die *indirekte* Verwandtschaft und vor allem die Stärke, die Stabilität des *Fadens* erhalten wir dann dadurch, dass „viele Fasern einander übergreifen“. Diese Metapher lässt sich sowohl kompositorisch als auch interpretatorisch auf vielfältige Weise explizieren: Wittgenstein selbst spricht in PU 67 von „kreuzen“ und später vom „lückenlose[n] Übergreifen dieser Fasern“. Im Falle des Fadens kann man an „verflechten“ und „verdrillen“ denken. Letztlich bezieht Wittgenstein sein Gesamtbild von Sprache auf diese Metapher: Die Sprache als ungeheuer komplexer Faden (vielleicht besser als höchst vernetztes Strickwerk) ist enorm stabil, obgleich es keine rote Faser gibt, die durch den ganzen Faden läuft. Wir können uns sprachliche Bedeutung philosophisch als etwas äußerst Stabiles klar machen, ohne auf sprachliche Universalien mit absolut fixer Bedeutung zurückgreifen zu müssen.

Im Folgenden streben wir *keine* Theorie der Familienähnlichkeit an. Dieser Eindruck könnte entstehen, da ein strukturell orientierter und formal stringenter Vorschlag zur Explikation des Begriffs vorgestellt wird. Unter der *Suche nach Familienähnlichkeiten* wird vielmehr eine *Strategie* verstanden, neue Räume der Betrachtung zu erschließen, die einerseits die Suche fernab von tradierten Mustern ermöglicht und andererseits eine gewisse Unvoreingenommenheit gegenüber den untersuchten Medien bewahrt, die ihre Grenze in den bereits vorliegenden inneren (logischen) Strukturen der Medien (Kompositionen) hat. Die Suche nach familienähnlichen Mustern ist selbst in gewisser Weise ein kreativer Prozess, der strittige Ergebnisse liefert, die ohnehin nicht auf universellen Anspruch, sondern auf das Klarwerden bestimmter Aspekte abzielen.

„Familienähnlichkeit“ steht als metaphorischer Begriff für gewisse mehrdimensionale Verflechtungen von Ähnlichkeiten, die nicht einfach auf zweistellige Relationen mit solchen Eigenschaften wie Reflexivität, Symmetrie und Transitivität (Äquivalenzrelation) reduziert werden können. Dennoch lassen sich die *Fasern* über das Vorkommen gemeinsamer *Gundmuster* in komplexen Umgebungen charakterisieren. Der *Faden* entsteht dann durch das (lückenlose) „Einanderübergreifen“ von beliebig vielen Fasern. Sowohl mehrstimmige Musikstücke als auch Texte mit bestimmten Phrasierungsmerkmalen lassen sich nach familienähnlichen Fäden durchmustern. Wir greifen relativ willkürlich zwei prominente Fälle heraus: Die ersten 9 Takte aus Beethovens spätem Streichquartett a-Moll opus 132 und die ersten 90 Paragraphen aus Wittgensteins Spätwerk „Philosophische Untersuchungen“. Der winzige Ausschnitt aus Beethovens Schaffen erscheint als ein Minikristall mit interner familienähnlicher Struktur. Der noch sehr unfertige Blick auf die kompositorische Struktur von Wittgensteins Schrift bildet einen ersten Hinweis zur Stützung der These, dass Wittgenstein Philosophie *komponiert* und eine außergewöhnliche Übereinstimmung zwischen dem Thema *Form* und eigener *Darstellungsform* angestrebt hat:

„Ich habe diese Gedanken alle als *Bemerkungen*, kurze Absätze, niedergeschrieben. Manchmal in längeren Ketten, über den gleichen Gegenstand [Fasern!], manchmal in raschem Wechsel von einem Gebiet zum anderen überspringend [Fadenbildung] ... Wesentlich aber schien es mir, daß darin die Gedanken von einem Gegenstand zum andern in einer natürlichen und lückenlosen Folge fortschreiten sollten.“ (PU Vorwort) Unsere Analyse wird schon an Hand weniger Fasern zeigen, wie Wittgenstein bestimmte Themen einführt, mit anderen Themen (Fasern) verdrillt, fallen lässt und später wieder aufnimmt. Die „natürliche und lückenlose Folge“ bildet selbst ein Beispiel für *Familienähnlichkeit*.

## 2. Familienähnlichkeit als Analyseverfahren von Beethovens Spätwerk

Bekanntermaßen ergibt sich bei der musiktheoretischen Analyse des Spätwerkes von Ludwig van Beethoven eine ganze Reihe von Schwierigkeiten:

Es ist schwierig ein klassisches Thema/Motiv zu finden, welches traditionellerweise eine bestimmte Tonfolge innerhalb einer Stimme ausmacht. Beethoven setzt z.B. verstärkt Grundmuster ein, die Intervallabstände von kleinen Sekunden aufweisen. Bestimmte Stimmen (Instrumente) scheinen keinen Beitrag zum Gesamtmuster zu leisten (sog. „Füllstimmen“).

Als Beispiel greifen wir die ersten 9 Takte aus Beethovens a-Moll-Steichquartett opus 132 heraus: [Vgl. Abbildung 1 am Ende des Artikels]

Wir kodieren nun die Noten in Symbole der Form „a<sup>b</sup>“ um, wobei „a“ die natürlichen Zahlen mit  $0 \leq a \leq 11$  repräsentieren kann, die ihrerseits die 12 Töne der chromatischen Tonleiter darstellen. Unsere Konvention besagt, dass „0“ für irgendeinen Ton „c“ steht. Die Exponenten „b“ geben die jeweilige Oktavlage des Tons an. Durch diese Angaben werden die Töne in ihrer *Tonhöhe* repräsentiert: [Vgl. Tabelle 1 am Ende des Artikels]

Die Taktangaben der Form „c-d“ erfassen mit „c“ die Takt Nummer und durch „d“ die Zählzeit des (4/4)-Taktes. Damit sind die jeweiligen Töne auch in ihrer *Tondauer* charakterisiert. „%“ stellt pauschal die Pausen der jeweiligen Stimme in der durch die Taktangaben angezeigten Länge dar. Weitere Angaben wie „pp“, „cresc.“, Bindebögen usw. werden nicht erfasst. Die einzelnen Stimmen (Instrumente) werden links durch die angegebenen Kürzel markiert: [Vgl. Tabelle 2 am Ende des Artikels]

## 3. Die traditionelle Analyse

Charakteristisch für die traditionelle Analyse ist der Start mit der Suche nach einem Motiv innerhalb einer Stimme, welches in der originalen bzw. transformierten Form wiederkehrt. Ein mögliches Grundmotiv hat die Form:  $(x)-(x+1)-(x+9)-(x+8)$  bzw.  $(x)-(x-1)-(x-9)-(x-8)$ , wobei für  $x$  im ersten Fall  $8^1$ ,  $3^1$  und  $3^{-1}$  bzw. im zweiten Fall  $0^1$  und  $5^0$  in Frage kommen: [Vgl. Tabelle 3 am Ende des Artikels]

Durch diese Brille betrachtet erhalten wir anscheinend eine deutliche Dominanz des Cellos (VC): „Während die ersten Takte vom Cello getragen werden ...“<sup>41</sup>. Krümmacher (1980, 117) meint, dass „das ‚Modell‘, mit Umschreibung der Quinte a-e [9-4] (bzw. e-h [4-11]) durch unteren und oberen Halbton [8/5 bzw. 3/0], zwei Takte umfasst.“ Schmidt (1994, 327) spricht von einer „am Anfang exponierte[n] Viertonformel“.

Es fällt weiterhin auf, dass die 2. Geige (V2) keinerlei Anteil an dieser Strukturbildung hat, sie eine sogenannte „Füllstimme“ ist. Krümmacher (1980, 117) vermerkt, dass „die zweite Violine das Modell aber keimhaft genau bringt“. Es wird sich zeigen, dass bei einer Analyse unter dem Gesichtspunkt der Familienähnlichkeit, ohne die 2. Geige mehrere Fasern gekappt würden, das Gesamtbild zerstört würde.

## 4. Die Familienähnlichkeitsanalyse

Es wird für unser Beethovenbeispiel folgende Form für die Familienähnlichkeitsanalyse vorgeschlagen:

Grundmuster:

Alle gewählten Grundmuster bestehen tonhöhenunabhängig aus kleinen Sekundabständen der Form  $\langle x, x \pm 1 \rangle$ , d.h. wir betrachten kommutative Tonpaarsequenzen als identische Glieder, wobei folgende Strukturen oktavenunabhängig in Frage kommen: (GM1)  $\langle 8, 9 \rangle$  bzw.  $\langle 9, 8 \rangle$ , (GM2)  $\langle 0, 11 \rangle$  bzw.  $\langle 11, 0 \rangle$ , (GM3)  $\langle 3, 4 \rangle$  bzw.  $\langle 4, 3 \rangle$  und (GM4)  $\langle 4, 5 \rangle$  bzw.  $\langle 5, 4 \rangle$ . Die „Viertonformel“ „besteht“ somit aus zwei Grundmustern, auf deren Basis wir zwei klar unterschiedene Fasern verfolgen können.

Phrasierung (logischer Spielraum):

- horizontale Phrasierung: Takte
- vertikale Phrasierung: Stimmen bzw. Instrumente (V1, V2, VA, VC).

Fasern:

kontinuierliche/ununterbrochene Abfolgen von mindestens zwei Vorkommen des Grundmusters der Form  $\langle x, x \pm 1 \rangle$  *unabhängig* von ihrem Vorkommen in den einzelnen Stimmen (unabhängig von der vertikalen Phrasierung), wobei mindestens eine horizontale Phrasierungsgrenze (Taktstrich) passiert werden muss. Daher bildet das mögliche Grundmuster  $\langle 5^1, 6^1 \rangle$  insbesondere in V2 in Takt 8 keine Faser. Auch das VC-Vorkommen von  $\langle 5^0, 4^0 \rangle$  in T2 ist isoliert. Das  $\langle 4^{-1}, 5^{-1} \rangle$ -Grundmuster ist in den Takten 7 und 8 zwar auf zwei Takte (und zwei Stimmen) verteilt (T7-3, VC und T8-1, V2), es findet sich aber keine Verbindung zu weiteren Vorkommen dieser Struktur, womit wiederum keine Faser vorliegt.

Faden:

gleichzeitige (zählzeitenübereinstimmende) Überlagerung von Fasern. Diese Struktur kann und soll vor allem (implizit) *gezeigt* werden. Wir sehen die unterschiedliche Anzahl der Fasern in der letzten Zeile „Fs“. Die Pluszeichen zeigen die Mehrfachvorkommen oktavidentischer Töne in Fasern an. Außerdem veranschaulicht das Bild mit Blick auf die vertikale Phrasierung, wie sich die Fasern auf die einzelnen Stimmen verteilen und kreuzen.

[Vgl. Tabelle 4 am Ende des Artikels]

Beobachtungen:

- Das Stück setzt mit der Faser ein, die aus dem kommutativen Paar (8,9) gebildet ist: (8,9)-Faser. Sie läuft durch *alle* 4 Stimmen, d.h. alle Stimmen tragen zur durchgängigen Gestaltung dieser Faser bei, die im Takt 9 erstmals abbricht, allerdings im 1. Satz noch häufig wieder aufgenommen wird (z.B. Takte 22-23, 25-27). Hegewald (2010) hat ein schönes Programm geschrieben, welches es erlaubt beliebige Midi-Dateien nach selbst gewählten Grundmustern zu durchsuchen, die Fasern farblich hervorzuheben und damit die Fadenstruktur in seiner Gesamtheit grafisch darzustellen.

- Die (11,0)-Faser beginnt in der 2. Hälfte des 2. Taktes (T2-3/4) in der 2. Geige (V2) und setzt sich ebenfalls bis Takt 9 fort. Wiederum sind alle 4 Stimmen beteiligt und es kommt dabei zur Überlagerung mehrerer Stimmen (T5/3+4: V2+VA, T6/3-4: V1+V2+VA, T8/4: VA+VC und 9/1: VA+VC).
- Vertikale Schnittpunkte zwischen diesen beiden Fasern liegen zwischen allen Takten außer T6+7.
- Die (4,5)-Faser erstreckt sich über maximal 2,5 Takte (T4-3 bis T6).
- Die (3,4)-Faser erstreckt sich über maximal 2 Takte.
- Zudem überlagern sich die beiden Fasern (3,4) und (4,5) wegen des gemeinsamen Tones 4 – vgl. T4.3 (VA) und T8-3 (V1).

Legt man diese beiden Fasern zusammen, so ergibt sich ein weiteres durchgehendes Bild von T3.1 bis T9.1. Werden die beiden Paare unifiziert, so ergibt sich sogar eine Faser, die bereits in T2.1 einsetzt – also noch vor der (11,0)-Faser. Das Cello hat nach dieser Interpretation in T1 und T2 bereits nacheinander den Startschuss zu zwei durchlaufenden Fasern gegeben.

### 5. Grober Vergleich mit der traditionellen Analyse:

Unsere Analyse ist mit Blick auf das Suchen von Fasern, deren Überlagerung Familienähnlichkeit ausmacht, ausgerichtet. Dazu werden unabhängig von den Stimmen (der vertikalen Phrasierung) Grundmuster gewählt, ohne spezielle Komplexitätsauflagen (hier vertauschbare Tonpaare, nicht atomare Töne in fixer Anordnung).

Die Fasern verlaufen nicht innerhalb der einzelnen Stimmen, sondern quer durch alle Stimmen, wobei es zu interessanten Überlagerungen und Verflechtungen kommt.

Das nachstehende Bild zeigt die hohe Beteiligung von V2, die nach der traditionellen Analyse nicht musterbildend zu sein schien. Ohne die 2. Geige (V2) würde das familienähnliche Gesamtbild in sich zusammenbrechen: [Vgl. Tabelle 5 am Ende des Artikels]

### 6. Familienähnlichkeit als Analysemethode von PU I

Es wird nun das Ergebnis einer verwandten Analyse mit Blick auf die ersten 90 Paragraphen der „Philosophischen Untersuchungen“ gezeigt. Dabei sind folgende Vorgaben gemacht worden:

Grundmuster:

Wir wählen Wörter (Bedeutung, Form, Gebrauch/gebrauch-, Spiel-/spiel-, Sprach-/sprech-, Wort-/Wörter, ab § 68: Regel) bzw. das Kompositum „Sprachspiel“ als einfache bzw. molekulare Grundmuster.

Phrasierung:

- Die „horizontale“ Phrasierung erfolgt über die durchnummerierten Paragraphen, „kurze Absätze“.
- Annahmen über „vertikale“ Phrasierungen in Texten sollen keine Berücksichtigung finden.

Fasern:

Diese werden gebildet durch das (mehrfache) Vorkommen desselben Grundmusters in unmittelbar aufeinanderfolgenden Paragraphen. Zugleich wird unter „Einträge“ die Summe des Auftretens aller Grundmuster innerhalb des jeweiligen Paragraphen ermittelt.

Fäden:

Das vertikale Überlappungsmuster der einzelnen Fasern in seiner horizontalen Erstreckung.

Unter „Fasern“ wird jeweils die Summe „n“ der durch einen Paragraphen zugleich verlaufenden Fasern dargestellt. Durch „n+“ wird angezeigt, dass das Kompositum „Sprachspiel“ in diesem Paragraphen ebenfalls vorkommt. Durch „\*“ wird darauf verwiesen, dass zusätzlich zum Vorkommen in „Sprachspiel“ weitere Vorkommen von „Sprache“ bzw. „Spiel“ im jeweiligen Paragraphen auftreten, die keine weiteren Bestandteile einer Faser sind: „Spiel“ in §§ 7, 16, 27, 33, 44, 57 bzw. „Sprache“ in §§ 71, 77:

[Vgl. Tabelle 6 am Ende des Artikels]

Diese Analyse ist zugegebenermaßen rudimentär. Aber sie zeigt dennoch schon mit Blick auf eine sehr geringe Anzahl von Grundmustern eine enorme Verflechtung der dadurch generierten Faserabschnitte:

- Bereits im § 6 überlagern sich 4 Fasern, in den §§ 21-23 sogar 5 (ein Teilabschnitt der ersten Sprachspiel-Faser).
- Es lässt sich eine ansteigende und absteigende Anzahl von Fasern beobachten: Z.B. von 1 über 5+ wieder zurück zu 1 (§§ 18-28).

Unsere Wahl lässt allerdings noch mehrere Fäden zu, da sich z.B. in §§ 12-14 und 46 keine Fasern finden. Die lässt den Interpreten aber gerade auf diese Paragraphen aufmerksam werden. Die §§ 12-14 befinden sich zwischen zwei Abschnitten der Wort-Faser (5-11 + 15-17). Ein Blick in den Text zeigt rasch, dass Wittgenstein hier die Analogiekette Wort-Werkzeug(12)–Handgriff(13)–Werkzeug(14)–Wort entwickelt. Unter dieser Einbeziehung ergibt sich eine durchgehende Faser 5-17. Wenn wir § 46 und seine Umgebung betrachten finden wir sofort die „Name“-Faser, die von §§ 37–46 und 48–51 reicht, sowie die „einfach“-Faser, die sich u.a. von §§ 45-49 erstreckt.

Die Suche nach Familienähnlichkeiten in der angegebenen Weise eröffnet also auch neue Frageräume hinsichtlich der Interpretation von lokalen Zusammenhängen, indem sie nachdrücklich auf die komplexe Vernetzungsstruktur der Kompositionen hinweist.

### 7. Ausblick

Die vorgestellten Analysen stellen in keinsten Weise Hypothesen über das tatsächliche kompositorische Vorgehen bei Beethoven und Wittgenstein dar. Wichtig für diese Methode ist aber, dass die Annahmen der jeweiligen Grundmuster ausschließlich dem Werk selbst entnommen werden. In gewisser Weise sind in diesem Rahmen alle Annahmen logisch zulässig. Die speziellen Vorgaben, die hier alternativ versucht wurden, zeigen die Einseitigkeit und Begrenztheit tradierter Rahmenannahmen auf. Außerdem zeigen diese und ähnliche Analysen bisher vernachlässigte Verwandtschaften in den Kompositionen Beethovens und Wittgensteins auf. Sollte es nicht gelingen, ähnliche familienähnliche Verflechtungen von Fasern im Frühwerk von Beethoven und Wittgenstein nachzuweisen, dann würde dies auf neue Aspekte der Verwandtschaft und Verschiedenheit in den Kompositionen hindeuten.

### Endnoten

<sup>1</sup> [http://de.wikipedia.org/wiki/15.\\_Streichquartett\\_\(Beethoven\)](http://de.wikipedia.org/wiki/15._Streichquartett_(Beethoven)) [09.05.2010].

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Abbildung 1

C	Cis	D	Dis	E	F	Fis	G	Gis	A	Ais	H	C	Cis	D	Dis	E	F	Fis	G	Gis	A	Ais	H	c
0'	1'	2'	3'	4'	5'	6'	7'	8'	9'	10'	11'	0'	1'	2'	3'	4'	5'	6'	7'	8'	9'	10'	11'	0'
2'	0c'	d'	0c'	e'	f'	0c'	g'	0c'	a'	0c'	h'	c'	0c'	d'	0c'	e'	f'	0c'	g'	0c'	a'	0c'	h'	c'
0'	1'	2'	3'	4'	5'	6'	7'	8'	9'	10'	11'	0'	1'	2'	3'	4'	5'	6'	7'	8'	9'	10'	11'	0'

Tabelle 1

V1 = 1. Violine (Geige), V2 = 2. Violine, VA = Viola (Bratsche), VC = Violoncello

	1-1	1-3	2-1	2-3	3-1	3-3	4-1	4-3	5-1	5-3	6-1	6-3	7-1	7-3	8-1	8-2	8-3	8-4	9-1	9-2		
V1	%		%		3'	4'	0'	11'	8'	9'	11'	0'	0'	11'	3'	4'	5'	5'	4'	2'	5'	2'
V2	%	%	11'	8'	9'	6'	8'	2'	0'	5'	0'	4'	9'	8'	5'	8'	8'	2'	2'			%
VA	%	9'	8'	0'	11'	3'	4'	11'	0'	2'	0'	0'	9'	8'	8'		11'	11'				%
VC	8'	8'	9'	4'	%	%	5'	4'	8'	8'	3'	4'	0'		11'		11'					%

Tabelle 2

	1-1	1-3	2-1	2-3	3-1	3-3	4-1	4-3	5-1	5-3	6-1	6-3	7-1	7-3	8-1	8-2	8-3	8-4	9-1	9-2		
V1	%		%		3'	4'	0'	11'	8'	9'	11'	0'	0'	11'	3'	4'	5'	5'	4'	2'	5'	2'
V2	%	%	11'	8'	9'	6'	8'	2'	0'	5'	0'	4'	9'	8'	5'	8'	8'	2'	2'			%
VA	%	9'	8'	0'	11'	3'	4'	11'	0'	2'	0'	0'	9'	8'	8'		11'	11'				%
VC	8'	8'	9'	4'	%	%	5'	4'	8'	8'	3'	4'	0'		11'		11'					%

Tabelle 3

	1-1	1-3	2-1	2-3	3-1	3-3	4-1	4-3	5-1	5-3	6-1	6-3	7-1	7-3	8-1	8-2	8-3	8-4	9-1	9-2		
V1	%		%		3'	4'	0'	11'	8'	9'	11'	0'	0'	11'	3'	4'	5'	5'	4'	2'	5'	2'
V2	%	%	11'	8'	9'	6'	8'	2'	0'	5'	0'	4'	9'	8'	5'	8'	8'	2'	2'			%
VA	%	9'	8'	0'	11'	3'	4'	11'	0'	2'	0'	0'	9'	8'	8'		11'	11'				%
VC	8'	8'	9'	4'	%	%	5'	4'	8'	8'	3'	4'	0'		11'		11'					%
Fs	1	1	1	2	3	3	3	3	3	3+	3	3+	3	3+	3	3	3+	3+	3+	2+	0	

Tabelle 4



	1-1	3-3	2-1	2-3	3-1	3-3	4-1	4-3	5-1	5-3	5-1	5-3	7-1	7-3	6-1	5-2	5-3	5-4	5-1	5-2
9.8	VC	VC	VA	VA	V2	V2	V2	V2	V1	V1	VC	VC	V2	V2	VA	VA	V2	VA	VA	VA
0.11				V2	VA	VA	V1	V1	VA	VA	V1	V1	V1	V1	VC		VC	VA	VA	VA
5.4			VC	VC				VA	VC	VC	V2	V2		VC	V2		V1	V1	V1	VA
4.3					V1	V1	VA	VA						VC	VC	V1	V1			VA

Tabelle 5

PU	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	11	12	13	14	15	16	17	18	19	20	21	22	23	24	25	26	27	28	29	30	...	
Bedeutung	3	1			1							1							1												1	
Form					1	1				2			1						3	5	2	1	2	1	1							
Gebrauch																																
gebrauch-	1																															
Spiel	1		4			7													1		2	1	3	2			2					
spiel-										2									1			1	1	1						1	1	
Sprachspiel							4												1			2	1	3	2			2				
Sprach-													2																			
sprach-																																
Wort	34			1	8	3	1		6		2	1	3	4	3	8	2	1	3						1		2	12	5			
Wörter	4	1		1	8	1	4	6	2	2		2							4								1		1			
Einträge	31	8	1	8	8	21	30	7	12	21	2	0	7	1	1	10	5	4	12	25	18	8	18	8	7	3	9	2	17	8		
Fasern	3	3	1	1	3	4	3*	3	3	3	1	0	0	0	1	2*	2	1	2	2	5+	5+	5+	4+	3	3	2*	1	4	4		

PU	31	32	33	34	35	36	37	38	39	40	41	42	43	44	45	46	47	48	49	50	51	52	53	54	55	56	57	58	59	60	...	
Bedeutung										2	5	4	1	3		1				2						5	2	2				
Form	4		8	3	8	1																										
Gebrauch																																
gebrauch-																																
Spiel	14		1	3		1	1			3	2	2							1	2	3	7	2	8	10	1		1		2		
spiel-	1		1																													
Sprachspiel																																
Sprach-																																
sprach-																																
Wort	4		1	2	1		19	4	3	1	1	3	1	2		8	6	1					1		2	1	5		8			
Wörter											1	3								1	2	2	3		4							
Einträge	26	5	13	4	15	4	3	32	10	10	15	8	8	0	3	0	13	11	17	18	13	3	17	15	14	4	8	12	1	13		
Fasern	3	1	2*	3	3	3	2+	3+	3	3	4+	4+	4+	3*	1	6	2	4+	3+	3+	4+	1	2+	2+	3+	2	3*	3	1	3+		

PU	61	62	63	64	65	66	67	68	69	70	71	72	73	74	75	76	77	78	79	80	81	82	83	84	85	86	87	88	89	90	...	
Bedeutung																																
Form	2		4		1									1	6	2		1	1													
Gebrauch																																
gebrauch-																																
Spiel	1		4	2	10	1	8	4	5	5					5	1	1			2		3	1		2							
spiel-																																
Sprachspiel																																
Sprach-																																
sprach-																																
Wort	1																															
Wörter																																
Regel																																
Einträge	4	1	4	8	15	16	7	19	5	6	10	1	7	3	5	1	11	3	8	8	14	11	0	9	1	8	2	2	1	6		
Fasern	4	0	0	3+	3+	1	2	2	2	2	3*	1	1	1	0	1	4*	3	3	3	4	4	2	2	1	1	1	2	1			

Tabelle 6

# Ist das Wort Pfanne eindeutig ins Rumänische zu übersetzen? Vom Umgang mit einem Wort als Transporteur eines Bildes

Annelore Mayer, Baden, Österreich

„Cu gândiri și cu imagini Înnegrit-am multe pagini.“  
(„Mit grüblerischem Denken und mit Einbildungskraft  
Habe ich viele Seiten eingeschwärzt.“)

– So der nachhaltig von der Philosophie Schopenhauers geprägte rumänische Dichter Mihai Eminescu (1850-1889) (Eminescu 2002, 392).

Wir alle wissen, was eine Pfanne ist. Wissen wir es? Wir wissen es, insofern wir einer bestimmten Sprachgemeinschaft angehören und – im konkreten Falle der Pfanne – darüberhinaus einer bestimmten kulinarischen Gemeinschaft, in welcher einer Pfanne eine ganz konkrete werkzeugliche Funktion zukommt. In diesem gleichsam kulinarischen Wissen offenbart sich „die Gewohnheit eines Systems, die Fähigkeit zu sinnvoller akustischer Wahrnehmung und das beziehungsvolle Erleben, welche die Vertrautheit mit einer Sprache definieren.“ (Mayer 2006, 10) Die sinnvolle akustische Wahrnehmung muss auch als adäquate Umsetzung jenes Gesamtbildes jenes Dinges verstanden werden, welches durch das Wort zur Darstellung kommt, also gewissermaßen im Reden der Fall wird. Das „Ein-Gebildete“ beweist sich demnach hier als mitgestaltende Kraft. So ist also dabei im wahrsten Sinne des Wortes im Auge zu behalten, dass jenes Gesamtbild in sich eine Fülle von Einzelbildern trägt, welche durch ebendieses beziehungsvolle Erleben in kompetenter Weise zur Sprache kommen mit Hilfe eines zusammenfassenden Wortes. Dazu Arthur Schopenhauer: „Nothwendig ist das Wort zur Vergegenwärtigung des Begriffs realer Substanzen ... Wie sollen wir Eigenschaften stets zusammenhalten um sie als zusammengehörig beliebig zu vergegenwärtigen, wenn nicht ein Zeichen wäre, das den Begriff zusammenhält und den Gedanken hervorruft und mitteilt? Der Anschauung präsentirt sich bald die eine bald die andere Eigenschaft: bloß der Begriff hat sie immer beisammen, nur im Begriff sind sie uns zugleich gegenwärtig: und für unser sinnliches an Zeit und Succession gebundenes Bewußtseyn muß diese Gegenwart durch ein Wort bezeichnet werden.“ (Schopenhauer 1990, 261)

Im Falle der Pfanne ist also das Reden über dieselbe auch deren bildliche Darstellung durch akustische Mittel. Um im Besitze des sprachlich-kulinarischen Wissens über „Pfanne“ zu sein, ist es demnach notwendig, folgendes im Auge zu haben – und zwar durch akustische Zeichen: „Was das Bild darstellt, ist sein Sinn“ – so Ludwig Wittgenstein. (Wittgenstein 1984/1, 2.221) Dieser Sinn ist im wahrsten Sinne des Wortes bildlich in dem wahrzunehmen, was sich in einer Pfanne befindet und wie sie demnach ihren werkzeuglichen Aufgaben zugeführt wird.

Ein Blick – um im Optischen zu bleiben – auf die etymologische Herkunft des Wortes vermag schon einiges zu klären. Grundlage der „Pfanne“ ist das Lateinische „*patina*“ mit ähnlicher Bedeutung, nämlich der eines schalenartigen Gefäßes zur Bereitung einer heißen Speise. Die Römer übernahmen ihr Wort aus dem Griechischen, wo „*πατρανη*“ ebenfalls ein dergestaltiges Küchengerät akustisch zur Evidenz bringt. Über mittellateinisch „*panna*“ kam es ins Germanische. Dort wurde es einerseits unverändert bewahrt – isländisch „*panna*“ – oder erfuhr diverse Mutati-

onen: dänisch „*pande*“, niederländisch „*pan*“, norwegisch „*panne*“. Im Althochdeutschen hieß es „*phanna*“, im Mittelhochdeutschen „*phanne*“. In allen Fällen behielt das Wort das feminine Genus wie im Lateinischen, welches allerdings das maskuline Genus des griechischen Wortes umgewandelt hatte. In leichter lautlicher Veränderung ist „*patina*“ auch in eine deutsche Fachsprache eingedrungen: als „*Patene*“ bezeichnet man im römisch-katholischen Bereich ein liturgisches Gerät, welches den Kommunizierenden beim Empfang der Hostie unter das Kinn gehalten wird. Trotz derselben Ableitung wird ein deutlicher Unterschied hörbar und dieser ist auch sichtbar in der Verschiedenheit des unterschiedlich bezeichneten Werkzeuges.

Ein anderer Sachverhalt liegt im Bezug auf die Pfanne in den romanischen Sprachen vor. Hier ist eine auffällige Vielheit festzustellen. Das französische „*poêle*“ und das italienische „*padella*“ beruhen auf dem lateinischen Wort „*patella*“, was soviel wie „Opferschale“ bedeutet. Die portugiesische Pfanne heißt „*frigideira*“, die spanische „*sartén*“, die rumänische „*tigaie*“. In allen Fällen ist das Wort feminin.

Obwohl das Rumänische eine romanische Sprache ist, hat sie dieses Wort nicht aus dem Lateinischen übernommen, sondern aus dem Griechischen. Dort bedeutet „*τηγανον*“ eben genau das – eine Pfanne. Das Rumänische hat allerdings dieses maskuline Substantiv in ein feminines umgestaltet.

Das Bedientwerden innerhalb einer Sprachfamilie aus zwei unterschiedlichen Sprachen im Hinblick auf dasselbe Wort ist übrigens auch in slawischen Sprachen und da gerade wiederum am Beispiel „Pfanne“ festzustellen. Im Tschechischen heißt sie „*pánev*“, sie kommt also aus dem Lateinischen, die kroatische nennt sich „*tiganj*“ und macht ihre griechische Herkunft auch akustisch wahrnehmbar. Beide Wörter sind übrigens maskulin!

Zum griechischen „*τηγανον*“ gibt es auch eine lateinische und deutsche Verwandtschaft: „*tegula*“ und „Tiegel“ – letzterer ist aber von einer „Pfanne“ optisch und verwendungstechnisch höchstlich unterschieden.

„Nach der Benennung fragt nur der sinnvoll, der schon etwas mit ihr anzufangen weiß“ – dies stellt Wittgenstein fest (Wittgenstein 1984/1, 255/31). Was heißt aber, mit ihr „etwas anzufangen wissen“? Heißt das nicht, sich ein Bild gemacht zu haben, weil gewusst wird, welche Einzelercheinungen jene Gesamttatsache ausmachen, die da benannt wird? Welches Bild hat demnach ein Mensch vor Augen – und er hat es vor Augen, weil er es in sich hat, – welcher das Wort „*tigaie*“ spricht? Diesem Wort gehen in der traditionellen rumänischen Kultur folgende Bilder voraus: dieses „Küchengerät“ ist zumeist gar kein solches, da es im Freien verwendet wird und nicht vorzugsweise in der Küche. Es begleitet die herumwandernden Hirten, die mit ihren Tieren zu den Weideplätzen ziehen. Es begleitet aber auch die wandernden Musikanten, welche eine „*tigaie*“ an ihren Leiterwägen hängen haben, neben ihren Instrumenten, wie Baßgeige und Cimbalon. Dort macht „*tigaie*“ gleichsam ihre eigene Musik, so dass sie auch „Klangbilder“ erzeugt. Zur gegebenen Zeit kommt

sie über eine Feuerstelle und es wird darin Polenta und gegebenenfalls Leberpastete zubereitet – auch das erzeugt wieder eine eigene „Klanglichkeit“. Dann wird aus der „*tigaie*“ gegessen – wobei sie natürlich nicht auf einen Tisch gestellt wird, weil ja keiner vorhanden ist; die Menschen sitzen dann eben um sie herum und beim Essen singen sie und erzählen einander Geschichten. So die persönliche Mitteilung und „Bildbeschreibung“ von Dr. Hans Dama, Lektor für Rumänisch am Institut für Romanistik der Universität Wien.

Gerade eine solche authentische und kompetente „Bildbeschreibung“ macht deutlich, dass dem Wort „*tigaie*“ in der rumänischen Sprache – und nur in ihr – die Funktion einer von Wittgenstein so genannten „hinweisenden Definition“ zukommt. Denn hier wird diesem Philosophen gemäß folgendes deutlich: „Die hinweisende Definition erklärt den Gebrauch – die Bedeutung – des Wortes, wenn es schon klar ist, welche Rolle das Wort in der Sprache überhaupt spielen soll.“ (Wittgenstein 1984/1, 254/30)

Was bedeutet nun aber diese im Kontext mit dem Gebrauch stehende ganz bestimmte Kenntnis von Bildern, welche als Gesamtbild von einem rumänischsprachigen Menschen mit dem Wort „*tigaie*“ akustisch zur Evidenz gebracht wird für dessen Umgang mit dem im Wörterbuch als adäquat angegebenen deutschen Wort „Pfanne“ und dessen Bildern? Können „Pfanne“ und „*tigaie*“ wirklich so problemlos nebeneinander stehen wie im Wörterbuch? Dort stehen sie bildlos und somit uneindeutig. Es fehlt hier nämlich der Bezug zu den Elementen des Bildes. Aber Wittgenstein macht auf etwas Wesentliches aufmerksam: „Das Bild besteht darin, daß sich seine Elemente in bestimmter Art und Weise zueinander verhalten. Das Bild ist eine Tatsache.“ (Wittgenstein 1984/1, 2.14 – 2.141) Wenn ein rumänischsprachiger Mensch etwa während eines Urlaubes in Österreich beim Besuch einer urigen Gastwirtschaft beispielsweise auf einer Berghütte eine „Pfanne“ wahrnimmt als ein Gerät, welches bereits mit Speisen gefüllt aus der Küche auf den Tisch getragen wird, so kann in dieser Wahrnehmung der fehlende Bezug zu all dem evident werden, was „*tigaie*“ ausmacht. Das Gerät – als es selbst und in seiner „Gerätschaftlichkeit“ durchaus vertraut – erweist sich plötzlich als losgelöstes Element, losgelöst von der Wirklichkeit. Losgelöst somit auch aus dem durch das Wort zum Ausdruck gebrachte vertraute Bild. Jedoch ist gemäß Wittgenstein das Bild „so mit der Wirklichkeit verknüpft; es reicht bis zu ihr.“ (Wittgenstein 1984/1, 2.1511) Zwischen dieser Wirklichkeit und jenem Menschen, welcher dieselbe akustisch zur Evidenz bringt, hat also eine Innigwerdung stattgefunden und diese hat Beständigkeit gewonnen. Beides hat stattgefunden dadurch, dass es zwischen der Tatsache samt der diese konstituierenden Bildern und dem innig gewordenen Menschen ein selbstverständliches Vertrauensverhältnis gibt. Und in diesem Vertrauensverhältnis ist eben nichts losgelöst. „Ein Name steht für ein Ding, ein anderer für ein anderes Ding und untereinander sind sie verbunden, so stellt das Ganze – wie ein lebendes Bild – den Sachverhalt dar“ – so nochmals Wittgenstein (Wittgenstein 1984/1, 4.0311). Auf diese Art gesehen ist die scheinbar adäquate Gegenüberstellung von „Pfanne“ und „*tigaie*“ im Wörterbuch in Wirklichkeit der Versuch, anhand von äußerlichen Parallelitäten – ja, nun was herbeizuführen? Die Äußerlichkeit dieser Parallelität offenbart sich im gegebenen Fall durch die Art der Werkzeuglichkeit des benannten Gerätes, welche dem Kulinarischen zugeordnet ist. Sie gibt aber noch lange keine aufeinander bezogene Auskunft über eine Innigwerdung. „Sich in der Muttersprache über die Bezeichnung gewisser Dinge nicht irren können ist einfach der gewöhnliche Fall.“ (Wittgenstein 1984/8, 247/630) Das von Wittgenstein mit

Alltagsqualität belegte Auskennen meint eben auch das Kennen der Einzelbilder, welche durch das Wort zum Gesamtbild gefasst und als Eins aussprechbar gemacht werden. So gesehen wird durch die lexikalische Parallelität die Frage, ob das Wort „Pfanne“ eindeutig ins Rumänische zu übersetzen ist mit „Nein“ beantwortet. Sie geschieht nämlich ausschließlich auf der Präsentation der vermeintlichen Gleichheit im Hinblick auf die kulinarische Werkzeuglichkeit von „Pfanne“ und „*tigaie*“. Diese alleine schafft aber kein Innigwerden – es fehlen ja die dazugehörigen Einzelbilder.

Dies ist eine vielfach gemachte Erfahrung in der sprachvermittelnden Arbeit. Die Lehrperson ist dann aufgefordert, die Bildlosigkeit aufzuheben. Das bedeutet aber nichts weniger, als unterschiedliche Bilder einander zuzuführen, oder, ein weiteres Mal wittgensteinisch gesprochen, nicht nur die unterschiedlichen Wörter, sondern die existentiell mit ihnen verbundenen Bilder von den jeweiligen Flüssen des Lebens, wo die Wörter ihre Bedeutung haben – und eben nur dort – hinüberzuführen in ein zu suchendes Sammelbecken. „*Traducere*“ – „Hinüberführung“, in beiden Fällen feminin, macht diese Aktion in beiden Sprachen auch bildlich nachvollziehbar. Die kulinarische Werkzeuglichkeit von „Pfanne“ und „*tigaie*“ kann dabei einen sinnvollen Bezugspunkt geben. Von ihm soll nicht ausgegangen, es soll vielmehr etwas auf ihn hingeführt werden. Was könnte also gleichermaßen in einer „*tigaie*“ und in einer „Pfanne“ brutzeln und so ein gemeinsames, vergemeinsamendes Bild hervorrufen? Eine rumänische Deutschstudentin hatte in dieser Hinsicht einmal eine Glanzidee, welche von der Lehrperson durchaus als Sternstunde im Unterricht zu würdigen war. Sie – die Studentin – sah sowohl in der „*tigaie*“ als auch in der „Pfanne“ einen Eierkuchen. Der heißt in ihrer Sprache „*plăcintă*“, in Österreich „Palatschinke“. Das österreichische Wort für diese Traditionsmehlspeise ist etymologisch mit dem rumänischen zutiefst verwandt und beide haben ihren Ausgangspunkt in der lateinischen „*placenta*“ – mit diesem Wort bezeichneten die römischen Hausfrauen einen runden Eierkuchen, welchen sie „*in patina*“, also in der heißen Pfanne zubereiteten. Rumänische und österreichische Menschen können sich im gegenständlichen Falle also gleichermaßen kulinarisch auf die alten Römer beziehen. So kam der „*plăcintă* / Palatschinke“ in der konkreten Unterrichtssituation die das unterrichtliche Geschehen befruchtend weiterführende Funktion eines „Überschnittsbildes“ zu, welches die bildlose lexikalische Parallelität wiederum dem Bildlichen zugänglich machte. Es konnte nämlich – nochmals mit Wittgenstein gesprochen – die „Seele“ des jeweiligen Wortes wieder eine – ihre – Rolle spielen (vgl. Wittgenstein 1984/1, 440/530).

Dieser Gedanke kann für sich Kontinuität beanspruchen. Im 12. Jahrhundert beispielsweise formulierte ihn Bernhard von Clairvaux folgendermaßen: „*Instructio doctorum reddit, affectio sapientes.*“ („Die Unterweisung bildet gelehrte, die durch Beeindruckung herbeigeführte Gestimmtheit Weise.“ (Bernhard 1994, 342) Gelehrte können Wörter wie ein Wörterbuch parallelitäten, die Weisen, welche auch die verschiedenen Bilder in sich tragen, können sie verstehen.

Demnach war die Freude der rumänischen Deutschstudentin umso größer, weil es ihr nämlich auch schon aufgefallen war, dass nichtösterreichische Deutschsprechende die Palatschinke nicht in ihren lateinischen Wurzeln und daher auch nicht in deren „Mehlspeisenidentität“ kennen und deshalb oft von dem „Palat-Schinken“ sprechen und diesen auch mit einem männlichen Artikel ausstatten. Die akustische Realisierung im Hören ruft bei solchen Menschen eben das Bild von etwas Fleischigem,

einem Schinken eben, hervor und der ist im Deutschen ja tatsächlich maskulin. Von einem „Überschneidungsbild“ kann hier aber keineswegs gesprochen werden.

So wirft jeder „Fluß des Lebens“ seine eigenen, optisch wie akustisch zustande gekommenen Spiegelbilder zurück, welche durch feinfühliges „*traduce* / übersetzen“ – durchaus auch im fährtechnischen Sinne gemeint – miteinander überschritten werden können, so dass eine vergemeinsamende Innigwerdung möglich wird. Diese aber ist es, die evident macht, dass es die Wörter sind, welchen im Lebensfluß ihrer Sprachen die Funktion der Transporteure von autochthonen Bildern zukommt. Fehlt sie, so besteht in höchstem Maße die Gefahr, dass ein Mensch auch bei guter lexikalischer Kenntnis einer anderen Sprache doch nichts Besseres vermag, als dass er – wie es Hans Dama in einem Gedicht ausdrückt - „aus dem Blechnapf leerer Sprache frißt.“ (Dama 1999, 34)

Abschließend noch ein erhellend-bestätigender Hinweis: Dieser „Blechnapf“ ist im hier vorgestellten Sachverhalt nach Aussage des Fachmannes Dama ins Rumänische mit „*tigaie*“ zu übersetzen.

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# Von der versagenden Sprache zum verklanglichten Bild – Mechthild von Magdeburgs tönende *figurata locutio*

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„Nun gebricht mir mein Deutsch.“ (Mechthild 1995, 44) Auf einem Höhepunkt analytischen Vorgehens im Hinblick auf etwas von ihr Erlebtes sieht sich Mechthild von Magdeburg (1207–1292) in ihrem großen Werk *„Ein vliessendes lieht der gotheit“* außerstande, dem Gegenstand nachdenkender Betrachtung weitere Wörtlichkeit abzugewinnen zu können.

Wie vermag dem auch anders zu sein! Ludwig Wittgenstein wird 700 Jahre später vergleichbar dazu sagen: „Die Gegenstände kann ich nur *nennen* ... *Ich kann von ihnen sprechen, sie aussprechen kann ich nicht.*“ (Wittgenstein 1984, 3.221) Es geht demnach hier nicht ausschließlich um Mechthilds Position als Erlebnismystikerin, wiewohl dergleichen Stellen die historische Position dieser Denkerin klar werden lassen: als deutsch Schreibende ist sie genötigt, Begriffe, welche in der von ihr verwendeten Sprache noch nicht geprägt sind neu zu finden – und sie tut dies unter Rückgriff auf die Tradition, indem sie sich des Mittels der *„figurata locutio“*, also einer im weitesten Sinne „bildlichen“ Rede bedient. Das „Bildliche“ wird von ihr aber keineswegs nur optisch verstanden, denn zur Bewältigung ihrer Aufgabe wendet sich Mechthild immer wieder der Musik und deren Begrifflichkeit zu. Ein solches Vorgehen ist philosophiegeschichtlich wohlbegründet und fußt auf dem für das Mittelalter so wichtigen Aurelius Augustinus. Die Musik ist nach dessen Aussage als *„scientia bene modulandi“* (Augustinus 2002, 6) demnach nicht nur etwas sinnlich Erfahrbares, sondern als Theorie gleichermaßen ein wichtiges geistiges Erkenntnismittel. Beides ist für die Magdeburgerin von grundlegender Bedeutung im Hinblick auf ihr Vorgehen, steht im Mittelpunkt ihres Buches doch die reflektierende Auseinandersetzung mit den ihr als Mystikerin leiblich-geistig – also gesamt menschlich – zuteil gewordenen Erfahrungen in der *Unio mystica*, der Einswerdung mit Gott. Jener ist auch ihr Gesprächspartner in den dialogisierenden Teilen des Werkes, welche an entscheidenden Stellen von der freien zur gebundenen Sprache übergehen und sich so formal eines musikalischen Werkzeuges – des Rhythmus – bedienen.

Die absichtsvolle Zusammenführung von Erfahrung und Analyse und die dabei statthabende reflexive Begriffsfindung in der Muttersprache – das sind Ingredienzien, welche Mechthild zu einer Gestalt der europäischen Philosophiegeschichte gemacht haben.

Dass sie nach Festgefügtheit bei Augustinus, bei der Musik und der Technik der *figurata locutio* sucht, das zeigt sie im Einklang mit der Überzeugung jener Epoche, dass sie sich in ihrer philosophischen Arbeit, auf der Suche nach Ausdruck unter Anwendung künstlerischer Mittel, nicht als *„creatrix“* verstehen darf, sondern als *„inventrix“*, welche Möglichkeiten *findet*, das ihr Aufgetragene darzustellen.

Freilich: ein Erlebnis ist für Mechthild mit dem Aussprechen des Begriffes nicht nachzuvollziehen, weil diesem als ihm selbst gerade der erlebnishafte Aspekt fehlt. Das sinnlich-leibliche Erlebnis ist aber, gleichberechtigt dem Denken, ein dem Menschen angemessenes Mittel der Erkenntnis. Das ist gute, wieder auf Augustinus fußende

christliche Tradition. Dieser stellt in *„De Trinitate“* fest: *„Cum enim duo sunt genera rerum quae sciuntur, unum earum quae per sensum corporis percipit animus, alterum earum quae per se ipsum, multa illi philosophi garriunt contra corporis sensus; ... sed absit a nobis ut ea quae per sensum corporis didicimus, uera esse dubitemus.“* (Augustinus 2001, 306)

So offenbart sich das, was erkannt werden will, in einer sinnlich wahrnehmbaren Weise, nämlich in verschiedensten Bildern, welche dann folgerichtig auch eine sinnliche Reflexion ermöglichen, respective nach einer solchen geradezu verlangen. Aber diese Bilder bleiben nicht im Optischen alleine verhaftet, sie beziehen zumal das Akustische mit ein, ja, verlassen an entscheidenden Stellen das Sehen, um sich ganz dem Hören zu überlassen.

Dieses Hören erweist sich dann als die volle Umfassung des göttlichen Gesprächspartners, der Mechthild einmal optisch wie akustisch wahrnehmbar als festverwurzelter singender Baum entgegentritt, um ihr die Folgerichtigkeit erwünschten gegenseitigen Handelns kundzugeben:

So du den bön umbevahest, denne lere ich dich der  
megde sang, die wise, dú wort, den suessen klang ...  
(Mechthild 2008, 68f).

An 18 Schnittstellen ihres Buches verbildlicht Mechthild ihren Text klanglich. Hier werden zur Musik gehörende Begriffe nachhaltig eingesetzt, Wörter, welche dem Klang von Instrumenten, dem Gesang und dem Tanz zugeordnet sind.

Dabei ist zu unterscheiden, ob ihr das Erlebnis schon von sich aus und unmittelbar als sinnlich erfahrbares Klangbild entgegentritt, oder ob sie es in der nachfolgenden Reflexion als solches gestaltet. Eine weitere Möglichkeit nützt sie, wenn sie sich selbst in eine musikalische Konfiguration hineinverlangt:

So spricht si: »Ich mag nit tanzen, herre, du enleitest mich. Wilt du, das ich sere springe, so müst du selber vor ansingen; so springe ich in die minne, von der mine in bekanntnisse, von bekanntnisse in gebbruchunge, von gebbruchunge über alle moenschliche sinne. Da will ich blißen und doch fúrbas crigen.«  
(Mechthild 2008, 40f)

Hier ist darauf zu verweisen, dass der Tanz mit der ihm zugehörigen Musik, die im Mittelalter oftmals auch gesungen wurde, in dieser Epoche als ein im Erleben nachvollziehbares klanglich-optisches Bild der Ordnung Gottes in seiner Schöpfung – realisiert im richtigen Setzen der Tanzschritte an den entsprechenden Stellen der Musik – verstanden worden ist.

Als sinnlich und geistig vom Menschen erlebbarer Ausdruck göttlicher Ordnung ist die Tonkunst auch fähig, das Gute zur Darstellung zu bringen. Auf der Grundlage dieses Gedankens vollziehen sich demnach Mechthilds Überlegungen wie jene zur Beschaffenheit des schlechthin guten, weil geistlichen Menschen. Gemäß dem ihr zuteil

gewordenen Schau- und Klangbild gleicht dieser „einem Tier in dreißig Dingen seiner Natur“. In ihrer reflektierenden Rede vermittelt die Magdeburgerin gleichermaßen die sehend wahrzunehmenden Körperteile dieses Wesens wie das an ihm Hörbare so, wie es ihr eben, ihre Augen und Ohren gleichermaßen einnehmend und beschäftigend, entgegentritt.

Dieses Tier hat nämlich „goldene Barthaare, die klingen so lieblich, wenn es saugt, daß die süße Stimme und der fröhliche Klang in seinem Herzen erklingt ... Das Tier hat große Ohren. Sie halten sich offen zum Himmel hin, und es lauscht auf den Gesang der Vögel.“ (Mechthild 1995, 144f).

Es ist an diesem „Tier“ demnach sowohl selbst etwas, das Klang wird, es wendet sich aber gleichermaßen selbst dem Klang zu. Diese von Mechthild reflektierte Erscheinungsform als Schau- und Klangbild ist nicht nur im Sinne der Gesamtheit – jener einer sinnlichen und danach bedenkenden Wahrnehmbarkeit – von definitiver Wichtigkeit. In ihr offenbart sich ebenso – gerade im Zusammenhang mit der Erkenntnis Gottes und des göttlichen Wortes – eine Bereitschaft und eine Fähigkeit zu ebendieser Bereitschaft: nämlich zu jener, dem erkennenden Hören den Vorzug zu geben vor dem Sehen. Diesem wohl auch auf physikalisch-physiologischen Vorstellungen damaliger Zeiten beruhendem und auf Grund dieser ebenso naturwissenschaftlich begründetem Vorzuggeben teilt der Magdeburgerin später Zeitgenosse Meister Eckhart folgenden Sinn zu: „*Wan daz werk des hœrennes des ewigen wortes, daz ist in mir und daz werk des sehennes daz gât von mir. Und daz hœren bin ich lîdende, aber daz sehen bin ich wûrkende.*“ (Eckhart 2003, 421) Das heißt also, dass im Hören das Bild von außen - soll bedeuten: von Gott – in den Menschen hineinkommt und dort auf jenes Bild trifft, das dieser Mensch sehend in sich geformt hat. So kommt dem Hören eben dann der höhere Wert in der Suche nach Erkenntnis zu und auf Grund dessen ist auch die Notwendigkeit gegeben, hinter die akustischen Seiten eines Bildes zu kommen, damit gerade sie in ihrer eindringenden Wirkung Relevanz gewinnen können. Freilich muss die *figurata locutio sonans* – das tönende Bild – eine durch die Vernunft erkennbare und durch sie nachvollziehbare Angemessenheit aufweisen. Der Eckhartschüler Heinrich Seuse, Philosoph gleichermaßen wie Erlebnismystiker und in dieser Doppelfunktion der Magdeburgerin geistig eng verwandt, weist in seinem erkenntnistheoretischen Werk „*Daz buechli der Warheit*“ expressis verbis darauf hin. In dieser dialogisch gestalteten Schrift läßt er das göttliche Wort selbst den definitiven Satz sprechen: „*daz guteû vernünftîgû bilde nût werin zu verwerffene, dû ir klaren vernünftîgkeit underwûrfliche haltend nach meinunge der heiligen kristenheit.*“ (Seuse 1993, 4)

Vernünftigkeit und somit vernünftige Nachvollziehbarkeit unter Einsatz des Denkens und der Sinne erweist sich aber im Hinblick auf Klangliches in dessen Angemessenheit. Zu dieser Erkenntnis kommt Aurelius Augustinus in „*De Musica*“, wo er, ausgehend von seinem Dictum „*Musica est scientia bene modulandi*“ eine weitere Definition für die Musik ableitet: „*Musica est scientia bene movendi... Unde aliud est modulari, aliud bene modulari.*“ (Augustinus 2002, 12) Die gute Abmessung führt aber zur Angemessenheit. Und in dieser Angemessenheit kommt der Musik die Fähigkeit zu, sich zu erstrecken. Das kann von Menschen dadurch wahrgenommen werden, dass er ein musikalisches Werk als in der Zeit stattfindend erlebt. Darüberhinaus kann aber diese Erstreckung auch eine solche von der Zeit in die Ewigkeit sein und somit den Menschen in seiner ihm zugemessenen Zeit auf Erden mit der Ewigkeit Gottes verbinden. Darüber war sich einer der

bedeutendsten Komponisten des 20. Jahrhunderts, Olivier Messiaen (1908-1992) – nach persönlicher Aussage ein „*né croyant*“ - gerade als Künstler völlig im Klaren. In Kompositionen wie „*Couleurs de la cité céleste*“, „*Eclairs sur l'au-dela*“ oder „*Des canyons aux étoiles*“ schuf er Musik, welche nach seinen eigenen Worten im Hören auch gesehen werden kann, zumal in Farben. Diese Werke sind keineswegs Bildbeschreibungen mit Hilfe von Tönen, also gleichsam musikalische Nacherzählungen. Denn das von ihm geschaffene Klang- und Schaubild ist nach Messiaens Auffassung dem ausschließlich optisch zu rezipierenden Bild in einem Punkt wesentlich überlegen: es kann sich erstrecken, ohne seine Position gegenüber den Rezipierenden dadurch zu verändern. Das heißt: es geht den „Hör-Schauenden“ nicht verloren, sondern zieht sie in angemessener Weise mit hinein in diese Erstreckung. Eben deshalb kann die „Himmliche Stadt“ in allen ihren Farben erscheinen, leuchtet die Ewigkeit als ewig in die menschliche Zeit hinein, ist der Weg von den Schluchten zu den Sternen als ganzer praesent und kann doch in der Zeit begangen werden. Messiaen sagt es selbst sehr anschaulich: „*Un tableau est quelque chose préalable, de figé, ce n'est pas la musique en mouvement. Aucune explication ne peut rendre ces étoiles, ces spirales, ces arcs-en-ciel aux couleurs ineffables, que je vois tourner les uns dans les autres, à la même vitesse, que les sons, lorsque j'attends de la musique ... c'est un phénomène synesthésique merveilleux, indépendant de la conscience claire, irréductible aux classements et aux catalogues.*“ (Vinay 2008, 150)

Den messiaen'schen Ausgangsaspekt hat 1789 der Philosoph und Dichter Novalis folgendermaßen angesprochen: „Die Skulptur ist das Gebildete Starre. Die Musik das (gebildete) *Flüssige*.“ (Novalis 1993, 19)

Jedenfalls: was der Komponist aussagt, das ist in seiner Musik nachhörbar und wird damit sichtbar. Denn es ist jenes verklanglichte Bild, welches zum Auslöser dieses „*phénomène synesthésique*“ wird. Und in der Tat handelt es sich bei der Rezeption eines solchen verklanglichten Bildes um ein vielsinnliches Ereignis, welches allerdings seinen Ausgangspunkt im Hören hat, bei welchem der Mensch in der Bewußtheit des Erkenntnisgewinnes im besten Sinne des Wortes von sich und mit Meister Eckhart sagen kann „*daz hœren bin ich lîdende.*“

Eine Betrachtung „*sub specie aeternitatis*“ Messiaens im legitimen Kontext bedenkenden Glaubens mit Mechthild von Magdeburg – hier durchaus berücksichtigend, dass sich der französische Komponist nicht als Mystiker verstanden wissen wollte - das gibt Anlass zu Überlegungen im Hinblick auf die von beiden postulierte Erstreckung des Klanglichen vom Zeitlichen ins Ewige, welche dem Menschen Teilhabe ermöglicht an der „*Coincidentia oppositorum*“ von Bewegung und Standfestigkeit. Wie sehr bei solchen Überlegungen die Zeit in ihrer Erscheinungsform als gerade aktuelle Gegenwart bedeutungslos ist, das hat Messiaen, dessen Innovationskraft unbestritten ist, bewiesen. Wie sehr er bei seinem innovativen Vorgehen den Rückbezug, also die „*religio*“ im wörtlichsten Sinne suchte, läßt sich an schlichtweg allen seinen Werken erkennen, markantest vielleicht schon am Titel seiner späten Komposition „*Un vitrail et des oiseaux*“ aus dem Jahre 1986. Der „*Vitrail*“, ein farbintensives bemaltes Glasfenster in einer gotischen Kathedrale, war für den Komponisten zeitlebens ein Faszinosum *par excellence*. Andererseits ist es ein Phänomen, welches kunstgeschichtlich definiert der Epoche Mechthilds zugehört. Vor diesem Kirchenfenster, dem durch die Jahrhunderte Beständigen und in der Leuchtkraft seiner Farben Feststehenden bewegen sich Vögel und der Komponist stellt vor die ihm Zuhörenden in

seinen Klängen die gleichzeitig nachvollziehbare Einheit von *stabilitas* und *motus* her.

Der Klang ist also das in Ausgedehntheit Vernehmbare durch seine Fähigkeit der Erstreckung. Das verklanglichte Bild macht demnach eine in der Zeit gehabte Erkenntnis für den Menschen ebenfalls erstreckbar und im besten aller Fälle in Ewigkeit nachhörbar und damit auch schaubar. Mechthild von Magdeburg vermag es klangbildlich darzustellen:

Und wie die Gottheit klingt und die Menschheit singt  
und der Heilige Geist die Harfen des Himmels spielt,  
daß alle Saiten klingen, die da gespannt sind in der  
Minne. (Mechthild 1995, 43)

Der ewige Gott und der nach Ewigkeit verlangende Mensch in seiner irdischen Lebenszeit klingen unter den Vorzeichen der Liebe zusammen – und das ist ein Bild, das der Mensch auch schon auf Erden vernehmen kann.

Auf Grund ihrer intensiven Überlegungen vermag es Mechthild gegen Ende ihres Buches, in einer metaphorischen Zuordnung klösterlicher Ämter an die Tugenden, die Musik als die Kunst des sich erstreckenden Klanges einer der Kardinaltugenden in die Hände legen:

Sangmeisterin ist die Hoffnung, sie erfüllt mit demütig heiliger Andacht, daß des Herzens Ohnmacht im Sange vor Gott gar herrlich klingt, daß Gott die Noten minnt, die tief im Herzen singen. Wer versteht, mit ihr zu singen, dem wird es auch gelingen mit ihr in der himmlischen Liebe. (Mechthild 1995, 306f)

Das werdende Gelingen ist aber das, was durch das Klang- und Schaubild schon erkenntnisbildend im Erlebnis und der Erfahrung davon von Mechthild antizipiert wurde

und sich der analysierenden Denkerin im Tanz als sich nicht widersprechender Wunsch „*da will ich bleiben und doch fürbas crigen*“ offenbart. Dieses Offenbarwerden und dessen Innwerdung ist dann allerdings ein wahrhaft „vielsinniges“ Ereignis, ein „*phénomène synesthésique merveilleux*“, bei welchem nicht nur einer Mechthild von Magdeburg das „Deutsch gebricht“. „Denn“, so Wittgenstein, „es ist klar, daß wenn man hier das Letzte sagen will man eben auf die Grenze der Sprache kommen muß, die es ausdrückt.“ (zitiert bei Rothhaupt 2008, 437)

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# Beginning Without the Saying/Showing Distinction

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Wittgenstein is uncertain of how to picture the preconditions of all language. He vacillates between a realism that construes these facts as logically prior to language, and an idealism that construes them as internal to it. I argue that he is reluctant to endorse either picture because each seems to presuppose the troubled notion of a *shown* but ineffable reality. After arguing that the root of this apparent dilemma is a tension between methodological quietism and the view that grammar is arbitrary, I offer two suggestions on how the dilemma might be dissolved.

## 1. The Picture

Wittgenstein *wants* to say that language has its historical origin, and logical foundation, in the primitive reactions that early human beings first had to certain regularities in nature (Wittgenstein 1980, 31e; Wittgenstein 1967, §391, §540-§541, §545; Wittgenstein 1975, §474-§475, §401-§402, Wittgenstein 1958, 230, 56, §142).<sup>1</sup> He believes that this view expresses an obvious historical truism that characterizes our world picture (Wittgenstein 1975, §617-§618; Wittgenstein 1975a, I-§5, Wittgenstein 1958, 230; cf., *ibid.*, §415), but is uncertain of how to interpret this truism. He thinks it a faulty realism to construe the origins of thought as extralinguistic, and a faulty idealism to construe them as intralinguistic. I offer an account of this apparent dilemma and suggest two ways it can be navigated.

## 2. Taking the Picture Literally

We see the inclination toward realism in Wittgenstein's concern that the origins of language are logically indescribable. It seems to him that, if it is indeed obvious that "the possibility of a language-game is conditioned by certain facts", these facts would have to be shown, rather than *said*, to exist (Wittgenstein 1975, §617-§618). Intolerant of the saying / showing distinction, he adds that "that's not how it is" (*ibid.*), but he remains uncertain of how this false appearance is to be dissolved.

Struggling to make sense of this illusion, Wittgenstein deviates from his temptation to picture the foundations of language as clearly specifiable primitive behaviours. He now considers picturing them as mysterious *some things* in an indescribable "bustle of life" (Wittgenstein 1980a, II-§624-§625; cited in Stern 1995, 191): How are we to imagine the evolution of language from this ethereal background? "The picture is something like this: Though the ether is filled with vibrations the world is dark. But one day man opens his seeing eye, and there is light" (Wittgenstein 1958, 184). Still unsatisfied, Wittgenstein tells us that this picture is obscure, and that it somehow "takes us in" (*ibid.*).

This concern is illuminated when we compare this picture with one Wittgenstein considered using to represent the foundations of language circa 1930, but which he recognized as senseless. At this time he believed these foundations were sense impressions of a specious present experiential flux (Wittgenstein 1975a, V-§54, VII-§68, XIV-§168; cf. *ibid.*, XIV-§166; Wittgenstein 1980, 8e, 16e). He realized that this *given* could not be significantly imagined

even as an imprecise array of vibrations in the phenomenal field, for this picture locates the given in the grammatical space of 'precision' and 'imprecision' and, therefore, fails to station it at its supposed post logically prior to language (Wittgenstein 1975a, XX-§217, §213).<sup>2</sup>

This realization resounds in the ambivalence about picturing the foundation of thought as an array of vibrations in the ether of a dark pre-linguistic world. No less than when we try to imagine an extralinguistic background as an order of specifiable primitive behaviors, when we try to imagine one as an indefinite blur, the descriptive content of the notion evaporates under scrutiny and leaves us with an inarticulate sound (see, Wittgenstein 1958, §257, §261). The notion, then, 'take us in' in the same way it took in Wittgenstein during his middle period; it gives us the impression that language is derived from some *shown* reality beyond the bounds of sense (Wittgenstein 1975a, XIV-§168). Though it prescind from the early phenomenism, the later attempt to imagine the foundations of language still tries to 'begin before the beginning' (Wittgenstein 1975, §471; cf., Wittgenstein 1975a, VII-§68).

Despite its apparent senselessness, the view that language is made possible by a reality independent of internal relations is not abandoned (Wittgenstein 1958, §374, 184). This is odd, for when the logical atomist indulges this view, Wittgenstein counters with the observation that "[w]hat looks as if it *had* to exist, is part of the language" (*ibid.*, §50; cf., Wittgenstein 1974, VII-§95). Why does Wittgenstein not heed this same corrective himself? Why not recognize language as the domain of possibility *within* which facts exist, and, in line with the view that our world picture might be a kind of mythology (Wittgenstein 1975, §95), recognize the notion of a natural order that makes this domain possible as a useful cosmological metaphor? On this view the foundations of language would be no more *logically* prior to language than our private mental states are *logically* private so the problem of sensibly describing those foundations would dissolve.

In fact, the troubles with this tempting realism motivate a countervailing temptation toward just this alternative view.

## 3. Taking the Picture Metaphorically

After struggling to describe any genuine preconditions of language (Wittgenstein 1956, III-§24) Wittgenstein desists in that effort and submits: "The limit of the empirical—is *concept formation*" (Wittgenstein 1956, III-§29; cf., *ibid.*, V-§18; Wittgenstein 1980, 9e-10e). Indeed, in these moods, when he is not "putting the cart before the horse" and construing those founding primitive behaviors as literally prior to language, he describes those behaviors clearly, and without concern that doing so tries to 'begin before the beginning' (Wittgenstein 1967, §540-§542, §545; cf., Wittgenstein 1958, 226). Here the background is thought to be fully expressed in hinge propositions (Wittgenstein 1975, §401-§402; cf., *ibid.*, §87, §167; Wittgenstein 1980, 8e), and since the being of propositions presupposes the being of a whole linguistic practice, "[w]hat has to be accepted,



the given, is – so one could say – *forms of life*” (Wittgenstein 1958, 226; cf., *ibid.*, §241).

Though picturing the world as internal to language allows us to speak about the preconditions of thought, Wittgenstein worries that he lacks the conceptual contrivances necessary to support the picture (Wittgenstein 1956, III-§54; cf., Wittgenstein 1980, 9e-10e). Bernard Williams and Jonathan Lear propose that these contrivances are notions of *alternative languages*.

The view that the body of fact falls within the limits of *language* is meant to capture the idea that those limits are contingent; they are distinctly *our* limits as opposed to ones we might have had if the interests of human life had engendered different concepts. However, as Williams and Lear contend (Williams 1981, 158, 160; Lear 1984, 232) it seems to Wittgenstein that the notion of ‘different concepts’ is incoherent (Wittgenstein 1975a, V-§47, VI-§58; Wittgenstein 1974, VI-§71; Wittgenstein 1958, 147). Struggling with this impression he writes:

If [people] really have a different concept than I do, this must be shown by the fact that I can’t quite figure out their use of words. But I have kept on saying that it’s conceivable for our concepts to be different than they are. Was all that nonsense? (Wittgenstein 1978, III-§123-§124, quoted in Forster 2004, 173)

Given our quietist fidelity to the actual grammar of ‘language’ (or ‘concept’), for any use of words to count as ‘language’, we must be able to learn the meaning of those words (Wittgenstein 1958, §124, §207). Sharing Donald Davidson’s premise that an alternative language would not meet this criterion, Wittgenstein also shares his impression that the notion ‘alternative language’ is confused (Davidson 2001, 190, 185). This same impression is expressed as a concern that we misuse the modal operator when we say that these unimaginably different concepts are ‘possible’ (Wittgenstein 1974, VI-§82; Wittgenstein 1958, §497 cf. Wittgenstein 1967, §253-§254; Wittgenstein 1956, II-§84)

Williams and Lear plausibly submit that this Davidsonian observation makes it appear to Wittgenstein that the notion that facts are internal to language amounts to an unsustainable idealism that collapses into the Kantian view that facts fall within the modal boundaries of the world, which could not be other than they are (Lear 1984, 238; Williams 1981, 161, 163). Less plausibly, they suggest that Wittgenstein entertains this idealism, despite its senselessness, because he thinks its truth can be shown but not said (Lear 1984, 242; Williams 1981, 163). This is unlikely not only because the saying / showing distinction is denounced in the later work, but because we can account for why this idealism is tolerated, without disregarding this denunciation, once we consider the later-day temptation to say that grammar is arbitrary (see, Wittgenstein 1974, §133-§134).

Wittgenstein retains an inclination toward idealism because he is reluctant to trust his impression that radically alternative grammars are impossible. The fact that concepts are not rationally necessitated by corresponding metaphysical essences appears to undermine the idea that there are any concepts we *couldn’t* rightfully countenance or discard (Wittgenstein 1958, §372-§374, §520, §230; Wittgenstein 1956, I-§74; Wittgenstein 1974, VII-§95). Though the view seems to violate his quietist commitment to the grammar we have, Wittgenstein is tempted to say that this failure of essentialism leaves open the ‘possibility’ of even ‘languages’ unimaginable to the language

we currently have (Wittgenstein 1967, §387-§388, §390, §339; Wittgenstein 1974, VI-§73; cf., Wittgenstein 1956, II-§84). Ultimately, he intimates that grammar can be described in contrast to these possible alternatives, but he is uneasy about this belief having not yet determined how these apparent possibilities can be expressed (Wittgenstein 1975, §501). Correspondingly, he uneasily entertains the idealism that presupposes the possibility of this description, unwilling to endorse that view before he can offer the description with confidence.

We’re told that this puzzlement over the origins of concepts is connected with the apparent impossibility of alternative languages (Wittgenstein 1974, VI-§71). We can now see this connection, and answer our question of why that awkward realism about those origins is not dismissed. Uncertain of the alternative grammars necessary for picturing the preconditions of concepts as internal to a transcendental language, Wittgenstein returns to considering language as an empirical phenomenon that evolves from a genuinely pre-linguistic reality. Reflections on the awakening of consciousness leave him equivocating between an idealism that seems to presuppose shown but ineffable grammars and a realism that seems to presuppose shown but ineffable pre-linguistic facts.

#### 4. Dissolving the Dilemma

How should Wittgenstein navigate this dilemma? Barry Stroud and Michael Forster claim that he need not be able to describe radically different languages in order to countenance the possibility of such things (Stroud 1984, 255; Forster 2004, 181-182). If this were so, he could sensibly specify language as the idealistic limit of the world and dissolve his ineffable realism about the origins of language.

But what if Davidson is correct? If radically alternative concepts are chimerical, idealism really will collapse into a kind of post-Kantian pure realism. However, this result would leave room for us to navigate our dilemma.

To stay true to his quietism, at this juncture Wittgenstein should not follow Davidson and abandon the notion of alternative languages, but part with him and abandon the problematic premise that alternative languages would have to be unimaginable from the perspective of the language we have. The notion of these alternatives would remain important and intelligible; it would simply need to be sensibly cashed out.

To do this, Wittgenstein could side with Quine and say that different conceptual schemes are individuated by different ontologies (Quine 2004, 184). Here, ‘our language’ might be given by the ontology of everyday objects that human beings have in common, and could be contrasted with languages given by the other actual ontologies, and the infinitely more possible ontologies, that we can easily comprehend. This countless plurality of languages would thus replace the monolithic ‘language’ of idealism as the landscape of all that we can imagine.

The general notion of ‘language’ would here amount to a shorthand way of speaking about these particular languages that carries no idealistic implication that these particulars compose a larger language when taken together. The realism of this view recognizes that these languages only compose the necessary modal order of the world. Accordingly, the slogan ‘facts are internal to language’ would paraphrase the idea that every fact is internal to one or another of these various grammars.

Like that idealism that would be left open by the Stroud-Forster view, this realism allows for a picture of concept formation that rests upon neither inexpressible languages, nor upon inexpressible pre-linguistic facts. Our talk about the evolution of concepts would amount to one language's mythology about what *had* to exist as a pre-condition for the possibilities of mind and world that we find in the space of grammars.

Whether or not quietism undermines the arbitrariness of grammar and precludes the possibility of radically different concepts, Wittgenstein can conclude that talk about the origins of language specifies facts internal to language and, so, amounts to a kind of cosmological metaphor.

### Endnotes

<sup>1</sup> Since this view is both historical and logical in nature, I shall shift between these two ways of describing it.

<sup>2</sup> For a detailed discussion of this middle period view, see, Stern 1995, 160-192.

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# Simulation Theory With or Without Introspection: An Expressivist Compromise

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In this paper, I will defend Robert Gordon's non-introspectionist version of the simulation theory of social cognition against the criticism put forth by Alvin Goldman, who argues that simulation theory must include an introspectionist account of mental concepts. My strategy will be to isolate the compelling part of Goldman's challenge and then consider conceptual options for meeting it without turning to full-blown introspectionism, i.e. by taking on a deflationary account of introspection, based upon Wittgenstein's expressivist conception of self-ascription. But first I will briefly introduce and contextualize simulation theory.

## 1. Background: theory theory versus simulation theory

Theoretical debate and empirical research into social cognition and mental concepts have been dominated by two theories: theory theory and simulation theory. According to theory theory, social cognition involves two central components:

- i) Mental concepts to denote mental states, conceived as unobservable entities causing behavior.
- ii) Nomological generalizations linking mental states among each other and to perception and behavior.

Obviously, two components are closely linked. Obviously, theory theory yields a functionalist account of mental concepts, which highlights criteria that are accessible from the third-person perspective, thus marginalizing introspection.

The basic insight of simulation theory is that we don't need to represent these nomological functional relations since we embody them insofar as we are similar to other people. We can simply put ourselves in another person's shoes and see how we would act, what we would think, or how we would feel, and then expect the same of them. Various versions of simulation theory differ however with respect to the account of mental concepts they derive from this basic picture.

Before I explain the difference, I will point out that, although the debate is primarily about third-person ascription, first-person ascription must also be part of the picture of mental concepts. Specifically, there should in fact be a symmetry or stability between the contents of mental concepts used in first- and third-person ascriptions, otherwise we would not understand other people when they talk tell us what they think or feel. Both theories therefore include accounts of first-person ascription. For simulation theory, this is all the more important since it makes first-person ascription primary. After all, the idea is that first-person embodiment of the psychological apparatus constituting nomological relations obviates the need for representations thereof. The question at stake, then, is what kind of access people need to have to these embodied relations in order to exploit them in simulations for social cognition. Specifically, does it make sense to regard this kind of access as introspective?

## 2. Simulation with or without introspection?

Alvin Goldman (2006) rejects only the second component of theory theory, namely the representations of nomological relations supposedly used to derive predictions about behavior from constellations of mental states. But he thinks that mental concepts need to be used (a) in order to set up a simulation – i.e. in order to ascribe a constellation of beliefs and desires to someone so that we can simulate their perspective and see how we would act – and also (b) to exploit a simulation – i.e. to identify the state that is the output of the simulation in order to ascribe it to the target person. But that means that he needs an account of mental concepts that does not rest on representations of nomological relations. He therefore turns to internally accessible criteria, i.e. introspectionism. I will come back to his proposal below.

Robert Gordon's (1995) "radical simulation" theory rejects both components of theory theory, i.e. Gordon denies that mental concepts play a role in setting up or exploiting a simulation. Gordon appeals to Gareth Evans' ascent routine: if you are in a position to assert "p", you are in a position to assert, "I believe that p". In other words, you can tack on "I believe that ..." reliably without even possessing a full concept of belief, and the result will function as a belief would. According to Gordon, you can assert "p" in a simulation of someone else and tack on a sort of tag to the effect that p is their assertion and not yours, and it will function reliably like an ascription of a belief. Many people find this attractive because they, like Gordon, find it phenomenologically plausible that we think about situations rather than about people's minds when we are trying to understand them. Unfortunately, there are some problems with Gordon's view. I will focus on just one of them, which is the basis of Goldman's case for introspectionism.

Evans' account is designed for beliefs; it accomplishes a transition from a first-order utterance about the world to a second-order utterance about a belief about the world. But can we use an ascent routine to self-ascribe other propositional attitudes? If someone asks me "do you hope that p?" there is no obvious way to apply the ascent routine model to answer the question. This criticism indeed points to a limitation, namely that although the ascent routine is a good explanation of how the content of propositional attitudes can be redeployed in an ascription, it does not explain how the attitudes themselves can be identified for the purposes of ascription.

To see this, consider a simple example of the kind of social cognitive achievement that Gordon and Goldman both want to explain. Sammy utters the sentence "The Yankees will win." Gertrude understands this to be an expression of despair rather than a mere prediction or an expression of hope. Gertrude then accordingly draws inferences about how Sammy will act in a range of situations, e.g. being invited to a glass of champagne, hearing the

surprising news that the Yankees have lost, seeing a person wearing a Yankees shirt, etc.

The distinctions among different mental concepts – such as BELIEF, DESPAIR, and HOPE – enable one to draw these inferences. Gordon wants to explain that via ascent routines. The problem is that insofar as the content of the mental states in question is the same (hoping/despairing/predicting that the Yankees will win), mere redeployment of the content will not help Gertrude to draw the different inferences. She must take into consideration some other properties of the state being interpreted or ascribed, such as the attitude toward that content and/or the intensity of the attitude. Goldman's point is that in order to take such properties into consideration, Gertrude must become aware of them in some way, and Gordon's ascent-model gives no help with that.

### 3. Towards an expressivist account of introspection

Goldman wants to avoid positing that there is an internally identifiable marker for each propositional attitude, since he thinks that would lead to an unparsimonious explosion of internal markers. Instead, he makes the plausible assumption that we are sensitive to a finite set of internally accessible criteria or parameters, and that different propositional attitudes are constituted by different combinations of settings of these parameters. Goldman's tentative proposal envisages just three such parameters, namely a doxastic, a valence and a bodily feeling parameter. HOPE, for example, would be constituted by a relatively positive setting on the valence parameters plus a relatively uncertain setting on the doxastic parameter, and perhaps some proprioceptively accessible typical bodily changes (e.g. increased heart-rate, upright posture). DESPAIR, in contrast, would combine a negative setting of the valence parameter with near-certainty on the doxastic parameter, and typical bodily changes etc. I think that this is a reasonable tentative proposal concerning what internal parameters we might be sensitive to. But it is not the case that introspection – in a full-blown sense is the only way to access these parameters. On the contrary, I will argue that there are conceptual resources for articulating how we monitor and self-ascribe these parameters of our mental states without detecting them or directly becoming aware of them, and that the relevant empirical evidence favors such a deflationary proposal.

First of all let me point out that the ascent routine model and thus Gordon's version of simulation theory, is a species of *expressivism*, which is an essentially Wittgensteinian view of self-ascription. It is based upon self-ascription via self-expression, e.g. I scream "that hurts" when you stick a knife into my leg or I cautiously say "I believe Stockholm is larger than Oslo" to express uncertainty. In both cases, the self-ascription flows from the internal state in the same way that a facial expression flows from an internal state, i.e. without any attempt to detect that state.

This account may qualify as introspectionist insofar as it postulates a special, first-person mode of access to one's mental states, but it is deflationary insofar as it does not conceive of this access as perceptual. It may sound like a mere trick that cannot serve as a model of how we usually keep track of our mental states. But there is in fact relevant empirical evidence suggesting that there are states filling the functional roles postulated by Goldman's three introspectively accessible parameters and which can influence our decision-making, expectations and inferential processes via expression rather than via full-blown intro-

spection, i.e. without our detecting them or directly becoming aware of them.

I will focus on the doxastic parameter here, and will say just a bit about the other two towards the end. The kind of mental state or process that would be suited to play the role of a doxastic parameter would have to produce an assessment of our state of confidence in the quality of information about the world being used in decision-making, expectation-formation or inferential processes. There is in fact lots of empirical work on such "epistemic feelings" that help us in judging the adequacy of a particular response or evaluating the ease or difficulty of learning some new information or of recalling some previously learned information (Proust 2006). Epistemic feelings provide us with internal cues that lead us to produce different behaviors. An uncertainty cue, for example, would lead one to seek more information, to hesitate, to repeat a learning process or to modify it, not make a high wager on one's guess. In other words, they are internal cues that enable us to distinguish among degrees of certainty.

The presence of such skills in species that lack theory of mind abilities speaks against the idea that their use depends upon their being linked up with mental concepts (Proust 2006). So far, this supports Goldman's general picture – since he wants the doxastic parameters to be a *component* of the mental states picked out by propositional attitude concepts, he obviously needs to exclude the possibility that they *presuppose* mental concepts. But, crucially, it is not at all clear that the exploitation of these cues requires us to be aware of them. They may influence our behavior and/or thought processes without our being aware of them, and we may simply be aware of the behavior and/or thought processes that they dispose us to without our being aware of them. If this is the case, then, *a fortiori*, the same would be true of self-ascriptions occurring within the contexts of simulating other people. Then Goldman's analysis of the components of propositional attitudes would be right, but he would be wrong in claiming that we must introspectively access them in order for them to influence our ascriptions.

There are some studies that are relevant to this issue. Persaud et al. (2007) reported a series of studies in which participants performed various tasks under uncertainty, such as pack-selection in the Iowa Gambling Task and visual discrimination in blindsight, and then placed wagers upon their decisions. These tasks are interesting because the participants say they are making blind guesses but perform significantly better than chance, revealing that they have unconscious hunches that are influencing their decisions. Crucially, the participants did not maximize their winnings by placing higher wagers when they had made correct guesses, thus suggesting that they could not distinguish between decisions based upon hunches and decisions that were blind guesses – they were not only unaware of such a distinction, but their wagering decisions also failed to reflect any unconscious tracking of such a distinction. This favors Goldman, since it suggests that the epistemic feelings do not make any difference upon wagering in the absence of awareness.

There was however a condition in which participants in an Iowa Gambling Task – before placing their wagers – ranked the payoff likelihood of packs from -10 to +10 and stated which packs they would prefer to pick from if they had to choose just one. In this condition, their wagers tracked their performance much better, thus maximizing their winnings. This suggests that answering these questions caused them to become aware of their epistemic feelings toward the packs. But – and here is the decisive

point – the way in which the participants in the Persaud study become aware of their epistemic feelings about the packs was by ranking the packs and predicting their own behavior, not by directly looking into their own minds. It is reasonable to interpret this as an indirect access to their epistemic feelings via the behavior that would express those epistemic feelings.

Finally, I will say just a bit concerning the valence and bodily feeling parameters. I take it to be a clear-cut case that preferences and aversions (i.e. states functioning as a valence parameter), and multifarious bodily states (i.e. the bodily state parameters) can influence our thought processes and behavior without our being aware of it. Moreover, they do so in a predictable way, such that we can reliably anticipate how we will think, feel, decide and act when we are in those states – regardless of whether we are aware that they are the cause. In the context of a simulation of someone else, this kind of indirect access to emotional and other bodily states via their expressions enables us to anticipate their actions. All that this proposal requires is that we mirror others' emotions and various bodily states, and that this mirroring causally contribute to our understanding others actions, thoughts and emotions. And indeed there is lots of evidence that thinking about various kinds of perceptual, motor or affective experiences, or observing them in others, causes our

own perceptual, motor or affective systems to be activated as they would if we were performing the movements or having the sensory or affective experiences ourselves. And this resonance or embodiment seems to be necessary for understanding others' intentions or emotions and to influence various kinds of conceptual processing (Bastiaansen et al. 2009).

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# Von internen Relationen und Eigenschaften zur Grammatik

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In diesem Beitrag soll der Frage nachgegangen werden, wie die Begriffe "interne Eigenschaft" und "interne Relation" aus der *Logisch-philosophischen Abhandlung*, mit Wittgensteins späterer Entdeckung der Grammatik zusammenhängen. Eine enge Verbindung ist etwa in folgender Notiz klar ersichtlich: „Die internen Relationen (die internen Eigenschaften) sind nichts anderes, als das, das in der Grammatik beschrieben wird.“ (Wittgenstein / Waismann 2003, S. 236). Es soll gezeigt werden, dass hier ein starkes, bisher kaum untersuchtes, Element der Kontinuität von zentralen Begriffen aus der *Abhandlung* zum dem, was Wittgenstein später als Grammatik bezeichnet hat vorliegt. Diese Begriffe bleiben in ihrem sachlichen Kern unberührt, obwohl sie sich in der *Abhandlung* auf die "Gegenstände" Gründen, später aber auf die Rolle, die Paradigmen und unzeitliche Sätze im Sprachgebrauch spielen. Paradigmen dienen beim Lehren der Sprache als Mittel der Darstellung und stiften so interne Eigenschaften und Relationen, die grammatischen Sätze sprechen eben diese Beziehungen aus.

## 1. Der Begriff Struktur in der Logisch-philosophischen Abhandlung

Wittgenstein definiert die Begriffe interne Eigenschaft und interne Relation in der *Logisch-philosophischen Abhandlung* als Eigenschaft der Struktur bzw. als Relation der Strukturen (LphA 4.122). Über diese speziellen Eigenschaften und Relationen kann nach Wittgenstein aber nicht sinnvoll gesprochen werden. Um Wittgensteins Verständnis von internen Relationen und Eigenschaften zu verdeutlichen, soll zunächst der Begriff "Struktur" erläutert werden. Anschließend wird die Frage geklärt, weshalb das Bestehen der internen Eigenschaften und Relationen nicht durch Sätze behauptet werden kann.

Struktur wird in LphA 2.032 folgendermaßen definiert: „Die Art und Weise, wie die Gegenstände im Sachverhalt zusammenhängen, ist die Struktur des Sachverhaltes.“. Der Sachverhalt hat neben der Struktur auch eine Form, die nach 2.033 die Möglichkeit der Struktur ist. Form und Struktur sind wechselseitig aufeinander bezogen. Diese Zusammenhänge können anhand eines Beispiels verdeutlicht werden. Angenommen wird ein Sachverhalt A, der aus den drei Gegenständen a, b und c besteht. Alle kombinatorischen Möglichkeiten der Gegenstände ergeben die Form des Sachverhaltes A. Die Form würde, wenn wir nur lineare Kombinationsmöglichkeiten in Betracht ziehen, folgendermaßen aussehen: (abc, acb, bac, bca, cab, cba). Mit der Form des Sachverhaltes A sind auch alle möglichen Arten der Struktur des Sachverhaltes gegeben, in diesem Fall sind dies sechs mögliche Strukturen. Ganz allgemein kann man sagen, dass Struktur in der *Abhandlung* eine Art von Ordnung bedeutet, die eine von verschiedenen anderen kombinatorischen Möglichkeiten verwirklicht.

Die Struktur der Sachverhalte wird konstituiert durch die Gegenstände, bzw. deren Form und interne Eigenschaften. Diese internen Eigenschaften müssen nach LphA 4.123 derart sein, dass es undenkbar ist, dass der Gegenstand sie nicht besitzt. Dem stehen die externen Eigenschaften und Relationen gegenüber, die zufällig be-

stehen und auch anders denkbar sind. Wittgenstein verdeutlicht sein Verständnis von internen Eigenschaften anhand des zentralen, bei ihm immer wiederkehrenden Farbbeispiels. Er schreibt in LphA 4.123: „(Diese blaue Farbe und jene stehen in der internen Relation von heller und dunkler eo ipso. Es ist undenkbar, daß diese beiden Gegenstände nicht in dieser Relation stünden.)“.

Die Tatsache, dass es undenkbar ist, dass eine interne Eigenschaft eines Gegenstandes nicht besteht, ist auch der Grund dafür, dass diese Eigenschaft nicht durch einen sinnvollen Satz ausgedrückt werden kann. Wittgenstein legt in der *Abhandlung* das Prinzip der Bipolarität zugrunde, welches besagt, dass ein sinnvoller Satz sowohl wahr als auch falsch sein können muss. Sätze über interne Eigenschaften und Relationen erfüllen dieses Prinzip aber nicht, weshalb diese Sätze auch unsinnig sind. Bei einem sinnvollen Satz muss immer auch die Möglichkeit bestehen sich dessen Gegenteil denken zu können. Dieser Test kann bei einem Satz, der das Bestehen einer internen Relation aussagt, nicht durchgeführt werden. So ist das Gegenteil des Satzes, „Weiß ist heller als Schwarz“, nicht denkbar und damit ist auch der Satz selbst unsinnig.

Finch (1971, S. 13) hat argumentiert, dass die Form der Gegenstände und Sachverhalte allen möglichen Strukturen der Welt zugrunde liegt. Eine bestehende Struktur bildet dagegen das Wesen eines Sachverhaltes oder einer Tatsache. Wie zuvor dargelegt kann aber über Eigenschaften des Wesens nicht sinnvoll gesprochen werden. Sätze können nach Wittgenstein nur Tatsachen in der Welt ausdrücken, sie können nur über etwas kontingentes sprechen. Insofern drücken sie nur externe Eigenschaften und Relationen aus, die zufällig bestehen, nicht aber interne Eigenschaften, bei denen es undenkbar ist, dass sie nicht bestehen. Festzuhalten bleibt, dass die Gegenstände, die laut Wittgenstein einfach sind (LphA 2.02), und die Substanz der Welt bilden (LphA 2.021), der Möglichkeit von Struktur überhaupt zugrunde liegen und zugleich dem Wesen der Dinge.

## 2. Übergang zur Grammatik

Nachdem Wittgenstein 1929 nach Cambridge ging, um sich wieder der Philosophie zu widmen, wurde ihm rasch klar, dass im System der *Abhandlung* Mängel liegen. Bekanntlich spielt hier das Problem der Farbinkompatibilität eine wichtige Rolle. Durch dieses Problem gelangte Wittgenstein zu der Einsicht, dass nicht einzelne Sätze als Maßstab an die Wirklichkeit angelegt werden, sondern ganze Satzsysteme (vgl. dazu Wittgenstein 1984, S. 73 – 81). Diese Satzsysteme sind gekennzeichnet durch die innere Struktur der Sätze, aus denen sie bestehen. So sind beispielsweise die Elemente des Farbsystems durch interne Relationen bestimmt, die Auswirkungen auf die Syntax von Farbsätzen haben. Dies zeigt sich daran, dass etwa das logische Produkt des Satzes, „An ein und demselben Punkt ist grün und rot zugleich“, nicht existiert. Die Konsequenz daraus ist, dass die Regeln der Syntax, wie sie in der *Abhandlung* durch die Wahrheitstabellen demonstriert werden, nicht weit genug sind, um dem tatsächlichen Gebrauch der Sprache gerecht zu werden.

An dieser Stelle weitet Wittgenstein seinen Ansatz aus, indem er beginnt den Terminus der Grammatik zu verwenden. Der Übergang kann anhand des Vergleiches einer überarbeiteten Bemerkung von Wittgenstein veranschaulicht werden, wobei zugleich deutlich wird, wie wichtig es bei Wittgenstein sein kann einzelne Bemerkungen detailliert im Nachlass zu recherchieren. Sie wurde ursprünglich 1929 in MS106,99 niedergeschrieben, in ein Typoskript diktiert (TS208), um dann am 28. November 1931 zur Umarbeitung aus TS208 in MS112,134v übernommen zu werden. Dort hat Wittgenstein sie neu konzipiert und in dieser Form in die Typoskripte TS211, TS212 und schließlich in das *Big Typescript* (TS213) übernommen.

MS106,99 / 1929 [= TS208]: Eine Mischfarbe oder besser eine Zwischenfarbe von blau & rot ist dies durch eine interne Relation [von] zu den Strukturen von Rot & Blau aber diese interne Relation ist elementar und D.h. Sie besteht nicht darin daß der Satz a ist blaurot ein logisches Product von a ist blau & a ist rot ~~ist~~ darstellt.

TS213,477 / 1932 [= MS112,134v, TS211, TS212]: Eine Mischfarbe, oder besser Zwischenfarbe, von blau und rot ist dies durch eine interne Relation zu den Strukturen von blau und rot. Richtiger ausgedrückt: was wir "eine Zwischenfarbe von blau und rot" (oder "blaurot") nennen, heisst so, wegen einer Verwandtschaft, die sich in der Grammatik der Wörter // in den grammatischen Bestimmungen über die Wörter // "blau", "rot" und "blaurot" zeigt. (Der Satz, der von einer internen Relation der Strukturen redet, entspringt schon aus einer unrichtigen Vorstellung; aus der, welche in den Begriffen 'rot', 'blau', etc. komplizierte Strukturen // Gebäude // sieht; deren innere ~~Struktur~~ Konstruktion die Analyse zeigen muss.) Die Verwandtschaft aber der reinen Farben und ihrer Zwischenfarbe ist e l e m e n t a r e r Art, d.h., sie besteht nicht darin, dass der Satz, welcher einem Gegenstand die Farbe blaurot zuschreibt, aus den Sätzen besteht, die ihm die Farben rot und blau zuschreiben. Und so ist auch die Verwandtschaft verschiedener Grade eines rötlichen Blau, z.B., eine elementare Verwandtschaft.

Wittgenstein behandelt in der Ausgangsbemerkung die Frage der Zwischenfarben. Dabei geht es ihm um die Relation einer Zwischenfarbe, z.B. Blaurot, zu den primären Farben. Seine Analyse geht dahin zu sagen, dass es sich um eine Relation der Strukturen handelt, also eine interne Relation. Mit dem Hinweis, dass es sich dabei um eine elementare Relation handelt, ist eine Modifikation der Position der *Abhandlung* verknüpft, da eine Zwischenfarbe nicht in ein logisches Produkt analysiert wird (vgl. dazu Kenny 1974, S. 125). In der neuen Fassung der Bemerkung wandelt Wittgenstein die Formulierungen ab. An die Stelle der Begrifflichkeit „interne Relation zu den Strukturen von Rot & Blau“, setzt er nun den Begriff der Grammatik. Dies spiegelt wieder, was eingangs bereits zitiert wurde, dass nämlich „Die internen Relationen (die internen Eigenschaften) nichts anderes [sind], als das, das in der Grammatik beschrieben wird.“ (Wittgenstein / Waismann 2003, S. 236). In der überarbeiteten Bemerkung fügt Wittgenstein in Klammern auch noch eine Begründung ein, weshalb er anstatt von einer internen Relation lieber von der Grammatik der Wörter spricht. Dieser Wandel ist hauptsächlich auf eine veränderte Auffassung der Analyse zurückzuführen. Die Analyse von Sätzen besteht nicht im Auffinden verborgener logischer Strukturen, die durch Gegenstände hervorgebracht werden, wie noch in der *Abhandlung*, sondern in der übersichtlichen Darstellung

der Grammatik der Wörter. Was an dieser Stelle noch offen bleibt ist die Frage, wie grammatische Bestimmungen über die Farbwörter zustande kommen und damit die Frage, worauf sich interne Eigenschaften und Relationen gründen. Dies hängt eng mit den wichtigen Begriffen Paradigma und Unzeitlichkeit zusammen, die nun thematisiert werden.

### 3. Paradigma und Unzeitlichkeit

Obwohl die oben zitierte Bemerkung aus TS213,477 vermuten ließe, dass Wittgenstein die Termini interne Eigenschaft und interne Relation vollständig im Begriff der Grammatik aufgehen lässt, ist dies nicht der Fall. Im Gegenteil beginnt Wittgenstein sogar 1937 in dem Manuskriptband MS117 (entspricht TS221 und TS222, was Grundlage des Teil I der *Bemerkungen über die Grundlagen der Mathematik* ist) damit, das Konzept der internen Relationen und Eigenschaften zu erweitern.

Dies wird an folgenden Bemerkungen erkennbar, die aus MS117,32ff stammen:

Wenn wir sagen: "dieser Satz folgt aus jenem", so ist hier "folgen" wieder unzeitlich gebraucht. [...]

Vergleiche damit: "Weiß ist heller als Schwarz". Auch dieser Ausdruck ist zeitlos & auch er spricht das Bestehen einer internen Relation aus.

"Diese Relation besteht aber eben" — möchte man sagen. Aber die Frage ist: Hat dieser Satz einen Gebrauch — & welchen? [...] Denn wir sagen: dieser Gegenstand ist heller als jener, oder, die Farbe dieses Dings ist heller als die Farbe jenes, & dann ist etwas jetzt heller & kann später dunkler sein. Woher die Empfindung, "Weiß ist heller als Schwarz" sage etwas über das Weisen der beiden Farben aus? — Aber ist die Frage überhaupt richtig gestellt? Was meinen wir denn mit dem 'Wesen' von Weiß oder Schwarz? Wir denken etwa an 'das Innere', 'die Konstitution', aber das ergibt hier doch keinen Sinn. Wir sagen etwa auch: "Es liegt im Weiß, daß es heller ist ...". Ist es nicht so: das Bild eines schwarzen & eines weißen Flecks



dient uns zugleich als Paradigma dessen was wir unter "heller" & "dunkler" verstehen & als Paradigma für "weiß" & für "schwarz". In so fern 'liegt' nun die Dunkelheit 'im' Schwarz, als sie beide von diesem Fleck dargestellt werden. Er ist dunkel dadurch daß er schwarz ist, aber richtiger gesagt: er heißt "schwarz" & damit, in unserer Sprache auch "dunkel". Jene Verbindung, eine Verbindung der Paradigmen & Namen ist in unsrer Sprache hergestellt. Und unser Satz ist unzeitlich, weil er nur die Verbindung der Worte "weiß", "schwarz" & "heller" mit einem Paradigma ausspricht. [...]

Die beiden ersten Bemerkungen geben einen Eindruck davon, was unter dem unzeitlichen Gebrauch von Sätzen zu verstehen ist. Dieser Gebrauch besteht darin, dass einer bestimmten Sorte von Sätzen ein unanfechtbarer Status zugeschrieben wird, wie dies z.B. bei logischen Folgerungsbeziehungen der Fall ist. Ebenso ist der Satz „Weiß ist heller als Schwarz“ ein zeitloser Satz, der das Bestehen einer internen Relation ausspricht. Er ist zeitlos, da er nicht von den Tatsachen in der Welt abhängig ist.

Zeitlose Sätze, die interne Relationen betreffen, dürfen nach Wittgenstein aber nicht so verstanden werden, als würden sie das Wesen einer Sache enthüllen. Das etwa der Satz „Weiß ist heller als Schwarz“ etwas über das Wesen der Farben aussagt, könnte man eher noch der Position der *Abhandlung* zuordnen, wobei Wittgenstein ja ausgeschlossen hatte, dass sich über das Wesen sinnvoll sprechen lässt. Um die irreführende Frage nach dem Wesen der Farben zu vermeiden weist Wittgenstein auf die Rolle von Paradigmen hin. Unter Paradigmen kann man sich nach Schulte (Schulte 2005, S. 90 – 91) ein Mittel der Darstellung vorstellen, welches beim Lehren und Erklären der Sprache eine wichtige Rolle spielt. So kann das von Wittgenstein angeführte Paradigma des weißen und schwarzen Flecks dazu dienen beim Lehren der Sprache die Verbindung zwischen Schwarz und Dunkelheit herzustellen. Diese Verbindung wird aber allein in unserer Sprache hergestellt. Der unzeitliche Satz, „Weiß ist heller als Schwarz“, spricht diese Verbindung aus und beschreibt damit einen Ausschnitt unserer Farbgrammatik, aber er spricht nicht über das Wesen der Farben. Mit Hilfe von Paradigmen werden grammatische Bestimmungen über Wörter getroffen und somit interne Beziehungen gestiftet.

In MS117 findet sich auch eine wichtige Bemerkung, in der Wittgenstein erstmals nach der *Abhandlung* darüber reflektiert, was wesentliche Merkmale von internen Eigenschaften sind. Diese Bemerkung aus MS117,25 lautet:

Was ist denn das Characteristicum der 'internen Eigenschaften'? Daß sie immer, unveränderlich in dem Ganzen bestehen, das sie ausmachen «bilden»; gleichsam unabhängig von allen äußeren Geschehnissen. Wie die Konstruktion einer Maschine auf dem Papier nicht bricht, wenn die Maschine selbst den äußeren Kräften erliegt. — Oder ich möchte sagen: Daß sie nicht Wind & Wetter unterworfen sind, wie das Physikalische der Dinge; sondern unangreifbar wie Scheme[m]n.

Wittgenstein drückt hier in einer Reihe von Metaphern einen wesentlichen Aspekt der internen Eigenschaften aus, der sich durchhält von der *Abhandlung*, bis zur

Grammatik. Dieser Aspekt ist darin zu sehen, dass es undenkbar ist, dass interne Eigenschaften und Relationen nicht bestehen. Insofern sind sie auch unangreifbar wie Schemen, da sie nicht in sinnvollen Sätzen ausgedrückt werden und daher auch unabhängig von den Tatsachen in der Welt sind. In sinnvollen Sätzen können wir immer nur externe Eigenschaften und Relationen ausdrücken, nie aber interne. Während jedoch in der *Abhandlung* diese Dimension noch an "Gegenstände" gebunden war, die die Substanz der Welt bilden (LphA 2.021), wird diese Ebene von Wittgenstein nun auf den Gebrauch der Sprache, bzw. die Grammatik zurückgeführt, wodurch er gleichzeitig die Verankerung dieser Dimension in unserer Lebenswelt betont. Vor diesem Hintergrund kann eine Kontinuität von den internen Eigenschaften und Relationen, wie sie in der *Abhandlung* gedacht werden, bis zum Konzept der Grammatik festgestellt werden. Wittgenstein lässt die Begriffe interne Eigenschaft und interne Relation in ihrem sachlichen Kern unberührt, entdeckt aber, dass diese Beziehungen durch Paradigmen gestiftet werden, nicht durch Gegenstände, und grammatische Sätze sprechen diese Verbindungen aus.

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# Wie wirklich ist die Wirklichkeit? Wissenschaftliche Fotografien als Daten

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## 1. Einleitung

In der modernen wissenschaftlichen Praxis findet eine Vielzahl unterschiedlichster Varianten wissenschaftlicher Bilder ihre Verwendung. Während in der bildtheoretischen Debatte bei einigen dieser Entitäten der Status des Bildes mehr oder weniger strittig sein mag, scheint doch kein Zweifel daran zu bestehen, dass die *Fotografie* neben dem klassischen Gemälde als *die* paradigmatische Instanz des Bildbegriffs gelten kann.

Diese relativ unkontroverse Klassifizierung ergibt sich zum Teil sicherlich daraus, dass viele in der Fotografie das *Abbild* des fotografierten Gegenstandes sehen. Eine Fotografie scheint uns die Welt so zu zeigen, wie sie wirklich ist bzw. zumindest zum Zeitpunkt der Aufnahme war. Roland Barthes fasst diese Auffassung in seiner These des „*Es ist so gewesen*“ – als Kernaussage des fotografischen Bildes zusammen (Barthes 1989, 86ff.). Ja, der Name selbst scheint schon auf diese Einordnung der Aufnahmetechnik hinzuweisen – *Photo-graphieren* – als Ausdruck dafür, dass das Licht (die Photonen), das vom aufgenommenen Gegenstand ausgeht, sich gleichsam selbst in das dafür bereitgestellte Medium – ehemals die Fotoplatte und mittlerweile der digitale Speicherchip – einschreibt.

Auf der anderen Seite ist jedem, der selbst einmal eine Kamera in die Hand genommen hat, bewusst, dass das Fotografieren eine durchaus aktive Tätigkeit darstellt und kein bloß passives Aufnehmen einer sich scheinbar selbst anbietenden ‚Lichtgestalt‘. Man entscheidet sich für einen Gegenstand, ein Objekt, von dem man meint, dass es das Foto *wert* sei (vgl. Sonntag 2008, 32, 89ff.). Fotografieren bedeutet beispielsweise, Auswählen, Heranzoomen, Belichten und evtl. entsprechende Filter, Linsen oder Blitzlicht einzusetzen.

Im folgenden Beitrag soll es darum gehen, die Fotografie in der Wissenschaft im Spannungsfeld zwischen Objektivitätsanspruch und menschlicher Intervention zu verorten. Zum einen soll gezeigt werden, dass fotografische Bilder ihren besonderen Status aus den Paradigmen von Ähnlichkeit und Kausalität beziehen. Zum anderen soll auf einige Schwierigkeiten eingegangen werden, die sich gerade im wissenschaftlichen Kontext aus diesen Paradigmen für den Status fotografischer Bilder ergeben.

## 2. Ähnlichkeit und Kausalrelation

Die zentrale Idee der Ähnlichkeitstheorie des Bildes besagt: *Eine Entität ist ein Bild von etwas (einem Gegenstand oder einem Sachverhalt), weil es diesem ähnlich sieht* (vgl. Scholz 1991, 17, Scholz bietet auch eine fundierte Kritik zu dieser Theorie, vgl. ebd., Kap. 2). Es kann zweifellos festgestellt werden, dass Fotografien ihrem Bildgegenstand in einem Maße ähnlich sehen können, wie es kaum durch zeichnerische Fertigkeiten in der Kunst erreicht werden kann. „Die Fotografie – jede Fotografie – scheint eine unschuldigere und deshalb genauere Beziehung zur sichtbaren Realität zu haben als andere mimetische Objekte.“ (Sonntag 2008, 12) Diese Tatsache verdankt

sich letztlich der Funktionsweise der – mittlerweile digitalen – Aufnahmetechnik selbst. William Henry Fox Talbot beschrieb dementsprechend die Funktionsweise einer Kamera analog zur Wahrnehmung durch das menschliche Auge (vgl. Talbot 1981, 62). Aus heutiger Sicht läse sich das folgendermaßen:

Das vom Aufnahmeobjekt reflektierte Licht wird in der Linse der Digitalkamera gebündelt und auf den Bildsensor geleitet. Dort löst das einfallende Licht Elektronen aus einer Halbleiterschicht, die gezählt werden und die Helligkeitswerte der verschiedenen Bildbereiche ergeben. Um ein farbiges Bild zu erhalten, werden entsprechende Farbfilter benötigt, die dem Bildsensor vorgeschaltet werden. An diesem Punkt werden damit die eintreffenden analogen Informationen in die digitalen des Speichermediums übersetzt. Nichtsdestotrotz lässt sich eine kausale Kette vom ausgehenden Lichtstrahl des fotografierten Objekts bis zum entstehenden digitalen Bild nachverfolgen. Die Fotografie sieht ihrem Bildobjekt also ähnlich, weil es selbst eine bestimmte Art von Licht reflektiert, welches das Bild letztlich verursacht hat.

An dieser Stelle kommt eine weitere philosophische Bildtheorie ins Spiel – nämlich die Kausaltheorie des Bildes: „Der Grundgedanke lautet schlicht, Bilddarstellung sei wesentlich ein kausales Phänomen [...]. Etwas soll nur dann ein Bild von x sein, wenn x ein (herausragender) kausal relevanter Faktor bei der Entstehung des Bildes gewesen sei.“ (Scholz 1991, 64, hier findet sich ebenfalls eine detaillierte Kritik der Kausaltheorie des Bildes, vgl. ebd., Kap. 3) Es muss dazu angemerkt werden, dass – im Unterschied zur engen Korrelation von kausaler Entstehung und Ähnlichkeit im Falle fotografischer Bilder – im philosophischen Diskurs Kausal- und Ähnlichkeitstheorie grundsätzlich zwei unterschiedliche Theorieauffassungen darstellen (vgl. Scholz 1991, 64ff.). Es zeichnet sich also eine Besonderheit fotografischer Bilder ab: Ähnlichkeits- und Kausalrelation fallen in einer Art und Weise zusammen, wie es bei anderen Bildern nicht notwendigerweise der Fall sein muss.

In der Theorie der Fotografie hat sich bei vielen Autoren in diesem Zusammenhang eine Art „negative Bestimmung“ ihres Wesens durchgesetzt (vgl. Geimer 2009, 60ff.). So wird von diesen Theoretikern das Besondere des fotografischen Bildes in der Unabhängigkeit seiner Entstehung von der menschlichen Intervention verortet: „Das Wesen der Fotografie wird vor allem auch darin gesehen, was sie *nicht* ist, wie sie *nicht* oder *nicht ausschließlic*h funktioniert, nämlich als Ausdruck manueller Kunstfertigkeit.“ (Geimer, 2009, 61) Wilfried Wiegand hebt als den Unterschied zwischen Malerei und Fotografie hervor, dass die ersteren Bilder „gemacht“, während die letzteren „geschaut“ seien (vgl. Wiegand 1981, 8). Diese These der scheinbaren Unabhängigkeit von der Intention des Fotografen, die durchaus eine kritische Betrachtung verdient, verleiht fotografischen Bildern einen besonderen Vertrauensvorsprung ihrer Rezipienten. Ihnen haftet der Nimbus der Objektivität an, welcher sie geradezu für den Einsatz in den Wissenschaften prädestiniert.

### 3. Fotografien als Belege

Susan Sontag schreibt: „Fotos liefern Beweismaterial. Etwas, wovon wir gehört haben, woran wir aber zweifeln, scheint ‚bestätigt‘, wenn man uns eine Fotografie davon zeigt.“ (Sontag 2008, 11) Leicht nachvollziehbar wird dieser Punkt, wenn wir uns dem alltäglichen Phänomen der Urlaubsfotografie zuwenden. Was bedeutet es eigentlich, dass sich so viele Menschen in ihrem Urlaub auf Fotografien am Urlaubsort mit markanten Gebäuden, Landschaften und Denkmälern im Hintergrund verewigen? *Wozu das Foto?*, könnte man fragen, schließlich haben die Reisenden die entsprechenden Stätten ja gerade selbst besucht und in Augenschein genommen. Es mag unterschiedliche Gründe geben, eine solche Fotografie von der Reise mitzubringen. Zweifelsohne spielt bei vielen aber der Gedanke eine Rolle, dass sie den Daheimgebliebenen zeigen wollen, dass sie wirklich dagewesen sind. *Wenn du meinen Worten nicht glaubst, dann sieh selbst!* Der Fotografie wird damit im Alltag ohne große Umschweife der Status eines Belegs – ja, stärker noch, der eines Beweises zugesprochen.

Diesem Phänomen des Belegcharakters der Fotografie begegnen wir in derselben Weise auch in den Wissenschaften. In diesem Kontext wird die Fotografie als Messtechnik eingesetzt. Fotografische Bilder werden zu Messergebnissen und damit zu bestätigenden oder widerlegenden Instanzen für die zu prüfende Theorie oder ihrer Vorhersagen. Fotogrammetrische Untersuchungen gewinnen z.B. ihre Daten auf diese Weise. Diese Forschungsrichtung befasst sich „mit der Gewinnung und Verarbeitung von Informationen über Objekte und Vorgänge mittels Bildern, schwerpunktmäßig mit Bestimmung der Form, Größe und Lage von Objekten im Raum, vorzugsweise mittels photographischer Bilder als Informationsspeicher.“ (<http://solarsystem.dlr.de/Missions/express/kamera/kamera.shtml>, eingesehen am: 26.04.10)

Eine detaillierte Schilderung des Einsatzes einer Digitalkamera als Messinstrument in der Wissenschaft findet sich in der von Ralf Adelman vorgestellten Fallstudie zur Erfassung der Marsoberfläche mit Hilfe einer „High-Resolution Stereo Camera“ (HRSC) an Bord der Sonde „Mars Express“ (vgl. Adelman 2009, 23ff.). Auf der Website des Deutschen Zentrums für Luft- und Raumfahrt (DLR) heißt es zum Einsatzgebiet der Digitalkamera in diesem Forschungsprojekt: „Zum ersten Mal auf einer Weltraummission bildet eine Spezialkamera eine Planetenoberfläche systematisch in der dritten Dimension und in Farbe ab. Die Ergebnisse sollen die Beantwortung fundamentaler Fragen zur geologischen und klimatischen Geschichte des Roten Planeten ermöglichen. Die räumliche Auflösung der Stereobilder übertrifft bisherige topographische Daten der Marsoberfläche bei weitem und erlaubt es den Geowissenschaftlern, Details mit einer Größe von 10 bis 30 Meter dreidimensional zu analysieren.“ ([http://www.dlr.de/mars/desktopdefault.aspx/tabid-290/944\\_read-1409/](http://www.dlr.de/mars/desktopdefault.aspx/tabid-290/944_read-1409/), eingesehen am: 26.04.10)

An diesem Punkt muss festgehalten werden, dass *die Bilder* der Kamera des „Mars Express“ die relevanten Daten bilden, die im Zuge der Untersuchung gewonnen werden sollen. Die Bilder sind hier nicht redundant und durch zu Grunde liegende Daten zu ersetzen. Deutlich wird dies z.B., wenn die Gültigkeit der neuen Bilder durch den Vergleich mit Bildern älterer Mars-Missionen festgestellt wird (vgl. Adelman 2009, 44). Hier werden Bilder mit Bildern verglichen, um festzustellen, wie der Mars wirklich aussieht. Bilder gelten damit in diesem wissenschaftlichen Diskurs als Belege für Hypothesen. *Sie zeigen, dass es*

sich so und so auf dem Mars verhält. Datum und Bild sind hier identisch.

Möglich erscheint eine solche Verwendungsweise von Fotografien vor der angesprochenen Hintergrundannahme, dass diese Bilder zum einen in einer kausalen und zum anderen in einer Ähnlichkeitsrelation zum abgebildeten Objekt stehen. Der propositionale Gehalt, der für den Belegcharakter des Bildes notwendig ist – also, *dass es sich so und so verhalten hat* – scheint sich durch den kausalen Kontakt zwischen Bildgegenstand und Bild gleichsam in dieses einzuschreiben. In der Fallstudie zur Kartierung der Marsoberfläche lassen sich jedenfalls keine Anhaltspunkte dafür finden, dass die beteiligten Wissenschaftler die Bilder der HRSC anders verwenden würden denn als Daten anderer Messinstrumente. So wie man beispielsweise anhand eines Amperemeters in einem Stromkreis ablesen kann, dass die Stromstärke bei drei Ampere liegt, so lesen die Forscher aus den Bildern der HRSC die erfassten Höhenmeter und Geländestrukturen der Marsoberfläche ab. Und ebenso wie sie einem Amperemeter als Messinstrument vertrauen, vertrauen sie auch der Digitalkamera und ihren Ergebnissen. Abweichungen werden höchstens als Messfehler gewertet, die auf schlechte Beleuchtungsverhältnisse, ungünstige Aufnahmewinkel etc. zurückgeführt werden können – nicht jedoch auf eine Unglaubwürdigkeit der Bilder selbst.

Nun könnte man anführen, dass die ursprünglich beim DLR von der Raumsonde eintreffenden Bilder wenig Ähnlichkeit mit der Marsoberfläche aufweisen, Ähnlichkeit mithin nicht das ausschlaggebende Kriterium sein kann, wenn man diesen Bildern einen Belegstatus zugestehen möchte. Schließlich durchlaufen die eintreffenden Bilder einen umfangreichen Bearbeitungsprozess, bis sie letztlich dem gleichen, was wir von anderen Bildern oder durch eigene teleskopische Beobachtung als die Oberfläche des Mars kennen. Vielleicht, so könnte man argumentieren, spielt auch für die Wissenschaftler nicht die Ähnlichkeit der Bilder die entscheidende Rolle, sondern – wie für viele Theoretiker der Fotografie (vgl. Geimer, 2009, 106ff.) – allein die kausale Verbindung zum Bildgegenstand?

Gegen eine solche Abwertung des Ähnlichkeitsaspekts spricht jedoch folgende Überlegung: Die Mars-Bilder der HRSC auf der ersten Verarbeitungsstufe werden als vollgültige Resultate eines Messinstruments von den Forschern akzeptiert. Das bedeutet, dass sie davon ausgehen, dass die Bilder dem fotografierten Objekt – der Marsoberfläche – in den forschungsrelevanten Hinsichten entsprechen. Die Kamera wird dazu verwendet, als Detektor für bestimmte Eigenschaften zu fungieren. Und eben jene betrifft auch der Ähnlichkeitsaspekt, den die Wissenschaftler für relevant erachten (vgl. Adelman 2009, 47). Verschiedene Ähnlichkeitsbegriffe müssen hier also auseinander gehalten werden: (1) Die Ähnlichkeit zum Forschungsobjekt ist in dem Sinne gegeben, dass das Bild die relevanten Eigenschaften des Gegenstandes adäquat wiedergibt. (2) Was jedoch nicht gegeben ist, ist eine hinlängliche Ähnlichkeit der HRSC-Bilder zu Bildern, welche die menschliche Wahrnehmung von der Marsoberfläche liefern würde, bestünde denn die Möglichkeit dazu.

*So weit, so realistisch*, könnte man nun sagen. Offenbar hängt viel davon ab, was wir unter dem Begriff *realistisch* verstehen. Ist mit einer realistischen Darstellung gemeint, dass sie dem abgebildeten Gegenstand auf eine Weise ähnelt, wie wir es mit dem bloßen Auge wahrnehmen können, dann wären viele Darstellungen in den Wissenschaften in der Tat nicht als realistisch, weil nicht in diesem Sinne ihrem Gegenstande ähnlich, zu bezeichnen.

Warum sollten wir den Begriff aber derart eng fassen? Warum sollten wir Infrarot-Bilder oder solche im ultravioletten Bereich von vornherein aus dessen Anwendungsbereich ausschließen, wo doch kein Wissenschaftler an der realistischen Aussagekraft solcher Bilder zweifeln würde?

Paradoxerweise liegt ein Grund hierfür in einem gewissen Misstrauen gegenüber unseren eigenen Wahrnehmungsfähigkeiten. Nicht dem Instrument wird misstraut, sondern demjenigen, der mit seiner Hilfe Daten gewinnen will. Hat ihn – so die bekannte Frage aus der Wissenschaftstheorie – nicht seine Theorie dazu verleitet, ein Instrument zu bauen, das ihm eben jene bestätigenden Daten liefert, die er für die Verifikation seiner Hypothesen benötigt? (vgl. Carrier 2006, 69 ff.)

Ein anderer Aspekt, der bei Fotografien in diesem Kontext hinzutritt, besteht in der Skepsis, ob die als Datum oder Beleg verwendeten Entitäten tatsächlich so unabhängig von jeglicher menschlicher Intervention entstehen, wie es im Rahmen der kausalen Entstehungsgeschichte dieser Bilder von einigen Theoretikern hervorgehoben wird.

#### 4. Fotografieren als Tätigkeit

Betrachten wir noch einmal die Fallstudie zur Vermessung und Kartierung der Marsoberfläche, so resümiert Adelman: „Von der Ankunft der Daten am DLR und beim Erstellen der *data products* durch die Photogrammeter werden die Datenbilder ständig transformiert, Informationen hinzugefügt und weggelassen.“ (Adelman 2009, 54) Ziel dieser Aufbereitung ist es, auf der letzten Stufe ein 3D-Modell der erfassten Marsoberfläche zu erhalten.

Führen wir uns diese Zielsetzung vor Augen, ist die skeptische Haltung, fotografische Bilder nicht einfach als Abbilder der Wirklichkeit aufzufassen, einleuchtend. Gerade digitale Bilder machen eine nahezu beliebige Weiterverarbeitung möglich (vgl. Mitchell 1994, 31). Darüber hinaus kommt auch ein rein technischer Punkt dazu: Digitalkameras *sehen* nicht wie das menschliche Auge, sie rekonstruieren vielmehr, was wir sehen würden, wenn wir mit bloßem Auge hinschauen könnten. Vor diesem Hintergrund erweist sich die skeptische These doch nicht als abwegig, die Sontag folgendermaßen formuliert: „Auch wenn es in gewisser Hinsicht zutrifft, daß die Kamera die Realität einfängt und nicht nur interpretiert, sind Fotos doch genauso eine Interpretation der Welt wie Gemälde und Zeichnungen.“ (Sontag 2008, 12)

Man kann das Ganze auch noch eine Ebene weiterdrehen, wenn man hinzunimmt, dass die Fotografie zumindest im herkömmlichen Sinne eben nicht automatisch entsteht, sondern von einem Fotografen *gemacht* wird. Hier kommt dann eine ganze Reihe aktiver Eingriffsmöglichkeiten hinzu, die letztlich bestimmen, was das Bild uns zeigt. Nur ein Punkt unter vielen wäre z.B. die Auswahl des abzulichtenden Objekts (vgl. Sontag 2008, 87). Fotografieren in diesem Sinne ist eine Tätigkeit, die mit bestimmten Intentionen auf Seiten des Herstellenden verbunden ist.

Es scheint, als stünden wir am Ende doch vor einem Dilemma: Auf der einen Seite nutzen Wissenschaftler Fotografien als Belege für ihre Forschungshypothesen, was nur möglich erscheint, wenn sie diesen Belegen auch mit Recht einen Objektivitätsanspruch zusprechen können. Auf der anderen Seite haben wir gesehen, dass Fotografien oftmals alles andere als automatisch generierte Abbil-

der der Wirklichkeit sind, dass sie im Gegenteil sogar in hohem Maße von den Intentionen des sie herstellenden Subjekts abhängig sind. Lässt sich dieses Dilemma lösen, ohne einer der beiden Seiten den Vorrang zugestehen zu müssen? Können wir zeigen, dass zwischen diesen beiden Annahmen letztlich *kein* Widerspruch besteht?

#### 5. Der Status der Fotografie

Nun, für eine korrekte Analyse des Status des fotografischen Bildes scheint es vor allem wichtig zu sein, dass man differenzieren muss zwischen drei unterschiedlichen Aspekten, mit denen wir es zu tun haben:

(i) Zunächst einmal kann die Fotografie im Sinne eines Detektors in den Wissenschaften eingesetzt werden. Für die Beurteilung des Status der dabei entstehenden Daten ist das *technische Moment* der Aufnahme ausschlaggebend. Eine solche Aufnahme kann damit als neutrales Datum betrachtet werden. Es ist höchstens in dem Sinne theoriegeleitet, als dass eine Theorie vorgibt, welche Daten eigentlich für eine Bestätigung oder Widerlegung der Forschungshypothese relevant sind – wo also nach ihnen gesucht werden muss.

(ii) Davon zu unterscheiden ist der Vorgang einer *Weiterverarbeitung* der aufgenommenen Bilder, wie er in der Fallstudie von Adelman beschrieben wird. Hier haben wir es zweifelsohne mit einer bewussten Intervention des Forschers zu tun, der bestimmte Elemente des Bildes auswählt, interpretiert und seiner Interpretation entsprechend dann weiter herausarbeitet.

Und schließlich gilt es (iii), die *Fotografie als eine Tätigkeit* des Menschen zu untersuchen. Wird das Individuum durch den Gebrauch des Apparats zum Fotografen, unterliegt das Bildprodukt auch seinem aktiven, intentionalen geleiteten Gestaltungswillen. Belichtung, Bildausschnitt, Perspektive und Zoomfaktor können von ihm ebenso festgelegt werden wie die Farbe des fotografierten Objekts mit Hilfe unterschiedlicher Filter und Einstellungen.

Begeben wir uns zurück in die Wissenschaft, können wir nun abschließend feststellen, dass einem Einsatz der Fotografie im Sinne eines Detektors nichts im Wege steht. Das oben eröffnete Dilemma entsteht letztlich nur, wenn wir bei der Bewertung dieser Daten die Punkte (i) bis (iii) zu *einem* Phänomen verquicken – also keine Trennung durchführen, wo eine solche doch möglich ist.

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# Artistic Mimesis According to Proclus

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Proclus has lived from the early to the late 6<sup>th</sup> century A.D., i.e. more than ten centuries after Heraclitus had been the first to state that “art imitates nature” (fr. B10; D.-K., *Vors.*, I, 153, 1-2), as reported by Aristotle (*De mundo*, 5, 396 b 7). Also Plato himself adopted and, moreover, enhanced this conception in his *Republic* (X, 598 b; 606 d), stating that the work of art is, in fact, by *three* degrees inferior to its intelligible model, its respective idea, and denouncing in his *Sophist* (242 d) his contemporaries’ artistic processes deformed even the phenomenal realities of nature, thus qualifying them as sophistic since they were susceptible to a demagogical “theatrocracy” (*Laws* III, 700 a sq.). Indeed, by Plato’s time, plastic arts as well as performing arts tended to further evolve by abandoning traditional forms considered as “classical” and by adopting complicated styles advantaging dexterity which, in its turn, caused surprise and stupefaction to the masses instead of pure aesthetic pleasure felt by properly educated citizens (*Timaeus*, 80 b; *Theaetetus*, 171 a). Evolution of arts continued and even accelerated its course along the centuries, so that Proclus frequently misses the meaning of Plato’s assertions in this field. He is supposed, however, to stick, as a commentator, to the wording of the text he comments, as far as Plato’s main conceptions.

The notion of *mimesis* and its related homoradical notions are further used by Aristotle in the case of performing arts (e.g. *Politics*,  $\Theta$  5, 1340a 12; *Poetics*, 1, 1447a 16; 22; 6, 1449b 24; 1450a 4; 8, 1451a 31; 25, 1460b 8) and visual arts (*Great Ethics*, a 19, 1190a 31) as well, whereas Plato himself, particularly in his so-called “metaphysical” dialogues, uses, apart from *eidōs*, to designate the model, as opposed to the effigy (*eidōlon*: *Parm.*, 132d; 149e) and the image (*eikōn*: *Theaet.*, 162e; *Soph.*, 240b) the parallel term *paradigme* (*Soph.*, 235d; *Polit.*, 277d). The main significance, then, of the act of imitating, in the context of artistic creation, would be that of a factice reproduction of a natural (object) or intelligible (action) model; a reproduction which, when perceived by the contemplator, causes him a feeling of “emotion” (literally, a “commotion”, *synkinēsis*, according to Aristides Quintilianus).

Proclus, on his part, follows the Platonic tradition, notwithstanding his personal considerations on the issue. For him, at the highest level, that of the One, i.e. of the Good, the process of derivation is due to the One’s superabundance and affects by no means its own nature. On the contrary, the product of this derivation is sealed by a relative deficiency which, without impeding it from producing further deficient entities, compels the derivatives to seek their union with their source, thus implementing a process of conversion (*Elements of theology*, § 8, p. 8 Dodds).

Products, then, are unaccomplished developing entities, before acquiring their final aspect and ceaselessly seeking to unite with their model (*El. th.*, § 85, p. 78, 15-18 D.). Such a quasi love relationship supposes that each entity is participable by its derivatives. Only the One remains unparticipable, but becomes quasi participable thanks to the mediation of the *henads* (*El. th.*, § 25, p. 28, 27 D.), so that the relationship between cause and effect becomes a relationship between model and replica. The Diadochus seldom uses the term *mimesis*, but has often recourse to the verb *mimeisthai*. In any case, by *imitation*, he desig-

nates a resemblance intended by both the cause and the effect, especially the latter, since it is supposed to seek after its cause (*in Tim.*, I, 307, 23-25 Diehl). The notion of imitation runs through the whole work of Proclus, mainly in the fields of ontology, of epistemology and of the reflection on artistic creation. What follows will be focused on the latter domain.

As far as artistic creation is concerned the sector mainly, though not exclusively, illustrated is that of music. The scheme proposed in this respect reminds of the general attitude concerning procession and conversion. One states at this level an adaptation of the functional activity of reality to the musical instaurative activity (*Plat. th.*, IV, 17, p. 206 Portus <pp. 52, 18-53, 4 Saffrey-Westerink>). Proclus does not only allude to the efficiency of magic spells, but also to musical beauty or, at least, to the auditive pleasure. Such qualities are inherent to forms inspired by fixed superior models where order and Beauty coexist; on the contrary, forms inspired by inferior models, and therefore submitted to movement and change, lack order and beauty as well. Nevertheless, such forms escape to absolute ugliness if they refer to the beautiful even through negation (*in Tim.*, I, 266, 7-11 D.). The supernatural essence of the works of art evidently depends on the ontological, cosmological and aesthetic status of the realities they imitate. An extremely detailed graduation, according to which imitation confers to the imitating form the attributes, aptitudes and virtues of the imitated model is thus established. However, artistic imitation defies any precise ontological and cosmic order. Indeed, universal order forbids any transfer from an incorporeal or immortal status towards a corporeal and mortal one and *vice versa* (*in Tim.*, I, 33, 16-23 D.). Now, this is precisely what occurs at the level of artistic creation when, due to imitation, intelligible realities are expressed through sensible forms. In a similar way, a formal order prevailing during festivities, at the image of the order reigning in the universe, is obtained thanks to art, to music in particular (*in Tim.*, I, 89, 15-16).

Imitative analogies may be reversed, depending on the qualifications they refer to. Thus, Hephaistos, a blacksmith-god is considered by Proclus as working the bronze by imitating the visible sky, itself qualified as being of bronze, in its turn an imitation of the intelligible sky whose creator is also alleged to be a blacksmith (*in Tim.*, I, 143, 7.11 D.). One should remember that, in his *Protagoras* (321, d-e), Plato associates the god Hephaistos to the goddess Athena to both of whom Prometheus is supposed to have stolen the fire in order to offer it to mankind. Of course, being in love with the goddess, the god imitates her activity, be it in his own way. His art, then, is not deprived of wisdom (*in Tim.*, I, 144, 10-12 D.). The divine couple, thus, becomes, even unwillingly, the benefactor of humankind which, otherwise deprived of other resources, has inherited, through the creativity and inventiveness in the fields of art and of politics (*Plat. Th.*, V, 24, 297-298 P. <p. 88, 4-29 S.-W.>). Further on and by imitation of the divinities having founded the arts, humans that have been endowed with memory and imagination also tend towards imitating Hermes’ activity as an inventor, among others of the lyre, and believed to be diversely crafty whose crafts have been, by delegation, transmitted to the artists. In fact,

artistic imitation supposes two kinds of imitation: that of the model which the artist imitates and that of the way to follow in order to succeed (*in Crat.*, 8, 24-25 Pasquali). Opinion and imagination contribute to furnish the elements which form the epistemological framework thanks to which the enthusiasm prevailing during the process of artistic imitation becomes efficient (*ibid.*).

The elements of imitation proposed by the gods are, above all, identifiable symbols through which the artist-imitator introduces the contemplator into a domain still unknown to him (*in Crat.*, 31, 3-4; 27-28; 40, 23-41 P.). This ambiguous function of the imitator under the aspect of a poet makes him, for Plato, both condemnable and sympathetic (*Republ. III*, 391 d; 398 a; *in Crat.*, 29, 15-20 P.). As for Apollo, he presides the arts both of healing and divination, whose common character is "cathartic". At the level of Athena's cult, the imitation of her practical behavior results in sacrifices, whereas that of her contemplative behavior results in hymns (*in Tim.*, I, 197, 8-10 D.). The same occurs at the level of theurgical practices. So, it is desirable to mark the beginning of every action by imitating through celebrations the respective divine principle (*ad Hesiodum*, 298, 25-26; 327, 26-28 Gaisford).

Artistic imitation raises the question of whether the artist's inspiration emerges from the intelligibles which, being formless, consequently need to be directly invested with an imaginary form or with a sensible appearance borrowed from nature. This question had already been raised by Plato himself who distinguished respectively the imaginative from the mimetic art (*Sophist*, 36 d-e). More than the average people, talented artists are able to correctly imitate. However, to imitate their works is very hard; it is a matter of skill (*in Parmen.*, 626, 4-27; 682, 9-13; 828, 3-12 Cousin). It may be feasible to reverse the process in a way; for, starting from natural realities and through artistic realities, one climbs up to realities experienced by the soul and, even further, to intelligible realities. The work of art, thus, becomes a "kairic" opportunity and, in its turn, a starting point for such an ascent. This is valid not only for the visual arts but also for dramaturgy, poetry in general and music as well, in spite of Plato's reticence (*in Rempublicam*, I, 50, 29-51, 5 Kroll). Each art possesses its secrets that everybody cannot share altogether; this entails (a) the necessity of the artist's specialization and (b) the prohibition of mixing various arts (*in Tim.*, I, 155, 20-21 D.). Plato deplored even the mixture of forms (*Laws III*, 700 c). During the process of imitation, which is part of the general process of creation, the artist mobilizes all of his mental faculties, to serve his activity. Prudence, which, for Plato, is part of the quadruple root of practical reason and associated with the research of "kairos" and measure (*Rep. IV*, 428 b ff.) in every human enterprise, is necessary to artistic activity in order to protect the artist from excesses and failures (*in Tim.*, I, 17-21 D.), although such a statement contradicts Porphyry, according to whom prudence is not needed in artistic creation (*ibid.*, I, 159, 11-12 D.). Measure and *kairos* are essential criteria of successful imitation.

Proclus' opinion on poetry totally diverges from Xenophanes' and Plato's, as far as the practice of poets is concerned. Supposing that it is daring, on their behalf, to degrade the gods by attributing to them vices proper to mankind, it is nevertheless useful to have recourse to the Homeric poems in order to find examples of the virtue which Socrates taught and personified as well by creating himself examples of correct imitation of models of civic

behavior, which, in turn, others might imitate, and which may be compared to hymns in honor of the city of Athens (*in Tim.*, I, 65, 7-17; 71, 27-73, 1; 89, 22-25 D.). To be serious, an imitation of words should respect the real relations existing between the *imitatum* and the *opus imitans* (*ibid.*, I, 65, 27-28), otherwise it becomes ridiculous. It results from this, that the work of art will always remain inferior to its model, whatever the latter's ontological status be. It neatly appears, then, that, for Proclus, every artistic activity an effort for imitation that, as any other activity, has to comply with certain principles and necessarily follow certain rules, the first of these principles being that of *derivation*, analogous, though not identical to the principle of *procession*, in the sense that procession designates a direct birth, whereas derivation is meant as a creation thanks to the mediation of the artist or, in the case of technical products, of the craftsman. The second principle is that of *particularization*, the result of imitation always being inferior to the model, hence its reduced importance. The third principle, associated with the preceding one, is that of *concretization*, by virtue of which, ontologically, the work of art is an aesthetic being suffering no repetition, otherwise risking degradation to the rank of craftwork. Unique and unrepeatable, the work of art bears the seal of its creator's personality. Respectively, the rules the latter must abide by are (a) imitation of models inciting propensity towards virtue; (b) taking into consideration the dialectics between servitude and freedom of artistic expression; and (c) ascertaining the continuity of various manifestations within the sector of each art.

If such is the situation of the arts considered in their totality and if such turns out to be the responsibility of all artists eager to create important and lasting works, one is then forced to admit that to abide by the principles and rules of imitation becomes a major obligation for each and every authentic creator. Proclus does not provide further details on this general issue, except for his particular opinions on every art, which normally follow, more or less, Plato's own views, notably on "good" music (*Laws II*, 656 d ff.) which is meant to serve religious cults and let courageous citizens grow. It is important to notice that, in spite of his fulminations against the artists of his time, Plato believes that life, being already difficult, would become intolerable without art and that he uses in this case almost the same wording as Socrates in the *Apology* (38 a; cf. *Rep. III*, 407 a; *Politicus*, 299 e) concerning a supposedly "unexamined" life. A marvelous product of a process comprising imitation, the work of art is an everlasting aesthetic being, a donation to the fellow-citizen and a direct tribute to divinities. Being the last stage of descending dialectical process which carries away the souls up to the universe of the realities *par excellence*, towards its irradiating paradigms.

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# There is no 'I' in 'Image': Wittgenstein's Image Forming, the Visual Room and the Boundaries of Language and Space

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## Introduction

When Wittgenstein addressed the question 'what is the mental image?' he quickly dismisses it for more pressing issues like image forming and images and sensations (Wittgenstein, 1967/1981, paragraph 621). He realized that images are not concrete phenomena, but psychological concepts; the act of conjuring up an image of something. The example he uses is the visual room, an object with spatial and architectonic qualities (Wittgenstein, 1958/2009, paragraph 398). This is significant as it shows spatial concepts to be essential to the philosophy of the image and image forming. The importance of the spatial construal of Wittgenstein's philosophy, with regards not only to images and image forming, but to his private/public issues and the inner/outer issue can be shown through an analysis of the Stonborough-Wittgenstein House. In fact, it is significant that Wittgenstein theorized about the image only after his experiment into architecture. After working in the spatial and architectonic dimensions that architecture is concerned with, Wittgenstein returned to philosophy with the empirical, as opposed to solely analytical and spatial approach to philosophical problems, including image forming. With its foundations in visual space, the visual room concept is an example of Wittgenstein's spatial approach to philosophy influenced by and integral to his work in architectonics and design. The discussion of the visual room is the "strongest evidence for Wittgenstein's association of the spatial and the linguistic" (Last, 2008, p. 185), leading to a crossing back and forth of concepts between the realms of philosophy and architecture.

## 1. Images and Image Forming

Wittgenstein's aphorisms regarding the image were characteristically rooted in a concern with the use of words that describe the concept. He differentiated the image from sensations; auditory images and visual images are distinct from heard sounds and the sensation of sight (Wittgenstein, 1967/1981, paragraph 621). Wittgenstein rejects that images are derived from perception and considers imaging as a unique phenomenon.

Rather than regarding the image as a thing, Wittgenstein suggests that image forming is temporal, occurring over time and is therefore an action or activity. Moreover, image forming is voluntary, unlike the observation involved in sense-impressions and hallucinations (Kose & Coriss, 1996). He concludes that the image cannot be a concrete thing inside our consciousness, because if this were the case, we would passively receive images rather than wilfully conceive of them. This image forming process, Wittgenstein says, should be thought of as "visual experience in terms of our each having access to images that no one else is privy to" (1997, p. 183). This visual experience is unique as it transcends qualities that can be applied to other real-world experiences. Wittgenstein's example to show these characteristics of visual experiences is the visual room.

## 2. The Visual Room

"The 'visual room' is the one that has no owner. I can as little own it as I can walk about it, or look at it, or point to it" (Wittgenstein, 1958/2009, paragraph 398). It is significant that the example Wittgenstein gives for visual impressions is a room – a three-dimensional, spatial, architectonic thing rather than anything else. It is the objective of this paper to show the spatial nature of the image and image forming and the role of architecture in this aspect of philosophy.

The visual room is the visual impression one constructs when trying to understand what someone means, when they say they are sitting in a room. By saying you know what they mean, you are saying you know how to think of the object that they mean (McGinn, 1996). We are compelled to think of the visual room as a quasi-physical thing; as possessing physical qualities, relationships in space and the ability to be assigned grammatical concepts. However these qualities for which a real-world room may be true are inappropriate and nonsensical for the visual room. For example, it makes no sense to possess a visual impression, nor to speak of its outside if the impression is of the inside. One cannot enter or exit the visual room in the sense one can in the world.

## 3. The Spatial Room

Wittgenstein concludes that the visual room shows "a new way of speaking, a new comparison" (Wittgenstein, 1958/2009, paragraph 400). He compares the visual experience of the room with a picture of it: both appear to be perspectival in nature. In addition to the visual impression being incapable of having features its real-world counterpart exerts, the visual impression has its own objective features that are not also features of the object it is an image of. The perfectly cubic room does not appear as a symmetrical object with edges of equal length, the image from inside the cubic room appears with a vanishing point, the image is with a one or two point perspective. Similarly artefacts in the room like tables act in the same way. The visual impression of a square table is not a square, it is seen in perspective. This comparison, between the visual room and a picture of it, is a comparison of two-dimensional representations and relies on the spatial qualities of the three dimensional objects being represented. The visual room shows that the problem of image forming is a spatial one.

The visual room shows that this particular philosophical problem, of image forming, is sited in space. This is not altogether conflicting with the notion that philosophical problems are situated within language. It is perhaps evidence of an inclusive realm where language and space intersect, what Nana Last calls a "shared territory between the spatial and the linguistic" (Last, 2008, p. 183). The intention of the visual room is to address private mental imagery, the relation between inner and outer and no doubt publicly accessible language, language is no longer



the "specific outward criterion" (Last, 2008, p. 184). Other criteria, such as space, vision and architectonics become frameworks for comparison. This somewhat more generous gesture of Wittgenstein's to allow for a foundation for definition other than language could not have occurred in the *Tractatus*. In fact, the first documentation of Wittgenstein's overt change in thinking and return to philosophy are dated in the months immediately following the house's completion (Wijdeveld, 1993, p. 183). It is significant that only after his work designing the Stonborough-Wittgenstein House did he use visual space as a foundation for the solution to a philosophical problem. Wittgenstein had more freedom to discuss philosophical tasks in spatio-visual terms, and the spatial realm was a new framework in which philosophy could situate itself.

#### 4. The House

Issues involved in the visual room example have their application in the architecture of the House. The act of envisioning a room that is not there is the task of the architect, and Wittgenstein's role as 'architect' influenced his use of the visual room and the topic of the image. Furthermore, the topic of the image and its example of the visual room is evidence for the spatial nature of these kinds of philosophical problems and the language we use to describe them. Rather than considering the House as a distinct entity from Wittgenstein's philosophy, it is considered here as an extension of the visual room. The House is an experiment with spatial limits that blends the boundaries of architecture, philosophy and language.

However, with regards to the philosophy of imaging, when Wittgenstein says of the visual room "it has no master outside it, and none inside it either" (Wittgenstein, 1958/2009, paragraph 398) he discloses the image's absence of true spatial qualities: its lack of ownership as well as the non-existence of boundaries. He eludes to spatial and visual, as well as material and non-material, conflict. Seemingly the visual room can be inhabited, if the image conjured is of someone in a room, but it does not make sense for its boundaries to be crossed. This is a problem with language and exposes the latent spatial nature of language itself. This kind of language is introduced after the completion of the house and contains implicit spatial interpretations. In using language that refers to space, Wittgenstein is showing the significance of spatial relationships in language and hence philosophy. He writes in the *Investigations* that the relationship language has with the world is not the "formal unity" he had previously imagined; rather "we are talking about the spatial and temporal phenomenon of language, not about some non-spatial, non-temporal phantasm" (Wittgenstein, 1958/2009, paragraph 108). From this we can infer that discussion of boundaries, inhabitation and accessibility need not be separated from their spatial connotations.

#### 5. Thresholds

The articulation of boundaries, an issue Wittgenstein finds with the visual room, is also a significant aspect of the design of the Stonborough-Wittgenstein House. All of the interior doors between rooms are double-layered, like the exterior doors. However, unlike the exterior doors, this is not a functional solution. The interior doors are metal framed with either glass or metal infill. The glass is either transparent or opaque. This creates a hierarchy of thresholds throughout the House. Boundaries between rooms are completely opaque and solid, entirely transparent and fluid or partially translucent. Moreover, due to the double

layering the threshold is different depending on which way you are crossing the boundary. The doors represent the complexity, and sometimes difficulty, involved in dealing with boundaries, both physical and metaphorical. Wittgenstein does not refer only to architectural boundaries with the doors in the House but also to the boundaries of language.

The materiality of the numerous double-layered doors in the house refers to the concept of privacy. Margarethe's private rooms are separated from the salon by doors with transparent glass on the inside and opaque sheet metal on the outside, the most complex boundary for the most private section of the House. Protecting the personal spaces with visually and spatially impenetrable materials links the House to the notion of private mental space portrayed on the visual room example. Image forming is an exclusive or privileged act, shown to be performed in private mental space, a realm analogous to the demarcation of private space in the House. Again the House has blurred the distinction between architectonics and language by exploring private mental space and private personal space literally as space. The privacy of one's exclusive image of the visual room is analogous to the privacy of the boudoir.

The floor plan of the House refers to the concepts of inhabitation and accessibility. To reach Margarethe's bedroom from the hall, one must pass through the salon and then her private living room. Spatially, the salon acts with connective properties between the hall and Margarethe's private living room, and her private living room mediates access from the salon to her bedroom. The delayed accessibility into the private rooms is reminiscent of the difficulty of entering or inhabiting the visual impression of a physical space. Accessibility is an issue that blends the physical and spatial with language.

The use of various mechanical systems to achieve precise results is essential in the House. The metal runner between the inner and outer door leaves allowed the double-layered doors to open in both directions smoothly and seemingly weightlessly. The metal curtains for covering the windows are raised by a "precisely calculated counterweight ... With the up and down movement of the opaque curtains, one gets a haptic feeling of light" (Zou, 2005, p. 27-28). The movement of these door and curtain mechanisms creates a temporal gesture by the architecture. A sense of time is brought into the building with the smooth motion of the vertical and horizontal sliding planes. Similarly, image forming is temporal; it is an action that occurs over time. The act of opening and closing can be likened to the forming of an image and conversely one can form an image of a blind or door opening and closing. While the visual room embodies these atmospheric attributes, recall that language too is a "spatial and temporal phenomenon" (Wittgenstein, 1958/2009, paragraph 108). Just as architecture permits time and motion, so too are language and philosophy inextricably entangled with these properties. The visual room highlights the complexity of the philosophical problem of a private mental image and its dependence on our understanding of space.

#### Conclusion

The image forming process, a private psychological action, is the activity of construing visual impressions of objects in the real world. Wittgenstein's philosophy of the image is bound to language when attempting to describe the concept, and now it is shown as bound to another formwork: the realm of architectural space. The aphorism of the vis-

ual room undergoes analyses of space and language, and in conjunction with the Stonborough-Wittgenstein House it is evidence for the inseparable links of linguistics and space. The visual room is not a mere metaphor that is by chance a room; it is its spatial nature that lends itself to a description of imaging. Wittgenstein is describing philosophy within a blurred boundary of language and space. The characteristics of the visual room as an analogy for language are explored further in the Stonborough-Wittgenstein House, showing the spatial nature of language and philosophical problems. The visual room describes language, but it has its limits. What is beyond the limits of the visual room is described by the architecture of the House. Architecture, the physical construal of the spatial nature of language, is the perfect framework for a philosophy grounded in language. Perhaps the only limits to Wittgenstein's philosophy are the limits of architecture.

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# Das Selbstbild bei Ludwig Wittgenstein im Gegensatz zu René Descartes

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## 1. Descartes (1596–1650)

Das Selbst bei Descartes zeigt sich schon so, dass die *Meditationen* in der Ich-Form geschrieben sind. In Korrelation mit dem methodischen Zweifel ist das denkende Ich dasjenige, an dem nicht gezweifelt werden kann. „Hier werde ich fündig: das Denken [=Bewusstsein, Anm. B.M.] ist es, es allein kann von mir nicht abgetrennt werden; Ich bin, Ich existiere, das ist gewiss.“ (Descartes 2004, 83)

Drei Gründe für den methodischen Zweifel werden angebracht, kognitive Grundlagen – orientiere ich mich nur an den althergebrachten Dingen oder habe ich dies selbstständig überlegt, die Frage, ob ich in einem Wachoder in einem Traumzustand bin und drittens wirft Descartes die Überlegung auf, ob ich Opfer eines marionettenhaften Verhaltens in der Macht eines bösen Dämons bin.

Der Zweifel lässt sich wie folgt darstellen:

„Ich nehme also an, alles, was ich wahrnehme, sei falsch; ich glaube, dass nichts von alledem jemals existiert habe, was mir mein trügerisches Gedächtnis vorführt. Ich habe überhaupt keine Sinne; Körper, Gestalt, Ausdehnung, Bewegung und Ort sind Chimären. Was soll da noch wahr sein? Vielleicht dies eine, dass es nichts Gewisses gibt.“ (Descartes 2004, 77)

Der methodische Zweifel rückt Descartes in die Nähe des Skeptizismus, ohne ein Skeptiker zu sein. Er fragt nach unhinterfragbaren Prinzipien und löst das Problem (scheinbar) damit auf, dass man an Gott nicht zweifeln braucht. So argumentiert Descartes in der 6. Meditation, dass das, was man klar und deutlich erkennen kann, von Gott sei und einen kein Betrügergott täuscht.

„Zum wenigsten weiß ich nun, dass sie, soweit sie Gegenstand der reinen Mathematik sind, existieren können, da ich diese klar und deutlich erfasse. Denn Gott ist ohne Zweifel imstande, alles das zu bewirken, was ich so klar aufzufassen imstande bin; nur wenn etwas einer deutlichen Auffassung widerstreitet, kann es, wie ich feststellte, Gott nicht entstehen lassen.“ (Descartes 2004, 177)

Descartes setzt zwar überkommene Vorstellungen einer radikalen Hinterfragung aus, um ein festes Fundament zu errichten, aber er macht hierbei einerseits Ausnahmen, andererseits bringt er einen Beweis Gottes, damit sein metaphysisches und erkenntnistheoretisches Gebäude nicht zusammenbricht.

So ist es nicht schwer, den Zweifler Descartes dahingehend zu überführen, dass er kein Skeptiker ist. Im Gegensatz hierzu kann man den Ausführungen Hans Sluga in seinem Aufsatz „Pyrrhonian Scepticism – Ludwig Wittgensteins Bezug zum Skeptizismus“ nachgehen und Hans Sluga wirft sogar die Frage auf, ob Wittgenstein ein pyrrhonischer Skeptiker sei.

Wittgenstein würde überhaupt in einem skeptischen Ton schreiben. Auch die These, dass metaphysische Sätze unsinnig seien, verweist auf ein skeptisches Unterfan-

gen. Ebenso kann man die Thematik des Regelfolgens und die Diskussion um die Privatsprache als skeptisch charakterisiert.

„But he also writes much of the time in a strikingly sceptical tone of voice. His *Tractatus* proposes, for instance, to show us, that metaphysical claims are strictly senseless. And what are we to say to his 'skeptical' arguments against the possibility of an essentially private language? Do these not amount to a philosophical skepticism concerning necessity and private experience.“ (Sluga 2004, 100)

Sluga weist überraschende Übereinstimmungen nach. Wittgenstein als einen Pyrrhonischen Skeptiker zu beschreiben, gehe auf Fritz Mauthner zurück. Mach habe Metaphern von Sextus Empiricus, dem wichtigen Exponenten der Pyrrhonischen Skeptik übernommen, diese übernahm wiederum Mauthner von Mach und Wittgenstein dann von Mauthner. Mauthners Schatten lägen über Wittgensteins Formulierungen, z.B. die Sätze 4.002 oder 5.5563.

Der Mensch besitzt die Fähigkeit Sprachen zu bauen, womit sich jeder Sinn ausdrücken lässt, ohne eine Ahnung davon zu haben, wie und was jedes Wort bedeutet. – Wie man auch spricht, ohne zu wissen, wie die einzelnen Laute hervorgebracht werden.

Die Umgangssprache ist ein Teil des menschlichen Organismus und nicht weniger kompliziert als dieser.

TLP 4.002: Es ist menschenunmöglich, die Sprachlogik aus ihr unmittelbar zu entnehmen.

Die Sprache verkleidet den Gedanken. Und zwar so, dass man nach der äußeren Form des Kleides nicht auf die Form des bekleideten Gedankens schließen kann; weil die äußere Form des Kleides nach ganz anderen Zwecken gebildet ist als danach, die Form des Körpers erkennen zu lassen.

Die stillschweigenden Abmachungen zum Verständnis der Umgangssprache sind enorm kompliziert.

Sluga sieht durchaus Differenzen zwischen Mauthner und Wittgenstein, er hält jedoch fest, dass ein wichtiges Argument für die skeptische These spricht, nämlich, dass Philosophie Sprachkritik sei. Weitere Argumente der Nähe zwischen Wittgenstein und Mauthner findet man, wenn man Mauthner bezüglich der *Philosophischen Untersuchungen* liest. So finden sich bei Wittgenstein und bei Mauthner ähnliche Auffassungen von der Sprache. Für Mauthner sei Sprache weniger eine Repräsentation, als vielmehr ein Kommunikationsmittel. Als solche existiert sie als soziale Realität. Auch Formulierungen von Mauthner, eine Regel sei nichts anderes als ein Ausdruck unseres Gebrauchs unserer Sprache entsprechen Überzeugungen von Wittgenstein aus den *Philosophischen Untersuchungen*.

Das Selbst bei Descartes bekommt eine weitere Nuance bei Descartes *Abhandlung über die Verschiedenheit von Körper und Geist*. So zeigt sich ein markantes Selbstverständnis bei Descartes – die reale Verschieden-

heit von Körper und Geist. Gilbert Ryle schlägt direkt in diese Kerbe und kritisiert ein solches Verständnis als ein ‚Gespenst in der Maschine‘.

Descartes reale Verschiedenheit von Körper und Geist verlangt nur die Trennbarkeit, nicht das Getrenntsein ist wichtig. Es ist eher selten, dass in einem Leben der Geist vom Körper getrennt existiert, und ohne Mensch besteht. Als Koordinationsstelle wird die Zirbeldrüse genannt – sie sei die Schaltstelle von Körper und Geist. Für seine Theorie bringt Descartes zwei Beweise, einen erkenntnistheoretischen und einen naturalistischen und Beispiele. Der erkenntnistheoretische Beweis fordert das klare und deutliche Erkennen, während der naturalistische Beweis aufzeigt, dass ein Mensch nicht wie eine Maschine nachbaubar ist und es also etwas zusätzliches bedarf. Eines seiner Beispiele sind Phantomschmerzen – ein Mensch, der seinen Arm im Krieg verlor, kann dort trotzdem plötzlich Schmerzen verspüren. Wo kein Körper mehr ist, bleibt die Empfindung zurück.

Gilbert Ryle verwirft das cartesische Weltbild mit dem Vorwurf, dass Descartes einen Kategorienfehler begehe. Der Geist sei eine andere Kategorie als der Körper und könne so nicht in dem Zusammenhang dargestellt werden, wie es Descartes tue. So könne man z.B. seinem Nachbarn begegnen, aber nicht dem Durchschnittssteuereinzahler; ebenso könne man bei einem Fußballspiel die Spielregeln erklären, nicht aber mit derselben Art und Weise den Mannschaftsgeist. Ebenso würde man sich wundern, wenn man einem jungen Wissenschaftler die Gebäude der Universität Oxford zeige und dieser hinterher fragen würde, wo denn nun aber bitte die Universität sei – Descartes würde den wahren Begriff von Geist mit seiner dualistischen These eher verwirren als klären, so Ryles Vorwurf.

## 2. Das Selbstbild bei Ludwig Wittgenstein

Eine schöne Analyse findet man bei Hans Sluga – „Whose house is that? – Wittgenstein on the self“ (in: Stern/Sluga 1996). Hans Sluga beginnt seinen Aufsatz mit § 398 der *Philosophischen Untersuchungen*, einem Landschaftsbild, auf dem ein Mann und ein Haus zu sehen ist – wem das Haus gehöre, fragt Wittgenstein, nun dem Bauern, der davor sitzt, wäre eine mögliche Antwort. Dann jedoch, so Wittgenstein weiter, könne er das Haus nicht betreten. Hans Sluga fragt, ob der der Bauer für das Selbst steht, das es nicht gibt? Was bedeutet es, dass er das Haus besitzt, jedoch nicht betreten kann? Was erzählt uns diese Geschichte?

Wittgensteins Diskussion über das Selbst bedeutet einen Komplex zu betrachten, und zwar Fragen nach dem Geist und der Sprache.

Wittgensteins Position ist eine anticartesische. Hierbei findet Sluga im *Tractatus logico-philosophicus* Stellen, die dies belegen. Außerdem lassen sich das Blue Book und die *Philosophischen Untersuchungen* heranziehen. So z. B. Im *Tractatus* Satz: 5.631 Das denkende, vorstellende, Subjekt gibt es nicht. Im Blauen Buch findet sich die Aussage, dass Wittgenstein der Sprache vorwirft, die Illusion hervorzurufen, dass das Wort „Ich“ auf etwas körperliches referiere, das in unserem Körper sitze, dies jedoch nur als das ego erscheine und nicht wirklich sei; und in den *Philosophischen Untersuchungen* § 410: „Ich“ benennt keine Person, „hier“ keinen Ort“ und „dieses“ ist kein Name. Aber sie stehen mit Namen in Zusammenhang.“

Sluga zeichnet den Weg im *Tractatus*, beginnend mit Satz 5.54 nach, den man anticartesisch verstehen kann. Es gebe keine Seele, schreibt Ludwig Wittgenstein und wendet sich gegen die Psychologie, die die Seele als etwas zusammengesetztes versteht.

*TLP* 5.5421: „Dies zeigt auch, dass die Seele – das Subjekt etc. – wie sie in der heutigen oberflächlichen Psychologie aufgefasst wird, ein Unding ist. Eine zusammengesetzte Seele wäre keine Seele mehr.“

Im nächsten Satz wendet sich Wittgenstein gegen Überlegungen von Bertrand Russell.

Russell habe für ein cartesisches Verständnis bzgl. einer Theorie der Bedeutung geworben, das wiederum von Wittgenstein angegriffen wurde.

Russell wird wie folgt beschrieben – in den *Principles of Mathematics* (1903) sieht er eine Differenz zwischen einer Proposition und einer Reihe seiner Komponenten. Das erstere bildet eine Einheit, während das zweite dies nicht tut. Wie aber kann man diese Einheit erklären? 1911 kam Russell auf den Gedanken, dass diese Einheit aus einem denkenden Subjekt bestehen könne – dies jedoch entspricht so einer cartesischen Konzeption.

„By 1911 he had, therefore, come around to thinking that the solution lay in the assuming that the apparent unity of a proposition was in each case due to a thinking subject holding the elements of the proposition together in its thinking or believing to the proposition.“  
(Sluga 1996, 324)

Russells Missverständnis bezüglich der Einheit der Propositionen verursacht eine verkehrte Konzeption des Selbst und so ist auch Wittgensteins bekannter Satz zu verstehen, dass Missverständnisse in der Logik falsche philosophische Theorien begründet. Die Einheit der Präposition kann nicht durch ein cartesisches Subjekt zusammengefasst werden. Das cartesische Selbst ist logisch zusammenhangslos.

Wittgenstein greift das cartesische Verständnis eines Selbsts an, insbesondere in den Sätzen *TLP* 5.54 ff. Dass ein Selbst sowohl Selbst ist, als auch ein solches repräsentiert, ist absurd. Und Wittgenstein durchtrennt so den Gordischen Knoten des modernen Verständnisses des Subjekts.

Hans Sluga subsumiert, dass, als Wittgenstein den *Tractatus* schrieb, ein anticartesisches Verständnis durchaus gängig war. Hume, Kant, Schopenhauer, Nietzsche, Mach und Freud waren Exponenten eines Anti-Cartesischen Verständnisses. Nietzsche wandte sich gegen einen Atomismus der Seele, der sich dagegen wendet, die Seele als undestruierbar zu betrachten, Mach fand, dass das Ich kein Fakt sei, sondern die Elemente, die die Seele konstruieren. Und Wittgenstein hatte diese Leute gelesen.

„By 1918 Wittgenstein must have been aware of these ideas. He was certainly familiar with Schopenhauer by then; he had also studied parts of Kant’s Critique of pure reason, knew some of Nietzsche’s writings, and was acquainted with Mach’s Analysis of Sensations from which the quoted sentences are taken.“ (Sluga 1996, 327)

Wittgenstein hatte außerdem die Position eines Anti-Objektivismus. Das denkende Subjekt ist eine Illusion, aber ebenso ist das Ich auch kein Objekt. Das Ich kann

weder ein Name für ein Objekt sein, noch eine Beschreibung eines Komplexes. Das Selbst ist auch nicht in einem psychologischen Sinn zu verstehen. Das Ich erscheint bei Wittgenstein sehr reduziert, es ist nicht nichts, es ist jedoch ebenso kein Objekt. Das Ich zeigt sich in seinem Verhältnis zur Welt – die objektive Welt, wie sie sich dem Subjekt zeigt, macht so auch das Subjekt aus.

„The objective world has to be conceived as a world given to a subjectivity and it is in this that the subject makes its appearance.“ (Sluga 1996, 329)

Ein solcher Ansatz korrespondiert mit vielen Überlegungen der Zeit in Kunst und Literatur. Kafka beschrieb in die Verwandlung die Handlung aus der Sicht des Käfers, also eine Welt, die sich dem Käfer zeigt und auch Arthur Schnitzlers Erzählungen bringen Beispiele für den Inneren Monolog. Das Ich tritt zwar hervor, die objektive Welt jedoch gibt es nur durch dieses Ich. Auch Bilder von van Gogh erinnern an diese Sichtweise, z. B. das Bild „Vincent's Zimmer in Arles“, da die Person des Künstlers durch diesen Raum wirklich wird. Der Kunstsinn der Wittgensteins findet sich nicht nur bei dem bekannten Klimt, liest man in dem Buch *Das Haus Wittgenstein* von Alexander Waugh, in dem auch die Schwierigkeiten der Familie Wittgenstein mit dem nationalsozialistischen Regime behandelt wird – Gretl Stonborough soll weit unter Wert 1937/38 Gemälde versteigert haben, hierbei finden sich Namen wie

Toulouse-Lautrec, Matisse, Gauguin und Picasso – also (außer Picasso) Künstler zur Zeit van Goghs.

Nochmals Ludwig Wittgenstein im Zitat:

*TLP* 5.641 Es gibt also wirklich einen Sinn, in welchem in der Philosophie nichtpsychologisch vom Ich die Rede sein kann.

Das Ich tritt in die Philosophie dadurch ein, dass „die Welt meine Welt ist.“ Das philosophische Ich ist nicht der Mensch, nicht der menschliche Körper, oder die menschliche Seele, von der die Psychologie handelt, sondern das metaphysische Subjekt, die Grenze – nicht ein Teil – der Welt.

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# Von der Grammatik der Sprache zur Grammatik der Natur

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## 1. Wieso eine Untersuchung der Grammatik der Natur nahe liegt

Seit den *Philosophischen Untersuchungen* [PU] besteht die erste sprachphilosophische Pflicht im Beschreiben von Sprachspielen. Wittgensteins Buch folgend etablierte sich eine ganze Tradition, in der gezeigt wird, wie dabei vorzugehen ist und wieso seine Methode tatsächlich auf den Boden der Tatsachen führt. Dorthin, wo sich der Spaten schließlich zurück biegt. Aber es wird eben nur für *Sprachspiele* gezeigt.

In § 217, wo Wittgenstein die Metapher vom Erreichen des harten Felsens und dem sich zurück biegenden Spaten benutzt, besteht die finale und nicht weiter zu begründende Einsicht darin, dass *wir eben so und so handeln*. Hier und auch sonst, wo es ihm um Praktiken geht, bezieht er sich auf die kulturelle Sphäre unseres Lebens. Diese charakterisiert er hinsichtlich bestimmter Aspekte als gewissermaßen widerständig und zugleich auch kontingent. Dabei interessiert ihn nicht einmal die ganze Sphäre kultureller Leistungen, sondern nur ein ausgewählter Teil: die Sprache. Worauf sich seine Untersuchung richtet, ist – allgemein und in Wittgensteins Worten gesagt – die *Grammatik der Sprache*. Die Grammatik, das ist eben der feste Grund, der uns zu tragen vermag, das sind die harten Felsen, an denen sich unsere Spaten zurück biegen. Denn die in Frage stehende Praxis ist nur unter Annahme der jeweiligen Grammatik denkbar (Widerständigkeit), wobei gleichzeitig jegliche konkrete Begründung für sie fehlt und auch unnötig ist (Kontingenz). Sprachspiele mit Farben sind bspw. nur unter der Annahme unserer Grammatik der Farbbegriffe denkbar, wobei es für deren konkrete Gestalt gleichzeitig keinerlei Gründe gibt und geben kann. Aber es muss doch erstaunen: Immer soll es Sprachliches sein, das diese enorme Kraft besitzt. Was ist mit dem wirklichen Felsen, an dem der wirkliche Spaten zerbricht? Ist er weniger „hart“ als sein metaphorisches Pendant? Was ist mit dem Widerstand, den der Tisch meiner Faust entgegensetzt? Was ist mit der Wirkung des Pausenkaffees? Wie verhält es sich überhaupt mit den Naturgesetzen? Wartet nur die Sprache mit Widerständigem und Kontingentem auf? Wollen wir nicht auch manchmal sagen, dass „es eben so und so ist“? Und zwar nicht etwa deshalb, weil „*wir so und so handeln!*“...

Da es Wittgenstein vordergründig um die Auflösung philosophischer Probleme geht, liegt seine Konzentration auf Sprache nahe. Die Natur hält er anscheinend für unproblematisch bzw. gelten ihm ihre Probleme einfach als Gegenstände anderer Disziplinen. Aber trotzdem: Die Natur gehört auch zu unserer Lebenswelt. Wir erlernten als Kinder nicht nur unsere Muttersprache, wir lernten auch über Natur. Und wir versuchen noch immer bestimmte Eigenarten der Natur zu verstehen, so wie wir noch immer Sprachphilosophie betreiben. Ist Wittgensteins Trennung von Sprache und Natur vielleicht zu streng? Ist die Anwendbarkeit seiner Methode womöglich gar nicht auf Sprache beschränkt? Gibt es möglicherweise nicht nur eine Grammatik der Sprache, sondern auch eine *Grammatik der Natur*? Falls ja, wäre damit freilich nicht die Grammatik des Wortes „Natur“ gemeint. Es ginge z. B. nicht um eine Untersuchung, wie sie Wittgenstein für die Grammatik des Wortes „wissen“ in *Über Gewißheit* vorschlägt. Es

würde auch nicht interessieren, ob Naturgesetze im Allgemeinen diese oder jene (sprachliche/logische/grammatische) Form haben. Zwar würde die Beschäftigung mit der Grammatik der Natur trotzdem unter Zuhilfenahme der Sprache erfolgen – jedenfalls nicht unter Verzicht auf Sprache –, aber der Untersuchungsgegenstand wäre doch ausdrücklich ein anderer. Eben die Natur.

Ich argumentiere dafür, dass es möglich und Gewinn bringend ist, nach einer Grammatik der Natur zu fragen. Und mehr noch: Die Methode, nach der dabei vorzugehen wäre, können wir sogar bei Wittgenstein nachlesen. Denn Wittgenstein hat seine spätphilosophische Methode bereits derart breit und fest abgesichert, dass wir sie nicht etwa von der Sprache her auf andere Bereiche zu *übertragen* haben, sondern dass wir sie gewissermaßen nur auf andere Bereiche *anzuwenden* brauchen. Im folgenden Abschnitt skizziere ich die Zusammenhänge einiger spätphilosophischer Grundbegriffe aus dem methodischen Teil der PU, um daran anschließend knapp darstellen zu können, wie die Methode zu verallgemeinern wäre. Im letzten Abschnitt führe ich ein konkretes Beispiel aus der elementaren Optik vor.

## 2. Eine Skizze der sprachgrammatischen Methode der PU

Der methodische Teil der PU reicht bis ca. § 133, wo es vorausschauend heißt: „[E]s wird nun an Beispielen eine Methode gezeigt, und die Reihe dieser Beispiele kann man abbrechen.“ Im ersten Teil (§§ 1 bis 88) geht es neben der Befreiung von Vorurteilen vor allem um die Einführung neuer philosophischer Begriffe: *Sprachspiel*, *Lebensform* und *Grammatik*. Im zweiten Teil (§§ 89 bis 137) geht es darum, was an der früheren, logischen Methode falsch war und wie sie durch die neue, grammatische Methode zu ersetzen ist. (Vgl. § 90: „Unsere Betrachtung ist daher eine grammatische.“) Dabei wird ein weiterer Begriff eingeführt: *übersichtliche Darstellung*. Zu den neuen Begriffen und zur grammatischen Methode einige Schlaglichter:

*Sprachspiel und Lebensform*: Unter Sprachspielen versteht Wittgenstein einerseits spielerische Kommunikationsformen, „mittels welcher Kinder ihre Muttersprache erlernen“ und andererseits Formen primitiver Sprachen (§ 7). Dabei geht es ihm nie nur ums Sprechen allein, sondern immer auch um die Tätigkeiten, mit denen das Sprechen verwoben ist: „Das Wort »Sprachspiel/« soll hier hervorheben, dass das Sprechen der Sprache ein Teil ist einer Tätigkeit, oder Lebensform.“ (§ 23 – Hervorhebungen, auch Anführungen in sämtlichen Zitaten wie im Original) Mit Lebensform, von der die Sprache also nur Teil ist, meint Wittgenstein all das, was wir uns außer einem sprechenden Sprecher noch vorstellen müssen, wenn wir versuchen, uns eine Sprache vorzustellen (vgl. § 19): z. B. eine Gemeinschaft von Sprechern, eine Lebenswelt, Gegenstände, alltägliche Rituale, Tätigkeiten oder auch Bedürfnisse etc. Die Lebensform bietet also den nötigen Kontext, in dem das jeweils betreffende Sprachspiel ausgemacht wird. All das viele „Lebensförmliche“ interessiert Wittgenstein jedoch nur am Rande; ihn selbst interessieren die sprachlichen Tätigkeiten, deswegen die Rede vom *Sprachspiel*.

*Sprachspiel und Grammatik:* In den meisten Sprachspielen, die Wittgenstein beschreibt, wird etwas erlernt oder etwas Erlerntes hinterfragt (vgl. wieder § 7). Es handelt sich um Situationen, die durch Experten, zu denen auch wir Wittgenstein-Leser gehören, immer schon gemeistert wurden und die zugleich so einfach sind, dass potentielle Laien zu folgen vermögen. Dasjenige, was in diesen Situationen gelernt werden soll bzw. was wir uns anhand ihrer zu vergegenwärtigen versuchen, ist Teil der Grammatik der Sprache. So heißt es z. B. in § 29 zur Rolle des Wortes „Zahl“ beim Definieren (bzw. Lernen) der Zwei: „[D]as Wort »Zahl« zeigt hier an, an welchen *Platz* der Sprache, der Grammatik, wir das Wort setzen.“ An anderen Stellen ist von der Grammatik der Worte „wissen“, „können“, „verstehen“ (§ 150), „passen“ (§ 182) und „meinen“ (§ 187) etc. die Rede. Was bei der Suche nach der Grammatik interessiert, sind Verwendungsregeln, die die Laien gewissermaßen schlucken müssen, wenn sie die Verwendung mitmachen wollen. Dabei handelt es sich jedoch nicht um die Regeln der Sprachspiele. Schließlich könnten wir uns einerseits Spiele vorstellen, in denen es bspw. um Zahlen und Farben ginge und andererseits solche, in denen es zwar um Zahlen aber nicht um Farben ginge. Im ersten Fall spielten dann Zahl- und Farbgrammatik eine Rolle, im zweiten jedoch nur die Zahlgrammatik. Keine der beiden Grammatiken würde also als Regelwerk eines dieser beiden Sprachspiele gelten können. Vielmehr werden *anhand* von Sprachspielen Grammatiken gelernt. Deswegen kommt der Untersuchung von Sprachspielen eine so besondere Rolle zu. Grammatiken selbst sind Verwendungsregeln eines Begriffes (oder einer Familie von Begriffen), die für alle möglichen Sprachspiele, in denen sie auftreten, gelten. Man könnte z. B. in Anlehnung an § 7 sagen: „Farbspiele sind Spiele, mittels welcher Kinder die Grammatik der Farben erlernen“ – und es gibt eben unüberschaubar viele solcher Spiele.

*Grammatik und übersichtliche Darstellung:* Da Sprachspielsituationen als Lehr-Lern-Situationen von Grammatiken beschreibbar sind, müssen die zu lernenden Grammatiken in ihnen offen verhandelt werden. Denn sonst würden die lernenden Laien nicht folgen können. Damit sind Wittgensteins Grammatiken keinesfalls als hypothetische Entitäten gedacht, die prinzipiell im Verborgenen liegen oder wirken. Sie können vielmehr mit Hilfe der grammatischen Methode frei gelegt und schließlich beschrieben werden. Somit löst Wittgenstein ein, was er in § 109 verspricht: „[W]ir dürfen keinerlei Theorie aufstellen. Es darf nichts Hypothetisches in unseren Betrachtungen sein. Alle *Erklärung* muss fort, und nur Beschreibung an ihre Stelle treten.“ Im übertragenen Sinne ist die grammatische Methode eine archäologische Methode. Sie rät uns dazu, Beispiele für den fraglichen Gebrauch zu suchen, diese Beispiele zu vermehren, zu variieren und abzuwandeln, nach Kriterien erfolgreicher und erfolgloser Anwendungen zu fragen und die Sprachspiele von verwandten und unverwandten abzugrenzen. Bis wir uns schließlich besser auskennen. Bis wir zuletzt in der Lage sind, die Grammatik übersichtlich darzustellen. Und wer die übersichtliche Darstellung zu lesen vermag, vermag die wesentlichen Tatsachen klar zu sehen: „Die übersichtliche Darstellung vermittelt das Verständnis, welches eben darin besteht, dass wir die ‚Zusammenhänge sehen‘.“ (§ 122)

### 3. Zur Verallgemeinerung der grammatischen Methode

Obwohl Wittgenstein seine grammatische Methode auf die Untersuchung der Grammatik der Sprache hin entwickelt hat, ist ihre Anwendung keineswegs auf Sprachliches beschränkt. Dreh- und Angelpunkt dieser Aufweitung des grammatischen Blickes sind die vier neuen Begriffe, deren

Zusammenhänge ich oben skizziert habe. Wenn es nämlich stimmt, dass Sprachspielsituationen im Grunde Lehr-Lern-Situationen sind, in denen Grammatiken offen verhandelt werden, dann öffnet sich ein Zugang zu einer Vielzahl solcher Situationen, in denen es überhaupt nicht um das Erlernen von Sprachlichem geht. Es gibt eben mehr zu lernen als nur unsere Sprache. Und wenn, wie Wittgenstein sich ausdrückt, „das Sprechen der Sprache ein Teil ist einer Tätigkeit, oder Lebensform“ (§ 23), dann kann und darf es uns eben auch um andere Teile „einer Tätigkeit, oder Lebensform“ gehen. Vermutlich liegt es dann nahe, nicht mehr nur von *Sprachspielen* zu reden. Zumindest erhalte der zweite Wortteil mehr Betonung. Die Methode sowie ihr Ziel würden jedenfalls bestehen bleiben: durch Variation der relevanten Spiele die Grammatiken offen zu legen und diese schließlich in übersichtliche Darstellungen zu bringen.

In den Sprachspielen, die Wittgenstein beschreibt, tauchen bereits eine Menge Kandidaten für andere Teile „einer Tätigkeit, oder Lebensform“ als Sprache auf: anheb- und stapelbare Würfel und Platten (§ 2), aufmalbare Farben (§ 8), Zeichnungen (§ 23), Tiere (§ 25), Himmel (§ 33), Figuren aus Holz (§ 35) etc. Wir könnten danach fragen, was wir neben Sprachlichem gelernt haben mussten, um all das zu verstehen, und wie wir es gelernt haben. Außerdem gibt es eine Reihe weiterer, nicht rein sprachlicher Kandidaten dafür, Untersuchungsgegenstand einer verallgemeinerten Methode zu werden. Z. B. Aspekte des gesellschaftlichen Zusammenlebens oder die Wissenssysteme vergangener Epochen – dazu könnten wir von Claude Lévi-Strauss und Michel Foucault lernen, deren Ethnographie bzw. Diskursanalyse deutliche „grammatische Züge“ tragen. Im letzten Abschnitt möchte ich beispielhaft andeuten, wie auch Naturphänomene nach der grammatischen Methode untersucht werden können.

### 4. Reflexionsgesetz vs. Spiegelraum

Das Reflexionsgesetz am Spiegel gehört zu unseren elementarsten physikalischen Gesetzen. Kaum vorstellbar, dass damit etwas nicht stimmen könnte. Aber eines fällt auf: Das reflektierte Licht, von dem dort die Rede ist (ob es nun als Strahl, Korpuskel, oder Welle gedacht sei), ist prinzipiell nicht beobachtbar. Wir mögen noch so sehr an die Vorstellung gewöhnt sein, dass von allem Hellen her etwas (unvorstellbar schnell) durch den Raum eilt, aber dieses „Licht“ bleibt letztlich doch eine hypothetische Entität. Das ist einerseits unbedenklich, weil solches Theoretisieren eben zum bewährten methodischen Kernbestand der Physik gehört. Aber andererseits ist es erlaubt, mit Wittgenstein zu gehen, der alles Theoretische und Hypothetische fortbringen möchte (s. o. zu § 109). Wie würde das für die Reflexion gelingen?

Wir könnten die im Spiegel sichtbaren Objekte ernst nehmen. Die Spiegelobjekte liegen nicht flach auf der Spiegeloberfläche, sondern räumlich hinter ihr. Dort, „hinter“ bzw. „in“ dem Spiegel sind sie sogar ortsfest: Man kann vor großen, ebenen Spiegeln „ein wenig um sie herumgehen“ und sie bleiben währenddessen, wo sie sind (abgesehen vom eigenen umhergehenden Spiegelbild). Der Spiegel wirkt also optisch wie ein Fenster in einen *Spiegelraum* hinein. Was durch dieses Fenster hindurch sichtbar ist, ist zwar nicht ertastbar, aber trotzdem optisch real: Alle Spiegelobjekte stehen mit allen anderen Objekten in optischen Beziehungen (soweit es die Größe des „Fensterrahmens“ eben zulässt). So, wie in spiegelfreien Räumen bspw. eine Kerzenflamme eine Tasse beleuchtet, so beleuchtet eine Spiegelkerzenflamme eine Spiegeltasse. Aber außerdem beleuchtet sie durch den Spiegel hin-

durch auch die Tasse und die ungespiegelte Kerzenflamme (die selbst wiederum Tasse, Spiegeltasse und Spiegelkerzenflamme beleuchtet). Man kann sich davon leicht anhand von Schattenverläufen überzeugen. Der Spiegelraum ist also ein optisch vollwertiger Raum.

Zu jedem (!) Objekt des Raumes, in dem der Spiegel steht, existiert im Spiegelraum ein Spiegelobjekt. Für ihre beiden Orte gilt ein einfaches, auf die Spiegeloberfläche bezogenes *Spiegelgesetz*: Jedes Objekt und sein zugehöriges Spiegelobjekt stehen sich lotrecht und abstandsgleich gegenüber. Damit ergibt sich auf einen Schlag die *gesamte* Geometrie der Situation. Außerdem wird sofort klar, dass für jede *einzelne* Sicht- und Beleuchtungsbeziehung diejenige Regel gilt, die vormalig Reflexionsgesetz hieß. Nur das sie jetzt nicht mehr von einem hypothetischen „Licht“ handelt, sondern rein geometrische Verhältnisse beschreibt. Bei näherer Betrachtung ergibt sich sogar das Spiegelgesetz selbst aus einer noch elementarerer Einsicht: Der Spiegel zeigt stets genau diejenige Ansicht, die er selbst (für einen hinter ihm stehenden Beobachter) gerade verdeckt (vgl. zu den letzten Absätzen Maier 1986 und Schön 1994).

Die Rede vom Spiegelraum mag ungewohnt sein, sie ist jedoch sehr mächtig. Das *Spiegelraum-Konzept* kann durch die gesamte Optik mitgenommen werden, weswegen es auch Eingang in Schulbücher gefunden hat (z. B. Cornelsens „Physik plus, Berlin, 7./8. Schuljahr“). Es stellt keinerlei Hypothesen über hinter den Erscheinungen verborgene Ursachen auf. Es beschreibt einfach, wie es ist. Und mehr noch: Erinnern wir uns daran, wie wir Umgang mit Spiegeln bekamen! Als Kinder lernten wir, uns selbst im Spiegel zu erkennen und mit Hilfe kleiner Spiegel „um die Ecke“ zu spähen. Später lernten wir mit dem Reflexionsgesetz den Spiegel als Umlenker von Lichtstrahlen

zu sehen. Schließlich aber meisterten wir, uns zu rasieren oder zu schminken. Und dabei vergaßen wir die Lichtstrahlen wieder, denn ein Verständnis des Reflexionsgesetzes half uns dort herzlich wenig. Kurzum: Das Spiegelraum-Konzept ist eine Art übersichtliche Darstellung eines Teils der Grammatik der Optik. Schminken ist eines der unzähligen Spiele, anhand deren wir diese Grammatik erlernen können.

Es finden sich weitere hypothesenfreie, naturwissenschaftliche Beispiele, u. a. in den Beiträgen der *Phänomen orientierten* bzw. *phänomenologischen* Strömung(en) der Naturwissenschaftsdidaktiken (siehe dazu z. B. in Grebe-Ellis 2005, Theilmann 2006). Auch das Buch, das Wittgenstein völlig unkommentiert auf einem Zettel zu § 109 in den PU erwähnt („Faraday, *The Chemical History of a Candle*: Water is [...]“), hält eine Menge solcher Beispiele bereit.

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# 'Operating with words' and the Shopping Scene

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In §1 of the P.I. Wittgenstein describes the following shopping scene. The narrative "I" sends someone shopping, giving him a slip of paper marked "five red apples". The person sent shopping carries the slip of paper to the shopkeeper. The shopkeeper then opens a drawer with apples, looks into a chart for the word "red", finds a colour sample opposite it and starts taking one apple of the colour sample found in the chart for each numeral from one to five, which he says out loud. Immediately after describing this shopping scene Wittgenstein remarks "– It is in this and similar ways that one operates with words. –".

Mulhall claims that the remark "It is in this and similar ways that one operates with words." implies that the shopping scene "is a paradigm of the ordinary – an everyday tale of buying and selling" (Mulhall 2001, 44). I question this claim and show that it rests on an assumption which is false.

First, note that Wittgenstein himself would *not* acknowledge the shopping scene he describes in §1 as 'ordinary'. In §53 he says:

We don't usually carry out the order "Bring me a red flower" by looking up the colour red in a colour chart and then bringing a flower of the colour that we find in the chart.

If we do not usually carry out the order "Bring me a red flower" by consulting a colour chart, neither do we usually carry out the request "five red apples" by consulting a colour chart. Wittgenstein would thus not call the shopping scene 'ordinary' or usual at all.

Second, the remark "It is in this and similar ways that one operates with words." implies that the shopping scene is a paradigmatic case for '*operating with words*'. In order to claim that this same remark implies that the shopping scene is a paradigm of the ordinary, Mulhall would need to assume that '*operating with words*' is just what we usually do with words. I shall show now that this assumption on which Mulhall's claim rests – that '*operating with words*' is just what we usually do with words – is false.

What we do with words is: to use them. I shall show that '*operating with words*' and '*using words*' are not equivalent expressions; the expression '*operating with words*' refers to only a part of the cases of '*using words*'. I do not want to show that '*operating with words*' is not at all '*using words*'. But, what I purpose to show is that not all cases of using words are also cases of operating with words. In order to show this I shall clarify the expression '*operating with words*'. This expression is in need of clarification because it is not an ordinary expression in English (and neither is its equivalent in German). We talk of operating with machines, with instruments or tools, with numbers and other things. But we do not normally say that we operate with words.

Since we do not have an original language game for this expression in ordinary language, in order to understand what '*operating with words*' means, we need to investigate how this expression is introduced and used by Wittgenstein. I shall do this with reference only to the P.I.

Referring to the *Blue Book* (see Hallett 1977, 75; Baker and Hacker 2005, 54-55; Savickey 1999, 160), is not of much help in this case. In the *Blue Book* (BB 16, 17, 69) the expression '*operating with words*' is introduced with reference to a similar shopping scene as in P.I. §1. Hence the same work of clarification which needs to be done for P.I. §1 needs to be done there too. Neither does it help that in the *Blue Book* the same scene is referred to both as "a simple example of operating with words" (BB 16) and "a case of the use of words" (BB 17) or "our old example for the use of words" (BB 69). This might lead some commentators into thinking that the expression '*operating with words*' is equivalent with the expression '*using words*'. But saying that *one* case of using words is a case of operating with words does not imply that *all* cases of using words are also cases of operating with words. At most it implies that this and similar cases of using words can be called cases of operating with words. And this brings us back to the P.I. §1.

Let us investigate the P.I. now. Wittgenstein introduces the expression to '*operate with words*' in §1. He then uses it throughout the P.I. only once more, in §449. In §449 Wittgenstein says:

[...] – One can't shake oneself free of the idea that using a sentence consists in imagining something for every word. One fails to bear in mind the fact that one *calculates*, *operates*, with words, and in due course transforms them into this or that picture. (PI §449)

'*Operating with words*' is used here as an equivalent for '*calculating with words*'. The expression '*to calculate with words*' is itself anything but ordinary, and it is used in the P.I. only in this quoted section. So there is little use to explain '*operating with words*' with reference to '*calculating with words*'. Nevertheless from this passage we get the following picture about '*operating with words*': '*to operate with words*' is analogous to calculating or doing a calculus with fixed rules.

If we think about the shopping scene – which is a case of '*operating with words*' – we can say that the way the shopkeeper acts is analogous to applying a calculus with fixed rules. The shopkeeper goes through specific distinct procedures for each of the three types of words. We can imagine him going through the same kind of procedures for every similar request from his clients, whether they want 25 red or yellow cherries, seven green or yellow bananas and the like. And we can say when he has applied these procedures correctly or not.

Bearing this in mind let us look at how Wittgenstein introduces the expression '*to operate with words*' in §1. He introduces it with reference to the shopping scene: "It is in this and similar ways that one operates with words". There is no doubt that this remark refers to the shopping scene, but it is not clear what the German "so" in "So, und ähnlich, ..." refers to. The English translation for "so" is "this way", but there is more than *one* way of using words in the shopping scene. It is commonly assumed – and not discussed – by commentators that "so" refers only to the way the shopkeeper uses words. But it is not clear why only

what the shopkeeper does with the words should be paradigmatic for 'operating with words'. Are there any reasons to claim that the narrative "I" or the person sent shopping do not operate with words?

Since we have not yet clarified the expression 'to operate with words' we cannot answer this question directly. But since I assume that 'operating with words' is part of what we call 'using words', we can answer the related question, whether there is any reason to claim that the narrative "I" or the person sent shopping do not use words in the shopping scene. Presumably the narrative "I" writes down the words "five red apples" on that slip of paper he or she gives to the person he or she sends shopping. There is no reason to say that writing down words on a paper is not one way of using words. We can say about the narrative "I" that he or she uses words. What about the person sent shopping? This person is given a slip of paper marked with some signs, which he carries to the shopkeeper. It is not straightforward neither that this person uses words, nor that he does not use words. Simply carrying a slip of paper does not make him use the words marked on it. We do not say about the postman that he uses the words marked on our letters he delivers. But if we think about him carrying a slip of paper as something similar to him repeating words (even a string of sounds in a foreign language that he does not know), we could say that he uses words.

And now we come to the second part of how 'operating with words' is introduced in P.I. §1. "It is in this and *similar* ways that one operates with words" (emphasis added). In order to clarify what counts as a case of operating with words we need to show what cases of using words are *similar*, and hence could be called cases of operating with words. And, in order to assess whether everything we call 'using words' is 'operating with words', we need to show whether there are also cases of use of words dissimilar, different, from the family of cases which are similar to the shopping scene.

We can imagine a whole range of uses of words similar to the use of words in the shopping scene (starting from shopping scenes where there is talking instead of handing in slips of paper, where the identification of the colour is done with the help of memory and so on, to scenes of any kind of transactions which imply the use of words). We could say that those using language in these cases apply a calculus with fixed rules. But let us focus on those cases of using words which are dissimilar, different from the way words are used in the shopping scene.

Think of the following use of language: a client comes into a grocery store and asks for seven blue lemons; the shopkeeper replies: "Sorry, we couldn't milk our hen today". This is one way we use words (though maybe only when telling a joke or writing/performing a play). To look for a procedure the shopkeeper goes through or could go through in order to come up with his answer is the same thing as imposing some preconceived idea, a picture of the way language functions, onto the use of language under consideration. Think also of cases of playing with words, cases of freely associating words, writing poetry, telling a strange dream, discussing during a literature or theology seminar and so on. These cases are all cases of using words, but we could not say about them that they are similar to the shopping scene. There is no procedure for each kind of words or for phrases. Hence these cases are not cases of 'operating with words'. Thus, not all cases of using words are cases of operating with words.

If operating with words would be just what we usually do, if the shopping scene would be a paradigm of the ordinary, just like Mulhall suggests, then the way we usually use words should be similar to the way words are being used in the shopping scene. But there is no *one* way we usually use words. And by looking at various cases of using words we see that there are similar but also *different* cases than the use of words in the shopping scene.

According to Wittgenstein "There are *countless* kinds; countless different kinds of use of all the things we call 'signs', 'words', 'sentences'." (P.I. §23). In other words we could not find a paradigmatic case for using words and say that "It is in this and *similar* ways that one uses words". For we use words in *different* ways. On the contrary, Wittgenstein says with respect to the shopping scene that "It is in this and *similar* ways that one *operates* with words" (emphasis added). Thus, operating with words is not the same as using words and the shopping scene is not paradigmatic of the ordinary.

One might feel that since the scene described by Wittgenstein is a scene of buying and selling (and what could be more ordinary than that?), the use of the words in this scene should be ordinary too. After claiming that "It is in this and similar ways that one operates with words." implies that the shopping scene "is a paradigm of the ordinary", Mulhall argues that "nothing could be more extraordinary than this scene of supposedly ordinary life" (Mulhall 2001, 44). Nevertheless, Mulhall attempts at imagining ways for the scene to be ordinary (Mulhall 2001, 46-48). I find this strategy misleading. Instead of trying to account for the ordinariness of a scene which we find to be just the opposite, we should try to account for its extraordinariness.

My suggestion here is the following. "It is in this and similar ways that one operates with words." implies that the shopping scene is a paradigmatic scene for 'operating with words'. The shopping scene is not ordinary because we do not ordinary operate with words, but only – say – in special cases. The purpose of the shopping scene is *not* to present us with an ordinary use of language. Instead, the purpose of the shopping scene is to introduce one picture of the working of our language (an alternative to Augustinian picture). This picture is the picture of using words as *operating* with words and it is meant to help us "shake [ourselves] free of the idea that using [words] consists in imagining something for every word" (see P.I. §449). This picture is not meant to depict how things are, but it has rather a therapeutic purpose.

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# The role of productive imagination in creating artworks and discovering scientific hypotheses

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## 1. Introduction: Probing Kant on the Role of Productive Imagination in Artistic and Scientific Creating and Discovering New Modes of Representing Reality

In this article I elaborate on Kant's conception of artistic *Productive Imagination* in creating artworks and I generalize it to explain the scientist *intellectual intuition* in discovery new hypotheses. Kant explicates *Intuition* as presentation of the imagination and developed the conception of *Productive Imagination* to explain the genuine creation of fine art.

For the imagination (as a productive cognitive power) is very mighty when it creates, as it were, another nature out of the material that actual nature gives it (Kant, *CJ*:314).

Kant developed the conception of *Intellectual Intuition* as supersensible objects of reason as distinct from empirical ones. I turn this transcendental concept into cognitive operations and explain all cognitions experientially. Hence the role of *productive imagination* lies in the artistic creation of new exemplary artworks, and the role of *intellectual intuition*, as productive imagination, lies in scientific discovery of new scientific points of view. Within Pragmaticist epistemology I explain that artists and scientists use their productive imaginations differently in their respective enterprises to construct their different modes of representing reality. These two kinds of imaginary productive operations are based directly and indirectly on the perceptual images of empirical objects. To understand the artistic creation of exemplary artworks, and the scientific discovery of new hypotheses, we have to elucidate the roles of their productive imaginations in these different enterprises by analyzing the different structures the artistic *aesthetic reflective judgment of taste* and scientific *logical reflective judgment of coherence*. I criticize Kant's narrow conception of *judgment* and offer Pragmaticist epistemic logic as complete proof of truth.

## 2. Kant on Theoretical Judgment and Aesthetic Judgment: Difficulties in the Conception of Judgment

### 2.1. Kant's division between theoretical logical judgment and aesthetic reflective judgment

Kant's dichotomy of art and science is based on the epistemological division between theoretical [logical] judgment and aesthetic [reflective] judgment, when the former is an objective and true representation of reality while the latter is subjective though universal to human nature in aesthetic experience without representing reality. This is based on the metaphysical division between the determinism of scientific mechanical rules followed in the development of theories, and the freedom of the artistic-genius's productive imagination in creating exemplary fine arts. Kant explicates this division as lawfulness versus free play (Kant, *CJ*:##35 36). This dichotomy between art and science, between artistic free productive imagination in creating fine arts and scientific determined mechanical rules of formulating theories, is elaborated in our traditions of phenomenological "Artism" and analytical "scientism."

### 2.2. Kant's Conception of Judgment and Its Difficulties in of His Three Critiques

Kant's epistemology developed on his general Conception of Judgment:

I then find that judgment is nothing but a way of bringing given cognitions to the objective unity of apperception (Kant, *CPuR*: B141-142).

Kant has three conceptions of judgments: *theoretical logical judgment* of science, *aesthetic reflective judgment* of fine art, and the *practical judgment of moral law* commands. In these three types of judgments we reflect upon our judging operations to feel and control them by comparing the relation among the operated cognitions of our faculties of Imagination, Understanding, and Reason. Thus we detect harmony or disharmony, but always between the two of them, as the subjective conditions for adequate or inadequate judgments. However, not every cognitive operation determines objective judgment since aesthetic reflective judgments are not objective knowledge of reality but only subjective reflection on the ideas of the Imagination and Understanding faculties to compare their harmony or disharmony ensuing from the feelings of aesthetic pleasure and displeasure (Kant, *CJ*: 237'-238'). The difficulty with Kant's three types of judgments is that because of his phenomenalist epistemology there cannot be any external restriction for their objectivity so he must assume transcendental principles, concepts, or rules, based on faith only. I showed that Kant's judgment of taste of the *Third Critique* is the same as Peirce's *Abductive inference of suggesting* new concepts or hypotheses, the *moral judgment* of the *Second Critique* is *Deductive apodictic inference*, and of the *First Critique* is the *Inductive determinative inference* of *theoretical judgment*, being equivalent to Peirce's basic *inferences*.

### 2.3. Pragmaticist Overcoming Kant's Narrow Conception of Judgment by Epistemic Logic of Trio

Hence not one of Kant's different judgments is complete proof of its truth, validity, or universality. To overcome the *a priorist* epistemology I showed that only the sequence of the three inferences, the *Trio* of Abductive Logic of Discovery, Deductive Logic of Necessity, and the Inductive Logic of Evaluating hypotheses, can confront reality and comprise complete proof (Neshet, 2007). This epistemic logic of cognition comprises complete proof of any judgment without recourse to any transcendental a priori assumptions. Our basic cognition is the perceptual operation of the *trio*:

[see Appendix for Diagram 1]

Thus, => is the Abductive *plausibility connective* suggesting the concept  $A^{Ab}$ , is the Deductive *necessity connective* inferring the abstract object  $C^{Dd}$ , and  $\Leftrightarrow$  is the Inductive *probability connective*

evaluating the relation of the concept  $A^{Ab}$  and new experiential object  $C^n$ . Since Kant does not combine the three inferences into complete proofs of the truths of theoretical,

ethical and aesthetical judgments, he has to justify their a priori assumptions separately (CPuR:A84ff.; CPrR:42; CJ:#30, 31). Thus by complete cognitive proof we confront reality with Abductive material logic of discovering cognitions and Inductive material logic of their evaluation which can justify them empirically without any a priori justification. Kant's frustrated attempt to unify human reason "to derive everything from one principle" is solved by Peircean epistemic logic of the *Trio*. With Pragmaticist epistemic logic we can understand better the scientist's *discovery* of hypotheses and the artist's *creation* of artworks.

### 3. Artistic Genuine Productive Imagination in Creating Fine Arts and Aesthetic Experience.

#### 3.1. Can the Artist Play Free with Productive Imagination in the Creation of Exemplary Artwork?

Kant's aesthetic theory of fine arts divided into two parts: the creation of the artwork by the artist and its evaluation in reflective judgment of taste. How can genuine creation of artwork be both the free play without following rules and despite being purposely and academically trained to control his work? It can be shown that free creation is self-controlled by habitual rules, and generally, according to Spinoza, personal freedom is inner determination (Neshet, 1999). Kant cannot accept such a conception of freedom since his critical philosophy is based on the dichotomy between the determinism of nature and the freedom of the transcendental subject. Yet we cannot explain the role of artists' *productive imagination* without playing free with self-control in creating artwork.

#### 3.2. The Conception of Aesthetic Experience and Creativity

The artist's aspiration in creating artwork is to make his abstract ideas of reality sensible by exhibiting them aesthetically in individual characters and situations of artwork. The artist has the motivation and theme to turn his *intellectual ideas* into the imaginatively created *aesthetic ideas* as artwork. Yet these intellectual ideas with their intuitive meaning-content come from the artist's experiential confrontation with reality. The artist wants to create an epitome of a lover or a cruel person, as Dostoevsky does in *The Idiot*, and *The Devils* respectively, but not to represent any personality but a type of human character, a "sensible expression" in which everyone can find something of himself, and thus represent aesthetically reality by exhibiting human mind and behavior.

My fantasy can in the highest degree differ from the reality that took place, and my Pyotr Verkhovensky may in no way resemble Nechayev, but it seems to me that in my astonished mind imagination has created that character, that type, which corresponds to this crime (Dostoevsky, on *The Devils*, October 8, 1870).

We have to explain how the artist in free play of *productive imagination*, reflecting continually on his experience and evaluating the beauty of the work in its creation, can achieve the harmony between the *rationality* of the *intellectual ideas* and the *sensuality* of the *aesthetic ideas*.

#### 3.3. Reflective Self-Control of the Productive Imagination in Creating the Aesthetic Product

However, if the spiritual motivation is that *aesthetic ideas* are to emulate *intellectual ideas* to create beautiful artwork, it must have reflective self-control to achieve the *harmony* between them:

[see Appendix for Diagram 2]

The creation of artwork by the *Productive Imagination* is by harmonizing the artist's *intellectual ideas* and the created *aesthetic ideas* which can be achieved by free-playing them reciprocally. Intellectual Ideas include rich experiential and general meanings and the theme of the intended artwork from which the artist uses the pre-conceptual imagery meaning-components to quasi-deduce and exhibit the aesthetic epitomes by subsuming the exemplified particulars under the general ideas. This is done with the best elements that will attune to the initial Intellectual ideas. To evaluate these elements in creative operation the artist continuously has recourse to his *general knowledge of reality* and the *imagery sensual intuition*. Since this productive imagination is an unstated operation, there are no formal rules to control the exhibition of aesthetic ideas, but habitual quasi-rules are instinctively and practically self-controlling and infer adequately *aesthetic ideas* from *intellectual ideas*. Yet the criterion for achieving beauty is only a true aesthetic representation of reality.

### 4. Discovery of New Modes of Representing Reality: Intellectual Intuitive Productive Imagination and Genuine Creative-Discovery as Metaphor

#### 4.1. Sensual Intuition and Intellectual Intuition in the Discovery New Concepts and Hypotheses

Epistemically the role of intellectual intuition in Abductive logic of discovery of new scientific hypotheses is analogous to our sensual intuition of perceptual discovery of new concepts (Neshet, 2001). The scientist's *intellectual intuition* operates with *productive imagination* on scientific background knowledge to solve its difficulties in explaining reality. This is done by *productive imagination* operating by instinctive and practical self-control to recombine the iconic and indexical imagery meaning-contents of background knowledge to discover a new imagery picture of reality. Then the scientists formulate them into a new abstract hypothesis, so we do not need scientists' *a priori* intuition as a miracle, à la Einstein and Popper. We can understand intuitive discovery of new aesthetic ideas and scientific hypotheses as *metaphors*. By creating and discovering new ideas, artists and scientists still use some old expressions, such as the terminology of *space and time*, but they change the imagery meaning-components to elaborate new pictures, so as to replace the classical picture's physical reality by the relativist picture. The new accepted theory has lost its metaphorical character as newly discovery, and has become merely an analogy to the old theory, e.g., the analogical pictorial imagery of Newtonian gravitational forces and Einsteinian Relativity with spacetime curvatures: we use both of them, but in different proof-conditions.

In his first paper on atomic theory in 1913, Bohr emphasized that although Newtonian mechanics is violated, its symbols permit visualization of an atom as a minuscule solar system. Bohr based all of his reasoning on the following visual metaphor: The atom behaves as if it were a minuscule solar system (Miller, 1996:225).

But the source of the intellectual intuition meaning-content lies in sensual intuition, otherwise it would remain an empty abstract formalism.

#### 4.2. The Role of Intellectual Intuition of Productive Imagination in the Recombination of Scientists' Background Knowledge to Discover New Hypotheses

The role of human intellectual intuition in genuine scientific discovery of new hypotheses lies in overcoming the difficulties in interpreting scientific background knowledge into discovery of a new comprehensive imagery-picture of reality to formulate the hypothesis. This is done by the *productive imagination of intellectual intuition* operating on the *imagery* components of the symbols to recombine them in Abductive discovery work by detecting new iconic similarities and indexical analogies for new combinations from background knowledge components. For example, in looking for a new intellectual image of the quantum theory components, instead of the images of weave and particle separated complementarily, the scientist can imagine a dynamic continuum of particle-weave components (Bohm and Hiley, 1993). Similarly, Cervantes combines in Don Quixote two different characters: a brave fighter for justice and a ridiculous fantasist, a combination which we can find, in different portions, in every one of us. Thus, *intuitive productive imagination* can freely play with different components of our experiential knowledge to create new aesthetic characters.

[see Appendix for Diagram 3]

This Abductive discovery of a new scientific hypothesis is the first stage of the entire scientific discovery; it continues with Deductive inference of theoretical prediction and Inductive evaluation proving its truth. Here is Einstein's expression of his play with productive imagination:

In the following, I am trying to answer in brief your questions as well as I can

(A) The words or the language, as they are written or spoken, do not seem to play any role in my mechanism of thought. The psychological entities which seem to serve as elements in thought are certain signs and more or less clear images which can be "voluntarily" reproduced and combined. There is, of course, a certain connection between those elements and relevant logical concepts ...

(B) The above mentioned elements are, in any case, of visual and some of muscular [kinesthetic] type. Conventional words or other signs have to be sought for laboriously only in a secondary stage, when the mentioned associative play is sufficiently established and can be produced at will.

(C) According to what has been said, the play with the mentioned elements is aimed to be analogous to certain logical connections one is searching for.

(D) Visual and motor. In a stage when words intervene at all, they are, in my case, purely auditive, but they interfere only in a secondary stage as already mentioned.

(E) It seems to me that what you call full consciousness is a limit case which can never be fully accomplished ...

*I am enough of an artist to draw freely on my imagination. Imagination is more important than knowledge. Knowledge is limited. Imagination circles the world.* (Einstein to Hadamard, 1945) *"Intuitive thinkers have made many of the breakthroughs in science."* (Louis de Broglie)

#### 4.3. The Self-conscious and Self-control of Intellectual Intuition in Discovery of a New Hypothesis

What Einstein expresses as *thought* without words can be understood as a distinction between *imagination* and *reasoning* (Einstein, 1949:7-9). The idea is that one's cognitive operation can be meaningful for one when its elements have felt meanings such that the entire operation is

meaningful for him to communicate to others. Yet without any verbalization of such an operation we hardly remember and articulate it, though we can elaborate upon it *habitualiter*, albeit with some explain for it as an unconscious process, hence as the work of a god, a muse, or any supernatural (e.g., Plato, Kant). That way we explain that there is no mystery in such an ingenious scientific operation. How we can understand Einstein's *unconscious thought* in scientists' creative imagination (Einstein, 1949:7)?

Certain obvious features of the phenomena of self-control ... can be expressed compactly ... by saying that we have an occult nature of which and of its contents we can only judge by the conduct that it determines, ... and since we are conscious of what we do deliberately, we are conscious *habitualiter* of whatever hides in the depths of our nature; and ... that a sufficiently energetic effort of attention would bring it out. Consequently, to say that an operation of the mind is controlled is to say that it is, in a special sense, a conscious operation. (Peirce, CP: 5.440-441)

Yet all self-control of mental operation must be at some level of self-consciousness to connect the phases of intuitive creativity in order to discover, elaborate and prove rationally the hypothesis.

### 5. Different Roles of "Productive Imaginations" in Artistic Creation and Scientific Discovery

#### 5.1. The Roles of "Productive Imagination" in Artistic New Exemplary Representations of Reality

The role of artistic *productive imagination* in the creation of aesthetic representation of reality lies in the artist's *Deductive* interpreting his *intellectual ideas* into *aesthetic ideas* as epitomized artwork. This is done by quasi-proof of this operation to ensure that artwork is a true aesthetic representation of reality.

[see Appendix for Diagram 4]

#### 5.2. The Roles of "Productive Imagination" in Scientific Discovery of a New Picture of Reality

However, the role of the scientist's *productive imagination* lies in his *intellectual intuition* recombining Abductively the imagery components of scientific background knowledge to overcome its difficulties. This is discovering a new imagery picture of reality to formulate a new hypothesis to prove its truth.

[see Appendix for Diagram 5]

But taken from the psychological view-point, this combinatory play seems to be the essential feature in productive thought—before there is any connection with logical construction in words or other kinds of signs which can be communicated to others. (Einstein, 1945)

Scientists reach the coherency of the new scientific picture only by evaluating the hypothesis experimentally, but in the imaginative phase they only feel it in regard to background knowledge.

#### 5.3. Artist and Scientist Represent Reality Through Their Cognitive Confrontation with Reality

We can explain that our aesthetic judgments of beauty are due to the artwork's true aesthetic representation of reality, and can be indicated through the harmony of intellectual ideas and aesthetic ideas in the creation and evaluation of artworks. But without confrontation with reality there is no

ground for the objective and true creation and evaluation of artworks in our judgments of taste and in scientific feeling of the coherence and beauty of their hypotheses (Neshet, 2002).

## 6. Conclusion: Genuine Artistic and Scientific Works are Different Modes of Representation

### 6.1. Fine Art and Science are Different Cognitive Procedures of Representing Reality

There is similarity in representation between scientific theories and fine arts and even myths as a kind of artistic epitomizing of characters, such as Apollo and Dionysus, to represent types of persons. In the creation of artworks by artists, and their grasp by others, one continuously compares them with their experience. The difference between artist and scientist in representing reality is that the former only instinctively quasi-proves the truth of artworks, while scientific hypotheses are proved rationally. This explains why artworks are regarded as fictions since we feel their truth only implicitly, while in science we prove it explicitly.

Every natural science will be worthless if its claims could not be tasted by observation of nature; every art would be worthless if it was no longer able to move men, no longer able to illuminate for them the meaning of existence (Heisenberg, 1948:88).

Hence, from our sensual experience and the inquiries into the nature of reality we develop our scientific theories and aesthetic artworks to represent reality truly to elevate our life within it.

### 6.2. Art and Science Are Different Modes of Representing Reality: "Aesthetically" and "Logically"

*Aesthetic* and *scientific* modes of representation differ in that the artist's representing reality is by *aesthetic epitomizing* of characters and situations, and the scientist's is by logical *abstraction formulating* general theories. Dealing with artworks, we have feelings and emotional reactions of pleasure by which we aesthetically judge them beautiful to indicate their beauty and truth in an aesthetic representation of reality. The proof and the truth of scientific logical abstraction formulations are proved true at the rational level of self-control of the discovery, elaboration, and evaluation of the hypotheses, yet are always relative to the accepted proof-conditions, the true-conditions and the proof methods of theories.

### 6.3. Art and Science Both Prove the Truth of Their Representation of Reality and Thus Have Truth in Beauty and Beauty in Truth

What is the beauty of scientific formulas and their proofs? The icons of aesthetic presentations in art and science have some similarity, and so does the indexical analogy between them in representing reality. Therefore, we can hypothesize that in both cases the feeling of aesthetic pleasure can be explained as true aesthetic representation of reality, though the modes of representations of art and science differ as individual epitomization and general formalization respectively.

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## Appendix

Diagram 1:

### The Operation of Perception is the *Trio* Quasi-Proof of Perceptual Judgment:

$$\text{Abduction}((C^{Ab}) (A \rightarrow C) \Rightarrow A^{Ab}) + \text{Deduction}((A \rightarrow C) A) \rightarrow C^{Dd}) + \text{Induction}((A, C^{In}) \rightsquigarrow (A^{In} \rightarrow C^{In}))$$

Diagram 2:




Diagram 3:



Diagram 4:





Diagram 5:



# Against the Psychologistic Reading of the *Tractatus* 3.11

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## 1. Introduction

How is it that the words come to have the meanings they have? Wittgenstein's *Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus* has been often interpreted as giving a psychologistic answer to this question. Especially 3.11 is taken to suggest strongly such an interpretation:

We use the perceptible sign of a proposition (spoken or written, etc.) as a projection of a possible situation.

The method of projection is to think of the sense of the proposition. (TLP 3.11)

This remark has been often interpreted as saying that it is the "thinking" independent itself of language that gives meanings to propositions. Such a psychologistic reading seems to be natural in a sense. In fact, not few interpreters adopt such a reading<sup>1</sup> and regard the view of the *Tractatus* concerning language and thought as psychologistic one.

In what follows, I will deal with the Norman Malcolm's book, *Nothing Is Hidden*, as a typical example of such a reading and point out the problems that it gives rise to and like to present a possible way of understanding the *Tractatus*' framework of views concerning language and thought in a *non*-psychologistic way. One of the most important points in doing so is how to read 3.11.

## 2. A psychologistic reading

Malcolm's psychologistic interpretation is clear in what he calls "the 'hidden' philosophy of mind and of language of the *Tractatus*" (NIH, p.76). Here let M designate a mental element, S a simple sign (name), and O a reality-element (object). Then it can be formulated in the following three theses (ibid.).

- i. M intrinsically means O.
- ii. S is correlated with M by stipulation or convention.
- iii. As a consequence of 1 and 2, S comes to mean O.

A simple sign S comes to mean a reality-element O by means of its being correlated (by stipulation or convention) with a mental element M that means O *intrinsically*, i.e., by its *inherent nature*. Thoughts are composed of psychical elements and propositions are composed of simple signs. Thus propositions has senses by means of their being correlated (by stipulation) with thoughts that are in turn intrinsically significant.

How does Malcolm come to attribute such a psychologistic picture to the *Tractatus*? Firstly, he cites a Wittgenstein's letter to Russell in which he answers to Russell's question of whether thoughts are composed of words or not (NIH, p.65).

No! But of psychical constituents that have the same sort of relation to reality as words. What those constituents are I don't know. (NB, p.131)

On the ground of this remark, Malcolm comes to separate (ontologically) thoughts composed of mental elements from propositions composed of physical elements (signs). Then he points out that in the *Tractatus* a

relation is supposed to obtain between a thought and a proposition, i.e., the relation of the latter's expressing the former (NIH, p.66).

In a proposition a thought finds an expression that can be perceived by the senses. (TLP 3.1)

I call the sign with which we express a thought a propositional sign. – And a proposition is a propositional sign in its projective relation to the world. (TLP 3.12)

In a proposition a thought can be expressed in such a way that elements of the propositional sign correspond to the objects of the thoughts. (TLP 3.2)

Malcolm draws from this the conclusion that "in the *Tractatus* thoughts (Gedanken) are *more basic* than word-propositions (Saetze)" (NIH, p.66). I think that for validity of this conclusion the "psychical constituents" should be established in advance as being independent of language. But he gives no argument supporting such a view. He rather presupposes it and simply says that "a thought does not *have* to be expressed in a physical sentence" (ibid.).

After in this way Malcolm attributes to thoughts a character of being independent of propositions, he proceeds to interpret 3.11 ("The method of projection is to think of the sense of the proposition"). 3.11 can be just what he wants, because he ascribes priority to thoughts over propositions (NIH, p.67) and in this remark Wittgenstein seems to say that propositions come to have their senses only by means of thoughts (or an activity of thinking). And it is just the way he interprets it (NIH, p.73, cf., Kenny 1981, p.142, Hacker 1996, p.31).

... A thought already has sense; it is already a picture of a possible situation. The question now is: how does a physical sentence become a picture? The answer of 3.11 is that a sentence becomes a picture (a projection) by virtue of a thought's transmitting its own sense to the physical sentence. A sentence, by itself, is 'dead': it is without sense, it says nothing. ... But when a sentence is filled with a thought it takes on life: it becomes a visible or audible thought. (NIH, p.73)

## 3. How to read it *non*-psychologically

Wittgenstein's views upon which Malcolm's interpretation is based are (1) that thoughts are composed of psychical constituents (his letter to Russell) and (2) that thoughts are expressed by propositions (TLP 3.1, 3.12, 3.2) and (3) that to think (Denken) plays a certain role for a proposition to have its sense (TLP 3.11). Malcolm elicits the alleged "hidden" philosophy of the *Tractatus* only from these. But it should be noted that at least (1) and (2) are *not* theses that imply commitments to a particular philosophical position concerning thought and language.

Both theses are compatible especially with what I regard as a basic line of thought of the *Tractatus*, i.e., what may be called a *loose identity theory* of thought and language:

Now it is becoming clear why I thought that thinking and language were the same. For thinking is a kind of language. For a thought *too* is, of course, a logical picture of



the proposition, and therefore it just is a kind of proposition. (NB 12/9/16)

A propositional sign, applied and thought out, is a thought. (TLP 3.5)

A thought is a proposition with a sense. (TLP 4)

I think we can understand this view more properly from the view point of *inner utterances* of propositions (as physical signs). For example, when we, at a restaurant, “think” about what kind of dish we will order, is it that we, representing a dish of meat and of fish, *innerly utter* the proposition “I got a dish of meat last night, so I’ll get fish tonight” or the like?

Or think about a case where we are required to speak in an unfamiliar language. In such a case, are we forced in turn to be aware that our everyday thinking is *operated in our own mother tongues*? An activity that we ordinarily call “thinking” seems at least to me to have a highly linguistic character, though of course it is not perceptible with senses.

Though we regard thinking as inner utterances of propositions, at least (i) and (ii) give rise to no problem. Propositions, as far as they are innerly uttered, can be said to being composed of psychical constituents (i.e., signs, as far as innerly uttered). And propositions innerly uttered can be transformed easily into physical propositions composed of visible or audible signs. Physical propositions thus obtained can be said to “express” the content of the original thinking (i.e., the original thoughts) (for example, the remark 1 of the *Tractatus* that “the world is all that is the case” can be said not only to mean *that the world is all that is the case*, but also to express *the Wittgenstein’s thought that the world is all that is the case*).

How about the third datum of which Malcolm makes use for his interpretation, i.e., the remark 3.11?

We use the perceptible sign of a proposition (spoken or written, etc.) as a projection of a possible situation. The method of projection is to think of the sense of the proposition. (TLP 3.11)

In the *Tractatus* for a proposition to be “a projection of a possible situation” is just for it to have a particular truth-condition, i.e., a particular meaning (“Sinn”). Therefore we can rephrase “the method of projection” as “the method of giving a meaning”. Then the above remark can be interpreted as saying that *the method of giving a meaning to the proposition is to think of the meaning of the proposition*. If we assume a mental activity of “thinking” that is independent of language, then this remark is supposed to evoke a psychologistic interpretation (à la Malcolm) that it is such a “thinking” that gives a meaning to a proposition.

But here we should note that the “meaning” has at least two aspects. I like to make a distinction between an “expression meaning” and an “utterer’s meaning” (cf., Searle 1979, chapter 4, Kripke 1977). Roughly speaking, the former is known by everyone who masters the language to which the expression belongs and is a meaning that the expression *itself* has, and, in many cases, it is its lexical meaning. We can say of the latter, roughly speaking too, that an utterer’s meaning of an expression is a function of its expression meaning and the context in which it is uttered (i.e., who utters it and in what circumstance it is uttered, etc.).

By the way, the *Tractatus’* method of philosophy is the analysis of our everyday language. It means that the

alleged “completely analyzed” language (TLP 3.201, 3.25) cannot but take over its meaningfulness from our everyday language. That our everyday language is presupposed as a datum means that the conception of meaning in everyday language, i.e., the conception of meaning that cannot be reduced into individual “thinking”, in short, the “expression meaning” distinguished above is presupposed. This is the matter of course in the loose identity theory of thought and language, or, it amounts to the same, in the conception of thought as inner utterances of propositions. For a proposition that is innerly uttered in our thinking must have a particular (expression) meaning in advance before it is entertained in the thinking.

3.11 was paraphrased above as “the method of giving a meaning to the proposition is to think of the meaning of the proposition”. Here are two occurrences of “meaning”. If these are identical, the remark becomes merely circular. For what we are supposed to have to “think” in order to give a meaning to a proposition can be nothing but the meaning of *the proposition* itself. Then the following paraphrase will be suggested.

The method of giving an *utterer’s* meaning to the proposition is to think of the *expression* meaning of the proposition.

Uttering innerly a proposition that has in advance a particular expression meaning (in short, thinking) constitutes an utterer’s meaning of the proposition.

But here a question arises immediately. Why thinking? Why an *inner* utterance? An “utterance” in an ordinary sense is to utter something in voice (externally). In fact, an utterer’s meaning of a proposition is constituted not only by an inner utterance of it (thinking) but also by an ordinary (external) utterance of it.

Here it is worthwhile to refer to the corresponding remarks of the *Prototractatus* that is (presumably the last) draft of the *Tractatus*:

A propositional sign is a projection of a thought. (PTLP 3.11)

It is a projection of the possibility of a situation. (PTLP 3.111)

The method of projection is the manner of applying the propositional sign. (PTLP 3.12)

Applying the propositional sign is [the same as] thinking of its sense. (PTLP 3.13)

As was seen above, the *Tractatus* connects “the method of projection” and “to think of the sense of the proposition” immediately. But the *Prototractatus* mediates them through “the manner of applying the propositional sign”. I think this is highly suggestive. For “applying the propositional sign” can be thought as accommodating not only an inner utterance of the sign but also an external utterance of it. The picture that to apply a proposition that has a particular expression meaning constitutes its utterer’s meaning can be said even to formulate succinctly a conceptual relation between these two aspects of meaning.

Now the German original of the *Prototractatus* 3.13 above reads, “Die Anwendung des Satzzeichens ist das Denken seines Sinnes”. If this remark is read as defining or explaining “Anwendung” (applying) by means of “Denken” (thinking), this remark is interpreted as closing the sight again that is opened by introducing the concept of “Anwendung”. For, read in such a way, “applying the propositional sign” as “the method of projection” is supposed to be restricted to an *inner* utterance of the proposition (in short, Denken or thinking).

This remark rather should be read simply as an identity statement in just the way the English translators of the *Prototractatus* read it. It reads, “applying the propositional sign is [the same as] thinking of its sense”. If it is read in this way, it turns out to be almost another version of the cited remark of the *Notebooks 1914-1916* (NB 12//9/16) where the loose identity theory of thought and language is suggested. In fact there it is said that “thinking and language were the same” and that “thinking is a kind of language” and that “a thought ... just is a kind of proposition”.

In virtue of the above consideration, we can read the *Tractatus* 3.11 from the view point of the loose identity theory of thought and language. Namely we can regard what is meant by “to think of the sense of the proposition” as including not only an inner utterance of the proposition but also an external utterance of it, i.e., to apply it in general. Thus the following reading will be suggested.

The method of giving an *utterer's* meaning to the proposition is to think of the *expression* meaning of the proposition, *in other words, to apply the proposition having a particular expression meaning*.

Compare this with Malcolm's psychologistic reading: the method of giving a (expression) meaning to the proposition is to think of the (expression) meaning of the proposition. We can point out at least two problems. (1) This reading seems not to be able to avoid the vicious circle mentioned above. Even if it could avoid, (2) this reading presupposes a mental activity of thinking that is independent of language, but that is incompatible with the *Tractatus'* basic line of thought, i.e., the loose identity theory of thought and language<sup>2</sup>.

#### 4. Summary

I have presented a possible way of reading 3.11 *non-psychologically* that is a stronghold of a psychologistic interpretation of the *Tractatus*. The point is (1) to regard the loose identity theory of thought and language as the basic line of thought of the *Tractatus* and (2) to distinguish between an expression meaning and an utterer's meaning (or the like) and (3) to interpret the phrase “to think of the sense of the proposition” by which what is said is a main source of a psychologistic interpretation as meaning “an inner utterance of the proposition” or “to apply the proposition”, either of which has no psychologistic implication.

The above interpretation based upon the loose identity theory of thought and language can secure the consistency with the aim of the *Tractatus* in a way a psychologistic reading cannot. Namely the aim of the *Tractatus* is “the logical clarification of thoughts” *through* an analysis of (our everyday) language (TLP 4.112).

#### Endnotes

- 1 E.g., Malcolm NIH, Kenny 1981, Hacker 1986, 1996, Stern 1995, etc.  
 2 Not only Malcolm but also Kenny and Hacker seem not to pay enough attention to this basic line of thought (NIH, pp.66-67, Kenny 1981, p.142, Hacker 1986, p.75).

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- PTLP: L. Wittgenstein, *Prototractatus: An Early Version of 'Tractatus Logico-philosophicus'*, ed. by B. McGuinness, T. Nyberg & G. H. von Wright, London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1971.
- TLP: L. Wittgenstein, *Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus (Logisch-philosophische Abhandlung)*, London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1922, with a new translation by D. F. Pears and B. F. McGuinness, 1961.

# The von Wright and Wittgenstein Archives in Helsinki (WWA): A Unique Resource

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[www.helsinki.fi/wwa](http://www.helsinki.fi/wwa)

## Introduction

The von Wright and Wittgenstein Archives, WWA, is a research resource at the Department of Philosophy, History, Culture and Art Studies at the University of Helsinki, located at the philosophy unit. Although its roots go back to the 1960s when the late professor Georg Henrik von Wright started to form his Wittgenstein-archives, WWA is currently re-establishing itself at the University of Helsinki with a new location and administration.

Activities of WWA may be divided into three groups. WWA provides basic logistical and scientific support to visiting scholars who benefit from the unique resources kept at WWA. It seeks to ensure immediate, effective availability of its materials while also securing long-term preservation. To this end WWA works on cataloguing, describing and digitizing its materials and on developing its website. Thirdly, WWA engages in independent and collaborative research efforts.

The materials kept at WWA have two different parts. One part consists of copies of Wittgenstein's *Nachlass* and other related items collected and organized by the late professor Georg Henrik von Wright (1916–2003). This part was described by von Wright as "probably the most comprehensive and well-organized Wittgenstein archive in the world" (von Wright 2000, our translation). The other part consists of von Wright's own literary estate, including a major part of von Wright's correspondence related to his activities as one of Wittgenstein's literary executors.

During von Wright's lifetime the archive was well-known and frequently visited by Wittgenstein scholars around the world. The publication of the Wittgenstein *Nachlass* in electronic form has made it much more widely available and easily accessible than before. The function of WWA and comparable holders of originals and copies of Wittgenstein-materials has thereby to some extent changed. They are no longer unique in providing access to the basic text sources. The availability of the *Nachlass* has, however, also opened up new questions for research that increase the relevance of detailed study of manuscript sources, variations in typescripts, editorial processes and related matters. In this new context WWA remains a unique resource, in particular for scholars interested in the editing process behind Wittgenstein's published works, or the history of their publication in general.

Thanks to the new material von Wright donated to the archives WWA is now also an invaluable resource for anyone interested in the philosophy of Georg Henrik von Wright. Among other things, it contains early versions of many of the most important works by von Wright.

## Background: von Wright and Wittgenstein

The origin of WWA goes back to a friendship between two extraordinary persons, Ludwig Wittgenstein and Georg Henrik von Wright.

Most scholars are familiar with the unusual course of Wittgenstein's life. The life and career of Georg Henrik

von Wright are probably less well known. The autobiography *Mitt liv som jag minns det* ("My Life as I Remember It") has been translated only into the other language of his home country, Finnish.

Georg Henrik von Wright was born in Helsinki 14th of June 1916, and died on 16th of June 2003. Already at an early stage he seems to have known that he would become a philosopher (Vilkko 2005, 1). Under the influence of his first teacher at the University of Helsinki, the Finnish philosopher Eino Kaila, von Wright became convinced that logical positivism finally had paved the way for philosophy as a proper science – in his autobiography he even speaks about logical positivism as the "Galilean turn of philosophy" (von Wright 2001, 18).

Logic was going to be one of his first research interests. From early on von Wright's investigations in logic went in surprising and innovative directions. His interest in the logic of induction earned him early recognition. Soon after he practically invented deontic logic and, later, the logic of preference. His later works include major books on theory of value and the philosophy of action and science. His last major book published in 1998 was on the philosophy of mind.

Especially in the Nordic countries von Wright was also known for his essayistic writings. These were written and published mainly in von Wright's mother tongue, Swedish. The essays, often praised for the elegance and purity of their prose, include early studies on Spengler, Dostoyevsky and Tolstoy. Some of them that make contributions to the philosophical diagnosis of our times have been translated and published in English (von Wright 1993b). A key topic in the essays is the cultural and moral interpretation of the advance of scientific rationality or, to use a term from the German tradition of critical theory that von Wright also related creatively to, the "dialectics of enlightenment." – von Wright sometimes called his attitude in these essays a "provocative pessimism" (von Wright 1993a, 150).

Von Wright first met Wittgenstein as a young post-graduate student in Cambridge 1939. According to the autobiography their first encounter was not altogether pleasant for either parts – von Wright made an unannounced appearance at Wittgenstein's lecture late in the term, and was met with angry comments from Wittgenstein about the presence of "unwanted visitors." Fortunately, von Wright sent a letter of apology to Wittgenstein, and immediately received a friendly answer. (Von Wright 2001, 76–77). This was the beginning of their friendship, which was re-established after the war when von Wright returned to Cambridge. In the autumn of 1948 von Wright became Wittgenstein's successor as professor at Cambridge, a chair he held until 1951 when he returned to Finland.

When Wittgenstein died in 1951 von Wright was surprised to learn that Wittgenstein had named him one of his literary executors, together with Elizabeth Anscombe and Rush Rhees. The executors soon found that Wittgenstein's literary estate was much more extensive than they had expected. Eventually, von Wright's work on the *Nach-*

lass that involved collecting primary material, cataloguing it, editing works for publication and independent studies of themes in Wittgenstein's philosophy, lasted more than 50 years. One example of von Wright's activity was when he in the summer 1967 together with Norman Malcolm, at Oxford, supervised the microfilming of the *Nachlass* for Cornell University (von Wright 1982, 38). Probably few other philosophers have influenced the first decades of Wittgenstein scholarship more than von Wright did through these efforts. Books compiled on the basis of Wittgenstein's *Nachlass* edited or co-edited by von Wright include *Über Gewissheit*, *Zettel*, *Bemerkungen über die Grundlagen der Psychologie* and *Vermischte Bemerkungen*. He also discovered the manuscript known as the *Prototractatus*.

### History of WWA

**Roots.** During his collecting and cataloguing of Wittgenstein's literary estate in the 1960s and 70s, von Wright also started to form a Wittgenstein archive with copies of the *Nachlass* in connection with his office at the University of Helsinki. The copies were regularly updated by von Wright for completeness as new material was discovered. Later on copies of Wittgenstein's correspondence and some biographical material were added.

For some years the Wittgenstein archive in Helsinki was also a center of research on the *Nachlass* in which von Wright together with Tauno Nyberg, André Maury and Heikki Nyman among other things tried to clarify the sources for various typescripts in the manuscripts, and differences between published texts and sources. One interesting result of this work is the so called *Helsinki-Ausgabe* of the Philosophical Investigations. (von Wright 1982, 6–11, and von Wright 2001, 168.)

**Donation letter.** In September 2000, three years before his death, von Wright donated the contents of his Wittgenstein archive to the University of Helsinki, under the conditions that the materials should be preserved as a separate and functioning unit at the Department of Philosophy, or what since the beginning of 2010 is the Department of Philosophy, History, Culture and Art Studies. The donation also included von Wright's own literary estate. Consequently, the archive that was formed through the donation basically includes two different parts, the Wittgenstein-materials collected by von Wright and von Wright's own literary estate.

The donation to the University in Helsinki was followed by a donation in August of 2002 to the National Library of Finland, which included his scientific home library and a major part of his correspondence. The contents of this donation is today known as the *Bibliotheca Wrightiana* of the National Library and is available for researchers at a short walking distance from WWA.

**Recent history.** In 2001 the contents of the archives followed the Department of Philosophy from its original location at Metsätalo in Helsinki to the nearby Siltavuorenpenger. In the summer of 2009 the archives moved back to Metsätalo, not however to the original room, but to a similar space. At the same time some efforts were made to re-establish the archive as a functioning research unit after some years with poor facilities and a lack of proper administration.

In 2009 the archive, in accordance with its bipartite composition, was renamed "the von Wright and Wittgenstein Archives", with the abbreviation WWA. It is now administrated by a director and steering group with five members and has a curator employed on a half-time basis. There are also plans to gather an international advisory group through invitations to Wittgenstein and von Wright experts, and experts on archives and digitizing.

### Present state and future plans

After some years of silence WWA is reconstituting itself as a research source. Today, WWA is located in two rooms at Metsätalo in Helsinki, providing working spaces with computers and effective internet access for two visiting researchers. Ongoing efforts are being made to improve the conditions. WWA is currently in the process of cataloguing recently added material and updating old catalogues. A special challenge is posed by digitizing as a new way of making the materials of WWA available for the scientific community, and a new means of preservation.

The Wittgenstein-part of WWA was fully catalogued during the life-time of von Wright (the catalogue is available on the website of WWA under the link "Wittgenstein materials"). However, there are some inconsistencies due to later additions that should be removed. More importantly, the material needs to be thoroughly re-examined and described in greater detail than has been done so far, in view of identifying qualitative aspects that may be of interest for researches, such as written remarks made by von Wright himself. Any findings of this kind will be added to the catalogue.

The literary estate of von Wright, including lecture notes, unpublished manuscripts, early versions of published works and correspondence relating to the publication of Wittgenstein's *Nachlass* is to be catalogued in the near future. There are also plans to digitize some of this material, in order to secure preservation and improve on its availability.

**Activities.** In April 2010 WWA hosted an international, cross-disciplinary colloquium with the title "Trends and Developments in Digital Publishing in the Humanities, with special reference to Wittgenstein's *Nachlass*". Papers presented at the colloquium will be posted on the website of WWA.

**Cooperation.** During 2008-2011 the *Wittgenstein Archives at the University of Bergen* and WWA run a research project funded by the Nordic research agency NordForsk, called Joint Nordic Use of WAB Bergen and WWA Helsinki (JNU VWAB). The project funds short-term visits by Nordic scholars to WWA and WAB engaged in Wittgenstein's studies or digital editing and publication. With cooperation partners in other European countries WWA is seeking funding for further work related to Wittgenstein-studies, digital publishing and the cross-section between these. With international cooperation partners, such as the WAB, the *Brenner Archives in Innsbruck* and the *Nordic Wittgenstein Society* WWA is currently involved in the preparation of several seminars and conferences in 2011.

### Links

Bibliotheca Wrightiana: <http://www.nationallibrary.fi/services/kokoeimat/vonwrightkokoelma.html>

JNU WAB: [http://wab.aksis.uib.no/wab\\_jnu-vwab.page](http://wab.aksis.uib.no/wab_jnu-vwab.page)

The program for the colloquium "Trends and Developments in Digital Publishing in the Humanities, with special reference to Wittgenstein's *Nachlass*" arranged by WWA in April 2010 is available at <http://www.helsinki.fi/phca/research/conferencesandevents.html#wwa> (8.5. 2010)

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# Wittgenstein on Art and Creative Imagination: “How to Understand ‘Genius’ as Courage in Talent and Character Manifested Through Talent”

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In this paper I will intend to provide a Wittgensteinian account of creative imagination and the use and context of creative imagination in line with Wittgenstein's Private Language Argument as well as his numerous remarks on the concepts of genius, talent and art stated in *Culture and Value*. Wittgenstein's philosophical position regarding arts and the artistic creation, has been a topic rather rarely touched upon by philosophers elaborating on his work, since it suggests a peculiar point of view where the incapability of the agent to create and imagine “a world from scratch”, in other words “ex nihilo” privately in his mind poses questions about whether that allows enough room for creative imagination and the utter uniqueness of the artist which bear the mark of genius that eventually point to a break with tradition and bring about a revolution in the perception of art throughout the history of art.

There are certain concepts and positions, namely “language games” central to Wittgenstein's philosophy concerning “meaning” in his later period, especially in ‘Investigations’ which provide the basis for understanding the relation between genius and art, in other words the way creative imagination functions as well as its conditions of possibility of existence which forms the basis of art that has been revolutionary when its historical impacts get to be taken into consideration. Here, I tend to use the rather provocative word “revolutionary” for certain art works primarily in order to draw attention to the link between “genius” and artworks and artists whose work have marked turning points in art history. It should not be taken to mean that art works who have not somehow had a historical impact to bring about a change of meaning in the language games played with the genre of art in question are of lesser artistic or aesthetic value, rather, my emphasis on revolution in artistic discourse brought about by certain artists such as Picasso, Bach, Duchamp and the like, should encourage us to think about the inherent correlation between “genius” and a change of, a break of, i.e. a revolution of artistic meaning and uniqueness employed in the language game concerning art and creative imagination. In this sense, “genius”, or the impact of “genius” is precisely bringing about a change of meaning in the language game, in other words, introducing “a new rule” to the language game and waiting until the moment that this rule gets to be understood, i.e. be applicable or possible to follow by the players of the language game considering that genre of art at the setting of the life form where meaning as “making sense” occurs. On genius and how the break with tradition or change of meaning that “genius” brings about will occur, Wittgenstein's statement in *Culture and Value*: “If someone is merely ahead of his time, it will catch him up one day”(MS 110 11:25.12.1930) is a good example of how he thinks about the double sided effect of saying/creating something utterly new and unique. At the time of manifesting this “ahead of time”ness through an artistic creation, until the time it gets followable and understood by more than one person and more than once in history, it will bear the mark of privacy and hence the uncanniness of incomprehensibility, but through time, the utterly new will also become acquainted with and acquired among the possible life forms and “language games” to be played thereupon.

Wittgenstein, having dedicated much of his later work to demonstrating in various ways how “Understanding is a public phenomenon”, the occurrence of which is verifiable through certain publicly accessible signs of successive rule following, where failing to do so would be downright sufficient reason to doubt the occurrence of Understanding, gets to put forward that “Meaning is use” concerning the question of meaning in art and creative imagination, as well as in other discourses. I argue that, all he writes on “genius”, “talent” or art works throughout his remarks in *Culture and Value* should be thought of in accordance with this basic claim that “Meaning is use”.

We can easily be puzzled by trying to work out the connection that is supposed to exist between this seemingly linguistic claim and Wittgenstein's remarks on creative imagination such as “Genius is courage in talent” or “Genius is talent in which character makes itself heard”. In fact, stating that “meaning is use” amounts to be emphasizing the practical conditions of the phenomenon of meaning and hence communication, since meaning is to be understood as practiced through language games being diverse contexts of a life form shared by individuals whose “Weltanschauung”(worldview) is shaped by the same “conceptual scheme”. By the same token, when Wittgenstein makes remarks on Genius or the various qualities of a certain piece of art, his first concern is to acquaint himself and the reader with the practical conditions of possibility of the occurrence of Genius, which can be read both as a practical guide to creative imagination and uniqueness for the artist him/herself as a path to be found within, and as a practical guide for the audience, i.e. the consumer of the art to diagnose and value the creative imagination and uniqueness of the artwork or artist.

It will be helpful for us at this point to clarify and elaborate on certain remarks of Wittgenstein in *Culture and Value* on art and genius. Let us first draw our attention to his remark: “Genius is *courage in one's talent*”(MS 117 152 c: 4.2.1940) This is a remark that addresses the would-be artist on the verge of a creative process. It is basically a remark that is in accord with the rest of Wittgenstein's later thought, which does not attempt to refer to anything private and incommunicable in the individual and what is unique to the confines of his mind and the imagination within these confines whatsoever, on the contrary, doubting the very communicability even to one's own of this private sphere were it to exist, this remark is actually a call for the artist/genius/creative thinker to discover the path that leads from the common feature of talent that is found in many, to the rare feature of genius that is to be found in very few. With this remark, Wittgenstein's aim is to put forward that there is no mysterious link that inherently lies between talent and genius in the case of genius, however it is an observable act of courage, of basically believing in and acting out of talent and the effort and investment made thereupon that transforms the talented person into a Genius. Among countless instances of talented people, it is only the ones who have courage in this talent, who are courageous enough to base their lives on this talent and do whatever it takes such

as education, training, belief, unconditional dedication, solitude, despair, adventures, a meaningful life which gives them the sufficient emotional stimuli to express throughout their art/invention, devotion of a lot of time and energy to the realization of the particular artwork/invention in question be it their own personal life turning to a work of art during this very process- to reach their very personal, unique expression in the specified art form or scientific activity. Hence, by merely stating that "Genius is courage in talent" Wittgenstein gets to be saying a lot on the publicly accessible pattern of one's transforming one's art to a work of genius.

However, he makes it yet clearer that it is not the case that having talent and having likewise courage in that very talent are sufficient for genius to be the case, since "character" is 'the ultimately indispensable feature of creative imagination and of genius which is the significantly remarkable bearer of the creative imagination in question and of "revolution-inciting" art, so to speak. In *Culture and Value*, he states: "Genius is talent in which character makes itself heard. For that reason, I would like to say, Kraus has talent, an extraordinary talent, but not genius (...) It is curious that this e.g. is so much greater than anything Kraus ever wrote. Here you see not merely an intellectual skeleton, but a whole human being. That is the reason too why the greatness of what someone writes depends on everything else he writes and does" (MS 136 59a:4.1.1948.) That is a remark pretty much in line with his writings on the conception of meaning, that is, what there is to the greatness of an artwork is that, only in so far as it bears the mark of being the outcome of a certain life experience lived by a certain artist in the form of a common story told in a personal way, it gets to be called a piece of genius, in the sense that it is an utterly unique and revolutionary way to refer to an ordinary life experience that could occur to anyone under the same conditions. In other words, only when the work of art reveals the artist's personal interpretation of what can be experienced by many and furthermore that this gets to be a repeatable practice on the part of the artist such that his audience come to guess his habits and emotive and cognitive attitudes looking at his art and thus feeling his character through his works, only then, can we say according to Wittgenstein, that we are confronted with a genius, say a genius artist, i.e. anyone who gets to be defined as making use of creative imagination. Of course not only character and the repeatability of this character's appearances and reflections, but also, being moulded by excellent technical and artistic skills of the artist with sufficient courage in his talent to go thus far in investing in it, are among the necessary conditions of genius, i.e. creative work that incites a sort of revolution in some aspect of the genre." The measure of genius is character, – even if character on its own does not amount to genius. Genius is not 'talent and character', but character manifesting itself in the form of a special talent.(...)"(MS 162b 22r c: 1939–1940)

In order to put forward the threefold nature of Wittgenstein's conception of creative imagination and hence the path to genius, as historically significant work with good originality-elsewhere in C&V he states: "it is already a seed of good originality not to want to be what you are not" – we should consider the example of an artist, a creative mind who can be thought as a concrete embodiment of manifesting these three necessary conditions in his path to bringing out the genius in him. When I gaze no further than into my own surroundings, as a philosopher coming from Istanbul, I am tempted to consider the example of Orhan Pamuk, the 2006 Nobel Prize winner in literature and actually his Nobel Prize speech, which later came to be published as a book called: "My father's suitcase". There he talks about his own process of becoming a writer putting that in the context of his

family, city, surroundings and habits, which we can more or less classify as the forming ingredients, foundations of his character. This speech-book is a particularly good example at hand to observe all three elements of Wittgenstein's discourse on genius and hence creative thinking. First, his example is that of someone who took courage in writing against all odds. His father, who enjoyed travelling, living to the full extent of life, social gathering, in other words who chose a life with more enjoyment and less deepening, lonely hours turning to years spent in a closed, darkish room with thousands of books, comes one day to his room to leave him a suitcase full of his notebooks and diaries. Pamuk, sincerely tells the story of how he almost fears to open and read the notebooks of his father, more than fearing from coming across a bad writer, he fears of actually coming across a good writer. Because if his father proves to be a good writer, i.e. a deep and sensible one although he never neither based his life on nor made challenging efforts on that, this will simply be a testimony to the fact that after all courage, courage to believe in and bleed for, so to speak, in one's own talent and making efforts merely as reflection of this courage, are unnecessary to the formation of genius. However, he does not come across any genius in his father's writings and talks about his relief of not coming across one. As for character, Pamuk writes in this very same essay, more than a couple of times about how one becomes a successful writer when he can tell his own personal story as if it is the life of others and still be himself in writing all these. It functions in such a way that, the reader identifies him/herself with every line of his writings as if he would be talking about their story while in fact it is him that is speaking in those very lines. For Pamuk, the path to being a good writer is through making one's personal life sound as if it is everyone's life dispersing it into thousand stories of thousand different characters each of which is unmistakably a reflection of a side of writer's own character and personal story. That is all there is to his genius as his character being felt, manifest through his works.

So far I have aimed to put forward a Wittgensteinian account of creative imagination depending on his writings on genius. It is no coincidence that almost every time Wittgenstein makes a remark on genius he does it in the context and exemplification of a concrete creative thinker or an artist and his uniqueness, i.e. his break with tradition in the sense of introducing the new, the utterly personal as the reflection of his character in the genre of art or science that he endeavours to create. Genius, in other words revolutionary creative thinking that introduces a new rule to the language game, a new context, stage setting to the pre-existing forms of life, is the act of one who has the courage to believe in his talent and who hence takes action on that as a reflection of his courage and through every such act of courage who manifests his own personal interpretation of what is accessible and liveable by everyone and envelops this new form of expressing the common with his personal seal, sent to the rest of the world from his address, namely his personal origin as the basis of his originality. And this seal, which has the mould of his character, no matter how many times sent to how many different targets, bears the mark of always the same sign imprinted on countless different envelopes. It is the seal of genius, namely courage in talent through which artist's character is heard and felt.

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# Übersetzen als normative Tätigkeit

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In der heutigen Translationswissenschaft wird der Begriff „normativ“ eher mit präskriptiven Kontexten assoziiert, wie etwa Übersetzer-Lehrgängen und Standardisierung in der Wirtschaft. In der theoretischen Diskussion ging man zu eher deskriptiven Ansätzen über, wie manche neulichen Forschungstendenzen deutlich zeigen: *Descriptive Studies*, Übersetzungssoziologie, Korpora, postkoloniale und interkulturelle Studien, unter anderen. Dabei wird die alt-hergebrachte Frage nach der *Treue* zum Original als ein Überbleibsel einer traditionellen, referenziellen Sprachauffassung verstanden und *ad acta* gelegt.

Und doch taucht sie implizit immer wieder auf, wenn etwa Fragen nach einer Übersetzungsethik oder -evaluierung gestellt werden. Während die postmoderne Diskussion das Fehlen einer universellen Übersetzungsmethode bzw. -ethik stets bekräftigt (vgl. Rodrigues 2007), erinnern manche Autoren daran, auch unter Verweis auf Wittgenstein (vgl. Britto 2007), dass man als Kritiker, Spezialist oder bloßer Leser immer wieder über die Qualität von Übersetzungen urteilen muss. Nach welchen Kriterien fällt so ein Urteil? Was ist der Geltungsbereich dieser Kriterien, was berechtigt einen, sie statt andere anzuwenden? Kann man immer noch von *richtig* und *falsch*, *gut* und *schlecht* reden, wenn man den festen Rahmen der essentialistischen, referenziellen Sprachauffassung der Tradition verlassen hat?

Ein gezielter Rückgriff auf Wittgenstein wird zeigen, dass Probleme dieser Art ohne Weiteres aufzulösen sind, wenn man nur die passende Einstellung zutage legt – was jedoch nicht bedeuten soll, dass sie endgültig gelöst seien. Denn sie können immer wieder auftauchen, wenn wir den rauen Boden der Praxis verlassen und nach universellen, kontextunabhängigen Formeln schauen.

Das Statut der Übersetzung wird im *Tractatus* zwar nicht als Thema behandelt, doch ganz deutlich zum Ausdruck gebracht (4.014, 4.0141, 4.0115). Die Möglichkeit der Übersetzung ist hier eine unmittelbare Konsequenz der Abbildungsrelation mittels der logischen Form. Man kann z.B. zwischen Partitur, Symphonie und Schallplatte übersetzen, weil die logische Form den Übergang der einen zur anderen Sphäre ermöglicht:

A	LF	B	LF	C
Partitur		Symphonie		Schallplatte

Die Abbildungsrelation zwischen Sprache und Welt könnte man als eine *vertikale* Projektion verstehen, während die Relation zwischen den verschiedenen Sprachen oder Notationssystemen als eine *horizontale* Projektion zu verstehen wäre.

Die Sprachauffassung des *Tractatus* ist bekanntlich eine referenzielle und passt gut unter die Charakterisierung der Augustinischen am Anfang der *Philosophischen Untersuchungen* (PhU 1, 3). Als solche hat sie den Vorteil, einen unbestreitbaren Maßstab für die Angemessenheit der Übergänge anzubieten – nämlich die logische Form. Da diese über die Wahr- oder Falschheit der Tatsachen entscheiden kann (etwas ist der Fall oder nicht), lässt sich über alles, was zur Welt gehört (oder gehören könnte), prinzipiell zwischen *wahr* und *falsch* entscheiden.

Das Problem ist nun, inwieweit die Sinn konstituierenden Eigenschaften eines Textes als eine Tatsache verstanden werden können, da sie, anders als etwa die Sätze der Wissenschaft, nicht empirisch zu überprüfen sind. Komplizierter wird es noch, wenn es um Texte mit ästhetischem oder ethischem Charakter geht, denn im *Tractatus* sind Ethik und Ästhetik außerhalb der Welt. Wenn die Übersetzung mittels der logischen Form geschieht, könnte es keine Übersetzung in diesen Bereichen geben, da sie als Werte außerhalb der Welt liegen (6.42), während die Logik die Welt von innen organisiert und daher keine Wirkung außer ihr hat.

Im späteren Werk übernimmt die Grammatik die früher für die logische Form reservierte Rolle. Was wahr bzw. *richtig* oder *falsch* ist, wird nicht mehr von einer universellen Struktur (der Logik) entschieden, sondern vom normativen Statut, mit dem manche Begriffe oder Sätze gebraucht werden. Aus dem Zusammenwirken verschiedener Sätze und Begriffe mit normativer Funktion entstehen dann die Bilder, wie sie Wittgenstein ab Ende der 20er bis in die 40er Jahren nach und nach zum privilegierten Objekt der philosophischen Therapie gemacht hat. Moreno (1993, 35) weist auf zwei unterschiedliche Eigenschaften der Bilder hin. Auf der einen Seite entsprechen sie Missdeutungen und führen deswegen zu unlösbaren Schwierigkeiten. Auf der andern führen sie zu einer *eindeutigen* Bestimmung des Sinnes (PhU 425, 426), sie scheinen uns sogar zu einer bestimmten Anwendung zu *zwingen* (PhU 141). Darum seien sie, immer noch nach Moreno, der „normative Bezug“ mit dem wir Objekte vergleichen.

Nun können aber die Bilder, die in verschiedenen Kulturen gebraucht werden, auch unterschiedlich sein. Anders gesagt: Der Unterschied der mobilisierten Bilder in der gängigen Praxis ist es, was verschiedene Lebensformen voneinander differenziert. Die Übersetzung soll nun diese Differenzen überbrücken und sagen, was trotz aller Unterschiede als gleichwertig zu verstehen sei. In abgeschwächter Form sagt man auch, die Übersetzung vertritt *hier*, was *dort* diese oder jene Funktion hat. Ansonsten würde man nicht von *Übersetzung*, sondern von etwas Anderem reden. Dass dabei auch die Differenzen zur Schau gebracht werden, wie die Dekonstruktion es zu betonen pflegt, ändert nichts an den Verweischarakter der Übersetzung.

Wenn nun einem Werk aus einer anderen Kultur, einer anderen Sprache oder auch einem anderen Zeichensystem (Jakobsons „intersemiotische Übersetzung“) eine neue Form<sup>1</sup> in *dieser* Sprache oder in *diesem* Zeichensystem gegeben wird, geschieht dies notwendigerweise unter Berufung jenes *normativen Bezuges*, mit dem wir Objekte vergleichen. In diesem Sinne verstehe ich das Übersetzen als *normative Tätigkeit*, unabhängig davon, ob das in einem präskriptiven Kontext geschieht. Diese Normativität ist auch davon unabhängig, ob die Norm schon etabliert ist oder nicht. Soll sie schon etabliert sein, so handelt es sich um eine Anwendung der Norm. Soll sie noch nicht etabliert sein, dann handelt es sich um die Einführung einer neuen Norm, die mit der alten konkurrieren wird – bis eine von ihnen sich durchsetzt, oder solange sie auch parallel in verschiedenen Regionen koexistieren.



Es sei auch daran erinnert, dass Übersetzungen für Leute gemacht werden, die im Prinzip keinen Zugang zum Original haben. In diesem Standardfall steht die Übersetzung zweifelsohne als Maßstab der Interpretation da, ihre Form setzt Spannbreite und Grenzen für mögliche Deutungen fest. Sie bildet die Basis, auf der zwischen *richtig* und *falsch*, *einleuchtend* oder *abwegig* unterschieden wird. Auch in diesem Sinne, als *Produkt*, hat Übersetzen bzw. Übersetzung einen normativen Charakter.

Man kann sogar etwas weiter gehen und behaupten, dass Übersetzungen, Verfilmungen, Kommentare und dergleichen dazu beitragen, das *Bild* eines bestimmten Textes herzustellen, auch für ein Publikum, das keinen Kontakt zum Original haben, sich oft über die Qualität, Angemessenheit oder gar Richtigkeit einer Übersetzung streiten, tut nicht anders, als den normativen Charakter der Übersetzung zu bekräftigen. Denn die Spezialisten haben als Aufgabe, sagen zu können, was *ist* oder *nicht*, in ihrem jeweiligen Fach. Darum geben sie sich nicht zufrieden, wenn eine Übersetzung ihre eigene Deutung des Originals nicht bestätigen kann, oder wenn sie andere Eigenschaften hervorheben, als jene, die sie als wichtig bzw. konstitutiv für das jeweilige Objekt erachten.

Sollten wir lieber beim Publikum bleiben wollen, bei dem der Zugang zum Original nicht von der Übersetzung abhängig ist, wie etwa bei den Fachleuten, werden wir bald sehen, dass auch da die Lage nicht viel anders ist. Dass gerade die Spezialisten, die in der Regel auch den Zugang zum Original haben, sich oft über die Qualität, Angemessenheit oder gar Richtigkeit einer Übersetzung streiten, tut nicht anders, als den normativen Charakter der Übersetzung zu bekräftigen. Denn die Spezialisten haben als Aufgabe, sagen zu können, was *ist* oder *nicht*, in ihrem jeweiligen Fach. Darum geben sie sich nicht zufrieden, wenn eine Übersetzung ihre eigene Deutung des Originals nicht bestätigen kann, oder wenn sie andere Eigenschaften hervorheben, als jene, die sie als wichtig bzw. konstitutiv für das jeweilige Objekt erachten.

### Wie hängt aber die Normativität mit der Art vom Bild zusammen?

Das Bild ist im *Tractatus* allumfassend und zugleich abstrakt, denn da geht es um Logik, nicht aber um deren Anwendung. Wenn der Philosoph im späteren Werk anfängt, sein Augenmerk auf den Gebrauch der Wörter in konkreten Situationen zu richten, kann die Grammatik als Erbe der reinen Logik nicht mehr allumfassend sein: Sie ist eher konkret und regional. Es entstehen deshalb verschiedene Bilder, deren Zusammenwirken dann wieder zu einem auch umfassenden *Weltbild* führen.

Zwei Stellen aus *Über Gewissheit* sind von besonderer Bedeutung in der Charakterisierung vom *Weltbild* und dessen Konsequenzen fürs Übersetzen:

Aber mein *Weltbild* habe ich nicht, weil ich mich von seiner Richtigkeit überzeugt habe; auch nicht, weil ich von seiner Richtigkeit überzeugt bin. Sondern er ist der überkommene Hintergrund, auf welchem ich zwischen wahr und falsch unterscheide. (ÜG 95)

Die Sätze, die dies *Weltbild* beschreiben, könnten zu einer Art Mythologie gehören. Und ihre Rolle ist ähnlich der von Spielregeln, und das Spiel kann man auch rein praktisch, ohne ausgesprochene Regeln, lernen. (ÜG 96)

Anders als das transzendente, abstrakte Subjekt der Logik im *Tractatus*, das außerhalb des Geschehens steht, ist der handelnde Mensch der Grammatik und des *Weltbilds* stets mitten in einer Situation: Er kann sich nicht außerhalb des Geschehens setzen und alle seine Entscheidungen fallen in genau dem Rahmen, der diese Situationen organisiert.

Aufs Übersetzen bezogen bedeutet das, dass die Vergleiche vom Original mit der zu entstehenden Übersetzung im Bezugsrahmen des Übersetzers selbst erfolgen. Dass soll nicht heißen, sie seien „subjektiv“, denn dieser Bezugsrahmen ist ja gerade das, was den anzuwendenden Kriterien ihrer Objektivität verleiht – zumal diese Kriterien, um deren Funktion zu erfüllen, auch öffentlich sein müssen. In diesem Sinne „wird die Objektivität der Idee von den grammatischen Regeln der Sprachspiele garantiert, in denen der ihnen entsprechende Begriff verankert ist“ (Moreno 2005, 405). Oder auch: Die Kriterien gehören zu einer Art gemeinsamen Mythologie und werden auf deren Basis interpretiert (ÜG, 96).

Auch die Kenntnisse, die der Übersetzer von der Kultur eines fremden Textes hat, gehören zu seinem Bezugsrahmen und werden beim Zielpublikum nur als solche anerkannt, wenn sie auch schon geteilt sind; oder wenn die Bereitschaft besteht, sie (als Kenntnis vom „Anderen“) in diesen Bezugsrahmen zu integrieren. Anders gesagt: Der Übersetzer schwebt nicht über beide Kulturen, sondern er handelt stets von ihrem Innern heraus.

So gesehen gibt es auch einen unweigerlich normativen Schritt, der logisch *vor* jenen Entscheidungen steht, die eine Übersetzungsstrategie in die eine oder andere Richtung setzt, welche Schleiermacher (1973) als mögliche Wege bezeichnet hat: Entweder den Text zum Leser oder den Leser zum Text (und seinen Entstehungsbedingungen) bringen. Der zu übersetzende Text und seine Entstehungsbedingungen müssen erst vom Übersetzer mittels seiner Interpretation *definiert* werden, und zwar im Vergleich mit anderen, vermeintlich vergleichbaren Objekten (innerhalb seines eigenen Bezugsrahmens).

Als Illustration vom Weg des fremden Textes zum Leser hin sei auf ein Beispiel von Toury (1993) verwiesen, das uns die Entstehung der Gattung *Hai-Kai* im Westen vor Augen führt. In seinem Aufsatz zeigt Toury anhand von 27 englischen Übersetzungen eines japanischen *Hai-Kai* über 80 Jahre, wie die Form des Gedichtes sich immer den poetischen Konventionen der jeweiligen Zeiten angepasst hat. Um eben als Gedicht zu gelten, mussten die Übersetzungen genau diesen (englischen) Konventionen folgen, und zwar ohne Rücksicht darauf, dass die Eigenschaften, die das Original als Dichtung im Japan charakterisieren, völlig anders sind und im Bezugsrahmen der Zielkultur z.T. gar nicht wahrzunehmen wären – wie etwa aus genau 17 Silben zu bestehen, wobei die Siebeneinteilung im Japanischen ganz anders als im Englischen sei. Hier geht es also um die Anwendung einer schon existierenden (wenn auch zeitlich variablen) Norm – wobei am Ende des Prozesses doch etwas Neues da ist: Eine andere, „importierte“ Gattung, die mit dem Originalbezug eher wenig zu tun hat. Im Sinne Wittgensteins heißt das: Noch ein Fall, in dem der Gegenstand als irrelevant aus der Betrachtung herausfällt.

Die von Rodrigues (2007) diskutierten Beispiele gehen in die entgegengesetzte Richtung: Alle Autoren greifen auf Übersetzungsstrategien zurück, die dazu beitragen, entweder die gängige Praxis der Übersetzer bzw. Verlage oder die Poetik der Zielkultur infrage zu stellen. Lawrence Venuti geht es z.B. darum, den Übersetzer aus seiner „Unsichtbarkeit“ herauszunehmen, d.h., der Text soll nicht fließend zu lesen sein; der Leser soll merken, dass *dieser* Text aus einer anderen Tradition stammt und nicht ursprünglich auf Englisch geschrieben wurde. Dass also ein Übersetzer am Werk war. Antoine Berman geht es um Ähnliches, wenn auch aus leicht anderen Gründen: Aus *ethischen* Überlegungen heraus sollen die übersetzten Texte sich nicht an die französische Poetik anpassen,

es gehe darum, Werke aus nicht-hegemonischen Kulturen in ihrer *Andersheit* völlig gelten zu lassen. In Brasilien haben die Gebrüder Campos ihrerseits einen ganz neuen literarischen Kanon aufgebaut, indem sie gezielt poetische Werke übersetzten, die nach ganz anderen Kriterien als die der etablierten brasilianischen Poetik ihrer Zeit strukturiert waren. Dass sie dabei auch starke Einschnitte in die Struktur des jeweiligen Originals machten (es ging also nicht um reine Mimesis), macht ihren Fall besonders aussagekräftig.<sup>2</sup>

In allen diesen Fällen gibt es auch einen *normativen* Zug, es geht darum, was sein *soll* bzw. wie etwas zu lesen oder zu übersetzen *sei*. Nun stehen aber viele der anzuwendenden Kriterien in den Bereichen der Werte (Ethik und Ästhetik), die im *Tractatus* nicht mit dem Begriff der Übersetzung zu vereinbaren waren. Dass sie hier auch mit der Übersetzung zu tun haben, erklärt sich daraus, dass das Weltbild nun *alles* integriert, wobei dessen Logik (bzw. Grammatik) *keine* Erfahrungswissenschaft sei (ÜG 98).

Deswegen ist es kein Problem, wenn eine Übersetzung anders hätte sein können. Ähnlich wie in der Diskussion mit dem Skeptiker, der behauptet, unsere Sinne können uns ja tauschen (PhU 355), lässt sich sagen: Dass unsere Kriterien letzten Endes auf Konventionen beruhen, ändert nichts daran, dass sie für uns wirksam sind. Darum kann und muss man Übersetzungen evaluieren – und zwar immer binnen eines gegebenen Bezugsrahmens. Ob und wann das *dogmatisch* wird, ist eine ganz andere Diskussion (siehe Oliveira 2009). Aber *normativ* bleibt jedes Übersetzen.

#### Endnoten

<sup>1</sup> Hier greife ich eine berühmte Formel von Benjamin (2001, 190) wieder auf, um sie nun ohne jegliche Metaphysik zu gebrauchen: „Übersetzung ist eine Form. Sie als solche zu erfassen, gilt zurückzugehen auf das Original. Denn in ihm liegt deren Gesetz als in dessen Übersetzbarkeit beschlossen“.

<sup>2</sup> Die Übersetzungen erfolgten etwa nach den Regeln des Kulturkannibalismus von Oswald de Andrade: „Meine Art, sie zu lieben, ist sie zu fressen“.

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# Wittgenstein on Culture

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1.

Wittgenstein's lamentation broadly fell upon the major characterizing features of western culture like outcomes of its industrial revolutions, irrational market growths, and greedy economies exhibiting itself in the imperialistic politics of their governments. In Wittgenstein's words, "The spirit of this civilization makes itself manifest in the industry, architecture and music of our time, in its fascism and socialism, and it is alien and uncongenial to the author (Wittgenstein 1980, p.6e)."

For Wittgenstein then, culture does not merely meant tools of civilization and the technological advancement exhibited through its industries and scientific achievements. Culture for him comprised of moralities and decorum of the society, religion, ethics, language and its mode of apprehending the world and nature. Culture for Wittgenstein was closely related to values. In his words:

"A culture is like a big organization which assigns each of its members a place where he can work in the spirit of the whole; and it is perfectly fair for his power to be measured by the contribution he succeeds in making to the whole enterprise...I realize then that disappearance of a culture does not signify the disappearance of human value, but simply of certain means of expressing this value, yet the fact remains that I have no sympathy for the current of European civilization and do not understand its goals (Wittgenstein 1980, p.6)."

Culture for Wittgenstein is a constitutive whole wherein each part has a specific role assigned to it and his worth is evaluated on the basis of contribution that he makes to this whole. One can see the socialist tint in this definition of culture as put forward by Wittgenstein. The fact is that Wittgenstein flourished at the time when socialism was at its peak and showing signs of it's a viable socio-political theory of a better world order provide evidence to the hypothesis that socialism might have had good influence on Wittgenstein's mind. The talk of 'frictional resistances' seems a pointer to bourgeoisie-proletariat tussle for supremacy and 'fragmented forces' nothing but the consequent alienation of the proletariat in the wake of that great struggle.

Along with his epistemological conceptions about language and world, one can see, a general trend of paradigm shift in Wittgenstein's thought – be it language, life or culture. It immediately brings into focus the scattered views of Wittgenstein about culture. His views about culture are hardly as a culture as a single entity, rather his views are on different aspects of culture – its ethics, values, religion, language and so on. Because of this fragmentary approach to culture (though he considered culture as a whole) and viewpoints being scattered here and there in his numerous notes and works, a concrete idea of Wittgenstein's views on culture is very hard to perform. Wittgenstein's views on different aspects of culture will put to scrutiny, evaluated and analyzed their worth in today's scenario.

2.

Foremost, that Wittgenstein seemed to be concerned about culture was its values. Values hold transcendental significance for Wittgenstein such that at the same time, values live inside and outside the world. In his words, "what is good is also divine. Queer as it sounds, that sums up my ethics. Only something supernatural can express the supernatural" (Wittgenstein 1980, p.3e). In a sentence, he relates ethics with religion and aesthetics and imparts a transcendental color to values. Although, values are transcendental, still these are very much part of the operating social world for Wittgenstein instead of taking values to be absolutist, as any transcendental value should be, rather takes them to be relative and instrumental. In his "*Lecture on Ethics*" he compares the various relative and instrumental values and claims that so far as fact-stating propositions are concerned, there are only relative goods and relative values. There is no sense in talking about absoluteness of values for that would imply that such values are unconditionally necessary and binding for the people as the statements of sciences are. Thus, it is only in science that we find absolute truths which are factual but since, "the good is outside the space of facts" (Wittgenstein 1980, p.3e), one cannot have consistently absolute value outside these facts. In *Lecture on Ethics*, he expounds upon this as,

"The right road is the road which leads to an arbitrarily predetermined end and it is quite clear to us all that there is no sense in talking about the right road apart from such a predetermined goal. Now let us see what we could possibly mean by the expression, 'the absolutely right road.' I think it would be the road which everybody on seeing it would, with logical necessity, have to go, or be ashamed for not going. And similarly the absolute good, if it is a describable state of affairs, would be one which everybody, independent of his tastes and inclinations, would necessarily bring about or feel guilty for not bringing about. And I want to say that such a state of affairs is a chimera. No state of affairs has, in itself, what I would like to call the coercive power of an absolute judge" (Wittgenstein, Ludwig 1965, p7).

One can instantly see two seemingly mutually contradictory currents running in Wittgenstein's thought. He apparently is trying to make the absolutist and relative aspects of the values compatible to each other. There is no absolutely good or bad value, but still, values have transcendental effect. Right road, in Wittgenstein's words, means only that, "it is right road relative to a certain goal" (Wittgenstein, Ludwig 1965, p. 5). And that seeking absolutism in such a state of affairs where everything is relative to one or the other thing is nothing but, "chimera". Still, values have a transcendental nature because contrary to scientific facts of the world, values are sought after for their own sake. That is, they have their "intrinsic" worth. Although, context bound as they are, they are not absolute, but they are transcendental owing to this intrinsic-ness which makes them stand apart from the scientific facts of

the world. That is why; Wittgenstein relates values with aesthetic goodness, which is in Moorean sense, indefinable. Values, like the goodness, are intrinsic and have totally different utilitarian aspect from scientific facts. When the utilitarian and instrumental aspects of scientific facts are clubbed with ethical propositions, most of the absurdity arises. Whereas one may validly wonder about the size of dog, what if one may “wonder about the existence of the world”? (Wittgenstein, Ludwig 1965, p. 8). World has an existence prior to any valuation and its existence is not relative or instrumental to any such evaluative endeavor. It does not matter whether what does one achieve by wondering at the existence of world, or if what achieves anything at all or not. Any values related to world's existence have to be intrinsic and non-instrumental. Here, the wonder is more of a metaphor than literal usage of the same word as in other contexts. From such “experiences” Wittgenstein concludes that most of the ethical discourses use language in a metaphorical or allegorical ways and that, “a certain characteristics misuse of our language runs through all ethical and religious expressions. All these expressions seem, prima facie, to be just *similes*” (Wittgenstein, Ludwig 1965, p. 9). All ethics and religions are nothing but the allegorical expressions of people's desires, beliefs, wanting etc. But, then similes are similes standing for something. That is, they are symbols that refer to something other than themselves. This other-reference imparts these similes or symbols a transcendental nature.

Wittgenstein here cautions to use similes as pointers to these facts, for as “soon as we try to drop the simile and simply to state the facts which stand behind it, we find that there are no such facts (Wittgenstein, Ludwig 1965, p. 10).” Similes, therefore, should be considered as similes only and not as pointers which point to some fact other than themselves. This is one difference between ordinary symbols and ethical and religious similes. And the fault of people is precisely that like ordinary symbols, they try to look at the fact behind these similes as in the case of ordinary symbols. Since this confusion is initiated and perpetuated incorrect use of religious and ethical symbols, Wittgenstein calls it the misuse of language. It is this misuse which has created so much philosophical rubble over the two millennia in philosophy by posing entities like mind, god, and inner life as something other than the similes which pointed towards them. In Wittgenstein's words,

My whole tendency and I believe the tendency of all men who ever tried to write or talk Ethics or Religion was to run against the boundaries of language. This running against the walls of our cage is perfectly, absolutely hopeless. Ethics so far as it springs from the desire to say something about the ultimate meaning of the life, the absolute good, the absolute valuable, can be no science. What it says does not add to our knowledge in any sense. But it is a document of a tendency in the human mind which I personally cannot help respecting deeply and I would not for my life ridicule it (Wittgenstein, Ludwig 1965, p.11-12).

One can here see strong current of anti-scientism and anti-behaviorism in Wittgenstein's thoughts. Ethics for Wittgenstein was not just an enquiry into “what is good” but an enquiry into the meaning of life itself. Against absolutism of traditional ethics, Wittgenstein brought ethics into the empirical reality of the life which is relative. Through the misuse of language we tend to see the apodictic elements in ethical and religious discourses which yield totally ‘nonsensical’ claims about life and beyond. It does not tantamount to say that all ethics is nonsense, as many commentators on Wittgenstein have maintained, rather by

exposing the inherent misuse of language, Wittgenstein rather home in on the true manner of considering ethics which is metaphorical interpretation of its aphorisms rather than literal ones for behind the similes there are no facts to look for. Such a literal interpretation of similes can be afforded in sciences, but not in ethics or religion.

Why and how does the same similes come to have different interpretations is answered by Wittgenstein in his concept of ‘language-games’. Every language-game which represents a “form of life” or activity is governed by its own rules. Therefore, the words used in a particular language-game may have different meanings according to the context. It is because of this reason that a same symbol can have literal or metaphorical interpretation according to the language-game in which it is being played. The different language-games of ethics and sciences thus account for the different meaning of their discourses and the words used in them.

Owing to this difference, the approach of the speaking community should be different with respect to both. Whereas one may validly look for ‘facts behind the simile’ in case of a scientific language-game, such may not be a plausible move in an ethical language-game. Confusion arises when people tend to mix their approaches to different language games. In “On Certainty” Wittgenstein explains the relation between language-games and changing connotations as, “the concept of knowing is coupled with that of the language-game” (Wittgenstein, Ludwig, 1969, Aphorism No. 60 ) and further that, “when language-games change, then there is a change in concepts, and with the concepts, the meanings of words change (Wittgenstein, Ludwig, 1969, Aphorism No. 65 ).” Thus, while interpreting a discourse, the proper location of its language-games needs to be distinguished from its corollaries that may fall in other spheres. Whereas, science demands literal interpretation of its discourses, ethics demand only metaphorical or allegorical interpretation.

Thus, language-games come to define what approach we should adopt in understanding the reality around us. Language-games are the major contribution of Wittgenstein towards philosophy of language, but equally in other disciplines, its effect can be seen as language-games are the tools through which various perspectives upon reality can be made and understood reality in various hues and colors. Language-games depict various ‘forms of life’ which are nothing but varied activities conducted by the people throughout their life. All the facets of life be it religion, ethics, morality, aesthetics, and even culture are nothing but various ‘forms of life’ which can be apprehended through their particular language games. Within a language-game of ethics, the basic building blocks are ‘values’ which are relative to the other constituents of that language game, but outside the language-game these values have transcendental existence. Although these are not, and should not be, used in language-games of other disciplines, still these do not lose their ontological reality on that account. Through language-games, thus, Wittgenstein maintains, simultaneously, the relative and transcendent aspect of values.

The inexpressibility thus implies that it is virtually impossible to define values with respect to objective facts found in the world. Values, like language, can only *show*, not *say*. That is why, Wittgenstein keeps asserts in the end of *Tractatus*, “What we cannot speak about we must pass over in silence (Wittgenstein, Ludwig 1961).” Ethics, therefore, is something that can not be validly spoken about like scientific propositions about the world. It can, at best, give us metaphors or similes which can point to higher truths,

but those cannot be analyzed in the manner of scientific facts. It is their inexpressibility that lends values a transcendental character. In *Lecture on Ethics*, he asserts, "Ethics, if it is anything, is supernatural and our words will only express facts (Wittgenstein 1980, p.7)." Since philosophy, in Wittgenstein's view, is nothing but a therapy, any moral enquiry, likewise can not be a science, but will necessarily remain a therapeutic study only.

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# Wie man ein Luftgebäude zerstört, oder: Die Bedeutung der Unterscheidung von Sagen und Zeigen für Nietzsches und Wittgensteins Praxis philosophischer Kritik

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## 1. Das Problem der Kritik

In einem berühmten Brief an Bertrand Russell bezeichnete Wittgenstein die Unterscheidung von Sagen und Zeigen als das Hauptproblem der Philosophie. Die Wittgenstein-Forschung hat belegt, dass der Ursprung dieser Unterscheidung in Wittgensteins kritischer Auseinandersetzung mit Russells Typentheorie zu finden ist (Cf. Glock 2005, p. 330). Aufgrund der solcherart nahe liegenden Abhängigkeit der Unterscheidung von Wittgensteins Verständnis der Logik, wie sie in den *Logisch philosophischen Abhandlungen* zu finden ist, wurde angenommen, dass besagte Unterscheidung jenseits der ontologischen und epistemologischen Prämissen von Wittgensteins Erstling bedeutungslos sei.

In Opposition zu dieser Auffassung versucht dieser Vortrag die heuristische Bedeutung dieser Unterscheidung in einem anderen Kontext nachzuweisen. Einem Kontext in dem sich unter anderem der späte Wittgenstein selbst sowie ein anderer berühmter deutschsprachiger Philosoph bewegen, der üblicher Weise nicht mit Wittgenstein in Verbindung gesetzt zu werden pflegt: Friedrich Nietzsche.

Die beiden Autoren praktizieren an eindeutig isolierbaren Stellen ihres Werkes eine ähnliche Form der Kritik. Es handelt sich dabei um jene Form der Kritik, welche eine gegnerische philosophische Theorie durch den Nachweis der ihr zugrunde liegenden, „falschen“ Vorannahmen zurückweisen will. Derartige Kritiken bewegen sich prinzipiell im Rahmen zweier Möglichkeiten: Entweder sie positionieren sich jenseits der gegnerischen Position und behaupten aus dieser Distanz rein thetisch die generelle Falschheit der Grundannahmen ihres Gegenübers. Dies führt jedoch meist dazu, dass sie von der Gegentheorie als Ideologem abgetan werden und keine weitere Beachtung erfahren.

Oder die kritisch-neue Theorie lässt sich auf die kritisierte Theorie ein und folgt den dieser Theorie inhärenten argumentativen Regeln. Dies bedeutet jedoch, dass sich die neue Theorie in dem Augenblick, in dem sie die Falschheit der Gegentheorie konstatiert, in einen Selbstwiderspruch zu begeben droht. Es ist ihr anscheinend nicht möglich den argumentativen Regeln der Gegentheorie zu folgen und zugleich die Falschheit dieser Regeln festzustellen.

Im Folgenden soll in einem ersten Schritt gezeigt werden, dass diese Problematik die Schnittstelle der ansonsten an vielen Punkten unvereinbaren philosophischen Praxis Nietzsches und Wittgensteins bildet. In einem zweiten Schritt wird dann demonstriert, dass sich Nietzsches und Wittgensteins Lösungsansätze dieser Problematik stark ähneln: beide entwickeln eine Form philosophischer Kritik, deren Vorgehensweise sich mit Hilfe der von Wittgenstein im Zentrum des *Tractatus* stehenden Unterscheidung von Sagen und Zeigen erhellen lässt.

## 2. Wittgenstein und Nietzsche

Das Verhältnis von Wittgenstein und Nietzsche hat in der Forschung lange Zeit ein stiefmütterliches Dasein geführt. Erst jüngst nimmt die Anzahl vergleichender Untersuchungen zu. Dies mag an den auf den ersten Blick schier unüberbrückbaren Differenzen zwischen den beiden Philosophen liegen. Nietzsches Schriften können ihren geistesgeschichtlichen Ursprung nicht leugnen: Sein Denken scheint noch ganz im Banne der Bewusstseinsphilosophie des 19. Jahrhunderts zu stehen. So wird in der Forschung häufig davon gesprochen, dass Nietzsche das Bewusstsein einfach durch die Sprache ersetzt und somit weit hinter den mit dem *linguistic turn* einsetzenden Sprachreflexionen zurückbleibt (Cf. Tietz 2000). Jedoch ist diese Auffassung durch jüngere Studien angegriffen worden, welche Nietzsches späte Sprachphilosophie als eine ausgeklügelte Semiotik ausgewiesen haben (Cf. Stegmaier 2000).

Trotz dieser offensichtlichen Differenzen treffen sich Wittgensteins und Nietzsches spätes Denken in zwei wesentlichen Punkten: Sowohl Wittgenstein als auch Nietzsche bedienen sich regelmäßig des Terminus „Philosophie der Grammatik“. Außerdem vereint beide ihr Anti-Essentialismus.

Letzterer steht in engem Zusammenhang mit deren Sprachphilosophien. So schreibt Nietzsche bereits in *Menschliches, Allzumenschliches*: „Das Wort und der Begriff sind der sichtbarste Grund, weshalb wir an die Isolation von Handlungs-Gruppen glauben: mit ihnen bezeichnen wir nicht nur die Dinge, wir meinen ursprünglich durch sie das Wesen derselben zu erfassen.“ (Nietzsche 1993, p. 547) Dies klingt wie eine Vorwegnahme der von Wittgenstein am Anfang der *Philosophischen Untersuchungen* vollzogenen Kritik am Augustinschen Bild der Sprache. Um exakter zu sein, handelt es sich dabei um die Kritik an der in diesem Bild vorherrschenden Auffassung, dass die Bedeutung eines Wortes das den von ihm bezeichneten Dingen gemeinsame Wesen sei. Wittgenstein weist diese Auffassung zurück und setzt an die so leer gewordene Stelle seinen Begriff der Familienähnlichkeit. (Cf. Baker/Hacker 2009)

Die zweite Parallele zwischen Wittgenstein und Nietzsche besteht in deren Verwendung des Begriffs der „Philosophie der Grammatik“. Dieser tritt mit *Jenseits von Gut und Böse* in den Mittelpunkt von Nietzsches sprachkritischem Denken. Er ist von der Forschung lange Zeit im Kontext von Nietzsches Erkenntnis-kritik gelesen worden. Diese schien eine argumentative Stütze durch Nietzsches angeblich universelle „Verfälschungstheorie“ (Cf. Tietz 2000) zu erhalten, als deren innigster Ausdruck folgendes, als Inbegriff der Philosophie der Grammatik gedeutete Fragment galt: „Das vernünftige Denken ist ein Interpretieren nach einem Schema, welches wir nicht abwerfen können.“ (Nietzsche 1993b, p. 194)

Das, wogegen sich Nietzsche mit dem Terminus tatsächlich wendet, ist die Tendenz zahlreicher Philosophen der Suggestivkraft grammatischer Strukturen zu erliegen. In *Jenseits von Gut und Böse* spricht Nietzsche im Hinblick auf die „Philosophie der Grammatik“ von „der unbewussten Herrschaft und Führung durch gleiche grammatische Funktionen“ (Nietzsche 1993a, p. 34). In diesem Punkt stimmt Wittgenstein mit ihm überein: „Die Sprache (oder das Denken) ist etwas Einzigartiges« - das erweist sich als ein Aberglaube (nicht Irrtum!), hervorgerufen selbst durch grammatische Täuschungen. Und auf diese Täuschungen, auf die Probleme, fällt nun das Pathos zurück.“ (Wittgenstein 2009, §110).

Diese Textstelle verweist auf zwei bedeutende Punkte: Erstens legt sie die Frage nahe, worin die grammatischen Täuschungen bestehen. Nietzsche gibt darauf keine Antwort, er macht jedoch unmissverständlich klar, dass der von ihm bekämpfte Platonismus bzw. die traditionelle europäische Metaphysik, also auch der zuvor bereits angesprochene Essentialismus, ein Folgeprodukt dieser Täuschungen sind. Die Bedeutung der Grammatik in Wittgensteins Spätphilosophie ist hier wohl nicht eigenes zu betonen, eine Darstellung derselben würde den hier zur Verfügung stehenden Rahmen sprengen. Hervorgehoben werden soll jedoch, dass Nietzsche und Wittgenstein als Folge ihrer Philosophie der Grammatik ein normatives Sprachbild besitzen.

Der zweite Punkt betrifft die von Wittgenstein explizierte Unterscheidung von Aberglaube und Irrtum. Baker und Hacker erläutern in ihrem *Analytical Commentary* diese Unterscheidung aus dem Kontext der Wittgensteinschen Kritik an der Auffassung, dass in der Sprache der logische Aufbau der Welt repräsentiert würde. Sowohl Wittgenstein als auch Nietzsche stimmen jedoch darin überein, dass ein solcher Aufbau nicht existiert. Dementsprechend sind darauf aufbauende Thesen nicht falsch, denn dann müsste ihr Gegenteil zutreffen, sondern bloßer Aberglaube. (Cf.. Baker/Hacker 2009b, p. 249).

Der Kritik und Destruktion dieser Formen des Aberglaubens widmen die beiden Denker einen großen Teil ihrer philosophischen Arbeiten. Dabei legt das ihnen eigene Sprachverständnis bereits ein bestimmtes Prozedere nahe. Dieses macht sich die normative Auffassung von Sprache, die Nietzsche und Wittgenstein gemeinsam mit dem Begriff der Grammatik verbinden, zu Nutze: Wenn die jeweils gegenwärtig gesprochene Sprache stets ihr inhärenten grammatischen Regeln folgt, können die sprachlich bedingten, abergläubischen Vorannahmen mancher Theorien durch Rückgriff auf diese Grammatik freigelegt werden.

Dies bedeutet jedoch, dass in Betreff der oben angeführten zwei möglichen Formen der Kritik Nietzsche und Wittgenstein die Letztere wählen: Sie praktizieren eine Form der Kritik, die den Kriterien der von ihr kritisierten Theorie folgt und der es dabei dennoch gelingt den dieser Theorie zugrunde liegenden Aberglauben offen zu legen. Diese Form der Kritik lässt sich auch als performative Kritik bezeichnen.

### 3. Die philosophische Kritik

Bevor wir zur eigentlichen Beschreibung von Nietzsches und Wittgensteins kritischer Praxis schreiten, ist mit Nachdruck darauf hinzuweisen, dass es sich bei der hier erläuterten Form der Kritik nicht um die einzige von Nietzsche und Wittgenstein angewandte Methode handelt. Wittgenstein selbst hat dies in folgende Worte gefasst: „Es gibt

nicht eine Methode der Philosophie, wohl aber gibt es Methoden, gleichsam verschiedene Therapien.“ (Wittgenstein 2009, §133 Zusatz). Der hier untersuchte Modus der Kritik dient insbesondere der Zurückweisung essentialistischer Konzeptionen durch Fokussierung auf deren sprachliche Grundlagen.

Zuvor ist diese Methode als performative Kritik bezeichnet worden. Jedoch sind die Begriffe der Performanz und der Performativität eindeutige Opfer gegenwärtig exzessiver Verwendung durch die Forschergemeinschaft geworden. Die Vielzahl an Verwendungen desselben machen es einem unmöglich sie als heuristisch wertvolle *termini technici* zu gebrauchen. Deswegen wird hier von nun an von philosophischer Kritik gesprochen und damit eine denkerische Praxis bezeichnet, welche dem zugrunde liegenden Schema des von ihr kritisierten Theorie im vollen Bewusstsein der darin enthaltenen Illusionen folgt und dabei eben diese Illusionen als solche kennzeichnet.

Über die Beantwortung der Frage, wie eine solche Form der Kritik möglich ist ohne in einen Selbstwiderspruch zu münden, kann diese Praxis selbst weiter erhellt werden. Dabei soll zuerst auf eine Beschreibung der Wittgensteinschen therapeutischen Praxis – von einem Teil genau dieser handelte eben auch die etwas unglückliche Formulierung der performativen Kritik – durch Eike von Savigny zurückgegriffen werden. Savigny beschreibt das Prozedere der Therapie wie folgt:

„Man muß [...] zeigen, woher die Voraussetzung ihre scheinbare Selbstverständlichkeit hat. Es wird nichts darüber gesagt, ob sie richtig oder falsch ist; es wird nur gezeigt, wie wir dazu kommen, sie als selbstverständlich oder zwingend notwendig anzusehen.“ (Savigny <sup>2</sup>1980, p. 179).

Die hier gegebene Beschreibung der Wittgensteinschen therapeutischen Praxis legt zum Zwecke ihrer Explikation einen Rückgriff auf die Unterscheidung von Sagen und Zeigen nahe. Damit dadurch tatsächlich ein besseres Verständnis dieser Form der philosophischen Kritik bewirkt wird, bedarf es einer Klärung wie diese Unterscheidung hier zu verstehen ist.

Im *Tractatus* ist die Unterscheidung bekannter Weise Wittgensteins Antwort auf ein traditionelles philosophisches Problem. Richard Rorty bringt dieses folgendermaßen auf den Punkt: „Wittgenstein saw [...], what Frege and Russell had not seen: that the search for nonempirical truth about the conditions of the possibility of describability raises the self-referential problem of its own possibility. [...] Frege and Russell had trouble explaining how knowledge of what they called “logic” was possible. The problem was that logic seemed to be an exception to the conditions which it itself laid down.“ (Rorty <sup>11</sup>2008, p. 54) Die Unterscheidung von Sagen und Zeigen bot einen Ausweg aus diesem Dilemma, zugleich erlaubte sie eine Grenzziehung zwischen empirischen sinnvollen Sätzen und dem Unsinn des Mystischen. In den *Philosophischen Untersuchungen* behauptet Wittgenstein jedoch nicht mehr, dass die Logik etwas Sublimes sei (Cf. Wittgenstein 2009, §89). Wie bereits gezeigt, lässt er den diese Idee stützenden Essentialismus fallen.

Außerdem bedienen sich Nietzsche und Wittgenstein im Rahmen ihrer kritischen Praxis eines zusätzlichen Hilfsmittels, dass die rigide Trennung zwischen Sagbarem und Unsagbarem des *Tractatus* sprengt, da es nach derselben regelrecht unmöglich wäre: Sie sprechen die Resultate ihrer Kritik aus, unterscheiden sich dabei jedoch in den Modi dieser Artikulation. Wittgenstein tut dies durch seine sogenannten grammatischen Sätze; Nietzsche mit

dem für ihn charakteristischen Pathos, indem er zuerst die Falschheit der kritisierten Theorie postuliert, um dann seine Gegentheorie durch die Anwendung der Figur der Selbstaufhebung (Cf. Zittel 1995) aufzuheben, und so einem performativen Selbstwiderspruch entgeht. Widersprechen die beiden damit nicht ihrer eigentlichen Intention? Im Gegenteil. Es kommt durch diese Praxis zu einer abermaligen Verstärkung ihrer Kritik an der essentialistischen philosophischen Tradition und deren Hoffnung zu endgültigen und fundamentalen philosophischen Einsichten zu kommen. Indem Nietzsche und Wittgenstein nach dem zeigenden Nachweis der abergläubischen Grundannahmen der von ihnen kritisierten Theorien, die Resultate dieser Kritik aussprechen befinden sie sich bereits jenseits der von ihnen kritisierten Theorien. Ein grammatischer Satz Wittgensteins sagt nichts über das Wesen der Welt, sondern er zeigt nur, wie ein bestimmtes Wort den konventionellen Regeln der es verwendenden Sprachgemeinschaft entsprechend zu verwenden sei. Dasselbe gilt für Nietzsches Genealogien, welche die von ihnen kritisierten Begriffe mit alternativen Bedeutungsgeschichten ausstatten.

Bedeutet das dann aber nicht, dass das Zeigen hier nichts anderes ist als der von Wittgenstein in den *Philosophischen Untersuchungen* geforderte Paradigmenwechsel von der Erklärung zur Beschreibung (Cf. Wittgenstein 2009, §109)? Dies mag auf den ersten Blick so erscheinen. Untersucht man diese vermeintliche Synonymie jedoch etwas genauer, offenbart sich einem, dass das Zeigen nur in einem ganz bestimmten Feld der durch die Beschreibung implizit erfolgenden Kritik Gültigkeit besitzt, nämlich jener Form, die sich aus dem Horizont der Philosophie der Grammatik speist. Nur in diesem Rahmen besteht ein eindeutiger Unterschied zwischen Sagen und Zeigen: Bei letzterem handelt es sich um ein Sprachspiel, das im Gegensatz zum Sagen ausschließlich von der Sprache selbst handelt ohne sich eines anderen Vokabulars als jenem der untersuchten zu bedienen, d.h. also ohne der Illusion zu verfallen durch die Konstruktion einer Metasprache die Grenzen der tatsächlich gesprochenen Objektsprache der kritisierten Theorie zu durchbrechen. Wie zuvor bereits angemerkt wurde, entgeht Nietzsche dabei dem möglichen Selbstwiderspruch, indem er alle an die zeigende Kritik anschließenden metatheoretischen Aussagen wieder aufhebt. An diesem Punkt verlässt er jedoch eindeutig Wittgensteins Denkhorizont.

Dies bedeutet, dass die von Wittgenstein am Anfang seiner philosophischen Laufbahn zum Hauptproblem der Philosophie erklärte Unterscheidung von Sagen und Zeigen auch zur Illustration einer bestimmten Praxis philoso-

phischer Kritik herangezogen werden kann. Es wurde gezeigt, dass diese Denkfigur ein probates Mittel der Abwendung performativer Selbstwidersprüche darstellt. Dabei verliert sie jedoch die Strenge, welche ihr in Wittgensteins früher Variante innewohnte. Mit der Hinwendung zu einer derartigen philosophischen Praxis repräsentieren Nietzsche und Wittgenstein zugleich ein Verständnis von Philosophie, das gegenwärtig nicht in höchstem Ansehen steht. Die hier dargestellte philosophische Praxis impliziert ein Verständnis von Philosophie, welches diese jenseits der empirischen Wissenschaften ansiedelt. Sie bietet zugleich eine Möglichkeit manche jener Luftgebäude, welche die philosophische Tradition so lange bewohnte, zu zerstören und uns von dem Aberglauben, dass es ein genuin philosophisches Wissen gäbe, zu befreien. Nietzsche und Wittgenstein haben uns durch diese Praxis neue Denkwege eröffnet, nun liegt es an uns ihnen auf diesen zu folgen.

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# Picturing as Mapping: A Mark of Continuity in Wittgenstein's Notion of Representation

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It is rather commonplace to speak of a turning-point in Wittgenstein's philosophy from 1929 onwards, and to describe such a switch by focusing on the withdrawal of the early "picture-theory" of language. The aim of this paper is to reevaluate such a description, and to show how the concept of picture Wittgenstein had in mind in the *Tractatus logico-philosophicus* (TLP) still pervades his later notion of representation. More precisely, I will claim that the Tractarian understanding of pictures as projections is still implicit in Wittgenstein's later notion of "synoptic views" intended as the goal of philosophical clarification. According to the later Wittgenstein, philosophy aims in fact at providing "perspicuous presentations" [*übersichtliche Darstellungen*] that are supposed to map the connections and jointures of language and its grammar. On that respect, his later approach to philosophy rests upon a theory of representation whose very core is that same paradigm of pictures as projections that was already crucial in the *Tractatus*. When it comes to the conception of pictoriality, the difference between the "early" and the "later" Wittgenstein (if any) is therefore only the following: whereas the early Wittgenstein had been using the paradigm of map-making in order to account for propositional language, the later Wittgenstein switches to a higher level, and now uses this projective paradigm in a description of the task of philosophical elucidation.

## 1. Renouncing the picture-theory?

The *Tractatus logico-philosophicus* is known to have introduced a "picture-theory" of language, whose main claim is that "[t]he proposition is a picture of reality. / The proposition is a model of reality as we think it is" (Wittgenstein 1922, 4.01). In other words, the proposition *shows* the state of affairs it is meant to describe while *speaking* about it. Now, the notion of "picture" that is at stake in this early picture-theory of proposition is obviously not the picture in a basic or "mimetic" sense of the word. As a matter of fact, one should take seriously the reference to picture as a "model" in the passage mentioned above, and read it as a highly probable echo of the description of mechanical models provided by Ludwig Boltzmann in his celebrated entry for the *Encyclopaedia Britannica* (Boltzmann 1974). Such a reference obviously implies that propositional pictures as seen by the early Wittgenstein do not seek to reproduce the external aspect of their objects, but rather focus on a restitution of their internal structure. Consequently, the crucial condition for the success of propositional representation is the existence of a relation of "coordination" [*Zuordnung*] between the elements of the proposition and those of the state of affairs it depicts (Wittgenstein 1922, 2.1514):

The representing relation consists of the co-ordinations [*Zuordnungen*] of the elements of the picture and the things.

Now, it is a well-known fact that such a notion of coordination has its roots in the characterization of "dynamical models" introduced by the physicist Heinrich Hertz in his *Principles of Mechanics* (Hertz 1895, esp. §418 ff.). Hence Wittgenstein's insistence, in some later descriptions of his

early picture-theory, on the mathematical or mechanical dimension of his former notion of picture (Wittgenstein 1967a, p. 185):

This concept of picture is something I have inherited from two sides: on the one hand, from the drawn picture [*ausgezeichneten Bild*]; and on the other hand, from the picture of the mathematician, which is a general concept. For the mathematician still speaks of representations, where the painter would no longer use this expression.

In the TLP, the mathematical dimension of this early notion of picture is explicitly stated when Wittgenstein refers to the concept of projection, and regards it as the very condition of propositional representation (Wittgenstein 1922, 3.11):

We use the sensibly perceptive sign (sound or written sign, etc.) of the proposition as a projection of a possible state of affairs.

The method of projection is the thinking of the sense of the proposition.

This "mathematics-based" picture-theory is actually quite convenient, since it provides the early Wittgenstein with a unitary account of any proposition whatsoever. Yet, its main failure also lies in this very "over-comprehensiveness". As Wittgenstein stresses after 1929, such an unwarranted generalization of the picture-theory prevents in fact the philosopher from gaining awareness of the multiple figures of language (Wittgenstein 1967b, §444):

The tendency to generalise the case seems to have a strict justification in logic: here one seems *completely* justified in inferring: "If *one* proposition is a picture, then any proposition must be a picture, for they must all be of the same nature". For we are under the illusion that what is sublime, what is essential, about our investigation consists in its grasping *one* comprehensive essence.

That's why Wittgenstein was eventually to renounce his early picture-theory, in favor of a conception of language focusing on the multiplicity of language-games. Nevertheless, this renouncement does not imply that Wittgenstein should have repudiated *every* aspect of his early picture-theory. Quite the contrary: although he is no longer committed to the claim that any proposition is a projection of reality, the later Wittgenstein keeps adhering to the mathematical paradigm of pictures as projections. As I will try to show right now, the point is that he no longer relies on this paradigm in order to explain how propositions work, but rather uses it in his description of the kind of representations philosophy is expected to produce.

## 2. Synoptic views as translations of a logical multiplicity

According to the later Wittgenstein, the right way to avoid the dogmatism involved in the early-picture theory is to be aware of the multiple figures language is likely to assume. But this approach also implies the necessity of an orienta-

tion among such a multiplicity: and this is precisely what "synoptic presentations" are to accomplish. This point is made, for instance, in a dictation to Moritz Schlick (Wittgenstein 2003, pp. 124-125):

Philosophical description gets its importance from the fact that it affords us an overview [*Übersicht*] which guards us against adopting a different system only because we do not see the right one. We yearn for a perspicuous representation, i.e., for a system, we do not see the right one, we are seduced into adopting a false system by the language or by some circumstance or other, and philosophy saves us by offering us the correct perspicuous representation.

Wittgenstein's interest for synoptic views is of course a major theme in his later philosophy, a theme whose motto may be found in the *Philosophical Investigations*, §122:

A main source of our failure to understand is that we do not *command a clear view* of the use of our words. – Our grammar is lacking in this sort of perspicuity. A perspicuous representation produces just that understanding which consists in 'seeing connexions'. Hence the importance of finding and inventing *intermediate cases*.

But what exactly is a "synoptic" or "perspicuous" view? Obviously, it is a way of presenting things by outlining their structure and relations. A synoptic view aims at showing directly to the eye the connections and correlations that pervade a given system. In other words, the synoptic views Wittgenstein focuses on in his later philosophy seem to be doing the same job as the propositional pictures of his earlier philosophy, namely the job of translating a logical multiplicity into another.

This reading is supported by a fascinating passage from Wittgenstein's *Remarks on Logical Form*. In this passage, philosophy is described as a kind of therapeutics whose main device is the elaboration of an elucidating symbolism. This symbolism seeks to devise a "clear picture" of language, the picture in question being a translation of its logical multiplicity (Wittgenstein 1929, p. 16):

The idea is to express in an appropriate symbolism what in ordinary language leads to endless misunderstandings. That is to say, where ordinary language disguises logical structure, where it allows the formation of pseudo-propositions, where it uses one term in an infinity of different meanings, we must replace it by a symbolism which gives a clear picture of the logical structure, excludes pseudo-propositions, and uses its terms unambiguously. Now we can only substitute a clear symbolism for the unprecise one by inspecting the phenomena which we want to describe, thus trying to understand their logical multiplicity.

This reference to the logical multiplicity of linguistic phenomena is not to be explained by mere chronological arguments to the effect that the *Remarks on Logical Form* are a text of transition between Wittgenstein's early and later philosophy. As I will now insist, the reference to philosophical representations as projective pictures goes far beyond 1929, and keeps underlying Wittgenstein's notion of synoptic views until the *Philosophical Investigations*.

### 3. Synopticity as a mapping

To support my claim that the notion of representation involved in Wittgenstein's later concern for synoptic views is similar to the notion of representation already involved in the *Tractatus*, I would like to stress how, in both cases, propositional pictures are described as mathematical pro-

jections of a given state of affairs. I have already presented the mathematical implications of the notion of picture in the TLP: my point is now that the synoptic views of the later Wittgenstein also rest on the same mathematical paradigm. For instance, Wittgenstein's insistence on the diagrammatic nature of synopticity is explicit in the *Philosophical Remarks*, when he elaborates on the so-called "color octahedron" (Wittgenstein 1964, §221). For the color octahedron is *literally* a diagram that clarifies the grammar of colors by means of a mapping of chromatic relations (Wittgenstein 1964, §1):

The space of colors is, e.g., *incidentally* described by means of the octahedron, on the vertex of which are the pure colors; and such a representation is a grammatical one, not a psychological one. [...] The octahedron-representation is a synoptic representation of grammatical rules.

On that respect, synoptic presentations that consist of such diagrams are quite comparable to the mathematical mappings of the TLP. No wonder, then, that this understanding of synoptic views as diagrammatic presentations should be associated to a recurrent reference to cartography. See, for instance, the *Cambridge Lectures* (Wittgenstein 2001, p. 43):

One difficulty with philosophy is that we lack a synoptic view. We encounter the kind of difficulty we should have with the geography of a country for which we had no map, or else a map of isolated bits. The country we are talking about is language, and the geography its grammar. We can walk about the country quite well, but when forced to make a map, we go wrong.

The claim that the synoptic task of philosophy amounts to a kind of map-making of language is also explicit in the *Big Typescript*, where philosophy is openly compared to geography (Wittgenstein 2005, §90):

Teaching philosophy involves the same immense difficulty as instruction in geography would have if a pupil brought with him a mass a false and falsely simplified ideas about the courses and connections of rivers and mountains.

This metaphor is of course connected to the celebrated paradigm of orientation that underlies Wittgenstein's description of philosophy, for instance in Wittgenstein 1953, §23 ("a philosophical problem has the form: 'I don't know my way about'"), or again in a remark from a manuscript where Wittgenstein asserts that "[his] duty is to teach you the geography of a labyrinth, so that you may completely find your way about it" (Wittgenstein 2000, 162b): 6v). A similar analogy between philosophy and sign-positing is again mentioned in a 1931 remark (Wittgenstein 1994, p. 18), to the effect that:

Language sets everyone the same traps; it is an immense network of easily accessible wrong turnings. And so we watch one man after another walking down the same paths and we know in advance where he will branch off, where walk straight on without noticing the side turning, etc. etc. What I have to do then is erect signposts at all junctions where there are wrong turnings so as to help people pass the danger points.

Now, granted that map-making *is* a form of projective depiction, one may propose a new reading of Wittgenstein's evolution with respect to the notion of picture. Although the later Wittgenstein has ceased to regard the proposition as a projection of a given multiplicity into another, he does reintroduce the projective paradigm at a higher level:

namely, when he insists on the necessity of synoptic presentations, the latter being intended as structural projections of a system of rules. Consequently, it is correct to assume that Wittgenstein never lost his interest for a conception of pictures as projections. The notion of picture Wittgenstein has in mind after 1929 when he asserts that philosophy should produce synoptic depictions of language is identical to the notion of picture that was underlying his early pictorial theory of language; the only point is that this concept now switches from the level of *propositional* pictures to the level of *philosophical* representations.

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# A Proposed Solution to Two Puzzles in Mathematical Mapping

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## 1. Equals

The "equals" function in mathematics identifies different things as the same thing. Being different, however, they are not the same. Mapping different thing to different thing "proves" sameness. Still not the same thing, mapping is ascription of sameness.

Reconsidering the "equals" function, one source indicates, "Two quantities are said to be equal if they are, in some well-defined sense, equivalent." (Weisstein <http://mathworld.wolfram.com/Equal.html>.) Thus is the, "equal sign ... : a sign = indicating mathematical or logical equivalence." (Mish 391) As to the nature of "equivalent," the initial source provides, "If  $A \Rightarrow B$  and  $B \Rightarrow A$  ... , then A and B are said to be equivalent." (Weisstein <http://mathworld.wolfram.com/Equivalent.html>) If true, however, then if Jill is married to Jack, and if Jack is married to Jill, "then [Jill] and [Jack] are ... equivalent," when they are not.

Error occurs assuming, "'Implies' is the connective in propositional calculus which has the meaning 'if A is true, then B is also true.'" (Weisstein <http://mathworld.wolfram.com/Implies.html>) Identifying sequential indexing of exclusively disjunctive elements, implication distinguishes elements which are not the same. Identifying sequential indexing of inclusively disjunctive elements, equivalence distinguishes elements which are the same. Implication concerns form, not content. Equivalence concerns content, not form. Misconception focuses on indexing, not indexed.

Reexamination begins with, "'equal ... equivalent ... **syn** see same.'" (Mish 391) Developing this is, "equivalent ... **2a**: like in signification or import ... **syn** see same." (Mish 392-393) Evident is "equal" is "equivalent" because both mean "same." Relevant, then, is,

**1same** ...: identical .... same may imply and self-same always implies that the things under consideration are one thing and not two or more things .... identical may imply selfsameness or suggest absolute agreement in all details. (Mish 1035-1036)

Elements are equal when identical because the same, and unequal when similar because not the same. Same elements are identical because associated. Like elements are similar because disassociated.

## 2. Puzzles

Introduced is, "**Frege's Puzzle**: how, if true, can ' $A=B$ ' differ in cognitive significance from ' $A=A$ '?" (Bealer <http://www.yale.edu/philos/grad3.html>) " $A=A$ " being indistinguishable from " $A=B$ ," however, introduced is Wittgenstein's Puzzle:

The formula ' $a=a$ ' uses the identity sign in a special way: for one would not say that  $a$  may be substituted for  $a$ . Yet we do start in inductions with something like  $a=a$ . ... Does ... it [make] sense to write ' $x=x$ '? (Ambrose 208)

Now,  $(A=A) \wedge \neg(A=B)$  on Frege's Puzzle, and  $(A=B) \wedge \neg(A=A)$  on Wittgenstein's Puzzle.

Accepting both puzzles,  $(A=A)$  and  $(A=B)$  are mutually defeating. Significance occurs considering, "It is true that  $a=a$  and  $a=b$  are used at the start of proofs by induction." (Ambrose 208) Introduced is the first fundamental condition,

which a deductive presentation must satisfy if it is to be fully rigorous: 1. Explicit enumeration of the primitive terms for subsequent use in definitions. (Blanche 21-22.)

Initiated is a set, significance of which is indicated considering, "Without [set theory], not only can we not *do* modern mathematics, we can't even say what we are talking about." (Stewart 43)  $A=A$  and  $A=B$  introducing an initial element in any well-ordered set, if mutually defeating, then sets are impossible. Sets being impossible, when modern mathematics is impossible without sets, then modern mathematics is impossible if  $A=A$  and  $A=B$  are mutually defeating.

## 3. Proof

Presented is a mapping problem introduced by David Hilbert's "distinction ... between a subject matter under study and discourse about the subject matter." (Nagel 31) Linkage is by means of a substitution whereof, "One must at all times be able to replace 'points, lines, planes' by 'tables, chairs, beer mugs.'" (Boyer 610.) Implementing this function, Kurt "Gödel first showed that it is possible to assign a *unique number* to each elementary sign, to each formula (or sequence of signs), and each proof (or finite sequence of formulas)." (Nagel 69)

As to the nature of proof, nothing in Hilbert and Gödel's mapping scheme is inconsistent with pairing every element of "the subject matter"  $D$  with one element of the "subject matter understudy"  $T$ , and every element of  $T$  with one element of  $D$ , and no element of  $D$  or  $T$  with more or less than one element of the other, establishing a bijection of "the subject matter" and the "subject matter understudy." Hereby, "the situation is perfectly symmetrical; and if we turn all the arrows round we define another function ... in the opposite direction." (Nagel 71) Proceeding thus, "the subject matter" is converted into the "subject matter understudy."

Achieving this, "the subject matter"  $D$  of which the current "subject matter"  $D$  constituted the "subject matter understudy," can be converted into the current "subject matter understudy"  $T$ , and so on until the universe is converted into the current "subject matter understudy"  $T$ . Now every  $D$  is converted into  $T$ . Being so, the process can be reversed "in the opposite direction," converting every  $T$  into  $D$ .

Now whether the current "subject matter understudy"  $T$  is "the [current] subject matter" or not is ambiguous. Thus it is impossible in the process of mapping "the subject matter"  $D$  to the "subject matter understudy"  $T$ , to specify "a *unique* element  $f(x)$  of  $T$  ... so that there is no ambiguity attached to it." (Stewart 67-68) Proof by mapping as Hilbert and Gödel propose is unnecessary, then. Ambiguity is resolved only by embracing it in circularity,

conjoining otherwise separate linear conversions of “the subject matter” and the “subject matter understudy.”

Implemented is proof by mathematical induction. Like a rational number, engendered is an indefinitely repeating sequence of consecutive digits. Sought by marginally transitioning from “individual in the universe of the discourse” to “individual in the universe of the discourse” by the degrees of similarity represented by the fuzzy set, is an indexical conversion of individual into individual.

#### 4. Recursion and Iteration

Constituting mathematical identity is location within a set. Separating the accidental and essential theories of mathematical identity is the nature of the set within which location constitutes identity. There are two kinds of sets considering this, cardinal and ordinal, which are distinguished by the mechanism generating them. Cardinality is generated recursively, and ordinality is generated iteratively. Functionally the essential theory of identity is recursive, location within a cardinal set. Functionally the accidental theory of identity is iterative, location within an ordinal set.

Recursion is the means by which identity occurs in a domain—indeed it is what constitutes a domain. Iteration is the means by which identity occurs in co-domains—indeed it is what constitutes co-domains. Mathematical identity is neither essential nor nominal, then, it is both. It is essential in a domain, and nominal across domains. Additionally, it is nominal across domains because appearance of a thing in different domains is different. Appearance differs at least concerning those things to which something is related.

Both recursion and iteration are mechanisms of identity, determining the membership of a set. This occurs by a process of sequencing. Common to both recursion and iteration is identity of sequence members by analogy with an archetype, this archetype constituting the intensional criterion of sequence membership. Distinguishing recursion and iteration is the nature of the identifying archetype.

Each initiates with identification of a base case, but differs according to the nature of the base case. Recursion is essential identity from a constant base case, and iteration is accidental identity from an inconstant base case. An identity function continuously applied to a constant analogical archetype constitutes a recursive sequence. An identity function continuously applied to an analogical archetype or archetypes in a transitive sequence constitutes an iterative sequence.

Recursion is the means by which identity occurs within a domain—indeed it is what constitutes a domain. Iteration is the means by which identity occurs in co-domains—indeed it is what constitutes co-domains. Identity is neither essential nor nominal, then, it is both. It is essential in a domain, and nominal across domains. And it is nominal across domains because appearance of a thing in different domains is different. If nothing else, they differ by to what they are related.

Distinguishing the forms of sets are the mathematical concepts of “field,” “commutative ring with unity,” and “corecursive hyperset.” A recursive set determines a field, composing an unlimited set. Constituent are conjoined elements without disjointed elements. Set identity is constant determined in any sequential order.

An inductive iterative set determines a ring, composing a limited set with subsets. Constituent are conjoined and disjointed elements, with disjointed elements defining

set limits. Set identity is inconstant determined in any sequential order from one limit to the other limit. Different resolution being possible at each disjunctive, set limits are inconstant.

A deductive iterative set determines a corecursive hyperset, composing a limited set without subsets. Constituent are conjoined elements with disjointed elements defining set limits. Set identity is constant, determined in any sequential order from one limit to the other limit. Different resolution being impossible at each conjunctive, set limits are constant.

Both a ring and hyperset integrate induction and deduction into a Platonic dialectic. The set of all analytic proofs can be proven only synthetically. The set of all synthetic proofs can be proven only analytically. Therefore, the set of all proofs can be proven only circularly, reciprocally synthetically and analytically. Analytic proof being a priori identity, identified is the synthetic a priori.

This can be recursive in the form of a field, or iterative, whether parallel in the form of a ring, or sequential in the form of a corecursive hyperset. Whether parallel or sequential, reciprocal analytic and synthetic identity constitutes self-identity. Self-defining, composed is a self-contained system. Converging onto alternate limits, conjoined reciprocal proofs are mutually verifying.

#### 5. Hyperset and Ring

Resolved are both Frege's puzzle and Wittgenstein's puzzle. Differentiating them is the means by which “the subject matter” and the “subject matter understudy” are mutually mapped.  $A=A$  identifies a corecursive hyperset, which from alternate limits reciprocally generates the same transmutative sequence in inverse order. Distinguished are aspects of the same thing.  $A=B$  identifies an iterative ring, which from alternate limits reciprocally generates the same transmutative sequence in variable order. Distinguished are instances of the same thing.

Relevantly, a set whose constituents are diffused does not contain itself, and a set whose constituents are fused does contain itself. Elements of a diffused set are conjoined; elements of a fused set are implicated. A conjunctive diffused set is a cardinal set, constituting the same set—having the same identity—in any sequence of elements. An implicative fused set is an ordinal set, constituting a different set—having different identity—in different sequences of elements.

Considering the limit of the power set symbolized by  $\wp$ , whether this limit is real or nominal, shows this. Identifying every element between the limits of a set, the power set of any set is ambiguous. Distinguishing each member of a set is understandable in contradictory ways, as generating both one indivisible thing and infinite indivisible things. Either every element is fused into one with nothing separating one from another, or every element is diffused into infinity with nothing linking one to another.

Identifying every element between the elements of a set when, “The rational fractions are so dense that between any two of them, no matter how close, there always will be another,” the power set is understandable as separating or integrating “the rational fractions.” (Boyer 566) Neither there is a subset, nor there is no subset, between any two subsets, is inconsistent with the power set. The first identifying a dense set, and the second identifying a discrete set, the power set is consistent with dense and discrete set.

Proceeding thus, movement is from identity of all the elements of the set in an all encompassing ordinal sequence, to all the elements of the set in an all encompassing cardinal sequence. So doing, different cardinal sequences of all system elements can be analogically identified by transposing elements within a sequence according to corresponding elements within another system until converting the former into the latter.

Implemented is a translation function transforming systemization of elements into systemization of elements. Implicatively integrated by a sequential conversion of systemization into systemization, constituted is a coherent whole. Systemization seamlessly transforming into systemization, the whole is consistent.

As consistent, the transformative set is well-ordered. It is so because different encompassed systemizations are understood as aspects of one another. Being mutual aspects, systemization is indistinguishable from systemization. Because indistinguishable, such systemizations compose a single transformative systemization.

Being so, exhibited is a function whereby constituents reciprocally fuse into the same indistinguishable whole by repetitive iterative application of the "+" conjunctive function in any sequential order. Alternately, they diffuse into the same distinguishable parts by repetitive iterative application of the "." disjunctive function in any sequential order. Constituents as fused whole are an object, and as diffused parts are objects.

Manifest is the conjunctive relation of identifiable particulars. Relation is an unbroken path between two elements within a domain. If a broken path, how is an element prior to the break known to be the same element subsequent to the break? Elements in different domains are proven related by tracing an unbroken path between them, incorporating both into a common domain. Proof is tracing such an unbroken path, mathematically constituting identifying a dense set. It is material when physical, an unbroken path of matter between limits. It is mental when phenomenal or conceptual.

Relation being a continuum between particulars, a particular is identifiable within a continuum by alternate identity as constituent and non-constituent of the continuum. Fusion of constituents renders a particular distinguishable from the continuum. Diffusion of constituents renders a particular indistinguishable from the continuum.

Cyclic transitive marginal conversion of constituents from fusion to diffusion and diffusion to fusion renders a particular distinguishable and indistinguishable from the continuum.

Thus, form is not independent of substance. It has no independent ontological status. Linguistically, it is a verb, identifying a substantive state of being or substantive states of being. As a substantive state, it is contained within a recursive field. As substantive states, it contains within itself an iterative sequence. Mapping identifies an iterative sequence. Mathematical equality identifies iterative sequences.

Reciprocal transitions from limiting states are equated, distinguished by the means constituting the same continuum. Alternating ordinal succession identifies  $A=A$ , the same sequence distinguished by reverse order. Alternating cardinal succession identifies  $A=B$ , the same sequence distinguished by differential order. Thus,  $A=A$  identifying aspects, and  $A=B$  identifying instances, they are mutually consistent. This is because they designate different things. Being the means by which sets are composed, when sets constitute modern mathematics, modern mathematics is possible.

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# Logic and its Application in Ludwig Wittgenstein's Early Philosophy

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## 1. Logical notation and natural language

*Logical necessity* (*logische Notwendigkeit*) is a distinguished notion in Wittgenstein's early works. One can even say: Wittgenstein's entire early philosophy is the theory of logical necessity.

This point of view is consistent with the idealistic (or non-realistic) interpretation of *Tractatus*. This interpretation allows to state, as Jerzy Perzanowski writes, that Wittgenstein's thesis about logic and language determinate Wittgenstein's thesis about the world and reality (Perzanowski 1984, p. 224).

The starting point of Wittgenstein's early philosophy is the assumption that logical necessity is the basis of any representation of reality (McGuinness 2002, pp. 85-86). The main aim of Wittgenstein's investigations is to reveal this basis, which is concealed beneath the surface of any natural language.

Therefore, logical analysis must ignore the contingent shapes of natural language and express the logical necessity in the proper *logical notation* (*Begriffsschrift*, *Zeichensprache*) (TLP 3.325), which reveals universal *logical syntax* (*logische Syntax*) (TLP 3.325, 3.33, 3.334, 3.344, 6.124). Finally, one can read in *Tractatus* that *All philosophy is 'critique of language'* (TLP 4.0031).

It is very important to grasp that Wittgenstein's investigations on logical necessity apply not only to the artificial logical notation but, as Max Black remarks, to any possible representation of reality – any natural language (Black 1964, p. 24).

Wittgenstein is not interested in perfect language. Elizabeth Anscombe points out that this very important trait of Wittgenstein's early philosophy was missed in Bertrand Russell's *Introduction* (Anscombe 1959, p. 91). Wittgenstein writes: *all the propositions of our everyday language, just as they stand, are in perfect logical order* (TLP 5.5563).

According to this interpretation, logical notation is, as Peter M.S. Hacker writes, not a perfect language (Hacker 1979, p. 231) – it is only a tool of logical analysis. In natural language the necessary basis cannot be shown directly, but in logical notation everything that is logically necessary can be expressed *on one occasion* (TLP 5.47).

One should emphasize that Wittgenstein's early investigations concern the necessary essence of symbolism – not the contingent way of material form of the symbol, i.e. the *sign* (*Zeichen*) (TLP 3.11, 3.32, 3.321, 3.325, 3.326). Symbol is the sign used *in its projective relation to the world* (TLP 3.12). However, the sign in itself is not a possible representation of a part of reality (Glock 1996, pp. 315-316).

The essence of symbolism is expressed only by logic and *it is not arbitrary* (TLP 3.342, 6.124). The distinction between arbitrary (accidental) and not arbitrary (essential) features of symbolism is crucial to properly understand Wittgenstein's philosophy of logic (Black 1964, p. 150). One can say that every symbolism or arbitrary nota-

tion can be analyzed with non-arbitrary notation, i.e. logical notation.

To sum up this section, the multiplicity of natural languages is the multiplicity of arbitrary notations. However, if one subtracts everything that depends on conventions, it will remain the indivisible core of the logical necessity, manifesting itself especially in the logical propositions of the classical propositional calculus.

## 2. Logical necessity in logical notation

Since substitutions of the thesis of the classical propositional calculus, i.e. substitutions of the propositions of logic, are necessarily true propositions, propositions of logic must express the logical necessity with no reference to anything that is contingent. In other words, the classical propositional calculus must be an effective method for solving which formulas of the classical propositional calculus are the propositions of logic. Logic must maintain its autonomy, as Wittgenstein writes: *Logic must take care of itself* (NB 22.08.1914; TLP 5.473).

The claim that logic is autonomous means that the necessary truth of the substitutions of the propositions of logic must be recognized from the symbol alone (RUL Nov., 1913, Norway, 1913; TLP 6.113, 6.126) (Glock 1996, pp. 200-201). Finally, the propositions of logic must be considered as tautologies (TLP 6.1; NM p. 114). Tautologies like denied tautologies, i.e. contradictions, *say nothing* (NB 3.10.1914; NM p. 108; TLP 4.461, 4.462, 4.463, 5.43, 6.11, 6.124) and *are not pictures of reality* (TLP 4.462, 6.1, 6.11, 6.111) (Glock 1996, p. 355; Link 2009, p. 45).

The necessary condition for expressing the propositions of logic as tautologies is the existence of *elementary propositions* (*Elementarsätze*). Elementary propositions are the simplest propositions that do not consist of any other propositions and have only one determinant of their truth – reality (TLP 4.01, 4.05, 4.06, 4.21, 4.25) (Glock 1996, pp. 102-103). Furthermore, elementary propositions are logically independent of each other, i.e. neither truth nor falsehood of another elementary proposition can be inferred from a truth or falsehood of one elementary proposition (TLP 4.211, 5.134) (Baker 1988, p. 95; Cheung 2004, pp. 97-98; Fogelin 2006, p. 35).

Wittgenstein also adds that elementary propositions assert the existence of a contingent *state of affairs* (*Sachverhalt*) (TLP 4.21); that if it exists as a *positive fact* (*positive Tatsache*), it is a reference of the true elementary proposition (TLP 2.06, 4.25). For every state of affairs is contingent, the truth of every elementary proposition is contingent, too. One can say that every elementary proposition and every proposition consisting of elementary propositions, which is not the substitution of tautology or contradiction, is *bipolar* – possibly true and possibly false (Baker 1988, pp. 39, 54, 93; Cheung 2004, p. 97; Glock 1996, pp. 63-64; Wright 1982, p. 193).

Thanks to the existence of elementary propositions it is possible to present in the truth-tables the *truth-possibilities* (*Wahrheitsmöglichkeiten*) (TLP 4.4, 4.41) of elementary propositions, and finally, the conditions of truth

and falsehood of all propositions, including propositions consisting of elementary propositions (TLP 4.41, 4.431). Wittgenstein establishes that the elementary proposition is a *truth-function* (*Wahrheitsfunktion*) of itself and every proposition consisting of elementary propositions is a truth-function of elementary propositions (TLP 5).

Now Wittgenstein can present all propositions of logic as tautologies, i.e. formulas in the classical propositional calculus distinguished by an effective method that expresses the necessary truth of the substitutions of the propositions of logic and the necessary falsehood of the substitutions of the denied propositions of logic. As Wittgenstein writes: tautologies are true and contradictions are false for all the truth-possibilities of the elementary propositions (TLP 4.46).

It is worth emphasizing that elementary propositions are logically independent of each other if, and only if, elementary propositions are bipolar. Although it may seem that substitutions of propositional variables are also non-bipolar propositions, from the logical point of view, every substitution of propositional variables are only bipolar propositions. For example, one can say that in formula  $\Phi \rightarrow \Phi$  variable  $\Phi$  can represent all formulas, including tautologies and contradictions. Notwithstanding variable  $\Phi$  is meta-linguistic and does not belong to the formal language of the classical propositional calculus. One can also add that the idea of the truth-table in the classical propositional calculus presumes that the truth-table can be applied to all their substitutions.

Now it is clear why Wittgenstein states that *The only necessity that exists is logical necessity* (TLP 6.37, 6.375). Only substitutions of tautologies are necessarily true and only substitutions of contradictions are necessarily false (TLP 5.525). Others propositions are contingently true, i.e. possibly true and possibly false.

To sum up this section, an effective method for solving which classical propositional formulas are the propositions of logic must guarantee the existence of its basis. This basis can only consist of elementary propositions. Thus, the logical notation must contain propositional variables that represent only bipolar elementary propositions. As Wittgenstein writes, there must be elementary propositions *on purely logical grounds* (TLP 5.5562).

### 3. Contingent applicaton of logic

According to Wittgenstein, logical notation must express only what is *not arbitrary* (TLP 3.342, 6.124). Since logical notation gives a definitive way to show which formulas are its propositions, it expresses only what is not contingent. Even a determination of the scope of arbitrary issues is itself arbitrary, and thus, cannot be expressed by logical notation.

Wittgenstein distinguishes between logic and its *application* (*Anwendung der Logik*); he asserts that logic cannot anticipate its application (TLP 5.557). Application of logic seems to be a matter of arbitrary and contingent decisions. If logic anticipates its application, the application would belong to logic, and thereby, would not be the application of logic, but logic itself or logic would not be logic, but only a matter of contingent elements. Contingency must be excluded from logic. Therefore, logical notation cannot express anything that belongs to application of logic.

How can one grasp the relation between necessary logic and the contingent application of logic? The best way is to get this picture: logic is like a stencil which is put on the surface of the natural language. Through this stencil one can see the natural expressions as elementary propositions or the propositions consisting of elementary propositions.

One can deal with the great importance of the distinction between logic and its application in virtue of Wittgenstein's investigations on the redundancy of the identity sign '=' in logical notation. Wittgenstein writes: *It is impossible to assert the identity of meaning of two expressions* (TLP 6.2322).

Wittgenstein explains that to say of two things that they are identical is nonsense, on the other hand – to say of one thing that it is identical with itself is to say nothing at all (TLP 5.5303). Thus identity of object I express by identity of sign, and not by using a sign for identity. Difference of objects I express by difference of signs (TLP 5.53). Wittgenstein concludes: The identity-sign, therefore, is not an essential constituent of conceptual notation (TLP 5.533; NB 29.11.1914).

The identity of the meaning – or better say, the identity of reference of the names and identity of a possible reference of the propositions – is the identity of the symbols: names or propositions. All expressions of the identity are trivial and redundant. Thus, in the logical notation the same symbols should be represented by the same signs (Fogelin 2006, pp. 73-74).

A notation with different symbols having the same reference (or the same possible reference) must be supplemented by an arbitrary interpretation in which every reference of any symbol should be established by the identity sign. However, a such notation would not be the logical one – the ultimate mean expressing the logical necessity.

Since the symbols having the same reference (or the same possible reference) are the same symbols, they are also represented in logical notation by the same signs. When different symbols have a different reference, the arbitrary interpretation of the symbols' reference is redundant, and thereby, the identity sign expressing such interpretation is also redundant.

In logical notation the only thing that is expressed by signs is the identity of a representation of the identical signs. The same signs represent the same symbols (names or propositions) and the same symbols have the same reference. Signs, as it was pointed out, do not depict reality, but they can be used as depictions, i.e. propositional symbols.

Wittgenstein's investigations on the material shape of logical notation lead to the following conclusions: logical notation is only a tool for logical analysis, and thus, it is only the system of signs which cannot depict reality, but which can be used to analyze propositions depicting reality. For example, propositional variables are not elementary propositions, but they are only signs which represent elementary propositions.

Now it is also clear that for Wittgenstein, logical notation is not a perfect language. One can even say: for the author of *Tractatus* logical notation is not a language at all.



It is only a scheme that can be used to show which expressions are elementary propositions and which are propositions consisting of elementary propositions.

To sum up this section, the perspective from the viewpoint of necessary logic and the perspective from the viewpoint of the contingent application of logic in natural language are not mutually exclusive. They complete each other and create a picture of any language on which there is a place for both what is logically, non-arbitrary and for what is contingent, arbitrary. Finally, one shouldn't reject Wittgenstein's early philosophy as the doctrine of the artificial or perfect language. Wittgenstein presents not a language, but merely a stencil which one can use without any restraint in analyzing any representation of reality.

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# The Face of the Work of Art: Wittgenstein on Expression

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Wittgenstein was clearly fascinated by the human face. But he appears to have been interested in faces not only for their own sake, but also for what we might call the face's meta-philosophical significance. In other words, Wittgenstein seems to have intuited that the way we see the human face is conceptually related to how we perceive other kinds of meaningful phenomena, which he sometimes tellingly spoke of as possessing faces or physiognomies of their own. As he suggested in the *Philosophical Investigations*, for example, a familiar word can strike us as possessing a "face," as if the word had become a "likeness" of its meaning (Wittgenstein 1953, 186). Wittgenstein recognized faces in a wide variety of other cultural phenomena, too, including the compositions of Bruckner, Haydn, and Schubert.

Though it might seem idiosyncratic of Wittgenstein to posit a conceptual connection between faces and artworks, he was, in fact, not alone among important modern thinkers in proposing that particular analogy. Others who have proposed similar analogies include Theodor Adorno, Walter Benjamin, Paul de Man, Allen Grossman, Michael Fried, and Susan Stewart. What underlies this surprisingly common analogy, I believe, is a shared intuition that our understanding of the expressiveness of artworks is conceptually related to our understanding of the expressiveness of the human face and body. If we therefore want to hold on to the thought that aesthetic expression is *real*, everything will depend on how we understand the expressiveness of the living human figure. On the other hand, if we're convinced that art is not literally expressive (for whatever reasons), then it's very likely that that belief will, in turn, be reflected in the way we regard the body itself.

Take the poststructuralist theorist, Paul de Man, for example, who like Wittgenstein, considered the face a crucial concept for aesthetics. Unlike Wittgenstein, however, de Man was skeptical of the reality of both aesthetic and bodily expression, including the expressivity of the face itself, which he famously claimed was but the illusory "effect" of language (in particular, the face-conferring trope of "prosopopoeia"). That de Man would take a position on the significance of the face so radically different from Wittgenstein's tells us something important: that the meaning of the face for modern aesthetics is as problematic and contestable as it is apparently philosophically crucial.

This is surely so because of course it will be hard to know what the significance of the face should be for the philosophy of art, when so many of us late-modern individuals feel so uncertain about the meaningfulness of the human face itself. Deep uncertainty, even outright skepticism: aren't these the intellectual moods that for a long time now have characterized our (and our culture's) thoughts about faces, and what they may or may not reveal about ourselves and other persons? And this prevailing skeptical mood, of course, raises challenging questions for my attempt to argue that Wittgenstein's remarks about faces have something to teach us about aesthetic experience. For what are we to make of Wittgenstein's suggestion that cultural phenomena (like words or melodies) have meaningful faces, when there seems to be such widespread doubt about whether faces themselves are actually meaningful in the first place?

For Wittgenstein, meaning is to a word as mind is to a face; but he can see a word as having a meaningful face, only because he already regards the face itself as expressive of mind. Consider, for example, this typical remark:

"We see emotion."—We do not see facial contortions and make inferences from them ... to joy, grief, boredom. We describe a face immediately as sad, radiant, bored, even when we are unable to give any other description of the features. (Wittgenstein 1967, §225)

If Wittgenstein is wrong about faces, that will surely compromise his physiognomic approach to aesthetic expression. And, indeed, I would not be surprised if many today find it hard to accept what Wittgenstein seems so clearly to be affirming: the immediate perception of mental states.

From poststructuralist theory to evolutionary psychology to cognitive science, a key underlying assumption that unifies so much contemporary thinking about the face (and indeed about the body as a whole) is that its surface is without intrinsic expressive meaning. As the developmental psychologists Annette Karmiloff-Smith and James Russell succinctly put the point: there is "nothing specifically *mental* about human faces" (Karmiloff-Smith and Russell 1994, 253). What they mean is that the face can, by altering its spatial configuration, indicate or refer to psychological content, but the surface (the *flesh*) of the face as such is assumed to be without any intrinsic mental meaning of its own.

The historical roots of this characteristically modern attitude towards the face's appearance go back at least to Descartes, who re-interpreted human beings as composite entities: minds, on the one hand, and bodies, on the other. After Descartes, the very idea of "expression" suffers a profound inner division: there is now, on the one hand, that which is expressed (the feeling or emotion), while on the other, there is the overt bodily expression (a gesture or an utterance). And so, it becomes, for many, self-evident that interpretation or inference are necessary in order to understand the so-called "expressions" of human beings. For as the cognitive psychologist Alan Leslie puts it: "Because the mental states of others ... are *completely hidden from the senses*, they can only ever be *inferred*" (Leslie 2004, 164).

As we know, Wittgenstein's later writings give us good reasons to question—even to refuse—this Cartesian picture of the body. Indeed, unlike the better-known French critiques of the Cartesian subject, which provisionally accept, and only then deconstruct, Descartes' binary of mind and body, Wittgenstein simply reminds us that we need not ever accept, in the first place, Descartes' distorting picture of who and what we are. For we are not composite entities: we are simply human beings. In numerous remarks, Wittgenstein gently reminds us that we do not see overt behaviors, interpret them, and then conclude that they are the behaviors of a human being, whom we can infer to be in this or that mental state. On the contrary, as soon as we recognize the living presence of a human being, we immediately see (and respond to) that person's body as expressive of psychological life. And so, Wittgenstein can articulate his simple alternative to the Cartesian

picture in one justly famous sentence: "The human body is the best picture of the human soul" (Wittgenstein 1953, 152). It follows then that the surface of the body need not be regarded as inexpressive, as believed by so many different modern schools of thought. On the contrary, there's no problem at all with the ordinary belief that we can see mental states *themselves* in the very movements of the human face or body. As Wittgenstein said of the face: "'We see emotion.'—We do not see facial contortions and make inferences from them."

But what might all this have to do with the so-called faces or physiognomies of artworks? What Wittgenstein realized is that just as the surface of the human face is intrinsically expressive of psychological states, so too can be the "merely" material surfaces of cultural artifacts: such as words, melodies, and pictures. Of course, Wittgenstein appreciated how tempting it is to think otherwise: and thus to see an expressive quality, say of a picture, and the pictorial surface itself as conceptually distinct, thereby reproducing the Cartesian problem of other minds as a problem about the perception of aesthetic expression.

Touching on this temptation in *The Brown Book*, Wittgenstein reproduces a very simple line drawing of a face, and he asks us to notice how it can strike us as possessing a distinct, particular expression. What interests him is that we are often tempted to draw a further, mistaken conclusion about the relationship between the image and the expression we see in it:

... one feels that what one calls the expression of the face is something that can be detached from the drawing of the face .... (We are, as it were, under an optical delusion which ... makes us think that there are two objects where there is only one. The delusion is assisted by our using the verb "to have"; what [something] *has* [we think] can be separated from it.)  
(Wittgenstein 1958, 162)

And so, when we say that a picture, a face, or anything else, for that matter, "has" a particular expressive quality, we are tempted to conclude that there exists a "relationship" between two conceptually distinct items. But Wittgenstein's important point is that the concept of expression doesn't name a *relation* of any kind: "expression" doesn't connect mind to body, quality to thing, or anything to anything else. What is expressed is present in, and as, the expression itself.

And so, to take a different example, when we hear an emotion expressed by a piece of music, that emotion is present nowhere but in the music itself, and so we really *hear* what is in *fact* really *there*. Wittgenstein knew very well how problematic this idea might seem, as is clear from the following remark:

Think of the expression "I heard a plaintive melody". And now the question is: "Does he *hear* the plaint?"...  
Some would like to reply here: "Of course I hear it!"—  
Others: "I don't really *hear* it." (Wittgenstein 1953, 178)

We are, by now, familiar with what's at stake in this back-and-forth. Notice, though, that Wittgenstein doesn't definitively settle the matter. He simply gives voice to two possible answers and then seems to ask: which voice is yours?

Intriguingly, this remark about musical perception is followed by a discussion of the possibility that one might be blind to the expressiveness of a human face. The remark about face-blindness reads like this:

We react to the visual impression [of a timid face] differently from someone who does not recognize it as timid (in the *full* sense of the word) ...  
One might say of someone that he was blind to the *expression* of a face. Would his eyesight on that account be defective?  
This is, of course, not simply a question for physiology. (ibid., 179)

Wittgenstein makes clear that the ability to recognize facial expressions is not entirely biological in nature, but a kind of skill that therefore requires enculturation (the mastery of concepts like "timidity"). Whether or not one is *fully* familiar with the concept for a given state of mind will be *shown* by how one responds to its appearance in others. Someone who is blind to a person's timid expression might treat him with cold indifference, rather than with the concern he might deserve and need.

The far-reaching implications of Wittgenstein's idea that one might be conceptually (rather than physiologically) blind to the psychological expressions of another person have been most powerfully explored by Stanley Cavell, especially in his discussion of soul-blindness in Part IV of *The Claim of Reason* (Cavell 1979). As Cavell makes clear there, the possibility of refusing to acknowledge (or of being blind to) the soul (or humanity) of another person is, in fact, a standing human possibility, even temptation.

It's telling, I think, that Wittgenstein's remark about face-blindness would come right after his discussion of musical perception. It does so, I suggest, because Wittgenstein regards blindness to a face's expressions as conceptually related to the blindness we might display towards the expressiveness of aesthetic phenomena. It follows as well, though, that such blindness to aesthetic expression is as much in the realm of possibility (and practice) as our being soul-blind with respect to one another. Nothing can stop us from seeing artworks as void of expressive life; just as nothing can stop us from seeing the human face or body as lacking intrinsic psychological expressivity. Indeed, "expression-blindness," to give this condition a name, appears to be an especially powerful temptation in our late modern culture, in both the humanities and the natural sciences.

But just like skepticism about other minds, as Cavell has argued, neither of the two forms of expression-blindness can be philosophically refuted. Cavell's profound insight about skepticism was to see that far from being a mere error in need of correction, the skeptic's position actually expresses an important philosophical truth: that there exists no ground for the meaningfulness of our lives together (such as a conceptual framework of rules), only our fragile attunements with one another, which we ourselves must maintain by caring for our shared sense-making practices. There is thus nothing to stop any of us from refusing to acknowledge those attunements, fragile as they are, which is of course the skeptic's tragic choice. And just so, there is nothing to stop any of us from

withdrawing our mutual acknowledgments (fragile as *they* are) of the expressive meaningfulness of our very bodies, or of the artworks we make, enjoy, and study. The expressiveness of art will indeed be but a projective fiction or illusion in so far as we choose to see artworks in that way.

That choice, however, need not be one we ourselves feel compelled to make, as if it were philosophically truer, and somehow less naïve, to see the expressive qualities of artworks as not *really* there, but rather as the result of some sort of interpretation, inference, or projection. That, I think, is what Wittgenstein was suggesting, when he endowed aesthetic phenomena with faces. Such physiognomic remarks remind us that the very materiality of our artworks, no less than the living flesh of our bodies, has the intrinsic power to express mind and meaning. What's therefore at stake in disputes about aesthetic expression is not only how best to understand art, but also how best to see our very selves.

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# Russell vs. Wittgenstein: In Defense of Russell (A Reply to Some Old Thesis of Peter Hacker's Interpretation of Wittgenstein's *Tractatus*)

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Peter Hacker is currently one of the most influential and brilliant specialists of Wittgenstein's philosophy. His thesis on the connection between Russell and Wittgenstein, both prior to *Tractatus* and therein, were presented mainly in *Wittgenstein's Place in Twentieth-Century Analytic Philosophy*, published in 1996, that is, 14 years ago. In subsequent books, Hacker resumes these thesis and continues to use them in his readings of Wittgenstein after the *Tractatus*. To my knowledge they have not been subjected to any more or less systematic criticism from reviewers particularly interested in Russell's philosophy, as would be perfectly natural, since (as I will suggest) they are debatable or even controversial for those who have interpreted this philosopher under different, and probably more coherent, presuppositions. Hacker's theses are illustrations of what I have polemically called in my doctoral dissertation and in some papers in English (Ribeiro 1999, 2001, 2005) a 'Wittgensteinian reading of Russell's philosophy'. For all of the above reasons, I will focus essentially on Hacker's book previously mentioned. Naturally, my intention, as his in *Wittgenstein: Connections and Controversies*, is to provide input for a better understanding of the matters at issue.

Peter Hacker's central thesis is that the *Tractatus* provides the first systematic research on the nature of logic from a viewpoint which, albeit largely metaphysical, envisages eliminating any impure associations with psychology and epistemology, or, as he says, "liberating the philosophy of logic from its antecedents failure to differentiate adequately the truths of logic from empirical, psychological or putative Platonist generalisations" (Hacker 1996: 34), as the ones of Frege and Russell. The novelty and originality of *Tractatus* consists, in fact, in such logical reduction of its subject-matter, against the mentioned associations made by those thinkers, in spite of the antipsychologistic premises of their respective philosophies. In the case of Russell and before that book, there were, of course, serious inconsistencies in his philosophy, which lead to Wittgenstein's criticisms and are carefully studied by Hacker; but the main difference between the two philosophers, according to him, was not merely a technical one. What we have with *Tractatus* is a new conception of logic based on the rejection of the confusion between logic, on the one hand, and psychology and epistemology, on the other hand, "even though distortions remained" (*ibid.*) This was already the direction in which Wittgenstein's review of Russell's theories in the manuscript *Theory of Knowledge* pointed (see *ibid.*: 26). Hacker, like some other critics before him (see Hylton 1990), suggests that Russell should have lead his thought according to the methodologically pure path of Wittgenstein's views on logic, and that he did not know how to do it without renouncing to its own approach, which was the cause of the inextricable troubles underlying his theories. Furthermore, he believes that the evolution of Russell's philosophy after *Tractatus* had no relevance at all to the genesis of contemporary analytical philosophy. In short, Hacker's interpretation is founded on three fundamental assumptions regarding the connection between

Russell and Wittgenstein: *i*) the philosophy of the former—before *Tractatus*—has wrongly confused the subject-matter of logic with those of psychology and epistemology; *ii*) the philosophy of the latter proved, particularly in that book, that such confusion was illegitimate by putting logic in its right place and unveiling its true meaning; *iii*) by and large Russell accepted this fact, although he did not fully understand it, nor managed to draw the appropriate consequences from it.

The first assumption needs to be elaborated for a better understanding. An important illustration of it are Russell's views on the relation between logic and ordinary language. Max Black had previously argued that it is precisely the confusion between logic and epistemology that in the end explains the need for a logically perfect language when this is contrasted to a ordinary one (see Black 1989), and for what is known as the "myth of the paraphrase" or of "the ideal translation". According to Hacker, both Frege and Russell subscribe to the same fundamental view on the matter: "They held natural languages to be logically defective, both in containing vague terms and in failing adequately to represent the subject-matter of the truths of logic. Hence, for logical, proof-theoretic and metaphysical purposes, they should be replaced by a logically perfect language: namely the language of *Begriffsschrift* or *Principia*. This would make sense only if... the role of the propositions of logic is indeed to represent a certain subject-matter with maximal accuracy... Contrary to Frege and Russell, Wittgenstein argued that 'all propositions of everyday language, just as they stand, are in perfect logical order' (TLP, 5.5563). By this, he later explained, he meant that 'the propositions of our ordinary language are not in any way *less correct* or *less exact* or *more confused* than propositions written down, say, in Russell's symbolism or any other '*Begriffsschrift*'" (Hacker 1996: 26).

Russell's concept of ordinary language can be summarised in three main ideas, according to Hacker's interpretation, which, as previously mentioned, matches that of Black and other authors:  $\alpha$ ) ordinary language is not in perfect logical order, i.e., it is essentially vague and defective, and it is for that reason that philosophical analysis requires a logically perfect language;  $\beta$ ) such is precisely the artificial language of *Principia*;  $\gamma$ ) Russell believes in  $\alpha$ ) because he wrongly confuses the subject-matter of logic with the ones of psychology and epistemology.

I now intend to briefly dispute the reading of Russell and Wittgenstein which can be drawn from the thesis described above. As for Russell: In spite of Hacker's careful historical analysis, he does not takes into consideration some special developments of Russell's philosophy after "The Philosophy of Logical Atomism", which lead to findings on the connection between logic and ordinary language significantly different from the ones already presented. I will return to this point later on. On the other hand, Hacker's reading is based on the metahistorical assumption that the development of Russell's philosophy,

after *Principia*, should have been subordinated to Wittgenstein's conception of logic, in view of its greater consistency. Why should the foundations of logic not be grounded on psychology and epistemology, contrary to what Russell suggests in the introduction of *Tractatus* (cf. Wittgenstein 1933: 7-8)? Evidently, only by developing a philosophical project of the kind could Russell have found the answer to the question; and this was just what he endeavoured until the book *An Inquiry into Meaning and Truth*. The argument that, after *Tractatus*, the most interesting developments of logic were achieved entirely independently of Russell's views and pursuant to those of Wittgenstein, is disputable and, on several accounts, controversial. Nonetheless, it is unacceptable in the protohistorical version that Hacker lends to it in *Wittgenstein's Place in Twentieth-Century Analytic Philosophy*: that Wittgenstein, already at the time of *Tractatus*, was to some extent aware of the impact and historical scope of his own theories.

However, this is not very important for me here. I would like to reply to Hacker's theory according to which both Russell's philosophy and that of Wittgenstein at the time of *Tractatus* were essentially atomist, the difference between the two atomisms being that, unlike the former, the latter would be pure and free of epistemological assumptions (cf. Hacker 1996: 29-30). In my view, this is a disputable interpretation, which once again comes closer to the interpretations of some English authors of the 1960s who believed in an alleged "tradition of British empiricism" (see Pears 1956). Regarding atomism and Wittgenstein in particular, the opposite is true: as was held by D. McCarthy (McCarthy 1991), the conception of logic in general, in *Tractatus*, is clearly holistic, in the sense that it is based on the grounds that logic is not only one of many ways of representing the World, but is, rather, the essential condition for *all* possible representation or for *all* the systems of representation (ordinary language, geometry, mechanics, music, etc.); and, so understood, logic is the mirror of the World as a *whole*, the limits of it being equivalent to the limits of the World and of all language with meaning (*TLP*, 5-61). It is from this holistic perspective that Wittgenstein's distinction between showing and saying, and his theory of solipsism, in *Tractatus*, must be interpreted. Focusing on the first: we cannot exceed the limits of language in order to "represent" what it has in common with facts, that is, the *whole* in which representation properly called consists of, since such "representation" would violate the limits of factual language itself (*TLP*, 4-12, 4-121). Now, if we try to reread again Wittgenstein's book according to a holistic view like this, the conclusions to draw will be quite different from those of Hacker's atomist reading. In special: Wittgenstein's (somewhat radical) holism lies at the root of his well known analogy between *Tractatus* and a ladder, which lead the philosopher directly to the thesis that his propositions in that book are senseless (*TLP*, 6-54).

As for Russell, I have already suggested that Hacker does not always interpret his philosophy in a contextual manner, and that sometimes he reads it following views which were only later presented in the history of the analytical movement. However, criticising that kind of methodology is not my priority. My main objection is: some of Russell's works and papers produced immediately after "The Philosophy of Logical Atomism" and the impact on him of Dewey's pragmatism, pointed to what we can call a "partial semantic holism", according to which (in short) what is represented in ordinary language is always mediated or interpreted by it, but nonetheless exists *per se* and independently of the representation itself. This type of holism was already mentioned in Russell's paper "On Propositions" (Russell 1986a), but it is suggested quite

clearly in the preparatory manuscripts of *The Analysis of Mind* (Russell 1988), even before the English edition of *Tractatus*, and had as its main consequence the withdrawal of the acquaintance theory. In fact, it was just this partial holism that leads Russell to a new concept of vagueness (Russell 1988a) and to a view similar to that of Wittgenstein, according to which ordinary language is in order and does not require any correction through a logically perfect language (see Russell 1978: Lecture X). And it is from its perspective, against to a radical version of holism that leads directly to the end of the philosophy, as happens apparently with *Tractatus*, that we should reread today Russell's introduction to that book (Ribeiro 2005). Generally speaking, after the 1920s holism and its problems are the leitmotif of the development of Russell's philosophy.

Concluding and in light of the observations above, I would like to comment briefly Hacker's thesis on the concept of logically perfect language. First, the concept only appears to us in 1918, namely in "The Philosophy of Logical Atomism" (Russell 1986: 176). Hacker, like Black before him, ambiguously suggests to its readers that the concept had already been unveiled in *Principia* (Hacker 1996: 20); but for reasons I cannot develop here, this is not true. Furthermore, one cannot forget that when the concept emerges in the development of Russell's philosophy its purpose was not to correct ordinary language and to restore a precision or accuracy somehow alienated. As I have mentioned before, for Russell too ordinary language is in (perfect logical) order. It is very clear in some passages of "The Philosophy of Logical Atomism" that a logically perfect language would not be entirely artificial or symbolic, as the language of *Principia* is. In order to be logically perfect, as Russell says in that paper, such language should include vocabulary, in particular, names relating to each individual's private experience (1986: 176). In 1923, Russell further adds that a logically perfect language should include "words, perceptions, thoughts, or something of the kind" (Russell 1988a: 152); since this is impossible, it is a purely ideal language (*ibid.*). It is clear, from this point of view, that Russell's types are not only logical or mathematical entities, and that they must include or embrace all human experience. In so far as the logically perfect language should establish a connection, in a way not explained by Russell, between his theory of types and the theories of acquaintance, descriptions and logical constructions (as Black pertinently saw), we can see that Hacker's simplistic view of it cannot be accepted. What would be then the purpose of such language? Essentially, as I have argued in previous papers (see Ribeiro 2001), to enable an ontological analysis which was challenged by holism and its dangerous consequences for the status of philosophy. In my view, this is what Russell himself explicitly holds years later, in *An Inquiry into Meaning and Truth*. Nonetheless, having arrived at this crucial idea, we are already very far from a Wittgensteinian reading of Russell's philosophy, like the one presented by Peter Hacker.

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# Methodologische Aspekte des Bildgebrauchs bei Wittgenstein

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Unter der Voraussetzung, dass das Bild bei Wittgenstein funktional definiert ist, widmet sich dieser Beitrag der Frage, inwiefern der von Wittgenstein thematisierte und stellenweise auch vorgezeigte Gebrauch von Bildern operationalisiert, d.h. als Abfolge von Handlungsschritten beschrieben werden kann. Es soll gezeigt werden, warum sich der Bildgebrauch einer Etablierung als Methode weitestgehend entzieht und welche Konsequenzen dies für ein Verständnis vom Bild als Erkenntniswerkzeug hat.

## 1. Ausgangspunkte

Entgegen den viel diskutierten konzeptuellen Disparitäten im Werk Wittgensteins steht der Ausdruck ‚Bild‘ mit großer Zuverlässigkeit für (abstrakte oder gegenständliche) Artefakte, deren Eigentümlichkeit es ist, Weltsegmente zu sein, die anderen Weltsegmenten im Ganzen oder zu Teilen als Stellvertreter zugeordnet sind bzw. unter bestimmten Bedingungen zugeordnet werden können. Das Bild ist demnach wesentlich durch seinen Gebrauch als Modell bestimmt, welcher es je nach Kontext genauer profiliert. Es gilt: „If a fact is to be a picture we must use it to picturing something“ (Lindskog 2007, 34).

Wenn das Bild dementsprechend durch seinen Gebrauch definiert ist und man annehmen kann, dass sich der erfolgreiche Bildgebrauch in erprobtem Rezeptwissen niederschlägt, dann liegt die Frage nahe, ob der Einsatz von Bildern bei Wittgenstein einer (bewährten) Methode folgt bzw. inwieweit Bilder überhaupt einer regelorientierten Nutzung zugänglich sind. Auf Grundlage der Wittgensteinschen Textvorlagen ist dies gar nicht leicht zu beantworten, da keine methodischen Vorgaben gemacht werden, deren Umsetzung beispielhaft problematisiert werden könnte. Allerdings werden Bedingungen genannt, unter denen von einem falschen Bildgebrauch gesprochen werden kann. Im Folgenden soll gezeigt werden, warum sich der Bildgebrauch dennoch einer (nachträglichen) Operationalisierung weitestgehend entzieht.

## 2. Regeln des Sprachgebrauchs

Bevor eine sinnvolle Besprechung des Bildgebrauchs stattfinden kann, sind zunächst die Richtlinien des Sprachgebrauchs zu klären, um dasjenige identifizieren zu können, was als Bild angesprochen wird. Da Wittgenstein keine expliziten Einführungen in das eigene terminologische Instrumentarium voranstellt, bietet es sich an, die charakteristischen Attribute des Bildes aus den Verwendungskontexten des Ausdrucks zu abstrahieren.

Der Grund, weshalb Wittgenstein auf entsprechende Einführungen verzichtet, ist seinerseits ein methodologischer, er liegt sowohl in der Natur der Begriffe als auch in den Möglichkeiten des Definierens als spezieller „Technik des Wortgebrauchs“ (VPP, 200). Genauer lassen sich also zwei Gründe finden, welche die Verwahrung Wittgensteins gegen das Voranstellen von Definitionen erklären können:

Zunächst erhält ein Ausdruck immer nur in konkreten Gebrauchskontexten eine Bedeutung. Ihn zu definieren heißt, Beschreibungen seiner Kontexte als Modelle seines Gebrauchs in Geltung zu setzen (VPP, 207). Da

der dynamische Sprachgebrauch aber nicht dieselbe Beständigkeit hat wie die ihn beschreibenden Modelle, kann er immer wieder ihre Revision erforderlich machen. Insofern die Impulse für Definitionen dementsprechend von der Sprachpraxis ausgehen, scheint ihre vorschnelle Restriktion für Wittgenstein nicht in Frage zu kommen. Definitionen, so könnte man die Argumentation fortschreiben, sind das Ziel philosophisch motivierter Beschreibungen des Sprachgebrauchs, haben aber selbst keine präskriptive Funktion für den Gang der Überlegungen.

Ein zweites Argument gegen die explizite Grundlegung einer Terminologie ist darin gegeben, dass sich das Definieren nicht in der bloßen Aneinanderreihung alternativer sprachlicher Ausdrücke erschöpft (VPP, 201). So kann die Vereindeutigung einer Wortbedeutung z.B. auch durch Gesten geleistet werden. Dass es trotz der engen Anbindung der Bedeutung an den unmittelbaren Kontext ihrer Generierung dennoch möglich ist, sich vermittels und auch über begriffliche Modelle (Bilder des Sprachgebrauchs) zu verständigen, setzt voraus, dass es einen gemeinsamen Grundstock an Sprachregeln bzw. Ausdrucksmöglichkeiten gibt (VPP, 211).

Bleibt für den Zweck der hiesigen Begriffsklärung zu fragen, ob ausgerechnet im Falle des Bildes nach einer Definition gesucht werden kann. Immerhin könnte „Definierbarkeit“ selbst ein Konzept sein, dessen Gebrauch gewissen Beschränkungen unterliegt. Diesem Einwand kann mit Wittgenstein jedoch entgegengehalten werden, dass jeder Begriff einer Definition und damit auch der Analyse seines Gebrauchs zugänglich ist: „Die Behauptung, das Denken sei undefinierbar, geht nicht an. Warum? Weil kein Begriff undefinierbar ist. Wir müssen uns fragen: In welchem Zusammenhang steht er? Es kann sein, daß er in einem System definierbar ist, in einem anderen dagegen nicht. Womöglich kennen wir eine Definition, die uns aber keineswegs nützlich ist“ (VPP, 200).

Speziell im Falle des Bildes lässt sich nun allerdings kaum von einer Bandbreite an beschreibbaren Gebrauchssystemen sprechen, in die der Ausdruck verschiedentlich integriert wäre. Zumindest ist keine terminologische Konkurrenz in Sicht, vielmehr lassen die verschiedenen Verwendungen des Bildausdrucks eine Familienähnlichkeit unter den Bildern vermuten. So wird das Bild bereits im *Tractatus* durch seine Funktion eingeführt, die auf weitere substantielle und akzidentielle Attribute des Bildes schließen lässt: Demnach handelt es sich bei dem Bild um ein Artefakt, das dem Modellieren von Weltsegmenten dient und selbst ein solches Segment ist („Wir machen uns Bilder der Tatsachen“ [TLP, 2.1]); „Das Bild ist ein Modell der Wirklichkeit.“ [TLP, 2.21]). Nachdem damit der Modellcharakter (Stellvertretung von Sachlagen, die mit dem Stellvertretenden nicht identisch sind) des Bildes an den Anfang seiner (indirekten) Charakterisierung gestellt ist, wird als nächstes die Zusammengesetztheit des Bildes aus einzelnen bedeutungstragenden Elementen genannt („Den Gegenständen entsprechen im Bilde die Elemente des Bildes“ [TLP, 2.13]). Aus der Zusammengesetztheit ergibt sich wiederum die mehrfache Referentialität des Bildes, insofern sich seine Elemente jeweils aufeinander sowie als Aggregat zu einer bestehenden Sachlage beziehen können. Die Art der Bezugnahme wird für den Fall der mögli-



chen Strukturidentität als „Abbildung“ spezifiziert (TLP, 2.15 ff.). Während sich aus der Möglichkeit der Strukturidentität die Strukturiertheit des Bildes als substantielles Merkmal ableiten lässt, handelt es sich etwa bei der Räumlichkeit nur um ein akzidentielles Merkmal, auch wenn das Hantieren mit Bildern im „logischen Raum“ die räumliche Ausgedehtheit des Bildes zu implizieren scheint („Jedes Bild ist auch ein logisches. [Dagegen ist z.B. nicht jedes Bild ein räumliches“ [TLP, 2.182]). Der vermeintliche Widerspruch kann aufgelöst werden, sofern der „logische Raum“ für einen definierten Bereich von Entitäten und ihren Bezugsmöglichkeiten steht. Kommen dem Bild die Attribute des so verstandenen Raums zu, handelt es sich bei ihm ebenfalls um eine abstrakte Entität.

Das Bildmerkmal, dem in der Literatur von den oben aufgeführten am meisten Beachtung geschenkt wird, ist bezeichnenderweise die Modellfunktion (Genova 1995; Ricketts 1996). Die übrigen Merkmale des Bildes (die Artifizialität, Zusammengesetztheit, Referentialität, Wahrheitsfähigkeit, logische Strukturiertheit und Abstraktheit) lassen sich aus dieser Funktion ableiten. Weil das Bild entgegen unseren Alltagssprachlichen Gewohnheiten damit nicht gegenständlich, sondern eben rein funktional definiert ist, lassen sich in der Literatur verschiedene Analogisierungsversuche finden, die eben diese Eigentümlichkeit des Wittgensteinschen Bildbegriffs hervorheben wollen. Schwierigkeiten ergeben sich dabei, wenn ganze Systeme aufeinander übertragen werden, so etwa wenn der Bildbegriff mit den Kantischen *Schemata* analogisiert wird: „Instead of schemata, Wittgenstein speaks of pictures. Pictures are Wittgenstein's version of non-empirical intuitions“ (Genova 1995, 97). Diese Übertragung ließe sich rechtfertigen, käme dem Bild ein transzendentaler Status sowie die Form einer Regel zu, es müsste das Verfertigen von konkreten Bildern (für die dann eine Bezeichnung fehlen würde) allererst ermöglichen; eine wenigstens für den *Tractatus* schlechthin unzutreffende Lesart.

An diesem Beispiel lässt sich aber dennoch ein Punkt machen: Begriffe werden zwar durch ihren Gebrauch definiert, die verschiedenen Gebräuche stehen jedoch in einem nicht-bildlichen Verhältnis zueinander. Dies ist wohl auch gemeint, wenn Wittgenstein darauf hinweist, dass sich Begriffe nur im Rahmen von Systemen definieren (d.h. ihrem dortigen Gebrauch gemäß beschreiben) lassen (VPP, 200), dass sie also in systematischen Zusammenhängen stehen, die hinreichend identisch sein *müssen*, damit die sie mitkonstituierenden Begriffe identisch sein *können*.

Um den systematischen Zusammenhang im vorliegenden Fall weitestgehend zu bewahren, soll für die Besprechung des Bildgebrauchs daher (nur) das als Bild berücksichtigt werden, was in seinem Gebrauch als Modell einschlägig spezifiziert ist.

### 3. Regeln des Bildgebrauchs

Stellt man sich das Modellieren von Bildern als schematischen Vorgang vor, stößt man auf Ungereimtheiten der Wittgensteinschen Bildtheorie. Zunächst leistet der Tagebucheintrag vom 9.5.1915 („Der Satz ist das Bild der Tatsache“; Tageb., 9.5.15) der gängigen Interpretation Vorschub, es handele sich bei Bildern um Satzgefüge, die der Möglichkeit nach einen Sachverhalt abbilden. Unter dieser Voraussetzung besteht das Verfahren der Bilderstellung in der Bildung von Sätzen sowie in Akten der Zuordnung der Satzelemente zu den Sachen: „Dadurch, daß ich den Bestandteilen des Bildes Gegenstände zuordne, *dadurch* stellt es nun einen Sachverhalt dar und stimmt entweder

oder stimmt nicht“ (Tageb., 26.11.14). Die implizite Chronologie dieser Aussage ist bei näherer Hinsicht jedoch problematisch, scheint es doch, als ob das Bild schon vorhanden ist und dann erst stückchenweise einer Sachlage zugeordnet wird. Dies würde allerdings der These entgegenstehen, dass der Akt der Zuordnung – d.h. der Gebrauch von etwas *als* Bild – ein Satzgefüge oder einen anderen Gegenstand erst zum Bild macht.

Die hier aufscheinende Widersprüchlichkeit gründet offenbar auf einer erkenntnistheoretischen Verlegenheit, die aus dem prinzipiell modell- bzw. stellvertretervermittelten Weltzugang resultiert: „Die Gegenstände kann ich nur nennen, Zeichen vertreten sie. Ich kann nur von ihnen sprechen, sie aussprechen kann ich nicht“ (TLP, 3.221). Wir stellen uns Sachverhalte demnach immer mittels Bildern vor; der Bildgebrauch ist genauso unvermittelt wie unhintergebar. Außerdem müssen die Adressaten der Zuordnung bzw. Stellvertretung selbst wenigstens *bildhafter* Natur sein, um Abbildungsverhältnisse aufgrund von Strukturidentität ermöglichen zu können („Das Bild hat mit dem Abgebildeten die logische Form der Abbildung gemein“ [TLP, 2.2]). Wenn die Wirklichkeit aber demnach schon bildhaft gegeben ist, dann lässt sich erstens fragen, zu welchem Zweck sie einer bildlich Replikation bedarf, wenn damit offenbar lediglich die Transformation eines Modells in ein anderes vorgenommen wird. Zweitens ist fraglich, inwiefern der Vorgang der Replikation bzw. der Gebrauch der Replikatel gehen kann. Die erste Frage würde Wittgenstein als nicht in den philosophischen Zuständigkeitsbereich gehörig zurückweisen, insofern es im Interesse der Philosophie auf richtige Beschreibungen von Symbolgebräuchen ankommt und nicht auf deren Rückführung auf Ur-Motive (BIB, 39). Auf die zweite Frage geht Wittgenstein allerdings explizit ein: Kann man ein Bild falsch gebrauchen?

Während Bildern im *Tractatus* Wahrheitswerte direkt zugeschrieben werden, findet sich in den *Vorlesungen über die Philosophie der Psychologie* eine andere Reglementierung: „Wenn von einem ‚Bild‘ die Rede sein soll, kann ich sagen, daß sie den Gebrauch des Bildes falsch beschreiben. Schließlich ist das Bild ein Symbol mit einem Gebrauch. [...] Es nutzt nichts zu behaupten, [ein Bild] stehe für ein anderes Ding. Es ist ein Bild anderer Art. Besser gesagt: Das Bild wird bei einer anderen Technik verwendet“ (VPP, 25f.). Ein Bild ist demnach nicht falsch, sondern seine Funktionalisierung kann verunglücken, und dies offenbar in dreierlei Hinsicht: (1) Wenn Modell und Wirklichkeitsgegenstück einander in nicht passender Weise zugeordnet werden. (2) Wenn die Zuordnung falsch thematisiert wird (Warum-Frage) oder (3) wenn der Bildgebrauch inadäquat beschrieben wird. Fehlerindikator für (1) ist die nicht gegebene Strukturidentität, für (2) liegt der Fehler in der Suche nach Ursachen für die modellierten Sachlagen.

Am schwierigsten ist es, Fehlerkriterien für (3) zu bestimmen. Wie kann die Beschreibung eines Bildgebrauchs misslingen? Wenn Beschreibung und Bildgebrauch eine strukturelle Übereinstimmung vermissen lassen? Schwerlich lässt sich für die Beschreibung ein derartiges Kriterium vorstellen, da für eine Beschreibung offenbar kein allgemeines Schema des Gelingens angegeben werden kann. Es müsste sich dabei ja selbst um eine höherstufige Beschreibung des beschreibenden Sprachgebrauchs handeln, deren Gelingen wiederum zu hinterfragen wäre. Beschreibungen haben sich folglich (erst) im Gebrauch zu bewähren und entziehen sich insofern ihrer Operationalisierung.

Bleibt zu fragen, nach welchen Richtlinien sich Wittgenstein selbst der Bildwerkzeuge bedient, nachdem es bislang vorwiegend um theoretische Aspekte des Bildgebrauchs ging. Drei Beispiele sollen hier für eine genauere Betrachtung herangezogen werden. Mit ihnen lässt sich die Vermutung stützen, dass sich der Bildgebrauch einer Etablierung als Methode weitestgehend entzieht.

Da der Gebrauch von Symbolen im Zentrum des theoretischen Interesses Wittgensteins steht, liegt die Funktionalisierung von nicht-abstrakten, figürlichen Bildern als *Analyseobjekte* nahe. So wird bspw. die Skizze zweier Fechter (Tageb., 29.9.14) als Grundlage für die Erörterung der Frage verwendet, ob Bilder richtig oder falsch sein können:




Das Bild wird an dieser Stelle primär nicht als *Modell* von etwas Bestimmtem behandelt, sondern als Exemplifikation eines Symbolgebrauchs, um dessen Kapazitäten es geht. Interessant ist, dass das Bild in Anführungsstriche gesetzt ist, und damit in die Nähe sprachlicher Ausdrucksformen gerückt bzw. mit diesen kombiniert wird. Bei dieser Sonderbehandlung, die offensichtlich nicht jedem non-verbalen Einsprengsel in den Tagebüchern zuteil wird, handelt es sich um die Kennzeichnung einer Meta-Referenz; es geht demnach nicht um das Dargestellte, sondern um die Darstellung selbst. Die Kennzeichnung dieser Fokussierung wird allerdings nicht figürlich geleistet, sondern in Rückgriff auf schriftsprachliche Verfahren.

Eine weitere Variante des Bildgebrauchs besteht darin, die Behauptungen im Begleitkontext zu *belegen*. In den *Vorlesungen und Gesprächen über Ästhetik, Psychologie und Religion* finden sich beispielsweise drei skizzierte Gesichter, die das im Kontext behauptete Faktum als richtig ausweisen sollen, man könne Mimik, Gestik und Emotionen bildlich exakter ausdrücken als sprachlich (VuG 4,10).



Die dem Text beigegebenen Gesichter sollen demnach nicht bloß eine bestimmte Emotion, sondern performativ auch ihre Präzision als Darstellungsform darstellen. Ein regulativer Aspekt lässt sich hier nur in der Reihung der Bilder von links nach rechts erkennen, welche ebenfalls einer schriftsprachlichen Konvention entnommen sein könnte.

Schließlich findet sich in Tagebüchern auch eine Veranschaulichung der Modellfunktion des Bildes selbst (Tageb., 15.11.14):



Das Schema soll offenbar zeigen, dass man erkennen kann, ob ein Modell (Bild) *nicht* mit der Wirklichkeit kor-

respondiert, dass folglich beurteilt werden kann, wie sich Sachverhalte *nicht* modellieren lassen. Die an sich positive Proposition des Modells (eine Aussage über Sachverhalte und ihre Zusammenhänge) kann dem Schema zufolge vermittels Projektion von der Modell- auf die Wirklichkeits-ebene in eine negative Aussage über die Wirklichkeit transformiert werden. Aber selbst wenn sich tatsächlich ein solches Negativ-Kriterium formulieren ließe, ist der Bildgebrauch dennoch nicht operationalisierbar, da erstens ein Schluss in umgekehrter Richtung (von der Wirklichkeit zum Modell) auf keinen Fall möglich ist und das Modell zweitens keine Metrik angibt, die bei dem Justieren des Modell-Wirklichkeitsverhältnisses helfen könnte (etwa in Form von Aussagen darüber, welche Modifikationen am Modell vorgenommen werden müssen, damit eine Übereinstimmung der Modellprojektion und des modellierten Urbildes in der Wirklichkeit sichergestellt wäre.). Das Schema ist folglich ein Indiz dafür, dass der Bildgebrauch auch als Erkenntniswerkzeug nicht zur Gänze bzw. unmittelbar operationalisiert werden kann.

#### 4. Fazit

Eingangs wurde vorgeschlagen, den Bildbegriff im Werk Wittgensteins funktional zu verstehen. Aus diesem Verständnis ergab sich die Frage, inwieweit der Gebrauch von Bildern einer Methode folgt bzw. folgen kann. Insofern es sich bei Bildern entweder um gegenständliche oder abstrakte Modelle handelt, die aus dem Verfahren der Zuordnung von Symbolsystemen und Wirklichkeitssegmenten hervorgehen, sind drei Möglichkeiten des falschen Gebrauchs von Bildern denkbar: (1) Die Elemente des Bildes werden den Elementen der Wirklichkeit in nicht passender Weise zugeordnet. (2) Die Erstellung des Bildes wird zum Anlass irreführender Überlegungen (Warum-Fragen). (3) Der Gebrauch der Bilder wird unzutreffend beschrieben. Es wurde gezeigt, dass sich insbesondere für (1) und (3) kein allgemeines Schemata bzw. Fehlerkriterien angeben lassen, mit deren Berücksichtigung ein falscher Bildgebrauch identifiziert und vermieden werden könnte. An drei Beispielen wurde die Kernthese weiterentwickelt und festgestellt, dass es (allenfalls) die sprachlichen Symbole im unmittelbaren Bildkontext sind, die den Bildgebrauch einem operationalisierbaren Schematismus zugänglich machen.

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# Einprägsame Bilder: Paradigmen ohne Beweiskraft

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Wittgenstein hat den Olymp der Bilder gestürmt, er hat die ganze Besetzung aus mentalen, psychologischen, sprachlichen und ideellen Ab-, Ur-, Welt-, Vorstellung- und Erinnerungsbildern über die Klinge springen lassen und die Zeichnung schwimmt unbewiesen in ihrer Tuschelandschaft dahin.

[frei nach Heinrich Heine]

## 1.

Wittgensteins Überlegungen zur Beweiszeichnung betonen, dass sie ohne Rücksicht auf ihre singulären ikonischen Eigenschaften reproduzierbar sein muss. Da Wittgenstein hierbei aber selbst mit Zeichnungen argumentiert, wird die Unverzichtbarkeit des Bildlichen genau dort vorgeführt, wo ihre Irrelevanz erwiesen werden soll. Diesen Widerspruch erkennt und thematisiert Wittgenstein unter dem Begriff des „einprägsamen Bildes“, der im vorliegenden Beitrag in fünf Merkmalen dargestellt wird. Problematisch ist am Bildbeweis demnach ein nicht reproduzierbarer ikonischer Rest, der die jeweilige zeichnerische Ausführung allererst *einprägt* und paradigmatisch macht. Aufgrund seiner paradoxen Konstitution ist das *einprägsame Bild* jedoch ein Paradigma (Vorbild) ohne Beweiskraft, weshalb es sich im gegenwärtigen Boom wissenschaftlicher Visualisierungen als bildtheoretisches Korrektiv empfiehlt.

Obwohl Wittgenstein das *einprägsame Bild* an mathematischen, technischen und alltäglichen Beispielen exemplifiziert, untersucht er keineswegs bloß die Gebrauchsprobleme bestimmter Bildtypen sondern vielmehr ein systematisches Problem der Bildtheorie, das sich als die widersprüchliche Allianz von Idolatrie und Ikonoklasmus bezeichnen lässt. Beide sind für das Beweisbild gleichermaßen konstitutiv, weil es die visuelle Evidenz des zeigenden Bildes mit den instrumentellen Konventionen des sagenden Bildgebrauchs vereint.

## 2. Differenz

Wittgenstein diskutiert die widerstrebenden Komponenten des Beweisbildes an zahlreichen eigenen Zeichnungen:

„Wie ist es aber, wenn ich mich davon überzeuge, dass das Schema dieser Striche:

a)



gleichzahlig ist mit dem Schema dieser Eckpunkte:

b)



(ich habe die Schemata absichtlich *einprägsam* gemacht), indem ich zuordne:

c)



[6:46f.]

„Und so *prägt* der Beweis durch Ziehen der Projektionslinien einen Vorgang *ein*, den der eins-zu-eins Zuordnung der H[and]. und des D[rudenfußes]. – Aber *überzeugt* er mich nicht auch davon, dass diese Zuordnung *möglich* ist?“ [6:53]. Damit geraten die Komponenten „einprägsamer Schemata“ in Konflikt. In einer Randbemerkung problematisiert Wittgenstein entsprechend: „Heißt hier ‚diese Zuordnung‘ die der Figuren des Beweises selbst? Es kann nicht etwas zugleich Maß und Gemessenes sein.“ [6:53] Allerdings ist dieses Zugleich für die bildliche Existenz des Beweisbildes konstitutiv, denn „diese Zuordnung“ vereint immer schon beides: ein reproduzierbares Maß und seine Ausführungen im Einzelfall des Gemessenen.

Wittgenstein bezeichnet diese widerstrebenden Komponenten des Beweisbildes als sein *Wie* und sein *Dass*: „Aber kann ich denn nicht sagen, die Figur zeige, *wie* eine solche Zuordnung möglich ist – und muss sie darum nicht auch zeigen, *dass* sie möglich ist?“ [6:53] Das *Dass* betont die strukturellen Komponenten des Beweises, die eine bildferne Wiederholbarkeit implizieren, das *Wie* steht für die visuelle Exemplifikation im Einzelfall. Also für die Tatsache, dass ich erst „durch das Ziehen der Projektionslinien [...] überzeugt“ [6:48] werde. In einem nicht beweisenden Bildgebrauch können beide Funktionen durchaus als unterschiedliche Perspektiven der Bildinterpretation gelten:



[1:95]

„Denk dir eine Reihe von Bildern. Sie zeigen, wie zwei Leute nach den Regeln mit Rapiere fechten. [...] Hier bezieht sich das Bild auf eine Wirklichkeit. Man kann nicht sagen, es zeige, dass so gefochten wird, aber wie gefochten wird. In einem andern Sinne kann man sagen, die Bilder zeigen, wie man in drei Bewegungen von dieser Lage in jene kommen kann. Und nun zeigen sie auch, dass man auf diese Weise in jene Lage kommen kann.“ [6:301] Während das *Wie* des Beweises auf seine Kausalität und damit die Zeitlichkeit des Abgebildeten und des Abbildens verweist, zeigt das *Dass* reproduzierbare Möglichkeiten auf. „Wenn man vom Beweis sagt, er zeige *wie* (z.B.) 25 x 25 625 ergeben; so ist das natürlich eine seltsame Redeweise, da das arithmetische Ergebnis ja kein zeitlicher Vorgang ist. Aber nun zeigt ja der Beweis auch keinen Vorgang.“ [s.o.] Anders als bei der Rechnung verhält es sich bei der Demonstration des Beweisbildes, denn hier „*prägt* der Beweis durch Ziehen der Projektionslinien einen Vorgang *ein*“. Er überzeugt durch das *Wie* seiner Bildgenese, seine Performativität.

Indem Hand und Drudenfuß Namen erhielten, wurden die Figuren der ausgeführten Zeichnung jedoch bereits typologisiert: „Was ist dadurch geschehen, dass sie Namen erhalten haben, es wird dadurch etwas über die Art des Gebrauchs dieser Figuren angedeutet. Nämlich – dass man sie auf einen Blick als die und die erkennt. Man zählt dazu nicht ihre Striche oder Ecken, sie sind für uns Gestalttypen, wie Messer und Gabel, wie Buchstaben und Ziffern.“ [6:54] Der Gebrauch des Beweisbildes setzt typologisierte Komponenten voraus, die man „auf einen Blick“ erkennt und „unmittelbar wiedergeben“ [s.o.] kann.

Die Einmaligkeit konkreter Bildgebungen wird damit aber nicht wirkungslos: „Ich möchte sagen, es seien in dem Beweis nicht bloß diese individuellen Figuren zugeordnet, sondern die *Formen selbst*. Aber das heißt doch nur, dass ich mir jene Formen gut einpräge; als Paradigmen einpräge.“ [6:54] Die Einprägsamkeit überzeugender Beweisbilder nivelliert die Differenz zwischen *Dass* und *Wie* und macht es unmöglich, sie als getrennte Perspektiven der Bildinterpretation zu gebrauchen. Obwohl der Bildgebrauch „Gestalttypen“ und allgemeine Formen etabliert, sind es die jeweils demonstrierten individuellen Formen, die sich laut Wittgenstein *als Paradigmen einprägen*. Deshalb ist die *Einprägsamkeit* des Bildes buchstäblich als seine Eignung für eine *Prägung* zu verstehen, die wir durch ein gegenwärtiges Bild erhalten:



„Und wenn ich das Gesicht sich mir *einprägen* lasse [...] dann finde ich keinen Prototyp dieses Ausdrucks in meinem Geist; vielmehr breche ich gleichsam ein Siegel von dem Eindruck.“ [5:254 f.] Die paradigmatische (oder prototypische) Qualität des *einprägsamen Bildes* verdankt sich seiner singulären Bildwirkung.

### 3. Neuheit

Zwar heißt es, der „Beweis sei ein Bild“ [6:365], aber offenbar lässt er erst als „neues Bild“ [6:64] Neues denken.

„Es gibt ein Geduldspiel, das darin besteht, eine bestimmte Figur, z.B. ein Rechteck, aus gegebenen Stücken zusammenzusetzen. Die Teilung der Figur ist eine solche, dass es uns schwer wird, die richtige Zusammensetzung der Teile zu finden. Sie sei etwa diese:



[...] Kann man nicht sagen: die Figur, die dir die Lösung zeigt, beseitigt eine Blindheit; oder auch, sie ändert deine Geometrie? Sie zeigt dir gleichsam eine neue Dimension des Raumes. (Wie wenn man einer Fliege den Weg aus dem Fliegenglas zeigte.)“ [6:55f.]

Das *einprägsame Bild* schafft also neue Denkmöglichkeiten: „Ich meine, ich habe an diese Art der Zusammensetzung gar nicht gedacht.“ [6:55], und hat offensichtlich poetische oder heuristische Qualitäten: „Die neue Lage ist wie aus dem Nichts entstanden. Dort, wo früher nichts war, dort ist jetzt auf einmal etwas.“ [6:56]

### 4. Reproduktion

Obwohl das Beweisbild durch seinen Neuigkeitswert überzeugt, verlangt es jedoch nach einer Reproduktion, die die Qualität der zeichnerischen Ausführung ignoriert:

„Die Zeichnung eines Euklidischen Beweises kann ungenau sein, in dem Sinne, dass die Geraden nicht gerade sind, die Kreisbögen nicht genau kreisförmig etc.etc. und dabei ist die Zeichnung doch ein exakter Beweis und daraus sieht man [...], dass sie einen Satz der Geometrie, nicht einen über die Eigenschaften von Papier, Zirkel, Lineal und Bleistift beweist. [Hängt zusammen mit: Beweis ein Bild eines Experiments].“ [6:143]


Die Forderung nach seiner Reproduzierbarkeit entspricht deshalb einer ikonoklastischen Tendenz im Beweisbild: „Die Figur ist nicht der Beweis“ [6:151], denn wird sie als Beweis gebraucht, muss vom Bildlichen abgesehen werden, weil der Beweis selbst „keine charakteristische visuelle Gestalt hat“ [6:151]. So ist die Größe der Zeichnung oder das gewählte Material ebenso irrelevant wie die Präzision der jeweiligen graphischen Ausführung: „Wie reproduzieren wir, kopieren wir einen Beweis? – Nicht zum Beispiel, indem wir Messungen an ihm anstellen.“ [6:150]

Die Gebrauchsweise des Bildes als Beweis fokussiert auf seine reproduzierbaren Bildeigenschaften: „Beweis“ nennen wir eine Struktur, deren Reproduktion eine leicht lösbare Aufgabe ist. [...] Der Beweis muss ein Bild sein, welches sich mit Sicherheit genau reproduzieren lässt. Oder auch: was dem Beweise wesentlich ist, muss sich mit Sicherheit genau reproduzieren lassen. Er kann zum Beispiel in zwei verschiedenen Handschriften oder Farben niedergeschrieben sein. Zur Reproduktion eines Beweises soll nichts gehören, was von der Art einer genauen Reproduktion eines Farbtons oder einer Handschrift ist.“ [6:143]


Allerdings kann das Wesen des Beweises damit nicht vollständig beschrieben werden, da für seine genuine Überzeugungskraft eine visuelle Demonstration konstitutiv

ist – allerdings nur die einprägsame: „Das ist der Beweis, was uns überzeugt: Das Bild, was uns nicht überzeugt, ist der Beweis auch dann nicht, wenn von ihm gezeigt werden kann, dass es den bewiesenen Satz exemplifiziert.“ [6:171] Beweiskräftig wird das Beweisbild also erst, wenn es in seiner konkreten bildlichen Demonstration überzeugt. Es ist auf seine *Einprägsamkeit* angewiesen. Dass ein bestimmter Bildgebrauch das Beweisbild kontextualisiert, ergibt hierfür keine *hinreichende* Bedingung. Denn: „Sagst du eigentlich etwas anderes als: der Beweis wird als *Beweis* genommen?“ [6:173]. Das macht Wittgenstein allerdings: „Der Beweis muss ein anschaulicher Vorgang sein. Oder auch: der Beweis ist der *anschauliche* Vorgang.“ [6:173] Damit ist aber auch gesagt, dass „Nicht etwas hinter dem Beweise, sondern der Beweis beweist.“ [6:173] Ähnlich zirkulär argumentiert Wittgenstein überall dort, wo er die Intransitivität des bildlichen Zeigens apostrophiert: „Das Bild sagt mir sich selbst [...] in seiner eigenen Struktur, in *seinen* Formen und Farben.“ [1:438]. Berücksichtigt werden damit all jene singulären Bildqualitäten, auf die der Beweis unter der Bedingung seiner bildlichen Reproduzierbarkeit verzichtet, die er aber selbst dort noch benötigt, wo er sich seine eigene Genauigkeit demonstriert:

„Man könnte z.B. die Figur



als Beweis dafür nehmen, dass 100 Parallelogramme, so zusammengesetzt, einen geraden Streifen geben müssen. Wenn man dann wirklich 100 zusammenfügt, erhält man nun etwa einen schwach gebogenen Streifen. – Der Beweis aber hat uns bestimmt, das Bild und die Ausdrucksweise zu gebrauchen: Wenn sie keinen geraden Streifen geben, waren sie ungenau hergestellt.“ [6:58] Erst der Gebrauch der Zeichnung als Beweisbild ermöglicht, ihre singulären Bildqualitäten in sekundäre zu überführen. Deshalb ist Bildevidenz noch in der zeichnerischen Selbstkontrolle des Reproduzierten unverzichtbar: „Diese Figur lehrt mich [...], dass ich wirklich die gleichen Figuren hingezeichnet habe“ [6:54]



## 5. Experiment

Was geschieht aber, wenn man den Vorgang der bildlichen Demonstration zum Experiment erklärt und nur sein Resultat als Beweisbild gelten lässt? „Die Tätigkeit der Prüfung brachte das und das Resultat hervor. Die Prüfung war bis jetzt also sozusagen experimentell. Nun wird sie als Beweis aufgefasst. Und der Beweis ist das Bild einer Prüfung.“ [6:304] Oder: „Der Beweis, könnte man sagen,

muss ursprünglich eine Art Experiment sein – wird aber dann einfach als Bild genommen.“ [6:160]

Wenn Wittgenstein feststellt, dass „das Bild eines Experiments [...] doch nicht selbst ein Experiment“ [6:51] ist, so wird die Beweiseignung des Bildes entsprechend separiert: „Ich könnte also sagen, der Beweis dient mir nicht als Experiment, wohl aber als Bild eines Experiments.“ [6:51] denn die jeweilige visuelle Ausführung und Vorführung ist für den Beweis irrelevant, nicht aber die Tatsache, dass es eine solche gibt. Zum Beweis wird das Bild demnach durch eine spezifische Gebrauchsweise, in der es als Beweisbild „dient“ und die die Komplexität des bildlichen Experiments bereits reduziert auffasst.

Weil sich das Bild aber nicht von seiner experimentellen Bildgenese abheben lässt, bleiben die singulären ikonischen Eigenschaften auch im Resultat des Beweisbildes sichtbar. Daraus entstehen Unterscheidungsschwierigkeiten: Was ist das Resultat des Experiments? „[...] das Rechnungsergebnis, oder das Rechnungsbild, oder die Zustimmung (worin immer diese besteht) des Rechnenden?“ [6:385]. Die Zustimmung, könnte man sagen, „besteht“ eben gerade in jener *Einprägsamkeit*, die das regelhafte Rechnungsergebnis und das singuläre Rechnungsbild zu einem überzeugenden Paradigma vereint. „Das Experimenthafte verschwindet, indem man den Vorgang bloß als *einprägsames Bild* ansieht.“ [6:68] Die Einprägsamkeit nivelliert alle konstitutiven Widersprüche des Beweisbildes. Aber sie erlöst es nur von der Singularität seiner bildproduktiven Vorgeschichte, wenn es sich der jeweils aktuellen bildlichen Evidenz unterwirft.

## 6. Paradigma

Als „vorbildliches“ Bild evoziert das Beweisbild paradigmatische „Anwendungen“: „Etwas hört auf Beweis zu sein, wenn es aufhört Paradigma zu sein“ [6:154].

Das *einprägsame Bild* steht somit zwischen Bildproduktion und Bildgebrauch. So wenn man etwa mit einer Gliederpuppe oder einer Kette „einprägsame Figuren“ erzeugt: „Gewiss; aber ich führe nur solche Bewegungen, solche Umformungen vor, die einprägsamer Art sind [...], weil es so leicht ist, sie immer wieder an verschiedenen Gegenständen vorzunehmen.“ [6:68] Gerade für das Thema der wissenschaftlichen Beweisbildung ist dieser Übergang von der Visualität des Experiments zu der des Beweises entscheidend (vgl. z.B. Latour, Rheinberger).

Dem *einprägsamen Bild* kommt deshalb eine „Fernwirkung“ zu, die darin besteht, „dass ich es anwende.“ [6:62] Dieser prognostische Effekt lässt sich vermeintlich von der vorgeführten Bildproduktion distanzieren: „Ich wusste nicht wie es gehen werde, – aber ich sah ein Bild, und nun wurde ich überzeugt, dass es so gehen werde, wie im Bilde. Das Bild verhalf mir zur Vorhersage. Nicht als ein Experiment – es war nur der Geburtshelfer der Vorhersage.“ [6:241] Doch sind es die konkreten Bildqualitäten, mit denen der Beweis für seine Regelmäßigkeit plädiert: „Und wenn *dieses Bild* die Voraussage rechtfertigt – das heißt, wenn du es nur sehen brauchst und überzeugt bist, ein Vorgang werde so und so verlaufen – dann rechtfertigt *dieses Bild* natürlich auch die Regel. In *diesem Fall* steht der Beweis hinter der Regel als Bild, das sie rechtfertigt.“ [6:305] Der Beweis rechtfertigt die Regel also mit den Mitteln des jeweils *einprägsamen Bildes*.

„Es fragt sich eben: Was nennen wir ein ‚einprägsames Bild‘? Was ist das Kriterium davon, dass wir es uns eingeprägt haben? Oder ist die Antwort hierauf:

„Dass wir es als Paradigma der Identität benutzen!“[6:150] Jedes *einprägsame Bild* schafft demnach ein Paradigma, das heißt es wird zu einem Bild, von dem man sich eine weitere Anwendbarkeit erhofft: „Das Bild zeigt mir natürlich nicht, dass etwas geschieht, aber, dass was immer geschieht sich so wird anschauen lassen“[6:307]. Entsprechend konstatiert Wittgenstein, das Bild „gibt unserem Glauben eine bestimmte Richtung.“[6:305]. Als Beweisbild soll es „nicht nur zeigen, dass es so ist, sondern dass es so sein muss“[6:149]. Und wodurch evoziert es weitere Anwendungen? „Wenn die Ziffern und das Gezählte ein *einprägsames Bild* ergeben. Wenn dieses Bild nun statt jedes neuen Zählens dieser Menge gebraucht wird.“[6:149] Das *einprägsame Bild* ersetzt seine Reproduktionen: es wird zum Simulakrum des Bewiesenen.

## 7.

Wittgensteins Reflexionen zur Einprägsamkeit des Beweisbildes formulieren ein kritisches Korrektiv für die gegenwärtige Konjunktur wissenschaftlicher Visualisierungen. Zwar eröffnen *einprägsame Bilder* dem Denken neue Räume, Dimensionen und mitunter „Auswege“, jedoch entziehen sich diese heuristischen und poetischen Qualitäten der argumentativen Reproduzierbarkeit des Beweises. Das „einprägsame Bild [...] bewirkt einen leisen Tausel der Gedanken“ [6:141], weil der Konflikt zwischen den wissenschaftlich beanspruchten Beweiseigenschaften und der bildlichen Evidenz unauflösbar bleibt und das *einprägsame Bild* letztlich eine systematische Chimäre ist. Wenn Paradigmen Vorbilder ohne Beweiskraft sind und

Beweise nicht ohne überzeugende Bildlichkeit auskommen, dann verlangt der Gebrauch des *einprägsamen Bildes* nach einer zweiseitigen Medienskepsis, die seiner doppelten Konstitution aus sagenden und zeigenden Komponenten entspricht. *Einprägsamkeit* ist die mediale Achillesferse des wissenschaftlich-technischen Beweisbildes.

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# A Use-Therapeutic Approach to Meaning

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Wittgenstein's reservations about philosophizing in a theoretical spirit are well known. In §§126-128 of the *Philosophical Investigations*, he rejects both explanatory claims and the usefulness of theses in philosophy. When the question turns to a theory of meaning, the answer to be expected is the same. However, the problem is that a good account of Wittgenstein's non-theoretical attitude in philosophy inevitably contrasts theses and explanations with descriptions of language games and grammatical remarks. The latter, the account continues, is what Wittgenstein really offers. It is natural to ask, then, in what sense grammatical remarks are supposed to be independent of a theory of language. This is the question I want to address with particular regard to Wittgenstein's famous dictum, "the meaning of a word is its use in the language" (§43).

The first apparent identification of meaning and use in the *Investigations* occurs in §30: "[A]n ostensive definition explains the use – the meaning – of a word if the role the word is supposed to play in the language is already clear." Is already clear to whom? Obviously, to the person to whom the explanation is given. To say that an ostensive definition explains the meaning of a word only to those who have a prior understanding of its general role involves relating the concept of word-explanation to the abilities of the learner. This is more explicit in §6, where Wittgenstein distinguishes ostensive teaching of words from ostensive definition. He restricts the latter to contexts in which the learner is able to ask for the names of things. It takes two to give an explanation. For Wittgenstein, this is true not only in a platitudinous sense. In his view, all forms of explanation are bound up with shared practices and differ according to individual practices. This he takes to be equally true of philosophy, which, accordingly, is not a matter of giving explanations that are immune to future experience, but dependent on the type of perplexities that require dissolution.

This point can be deepened by discussing a difficulty Paul Horwich finds in reading Wittgenstein. The central question of Horwich's Use Theory of Meaning is this: "[W]hich underlying, non-semantic property of a word provides it with the particular meaning it has?" (Horwich 1998: 103) For Horwich, the qualification "non-semantic" is crucial. If Wittgenstein were to allow semantic notions in characterizations of word-uses, "his identification of meaning with use could not be genuinely illuminating". If, on the other hand, he is interpreted as keeping semantic notions away from his concept of use, his "thesis" that meaning is use would be controversial and thus conflict with the demands of §§126-128 (cf. Horwich 2004: 68f., fn. 5).

In my paraphrase of Horwich's "dilemma", I have been slightly ambiguous about the distinction between giving an explanation of something and giving an explanation to someone. In Horwich's account both variants are present, but he takes it for granted that the former is the only possible option in philosophy. This is what he implies in drawing a distinction between ordinary and "genuinely illuminating" explanations. My first point is that for Wittgenstein this is not the case. He is in effect addressing his reader, since, in his view, the problem is due to us. Secondly, what Horwich sees as threatening the value of Wittgenstein's explanation of meaning as use actually provides

an argument *in favour* of such a view. For what does meaning have to be like in order for semantic concepts to be explainable through sentences containing other semantic concepts, or even the very same words that are to be explained? What we exhibit through examples, in the explanation of word-meaning, is the way in which the word is used.<sup>1</sup> Such explanations are genuinely illuminating for people, also in those cases where ostension plays no role.

In this sense, Wittgenstein is not propounding a theory of meaning in the *Investigations*. As I read him, a philosophical problem stems from an incongruity between the way we think we understand certain words and the actual way we use them, together with a shift from what is manifest to the speakers of a language to an impersonal level of representation. The result is a "picture", as Wittgenstein often calls it – a picture such as that of an "inner process". Wittgenstein addresses his reader in order to enlighten him, thus changing his attitude toward the problem. In a related sense, Wittgenstein addresses his own tendencies to be misled, which he shares with the reader. Thus the continuing illuminative value of Wittgenstein's remarks partially depends upon the extent to which he succeeds in articulating shared reactions. This is part of his mastery. If he suggests that such and such is the source of some particular philosophical puzzlement, his claim cannot be independent of the acceptance by the reader that, indeed, it is something like this that has led him astray. It is important to note that he is not only pointing out a particular tendency of our thinking but also giving an explanation as to how a philosophical problem might emerge from it. It is not this kind of explanation that he refuses to give. What he refuses to do is resort to assumption, postulation, generalization and other methods that play a vital role in scientific practice, since if he did proceed in this way he would no longer be speaking to the person that is the reader. He would no longer be giving explanations to someone but making someone an object of explanation.

This contention is connected with Wittgenstein's overall approach to philosophical problems. The notion of language-games is often taken to designate ways in which we actually operate with language in a multiplicity of contexts. However, another use of the term is more important. Primarily, language-games are descriptions of simple model contexts in which problematic features of a term can be studied. A language-game in this sense is similar to what Wittgenstein refers to as a "picture-object" in "Philosophy of Psychology – A Fragment" (PPF), formerly known as "Part II" of the *Investigations*. Wittgenstein introduces the term by way of a simplified drawing of a face and then explains: "In some respects, I engage with it as with a human face. I can study its expression, can react to it as to the expression of the human face." (PPF §119) Though it is infinitely simpler than a real human face, we can stand in a similar relation to it. The same is true of the simplified descriptions that are language-games, which is why our understanding of words can be directly studied by using them. In engaging in such procedures we can realise that the relationship between our concepts are other than we thought. Ordinary words can thus be identified, whose grammar can serve as a model for problematic terms in such a way that the philosophical puzzlement over them is

dissolved. What Wittgenstein is offering is a sort of “after-education” (*Nacherziehung*) in the use of words. To invoke, as Horwich suggests, an underlying stratum of basic properties in terms of which meaning is to be explained would subvert this instructional or therapeutic aspect of Wittgenstein’s discourse by involving an impersonal level of representation. (cf. Horwich 2004: 68-70)

Let us turn more directly to Wittgenstein’s explanation according to which the meaning of a word is its use in the language. In particular, I want to consider a variant formulation of §43, in which the well-known lines are followed by a *third* paragraph, whose deletion, according to the critical-genetic edition, is not unambiguous (my translation and emphasis): “Perhaps it would be more correct to say: a meaning of a word is *one way* of using it in the language.” (Wittgenstein 2001: 771f.) Accordingly, Wittgenstein is concerned with repeatable sounds or marks, and their relatively general meanings. In his view, generality of meaning is a matter of use, and meanings are relatively stable patterns of what people do with certain sounds or marks.

To underline that meanings are *relatively* general is to admit that the meaning of a word need not be the same in all contexts in which the word is standardly applied. Relevant examples are words whose several uses share no common element, but display a kind of family resemblance. The general pattern is of the following type: word-application *a* and application *b* share a feature in one respect, *b* and *c* in another respect, while there is not necessarily any significant feature shared by *a* and *c*. In cases like these, a basic unitary meaning is hardly imaginable.

Consequently, it is not easy to see how examples of this kind could be accommodated within use theories of meaning. The reason is that use theorists will not be content with a purely general explanation of word-meaning in terms of “the way a word is regularly deployed”. Use theorists want to answer the further question, *which* use regularities are responsible for the meaning a word actually has. According to Horwich, meaning is constituted by a basic regularity of silently accepting sentences in specific circumstances (cf. Horwich 1998: 94-96). As a consequence, he faces the difficulty of having to derive an indeterminate variety of uses of a given word from a set of unitary properties. I do not want to claim that family resemblance is an insoluble difficulty for Horwich’s account; I only want to indicate why this difficulty arises at all, rather paradoxically, in a theory that appeals to Wittgenstein as its progenitor.

Unlike Horwich, Wittgenstein does not assume that word-meanings have a unitary basis. I wish to add: not even in their use, for this is what I want to suggest in the remainder of this paper. In Wittgenstein’s idea of language, the understanding of a word can be viewed as a capacity to transfer uses in partially similar ways from particular contexts into further contexts. It is basically nothing but this capacity, together with a number of ways of explaining words.

Cases of *secondary meaning* are uses which are transferred in a way very dissimilar from the usual one. The first example I want to discuss is saying that Wednesday is fat and Tuesday lean instead of the other way around. Wittgenstein declares to be strongly inclined towards the first option and continues to ask: “Now have ‘fat’ and ‘lean’ some different meaning here from their usual one? – They have a different use. – So ought I really to have used different words? Certainly not. – I want to use *these words* (with their familiar meanings) *here*.” (PPF §274)

It is important to see that Wittgenstein’s example is not metaphorical. Moreover, meaning and use seem to come apart. Wittgenstein wants to use “*these words* (with their familiar meanings) *here*”, while he obviously does not use them in the familiar way. Nevertheless, these familiar meanings do inform the expression “Wednesday is fat and Tuesday lean”. This is clear from the fact that Wittgenstein “could only explain the meanings in the usual way”, as he notes in the next section. This is what distinguishes secondary meaning from metaphor. To explain a metaphor, such as “the chairman ploughed through the discussion”, one has to use terms that are connected with the *context* of the metaphorically deployed word. Metaphorical meaning, as Max Black explains, is the result of an “interaction” between a word and a context in which it normally does not occur;<sup>2</sup> it is not the meaning of a word. In instances of secondary meaning, by contrast, the element of interaction is absent. In explaining them, one has to fall back on the word’s regular pattern of use, its familiar meaning. Consequently, there is nothing secondary meanings could be meanings of, except for words. This is why they can, whereas metaphors cannot, be in conflict with Wittgenstein’s explanation of word-meaning in §43.

Wittgenstein’s second example, “For me the vowel *e* is yellow”, is quite obviously a kind of aesthetic judgement. This is perhaps due to the kinship of this type of example with metaphors. This kinship is based on our practice of contrasting “dark” sounds with “bright” or “light” ones and the admissibility of saying that a vowel has its place “between” two others. As a consequence, many people might agree that English vowels could be classified from bright to dark in the following manner: *e – a – i – u – o*, and similarly with regard to colours: yellow – orange – red – green – blue. Given such a practice, they could see the point of devising a metaphor like “The vowel *e* is yellow”, at least in certain contexts. However, there is no reason to suppose that all people would agree on the above orderings. Somebody may want to include violet instead of green; another person insist on a different ordering of the vowels in the middle range. Consequently, *some* of the corresponding expressions, say, “For me the vowel *i* is red”, may indeed be like “Wednesday is fat”, while others, such as “The vowel *o* is blue” may be metaphorical. In a uniform series of items, some might be instances of metaphor and others instances of secondary meaning.

Wittgenstein’s second example indicates that it may appear plausible to include secondary meaning in the broad category of aesthetic judgments. Accordingly, matching weekdays with “fat” or “lean” would be an expression of an aesthetic reaction. Although it presupposes an understanding of ordinary concepts, the corresponding rules do not determine which correlations are correct and which ones are not. Instead, it is up to each participant to make a decision. That this may be a rule of this peculiar language-game of “matching” does not alter the fact that the meanings of the words remain the same, while their uses differ. In this particular language game of “matching”, the very idea of attributing a colour to an object is transformed.

To conclude, interpreting Wittgenstein, as Horwich tends to do, as propounding a use theory of meaning non-trivially conflicts with the discussion of secondary meaning. The alternative I suggested in the first part of the paper is to see Wittgenstein as adopting not a use-theoretic but a use-therapeutic approach to meaning.



### Endnotes

<sup>1</sup> Horwich's "Implicit Definition Argument" comprises an analogous element of conferring meaning to a term by accepting postulates in which the very term is contained (Horwich 1998: 50, 138).

<sup>2</sup> Black 1962: 38f.; for a discussion of the 'chairman'-example cf. 26-28, 30f.

### Acknowledgments

I would like to thank Joachim Schulte and Britt Harrison for assistance and discussion.

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# Zu Wittgensteins Bemerkungen über „Grundlagen der Mathematik“: Zetteltyposkript TS222 – „topographisch“ und „numerisch“

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Von den Veröffentlichungen aus dem Wittgensteinschen Gesamtnachlass ist die von allen drei Nachlassverwaltern G. E. M. Anscombe, R. Rhees und G. H. von Wright gemeinsam herausgegebene Publikation *Bemerkungen über die Grundlagen der Mathematik* (= BGM; Erstausgabe 1956; revidierte und erweiterte Ausgabe 1974) eine der problematischsten postumen Editionen Wittgensteinscher „Werke“. Hier wird der erste Teil dieser Edition auf den nachlassphilologischen Prüfstand gestellt und einer anschaulichen Inspektion unterzogen.

Die sich seit einem halben Jahrhundert im Gebrauch befindliche BGM-Veröffentlichung ist überhaupt kein eigenes „Werk“ Wittgensteins, sondern eine von den Herausgebern in zweifacher Weise selektiv erstellte Kompilation. Einerseits wurden aus dem Nachlass bestimmte (keinesfalls alle) Typoskripte bzw. Typoskriptteile und Manuskripte bzw. Manuskriptteile zum Thema „Grundlagen der Mathematik“ selektiert; andererseits wurden aus diesen selektierten Texten wiederum Bemerkungskonvolute selektiert und – gegliedert in Teil I bis Teil VII – in die BGM-Publikation (BGM 1974) aufgenommen. Nämlich: BGM-Teil I und der dazugehörige Appendix I bestehen aus TS222.<sup>1</sup> Der zweite Appendix gibt TS224 wieder. Der dritte Appendix ist TS221 entnommen. BGM-Teil II enthält Bemerkungen aus MS117 und MS121. BGM-Teil III bietet Bemerkungen aus MS117 und MS122. BGM-Teil IV liefert Bemerkungen aus MS125 und MS127. BGM-Teil V hat Bemerkungen aus MS126 und MS127. BGM-Teil VI besteht aus MS164. Und BGM-Teil VII präsentiert Bemerkungen aus MS124. Im „Vorwort der Herausgeber“ zur revidierten und erweiterten Ausgabe wird mitgeteilt: „Teil I und praktisch genommen auch Teil VI, aber nur sie, sind vollständige Wiedergaben von Texten Wittgensteins. Was also als Teile II, III, IV, V, VII hier veröffentlicht wird, ist eine *Auswahl* aus umfangreichen Manuskripten.“ (BGM 1974, S. 33)

Die Auswahl Wittgensteinscher Bemerkungen in die BGM-Edition liefert ein verzerrendes und verfälschendes Bild von Wittgensteins Aufzeichnungen über die „Grundlagen der Mathematik“. So sind auch im vergangenen halben Jahrhundert inadäquate und inakzeptable Interpretationen zu Wittgensteins Ausführungen entstanden. Auf den bedauerlichen Umstand einer problematischen BGM-Edition und daraus resultierenden Fehlinterpretationen wurde insbesondere von Michael Nedo im Einführungsband zur *Wiener Ausgabe* aufmerksam gemacht (Nedo, S. 57-71). Und die gerade erschienene umfassende Studie *Braucht die Mathematik eine Grundlegung? Ein Kommentar des Teils III von Wittgensteins „Bemerkungen über die Grundlagen der Mathematik“* (2010) von Felix Mühlhölzer trägt der philologisch-philosophischen Berücksichtigung der Quellenlage für BGM-Teil III, also für die Behandlung der entsprechenden Textpassagen in MS122 und MS117, in vorbildlicher Weise Rechnung.

Hier soll nun exemplarisch auf den ersten BGM-Teil, konkret also auf TS222, detailliert eingegangen werden, nicht nur um zu zeigen, wie problematisch und inadäquat das Verhältnis zwischen dem originalen Nachlassdokument TS222 und der postumen BGM-Edition ist, sondern

auch um zu zeigen, dass die philologische Erschließung von TS222 im Nachlass bisher keinesfalls adäquat erfolgte. Die Aussage der BGM-Herausgeber, dass es sich bei Teil I darin um eine „vollständige Wiedergabe“ handeln würde, ist detailliert zu prüfen. Typoskript TS222 existiert nämlich als Zetteltyposkript im Nachlass, d.h. es setzt sich aus vielen ausgewählten ganzen Typoskriptseiten und zerschnittenen Typoskriptseitenteilen zusammen. Es selbst basiert dem Material nach auf Typoskript TS221. Und TS221 besteht aus der Auswahl von Bemerkungen, die vorgängig von Wittgenstein in Manuskripte – etwa MS115(I), MS117-MS119, MS121, MS162a – eingetragen worden sind. Diese Manuskripteinträge können dann selbst wieder – wie MS117(I) bzw. MS115(I) – aus anderen Manuskripten – etwa aus MS118, MS119, MS121 und MS157b bzw. aus MS146 und MS147 – übertragen worden sein. Anzusprechen ist zudem die Tatsache, dass sich in TS221 und dann auch in TS222 Bemerkungen aus zwei verschiedenen Zeitabschnitten des Nachlasses und Werkphasen bei Wittgenstein finden, nämlich in MS115(I) von 1933/34 und etwa in MS117-MS119, MS121, MS162a von 1937/38. Nachdem Wittgenstein TS221 im Original mit Durchschlagverfahren diktiert hatte, zerschneidet er eine Durchschlagkopie in einzelne Zettel, traf eine Bemerkungsauswahl und ordnete die erwählten Bemerkungen in eine neue Abfolge – TS222 entstand. Die einzelnen Zettel des TS222 sind im Nachlass in hierarchisch gegliederte Gruppen zusammengefügt überliefert. Jeder einzelne Zettel trägt nämlich in der oberen rechten Ecke eine handschriftlich mit Bleistift geschriebene Signatur: zunächst eine römische Zahl (von I bis VI), alsdann fast immer einen Kleinbuchstaben (a, b, c, etc.) und zuletzt eine arabische Zahl (1, 2, 3, etc.). So ist eine vollständige Gruppengliederung der Zettel in TS222 mit folgendem Nummerierungssystem vorhanden: I1-I22; IIa1-a29; IIb1-b2; IIc1-16; IId1-d3; IIe1-e6; IIff1-f5; IIIa1-a9; IIIb1-b11; IIIc1-c4; IVa1-a3; IVb1-b3; IVc1-c5; IVd1-d2; IVe1; IVf1; IVg1-g2; Va1-a6; Vb1-b3; VIa1-11; VIb1-b2. In der Abfolge dieser Systematik wurden die Bemerkungen des Zetteltyposkripts TS222 als Teil I in der postumen BGM-Publikation veröffentlicht; allerdings ohne die Wiedergabe der Gruppenbildung, sondern mit durchnummerierter Bemerkungszählung von §1-§171 und in Appendix I von §1-§27.

Es ist nun aber – und darauf wird hier erstmals der Fokus gerichtet – aller größter Zweifel angebracht, ob diese Zetteltyposkriptordnung tatsächlich von Wittgenstein selbst stammt. Vergleicht man nämlich die Schreibweise dieser Nummerierungssystematik mit anderen, sicher von Wittgenstein stammenden Schreibweisen – etwa mit den sich am oberen Blattrand befindenden Seitenzahlen der Blätter 138 bis 154 von TS222 oder mit den sich auf den meisten Zetteln in TS222 am linken Blattrand befindenden Sektionsnummern, so zeigt sich deutlich, dass sie eben nicht von Wittgenstein selbst angebracht wurde. Beispielsweise hat Wittgensteins Schreibweise der Zahl „7“ nahezu immer einen waagrechten Strich durch den diagonalen Abstrich; die Schreibweise der Zahl „2“ hat bei Wittgenstein selbst keinen gewellten waagrechten Endstrich, sondern ist fast immer eine gerade Linie. Zudem ist der Zusatz „reverse“ bei der Rückseitenbeschriftung auf

TS222-Zettel „VIa11“ sicher nicht Wittgensteins Handschrift und nicht Wittgensteins Art in solchen Fällen englische Bezeichnungen zu verwenden. Siehe dazu exemplarisch folgende Detailfaksimiles: zwei Abbildungen von TS222,IIe2 und TS222,IIa16 links mit Wittgensteins Handschrift und zwei Abbildungen von TS222,IIa27 und TS222,VIa11 „reverse“ rechts mit fremder Handschrift.

Dass diese Ordnung dennoch von Wittgenstein selbst zusammengestellt wurde, ist prinzipiell möglich, denn er könnte ja die Zettel der einzelnen Gruppen bzw. Untergruppen beispielsweise lediglich mit Büroklammern zusammengeheftet haben (wie er es auch bei anderen Gelegenheiten tat) und erst später wurde die topographisch so überlieferte Gesamtgruppierung von TS222 von fremder Hand mit der Nummernsystematik versehen. Für die Annahme, dass TS222 über längere Zeit hinweg in diese Ordnung gebracht war, spricht, dass für die meisten Untergruppen (also I, IIa, IIb, etc.) Rostabdrücke von verwendeten Büroklammern beim jeweils ersten Zettel recto und beim jeweils letzten Zettel verso vorhanden sind. Für die Hauptgruppen (also I, II, III, etc.) ist der Rostfleckenbefund nicht so klar. Bei einigen bzw. innerhalb einiger Untergruppen sind aber Ungereimtheiten vorhanden. So stimmen dem Anschein nach beim Recto- und Verso-Rostabdruck die Untergruppen IIc und IIe, sowie IVa bis IVf nicht zusammen. Und die Zettel I5, IIa11 und IIa25 enthalten Rostabdrücke, obwohl sie inmitten einer Zettelgruppe situiert sind und daher überhaupt keine haben dürften. Ob also die Einführung dieser Gruppenordnung und die Anbringung der Nummerierung in TS222 noch zu Wittgensteins Lebzeiten oder erst nach dessen Tod vor der BGM-Erstausgabe 1956 von fremder Hand erfolgte, kann nicht mehr entschieden werden.

Diese dubiose Sachlage hat nun Konsequenzen für die Einschätzung der Authentizität einerseits des konkreten Zettel- bzw. Bemerkungsumfangs (von 148 Zettel und einer Rückseitenbeschriftung bzw. von 171+27 Bemerkungen) in TS222 und andererseits der in der BGM-Edition vorhandenen Bemerkungsabfolge (von §1–§171 und §1–§27). Dieser Umfang und diese Anordnung der Bemerkungen von TS222 wird hier nun „topographische Ordnung“ genannt, oder auch: „TS222-topographisch“. Es existiert nun aber – und dies ist ein bedeutender Tatbestand, der bisher in der Nachlassforschung gänzlich übersehen wurde und hier erstmals dokumentiert wird – noch ein anderer Umfang und eine andere Anordnung von Bemerkungen in TS222, nämlich eine nun so genannte „numerische Ordnung“, oder auch: „TS222-nummerisch“.<sup>2</sup> TS222 enthält nämlich auch eine Durchnumerierung der meisten Bemerkungen in Wittgensteins eigener Handschrift von 201 bis 316. Diese Nummerierung ist nicht nur von 201 bis 316 vollzählig, sondern enthält zusätzlich drei weitere, subordinierte Bemerkungsnummern (281.1; 281.2; 311.1).

Was nun seltsam erscheinen mag, nämlich dass die Nummerierung erst mit der Zahl 201 beginnt, ist nicht nur erklärbar, sondern zeigt sogar einen außerordentlichen Sachverhalt, da sich so der unmittelbare Anschluss von TS222-nummerisch an Typoskript TS239, die so genannte bearbeitete Frühfassung der *Philosophischen Untersuchungen*<sup>3</sup>, nachweisen lässt. Damit ist also unmittelbar die Rekonstruktion der Gesamtgenese von Wittgensteins unvollendetem opus magnum *Philosophische Untersuchungen* (=PU) betroffen. Nachdem Wittgenstein 1936/37 Ma-

nuskript MS142, die so genannte PU-Urfassung geschrieben hatte, diktierte er anschließend Typoskript TS220, die so genannte PU-Frühfassung und arbeitete alsdann diese wiederum in Typoskript TS239 – eben in die bearbeitete PU-Frühfassung – um. Die Bemerkungen in TS239 hat Wittgenstein nach einigen Zahlenkorrekturen handschriftlich von 1 bis 206 durchnummeriert. Nimmt man die vorhandene Abweichung von fünf Zahlenwerten, nämlich von 206 als letzter Zahl in TS222 und von 201 als erster Zahl in TS239, in Kauf<sup>4</sup>, so kann die Zusammengehörigkeit dieser beiden Typoskripte zu einer Einheit als erwiesen gelten. Dieser Sachverhalt hat nun bedeutende Konsequenzen für die in großen Teilen noch ausstehende adäquate Rekonstruktion der PU-Gesamtgenese. Die Nummerierungssystematik von TS222-nummerisch erfasst, darauf ist aufmerksam zu machen, nicht alle in TS222 vorhandenen Bemerkungen. Was aber auf den ersten Blick als Nachteil gesehen werden könnte, erweist sich bei einer detaillierten Analyse von TS222, insbesondere im größeren Kontext des Wittgensteinschen Gesamtnachlasses, als Hinweis darauf, dass dies insofern als Vorteil zu sehen ist, als sich daran klar zeigt, dass Wittgenstein bei der Verzettlung von TS221 sowieso bewusst nicht alle darin vorhandenen Bemerkungen direkt weiterverwendet, sondern entweder ausgeschlossen oder für eine spätere andere Verwendung vorgesehen und aufgehoben hat. Neben den in TS222-nummerisch nicht einbezogenen Bemerkungen in TS222 finden sich nämlich weitere solche Portionen im Nachlass, etwa die – wie TS222 – ebenfalls aus TS221 stammenden Typoskripte TS223, TS224 (dem Appendix II von Teil I in BGM), TS240 und weitere Dokumente, etwa jene im Zettelyposkript TS212, dem so genannten *Proto-Big Typescript*, zwar gruppiert vorhandenen, dann aber in TS213, dem so genannten *Big Typescript*, nicht einbezogenen Portionen TS214 bis TS218. All diese Materialien sind Wittgensteins philosophischer Beschäftigung mit der Mathematik zuzurechnen und bilden neben TS222 und weiteren Aufzeichnungen in Manuskripten seit dem Jahr 1929, die Basis für die von Wittgenstein vorgesehene Ausarbeitung eines philosophischen Werkes zum Thema „Grundlagen der Mathematik“ – wie es vom ersten Entwurf des PU-Vorwortes (in MS159,34r) bis zum letzten PU-Vorworttext (in TS227,1) heißt –, denn er plante sogar einen eigenen Band seiner – übrigens mindestens dreibändig von ihm konzipierten – *Philosophischen Untersuchungen* zu dieser Thematik, den er dann aber zeitlebens nicht erstellt bzw. fertiggestellt hat.

Um auch in diesem Abschnitt der Rekonstruktion der PU-Genese größere Klarheit zu erreichen, sind wiederum detaillierte, minutiöse Nachlassstudien unabdingbar. Nur auf diese Weise lässt sich nämlich erweisen – was hier erstmals dargetan wird –, dass TS222-nummerisch nicht nur vor TSS222-topographisch arrangiert war, sondern dass TS222-nummerisch genau genommen und treffender als „TS221-umgearbeitet“ zu betrachten und zu benennen ist, weil es im Anschluss an und Kontext von TS221, präziser und treffender „TS221-unbearbeitet“ bezeichnet, verortet werden muss. TS222-nummerisch wurde nicht im verzettelten Zustand erstellt, sondern bereits im unverzettelten Zustand, also an dem bzw. an einem Durchschlagexemplar TS221. So machen die in TS222-nummerisch bzw. TS221-umgearbeitet enthaltenen Referenzvermerke – etwa das Notat „Siehe S. 171/252“ [=TS222,IVc1 bzw. TS221,171] auf Zettel TS222,IIa3 [=TS221,173] oder der Vermerk „(Siehe S. 173/257)“ [=TS222,IIa10 bzw. TS221,173] auf Zettel TS222,IIa10 [=TS221,171] – nur Sinn, wenn jene Seitennumerierung mit deren Hilfe referiert wird, noch intakt ist, also TS221 bereits als TS221-umgearbeitet vorliegt, aber noch nicht verzettelt und in TS222-nummerisch umgeformt

worden ist. Die Kombination von Seitenzahlangebe und Sektionsnummer bei Referenzen belegt ebenfalls, dass bereits in TS221-umgearbeitet die Zählung nach TS222-nummerisch vorhanden war. Weitere Belege für eben diesen Umstand erbringt die genaue Analyse der bei der Verzettelung von TS221 entstandenen Schnittkonturen, denn einige exemplarische Fälle zeigen klar und deutlich, dass bereits in TS221-umgearbeitet die Nummerierung nach der Zählweise TS222-nummerisch existierte und erst danach die Zerschneidung dieses TS221-Durchschlags geschah und so der Übergang zu TS222-nummerisch erfolgte. Siehe dazu folgende drei Beispiele als Detailfaksimiles.



Bei TS222,IIe6+IIla2 [=TS221,163] stimmen die Schnittkonturen genau überein, wurde die Bemerkungsnummer 236 (versehentlich) waagrecht durchgeschnitten und war demnach vor dem Zerteilen bereits vorhanden. Bei TS222,IIla5 [=TS221,159] mit der Bemerkungsnummer 230 sowie bei TS222,IIla7 [=TS221,157] mit der Bemerkungsnummer 226 wurde abweichend von einer möglichst waagrechten Schnittführung jeweils der Schnitt eigens um die beim Zerschneiden bereits vorhanden gewesene Nummer herumgeführt. Wittgenstein hat also zunächst TS221 diktiert, hat dann einen Durchschlag von TS221 handschriftlich mehrfach bearbeitet und so TS221-umgearbeitet kreiert, hat dabei die Bemerkungsnummerierung nach TS222-nummerisch eingeführt, hat Referenzvermerke angebracht, hat nachfolgend dieses TS221-umgearbeitet verzettelt, hat so TS222-nummerisch physisch erstellt, hat zuletzt (höchstwahrscheinlich) TS222-topographisch arrangiert. Eigentlicher Grund für die Verzettelung von TS221-umgearbeitet war, so kann man alsdann zeigen, dass die darin enthaltene Durchnummerierung nach TS222-nummerisch sich noch nicht in chronologischer Abfolge befand, sondern im Typoskript lediglich von Bemerkungsnummer(n) zu Bemerkungsnummer(n) vor und zurück springend vorhanden war. Zur Herstellung der auch physisch richtigen Abfolge musste also TS221-umgearbeitet zerschnitten werden, um daraus TS222-nummerisch konkret anordnen zu können.

Von großer Aussagekraft sind alsdann weitere in TS222 enthaltene Referenzvermerke. Ob solch ein Vermerk jedoch bereits im Stadium von TS221-umgearbeitet existierte, oder im Stadium TS222-nummerisch angebracht wurde, oder sogar erst im Stadium TS222-topographisch hinzugefügt ist, muss für jeden einzelnen Fall extra eruiert werden. Hauptsächlich handelt es sich dabei um Bezugnahmen – etwa mit Notaten wie „> 3 Bemerkungen <Bd XIII> auch Bd XII S. 133/3“ bei TS222,IVg2 [=TS221,159] oder „Bd XIII“ bei TS222,IIla9 [=TS221,183] oder „> Bd XII S. 103/1“ bei TS222,IIla6 [=TS221,160] – auf die Manuskriptbände MS116(I) und MS117 einerseits und um Bezugnahmen – etwa mit dem Notat „(vgl. §189)“ bei TS222,I1 [=TS221,138] – auf die so genannte PU-Zwischenfassung bzw. auf die so genannte PU-Spätfassung andererseits. Alleine schon mit diesen wenigen hier erwähnten Forschungsergebnissen kann die Notwendigkeit der Einbindung sowohl von TS222-nummerisch als auch von TS222-topographisch in die Rekonstruktionsforschung der Genese von Wittgensteins

opus magnum erwiesen werden. Die Erforschung des Wittgensteinschen Gesamtnachlasses steht am Anfang – nicht am Ende. Und so geht es in diesem kondensierten Beitrag nicht darum vorschnelle und voreilige Antworten zu liefern, sondern darum innovative und kreative Fragen zu stellen und alternative Lösungsvorschläge einzubringen. Etwa: Ist TS221 (=TS221-unbearbeitet) wirklich Teil der PU-Frühfassung? Ist die fortlaufende Nummerierung der Seiten in TS220 und in TS221 wirklich aussagekräftig und ausschlaggebend für die bisher weithin herrschende Annahme, dass dies die beiden Teile der PU-Frühfassung sind bzw. sein sollen? Spricht nicht vielmehr die fortlaufende Bemerkungsnummerierung in Paragraphen (bereits in TS220, sowie alsdann in TS239 und in TS221-umgearbeitet (=TS222-nummerisch) aussagekräftig für diese Zusammengehörigkeit? In TS221-unbearbeitet jedenfalls fehlt jegliche Nummerierung der Bemerkungen. Ist also TS222-nummerisch (=TS221-umgearbeitet) Teil der bearbeiteten PU-Frühfassung? Ist TS222-topographisch als Teil der PU-Zwischenfassung oder sogar der PU-Spätfassung anzusehen? Es ist bemerkenswert, dass im „Vorwort der Herausgeber“ zur BGM-Erstaussgabe 1956 der BGM-Teil I, also TS222, präziser: TS222-topographisch, als „Teil einer früheren Fassung des Manuskriptes der ‚Untersuchungen‘“ (BGM 1956, S. vi) angesehen wurde und damit in die PU-Genese einbezogen war. Neben und nach der philologischen Beschäftigung mit dieser Thematik ist selbstverständlich auch die inhaltlich erschließende und interpretierende Auseinandersetzung mit diesen und vielen anderen Bemerkungskonvoluten Wittgensteinscher Überlegungen zu „Grundlagen der Mathematik“ erforderlich. Ein wichtiger Ansatzpunkt hierzu wäre etwa der Vergleich der formalen Ordnung und inhaltlichen Analyse von TS222-nummerisch einerseits und TS222-topographisch andererseits.<sup>5</sup>

## Endnoten

<sup>1</sup> Alle Dokumente werden zitiert nach dem Katalog „The Wittgenstein Papers“ von Georg Henrik von Wright.

<sup>2</sup> Es entspricht sicher nicht den akademischen Gepflogenheiten, dass Nuno Venturinha aus einem vertraulichen Arbeitsbericht entnommene Forschungsergebnisse – hier konkret die Entdeckung und Rekonstruktion von TS222-nummerisch und den Nachweis der Zusammengehörigkeit von TS239 und TS222 – ohne meine Erlaubnis, ohne die Erwähnung meines Namens, ohne meine eigene Veröffentlichung (wie Sie hier nun erfolgt) abzuwarten – in seinen Publikationen verwendet.

<sup>3</sup> Siehe hierzu und zu den folgenden Bezeichnungen einzelner PU-Fassungen die von Joachim Schulte im Jahre 2001 herausgegebene Veröffentlichung *Philosophische Untersuchungen. Kritisch-genetische Edition*.

<sup>4</sup> Ein minutiöses Detailstudium kann die mehrfachen Änderungen der Durchnummerierung sowohl in TS239 als auch in TS222 und die damit entstandene minimale Abweichung beim Übergang der Zählung vom ersten ins zweite Typoskript nachvollziehbar aufklären.

<sup>5</sup> Ausführlichere Dokumentation auch zu der in diesem Beitrag behandelten Thematik und die Rekonstruktion und Edition sowohl von TS221-umgearbeitet als auch von TS222-nummerisch wird in Rothhaupt 2010 geboten werden. Dieser zweite Band eines philologisch-philosophischen Kommentars zu Ludwig Wittgensteins Gesamtnachlass mit dem Titel *Kreation und Komposition* ist in Vorbereitung. Der erste Band ist bereits im Erscheinen.

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# Some Thoughts on Wittgensteinian “Nonsense” and the Use of Metaphor

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There are already several general accounts of nonsense in the wittgensteinian literature, especially in the articles and books of J. Conant and C. Diamond concerning Wittgenstein’s “resolute” reading.<sup>1</sup> My aim is not to offer some new general account of the notion of nonsense but to present a kind of relation between it and the notion of metaphor. Both of the above scholars use nonsense’s notion against the substantial nonsense (i.e. showing but not saying) while introducing the term “austere nonsense” (straight or simple nonsense), that is when we realize through the philosophical procedure that there is nothing to say after such an intellectual – methodological effort – that everything is a simple frustration.

But if we feel that way, what’s left? Contingently, it might be said that such an effort will be viewed as a descriptive route, in terms of philosophical grammar, which functions just as a possibility showing an impotence to express itself propositionally. Considering this fact one multiple and versatile possible solutions which comes before our eyes is that of literature. So many wittgensteinian thinkers have said that Wittgenstein’s style of writing is that of poetical philosophy.<sup>2</sup> In this sense, I’d like to say that while we’re coming to realize that nonsense is the strict nonsense, we inescapably resort to figurative forms (metaphorical) that running parallel to those terms, noticing Frege’s distinction between “concept and object”.<sup>3</sup>

Using these terms in our everyday speech – wittgensteinian speaking – we understand that the notion of meaning needs a literary procedure plus something else, in order to give an explanation of the notion. For no deictic condition could provide the sense of these concepts. So, using the predicates (figures of speech) in a phrase or a statement, we suppose of making many versions, even unconsciously, of the meaning such a phrase. In my opinion, where all the equipment of ordinary language is coming to the end of all explanations, it’s the time of various expressive/figurative forms i.e. poetry (literature) to be in charge in order to secure the meaning of the expressions. For how else could we’ve been thinking of these wittgensteinian terms found in enormity in his text, such as: showing to, ineffability and the mystical?

Again, the nonsense in the tractarian literature, may be one issue of another in order to protect us from being lured by the charm of the language. Could it be that way? I’m not sure. Maybe the Viennese philosopher had something else in his mind. Language is the meaning – language as proto-phenomenon (Urphaenomen), language as an activity or the language both as meaning and agent in an interaction. What’s left? To think of the function such a relation, which is not only function but a very essence (ontology) as well. Why not us think of the essence as an expression of possibility (kantian speaking) which in the world takes shape (form) and structure if not content? Many thinkers expressing loosely the notion of the possibility but only few are trying to analyze it (TLP 2.0123).

Probably the reason of talking nonsense is our frustrated effort to specify the meaning of a proposition or a word. And just tell me, if we come to realize such a frustra-

tion why not our actions lead us to the resort of literature? This is the situation of speaking and writing differently, loosely, tolerantly with hidden but not destroyed concepts, forming a variant and multiple reality but a very reality, at the point where someone says that is nonsense? I’m not quite sure, but for some reason the logical necessity of the possibility has to provide a so-called answer to the nonsense’s notion.

Again, I’m not sure about using the right term “literature” or metaphor/figurative as I was mentioning in the above “readings”, especially mine. I was trying to say that: showing towards something means the possibility of the expression plus the expression itself. Accordingly, the expression needs a medium or has to be the medium itself. Conclusion: If we look closely to the function of literature we will see that we’re facing with a new point of view. I mean the articulation of the variety of events. Too many things to be hidden too many things to be articulated. More or less it’s the same way we’re dealing with philosophy, but only according to the articulated form and not with the variety of meanings. The form that has also a use. All this charming mental enterprise needs some ways of expression. And if we say that the expression means a “real” gibberish showing nothing but real nonsense, at the same time, in my opinion the procedure of the expression in all the way down has been described by a discipline: philosophy or literature. If for any reason we temporarily doubt about philosophy, why not choosing the literature’s example? Both disciplines are using versions to interpret or to exhibit the events.

According to Wittgenstein, the notion of meaning is a crucial factor of doing philosophy. We mean something despite some obscure or implicit factors. These factors could probably be explained or exposed by other fields of knowledge, for example by that of literature. There are times that meanings provided by non philosophical activities becoming later familiar with philosophical concepts or many versions about concepts. There is an enormous intellectual procedure showing to these activities, by incorporating them being part of themselves. This is by no means to abolish philosophy, it is just to strengthen its function. If we say there is nothing but nonsense, what’s going to be left? Would it be a method for a conspicuous and honest ignorance or would be something like the swan – song of a quasi traditional philosophical activity that of trying to determine rigidly the meaning. It must be an answer ...

The scholar community finds this fact as having an enormous interest and examines the wittgensteinian dealing of concepts and meaning with great profundity. Sometimes escaping the strict philosophical matters we end up in an interesting narration using the figurative speech usually combining the Wittgenstein’s personal deeds with his philosophical deeds. This could be a way to the metaphor.

And if you say like in the language games: it’s a sort of habit and nothing else ... you’re right. We’re making moves – searching the meaning etc. – on the solid ground of the familiar language game. Let us notice, this action we take under consideration the so called ethical factor relat-

ing the subjectivity to that of objectivity. For, in the *Tractatus* the solipsistic "I" is the limit of the world. To paraphrase: It participates in an interaction of pleasure in relation to cosmos for it is a cosmos itself.

An afterthought ...

To keep going with Diamond's another famous article: "Wittgenstein on ethics and mathematics",<sup>4</sup> I kept in my mind one of my closest friend's last words about the article while we were staring at the Acropolis's Museum: "Diamond's thought is like a smooth stream ending to a waterfall." I think he was right. To be more specific:

The crucial issue is about realism. Professor Diamond's aim is that of Wittgenstein's aim: Not just to give a profound and well formed content which could be different in other occasions but to raise questions, on the philosophical procedure itself. Historically speaking, philosophy deals with the origins of the meaning via language. Doing this way, language gives all the linguistic media to fulfill this purpose. What's philosophy in the analytic tradition?

i) The search for the use of meanings. ii) The overview of the use which is the description of the meaning. What we don't know it is the kind of use. The notion of use has a historical meaning. In the wittgensteinian epoch some uses were of a different kind as we now know of using them. Equally, in the same epoch the reduction to behaviorism was equal to empiricism. In our days cognitivism is the reduction to a full blooded naturalism. What's left to be consistent to the spirit of philosophy? In my opinion: *realism*. It's hard to say but a very fact that the use of the meaning of realism is different now as it was before. Perhaps, it is the central theme that Wittgenstein was questioning about.

With all of my due respect, Professor Diamond is doing her best to make this clear. She avoids to call Wittgenstein as a realist and prefers to use the philosophical term/attribute in methodological reasons (purposes). Her aim is to use the term "*proverb*" in order to give a clear description of the meaning without the indicative connotation which is necessary but not the only one.<sup>5</sup> Using the term "*proverb*" means that Wittgenstein is preparing us to see some kind of the uses of meaning but not the nature of meaning itself. That is unspeakable, like logic and ethics. We do know something of them using proverbs or narration about their use in our world. The kind of use is sometimes before our eyes in the language that we're participating with the others. Is this true or it's the other way around? We're preparing ourselves to see the differences or the nuances in the meaning through the uses of proverbs. Through the function of them we could see things with a clearer way. It's like the true role of metaphors.<sup>6</sup>

So, what's new in the Wittgensteinian theses? To describe the aim of philosophy, which could mean: An acceptance upon: To search, to hide, to reconsider or to reveal the meanings, and the sense of quieting about them as well. This is just an activity and such an activity needs a stable foundation or a base to be acted upon it. The activity of some kind is surely the linguistic function with all of its performances.

Gradually, we're coming to the hard bedrock of the forms of life. If we see the things under the prism of realism, there is nothing which can be used as a foundation in order to explain the meaning of them. I'm not talking about the other philosophical theories. I'm referring to realism because I consider myself being a realist as well. There are times whereas I'm convinced that Wittgenstein is a realist and some others that he is not. But it could be an

anachronistic view on treating the wittgensteinian theory in the recent terms of a full blooded realism. I agree with Diamond's thesis. Maybe this could be the reason we use the term "*proverb*", by using the method of analogy. The crucial matter is how we could attach the term "*realism*" to some of wittgensteinian statements about the sense of meanings in the language. What's the kind of use he is making of? Is it obvious or not? Questioning about them means at the same time that we eventually realize their presence. If I'm reading her in right way, the term "*synchronic criterion*" which she's using in the text could be an answer to the problem. To be synchronic means to be in terms of the language games (my complement). Surely, it seems to me that we deal with two fields, the realism and the metaphor: the meanings on the surface, in order to be overviewed with multiple if not complicated versions as well.

Wittgenstein undermines deliberately every philosophical procedure by the same means of doing philosophy. Of course, this is too risky because he may fall into. Perhaps he fails preparing us in order to avoid the danger, although he tries doing it by sending signals. This is his honest gesture to us: understanding the moment and judging it plus the transforming, fitting if not surviving the meanings.

I would asking while I'm talking about metaphor, whether this is going to have the same sense with Diamond's thesis. She is using proverbs in order to make clear some kind of use. A proverb which is probably a synoptic and metaphorical narration about the essence of things in the world. In using a borrowed phrase by the common sense context we make facts and state of affairs more obvious, far more lucid. The answer might be in a far process ...

By doing this philosophical move, Wittgenstein invites us to a game. The game is a rule-guided activity and is being performed for our pleasure. In any case, it's a much serious enterprise. Dealing with the meanings of the words and propositions means that we are aware of the crucial philosophical problems and their legitimate subversion by the vast philosophical literature as well. None the less, he is also waiting for the contingent if not legitimate answers. In the *Tractatus* he is holding the philosophical and pedagogic role to prepare us simply for the use of the expressions, by denoting the determinate meaning of the words and showing towards the ineffability of Ethics, Aesthetics and Metaphysics. In his later period of writing he employs the meaning of use, giving the more exegetical and descriptive version for the meaning in general inside the context of the everyday affairs. "What the words mean" depends on the common language, not on how they are taken or how the speaker intends them to be taken. How they ought to be taken is a matter of what the result of maximization of agreement among the utterances of the language community.<sup>7</sup>

Perhaps, in doing so, there will be no absolute need of a systematic academic research filled by literal expressions. On the contrary, could be metaphorical terms making the sense and the use of linguistic expression more obvious and transparent. If this is going to happen by narrations, i.e. reasons in order to explain the facts in the familiar language game, we may accept them. Notwithstanding, if we consider this strategy as a tough procedure, let give ourselves a break waiting some other moment, in order for the meaning to be revealed on us – not them to be imposed. This is by no means a superficial quietism. Most of the time the meaning is open to us on the surface – "before our eyes".

Using the figurative language Wittgenstein is claiming to denote the significant changes in his philosophical work, by subverting any attempt to create a so called systematic philosophical theory. He denies of doing any kind of dogmatic doctrines, or giving additional meaning to the meanings we already have at hand.<sup>8</sup> Wittgenstein is doing a decent, a human effort in providing us with a respect for the meaning of life. This is a human, a true human practice.

#### Endnotes

<sup>1</sup> J. Conant, "Elucidation and Nonsense in Frege and early Wittgenstein" and C. Diamond, "Ethics, Imagination and the Tractatus" in *The New Wittgenstein*, (2001) A.Crary and R.Read (eds), London: Routledge, pp. 149 -217. C. Diamond(1991), *The Realistic Spirit: Wittgenstein, Philosophy and the Mind*, Cambridge Mass: MIT Press.

<sup>2</sup> *The Literary Wittgenstein*, (2004) J. Gibson and W. Huebner (eds), London: Routledge, pp. 1-13.

<sup>3</sup> J. Conant, *ibid*, pp.205-13, H. Sluga(1980) , *Gottlob Frege*, London: Routledge.

<sup>4</sup> C.Diamond, "Wittgenstein, mathematics, and ethics: Resisting the attractions of realism.", in *The Cambridge Companion to Wittgenstein* (1996), H.Sluga and D. Stern (eds), Cambridge, U.K.: Cambridge University Press,pp. 246-56.

<sup>5</sup> *Ibid*.

<sup>6</sup> A.Stroll, "Wittgenstein's Foundational Metaphors", in *The Third Wittgenstein*, (2004), D. Moyal – Sharrock (ed.), Hampshire, U.K.: Ashgate, pp.13-24, see also J. Gill, *Wittgenstein and Metaphor*, (1981), Washington, D.C.: University Press of America.

<sup>7</sup> S.C.Wheeler: "Wittgenstein as Davidson on Metaphor", in *Wittgenstein und die Metaphor* (2004), Arnsald, Kertscher and Kross (eds.), Berlin: Parerga Verlag, pp. 195-220.

<sup>8</sup> Doing so, Wittgenstein, is partly compatible with Davidson's idea about metaphor: "The central mistake against which I shall be inveighing is the idea that a metaphor has, in addition to its literal sense or meaning, another sense or meaning." D. Davidson, "What Metaphors Mean.", in *On Metaphor*,(1978), Sheldon Sacks, ed., Chicago: University of Chicago Press, pp.29-46.



# Moral Judgments as Part of What Ethics Must Show

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## 1. Saying and showing, sense and nonsense

The main purpose of this text is to show that expressions such as “Well, you *ought* to want to behave better,” which in the *Lecture on Ethics* Wittgenstein names “absolute judgments of value,” have to be expressed despite the fact that they are not legitimate propositions of language and so cannot be *said*. The reason why this is so is that *showing* what is right or wrong to do is part of a correct and coherent way of living, which in our case means the living of a happy life. To go through all this I’ll first need to talk about some essential distinctions and “definitions” present in both the *Lecture* and in the *Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus*. I take these works as containing the same conception of language and of Ethics, even if the *Lecture* dates from ten years later than the *Tractatus*.

Let’s begin with the saying and showing distinction. According to Wittgenstein’s own criteria the only language which can be named as such is the one following the radical and restrictive logical conditions of *sense*: a descriptive language which must fit reality positively or negatively and which has bipolarity as one of its main traits. Given these conditions, the fitting in question is only possible between *language* and *facts*. And this is why its propositions are solely empirical and scientific propositions. Everything which does not follow these conditions is therefore *nonsense*, and in this domain we can find Logic, Ethics, Aesthetics, Religion and Philosophy itself. Nowadays it is already clear that the nonsense is not to be considered as mere gibberish and dismissed as such (surely, one major exception is the “resolute reading,” which I’ll however not discuss here), as is also clear that Wittgenstein’s intention was not a positivist one as the Vienna Circle thought it was. On the contrary, Wittgenstein was trying to keep in safe the things he thought were the most important ones, Ethics surely among them all. In doing this Wittgenstein gave Philosophy a new task, the one of clarifying language and sorting out nonsense; so Philosophy has now to be a critical activity and do no more “philosophical propositions” of any kind, as we can read at the paragraph 4.112 of the *Tractatus*. Now we also know that this book had not only a logical purpose, but that the cleaning in question had major ethical reasons: in restricting language to an empirical and scientific language, Wittgenstein also aimed to bring peace to our disturbed and confused philosophical minds struggling to understand what Ethics is all about and writing innumerable (mistaken) moral theories. As Wittgenstein himself told in a letter to Ficker, what we cannot speak is what really mattered to him (Wittgenstein 2001, letter 53.) And as we can see in the *Tractatus*: that about what we cannot speak shows itself and trying to talk about it can’t but bring us damage.

So let’s now try to understand what is this *nonsense* Wittgenstein is trying to dismiss as (logically and morally) damaging. First of all, it doesn’t seem to me to be the nonsense of “logical propositions,” tautologies and contradictions (even if these are equally not legitimate propositions); these show themselves immediately as such and do not lead us to any *illusion of sense*. Wittgenstein is not entirely coherent, but the term he uses to talk about it is *sinnlos*. Things are different when it comes about the term *unsinnig*: its use in the *Tractatus* is deeply related to supposed

“metaphysical-philosophical propositions” attempting to say what is already shown in no matter which “philosophical domain.” This kind of expression is not immediately absurd or tautological but could give us a certain *illusion of sense*. And this is why Wittgenstein’s own example could at first sound as a legitimate proposition: “the question whether the Good is more or less identical than the Beautiful” (*Tractatus*, 4.003.)

The suggestion I would like to advance here is that the nonsense Wittgenstein is dismissing is the one which, when expressed, is *superfluous*. The saying and showing distinction was of the utmost importance exactly because we cannot say what we cannot say (due to the logical conditions of sense), but also because we cannot say what shows itself (and even the logical conditions of sense show themselves in sound language.) And what shows itself is that which is necessary as a condition to that which is sayable. The nonsense Wittgenstein is dismissing could then receive the following “definition”: nonsense is every attempt to say what is *necessarily shown*.

At the paragraph 4.1212 of the *Tractatus* Wittgenstein says that “what *can* be shown *cannot* be said.” All logical (internal) properties of language show themselves in language; the way language works is already given with language itself. In the same manner, the very essence of the world is shown through language: “logic is not a body of doctrine, but a mirror-image of the world” (*Tractatus*, 6.13.) That the world exists is already given with the fact of language itself. And this is necessary, it could not be otherwise. (We can find several other examples concerning this point in the *Tractatus* and in the *Notebooks 1914-1916*; however, I don’t have space here to discuss it longer.)

Now I would like to suggest that this is exactly the same when it comes to Ethics: we cannot have ethical propositions because, as it happens in the case of Logic, it would be *superfluous* to assert something which is necessarily shown.

## 2. Ethics

How could Ethics be shown? To answer this question we actually need to be sure that for Wittgenstein there’s something like necessary ethical values as there are necessary logical properties of language. And I think we can give a positive answer to this question through Wittgenstein’s own “definition” of what Ethics could be.

He does this in the *Lecture* unfolding Moore’s definition given in the *Principia Ethica*: “Ethics is the general inquiry into what is good.” Wittgenstein then says that we could also think about Ethics as the “inquiry into what is valuable, or, into what is really important, or I could have said Ethics is the inquiry into the meaning of life, or into what makes life worth living, or into the right way of living” (Wittgenstein 1997, p.66.) Certain elements of this definition can also be found in the *Tractatus* but in a more ridiculing manner, as in the paragraphs 6.52 and 6.521 concerning the unspeakable sense of life: *there is* a sense of life which can be attained as a solution to the supposed problems of life, only it cannot be *said*; or as in the paragraphs 6.423 and 6.43 concerning the good and bad will

which will then match with the happy or the unhappy life; or as in the last but one paragraph (6.54) where Wittgenstein says that *there is* a correct way of seeing the world. (I'll not talk about the logical aspect of this correction, exactly because I'm taking an ethical point of view, but I'm aware that both ethical and logical aspects of seeing the world correctly are of importance for what Wittgenstein is aiming at in the *Tractatus*.)

All this cannot be said or put into a moral theory and even the term "definition" employed above is in this sense misleading. But I think Wittgenstein's Ethics is not empty of a content which, as I argue in my thesis, could be qualified as stoical. The point I'm suggesting is not that we can find stoical influences in his works, but that we can understand his Ethics better if we understand it as having several stoical elements and characteristics and that a correct and coherent way of seeing the world must necessarily integrate those traits. So, for instance, the will, the carrier of Ethics, can be good or bad and lead to a correct or an incorrect way of life. In the *Notebooks* the correct way of life is identified with the happy life (entry 30.7.16) and is characterized as a life lived in the present, without fears and hopes, without fear of death, in accordance with the world as it is and in accordance with whatever happens in the world, because in it everything happens by mere chance. The world of facts is neither bad nor good, but these are characteristics of the willing subject which, as a limit, does not appear *in the world*. Still, this happy life should integrate good actions which are in themselves rewarding, as is stated in the paragraph 6.422 of the *Tractatus*:

The first thought in setting up an ethical law of the form 'thou shalt...' is: And what if I do not do it? But it is clear that ethics has nothing to do with punishment and reward in the ordinary sense. This question as to the *consequences* of an action must therefore be irrelevant. At least these consequences will not be events. For there must be something right in that formulation of the question. There must be some sort of ethical reward and ethical punishment, but this must lie in the action itself. (And this is clear also that the reward must be something pleasant, and the punishment something unpleasant.)

Good actions bring the reward in themselves and I think that this can only mean for the willing subject a good consciousness, peace of mind, or in stoical terms, *ataraxia*. Moral correctness is here identified to happiness.

Notice that, in this sense, attaining happiness is nothing more than a matter of *attitude*. It doesn't depend on any external conditions in the world, but only on the good will of the subject. More than that, this positive attitude towards life *is* already happiness. As we can read in the *Notebooks*, "the will is an attitude of the subject to the world" (entry 4.11.16), and this is why the world of the happy person is different from the world of the unhappy: one has to want to be happy and one has to want to lead a correct life.

Taking this all into account, we can now talk about both how Ethics shows itself and how what is shown provides a criterion for action.

I think Ethics can be shown in various ways, through examples and good or bad actions of other people, through literature stories and characters, through the advices of someone of a solid and coherent character, but above all through the way of life we see the happy person living. At the same time, the happy person is the criterion and the guide for both the actions and the attitude one should have towards the world and life.

Surely, none of these things can be said or turned into a moral theory, and this "criterion" could never be a theoretical or scientific one, as Wittgenstein himself puts at the very end of the *Lecture*: "Ethics so far as it springs from the desire to say something about the ultimate meaning of life, the absolute good, the absolute value, can be no science." But the whole of what is shown is *necessary* as a condition to the very fact of life, and to what we conceive as morality (see the entry 21.7.16 in the *Notebooks*). Necessary as it is, all talk about Ethics, pretending to be true or pretending to be philosophical and giving us this very appearance of sense, is *superfluous*. With this superfluity, not only are we breaking the logical rules of language as given by Wittgenstein, but we are still morally in fault: understanding why the silence over "ethical propositions" is required is also part of the correct way of seeing the world. (Surely, that we constantly try to run "against the boundaries of language" is due to that "tendency in the human mind" which Wittgenstein says at the end of the *Lecture* he deeply respects.)

Now, given the necessity of Ethics, there being values and criteria that show themselves, and given the demand of coherency and of right actions for the sake of the happy life, value judgments are not only allowed but actually required as a way of showing. This is how we should understand that passage of the *Lecture* where one is obliged to reply: "Well, you *ought* to want to behave better."

This expression is *obligatory* as a correct reaction to a wrong behavior. This too marks the difference between relative and absolute value: there's nothing wrong in answering "Ah then that's all right" to a bad tennis player who says "I know I'm playing badly but I don't want to play any better"; but things are different concerning bad *moral* actions: "But suppose I had told one of you a preposterous lie and he came up to me and said 'You're behaving like a beast' and then I were to say 'I know I behave badly, but then I don't want to behave any better,' could he then say 'Ah then that's all right'? Certainly not; he would say 'Well, you *ought* to want to behave better'" (Wittgenstein 1997, p.68.) "Certainly not" is the crucial expression here. The silence concerning someone else's bad behavior is a bad behavior too and would not be in accordance with a correct way of leading life; it would equally be a bad action implying its own punishment.

In this sense, the silence Wittgenstein is demanding over ethical expressions pretending to be propositions of language should in no way lead to an immoral silence when it comes to others' immoral actions. This seems to me to be still in complete accordance with the individual character of Wittgenstein's Ethics, but shows us a step further in the way this Ethics can take others into account.

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# Seeing the Investigations Through Cubist Eyes

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In 1932 Wittgenstein wrote, 'my main movement of thought is a completely different one today from 15 to 20 years ago. And this is similar to when a painter makes a transition from one school to another' (Wittgenstein 2003). Wittgenstein's movement from the *Tractatus* to the *Investigations* is similar to a transition from representational art to Cubism. He shifts from a fixed logical viewpoint outside the text to a text of dynamic, multi-perspectival and interactive grammatical remarks. The text of the *Investigations* is like an early Cubist painting in form, content, and meaning.

At the beginning of the Cubist movement, Apollinaire notes that 'the new painters were sharply criticized for their preoccupation with geometry. And yet, geometric figures are the essence of draftsmanship ... It may be said that geometry is to the plastic arts what grammar is to the art of writing' (Apollinaire 1960). Wittgenstein's use of grammar is similar to the Cubist use of geometry. Grammar is not something hidden (to be discovered) but something that becomes clear or surveyable through a rearrangement (PI 122). In the preface to the *Investigations*, Wittgenstein describes himself as a draftsman, and writes that 'a thinker is very much like a draughtsman whose aim it is to represent all the interrelations between things' (CV 12e). Early Cubists sought clarity of form in order to reveal the dynamic interaction of phenomena. By reducing forms to basic geometrical components, Cubists attempted to present a multi-perspectival or multi-aspectival view of a scene (Miller 2001):

Cubism is an art concerned with interaction; the interaction with different aspects; the interaction between structure and movement; the interaction between solids and the space around them; the interaction between the unambiguous signs made on the surface of the picture and the changing reality which they stand for. It is an art of dynamic liberation from all static categories (Berger 1965).

The Cubist concern for spatial and temporal flux, the interaction between different aspects, and the visual revelation of interlocking phenomena is similar to Wittgenstein's preoccupation with the spatial and temporal phenomena of language, aspect-seeing, and seeing grammatical interconnections.

The clarity or perspicuity sought in Wittgenstein's grammatical remarks is similar to Cubist attempts to present a multi-perspectival or multi-aspectival view of a scene. One of the problems addressed by early Cubists was how to represent an object or scene from differing viewpoints simultaneously in order to give equal validity to each. One solution was to represent a scene as if an observer were 'moving around an object [in order to] seize it from several successive appearances' (Miller 2001). In 1930, Wittgenstein notes that each of the sentences he writes is trying to say the whole thing (the same thing) over and over again: 'It is as though they were all simply views of one object seen from different angles' (CV 7e). In the preface to the *Investigations*, he writes that 'the same or almost the same points were always being approached afresh from different directions, and new sketches made'

(PI ix). He speaks in terms reminiscent of Cubism in his general remarks on philosophy (PI 89-133). He also notes that 'the axis of reference of our examination must be rotated, but about the fixed point of our real need' (PI 108). Rotating the axis of reference is a recognizable Cubist technique.

The multi-perspectival or multi-aspectival nature of Wittgenstein's investigations can be seen in individual remarks as well as longer sequences. One example of an individual remark that describes a concept from different viewpoints simultaneously is §33 of the *Investigations*. In response to a claim that all one needs to know (or guess) in order to understand an ostensive definition is what the person giving the explanation is pointing to, Wittgenstein asks what pointing to the shape, colour, or number of an object consists in: 'Point to a piece of paper. – And now point to its shape – now to its colour – now to its number (that sounds queer). – How did you do it?' (PI 33) He suggests a possible response: we mean different things each time we point. He then asks how this is done, and suggests that we concentrate our attention on the colour or the shape. Naturally, the next question is 'how is *that* done?' Wittgenstein approaches the investigation from yet another direction when he concedes that we will, no doubt, do something different when we point to (or look at) colours and shapes, but asks whether we always do the *same* thing when we direct our attention to a colour (for example). He asks us to imagine various different cases. To indicate but a few:

'Is this blue the same blue over there? Do you see any difference?' – You are mixing paint and you say 'It's hard to get the blue of this sky.' 'It's turning fine, you can already see blue sky again.' 'Look what different effects these two blues have.' 'Do you see the blue book over there? Bring it here.' 'This blue signal-light means ...' 'What's this blue called? – Is it 'indigo'?' (PI 33)

We may do many different things while attending to the colour of something. Wittgenstein also reminds us that this is the sort of thing that happens *while* we direct our attention at something, but that it isn't these things by themselves that make us say someone is attending to the shape, the colour, and so on (PI 33). This leads to an investigation of 'attending to a shape' as well as an investigation of the 'characteristic experiences' of pointing to a shape.

What is the point of all of these investigations? Why present a word or concept from differing viewpoints simultaneously? One reason is that when we do philosophy we often nourish our thinking with only one kind of example (PI 593). Wittgenstein challenges our one-sided diet of examples by presenting numerous cases from differing viewpoints simultaneously (thereby giving equal validity to each). (He often offers not merely one or two examples, but seven or eight.) He also effectively draws attention to the spatial and temporal dimensions of our language-use. And, by presenting our words or concepts from differing

viewpoints simultaneously, he attempts to change our way of looking at things (PI 144). He writes that 'we predicate of a thing what lies in the method of representing it. Impressed by the possibility of a comparison we think we are perceiving a state of affairs of the highest generality' (PI 104). He suggests that when we think we are making discoveries in philosophy we are really discovering a new way of seeing or a new comparison (PI 400): 'What you have primarily discovered is a new way of looking at things. As if you had invented a new way of painting, or, again, a new metre, or a new kind of song' (PI 401). This is not a dismissal of philosophy but its validation. According to Wittgenstein, 'what a Copernicus or a Darwin really achieved was not the discovery of a true theory but a fertile new point of view' (CV 18e).

A new way of seeing alters both the meaning and content of the text or canvas. The meaning of a Cubist painting is not its subject matter but the relation between the seer and the seen (Berger 1969). As Berger explains:

It [is] impossible to *confront* the objects or forms in a Cubist work. Not only because of the multiplicity of viewpoints – so that, say, a view of a table from below is combined with a view of the table from above and from the side – but also because the forms portrayed never present themselves as a totality. The totality is the surface of the picture, *which is now the origin and sum of all that one sees*. The viewpoint of Renaissance perspective, fixed and outside the picture, but to which everything within the picture was drawn, has become a field of vision which is the picture itself (Berger 1969).

Similarly, it is impossible to confront objects or forms in Wittgenstein's philosophical writings. One of the recurring themes of his philosophy is that the description and use of language does not involve objects and their designation. Rather, he attempts to describe the spatial and temporal phenomena of language. A multiplicity of viewpoints ensures that what is presented or described is never static. Wittgenstein puts words into motion. According to Berger, we should not ask of a Cubist painting: Is it true? Or: Is it sincere? Rather, we should ask: Is there movement and continuity? (Berger 1969) The same applies to Wittgenstein's grammatical remarks.

Within a Cubist painting, the relation between any two forms can be inferred but it does not establish the rule for all spatial relationships between all forms in the picture (Berger 1969). These relationships remain dynamic. Similarly, in Wittgenstein's writings the relation between any two forms of expression can be inferred, but this does not establish a rule for all grammatical relationships between all forms of expression in the text. They remain dynamic, and the multiplicity of forms never presents itself as a totality (PI 183). The meaning of Wittgenstein's writings is the relation between the reader and what is read. He claims that readers should be able to see their own thinking in his writings (CV 18e). A viewpoint that is fixed and outside the text (as in conventional philosophy books) becomes a field of vision which is the text itself. In other words, our relationship to Wittgenstein's texts is not a given. We are participants not merely spectators. What is given is the text itself (in the form in which we now have it) and we must find ourselves in relation to it.

In Cubism, another way of describing the relation between the seer and the seen is to say that everything begins and ends with the surface of the painting:

We begin with the surface, but since everything in the picture refers back to the surface we begin with the

conclusion. We then search – not for an explanation, as we do if presented with an image with a single, predominant meaning (a man laughing, a mountain, a reclining nude), but for some understanding of the configuration of events whose interaction is the conclusion from which we began (Berger 1969).

We also begin in Wittgenstein's later philosophy with the text itself. Here, too, everything refers back to the text, so we begin with the conclusion. We then search, not for an explanation, but for an understanding of what we have read. When we gain insight, we do not discover something new but see what has always been before our eyes (which we were previously unable to see). Berger also writes that:

the picture surface acts in Cubist painting as the constant which allows us to appreciate the variables. Before and after every sortie of our imagination into the problematic spaces and through the interconnections of a Cubist painting, we find our gaze resettled on the picture surface, aware once more of two-dimensional shapes on a two-dimensional board or canvas (Berger 1969).

The printed page acts in Wittgenstein's philosophy like the picture surface of a Cubist painting. Before and after every sortie of our imagination (through the grammatical interconnections of his remarks) we find ourselves struck once again by words printed on a page (two-dimensional shapes on a two-dimensional piece of paper). Wittgenstein's remarks, separated from one another by blank space, continually draw our attention to the text itself (as does the juxtaposition of German and English on each page). To fill in the blank spaces between remarks is not to provide missing information, but to add imaginatively to the variations already recorded.

The clarity of form found in Cubist paintings is as philosophically complex as its subjects and materials are deliberately modest (Berger 1965). The simplicity of Cubism is not the result of simplification for its own sake. On the contrary, the aim of Cubism is to arrive at a far more complex image of reality than had been attempted in painting before (Berger 1969). According to Berger, the problem facing Cubists was so complex that their manner of stating it and their trying to solve it absorbed all their attention. Thus, the subjects of Cubism are taken from everyday life, and its subject matter is often confined to the world of the studio. The simplicity of Wittgenstein's later writings is also misunderstood. The description of language-use (for the purpose of conceptual clarification) is so complex that his grammatical investigations often involve the simplest possible conditions. His use of ordinary language and everyday examples is not meant to trivialize philosophical inquiry but to acknowledge and address its complexity. Of all possible notations, ordinary language is the one that pervades our lives. Without the simplicity inherent in his writings Wittgenstein's philosophical task would be overwhelming. Although he writes that philosophy simply puts everything before us and neither explains nor deduces anything, the description of what lies open to view is difficult and complex (PI 126). Further, 'the aspects of things that are most important for us are hidden because of their simplicity and familiarity. (One is unable to notice something because it is always before one's eyes.)' (PI 129) How to make visible what is always before our eyes is a complex philosophical and aesthetic task. When Wittgenstein returns to philosophy in 1929, he returns words from their metaphysical to their everyday use (PI 116). Far from presenting a commonsense view of the world, this return represents a complex and dynamic way of seeing.

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# Wittgenstein's Picture Theory of Language and Self-Reference

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On the basis of reactions that Wittgenstein received from Frege and Russell after they had read the *Tractatus* manuscript he realized that his inspirators did not recognize *Tractatus*'s main idea, which according to Wittgenstein also should be counted as the cardinal problem of philosophy: "The main point is the theory of what can be expressed (gesagt) by propositions – i.e. by language – (and, which comes to the same, what can be *thought*) and what can not be expressed by propositions, but only shown (gezeigt)." (Letter to Russell 19.8.19, Wittgenstein 1974, p. 71)

According to the *Tractatus*'s picture theory the essence of language is depicting reality through the general propositional form. A proposition is a picture of how things are. The picture and what is depicted must have the same logico-mathematical multiplicity of distinct elements of which they are composed. The picture and depicted reality share "the pictorial form" that makes it possible to structure elements within the picture for the purposes of mirroring reality in a conventionally determined way. The pictorial form as a possibility of that structure can have different kinds of representation yet their base is still one logical form.

Propositional representation is possible due to a logical isomorphism between the combination of propositional signs and the possible configuration of things in a depicted situation. The proposition is false if it depicts a non-existing combination of things nevertheless it remains meaningful when this combination of things is possible.

All meaningful propositions are truth-functions of elementary propositions. These elementary propositions are concatenations of logically proper names which are further unanalysable and their meanings are simple objects they go proxy for. The sense of an elementary proposition is one possible combination of these objects, i.e. the state of affairs it depicts. One elementary proposition cannot contain sense of any other, so one cannot entail nor contradict another. An assignment of a truth-value to one elementary proposition is logically independent of an assignment of a true-value to any other. A false elementary proposition is not the negation of a true one, it depicts the state of affairs that it does not obtain.

The idea that language and reality share a definite pictorial form presupposes the metaphysical claim that both an elementary proposition and the possible state of affairs it depicts consist of ultimate elements. Although one of its motivations was to dissolve problems concerning the relationship between elements and complexes, which Russell left unsolved, the picture theory collapses just with this atomistic metaphysics. This collapse is actuated by two of Wittgenstein's tendencies which are interconnected: first, to describe the essence and limits of language, and second, to keep this effort as general as possible. That means that, by describing the essence and limits of language also cover this description because it is a part of the examined language.

Thus, on one hand, Wittgenstein generally analyses an elementary proposition as including two kinds of relation: the relation of names, i.e. its internal structure, and

the pictorial relation correlating its names and objects in reality etc. On the other hand, when Wittgenstein expresses the essence of language this way and does it in terms of this language alone, he cannot adduce any particular example of elementary proposition without giving up generality: "If I cannot say *a priori* what elementary propositions there are, then the attempt to do so must lead to obvious nonsense." (TLP 5.5571, Wittgenstein 1961)

The description of an element is always some descriptive complex. No matter that we "talk" about a name or about an object, because language is a part of reality and simultaneously to say that "something is real" is a language expression. The generality of Wittgenstein's analysis is embedded in the self-referential power of language and seems to lead to paradox and senselessness. This is the reason why in the *Tractatus* Wittgenstein intends to show that posing problems of philosophy, i.e. general problems, is a consequence of misunderstanding the logic of our language.

The aim of *Tractatus*, which is drawing a limit to the expression of thought or, in other words, to determine a boundary between what can be said clearly and what can be only shown because attempts to express it lead to nonsense, can be interpreted as an endeavor to protect language from what we will call "the senseless flexion" that emerges when philosophical problems are posed. The flexion strengthens with the generality of expressed problems and finally becomes self-reflexion. The main point of this interpretation is that the generality of an expressed problem, the self-reference of the expression and senselessness are mutually connected. This connection is the breeding ground of which logico-semantic paradoxes are born.

The Wittgenstein's saying-showing distinction at the same time proscribes general propositions about the world and the realm of value as well as propositions about the essence of propositional representation. Unlike bipolar meaningful propositions and their limiting cases, tautologies and contradictions, these propositions concerning transcendental preconditions of the world and its symbolic representation are just "pseudo-propositions". They are senseless attempts to say things that could not be otherwise.

Thus, on one hand, *Tractatus*'s list of ineffabilia includes ethical and aesthetical values, the logic of facts, the atomistic ontology, that there are laws of nature, that the world is my world, that there is no soul, the meaning of life, everything that is higher, the mystical etc. On the other hand, we should pass over in silence that propositions and what they depict share the pictorial form, the logical form or the logico-mathematical multiplicity, that there are the meaning of signs and the sense of propositions, that something falls under a formal concept such as a name or a number, that propositions are linked together according to the rules of logical syntax and inferences, etc. In other words, we should pass over in silence everything that is stated about the Picture Theory above.

Wittgenstein's prohibition of logico-syntactic and semantic categories was supposed to avoid difficulties

encountered by Frege and Russell. Frege's riddle of "concept of 'concept'", by which we try to name the unsaturated entity, i.e. concept, although names can only refer to something which is saturated, i.e. objects, as well as Liar-like paradoxes, whose structure can be demonstrated on that of set-theoretic paradoxes, i.e.  $R \{X \mid X X\} \leftrightarrow R R \leftrightarrow RR$ , are all based on circularity and self-referential or "impredicative" definition. Russell tried to dissolve these paradoxes by means of his theory of types which was motivated by the so called "vicious-circle principle": "Whatever involves *all* of a collection must not be one of the collection." (Whitehead and Russell 1910, p. 37)

According to Wittgenstein, Russell's theory of types is superfluous and must be done away with by a proper theory of symbolism which should show that "what seem to be *different kinds of things* are symbolized by different kinds of symbols which *cannot* possibly be substituted in one another's place". (Letter to Russell 1.1913, Wittgenstein 1974, pp. 19-20) From the perspective of the saying-showing distinction it is not possible to establish rules of logical syntax by mentioning the meaning of a sign as Russell does. (See TLP 3.33-3.334, Wittgenstein 1961) The sign of a propositional function already contains the "prototype" of its argument and thus a function cannot contain itself. In case some function  $Ffx$  could be its own argument "there would be a proposition ' $F(Ffx)$ ', in which the outer function  $F$  and the inner function  $F$  must have different meanings, since the inner one has the form  $\varphi(fx)$  and the outer one has the form  $\psi(\varphi(fx))$ . Only the letter ' $F$ ' is common to the two functions, but the letter by itself signifies nothing. This immediately becomes clear if instead of ' $F(Fu)$ ' we write ' $(\varphi):F(\varphi u)$ .  $\psi u = Fu$ '. That disposes of Russell's paradox." (TLP 3.333, Wittgenstein 1961)

But is really such "proper theory of symbolism" that disposes of self-reference and paradoxes arising of it conceivable? The senseless pronouncements of *Tractatus* itself prove that such theory is not conceivable. *Tractatus* is an example of a general theory of language, i.e. the picturing of theory of picturing, which flexes to the self-picturing and at the same time tries to protect itself from this senseless-flexion. Wittgenstein's propositions ought to be only elucidatory and who understands them finally recognizes them as senseless, "when he has climbed out through them, on them, over them. (He must so to speak throw away the ladder, after he has climbed up on it.) He must transcend these propositions, and then he will see the world aright". (TLP 6.54, Wittgenstein 1961)

Anyway, is the picture of the world devoid of this kind of propositions the right picture of the world? Indeed, elimination of the senseless flexion from a language entails the loss of its enchanting ability of expressing an infinity by finitely many expressions. The self-reference should be conceived as an essence of language, as some-

thing not to be disposed of. Various semantic paradoxes, such as Grelling's, Berry's, Richard's, Curry's etc., can be then perceived not as a menace but as a celebration of the miracle of language.

Recently Stephen Yablo has tried to prove that "self-reference is neither necessary nor sufficient for Liar-like paradox". He has propounded the paradox that can be paraphrased as follows: Every proposition in an infinite sequence of propositions says that all subsequent propositions are untrue. (Yablo 1993) Paradox arises because it is not possible to decide the true-value of any proposition in the sequence. But is this paradox really without self-reference? One can eliminate self-reference only if one can distinguish between "all subsequent propositions" and "all propositions" within an infinite sequence of propositions. Until we are not able to determine a rule for such infinity comparison, i.e. express that rule by denumerable words, infinitely many propositions still collapse into one proposition that says about itself that is untrue. For it is just self-reference that spreads an infinity.

The ability of saying anything, or more generally, picturing anything is based on the ability of self-picturing. Whatever can be counted as language which enables to picture anything including this picturing itself. The "creativity of language", that allows us to compositionally form an infinite number of meaningful propositions with a finite number of marks and noises, is rooted in the self-reference, among others because the rules that determine which strings of marks and noises are linguistic expressions as well as the rules of syntax and compositionality are expressible in that language.

Generality means being able to include or subsume itself. That is how a paradox arises because an infinity mirrors in something particular and vice versa. What is vexing about paradoxes is not the circularity or our inability to decide the true-values, but our insight into an infinity. We fear we would name the infinity and thus we would become a mirror depicting another mirror. We would see only the mirror instead of our picture in the mirror. The fear of *circulus vitiosus* has roots in *horror infiniti*.

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# Do We Really Need Negative Atomic Facts to Make Sense Out of the Tractarian Sense Theory?

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This paper defends that negative atomic facts are irrelevant to the tractarian theory of sense, even if it deals with the sense of false and truly negated propositions. In other words, we do not need negative facts compounding the tractarian ontology, if we focus on two well-known tractarian features. First, the intuitivity of assuming propositions as maps of reality, as a sort of rehearsal simulating possible articulations of denoted objects. Consequently, to understand a map does not imply that the represented complex is actualized in the world, neither now, nor in the past nor in the future. A second tractarian feature is the assumption that the tractarian sense theory conveys two asymmetric levels, namely: projection of sense and determination of truth value. In this way, to understand a proposition, irrespective of being true or false, is to understand the very same fact (always possible!) (TLP 4.021,2<sup>1</sup>). As a result, we can assume that the tractarian passage 2.06 does not introduce another ontological category, that is, it does not maintain that negative facts compound the world, but it conveys an only-terminological distinction between the existence of state of affairs (positive facts) and its inexistence (negative facts).

## 1. Introduction

The semantics of falsehood and negation represents a problem for realist and descriptivist accounts of truth. We can hold here the realism in semantics as a conjugation of two main theses, both largely intuitive and reasonable which are part of our natural vision of descriptive sentence sense and truth. Namely:

- i) we must find in the reality what would make a descriptive proposition true.
- ii) we must be able to identify in the reality the part or portion of it – it does not matter if either a state of affairs, or a fact, or a complex of entities, etc. – which would make it true.

These two theses, when conjugated, reflect the assumption of a correspondentist paradigm as the basis to the condition and truth value determination of a proposition. To understand a proposition is thus to be able to identify the part of reality that should be actualized in order to make it true. This account represents, in principle, the possibility to identify the truth value of a proposition by comparing it to reality. Their sense should logically come prior in comparison to the truth values. The elegant naturalness of realist account of truth is remarkable: in order to know whether a sentence is true or false, we have “to take a look” at reality. This sort of natural procedure makes such an account more congenial as other truth theories which lie on strictly pragmatic or contextual elements.

As the correspondentist account of truth holds, true propositions stand for, substitute, describe, represent or identify actual facts of reality, that is, what is the case. This demand seems not to be problematic in the true-propositions field. Nevertheless, when this descriptive feature is given, which would false propositions identify in the reality? Do they not identify anything? Do they fail in

descriptiveness? Are they, thus, a sort of bad symbols? Are they no propositions at all? *Aber man kann aus einem falschen Satz Schlüsse ziehen*. Their sense is legitimate. They do make sense, although they are not true. Their falsehood does not damage their sense (TLP 4.023). Hence, must also the false propositions describe something when we follow the correspondentist principles? However, if we follow this reasoning, what they should identify? Do they describe negative facts, merely possible and not actual facts? Do they identify the not-being, what is not the case? Comparatively, does the truly negated proposition after the negation begin to identify stipulative negative aspects of reality? When we keep on demanding a uniform treatment of propositions in the descriptiveness mainframe, what would the ontological correlate to linguistic contradictions be like? Would they be contradictory facts, impossible facts, real or actual absurds? Should we thus demand that reality should also be compound by contradictory facts?

“Only the conjunction of some objective elements can make a sentence true”. This kind of classical realism which demands a metaphysics with independent object is a main feature of the *suus generis* ontology of Wittgenstein’s *Tractatus*. The tractarian system presupposes a net of discrete and eternal objects compounding reality which defines an exhaustive net of possible combination of complexes (*der logische Raum*). Question: How does this peculiar realist, but paradigmatic, system heritage and treat this problem with false and truly negated propositions?

## 2. Development

The philosophy exposed systematically in Wittgenstein’s *Tractatus Logico-philosophicus* is an attempt to determine the semantic limits of every possible language. This is done by a logical investigation of the propositional symbolism *i.e.* by an analysis of our capacity for representation using statements or sentences (*Sätze*) which describes states of affairs (*Sachverhalte*). As Wittgenstein states just in the beginning of his preface, “this book intends to determine the limits of what can be expressed by our thoughts”. Wittgenstein argues that the essence of language is descriptive. As a result, all other possible use of language should be analyzed in terms of descriptive use done by descriptive sentences. Every proposition is a logical representation from a fact, because the names in an all-analyzed proposition are symbols to the objects which compound the represented fact. The name and the named object must have the same logical form. The possible articulation of names in proposition has to be necessarily suitable to the possible articulation of objects in facts. The syntax of language, *i.e.* all meaningful linguistic structures, has to match the “syntax” of world. In clear opposition to Frege, the complex logical forms are guaranteed by the names in proposition which have the same possible articulations of objects that constitute the facts in the world. Furthermore there is no possibility of lack of truth value or non-denotative names. All legitimate propositions have a truth value because all names have its own referenced object (TLP 5.4733). Logical forms, to Wittgenstein, are not



given by complex propositions as Frege thought but by the existence of objects denoted by the names in a proposition. What sustains this account is the assumption that propositions are *Bilder* of reality (TLP 4.01–4.016).

To express representation Wittgenstein uses *Bild* in *Tractatus*, word that has little technical sense, but a broad semantic scope and application, from simple drawings, portraits and pictures to complex maps or scientific models. It seems clear that the tractarian *Bild* must be understood preferably as maps or models, given that some exegetic problems should be avoided.

One can hold that an exegetic problem to be avoided by this understanding is the requirement of negative facts in order to allow the sense of false or truly negated propositions. When we understand propositions as maps of reality, we do not need to assume the existence of negative facts compounding the reality. Here, we have to draw an apparently trivial but important distinction. The propositions in *Tractatus* should not be held as portraits or pictures, but as maps or models. All portraits are *Bilder*, but there are *Bilder* which are not portraits. Following the tractarian account, the propositions are not portraits, they are maps, models. A portrait demands certain iconicity, certain material similarity or likeness between representation and represented complex. For all intents and purposes, the important step by the tractarian theory of sense is to state that the propositions must have certain logical or structural similarity to the represented complex, and not material. The propositions have to be able to expose or to show, by means of their structural articulation, the represented complex form, that is, the possibility of articulation shown by the represented complex constituents. The representation constituents and the represented complex constituents can, but do not have to be, materially similar. Moreover, it makes no sense to have portraits from non-existent facts. On contrary, we can have models or maps of complexes which neither exist nor have ever existed. We can not have portraits from future facts, but we can have models or maps of complexes which do not exist, but can exist.

As a result, it would be misleading to understand *Bild* as portrait in *Tractatus*, the more direct and secure analogy would be with models, or even maps, that simulate by means of their constituents a reality (possible) part. In fact, when we talk about maps, we only need to understand the “cardinality” of the map, how many and which are its relevant constituent points. We have to be able to understand the reference of these constituents and understand how they are articulated, that is, its configuration (cf. TLP 2.1–2.182). Once we have understood the map, we can search a correspondent fact in the world. In this case, we do not search a negative fact, but an obviously positive one, namely: the fact understood through the map, the fact shown by the map. If the fact is not actualized in the world, the map is so to speak “false”. If it is actualized, the map is “true”. Hence, just as understanding a map does not imply that the represented complex indeed exists, to understand a proposition does not imply that the represented complex must exist in the world either.

The map and its constituent points represent differently, just as the proposition and its names. “Namen gleichen Punkten, Sätze Pfeilen, sie haben Sinn” (cf. TLP 3.144). We understand maps and propositions through the determined articulation of their points or names which refer to points and objects of a reality part. We build the map sense through the reference and articulation of its points. We build the proposition sense through the reference and articulation of its names. This feature is especially clear in

fictional books which contain sophisticated but “false” maps. Despite this “falsehood” they can be understood and systematically studied. For instance, we can mention the sophisticated maps in Tolkien’s classic *Lord of the Rings*. We do not have to assume that there is a fantastic place somewhere in reality, neither positive nor negative, in order to understand Tolkien’s maps. We only need to understand their constituents, what they stand for, and how they are articulated. The irrelevance of negative facts is also clear in another analogy to maps. In spite of being a unsound map, we can understand a map which depicts Berlin as the capital city of Brazil. That is because we know what its points (names) stand for and we know furthermore their so to say grammar (ihr “logischer Raum”). For example: Brazil is a country, and countries are compound by cities, and not *vice versa*. Comparatively, a map that would draw Brazil as the capital of Berlin would be rather hard to understand in this context. In both cases, in order to understand the sense of the map, we do not need to assume that the referent complex exists, whether in a positive or negative sense (for example, neither an actual or unactual fantastic fictional place, nor a positive or negative fact “Berlin Capital Brazil”).

In 4.025 Wittgenstein makes these exigencies to the understanding of a *Bild* even clearer: “*Die Übersetzung einer Sprache in eine andere geht nicht so vor sich, dass man jeden Satz der einen in einen Satz der anderen übersetzt, sondern nur die Satzbestandteile werden übersetzt (...)*” dictionaries deal with names, and not with propositions. In order to understand a proposition in an idiom we need to know mainly the constituent names, their reference or sense and how they articulate with other names. In principle, we can even have an inventory of all possible propositions in a language.

The tractarian elementary propositions are the proper ground to the demand of isomorphism which articulates in a 1-1 manner the logical form of objects and their names. In this way, Wittgenstein could avoid ambiguities, synonymies, and ensure the represented complex exhaustion by the representing complex. In order to understand the sense of fully analyzed propositions we would need objects, their names, and their shared possible articulations. Even if all propositions were false, the world should contain objects in state of affairs. The relation possibilities of which should be respected by the names in the false propositions. In a nutshell, in this case we would need a world with objects, not empty, in order to understand their falsehood. We need objects which are articulated in some fact to be able to project the sense of propositions, even if they were false.

### 3. Conclusion

Atomic facts are irrelevant for the tractarian theory of sense, if we understand that it compounds two distinct and asymmetrical levels: the sense composition by means of a logical projection and the truth value determination by means of a comparison to reality. We need the sense to determinate the truth value, but we do not need the truth value to understand a proposition. In this way, a true proposition  $p$  shows a fact  $x$  that is actualized in the world. If the proposition  $p$  were false, it would show the same fact  $x$ , which, in turn, would not be actualized in the world. If the true proposition  $p$  were negated, its sense would be inverted, but without showing a new fact, but, in a manner of speaking, it has bet wrongly, that is, that  $\text{not-}p$  is true, when  $p$  is actualized. The fact that we understand from  $\text{not-}p$  is exactly the same fact that makes  $p$  true (cf. TLP 4.0621). That is, to understand a proposition, irrespective

of being true or false, it is to understand the same fact, independent of being positive or negative. In order to understand a proposition, just as the understanding of a map, it is mandatory to understand through its articulated constituent points the complex which, when actualized, makes it true. The actualization of this complex in the world (positive fact) or its non-actualization (negative facts) is neither a necessary nor a sufficient condition in order to understand a proposition. Are the negative atomic facts really important to the understanding of the tractarian sense

theory? No, if we understand, as Wittgenstein affirms, that propositions are models, or maps of reality. In this way, we have the protection of our best intuitions. "The world is something entirely positive, it is an effectiveness, it is *Wirklichkeit*".

#### Endnotes

<sup>1</sup> I use *TLP* followed by the respective passage number to quote *Tractatus Logico-philosophicus* from Suhrkamp standard edition.

# Hesiods *Thaumas* und Platons *Mythos von den Zikaden*: Bilder für Wittgensteins Staunen

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Wittgensteins hohe Bewertung von Kunst und Literatur als Medien, sich dem „Unaussprechlichen“ zu nähern, ist bekannt. Während er selbst betonte, wenige Philosophen gelesen zu haben und sich insgesamt über philosophische Werke kritisch äußerte, bekundete er in schriftlichen Aufzeichnungen und in Gesprächen mit Freunden seine Sympathie für Werke der Literatur – insbesondere auch für Märchen sowie Volkserzählungen, die seiner Meinung nach „für alle Völker“ (Drury, 129) geschrieben worden, daher von universaler Bedeutung seien. Häufig wies er auf russische Autoren wie Tolstoi und Dostojewski hin, seine Beziehung zur Antike – abgesehen von mehreren Anspielungen auf Sokrates, Platon und Heraklit – ist hingegen wenig erforscht.

Mit Bezug auf das Thema des diesjährigen Wittgenstein-Symposiums möchte ich im Folgenden über Bilder der griechischen Mythologie sprechen, die aus meiner Sicht für Wittgensteins Philosophieren in mehrfacher Hinsicht relevant sind: Zum einen für dessen ‚stauende‘ Betrachtung der Welt, zum anderen für dessen Präferenz für Bilder – Metaphern, Gleichnisse usw. – deren Bedeutung er insbesondere in späteren Jahren anstelle rationaler Erklärungsversuche im Bereich des verbal und wissenschaftlich schwer Zugänglichen hervorhob. Als dritter Aspekt sei das sinnliche, anschauliche Element bei Wittgenstein und den Griechen erörtert.

## I. *Thaumas* und *Iris* bei Hesiod

In seiner *Theogonie* (*Die Entstehung der Götter* oder *Vom Ursprung der Götter*) nennt Hesiod den „gewaltigen Thaumas“ (vom Stamm *thaum*: das Staunen) – ein Kind des Meeres (*Pontos*) und der Erde (*Gaia*).<sup>1</sup> Bereits in der Antike wurde Thaumas mit dem Wort *thauma* (Wunder) in Verbindung gebracht. Dessen Tochter *Iris* (der Name leitet sich vom griechischen Wort *Iris* für Regenbogen als auch von *Eiris* für Bote ab) steht als Botin zwischen der Welt der Menschen und der Götter. Bekannterweise haben sowohl Platon als auch Aristoteles in ihren Bemerkungen über das Staunen als Anfang des Philosophierens auf Hesiods mythologische Darstellung hingewiesen.

Im Hinblick auf die Bedeutung des Kosmos für die griechische Antike ist es nicht schwer zu verstehen, dass das Phänomen des Stauens als Kind des Meeres und der Erde dargestellt und dessen Tochter, *Iris*, aus dem Bild wechselnder Lichtverhältnisse und Farben erklärt wurde. Darin enthalten sind sowohl ruhende Betrachtung bzw. Schau – *Bewunderung* – als auch reges Beobachten der Veränderungen, die zu einer fragenden *Verwunderung* führen – beide Bestandteile des philosophischen Stauens. Dass Thaumas in der Spätantike auch als Vater des Flussgottes *Hydaspes* gedeutet wurde, könnte meines Erachtens in Zusammenhang mit dem Staunen über die steten Veränderungen bzw. das Fließen des Flusses, somit auch Heraklits *Panta rhei*, gesehen werden.

Bereits vor Hesiod wird im Denken der antiken Dichter wie Homer und Solon eine Haltung der Bewunderung vor der Schönheit des Kosmos deutlich, der zufolge Kro-

ner im Verweis auf Hegel die Religion der Griechen als eine „Religion der Schönheit“ zu bezeichnen sei. „Die Darstellung der griechischen Götter hatte zum Gesetz die Schönheit, die zum Geistigen gesteigerte Natur.“<sup>2</sup> Die Verehrung der Götter sei im Grunde eine Verehrung der Schönheit der phänomenalen Welt gewesen, im Polytheismus der Griechen demnach implizit ein Pantheismus enthalten.

Die mythologische Deutung des Kosmos wich mit der Zeit einem Fragen wissenschaftlich-rationaler Art, wie es bei den milesischen und späteren Naturphilosophen zu beobachten ist. Doch bereits Hesiod ging vom homerischen Denken in Bildern einen Schritt weiter, indem er den Musen die Fähigkeit zusprach, nicht nur das „Trügliche, dem Wahren Ähnliche“ zu sagen, sondern auch die Wahrheit selbst im Sinne der Unverborgenheit (*aletheia*), womit laut Schadewaldt ein Beginn des Philosophierens gesehen werden könne (Schadewaldt, 85f.).

Trotz des allmählichen Übergangs vom Mythos zum Logos finden sich auch bei späteren Denkern der Antike häufig Bilder, um philosophische Fragestellungen sozusagen zu ‚erhellen‘. Platon, der gegenüber dem Mythos als einem Werk des Dichters, das immer Falsches – wenn auch Wahres – enthält<sup>3</sup>, zwar eine kritische Haltung einnimmt, verwendet immer wieder Gleichnisse, Metaphern, Bilder, wie sie auch in Mythen vorkommen. Es soll hier weniger auf klassische Beispiele wie das Höhlengleichnis eingegangen werden, als vielmehr auf den Mythos von den Zikaden, der für das zur Diskussion stehende Thema des Philosophierens als Akt des Stauens bedeutsam ist.

Die vorhin angesprochenen Aspekte des Stauens – schweigende Betrachtung und neugieriges Fragen – sind auch bei Wittgenstein zu beobachten: Erstere zeigt sich insbesondere im *Tractatus* (in der mystischen Annäherung an die Welt außerhalb des Tatsachenraumes) und im *Vortrag über Ethik* (im Staunen „über die Existenz der Welt“), während der bewegte Zugang und das stete Fragen vor allem in späteren Jahren bei der Untersuchung der unterschiedlichen Aspekte der Objekte der phänomenalen Welt sowie der Wörter im alltäglichen Gebrauch zum Ausdruck kommen.

Dabei verwendet Wittgenstein fiktive Beispiele oder Bilder und macht auf nicht verbale Ausdrucksformen wie Mimik, Gestik und dergleichen aufmerksam. Sein Appell „denk nicht, sondern schau!“ (PU, § 66) soll den Leser vom abstrakten Denken und Rasonieren zu einer genauen Beobachtung des sinnlich Wahrnehmbaren, auch einer Art der Betrachtung in Bildern führen. Wesentlich dabei ist ein ganz in der Gegenwart stehendes Wachsein und Aufgehen in der philosophischen Untersuchung des konkret Gegebenen, wobei der Vorstellung einer Idee im Platonischen Sinne eine Absage erteilt wird. Anstelle einer metaphysischen Betrachtung der Dinge fordert Wittgenstein, das „Urbild“ in den „hausbackenen“ Fällen der Erscheinungen zu suchen. Denn es solle „das Bild sein womit wir die Wirklichkeit vergleichen, wodurch wir darstellen, wie es sich verhält. Nicht, ein Bild wonach wir die Wirklichkeit umfälschen“ (DB, 163f). In seiner Auseinandersetzung mit

dem Anspruch der „Kristallreinheit“, die die Logik fordert, und die im Widerspruch zur tatsächlichen Sprache steht, appelliert Wittgenstein dafür, auf den „rauen Boden“ zurück zu kehren (PU, § 107).<sup>4</sup> Doch es fällt ihm schwer, die „Brille“ abzunehmen (PU, § 103), durch die wir die Dinge – mit einer uns vorschwebenden Idee – betrachten. Trotzdem setzt er alles daran, um die Dinge von ihrer „metaphysischen Verwendung“ durch die Philosophen wieder auf ihre „gewöhnliche“ zurückzuführen:

Zu „Idealer Name“ & Ursprung des Ideals gehört die Bemerkung daß wir die Wörter die der Philosoph in Metaphysischer Weise verwendet ihrer gewöhnlichen Verwendung wieder zuführen. (MS 157b, 14v. Vgl. auch PU, § 116)

Trotz der Kritik an Platon gibt es meines Erachtens einige Aspekte, die zum Vergleich mit diesem herangezogen werden könnten, auf die in diesem Rahmen jedoch nicht näher eingegangen werden kann; im Hinblick auf die Bedeutung von Bildern und Wittgensteins Philosophieren im Sinne einer staunenden Haltung soll jedoch, wie erwähnt, der Mythos von den Zikaden erörtert werden.

## II. Der Mythos von den Zikaden in Platons *Phaidros*

Bei seinem Gang mit Phaidros, der Sokrates an den Rand der Stadt hinausführt, nehmen die beiden Platz im Schatten einer Platane, um zu philosophieren. Als in Folge der Hitze Phaidros Müdigkeit überkommt, warnt ihn Sokrates, einzuschlafen und weist auf den unaufhörlichen Gesang der Zikaden hin: Diese, so Sokrates, seien einer Legende nach vor langer Zeit Menschen gewesen, die bei der Entstehung der Musen so hingerissen waren, dass sie alles andere darüber, selbst Essen und Trinken, vergaßen, nur mehr sangen und dann starben. So entstand das Geschlecht der Zikaden, das die Gabe besitzt, ohne Essen und Trinken auszukommen, um tagaus, tagein auf den Bäumen zu sitzen und unentwegt zu singen, ungeachtet der sommerlichen Hitze, bei der die übrigen Menschen Siesta halten und schlafen. Diese Hingabe und Selbstvergessenheit in Anbetracht der Musen sind im Grunde Merkmale des Musik und Poesie liebenden Menschen wie auch des Staunenden vor der Schönheit des Kosmos, die ihn zu Gesang, Dichtung und Philosophie inspiriert. Dass die Musen in der griechischen Mythologie als Töchter des Zeus und der *Mnemosyne* (Erinnerung) dargestellt werden, zeugt vom hohen Stellenwert der Poesie – als vom höchsten Gott stammend und im Gedächtnis der Menschen lebend.

Wie Iris als Botin zwischen den Menschen und den Göttern steht, so agieren die Zikaden in ähnlicher Weise als „Mittlerinnen“, indem sie den Musen berichten, welche von den Menschen diese verehren. Der Terpsichore melden sie die, welche sie in den Reigentänzen ehrten, der Erato, welche sie durch Liebesgesänge feierten usw. Der Kalliope aber, der Ältesten, und Urania, der dieser am nächsten Stehenden, melden sie die, „welche in Philosophie leben und ihre Musenkunst ehren, denn diese, unter den Musen besonders dem Himmel und den göttlichen und menschlichen Reden obwaltend, lassen die schönste Stimme tönen ...“ (*Phaidros*, 259B). Aus all diesen Gründen dürfen die Philosophen zur Mittagszeit nicht schlafen, sondern müssen wach sein und reden, so Sokrates. Damit zeigt sich der Unterschied zum ‚normalen‘ Menschen, den weder die Schönheit des Kosmos noch der Künste zu Begeisterung hinreißt und seine Kreativität weckt, sondern der den Schlaf vorzieht, sich mehr oder weniger wie ein Blinder gegenüber dem ihn Umgebenden verhält.

Wach sein, beobachten, staunen und darüber philosophieren – diese Eigenschaften sind auch bei Wittgenstein festzustellen. Das aufmerksame Beobachten und rege Zugehen auf die Objekte seiner Betrachtung zeichnen insbesondere seine philosophischen Untersuchungen der späteren Jahre aus, während die bewundernde Haltung der frühen Jahre zu einem mystisch anmutenden Schweigen führt.

## III.

Die Selbstvergessenheit bis zur Rauschhaftigkeit, die zu schöpferischer Tätigkeit führt, kommt auch in Sokrates' *Preisrede auf den Eros* zum Ausdruck. Die größten aller Güter werden uns „durch den Rausch zuteil, wenn er als göttliches Geschenk verliehen wird“, so Sokrates. (*Phaidros*, 243E). Der Rausch sei nicht zu verurteilen, sondern notwendig, um Wahres zu schaffen; diejenigen ohne Rausch seien bloß Nachahmer, Dichter niederen Ranges. Nur die Berauschten seien geweiht, die Vernünftigen ungeweiht. Auch die Liebe ist göttliche Begeisterung, sie entzündet sich am Schönen, wobei die Seele durch stufenweise Schritte der Erkenntnis schließlich das vor ihrem Eintritt in den Körper geschaut Wahre und Vollkommene erkennt, somit zu philosophischer Erkenntnis gelangt.

In einem Gespräch mit Ludwig Hänsel über Dostojewski, das Christentum und die Antike weist auch Wittgenstein auf das Rauschhafte, Dionysische bei den Griechen hin.

13. Okt. Wittgenstein sagte: Dostojewski habe viel von den Alten, er sei antik (das von dem Gegensatz zwischen Antike u. Christentum sei überhaupt Geschwätz) – antik wie Plato allenfalls, meinte ich – sonst könnte ich ihn mir nicht denken. Dionysisch, nicht apollinisch. Nicht antik wie Goethe sich die Antike dachte – nicht konfliktlos, rein lebend, wie Goethe antik sein wollte und war, aber das, sagte er, war nur die primitive Antike, nur ein Ausgangspunkt [eine nie wirkliche Idylle, ein Ideal] und das reine Genügen an der Vitalität war das, worüber die Antike selbst, Plato [als Zerstörer der Antike], hinausstrebt. Das ist allgemeine Erscheinung sagt er. Der bedeutende Mensch, hat das, was ihm das Leben und die Zeit bieten, um es zu verzehren, um davon zu leben, um dadurch frei zu werden für sein eigenes Ziel. – Dost. habe einen ganz unmodernen Blick, wie ein Tier. Die Augen sind zum Schauen da, sind Organe. | sh V. (Hänsel Tagebuch, 13. Okt. 1921)

Der „bedeutende Mensch“ – so äußert sich Wittgenstein auch in einem Brief-Fragment über seine Vorstellung von eigentlicher Geistigkeit. In diesem Schreiben vergleicht er das Dasein der Menschen mit dem Befinden in einer roten Glasglocke – ein Gleichnis, das unverkennbar Parallelen zu Platons Höhlengleichnis evoziert. Ähnlich Platon schreibt er, dass jene, die von Geburt an in einem Raum lebten, durch die das Licht nur durch rote Scheiben dringt, sich kein anderes Licht vorstellen könnten, sondern die Röte dieses Lichts für *das* Licht, und nicht für eine „besondere Art der Trübung des einen Lichts“ halten (*Licht und Schatten*, 44).

Nur der bedeutende Mensch, der durch das Glas und damit aus seiner Begrenzung heraustrete und sich mit dem reinen weißen Licht befasst – Wittgenstein verwendet diese Metapher für Religiosität im Gegensatz zu Wissenschaft und Kultur, die er mit den gefärbten bzw. getrübbten Lichtern vergleicht – sei fähig, geniale Werke zu schaffen. Derjenige hingegen, der sich in seiner Kunst nicht mit Religion befasst, sei nur als Talent zu bezeichnen, dem es an

Tiefe und Glaubwürdigkeit mangle, weshalb er einen nicht zu fesseln vermöge: Nur „die Auseinandersetzung mit dem Geist, mit dem Licht, ergreift“, notierte Wittgenstein. Nur dann könne sich der Philosoph oder Künstler der Wahrheit nähern – wie dies auch in Platons Höhlengleichnis beschrieben wird. Dabei handelt es sich um die reine Wahrheit, nicht um den Schein, den Homer den Musen zusprach und von Hesiod bereits, wie erörtert, um den Aspekt der „unverborgenen Wahrheit“ erweitert wurde, doch der in gewisser Weise bis in die Ästhetik Goethes und Schillers reichte, wo „Schönheit“ und „Schein“ zusammengebracht werden und von „wahrem Schein“ die Rede ist. Die ursprünglich in dem Wort *aletheia* enthaltene Bedeutung von „Unvergessenheit“ war nach Hesiod im Sinne von „Unverborgenheit“ zu verstehen – als Entbergen des Wahren bzw. des „Wirklichen an sich selbst, das sich von sich selbst her zeigt“ (Schadewaldt, 85).

Auch Wittgensteins Suche nach Wahrheit und Klarheit ist mit einer behutsamen Annäherung an das Verborgene verbunden, dessen Entbergen oder Enthüllen mit dem Problem der Grenzen der Sprache, was ihn bereits im *Tractatus* zur Scheidung des Sagbaren vom Zeigbaren führte. Wie mühsam und langwierig das philosophische Argumentieren, der Weg des Fragens zur Antwort und zu weiterem Fragen ist, zeigt sich auch in seiner Spätphilosophie und wird in der Bemerkung „Was ist dein Ziel in der Philosophie? Der Fliege den Ausweg aus dem Fliegenglas zeigen“ (PU, § 309) deutlich, ein Gleichnis, mit dem er auf Nietzsche anspielt, der von der Torheit und dem Erstaunen der Fliege sprach, die an die für durchsichtig gehaltene Glasscheibe stößt.<sup>5</sup>

Das Erstaunen nimmt somit kein Ende: nach jeder vermeintlichen Antwort folgt eine neue Frage – ein neues Erstaunen. Führt jeder Prozess des Philosophierens somit zur Aporie oder gibt es einen Ausweg aus den „wonders of the jungle“ (MS 149, 5-6)?

Im Scheitern rationaler Erklärungsversuche weist Wittgenstein zunehmend auf Möglichkeiten hin, die dem Mythos näher als dem Logos sind. Verbunden mit der Betrachtung in Bildern betont er die Anschauung, damit Intuitivität, Spontaneität, Sinnlichkeit. Das „Verschwinden der Probleme“ sieht er nicht durch eine Lösung, sondern durch eine „Auflösung“, nicht durch eine Theorie, sondern durch eine radikale Änderung im Philosophieren. Trotz seiner Behauptung, sich als „Terminus ad quem der großen abendländischen Philosophie“<sup>6</sup> zu sehen und seinen Standpunkt als entgegengesetzten Standpunkt dessen, welchen Sokrates in den Platonischen Dialogen vertritt (TS 302, 14), zu charakterisieren, sind zwischen ihm und den antiken Denkern Parallelen zu beobachten, deren er sich wohl nicht bewusst war und worüber bis dato auch nicht hinreichend geschrieben worden ist.

#### IV. Konklusion

Während in der Antike mit der Zeit der Mythos dem Logos, das Denken in Bildern einer wissenschaftlichen Betrachtung der Welt, einem rationalen Argumentieren – dem Philosophieren – wich, könnte man bei Wittgenstein in mancher Hinsicht von einem umgekehrten Weg sprechen: dem Weg von einer analytisch orientierten Philosophie zur Kritik an den Wissenschaften und zur wachsenden Wertschätzung von Bildern (Gleichnissen, Metaphern, etc.), wie sie in Mythen zu finden sind, und denen neben Ausdrucksmitteln wie „Geste“, „Ton“, „Zeichen“ an Bedeutung zukommt, um das Nichtsagbare zu vermitteln bzw. zu „zeigen“. Dabei wird das Ineinandergreifen von Ethik, Sprache und Mythologie sichtbar.

Und hier lässt sich auch eine Brücke zu Platon finden: Nicht nur der Dialog *Timaios*, der Mythos im Sinne von „wahrscheinlicher Rede“ ist, sondern insbesondere auch im *Phaidros* wird die Bedeutung des Mythos offenbar. In diesem Dialog, wo es um den Eros, die Schau der Ideen und die Rhetorik geht, dient der Mythos neben dem dialektischen Gespräch als Mittel zur Erziehung. Denn wie schon Hesiod davon sprach, dass die Musen auch die Wahrheit sagen könnten, so ist Mythos auch bei Platon Logos – im Sinne der Rede mit Wahrheitsgehalt. Wenn Sokrates am Schluss des Dialogs sich auf die Weisheit der Nymphen und Musen beruft und zu Pan betet, ihn schön werden zu lassen „im Innern“ und dass, „was ich außen besitze, dem Innern befreundet“ (278E) sei, kommt es zu einem Ausgleich der Gegensätze zwischen Innen und Außen, zwischen Seele und Körper, zwischen Mythos und Dialektik. Dialektik ist der notwendige Weg der Forschung, mythisch ist der Weg der *Mania*, des Erlebens, des Eros (vgl. Hildebrandt, 13).

Auch die Rede ist ein Spiel, ein Spiel mit Sprache, wie der Mythos ein Spiel mit Bildern ist. Im Vergleich zwischen dem Landmann und dem Redner sagt Sokrates zu Phaidros, dass der Redner „um des Spieles willen“ die Gärten der Schrift besäe und beschreibe und sich damit selbst einen Schatz von Erinnerungen sammle für die Zeit, da er ins Alter des Vergessens gelange. (276C). Wesentlich für die dialektische Kunst sei es, die geeignete Seele zu wählen und zu bepflanzen und mit Reden der Erkenntnis zu besäen, die Samen tragen (ibid.).

Rede und Mythos erfordern Einfallsreichtum, Phantasie und Überzeugungskraft – wie es auch in Wittgensteins *Philosophischen Untersuchungen* zutage tritt. In seinen Untersuchungen über die unterschiedliche Bedeutung von Wörtern in verschiedenen Sätzen stellt er einmal die Frage: „ist alles was ich hier treibe nicht Mythologie? Dichte ich nicht zu dem Offenbaren dazu? [...]“ (TS 211, 195). An anderer Stelle schrieb er: „Ich glaube meine Stellung zur Philosophie dadurch zusammengefaßt zu haben indem ich sagte: Philosophie dürfte man eigentlich nur dichten.“ (MS 146, 50). Und in seiner Auseinandersetzung mit Moore über Gewißheit meint er, dass man die Sätze, die sein Weltbild beschreiben, mythologisch nennen könnte, und ihre Rolle ähnlich der von Spielregeln sei.

Man könnte sich vorstellen, daß gewisse Sätze von der Form der Erfahrungssätze erstarrt wären und als Leitung für die nicht erstarrten, flüssigen Erfahrungssätze funktionierten; und daß sich dies Verhältnis mit der Zeit änderte, indem flüssige Sätze erstarrten und gefrorene flüssig würden.

Die Mythologie kann wieder in Fluß geraten, das Flußbett der Gedanken sich verschieben. Aber ich unterscheide zwischen dem Strömen des Wassers im Flußbett und der Verschiebung dieses; obwohl es eine scharfe Trennung der beiden nicht gibt. (MS 174, 21v, 22r)

Doch ließe sich daraus nicht folgern, dass auch die Logik eine Erfahrungswissenschaft sei, sondern nur, dass der gleiche Satz einmal als von der Erfahrung zu prüfen, einmal als Regel der Prüfung behandelt werden könne.

Ja das Ufer jenes Flusses besteht zum Teil aus hartem Gestein, das keiner, oder einer unmerklichen Änderung unterliegt, und teils aus Sand, der bald hier bald dort weg- und angeschwemmt wird (MS 174, 22r).

Durch ständig neue Beispiele im philosophischen Diskurs und die häufige Verwendung von Bildern, durch unentwegtes Fragen und Antworten hoffte Wittgenstein, die Menschen zu eigenen Gedanken anzuregen, „Licht in ein oder

das andere Gehirn zu werfen“. Seine philosophische Methode gleicht einem sokratischen Dialog und einer Therapie, die, so scheint mir, ihren Ausgangspunkt in einer staunenden Auseinandersetzung und dabei einem Hinführen zu aufmerksamer Betrachtung des unmittelbar Gegebenen sowie zu einer Achtung vor dem Nicht-Erklärbaren nahm.

Mit der Bemerkung „Zum Staunen muß der Mensch – und vielleicht Völker – aufwachen. Die Wissenschaft ist ein Mittel um ihn wieder einzuschläfern“ (MS 109, 200) hat er wohl des Menschen der Antike gedacht, dessen Staunen vor damals Unerklärtem noch nicht zerstört und für eine mythologische Deutung offen war.

## Endnoten

<sup>1</sup> Hesiod: *Theogonie*, 21.

<sup>2</sup> G.W.F. Hegel: „Begriff des Geistes“, § 384, in: *Enzyklopädie der philosophischen Wissenschaften III*. Dritter Teil: *Die Philosophie des Geistes*, v10p31. In den *Vorlesungen über die Philosophie der Geschichte*, im Kapitel „Das objektive Kunstwerk“ betont Hegel, dass die Griechen Gott als Geistiges verehrten, bei den zwei Elementen Natur und Geist im Begriff des griechischen Geistes die Natur nur den Ausgangspunkt bildete (v12p299).

<sup>3</sup> Vgl. *Politeia*, 377, 378, wo es um die Erziehung der Wächter geht und Sokrates von „zweierlei Reden“ spricht, nämlich wahren und falschen. Zu den falschen gehören die Märchen und Sagen, die man den Kindern erzählt, und obgleich diese einen verborgenen wahren Sinn enthalten, müsse man vorsichtig abwägen, ob man solche Geschichten Heranwachsenden erzählen könne. Dabei spricht Sokrates vor allem die Göttergeschichten Homers und Hesiods an.

<sup>4</sup> Vgl. PU, § 107: „[...] Wir sind aufs Glatteis geraten, wo die Reibung fehlt, also die Bedingungen in gewissem Sinne ideal sind, aber wir eben deshalb nicht gehen können. Wir wollen gehen; dann brauchen wir die *Reibung*. Zurück auf den rauhen Boden!“

<sup>5</sup> Vgl. Friedrich Nietzsche: *Morgenröthe*, Aphorismus 444. Verwunderung über Widerstand: „Weil Etwas für uns durchsichtig geworden ist, meinen wir, es könne uns nunmehr keinen Widerstand leisten – und sind dann erstaunt, dass wir hindurchsehen und doch nicht hindurch können! Es ist diess die selbe Thorheit und das selbe Erstaunen, in welches die Fliege vor jedem Glasfenster geräth.“

<sup>6</sup> „Wenn mein Name fortleben wird dann nur als der Terminus ad quem der großen abendländischen Philosophie. Gleichsam wie der Name dessen der die Alexandrinische Bibliothek verbrannt/angezündet hat“ (DB, 64).

<sup>7</sup> Sein Weltbild definiert er dabei als den „überkommenen Hintergrund“, auf welchem er zwischen wahr und falsch unterscheidet.

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# Waste Articulated: Derrida via Beckettian WATT

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Beckett's *Watt* reads as follows:

on the waste, beneath the sky, distinguished by Watt as being, the one above, the other beneath, Watt. That before him, behind him, on all sides of him, there was something else, neither sky nor waste, was not felt by Watt. And it was always their long dark flowing away together towards the mirage of union that lay before him, whichever way he turned. The sky was of a dark colour, from which it may be inferred that the usual luminaries were absent. They were. The waste also, needless to say, was of a dark colour. Indeed the sky and the waste were of the same dark colour, which is hardly to be wondered at. Watt also was very naturally of the same dark colour. This dark colour was so dark that the colour could not be identified with certainty.

Sometimes it seemed a dark absence of colour, a dark mixture of all colours, a dark white. But Watt did not like the words dark white, so he continued to call his darkness a dark colour plain and simple, which strictly speaking it was not, seeing that the colour was so dark as to defy identification as such.

The source of the feeble light diffused over this scene is unknown.

Further peculiarities of this soul-landscape were:

The temperature was warm.

Beneath Watt the waste rose and fell.

All was silent.

Above Watt the sky fell and rose.

Watt was rooted to the spot.<sup>1</sup>

If articulation, *arthron*, passage, is always a rupture of continuity, thus becoming the potentiality to not-be and if the broken unity is treated as constitution of unexpected dis-position, the thinking of articulation "goes through a thinking of *place* [*lieu*], as a place or locus that is reduced neither to objective extension nor to objective space."<sup>2</sup> Since there exists no passage between signification and ostensive gesture without pre-reference to the very taking place of any relation, one can ask about the place of a single subject which never designates itself and never "relate itself to itself as subject."<sup>3</sup> Moreover, what seems crucial at that point is: what would be the figurativeness of any experience as singular being already divided in itself without possible self-relation? What would be the very of of any experience as an exposure to difference?

Watt articulates the difference between the waste, the sky and the self, remaining however within the very act of experiencing the difference: articulation as experience constitutes the presumed sense in terms of an object. This, however, is not in accord with phenomenological objectification – the object is not a product of intentional perception and the word uttered is not the one postulated as "recognized through all possible gestures."<sup>4</sup> It is not always the same realization of materiality of a sign but a word of pure experience already mediated through being articulated. Resistant to any reduction, the language marks the opening of possibility to not-be – thy waste/sky distance occupied by Watt indicates semiological spacing within which no ultimate semantic relation is possible and which rules out the possibility of passage between the semiotic and the semantic. Contingency of reality expressed in linguistic form does not function as an immediate experi-

ence: the ideality of an object that "reverberates in the ideality of the expression and in that of its sense"<sup>5</sup> is no longer a phenomenological adherence, on the contrary, it undermines its own foundation in the facticity of being articulated and of taking place. Embodied in the sensible, the embodiment itself substitutes the unlocated and untemporal being-of-sense. Sense becomes sensual. What is more, the fact that cannot be reduced to its phenomenological sense ceases to function within the primordial unity of sense and fact, as Husserl postulates, but exists within the concrete *apriori*. At the same time ideality of meaning becomes a predicate of experience – temporalized and spatialized within passive synthesis of time. There being no presence but for retentional-protentional delineations as *dynamic* potentiality to no-be, the sensible substrate of the Watean waste can be preconstituted only as material element of concrete actuality, already formed as momentary deferral in its sense. At this point phenomenological constitution of "the mirage of union" within existential experience turns out to exceed the primordial and final sense of any object constitution. Although, assuming that "indication is the category within which language refers to its own taking place"<sup>6</sup>, deixis not only indicates the taking place of a discourse but – doing so – undermines its own taking place. This paradoxical double negation takes possession of sense: without the possibility of negation no constitution and no experience could take place. Here the Nancy'ean statement: "we *touch* the origin"<sup>7</sup> as experiencing the dis-position of the world can be inscribed within the impossibility of phenomenological constitution and can explain the Watean waste in terms of dis-placement inherent to every "being singular-plural" (Nancy). The pure present of the "it happens" is no longer attainable: the "it happens" must be already delayed since diverging from the possible locus. Dis-placement presupposes distancing through opening any interval, or upspring of the event as unrepresentable. "In this sense – Nancy concludes – it exceeds the resources of any phenomenology, even though the phenomenological theme in general has never been more magnetized by anything else."<sup>8</sup> How then to articulate the difference between nothing and something?

Adopting the poetic imagery of the placement displaced – "beneath Watt waste rose and fell/ above Watt the sky fell and rose" – it becomes clearly visible that the presence of negation constitutes act of the very constitution and thus founds every predication and intentional act. The "present is at the same time negation and assimilation of the past moment in retention; it is because this retention itself is immediately of a piece with a protention that preserves and denies the present as future in the past, because all the movements of intentionality are constituted by this dialectic of time, that negation appears here as what essentially animates every genesis."<sup>9</sup> With existential passage of time experienced, its passivity inherent to any sense constitution, Watt seems an existential figure whose intentional acts reverberate throughout dis-position of sense. Moreover, it is in the Watean figure that being – intermingled with actual possibility to not-be – marks traces of all possible signification: figurative and temporally formed.

The Watean space – neither dark nor light – differentiates the dark from the light, itself becoming a point of departure which, however being a point of any possible referentiality, enters into the realm of im-possible self-referentiality. Nameless or unnamable, the landscape of sky/waste overlapping or intermingling, or (which is the same) of the space unfolding and folding itself, becomes a sign of an access – of some surplus signification that cannot touch any signified object. This sign of excess, this excessive sign, still signifies somehow, at least “by means of this angle, this fold, this doubled fold of an undecidable, a mark that marks both the marked and the mark.”<sup>10</sup> Self-referentiality of the term, its reference to the very act of relation between sound (visual image, here, the sky/waste reference) and sense (heterogeneity within homogenous landscape of the sky and the waste spaces) is both necessary and impossible, thus – aporetic.

Going back to the medieval distinction between *intention prima* (where a sign signifies an object intended) and *intention secunda* (where a sign signifies *intention prima*) and discussing a derridean notion of a trace as an aporetic figure, Agamben posits a question: how is it possible to signify something without turning it into an object intended? How is it possible for a sign to refer to *standing for* without any objective referent present in the act of reference? In order to avoid objectification of *intention*, the *intention* must not be neither present nor absent, but it must exceed its own reference while functioning as an excessive figure whose sense is never given or presumed. The moment of the sign *referring to* or *standing for* must not itself be transposed into *intention*, otherwise it would lose its signifying power, instead, the very moment must function as a trace of im-possible signification, the trace being neither concept nor object.

“Trace” – Agamben writes – names precisely this extinguishable instance of *repraesentamen* in every presence, this excess of signification in all sense. To turn the terms of medieval logic, there can be neither an *intention prima* nor *intention secunda*; every intention is always *secundo-prima* or *primo-secunda*, such that in it intentionality always exceeds intent and signification always anticipates and survives the signified.<sup>11</sup>

According to Agamben, the deconstructive paradox of a “trace”, can be seen as a different name for Fregean paradox of the concept “horse” (“Object and Concept”, 1892) which, in fact, is not a concept since, every time we refer to it in the expression “the concept ‘horse’ is not a concept”, the concept having been named starts functioning as an object. This paradox expresses the more general idea that once a term refers to something, it cannot refer to the fact of its referring to: *intention* functions as or rather becomes an *intentionum*. Hence the space of potential sense – once being a signifying point of reference to the very moment of signification, becomes impossible *intentionum* itself and undergoes objectification.

Perceiving his own perception, Watt is put within the space of his own passivity, or inability to name the form of the experience. Through materializing Aristotle’s potentiality, this experience affirms the impact of its own formlessness within some actualization of potentiality (impotentiality). The topology of experiencing the form affirms nothing more than the typology of sign taking place between *intention* and the *intentionum*, in the process of naming and signification:

The aporias of self-reference thus do not find their solution here; rather, they are dislocated and (according to Platonic suggestion) transformed into *euporias*. The name

can be named and language can be brought to speech, because self-reference is displaced onto the level of potentiality; what is intended is neither the word as object nor the word insofar as it *actually* denotes a thing, but, rather, a pure potential to signify (and to not signify) ... . But it is no longer meaning’s self-reference, a sign’s signification of itself; instead, it is the materialization of a potentiality, the materialization of its own possibility.<sup>12</sup>

Deictic in character, the reality of signification is the reality of discourse: elliptically pointing at its own moment of actualization, it actualizes the impotentiality of meaning. Inscribed within this discursive structure of signification, the Watean space composed around waste the and the sky materializes paradoxical character of sign: dark color, absence of color and dark white accompanied by Watt himself being undistinguishable from the scene, appear as such from within the possible relation between sound/the visual and sense. The possibility to-not be – which, in fact, means im-possibility actualized – can be traced in Watt’s perception of imperception, “the sensation of an *anaesthesia*, a pure taking place (in which truly nothing takes place other than place).”<sup>13</sup> Referring to itself, the im-perception (possibility of non-perception) as *intention* is no longer self-referential act, but becomes objectified and temporalized. Since the waste and the sky seem constituted on the same vertical level which – when actualized in the process of signification – turns into a vertical one, they become incorporated into the Watean figure which, at the same time (there is never the same time or any simultaneity), marks the un-marked traces of their being fold. Namely, there being no ultimate correspondence between the signified and the signifying, the sign is spatiality of a possible relation, or spacing within signification. The name itself – Watt – possess no internal sense, which makes him a figure of semantic void: the sound sounding like a question and referring to itself (as the *intentionum*) within *intention*, empties itself of any potential sense. All this results in the dissolution of the distinctive features of the scene, they taking a shape of trace-like concepts where a border-line between a sound and (non)sense is a limit of the very difference enabling any sign to appear.

This all boils down to the question: what is the place of negativity in the articulation of sound potentially endowed with sense? If the space round Watt is distinguished from Watt and if spacing precedes any space, where is the place of the articulation of sense as an integral element of sign? Supposing that the Watean waste is inseparable from the Watean sky, whereas the formless waste means some surplus of sense (its being of dark color, light color or colorless) prescribed to it, the very taking place of language overlaps the experience of nonorigin of this taking place. Already named, the waste and the sky, lose their significant power and remain merely “empirical marks”:

the trace is not only the disappearance of the origin ... it means that the origin did not even disappear, that it was never constituted except reciprocally by a nonorigin, the trace, which thus becomes the origin of the origin ... . that concept destroys its name and that, if all begins with the trace, there is above all no ordinary trace.<sup>14</sup>

Before indication being “a category within which language refers to its own taking place”<sup>15</sup>, it must be articulated somehow, which means its taking place as a discourse – the very discourse, however, is no longer just an indicative event of language, but the spacing between possible sides within the signifying relation. Watt – in existential relation to the space he is placed in (“rooted to the spot”) – is an indexical figure before being able to put any distinction



within the space itself. This Jakobsonian notion of the sign / as being in existential relation with its object has been radicalized here: it is not only existentially related to its utterance and hence functions as an index, but it is primarily marked by its possibility to-not pronounce /.

/ means the person uttering / – Jakobson defines – Thus, on the one hand, the sign / cannot represent its object without being associated with the latter “by a conventional rule,” and in different codes the same meaning is assigned to different sequences such as /, *ego*, *ich*, *ja*, etc. Consequently / is a symbol. On the other hand, the sign / cannot represent its object without “being in existential relation” with this object: the word / designating the utterer is existentially related to his utterance, and hence functions as an index.<sup>16</sup>

However, the Jakobsonian notion of the sign / “being in existential relation with its object” does not account for the negativity of the fact as the space of differentiation between the indexicality of the sign and of the object this sign refers to. Before the existential relation there must be existentiality of the very relation in terms of its taking place, which means its traces inscribed within what is said in the instance of discourse. Pure meaning (*voler-dire*) remains impossible, the structure of linguistic sign as a mark of the unmarked difference between sound and sense. Moreover, the conceptualization of the relation between the sign and its object – with possible sense constitution – verges on its own impossible actuality resulting from the fact that the concept of *relation* is not a concept when actualized. The Augustinian idea that the word uttered (a *vox*) as a dead word is “no longer mere sound ... but not yet a signification – insofar as it is the experience, that is, of a sign as pure meaning [*voler-dire*] and intention to signify before

and beyond the arrival of every particular signification<sup>17</sup> can no longer be justified. Intention to signify always points through a deictic gesture at itself, thus excluding purity of any referentiality: the word uttered as a dead word and neither mere sound nor yet signification, becomes *intentio* inseparable from its *intantum*, still displaced outside pure referentiality and meaning awaiting for disclosure.

## Endnotes

<sup>1</sup> Beckett, *Watt*, (Grove Press: New York ), p. 249.

<sup>2</sup> Derrida, *ibid.*, p. 24.

<sup>3</sup> J. L. Nancy, *Being Singular Plural*, transl. R. Richardson, A. O’Byrne (Stanford UP 2000), p. 40.

<sup>4</sup> Derrida, *Edmund Husserl’s Origin of Geometry. An Introduction* (University of Nebraska Press 1989), p. 67.

<sup>5</sup> *ibid.*, p. 71.

<sup>6</sup> Agamben, *Language and Death: The Place of Negativity*, transl. K. Pinkus, *Theory and History of Literature*, vol. 78 (University of Minnesota Press 1991), p. 25.

<sup>7</sup> Nancy, J.-L., *ibid.*, p. 13.

<sup>8</sup> *ibid.*, p. 162.

<sup>9</sup> Derrida, *The Problem of Genesis in Husserl’s Philosophy*, transl. M. Hobson (The University of Chicago Press 2003), p. 117.

<sup>10</sup> Derrida [in:] G. Agamben, *Potentialities* (Stanford University Press, 1999), p. 211.

<sup>11</sup> *ibid.*, p. 212.

<sup>12</sup> *ibid.*, pp. 217-218.

<sup>13</sup> *ibid.*, p. 218.

<sup>14</sup> Derrida, *Of Grammatology*, trans. G. Spivak (Baltimore: John Hopkins UP, 1976), p. 61.

<sup>15</sup> Agamben, *Language and Death. The Place of Negativity*, trans. K. Pinkus (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1991), p. 25.

<sup>16</sup> Jakobson, „Shifters, verbal categories and the Russian verb”, *Selected Writings*, vol.2 (The Hague, 1971), p. 132.

<sup>17</sup> Agamben, *The End of Poem*, transl. d. Heller-Roazen (Stanford UP, 1999), p. 64.

# On Imagining Mathematical Objects

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## 1. Imagining Natural Numbers

Anyone who seriously thinks that there are mathematical objects will normally admit that they are some kind of abstract existence. That is to say, they are not spatial temporal and they bear no causal relation to us. However, it seems mysterious then how we can possibly access them, for our sense organs are incapable of perceiving anything which is causally inert. It is a conceivable solution to assume that we can in some way *intuit* mathematical object. But then it still calls for an elucidation as to what is the intuition involved.

Gödel has suggested that mathematical intuition is *perception like* although he has not really explicated what this means (Gödel 1964). Later on, Charles Parsons has given a clear and persuasive account of how to intuit natural numbers (Parsons 1980). He thinks that the intuition involved there does not have to assume some kind of mystical faculty of the human mind and actually it is quite ordinary: we are familiar with the token type distinction recognized by ordinary language and we know how to *intuit* a word type or sentence type—we intuit them by *imagining* their tokens. For example, we all know what is the type of the word “chicken” and we can intuit such a type by imagining a token of it. Now suppose we use a sequence of strokes to represent a natural number (as Parsons did). For instance, we can use one stroke to represent 0, two strokes to represent 2, and so on. A sequence of strokes I have drawn on a sheet of paper with a pencil is a token but we know what its type is, and in order to intuit such a type, we imagine a token of it. Nothing special is involved here: we have done the same thing innumerable times whether intuiting a word type or a sentence type. Nonetheless, one may point out that, in this case, we are intuiting the type of a sequence of strokes, not a natural number. Actually, Parsons call the former a *quasi concrete object* which is abstract but has concrete instances and hence can be intuited while the latter a *pure object* which is abstract but has no concrete instance and hence cannot be intuited (Parsons 1990). Therefore, Parsons’ mathematical intuition applies actually to some quasi concrete representation of natural numbers, not to natural numbers themselves. But in any case, this offers a way to access natural numbers and once we have succeeded in explaining how this kind of intuition works, we can claim that some arithmetic truths (which are only about the structure of a representation of natural numbers) can be intuited.

The aforementioned account works well for small natural numbers, for it should be no problem at all for us to imagine a sequence consisting of only very few strokes and therefore intuit the type of such a sequence. However, the question then is whether stroke sequence types which we can intuit are enough to form a representation of natural numbers, or more formally and precisely, to form an  $\omega$  sequence isomorphic to natural numbers with the usual ordering. The easy cases are far from giving all the stroke sequence types which can form an  $\omega$  sequence, and very quickly we will find that we cannot establish the case in the same way when the natural number considered is getting bigger and bigger. The problem is that we cannot reasonably claim that we can imagine a sequence consisting of a large number, say, a billion, of strokes.

So the situation is that we will have to make a jump from the simple cases of which we have clear images to the cases of which we cannot hope to have clear images. Such a jump will be justified if we know that every stroke sequence can be extended by adding one more stroke, or in other words, every stroke sequence has a successor. Parsons points out: “... if we imagine any string of strokes, it is immediately apparent that a new stroke can be added. One might imagine the string as a *Gestalt*, present all at once: then since it is a figure with a surrounding ground, there is space for an additional stroke ... Alternatively, we can think of the string as constructed step by step, so that the essential element is now succession in *time*, and what is then evident is that at any stage one can take another step.” (Parsons 1980)

It should be fair to say that Parsons’ account looks *prima facie* plausible. There are some criticisms (Page 1993), but I think eventually we have to accept that any stroke sequence can be extended *in principle* (I won’t touch this issue now but will address it somewhere else). Anyway, here I shall accept Parsons’ account that the mathematical intuition applying to natural numbers can be achieved by imagination. Again, even though this intuition does not apply to natural numbers directly but rather to one of its possible *quasi concrete* representation, nothing has been lost here as long as the representation shares the same structure with natural numbers.

To recap: The representation of each natural number which is small enough is a stroke sequence type which we can intuit by imagining one of its tokens. However, we cannot possibly have a clear image of a sequence consisting of a large number of strokes and it may also be impossible in practice to produce a token of sequence that big. So the existence of the types of the big sequences has actually been inferred from two things: the existence of the types of small sequences and the operation of adding one more stroke which can be carried out in our imagination.

## 2. Imagining Mathematical Objects Which Form a Bigger Collection

We might try real numbers first. First of all, real numbers, just like natural numbers, are pure objects in Parsons’ sense. Hence we should try to find a possible representation of real numbers first. It seems not easy to come up with a systematic way to use combinations of some symbols to represent real numbers. Nonetheless, one might try to find a representation of all real numbers at once and it seems that the most natural candidate is a geometrical one, that is, a line which is infinitely long. Of course, in real life we cannot draw a line which stretches indefinitely in two opposite directions without end. However, we can definitely draw on a piece of paper a short segment whose length is, say, 5 centimeters and this is a token of a segment whose length is 5 centimeters. Nonetheless, we cannot really intuit its type by imagining a token of this segment, for we cannot reasonably claim that the segment in our imagination is 5 centimeters in length. But we can indeed imagine a segment of an uncertain finite length. We may say that here the type intuited through imagination has as tokens segments of reasonable finite lengths (one

cannot draw a line from the earth to the sun even though the distance between them is finite). That is to say, the type intuited is a *general* one some of whose tokens could be in different lengths. Then we can imagine that such a segment can be stretched in two opposite directions indefinitely since in the imagined space there is always room for stretching it. Now it might be suggested that a real number is to be represented by a point in this imagined line. But one cannot then go reversely to use a point token to stand for a real number, for here a point actually means a *position in such a line*, that is, it has some structural relations to other points.

We may say that the foregoing analysis follows Parsons' way in spirit. But now the question is whether the line representation is a good one. In order to answer this question, we have to see what we expect from a representation of a certain kind of mathematical object. The stroke sequence type representation of natural numbers is arguably an acceptable one, for it has preserved those important structural properties that natural numbers have. More precisely, the important structural properties of natural numbers are expressed by Peano's axioms and the stroke sequence type representation is good since the structure formed by such types satisfies Peano's axioms (the induction principle is a complicated case, but I won't discuss this issue here; see Parsons 1986). But the line representation of real numbers has missed something. At least, we cannot see that such a representation is Dedekind complete, that is, every bounded nonempty subset of such a line (as a set of points) has a least upper bound in it.

Perhaps we could imagine that a set of points is bounded although we cannot have a clear image of how many points there are. But even so, how can we see from this loose image that there is a point which is the least upper bound of such a set (just take a set consisting of one point and ask ourselves how to see its least upper bound)? It might be pointed out that this property is not first order and hence may not be known in such an intuitive way. But then I will ask another relevant question: how can one know that it is not the case that the line imagined consists of points of rational numbers only? (It is known that rational numbers are not Dedekind complete.) One might reply that if this is the case, there must be some points missing. But there is always a rational point between two rational points since rational numbers are dense, and in this light, I don't think that we can see some "holes" in the imagined line even if it contains only rational points, so what points are missing then? Or I may rephrase the question as: How can one know that the line one is imagining contains enough points to represent real numbers? This does not seem to be a question that can be answered from outside, that is, if one cannot decide this by looking at the imagined line, then such a representation of real numbers cannot be a good one.

Well, the cardinality of the set of real numbers is the same as that of the power set of the set of natural numbers, abbreviated as  $P(N)$ . So we might be interested in knowing whether  $P(N)$  can be intuited by imagination. Assume that we use stroke sequences to represent natural numbers and introduce a new symbol "\*", star, to separate two stroke sequences. Then a member of  $P(N)$  can be represented by a sequence of strokes and stars. For

instance,  $\{2, 3\}$  can be represented by a sequence of three strokes first, then one star and finally four strokes. For a small enough finite member of  $P(N)$ , we can intuit the sequence type which represents it by imagining one of the tokens of such a type. If a finite stroke star sequence (in which any two stars won't appear adjacently) is too big to be imagined, we may say that for any given finite stroke sequence there is always room in the imagined space for adding first a star and then a finite number of strokes to the right hand side of the given sequence; this is a kind of trick similar to the one that has been done in the case of natural numbers. But how about an infinite sequence of strokes and stars? Perhaps we could have a loose image of an infinite sequence of strokes and stars and claim that this is the general type of stroke star sequence tokens each of whose cardinality is  $\omega$ . But it seems to be too convenient to claim from this that we have all the countable infinite sequences needed, for if such a loose image could work, we might claim that we have mathematical intuitions on  $P(P(N))$ ,  $P(P(P(N)))$  and so on indefinitely, which seems simply too much.

### 3. Concluding Remarks

I think the foregoing observations in some sense reveal the limitation of our imagination when dealing with mathematical objects. We can have clear imaginations as well as imaginations not so clear; they might come in degrees. But the abstract object to be intuited by imagination is useful in representing a mathematical object only if the imagination involved is clear enough to guarantee that the intended structural properties of the mathematical object represented are also owned by the abstract object intuited by the imagination involved. Besides, it seems that it is also important that each imagined object can be identified in a way clear enough such that we may confidently count on it. For example, though we cannot have a clear image of a sequence of a large finite number of strokes, we can imagine that such a sequence is obtained by adding one more stroke for that number of times and this gives us a way to identify the sequence in question.

Readers might find this paper somewhat sketchy. Indeed I would like to tell more stories on this topic but I cannot do so here owing to the limitation of the size. Hopefully I have made some points clear here and I will definitely give a more detailed treatment somewhere else.

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# Wittgenstein and Foucault: Application of Analytical Methodologies to the Historical Epistemology of Foucault

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“A good simile refreshes the intellect”<sup>1</sup>

Le moment serait alors venu de considérer ces faits de discours non plus simplement sous leur aspect linguistique, mais, d'une certaine façon – et ici je m'inspire des recherches réalisées par les Anglo-Américains –, comme jeux, *games*, jeux stratégiques d'action et réaction, de question et de réponse, de domination et d'esquive, ainsi que de lutte. Le discours est cet ensemble régulier de faits linguistiques à un certain niveau et de faits polémiques et stratégiques à un autre niveau.<sup>2</sup>

In a series of five conferences titled “La vérité et les formes juridiques”, held in 1973 in Rio de Janeiro, Foucault makes an explicit reference to the Anglo-American analytic philosophy, which may nevertheless appear very general and just transient.<sup>3</sup> The reference in question occurs right at the beginning of the first conference, while Foucault is declaring his axes of research together with the methodology he wants to put in use for those. Foucault introduces the theme of the conferences as a methodological one, with the status of “hypotheses de travail, d'hypothèses en vue d'un travail future”, but presenting it as the point of intersection among 3 or 4 existing researches. His final target is the redefinition of the theory of the subject (third axe of research), through the historical revaluation of the social practices (first axe) and the analysis of discourses in terms of strategy (second axe).

Foucault's quotation refers to the *discourse* itself, as understandable, structured, playable, analysable, at *two different levels*: the linguistic and the strategic one. At first the difference between these two levels appears as the resumption of the general and wide distinction between a traditional “semanticist” or “formalist” and a “pragmatic” approach to language. The first could also be intended as a referentialist and a syntactical strand in the traditional analytic philosophy against which Foucault himself started a polemic in the pages of the *Archéologie du savoir*, in 1969.

In 1973 Wittgenstein is overtly intended by the French philosopher as approaching language in the second of those senses, the strategic or the pragmatic one, seeing as overcoming a narrower study of the mere linguistic syntactical regularities of the proposition. What is at stake then is the fact that Foucault underlines the need, its possibility being opened by Wittgenstein, to analyse the discourse in strategic and *political* terms. This means that in Wittgenstein we find, according to Foucault, the very possibility of an understanding of language that goes beyond the mere syntactical consideration of the linguistic facts. But what does it mean, in general, to talk about language-games as strategic struggle-activities constituted by actions and a counter-actions? Is it correct to state that Wittgenstein consider language as a strategic activity? We should first investigate the sense of the shift operated by Wittgenstein from language to language-games. As we all know the main shift from the first conception of language expressed in the *Tractatus* by Wittgenstein and the second, developed during the 30's and well represented in

the sections of the *Philosophical Investigations* is the passage from the consideration of a unique language to that of a linguistic *activity*, intrinsically multiple:

But how many kinds of sentence are there? Say assertion, question, and command? – There are *countless* kinds: countless different kinds of use of what we call “symbols”, “words”, “sentences”. And this multiplicity is not something fixed, given once for all; but new types of language, new language-games, as we may say, come into existence, and others become obsolete and get forgotten [...] It is interesting to compare the multiplicity of the tools in language and of the ways they are used, the multiplicity of kinds of word and sentence, with what logicians have said to be the structure of language (including the author of the *Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus*).<sup>4</sup>

Language-games are then what breaks the unity of language in two possible directions: because they are specific *regions* of language and very peculiar and restricted games in specific contexts; or because they represent an analytical instrument by which investigate the multiple functions according to which language is used. Wittgenstein himself keeps the ambiguity between these two conception of the language-games themselves, as concrete examples of limited linguistic practices<sup>5</sup> and as imaginary models through which understand our real practice.

The idea of *language regions* allows us to think about the political or the scientific discourses as specific regions of the general discourse. The discourse as itself it is a metaphysical unity, it does not makes sense since there are only various and specific discourses that take form only in their specific and different areas or regions.

In the above quotation Wittgenstein operates that rupture with the traditional image of language by describing the act of speaking a language as a very definite practice, extremely contextualized, historically contingent. What is most striking in the first of those two senses is that language-games are very specific instances of human activities, comparable to and woven with many other forms of practical and human activities embedded in historically contingent *forms of life*. Language it's not apart from all the rest of human natural behaviours, on the contrary it is part of our natural history just like walking, eating and so on.<sup>6</sup> Furthermore, their being natural means also that they are in a way nothing more than a sort of reaction, a sort of *natural way* to articulate a behavioural response to a certain stimulus – at least the refinement of such an instinct in more complex forms.

The origin and the primitive form of language game is a reaction; only from this can more complicated forms develop. Language – I want to say – is a refinement, ‘in the beginning was the deed’.<sup>7</sup>

What Wittgenstein probably wants to suggest here is that language and language-games are more similar to a natural, action and reaction behaviour than to an intellectual activity with logical and universal standards of foundation, justification and validity.

On the other hand, when Wittgenstein describes the language-games as an analytical instrument he talks rather differently:

Our clear and simple language-games are not preparatory studies for a future regularization of language – as it were first approximations, ignoring friction and air-resistance. The language-games are rather set up as *objects of comparison* which are meant to throw light on the facts of our language by way not only of similarities, but also of dissimilarities.<sup>8</sup>

Here a language-game is taken to be a kind of *model* to put beside reality in order to understand the latter. Just like scientific models, it can be imagined, created and then put in use as an “object of comparison”.<sup>9</sup> The two visions are not incompatible or inconsistent with each other since the analytical tool can be applied only to a language which is, in reality, already constituted by local games. A multiple and various analytical instrument is what is required for a multiple and various linguistic activity. Nevertheless the second one, the analytical meaning which compares the language-game to a certain kind of model, is certainly the most important from a methodological point of view.

Namely if we want to reconsider now the Foucaultian reference to the Wittgensteinian concept of game we can find helpful to issue a comparison between the function the concept of *language-games* has in the Wittgensteinian analysis of language and the function the concept of *rappports de force* has in the Foucaultian analysis of power developed in the pages of *La volonté de savoir*.

La condition de possibilité du pouvoir [...] il ne faut pas la chercher dans l'existence première d'un point central, dans un foyer unique de souveraineté d'où rayonneraient des formes dérivées et descendantes; c'est le socle mouvant des rapports de force qui induisent sans cesse, par leur inégalité, des états de pouvoir, mais toujours locaux et instables.<sup>10</sup>

The Foucaultian analysis of power consists in “déchiffrer les mécanismes de pouvoir à partir d'une *stratégie immanente* aux rapports de force”<sup>11</sup>. Namely there is no unique language, but as many languages as many language-games there are. Language-games are plural and multiple just as the relations of power are. They are conceived as local, specific, just as the *power-games*, or relations of power are: there is no power as a material thing localized somewhere, or an *essence*, conceivable in a unique way, but local relations of power, contextualized games of power. The various games of power have only the common feature of being game, of being played, of being practices governed and structured by rules and norms, tactics and strategies; among the different games of power these are nothing but *family resemblances*: they don't define the content, the goal of the power itself – for they are intrinsically individual –, but they rather define the formal structure, the analytical structure of power. Another important feature of the *language-games* is that they do not ‘hide’ anything behind or beyond them: there is no substance, whose the games would be the surface of. Behind the use of the language in a specific game (which is the only possible use) there are no substances such as meanings (as existing independently from the use and the context of the use), mental states (which are traditionally taken to accompany the process of meaning or understanding)<sup>12</sup>, subjects (as a centre that produces mental states which are linked or labelled with words and then to external objects). Wittgenstein, with his famous argument against the so called *private language*, insists on the necessity for the language to be external, overt and social in

a way. Sharable.<sup>13</sup> This leads to an anti-metaphysical and an anti-reductivist consideration of both language and power: the analytical reduction of power, of social institutions to their components, to their constitutive elements – such as single laws, punishment-acts, disciplinary procedures, praises, acknowledgments, repression mechanisms – with the intent to dismantle it, to look *inside it* is misleading. There is no inside and outside perspective, neither from language, nor from power. Neither are they localized, they are in a certain sense everywhere: in this sense we cannot talk from an external perspective (external to the language, external to the power, external to the history).<sup>14</sup>

Thus we can observe that developing the vague and general Foucaultian reference to the Anglo-Americans, we obtain an important analogy between power and language, relations of power and language games, entailing the possibility of a strong connection between analytical philosophy of language and political philosophy, Anglo-American philosophy and continental philosophy, theoretical and practical philosophy. In a word the idea of a language game is to the study of linguistic practices what the idea of power structures is to the study of political practices. This mainly because these two concepts critically oppose the foundational unity of both language and power, metaphysically considered as *Überbegriffe*.<sup>15</sup>

As we can see, the *strategic interpretation* is a peculiar non metaphysic way of analysing language, since it does not seek for a foundation of linguistic mechanisms in a logical norm or in the reference to a set of definite essences. This kind of interpretation has obviously the same sort of effects in the analysis of power. What Foucault thinks to be the limit of the contribution of the analytical philosophers of the ordinary language, and of Wittgenstein too, is that their analyses remain theoretical, since they create the space for a strategic interpretation without fully developing it.<sup>16</sup> Stating that this is certainly true, we can now focus on at least some of the main differences between the two approaches. First of all, the notion of strategy is crucial in this consideration of the language games: they are strategic since they are defined by Wittgenstein as a “reaction”. But the Foucaultian operation wants to go beyond that by stating that strategy is assessed by a *target* or a goal for that activity. In the Wittgensteinian analysis there is no space for those concepts, because the reduction of language to particular, local, historically determined language-games is what is solely needed by Wittgenstein to critic and abandon a strong and universal conception of language. For Foucault, the discursive practices which constitute language are directed towards the achievement of a goal which is not purely epistemological, but it's a political target, consisting in the modification of the present relations of power. Foucault does an additional move on the Wittgensteinian basis: in every situation we have a given set of relations of power among individuals, as a set of lines connecting them. Discourse can be either conceived as the way to produce, to defend and maintain this status quo, either, the way to alter and modify it.<sup>17</sup>

Nevertheless the Foucaultian task in the analysis of discourse and power could not be accomplished without the Wittgensteinian instruments: the two philosophers apply two philosophical strategies that need to be complementary. Primarily because the historical nature of language-games was first recognised by Wittgenstein himself. Secondly the idea of language-games, of language regions opened the possibility of a discourse without a unique foundation but intrinsically multiple, constituted by various and different games with specific rules, standards of rationality and so on.

This inevitably leads to the very Foucaultian idea according to which any field of knowledge is constituted by, has its roots in the relations of power at its basis. Namely there are no independent, transparent, fully objective fields or objects of knowledge, since each of them is interconnected with specific and local relations of power. *Political epistemology* then is a certain way to specify the historical epistemology which leads us to consider directly the connection between human social practices and higher, pure theoretical conceptualization schemas. Political epistemology, so to speak, foreshadows the overcoming of a purely epistemological truth, the one belonging to the traditional picture-theory of correspondence, towards a truth which is instead intrinsically historical and political. In so doing it fights against the most prominent and fundamental form of metaphysics. All the possible ways to intend what metaphysics is – a use of language outside language games, the misleading consideration of a grammatical proposition as empirical ones, the violation of our logical-syntactical grammar – are all part of this broader sense: the non strategic conception of language and language activity. A metaphysical attitude is the one entailed by a *correspondence theory*, which looks for unambiguous *essences* beyond words and concepts: a strategic conception of language is the only to allow us the overcoming of this theory. The only conception that takes into account the *opacity* of our language, together with its characteristic way of being embedded in a practical system of relations of power, a strategic net, a field of forces, a *form of life*, which constitutes the foothold – and not the logical foundation – for our epistemic games, for our epistemic truths.

## Endnotes

<sup>1</sup> Wittgenstein, *Culture and Value*, (1929), The University of Chicago Press, 1980, p. 1.

<sup>2</sup> Foucault, "La vérité et les formes juridiques", 1974, *Dits et écrits II*, Gallimard, Paris, 1994, p. 538. Foucault addresses in many other occasions to the concept of *game*, sometimes he talks about *game of truth*, for example, but in the reported reference he connects it directly to the Anglo-American philosophy of language.

<sup>3</sup> Wittgenstein is overtly mentioned by Foucault during the round table after the conference, where he says: "Il s'agit, d'un côté, d'une sorte d'analyse du discours comme stratégie, un peu à la manière de ce que font les Anglo-Saxons, en particulier Wittgenstein, Austin, Strawson, Searle". I claim that among the others, is Wittgenstein to represent the principle target of Foucault's analogy.

<sup>4</sup> Wittgenstein, *Investigations*, §23.

<sup>5</sup> *Ibidem*, §23: "Review the multiplicity of language-games in the following examples, and in others:

Giving orders, and obeying them –

Describing the appearance of an object, or giving its measurements –

Constructing an object from a description (a drawing) –

Reporting an event –

Speculating about an event – ...". Language-games appear as something we could potentially list, enumerate.

<sup>6</sup> Wittgenstein, *Investigations*, §7, 25.

<sup>7</sup> Wittgenstein, *Culture and Value*, 1937, p. 31.

<sup>8</sup> *Ibidem*, §130.

<sup>9</sup> See the similarity, stressed in many places by Wittgenstein himself, with the model-theory of the physician Ludwig Boltzmann.

<sup>10</sup> Foucault, *La volonté de savoir*, p. 122.

<sup>11</sup> *Ibidem*, p. 128

<sup>12</sup> Wittgenstein's opinion about the mere existence of mental states as such is in most cases ambivalent, but he is clear about the fact that they cannot be taken as physical explanation of linguistic processes such as understanding or meaning (see *Investigations* §665, §693).

<sup>13</sup> Wittgenstein, *Investigations*, § 293: "Now someone tells me that *he* knows what pain is only from his own case! – Suppose everyone had a box with something in it: we call it a "beetle". No one can look into anyone else's box, and everyone says he knows what a beetle is only by looking at *his* beetle.- Here it would be quite possible for everyone to have something different... The thing in the box has no place in the language-game at all, not even as *something*: for the box might even be empty."

<sup>14</sup> Foucault, *La volonté de savoir*, p. 121: "Par pouvoir, je ne veux pas dire «le Pouvoir», comme ensemble d'institutions et d'appareils qui garantissent la sujétion des citoyens dans un État donné. Par Pouvoir, je n'entends pas non plus un mode d'assujettissement, qui par opposition à la violence, aurait la forme de la règle. Enfin, je n'entends pas un système général de nomination exercée par un élément ou un groupe sur un autre, et dont les effets, par dérivations successives, traverseraient le corps social tout entier"; p. 126.

<sup>15</sup> Wittgenstein, *Investigations*, § 97.

<sup>16</sup> Foucault, "La vérité et les formes juridiques", p. 631: "Ce qui me semble un peu limité dans l'analyse de Searle, de Strawson, etc., c'est que les analyses de la stratégie d'un discours qui se font autour d'une tasse de thé, dans un salon d'Oxford, ne concernent que des jeux stratégiques qui sont intéressants, mais qui me paraissent profondément limités. Le problème serait de savoir si nous pourrions pas étudier la stratégie du discours dans un contexte historique plus réel, ou à l'intérieur de pratiques qui sont d'une espèce différente de celle des conversations de salon".

<sup>17</sup> *Ibidem*, pp. 631-632.

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# On Text-Setting as Aspect-Seeing by Means of Music

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## 1. Listening to music (then talking about it)

Listening to music is logically prior to analysis. Analysis (or at least the kind I would like to argue for) gives you the chance to spend quality time with the music you love; to live again imaginary sound trajectories; to try to re-present (*vergegenwärtigen*) privileged moments played out inside a richly differentiated temporal frame; to get carried away (again and again) while talking about all this, before the next time you listen again to the music (which will then set you anew to the analysis mode and so forth).<sup>1</sup> Of course, analytic discourse has a logic of its own and once operating in this mode things can't go exactly parallel to the listening mode. You may linger on one or the other 'privileged moment'; you can recourse to necessary background knowledge; you may see all of a sudden a hidden aspect you did not think of while listening to the music; you could spend an hour discussing a piece of music which only lasts a few minutes. At any rate, this kind of analysis (or its best parts)<sup>2</sup> will offer no *causal* explanation whatsoever, as Wittgenstein used to say about Freud's best interpretations: it will only be "an expression of ideas which led us from one end to another of a [piece of music]" (*Lectures*, 18).<sup>3</sup> And, of course, it will not so much name causes as it will *show* what is beautiful or interesting or clever or ... about the beloved piece of music.

## 2. Music-setting and Aspects

I suggest we consider text-setting, e.g. in a *Lied*, as *text-aspect exemplification by means of music*. Wittgensteinian 'aspects' concern duly a concrete way of *seeing-as*; i.e. a cognitive act between mere seeing, physiologically speaking (if there ever is such a thing), and actual interpreting; in other words, aspect seeing or noticing is a bit of both (a kind of 'seeing', in a large sense). While Wittgenstein's original discussion and much of the subsequent attention are focused on the visual domain and the change from one aspect to another (the famous rabbit/duck example), my attention is directed to aspect-seeing as *understanding* in poetry and music, esp. in the form of the art song:<sup>4</sup> a poem is by definition semantically dense and interpretatively open; any single reading and/or interpretation (by a composer, an actor or simply a reader) must necessarily pick out some but not all possible aspects. The setting itself (the music) is the aspect change.

Musical picking out is brought about more by way of *exemplification* than *denotation*. I use those two terms in Goodman's sense (*Languages of Art*), e.g.: 'red' denotes red; 'black' exemplifies (and denotes) black. Exemplification is denotation plus possession of the property denoted. Denotation is mainly at work in speech/literature and thematic painting. Exemplification is found in music and abstract painting. In song, exemplification might occur in all three levels of voice, text and piano, in many interesting combinations: the music set to a poem speaking about (denoting) immobility may exemplify movement; the music set to a poem denoting alertness and exemplifying sluggishness may exemplify sluggishness, etc. In general, the music will normally exemplify, while at the same time the poem will denote *and* exemplify. This means that a. the relation net is inherently rich, and it determines the result-

ing quality of the song, as well as directly involves the listener (exemplified aspects are the aspects noticed by the listener; or put in another way: the composer *sees* certain – a few out of many possible – text aspects which he then *exemplifies* musically which then the listener may *notice*), b. the text-to-music relationship can transcend the local word-to-music level and spill over, as it were, onto the whole of music (a word at one point of the song can influence the music at (an)other point(s) of the song).

## 3. Case Study Schumann (I)

Schumann songs present an inexhaustible well of subtle possible relations between text and music, one actually involving three distinct levels: the piano, the voice-as-music, the voice-as-text. I'll take a lied rather from the periphery of both audiences' and critics' attention: no 7 from the *Liederkreis*, op. 39: "Auf einer Burg". Here is the Eichendorff text:

Eingeschlafen auf der Lauer/ Oben ist der alte Ritter;/  
Drüber gehen Regenschauer./ Und der Wald rauscht  
durch das Gitter.// Eingewachsen Bart und Haare,/ und  
versteinert Brust und Krause,/ sitzt er viele hundert Jahre/  
oben in der stillen Klause./// Draussen ist es still und  
friedlich,/ alle sind ins Tal gezogen,/ Waldesvögel ein-  
sam singen/ in den leeren Fensterbogen.// Eine Hoch-  
zeit fährt da unten/ auf dem Rhein im Sonnenscheine./  
Musikanten spielen munter,/ und die schöne Braut, die  
weinet.

The poem is enigmatic by itself but interpreting the poem is not my concern here. I am interested in showing the aspects of the text that Schumann reacts to musically, and this, I believe, can be shown even if we don't get down to the bottom of what is really meant, either by Schumann or Eichendorff (which might or might not coincide).

The poem consists of four verses, two focused on the 'Ritter', two on the wedding and the 'weeping bride' [!]. First, we can *notice* that Schumann musically *sees* the poem's reference to old times: pseudo-polyphonic texture (the dotted rhythm also exemplifies metaphorically the 'auf der Lauer'- aspect) in the first part of the song together with choral texture, in the second. The song is modified strophic. Schumann uses the folk-like strophic form only to enhance his musical reaction to the incredible punch-line with the word 'weinet' at the end: as the song unfolds, the listener is aware of something going extremely wrong, already by the time of the second verse music, with its perverse harmonies; more even so, since the style alluded to is a pristine *Choral* style; The listener's uneasiness is confirmed at the end of the second verse (the end of the first half of the song) with its uncanny dissonances and distorted cadence. On the other hand, when *weinet* comes at the very end of the song, the music has nothing disturbing whatsoever: on the contrary, Schumann sets it in a buoyant euphonic cadence on *e*, which exemplifies rather an early-music sounding cadence, as if he saw an early-music aspect in 'weinet'. We realize, however, in hindsight, that the semantics of the 'weinet' is the source of the uneasiness in the first half of the song. At a closer look, the reason why the setting of the second verse (and of the

fourth) is disturbing, lies in the way the piano is made asynchronous to the voice (in rhythmical dissonance, as it were, with it). It seems, like the overall aspect Schumann elicits from the Eichendorff poem has to do with the lack of synchronization between the two worlds that correspond to the two halves of the poem. The local words-to-music reaction model is not adequate to account for this. We notice that the weinet-aspect, as well as the aspect of two contrasting temporal orders are the two principal aspects that Schumann sees in the Eichendorff text; in a way that his musical reactions to these spill over into different points in the course of the unfolding of the song.<sup>5</sup>

#### 4. Words and Music

As users of language we are able to make the distinction between actuality and different temporal frames of reference; also, the distinction between indicating, guessing, ordering, wishing, believing, comparing etc. What if one applies to language the filter of another medium, like painting, dance or music? (E.g. if one tries to render a certain text by composing music, or doing a painting, or performing a dance): one loses negation, temporal reference other than the actual, modalities like possibility, counterfactuals, necessity (or maybe is it all necessity?). In such a 'translation', apart from nouns, adjectives can be rescued too, but one needs to spend some time in the other medium to realize this: In an indirect way, the temporal element is rescued after all, and after a while one realizes that one can in the end have both actuality and long-term second order emerging qualities, which is what I think the equivalent of the adjectives. What, however, is for sure out of this list is: pronouns, prepositions, all the little syncategorematic words, and acts like the ones mentioned before: negation, as well as disjunction, entailment, conjecture, belief, doubt, wish, order etc. Ultimately, what gets lost in the passage from the linguistic to any other domain is the very distinction between Truth and Falsehood. All these are generally true for language set to music. Schumann (again) is exceptional: He has managed to set to music even the little syncategorematic words that introduce a simile: the comparative conjunctions 'wie', 'als', 'als ob'.

#### 5. Case Study Schumann (II)

Another song also from the periphery of audiences' and critics' attention is "Kommen und Scheiden", no 3 from Opus 90, poems by Nikolaus Lenau. Here is the text Schumann set to music:

So oft sie kam, erschien mir die Gestalt/ so lieblich wie  
das erste Grün im Wald.// Und was sie sprach, drang  
mir zum Herzen ein/ süß wie des Frühlings erstes Lied  
[im Hain].// Und als Lebewohl, sie winkte mit der Hand,  
War's, ob der letzte Jugendtraum mir schwand.

The song is in *g* flat major at the beginning and *f* sharp major, at the end: a first, almost visual hint (six flats – six sharps), at the Romantic identity-paradox (cf. Luhmann, 364). The presence in the text of the feminine figure is also ambivalent: she is a human person and/or an immaterial 'Gestalt'. This ontological ambivalence is emphasized through the tone-setting use in the text – and their

ingenious setting to music – of similes. Through its embedding in the context of the overall ambivalence of 'her' presence, Schumann is setting to music not the specific content of the similes (e.g. 'das erste Grün im Wald' or 'des Frühlings erstes Lied'), but the very notion of a simile. Musically, this is brought about through *the setting of every simile-introducing word* to an ingenious harmony that clearly deviates from the principal tonality (all in all something like the musical equivalent to Eichendorff's 'metaphysical tact' (Adorno, 73)). The other music-textual aspects relate to the composer's reaction to the semantics of concrete verbs: 'drang', with the harmonic friction of the 2<sup>nd</sup>; 'schwand', with the homologous 'elimination' a. of *b* sharp to *b* natural, b. of the voice; opening the way to the piano postlude in *f* sharp major.

Listening to music is logically prior to analysis – of course, other approaches to analysis (e.g. more on the *poetic* side) are possible that might even dispense altogether with the listening experience. However, for the kind of analysis counting on the analyst's involvement as a critical listener,<sup>6</sup> listening to music is to analysis what dreaming is to planning.

#### Endnotes

<sup>1</sup> We can't say about somebody 'She is musical', says Wittgenstein [T], if she is not able to *talk* about the music she seems to appreciate (*Lectures*, 6 n. 5; my emphasis); conversely, it could be argued that talking about music is meaningful only in relation to the quality of our involvement as listeners.

<sup>2</sup> We may call it with Boerthold Hoekner 'distant analysis', an allusion to Novalis.

<sup>3</sup> Wittgenstein refers originally to the Freudian explanations of jokes.

<sup>4</sup> Wittgenstein brings indirectly music in the discussion: "Doesn't it take imagination to hear something as a variation on a particular theme?" (*Pl*, 181).

<sup>5</sup> Another example of spilling over: the drone on *c* in the setting of the second verse is related to the *auf der Lauer*-aspect of the first line. In the second (fourth) verse, except for the early music- aspect, Schumann also notices musically the aspect of the passing years - aspect through the use of harmonic sequence.

<sup>6</sup> 'Analysis and criticism are deeply related modes of perception', in Hoekner, 82.

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Appendix

a) Robert Schumann, "Auf einer Burg" (*Liederkreis*, op. 39; no 7):

The image displays two pages of a musical score. The left page is titled "Auf einer Burg" and the right page is titled "In der Ferne". Both pieces are in 3/8 time and feature a vocal line and a piano accompaniment. The notation includes treble and bass clefs, a key signature of one flat, and various musical notations such as notes, rests, and ornaments. The lyrics are written below the vocal lines.

b) Robert Schumann, "Kommen und Scheiden" (op. 90, no 4):

The image displays two pages of a musical score for the piece "Kommen und Scheiden". The score is in 6/8 time and features a vocal line and a piano accompaniment. The notation includes treble and bass clefs, a key signature of one flat, and various musical notations such as notes, rests, and ornaments. The lyrics are written below the vocal lines. The publisher's name "G. Henle" is visible at the bottom of both pages.

\* The meter is mistakenly printed as 9/8, instead of the right 6/8; see Robert Schumann, *Lieder für eine Stimme mit Klavierbegleitung*, ed. Max Friedlaender [1856 – 1934] (Frankfurt/M: C. F. Peters, s.d.).

# Was es heißt, den Menschen als Menschen zu sehen: Wittgenstein und der Existenzialismus

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## 1. Sprachspiel und Weltbild

Um Wittgensteins Erläuterungen zum Aspektsehen richtig verstehen zu können, ist es wichtig, sich den Kontext, in den sie eingebunden sind, kurz in Erinnerung zu rufen. Der in diesem Zusammenhang zentrale Begriff ist der des Sprachspiels, der im §7 der PU als das Ganze „*der Sprache und der Tätigkeiten, mit denen sie verwoben ist*“, bestimmt worden ist. Die Gesamtheit der Sprachspiele, an denen jemand teilhat, bildet dessen Sprache. Im Weiteren verortet Wittgenstein den Ursprung der Bedeutungen der Wörter im Sprachspiel, also letztlich in der gemeinsamen Praxis der Sprachspielenden. Denn am Grunde des Sprachspiels liegt das Handeln (ÜG: §204). Aus dieser engen Verzahnung der Sprache mit den Handlungen der Menschen folgt, dass jedes Sprachspiel – und damit jede Sprache – am Ende auf einer Reihe unbegründeter Sätze fußt (da Handlungen ja keine Gründe sind). So entsteht eine Klasse von Annahmen, die den „*überkommene[n] Hintergrund, auf welchem ich zwischen wahr und falsch unterscheide*“ (ÜG: §94) bilden, die folgerichtig selbst aber einer Klassifikation nach richtig oder falsch entzogen sind. Diese Klasse unbegründeter und unbeweisbarer Annahmen beschreibt das Weltbild, das diejenigen teilen, die auch die zugehörigen Sprachspiele/Sprache teilen. „*Die Sätze, die dies Weltbild beschreiben, könnten zu einer Art Mythologie gehören.*“ (ÜG: §95) Zu jeder Sprache gehört demzufolge eine ihr zugrunde liegende Mythologie.

## 2. Aspektsehen

Diese Mythologie hat eine wichtige Funktion für das Aspektsehen. Unter *Aspektsehen* versteht Wittgenstein eine bestimmte Erfahrung:

„Ich betrachte ein Gesicht, auf einmal bemerke ich seine Ähnlichkeit mit einem andern. Ich sehe, daß es sich nicht geändert hat; und sehe es doch anders. Diese Erfahrung nenne ich »das Bemerkens eines Aspekts«“ (PU II: 518)

Der Witz besteht hierbei darin, dass ein Gegenstand, obwohl er derselbe bleibt, dennoch auf verschiedene Weisen vom Betrachter gesehen werden kann. Die Wahrnehmung, hier als der physikalische Prozess verstanden, bleibt dabei dieselbe. Was sich ändert ist, *als was* der Gegenstand gesehen wird. Das *Sehen-als* ist also scharf vom Akt der Wahrnehmung zu trennen (PU II: 524). Hier ist nicht gemeint, wie man einen bereits erkannten Gegenstand im Nachhinein auch sehen kann, wenn man sich nur genug anstrengt. Es geht vielmehr um die *übliche* Weise, wie wir Gegenstände allererst sehen. Dabei steht zwischen der reinen Wahrnehmung und ihrem Ergebnis ein Prozess des *Sehen-Als*, der ausschlaggebend ist, *als was* ich den wahrgenommenen Gegenstand sehe. Wittgenstein nennt diesen Prozess ein Deuten: Man kann Gegenstände

„(...) einmal als das eine, einmal als das andere Ding *sehen*. – Wir deuten sie also, und *sehen* sie, wie wir sie *deutern*“ (PU II: 519).

Zusammengefasst heißt das: Jemand nimmt etwas wahr, durch den dann folgenden Deutungsprozess ergibt sich, *als was* dieser Gegenstand gesehen wird.

Vor diesem Hintergrund wird die Rolle des Sprachspiels für das Aspektsehen deutlich. Die Sprache – und damit die Bedeutungen der Wörter – sind eng verbunden mit den Tätigkeiten der Menschen. In den Wörtern spiegeln sich gleichsam die Tätigkeiten und die Tätigkeiten verleihen den Wörtern Bedeutung. Das Sprachspiel hat auf diese Weise Einfluss darauf, *als was* man die Dinge sehen kann: Man kann nur sehen, was man kennt.

„Soll ich sagen: ‚Ein Hase kann ausschauen wie eine Ente‘? Wäre es denkbar, daß jemand, der einen Hasen, aber keine Ente kennt, sagte: ‚Ich kann die Zeichnung [Hasen-Enten-Kopf, T. W.] als Hasen sehen und auch noch anders, obwohl ich für den zweiten Aspekt kein Wort habe‘? Später lernt er eine Ente kennen und sagt: ‚Als das habe ich damals die Zeichnung gesehen!‘ – Warum ist das nicht möglich?“ (BPP: I-70)

Weil das *Sehen-als* im Rahmen des Aspektsehens das Ergebnis einer *Deutung* ist und als Tätigkeit aufgefasst wird (LS: III-556). Man deutet das Wahrgenommene auf die eine oder andere Weise, aber etwas zu deuten ist nur entlang bekannter Begriffe möglich. Andernfalls handelt es sich um eine Interpretation, die die kreative Erweiterung des Sprachspiels ermöglicht, aber eben einer Grundlage, also eines bereits gesehenen (gedeuteten) Gegenstandes bedarf. Dass das Aspektsehen nicht mit diesem späteren Interpretieren identisch ist, verdeutlicht Wittgensteins Hinweis darauf, dass man, wenn man einen Gegenstand *als etwas* sieht, diesen Gegenstand damit gleichermaßen erzeugt: „*Sehe ich wirklich jedesmal etwas anderes, oder deute ich nur, was ich sehe, auf verschiedene Weise? Ich bin geneigt, das erste zu sagen. Aber warum? – Deuten ist ein Denken, ein Handeln; Sehen ein Zustand*“ (PU II: 550). Dieser Hinweis ist einleuchtend, wird durch das *Sehen-Als* eben basal ein Gegenstand gleichsam konstituiert. Man nimmt etwas wahr und sieht es anschließend als *diesen Gegenstand*. Sähe man ihn anders, wäre er eben ein anderer Gegenstand.

## 3. Konsequenzen für Ethik und Anthropologie

In Ethik und Anthropologie ist die Frage, was ein Mensch ist, gleichermaßen alt wie schwierig zu beantworten. Einerseits besteht ein Zusammenhang von der physischen Erscheinung des Menschen zum Begriff desselben:

„Verstümmle einen Menschen ganz & gar schneide ihm Arme & Beine Nase & Ohren ab & dann sieh was von seinem Selbstrespekt & von seiner Würde übrig bleibt & wieweit seine Begriffe von solchen Dingen dann noch die selben sind. Wir ahnen gar nicht, wie diese Begriffe von dem Gewöhnlichen, normalen Zustand unseres Körpers abhängen. Was wird aus ihnen wenn wir mit einem Ring durch unsere Zungen & gefesselt an einer Leine geführt werden? Wie viel bleibt dann noch von einem Menschen in ihm übrig? In welchem Zustand versinkt so ein Mensch? Wir wissen nicht, daß wir auf ei-

nem hohen schmalen Felsen stehen, & um uns Abgründe, in denen alles ganz anders ausschaut.“ (DB: 67f)

Andererseits ist jedoch der Begriff des Menschen, so wie er Bestandteil einer jeweiligen Mythologie ist, entscheidend dafür, was als Mensch gesehen wird. Dies komplizierte Wechselverhältnis legt den Focus auf zwei Konsequenzen der Überlegungen zum Aspektsehen für Ethik und Anthropologie. Zunächst setzt die Diskussion der Frage, was der Mensch sei, bereits einen Begriff des Menschen voraus. Gearbeitet wird innerhalb dieser Theorien an der Interpretation des Begriffs *Mensch*. Nur indirekt und langsam kann dies zu einer Veränderung des mythologischen Menschenbildes führen, das eine Veränderung dessen, was als Mensch gesehen wird, zur Folge hat. Weiterhin bilden die Begriffe sozusagen ein Raster, durch das die Wahrnehmung fällt. Deshalb besteht derart eine grammatische Beziehung zwischen dem Aspekt und dem mit ihm korrespondierenden Begriff, dass ohne den Begriff der Aspekt nicht gesehen werden könnte (vgl. Wachtendorf 2008: 211; BPP: I-872).

#### 4. Gemeinsame menschliche Handlungsweise

Der Weg zu einer tragfähigen Bestimmung des Begriffs *Mensch* ist sehr kompliziert. Zu einer überzeugenden Definition gehört nach klassischer Auffassung im Sinne einer Wesensdefinition mindestens ein Merkmal, das allen Menschen wirklich zukommt. Ein derartiges Wesensmerkmal zu finden ist nahezu unmöglich, eingedenk der Pluralität von Sprachspielen. Wittgenstein zufolge verbleibt nur der Weg der (grammatischen) Untersuchung der Sprache, um solch eine Bestimmung zu finden. Denn darin wird seinen Niederschlag gefunden haben, was zur Praxis und zu den Gebräuchen der Menschen gehört:

„Daß der Schatten des Menschen, der wie ein Mensch ausschaut, oder sein Spiegelbild, daß Regen, Gewitter, die Mondphasen, der Jahreszeitwechsel, die Ähnlichkeit und Verschiedenheit der Tiere unter einander und zum Menschen, die Erscheinungen des Todes, der Geburt und des Geschlechtslebens, kurz alles, was der Mensch jahraus jahrein um sich wahrnimmt, in mannigfaltigster Weise mit einander verknüpft, in seinem Denken (seiner Philosophie) und seinen Gebräuchen eine Rolle spielen wird, ist selbstverständlich, oder ist eben das, was wir wirklich wissen und interessant ist.“ (VüE: 34)

Kennt man diese Gebräuche, kann man ausgehend davon nicht nur die Sprache der anderen verstehen. Vielmehr bestehe darin das Gemeinsame, das alle Menschen teilen. Folglich spricht Wittgenstein in diesem Sinne auch von einer „gemeinsame[n] menschliche[n] Handlungsweise.“ (PU: §206) Diese Bestimmung jedoch ist kontingent und es stellt sich immer noch die Frage, ob es denn eine allen Menschen gemeinsame Handlungsweise – ihnen gemeinsame Gebräuche – gibt, so dass es in diesem Punkt eine Kongruenz der unterschiedlichen Weltbilder geben kann. Eine mögliche Lösung dieses Problems führt über den Weg der Sprachpraxis. Damit sind notwendig einige Kompetenzen wie beispielsweise die Fähigkeit zum Regelfolgen verbunden, die die Sprechenden teilen müssen (vgl. Wachtendorf 2006). Der Preis dafür, lediglich in der Sprachpraxis eine gemeinsame Handlungsweise gefunden zu haben, ist jedoch eine nur sehr geringe Erklärungskraft. Die Frage bleibt daher, ob es möglich ist, eine etwas breitere und trotzdem tragfähige Bestimmung vorzunehmen.

Eine solche lässt sich im Existenzialismus finden, da dort eine Bestimmung der den Menschen gemeinsamen Handlungsweise allein ausgehend davon, dass sie Menschen sind – und damit unter Absehung von (weiteren)

kontingenten Sachverhalten, versucht wird. Derartige Versuche gibt es auch aus anthropologischer Richtung. Plessner (Plessner 1970) etwa versucht zu zeigen, dass das Lachen und Weinen typisch für den Menschen und nur ihn sei. Beim Lachen und beim Weinen nimmt der Mensch eine besondere Haltung zu sich beziehungsweise der Welt ein, die zu einem sich-Verhalten führt, das eben bestimmte, nur dem Menschen eignende Fähigkeiten voraussetze. Insofern ist diese Definition schon tragfähiger als eine bloße Betonung beispielsweise der Vernunft(fähigkeit). Aber so plausibel dieses Argument ist, zielt es doch wieder darauf ab, eine im Grunde kontingente Eigenschaft – das Lachen oder das Weinen – als Wesensbestimmung zu identifizieren. Seien die Voraussetzungen, um Lachen zu können, auch tatsächlich typisch menschlich, so muss es dessen Äußerung aber nicht notwendig sein. Diesen Nachteil umgeht der existenzialistische Zugang Karl Jaspers'. Jaspers zufolge ist die Grundkonstitution des Menschen, dass dieser sich immer in Situationen befinde. Eine Situation ist eine „Wirklichkeit für ein an ihr als *Dasein* interessiertes Subjekt“ (Jaspers 1973: 201f). Diese Bestimmung enthält einige wichtige Aspekte. Zunächst muss das Subjekt – und das ist das Wesentliche des Subjekts – an dem, was um es herum geschieht, interessiert sein. Dies ist sicherlich für jedes Lebewesen bis zu einem gewissen Grad notwendig, da es, um überleben zu können, ein Interesse daran haben muss, wie seine Umwelt geartet ist, weil es zum Überleben notwendig seine Bedürfnisse befriedigen muss. Es gibt aber einen Unterschied zwischen diesem bloßen Interesse, um lediglich das Überleben sicherzustellen, und dem Interesse des Subjekts, das ein Interesse *als Dasein* darstellt, wie es dem Menschen eigentümlich ist und weit über das erste hinaus geht. Darin liegt der zentrale Kern dieses Ansatzes: „Nicht mein *Dasein* also ist Existenz, sondern der Mensch ist im *Dasein* mögliche Existenz.“ (Jaspers 1973: 2) Gemäß Jaspers' Auffassung ist der Mensch nicht bloß da, sondern ihm kommt darüber hinaus eine besondere Eigenschaft zu: er hat Möglichkeiten, sich für sein *Dasein* zu interessieren, sich diesbezüglich für bestimmte, ihn als *Dasein* betreffende Dinge zu entscheiden und sich dadurch im bloßen *Dasein* zu einer Existenz zu machen. Damit ist weitaus mehr gesagt, als dass der Mensch ein vernunftbegabtes Wesen ist. Sobald er lebt, lebt er bezogen auf sich und die anderen, in steter Selbstreflexion sein Verhältnis zur Welt, zu sich und den anderen je neu bestimmend. Dadurch bekommt er Existenz und macht sich gleichsam zum Menschen. Er erlebt sein *Dasein* als in Situationen befindlich. Dies also ist bereits allen Subjekten dieser Art gemein: Sie befinden sich in Situationen, es kann nicht anders sein.

Von dieser grundsätzlichen Feststellung ausgehend beschreibt Jaspers einige besondere Situationen, die ihre Besonderheit daher haben, dass ihre Negation nicht denkbar ist – eine Eigenschaft, die sie mit den grammatischen Sätzen Wittgensteins gemein haben. Die grammatischen Sätze verortet Wittgenstein in *Über Gewißheit* am Fuße von Sprachspielen. Und weil Sprachspiele jeweils innerhalb bestimmter Lebensweisen gespielt werden, bleiben die grammatischen Sätze folglich abhängig von und gebunden an diese Lebensweisen. Demgegenüber identifiziert Jaspers allgemein so genannte *Grenzsituationen*, die allen Menschen gleichermaßen eignen. Dies ist beispielsweise: „daß ich immer in Situationen bin, [...] daß ich sterben muss“ (Jaspers 1973: 203). Insofern der Mensch an der Wirklichkeit und seiner Situation interessiert ist, kann er sich den Grenzsituationen nicht entziehen, was Konsequenzen für seine Haltung zur Welt und für seine Handlungen hat.

Die Vorstellung, die Jaspers und Wittgenstein von dem Begriff der *Grenze* haben, ist dabei ganz ähnlich. Jaspers schreibt: „Grenze drückt aus: es gibt ein anderes, aber zugleich: dies andere ist nicht für das Bewußtsein im Dasein.“ (Jaspers <sup>4</sup>1973: 203) In diesem Sinne heißt es im Tractatus: „[U]m dem Denken eine Grenze zu ziehen, müßten wir beide Seiten dieser Grenze denken können (wir müßten also denken können, was sich nicht denken läßt).“ (TLP, Vorwort) Aber wir wissen, dass es ein jenseits der Grenze gibt, das wir allerdings nie erreichen können.

Dementsprechend sind auch für Jaspers diese Grenzsituationen „wie eine Wand, an die wir stoßen, an der wir scheitern.“ (Jaspers <sup>4</sup>1973: 203). Während Jaspers an der Existenz scheitert, scheitert Wittgenstein an der Sprache:

„Es drängte mich, gegen die Grenzen der Sprache anzurennen [...] Dieses Anrennen gegen die Wände unseres Käfigs ist völlig und absolut aussichtslos.“ (VüE: 18f)

Bei Wittgenstein bleiben die *grammatischen Gewissheiten* zunächst material unbestimmt und eben an die jeweilige Lebensweise gebunden. Moore muss den König zur Annahme seiner Gewissheiten *überreden* (ÜG: §92). Allein dadurch, dass beide Menschen sind, teilen sie demzufolge nicht notwendig dieselben Gewissheiten. Folgerichtig kann Wittgenstein die *gemeinsame menschliche Handlungsweise* auch nicht bestimmen, weiß aber offensichtlich, dass er darauf nicht verzichten kann. So bleibt es hier offen, wie man einen anderen Menschen als solchen erkennen kann.

Diese in Wittgensteins Philosophie immanente Lücke lässt sich mit Jaspers Ansatz schließen. Dessen Philosophie erlaubt es, das dem Menschen Gemeinsame mittels der Grenzsituationen zu bestimmen. Derartige Grenzsituationen, in denen sich jeder Mensch befindet und

zu denen er sich verhalten muss, bilden das gemeinsame Sprachspiel, ja, die gemeinsame Lebensweise der Menschen. Aber dies ist nicht nur die gemeinsame Basis des Verstehens, sondern darüber hinaus stehen typischerweise bestimmte Handlungen mit Grenzsituationen in Verbindung (so etwa Angst- und Furchtreaktionen). Dies sind die Aspekte, die man an anderen erkennt. Aufgrund ihrer wird es möglich, den anderen auch als Menschen zu sehen.

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# Glimpses of Unsurveyable Maps

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That Ludwig Wittgenstein was interested in maps and map-making comes as no surprise. After all, he compares the form of a philosophical question to our common experience of disorientation – “I don’t know my way about.” (PI § 123) – and likens his *Philosophical Investigations* (PI) to an album containing sketches of a landscape which has been explored in a criss-cross manner. In this paper I present metaphors of perfect maps provided by Jorge Luis Borges, Lewis Carroll and Josiah Royce, and set these against remarks by Wittgenstein and Charles Sanders Peirce.

## 1. Seeing connections

In his collection of fake-historical fragments entitled *Museum* [1946] the Argentinian writer Jorge Luis Borges provides us with a description of ‘perfect’ map-making. His short text, titled „On Scientific Rigor (Del rigor en la ciencia)” is a fictitious example of scientific self-destruction. Apparently taken from a 17th century history book, the story tells of a nameless Empire in which Schools of Cartography are held captive by their picture of exactitude:

... In the Empire in question, the Cartographer’s Art reached such a degree of Perfection that the map of a single Province took up an entire City, and the map of the Empire covered an entire Province. After a while these Outsized Maps were no longer sufficient, and the Schools of Cartography created a Map of the Empire that was the size of the Empire, matching it point by point. Later Generations, which were less Devoted to the Study of Cartography, found this Map Irrelevant, and with it more than a little Irreverence left it exposed to the Inclemencies of the Sun and Winter. In the Western desert there are still Ruins of the Map, inhabited by Animals and Beggars. No other relics of the Geographic Discipline can be found anywhere else in the Land. (Borges 1999a, 139)

The core idea of this story may have sprung from an earlier version, one by Lewis Carroll. The novel in which we find it, Lewis Carroll’s *Sylvie and Bruno Concluded* [1893], was well-known by Borges (eg cf. Borges 1999b, 215) and admired by such diverse writers as James Joyce and Ludwig Wittgenstein (cf. Pitcher 1967, Fn5). As in the version of Borges, we are presented with a map too big for its own good:

“What a useful thing a pocket-map is!” I remarked.  
“That’s another thing we’ve learned from *your* Nation,” said Mein Herr, “map-making. But we’ve carried it much further than *you*. What do you consider the *largest* map that would be really useful?”  
“About six inches to the mile.”  
“Only six *inches!*” exclaimed Mein Herr. “We very soon got to six yards to the mile. Then we tried a *hundred* yards to the mile. And then came the grandest idea of all! We actually made a map of the country, on the scale of a *mile to the mile!*”  
“Have you used it much?” I enquired.  
“It has never been spread out, yet,” said Mein Herr: “the farmers objected: they said it would cover the whole country, and shut out the sunlight! So we now use the

country itself, as its own map, and I assure you it does nearly as well. (...)” (Carroll 1991, 265)

Using a country as its own map is comparable to Jonathan Swift’s *Lagadonian* language. Wittgenstein knew *Gulliver’s Travels* [1726] well, in fact, he even read an abridged version of it together with his pupils at the primary school in Trattenbach (cf. ICE 30.11.20). In chapter five Samuel Gulliver visits the Grand Academy of Lagado on the island of Balnibarbi, where he learns about the scientific endeavours to create a perfect language:

We next went to the school of languages, where three professors sat in consultation upon improving that of their own country. The first project was to shorten discourse, by cutting polysyllables into one, and leaving out verbs and participles; because in reality all things imaginable are but nouns. The other project was a scheme for entirely abolishing all words whatsoever; and this was urged as a great advantage in point of health as well as brevity. For it is plain that every word we speak is, in some degree, a diminution of our lungs by corrosion, and consequently contributes to the shortening of our lives. An expedient was therefore offered, and since words are only names for things, it would be more convenient for all men to carry about them such things as were necessary to express a particular business they are to discourse on. (...) [M]any of the most learned and wise adhere to the new scheme of expressing themselves by things; which has only this inconvenience attending it, that if a man’s business be very great, and of various kinds, he must be obliged, in proportion, to carry a greater bundle of things upon his back, unless he can afford one or two strong servants to attend him. I have often beheld two of these sages almost sinking under the weight of their packs, like peddlers among us; who, when they met in the street, would lay down their loads, open their sacks, and hold conversation for an hour together; then put up their implements, help each other to resume their burdens, and take their leave. (Swift 1892, 193f.)

In PI § 6 Wittgenstein reminds us that ostensive teaching of words may establish “an associative connection between word and thing”, which means amongst others that “a picture of the object comes before the child’s mind when it hears the word”. This is quite desirable, for example when we read poetry or novels, but it also has its disadvantages: We tend to take our pictorial associations for granted and forget that what words mean is not simply given. Using words across a variety of contexts, we tend to forget the language-game which caused us to associate a certain picture in the first place, “the language in which it is at home” (PI § 116).

Before I move on, let me summarize. Swift’s *Lagadonian* language shares one important feature with Borges’ and Carroll’s maps: it is highly impractical. While the giant maps block out the sun and at best serve as shelter for the poor, they have stopped being maps, since the purpose of a map is to give instructions we can follow: “Die Verwendung einer Landkarte besteht darin, daß wir uns in irgendeiner Weise nach ihr richten; daß wir ihr Bild in unsere Handlungen übertragen.” (MS 114, 51) Faced with these gigantic maps, the problem one encounters is the

very reason maps were invented in the first place. For maps are drawn to provide us with orientation in a country “deficient in surveyability. A surveyable representation produces precisely that understanding which consists in ‘seeing connections’” (PI § 122) and dissolves the feeling of not knowing one’s way about: „Es ist, wie wenn ich ein winziges Gesichtsfeld und ein schlechtes Gedächtnis hätte, und nun, durch hin und her blicken, mich auf einer großen Landkarte auszukennen lernen sollte. Man würde in so einem Falle fortwährend Zusammenhänge vergessen, verkennen, sie langwierig suchen, wo sie nicht sind.“ (MS 117, 220)

## 2. Seeing differences

Our third map is by Josiah Royce, who invented it for a supplementary essay of his magnum opus *The World and the Individual* [1899] (cf. Royce 1923, 502ff.). To Borges this ‘philosophical’ map is clearly on a par with the best of literary inventions (cf. Borges 1966, 152).

Bertrand Russell discusses it in chapter 8 (“Infinite Cardinal Numbers”) of his *Introduction to Mathematical Philosophy* [1919]. – I quote Russell:

A “reflexive” class is one which is similar to a proper part of itself. (A “proper part” is a part short of the whole.)

A “reflexive” cardinal number is the cardinal number of a reflexive class.

We have now to consider this property of reflexiveness. One of the most striking instances of a “reflexion” is Royce’s illustration of the map: he imagines it decided to make a map of England upon a part of the surface of England. A map, if it is accurate, has a perfect one-one correspondence with its original; thus our map, which is part, is in one-one relation with the whole, and must contain the same number of points as the whole, which must therefore be a reflexive number. Royce is interested in the fact that the map, if it is correct, must contain a map of the map, which must in turn contain a map of the map of the map, and so on *ad infinitum*. (Russell <sup>2</sup>1920, 80)

One interesting aspect of Royce’s map is the feeling of dizziness that grabs hold of the reader, as he tries to reconstruct the map-within-the-map in his mind. A disorientation of another kind.

Ever since Carl Friedrich Gauss wrote his treatise “Allgemeine Auflösung der Aufgabe: Die Theile einer gegebenen Fläche auf einer andern gegebenen Fläche so abzubilden, dass die Abbildung dem Abgebildeten in den kleinsten Theilen ähnlich wird” [1825], the terms prototype (*Urbild*) and projected pictorial form (*Abbild*) have been at home in the world of map-making. One important aspect of geodesic projection is the fact that prototype and depiction are never identical, they only come to be very much alike. In the case of a high likeness – preserving both angles and shapes of infinitesimally small figures – one speaks of a conformal projection. A “conformal” map simply conforms to the principle of angle-preservation. (cf. Gauss 1873, 189ff.)

There may be few philosophers who knew more about maps than the geodesist and mathematician Charles Sanders Peirce. It is in his review of *The World and the Individual* that Peirce writes about Royce’s perfect map and finds in it a confirmation of his own ideas concerning the self. Even though Royce gives Georg Cantor’s serial one-to-one mapping of odd-numbers onto integers as his source of inspiration, Peirce immediately thinks of Gaussian conformal projection:

[Royce] resorts to Gauss’s conception of *Abbild*, which has played a great role in mathematics. That is to say, he likens the idea representing the entire life to a map of a country lying upon the territory of that country. Imagine a map of England, absolutely perfect in its minutest details, to lie upon the soil of England, without covering the entire country it maps. Upon this map would be shown the very ground where the map lies, and the map itself, in all its minutest details. In this map of the map, the map will be shown again; and so on endlessly. (...) It is to be noticed that, each successive map lying well inside the one which it immediately represents (...) the endless series of maps will converge to a single point, which represents itself throughout each and every map of the series. In the case of the idea, that point would be the self-consciousness of the idea. An idea, being a state of mind with a conscious purpose, must evidently be self-conscious. (Peirce 1979, 83)

Peirce considers the map-within-the-map an apt metaphor for a self-representative system. He even goes one step further than Royce: Peirce insists that self-reference – in the map-metaphor that single point, where all maps of differing sizes converge – is essential to the continuum that provides our sense of remaining the same person over time:

„the man’s Self encloses intermediate selves – the domestic Self, the business Self, the better Self, the evil spirit that sometimes usurps his sovereignty. (...) Every reality, then, is a Self, and the selves are intimately connected, as if they formed a continuum. Each one is, so to say, a delineation; with mathematical truth we may say, incongruous though the metaphor is, that each is a quasi-map of the entire field of all the selves (...)“ (Peirce 1979, 84)

Speculations like these are not Russell’s cup of tea. Regarding Royce’s infinite maps-within-maps he simply says: “This point is interesting, but need not occupy us at this moment. In fact, we shall do well to pass from picturesque illustrations to such as are more completely definite, and for this purpose cannot do better than consider the number-series itself.” (Russell <sup>2</sup>1920, 80)

Wittgenstein, who loved to dwell on picturesque illustrations, may have thought otherwise. He was well aware of the fact that in a contextual sense every useful map is a map-within-a-map. For what use would a map of Oxfordshire be to someone lost in Lower Austria? Just as the meaning of words relies on their context, a map only makes sense where we need it.

Using a map means following its rules, thus we may copy a map by walking according to the information it gives (cf. MS 153b, 8v). This has important implications if one contemplates how a model of language may resemble a map. Language as a projection of reality, mirroring how the map shows internal relations of the landscape it depicts (cf. WA2: 184 1). But instead of solving linguistic problems of meaning this metaphor only makes them more apparent. To really understand the map, to be able to read it and bring it in connection with the landscape, requires that one does not overlook the differences amongst its markings:

Vergleich der verschiedenen Arten von Linien auf der Landkarte, mit den Wortarten in den Sätzen. Der nichts davon versteht, sieht eine Menge von Linien und weiß nicht, daß sie sehr verschiedene Bedeutungen haben; es sind Straßen, Grenzen, Schichtenlinien, Meridiane, Schraffen, u.a.. Denke dir auf dem Plan wäre ein Weg eingezeichnet und (mit einigen Linien) durchstrichen –

um anzudeuten, daß es diesen Weg gegeben habe, aber nicht mehr gebe. - (MS 116, 28)

Seeing various lines on a map, without knowing what they stand for, may result in taking their linearity as the most important feature. Certainly one way of being being held captive by a picture.

### 3. Conclusion

The above survey of 'perfect' maps was meant to show that useless maps may be useful after all. If only as inspirational material for philosophers. After all, Wittgenstein might have heeded Descartes' advice that the best way out of a thicket is to continue in the direction once chosen (cf. Descartes 1953, 142). Had Wittgenstein walked in a straight line through the forest, we would be one work of philosophy poorer, for it is his criss-cross manner of mapping thought that makes the landscape of his *Philosophical Investigations* so intriguing.

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# Bilder des Bösen: Schädel, Hirne, Gene

## Wissenschaftliche Modelle präventiver Forensik

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
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Können Sie mit den Ohren wackeln? Die Zunge rollen? Sind Sie neuerungsliebend? Oder homosexuell? Ein „Blick“ in Ihr Genom sollte all diese Fragen beantworten können. Jedenfalls wenn man der Homepage des *Human Genom Projects* Glauben schenken darf, die auf der Seite „Verhaltensgenetik“ unter anderem diese Fähigkeiten und Neigungen als genetisch zumindest mitbedingt aufzählt. Die Vorstellung vom Körperlichen, Objektiven am Menschen auf dessen mentale Eigenschaften schließen zu können, die Idee der „Physiognomik“ also, ist dabei nicht neu. Spätestens seit den pseudo-aristotelischen „Physiognomica“ zieht sich der Versuch „von äußeren Zeichen und Merkmalen [...] auf seelische Eigenschaften (Fähigkeiten und Anlagen, Gefühle, Temperament und Charakter sowie Krankheiten und Schicksalsverlauf) zu schließen“ (Dreier 1998: 955) durch die Geschichte der Anthropologie. Johann Caspar Lavaters höchst erfolgreiche „Physiognomische Fragmente“ von 1775 verzeichnen nicht nur arttypische Silhouetten von Dichtern, Musikern und Genies, sondern auch „Einige Tafeln vermischte Nationalgesichter“:

- „1. Ein russischer Soldat [...]. Rohe, fleischige, gedehnte Plumpheit und Treue.
2. Ein polnischer Edelmann, besonders durch das Zurückgehende seiner langen Stirne, durch den vorstehenden Bogen seines [...] Hinterhauptes – durch den weit hinaufgehenden Hals – als Polake kennbar.
3. Ein [...] Deutscher. Ein starker, wackerer, dreister, arbeitsamer Mann; geradewegs – cholerisch melancholischen Temperaments. So [...] kann kein Franzose, kein Engländer aussehen [...].
5. Ein in Ungarn erzogener Türcke – Die Stirn allein gut; alles andre besonders von den Augenbraune an bis zur Oberlippe schlecht. Auch Wange und Backe haben nichts feines. Im Munde schwebt jedoch ein Hauch von Treue und Liebe mit Verstand.“ (Lavater 1984: 321)<sup>1</sup>

Bereits 1778 veröffentlichte Georg Christoph Lichtenberg die Parodie „Fragment von Schwänzen“, in der er Schweineschwänze nach Lavaters Methode analysierte.

„Einige Silhouetten von unbekanntem meist tatlosen Schweinen:



- Schwach arbeitende Tatkraft;
- physischer und moralischer Speck;
- unverständlich entweder monströs oder Himmelsfunken lodrender Keim vom Wanderer zertreten;
- vermutlich verzeichnet, sonst blendender, auffahrender Eberblitz;
- verstümmelt;
- Kraft mit Speck vertatloset.“ (Lichtenberg 1994a: 533f.)

In Lichtenbergs Streitschrift gegen Physiognomik heißt es:

„Allein ruft der Physiognome, Was? Newtons Seele sollte in dem Kopf eines Negers sitzen können? Eine Engels-Seele in einem scheußlichen Körper? Der Schöpfer sollte die Tugend und das Verdienst so zeichnen? Das ist unmöglich. Diesen seichten Strom jugendlicher Deklamation kann man mit einem einzigen *Und warum nicht?* Auf immer hemmen.“ (Lichtenberg 1994b: 272)


Dennoch wurde die Physiognomik schnell zu einer wirkmächtigen Mode, die in ganz Europa wiederhall fand. In Deutschland entwickelte sie sich zunächst zur Schädellehre, zur Phrenologie, die indirekt ebenfalls auf Lavater zurückgeht, da schon dieser die Bedeutung des Knochenbaus betonte und daher vor allem Profile studierte.

1809 unterschied Franz Joseph Gall 27 sicht- und tastbare Schädelareale mit den ihnen entsprechenden seelischen Eigenschaften – vom Fortpflanzungstrieb bis zum Vorstellungsvermögen. (vgl. Gall 2001)





In Italien begründete Cesare Lombroso seine berüchtigte, auf phrenologischen Studien basierende, „antropologia criminale“ und die Idee des „delinquente nato“, des „natural born killer“. (Lombroso 1876)



Langsam arbeitete sich die Physiognomik also ins innere des Menschen vor. Von der Analyse der Gesichtszüge bei Lavater, zur Deutung der Ausstülpungen und Vertiefungen des Schädels bei Gall und Lombroso. Die Richtung war klar und so verwundert es nicht, dass die Eugenische Bewegung der USA in den 20 Jahren des 20. Jahrhundert hinter den Schädelknochen das „kriminelle Gehirn“ entdeckte.



Gegenwärtige populäre Neurobiologen, wie Wolf Singer und Gerhard Roth, verkünden die Entdeckung der völligen Determiniertheit des Subjekts. So schreibt etwa Wolf Singer: „Die Annahme [...] wir seien voll verantwortlich für das, was wir tun, weil wir es ja auch hätten anders machen können, ist aus neurobiologischer Perspektive nicht haltbar. Neuronale Prozesse sind deterministisch.“ (Singer 2004: 20)

In welche Schwierigkeiten ein solches „neues Menschenbild“ das Rechtssystem stürzt, wusste bereits Robert Musil, der im „Mann ohne Eigenschaften“ die Paradoxien einer Strafrechtsreform beschreibt, die dem Phänomen der „Unzurechnungsfähigkeit“ gerecht zu werden sucht: „[...] ist der Mensch sittlich frei, so muß man durch Strafe einen praktischen Zwang auf ihn ausüben, an den man theoretisch nicht glaubt; sieht man ihn aber nicht für frei an, sondern hält ihn für das Stelldichein unabänderlich verknüpfter Naturvorgänge, so kann man zwar durch die Strafe eine wirksame Unlusttendenz in ihm erregen, aber man darf ihm nicht sittlich anrechnen, was er tut. Wegen dieser Frage entstand [...] eine Partei, die vorschlug, den Täter in zwei Teile zu teilen; einen zoologisch-psychologischen, der den Richter nichts angehe, und einen juristischen, der zwar nur eine Konstruktion, aber rechtlich frei sei.“ (Musil 1994: 536)

Wolf Singer selbst fordert auch ein „neues Modell“ des Strafvollzuges in dem es naturgemäß nicht mehr um Strafe oder Rehabilitation gehen kann, sondern nur mehr um Prävention und Heilung. Aufgabe dieses Systems müsse es sein die aufgrund ihrer Gehirnstrukturen als gefährlich eingestuft Individuen in Gewahrsam zu nehmen und gegebenenfalls zu behandeln indem man versuche die „Attraktoren im Gehirn“ (Singer 2004:34) zu manipulieren. Auf die mit diesem Ansatz verbundenen Probleme macht Petra Gehring aufmerksam, wenn Sie schreibt: „Mit den Forderungen von Singer und Roth kann schneller als man denken mag ein tendenziell ‚lebenslängliches‘ Gefährlichkeits-Verwahrwesen drohen, das durch neurowissenschaftliche Gutachten gesteuert wird.“ (Gehring 2006: 199)

Dabei liegen diesen neurojuridischen Thesen problematische subjekttheoretische Prämissen zugrunde, die aufschlussreiche Einblicke in die gegenwärtige Subjekt-konstitution gewähren. Denn die gegenwärtige, von der Neurobiologie entfachte Diskussion über Willensfreiheit offenbart, dass das der Neurophilosophie zugrunde liegende Konzept von Subjektivität das selbsttransparente, vor allem aber sich selbst beherrschende, „heutokratische Subjekt“ der rationalistischen Tradition ist. (Foucault 1989: 94) So schreibt etwa Michael Pauen in seinem Buch über Willensfreiheit und Neurobiologie, worauf es ankomme sei nicht, ob eine Handlung frei oder determiniert sei, „entscheidend ist vielmehr, wodurch sie bestimmt wird: ist sie durch den Handelnden selbst bestimmt, dann ist sie eben selbst bestimmt und damit frei; hängt sie dagegen von äußeren Einflüssen oder Zufällen ab, dann ist sie nicht selbst bestimmt und daher auch nicht frei.“ (Pauen 2004: 19)

Wobei zu diesen „äußeren“ unfrei machenden Einflüssen auch „zwanghafte“ Wünsche, Bedürfnisse und Süchte gehören. Die Negativfolie des freien, gesunden Subjekts stellt der „Soziopath“ dar, der eine „psychopathische Disposition“ besitzt, die „die Wahrscheinlichkeit drastisch erhöht, dass eine Person eine Straftat begehen wird.“ (Pauen 2004: 242)

Die Figur des Kriminellen verschmilzt hier mit der des Kranken und Kriminalität mit Krankheit, so dass für

Pauen Mord, Ladendiebstahl, Drogenabhängigkeit, Rauchen und Alkoholismus ein und dasselbe Phänomen markieren: Mangelnde Willensfreiheit, mangelnde Selbstbestimmung, mangelnde Selbstbeherrschung. Dem kranken, bzw. kriminellen Subjekt fehlt „der rationale Umgang mit Konflikten zwischen den eigenen Wünschen, Überzeugungen und Bedürfnissen“. (Pauen 2004, 69)

Wie in Platons Gleichnis aus dem Phaidros ist es auch hier der autonome rationale Seelenteil, der Wagelenker, der die beiden Pferde, die anderen Teile der Seele, den Mut und die Begierden, im Zaum zu halten hat, soll die Seele nicht entarten. Das neue gesunde, bzw. normale Subjekt, der Neurophilosophie ist das alte rationalistische, alle Begierden und Leidenschaften beherrschende Subjekt des Rationalismus von dem bereits Platon und Descartes träumten. (vgl. Descartes 1984)


Das ändert sich auch nicht bei der neuesten, noch weiter in den menschlichen Körper eindringenden, physiognomischen Praxis: der Genetik.

Im August 2002 veröffentlicht die Zeitschrift *Science* den Artikel „Role of Genotype in the Cycle of Violence in Maltreated Children“. Der Aufsehen erregende Beitrag eines britisch-amerikanischen Forscherteams aus Psychologen und Psychiatern um A. Caspi, J. McClay und T. E. Moffitt, stellt eine Verbindung zwischen der Ausprägung eines bestimmten Gens (dem MAOA-Gen, das die Produktion eines Enzyms reguliert, das am Abbau bestimmter Neurotransmitter, vor allem des Serotonins, im Gehirn beteiligt ist) und der Wahrscheinlichkeit her mit der umweltlich vorbelastete (d.h. in ihrer Kindheit misshandelte) männliche Jugendliche später kriminelle Handlungen verüben werden:

„[...] [T]he researchers [...] found that antisocial behavior was more likely in males with the genotype for low MAOA activity who had been mistreated. The 55 boys in this group were about twice as likely to have been diagnosed with conduct disorder in adolescence as the 99 mistreated boys with the high-activity genotype. And they were three times more likely to be convicted of a violent crime by age 26.“ (Stokstad 2002: 752)

Obschon diese Studie vor allem beweist, dass die phänotypische Expression der genotypischen Prädisposition zu Gewalt, hauptsächlich von Umweltfaktoren abhängt (denn die genetisch „vorbelasteten“ Individuen, die in ihrer Kindheit nicht misshandelt wurden, wiesen keinerlei erhöhtes Risiko auf später kriminell zu werden), führte der Beitrag weltweit zu einer Serien von Zeitungsartikeln über die Entdeckung des „Kriminalitäts-Gens“.

Im April 2006 veröffentlicht ein Team von Neurowissenschaftlern um Andreas Mayer-Lindenberg in den *Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences* eine Arbeit über die „Neuronal mechanisms of genetic risk for impulsivity and violence in humans“, in dem nicht nur eine Verbindung zwischen Genetik und Neurobiologie hergestellt, sondern Kriminalität, bzw. Gewalttätiges Verhalten bereits im Titel mit „Impulsivität“ gleichgesetzt wird. In einem erklärenden Kommentar zur Arbeit heißt es: „Individual differences in several brain areas and cognitive functions associated with perception and regulation of emotions have been found to correlate with ‚impulsive‘ violent behavior.“ (Viding & Frith 2006: 6085)



Kriminelles Verhalten wird hier nicht nur auf eine anomale Gehirnaktivität zurückgeführt, die ihrerseits in abnormalen Genvarianten gründe, sondern auf begrifflicher Ebene in „Impulsivität“, also mangelnde Selbstbeherrschung, umdefiniert. Bezeichnenderweise hatte bereits Charles B. Davenport, einer der führenden Vertreter der Eugenischen Bewegung der USA, 1928 diese Umdefinierung vorweggenommen, als er in seinem Aufsatz „Crime, Heredity and Environment“ (vgl. Davenport 1928) ausführte, dass man nicht von der Vererbbarkeit von kriminellem Verhalten sprechen sollte, da dieses tatsächlich zeitlich und gesellschaftlich kontingent sei, sondern besser von der Vererbbarkeit einer „feeble-inhibition“, also von einer angeborenen Inhibierungsschwäche, die allerdings die Grundlage jeglichen verbrecherischen Verhaltens bilde. Der geborene Verbrecher sei jemand, der nicht in der Lage sei seine Triebe und Leidenschaften zu zügeln und sich jeder Reizung hingabe, ohne die möglichen Konsequenzen zu bedenken. Wenn gewalttätiges, kriminelles Verhalten aber nichts anderes ist, als unbeherrschtes, unbedachtes Tun, wird klar, warum sich der Erfolg eines Sozialisierungsprogramms für genetisch vorbelastete jugendliche nicht nur in einer Abstinenz von Gewalt, sondern auch in einer Inhibierung von sexuellen Aktivitäten äußert. Im Artikel „Which Kids Join Gangs? A Genetic Explanation“, der im Juni 2009 im *Time Magazin* erschienen ist, heißt es:

„Researchers at the University of Georgia last month published a study of 641 adolescents, ages 11 to 16, some of whom carried the short allele form of the gene 5-HTTLPR — a genetic condition found in about 40 % of the general population and long associated with low self-control, binge drinking and substance use. Half of the participants were randomly enrolled in drug prevention programs. After five years, those participants with 5-HTTLPR who were enrolled in a prevention program were no more likely than their counterparts in the comparison group, without the gene, to have engaged in drinking, smoking marijuana, and sexual activity. Youths with the gene, who were in the comparison group, were twice as likely to have engaged in these risky behaviors as their peers in the prevention group.“ (Kingsbury 2009)

Abgesehen von den immanenten Schwächen dieser Studien – so werden beispielsweise weitere gesellschaftliche Faktoren, die möglicherweise zu dem „risikoreichen“ Verhalten geführt haben, außer Acht gelassen und es keineswegs klar ist, ob „Impulsives Verhalten“ in anderen Kontexten nicht höchst wünschenswert ist), ist aus kulturwissenschaftlicher Sicht vor allem der öffentliche Diskurs über das „Kriminalitäts-Gen“ von Interesse.<sup>2</sup> Dabei fällt auf, dass sich der bereits nach den ersten überraschenden Ergebnissen des *Human Genome Projects* einsetzende Paradigmenwechsel innerhalb der Genetik (weg vom genetischen Determinismus und dem Modell der DNS als abzulesendes Programm, hin zur Auflösung der genetischen Information in ein komplexes netzwerkartiges Wechselspiel von DNS, RNS und Zellplasma, wie sie die „Postgenomik“ vertritt), im Laiendiskurs kaum wahrgenommen wird. Das Bedürfnis nach naturalistischer Reduktion und klaren deterministischen Modellen ist ungebrochen. Dabei ist die Genetik längst zu einem dialektischen Unterfangen geworden, denn einerseits reduziert sie den Menschen tatsächlich auf ein Ensemble chemischer Moleküle („die Gene“), versteht diese zugleich aber nicht mehr materialistisch, sondern immer mehr als bloße Anzeichen einer Prädisposition, d.h. statistischer Wahrscheinlichkeiten möglicher phänotypischer Expression. Die naturalistische Reduktion des Menschen auf seine Gene führt damit paradoxerweise nicht zu einem streng deterministischen Verständnis des Menschen und zu einer daraus folgenden Einschränkung seiner Freiheit, sondern vielmehr zu einem diffusen Gefühl der Unsicherheit und Gefährdung durch den eigenen Körper, dessen berechnete Unberechenbarkeit das Individuum einerseits von Verantwortung entbindet, da es für seine genetische Prädispositionen nicht zur Rechenschaft gezogen werden kann, es andererseits aber zugleich größerer Verantwortung aussetzt, da es nun erst recht die Pflicht hat, sich über seine Prädispositionen zu informieren und die Verantwortung dafür trägt, seinen „Lebensstil“ in den Dienst der genetischen „Risiko-Minimierung“ zu stellen. (Vgl. Weiß 2009)

Zu Recht weist Thomas Lemke in diesem Zusammenhang auf die eigentümliche Dialektik von Entsubjektivierung und Subjektivierung hin, die sich im Rahmen dieser „Genetifizierung“ unserer Lebenswelt ereignet:

„Die genetische Regierung der Risiken setzt das (bürgerlich-autonome) Individuum ebenso voraus, wie sie dieses zum Verschwinden bringt. Der Appell an Eigenverantwortung und Selbstsorge richtet sich an eben jenes Individuum, das durch die Methoden und Mittel der Gendiagnostik als Adressat und Ansprechpartner in Frage gestellt wird. Was bleibt von der Verantwortlichkeit der Einzelnen übrig, wenn die molekulargenetischen Erkenntnisse immer deutlicher aufzeigen, dass sie nichts anderes sind als Opfer oder Gefangene ihres Erbmaterials. [...] Das Individuum und dessen Entscheidungsfreiheit und Eigenverantwortung werden also zugleich affirmiert und destruiert. Es etabliert sich eine *double-bind*-Situation, wobei der Schicksalhaftigkeit und Zufälligkeit der Gene der Rekurs auf individuelle Autonomie und Selbstbestimmung korrespondiert.“ (Lemke 2000: 252)

Fazit: Gegen die These vom „genetischen Exzeptionalismus“ und der Rede von einer „genetischen Revolution“ kann festgehalten werden, dass sich die Verhaltensgenetik in eine lange Reihe „physiognomischer“ Theorien einreihet. Neu an der gegenwärtigen Naturalisierung bzw. Pathologisierung kriminellen Verhaltens, wie sie sowohl von der Neurobiologie als auch der Verhaltensgenetik betrieben wird, ist aber die Überführung des klassischen Deter-

minismus in einen Risikodiskurs und die damit einhergehende dialektische Bestimmung des Individuums das zugleich ermächtigt und entmündigt wird.

## Endnoten

<sup>1</sup> Weiter heißt es ebd.: „6. [...] der Engländer [...]! Die kurze oben fein gerundete Stirn – das Auge des Tiefblickers; das Bestimmte der Nase, [...] – die Muskeln am Auge und der Nase herab gegen den Mund – der feine, mit Salz bestreute obgleich wieder vernachlässigte, Mund – das hervorstehende, nicht scharfe, nicht stumpfe Kinn – und die gute Proportion der ganzen Form – kann das alles, ich glaub's nicht – in irgend einem der weisesten Russen oder Mohren, oder chinesischen Gesichte zusammen gedacht werden?“

<sup>2</sup> Vgl.: [http://www.bioethik-diskurs.de/documents/archiv/News/News\\_2002/kriminalitaet/view](http://www.bioethik-diskurs.de/documents/archiv/News/News_2002/kriminalitaet/view)

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# How Pictorial is Chinese? And Does it Matter?

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It has often been said that the Chinese script is pictorial or ideographic, and that this is one of the reasons why Chinese tend to think more analogically than logically, and why in the past the natural sciences have developed to a lesser degree in China than in the West. These are strong claims. Is it really true that Chinese is pictorial? Do the Chinese tend to think more analogically compared with Europeans? Is it also true that in the past the natural sciences developed to a lesser degree in China in comparison with Europe? These claims have often been oversimplified and exaggerated, but I think there is something to be said for them. The problems are in the details. In this short essay I will focus on the first question. I will argue that although Chinese can be said to be as “logographic” as any other language, Chinese characters still have semantic structures that create certain image-like qualities, not only through mere resemblance between sign and object, but also through family resemblances within semantic fields. The fact that Chinese is an isolating and basically monosyllabic language is essential in this.

Three or four thousand years ago we find patterns and inscriptions on oracle bones, which evolved over time and took their present form one or two thousand years later. In the beginning (1) they were pictorial signs for some basic objects and ideas. Then (2) they began to stand for spoken words. Some argue that it is only at this stage that we should speak of writing proper (Boltz 16-28, Sampson 149) and that this happened in China only around 1200 BC (Boltz 31), whereas a comparable stage of development in hieroglyphic writing was reached in Mesopotamia two thousand years earlier (Boltz 55). At this stage the signs functioned semantically (S). In a third step (3a) they were used for other words that happened to be pronounced similarly, in which case they functioned phonetically (P). As Classical Chinese tends to be monosyllabic and as there are more words than syllables, many such cases occurred. Additionally, the signs were also used for other words that had similar meanings (3b). Thus much confusion arose whenever a single sign stood for different things. Mere similarity in sound or meaning led to identity in writing. To remove such confusion the signs had to be disambiguated. Thus additional semantic and phonetic signs were attached, creating more complex written signs with more definite meanings (4). This led to the Chinese characters as we have them today. They usually have a semantic part (S) and a phonetic part (P) that are drawn from a pool of about 200 semantic and 1000 phonetic elements and that are usually characters themselves. Thus we have about 200 – 1000 possible SP combinations. But most of these are not realized and another way is used as well, combining more than two elements into one character.

It is important to notice that there are always choices involved in borrowing and combining and that pronunciation has changed over time and has varied from place to place. Hence it is now difficult to disentangle each historical strand for each individual character. There is no uniform scheme from which one could derive the connection between written and spoken words. Consequentially, learning how to read and write requires much memorization.

Let me tell the story in another way. Classical Chinese is monosyllabic: one word, one syllable. In modern Mandarin Chinese, there are about 1000 syllables, including tones. But there are more than 1000 words. Although in modern Chinese different monosyllabic words have often been combined to create new words, homophony is still widespread and context plays an important role. Each monosyllabic word is represented in writing by a single character, but differently from speech there are infinitely many possible written signs. Ten different words that happen to be pronounced identically (homophony) can thus be easily represented by ten different signs. This is a consequence of the fact that Chinese writing is not phonetic. It is not linked to the spoken language as closely as is the case in languages with an alphabet. Although Chinese writing has phonetic elements, it is not as phonetic as Latin or German, where we basically know how to write once we know how to speak, and vice versa. Even English is easier than Chinese in this respect.

It seems to me that the monosyllabic structure of Chinese has been cemented by the continued existence of written characters that do not invite inflections. Humboldt has called Chinese an “isolating” language, and it is still so classified today. He thought that Chinese isolates words, ideas, and characters: “The Chinese writing expresses, by a single sign, each simple word and each integral part of composed words; it suits the grammatical system of the language perfectly. The latter offers ... a three-fold isolation (*un triple isolement*): of ideas (concepts), words, and characters (*des idées, des mots, et des caractères*)” (Humboldt 172). The monosyllabic structure does not allow for inflections, and Chinese therefore has no morphology. It has less grammar in that sense, i.e. less morphology, and relies more on its syntax.

This three-fold isolation comes with what Humboldt called the “image” or “picture” character of the Chinese writing system: “The characters form an additional image (*une image de plus*) with which the ideas clothe themselves (*de laquelle se revêtent les idées*), such that the image blends (*s’amalgame*) with the idea for those who frequently use those characters” (Humboldt 172).

But what exactly is meant by “image” here? If the ideas “clothe” themselves in their written images, the latter, I think, are more than mere representations, i.e. more than attachments to the spoken words. They are an essential and integral part of the language itself. Alphabetic letters add less. Those who have argued against the idea that Chinese is pictorial or ideographic (as for instance Boltz) have often said that Chinese writing represents the spoken language as in any other language. All languages, they say, behave in this way. In their view language is always “logographic”, or “glottographic”. But it seems to me that this view is mistaken. It pays no attention to the deeper mental structures and argues too easily in either-or alternatives. In the case of Chinese, it down-plays the relevance of the semantic parts and underestimates certain psychological and sociological aspects of the writing system, as I will explain.

The semantic parts, mainly the so-called “radicals” or better “classifiers” (Boltz 68), are central in the use of dictionaries and the process of learning how to read and write. The Chinese have used and relied on the disambiguating function of their script, they have given much attention to graphic etymology, and they have highly valued calligraphy as a form of art. Thus in many respects the written form of language is much more important in Chinese than in Ancient Greek, Latin, English, or German. It has formative impacts in many ways.

Even if it can well be said that a written word always represents a spoken word, i.e. that the writing is logographic, it makes a difference whether the spoken word is phonetically decomposed, say by means of an alphabet, or not. Once we see that it is not so decomposed but left as a whole, Humboldt’s observations about Chinese make much sense: that it is an “isolating” language, that the ideas “clothe” themselves in additional “images” (*les caractères forment une image de plus, de laquelle se revêtent les idées*, 172), that “the mind is directed more directly towards the idea expressed” (*l’esprit doit se tourner entièrement vers l’idée*), that through the Chinese grammar “the mind is asked to find in almost every word an idea that occupies it by itself” (*en faisant trouver à l’esprit, presque dans chaque mot, une idée capable de l’occuper à elle seule* 173), that conformities and oppositions between ideas “strike us with a new force” (*frappent l’esprit avec une force nouvelle*) and push our mind to follow and imagine their mutual relationships” (*le poussent à poursuivre et à se rendre présents leurs rapports mutuels* 158).

The question whether or not Chinese is pictorial (or ideographic) is thus more than just a linguistic question in the narrow sense. It leads into psychology and even metaphysics, because we have to ask what exactly are meanings and what is going on in our minds when we think and imagine things. Chinese characters appear more isolated from each other, filling a square, and being composed in two-dimensional ways with places above and below, to the right and left, and diagonally in corners. Written words composed of alphabetic letters don’t have this structure. Letters simply follow each other one after another strung up along a single line, which invites graphic notation of inflection. But in Chinese, holding on to characters has hindered the development of morphology. Connections between words must therefore be made in other ways, relying more on syntax and contexts. The mind cannot rely on morphological schemes, general structures that I have called “systematic schemes of variation” (SSV, Wenzel 2007, 303). The visual two-dimensionality and the absence of inflections create different impressions and different tasks for the mind. Characters are differently stored in the brain, and Humboldt’s view about ideas “dressing themselves” in “images”, can be better understood in this light. Already mathematically there is a difference: thirty meaningless letters of an alphabet are very different from 200 plus 1000 more or less meaningful basic characters.

Let us come back to the view of those who see Chinese characters as well as any other form of writing as “logographic”. They argue that only signs that represent spoken words should be called writing. A red cross on an ambulance has meaning but should not be taken as an instance of writing. Emblems of clans are not writing either. Only when they begin to be associated with the *name* of the clan, when they stand for a spoken word in a language, does writing begin. Also characters of the form SP, composed of a semantic part S and a phonetic part P, are signs of spoken words. The formerly pictographic function of S has become irrelevant, they argue, because the picture does not resemble its object any more and the picto-

rial function has been given up for the logographic one. But I think this is not right. The pictographic feature has not become irrelevant, but has left traces and keeps leaving them in the mind of the language user as well as in the structure of the language itself.

It is not only resemblance that makes a picture. Let me explain. If you consider the sign S occurring in different characters with different phonetic parts SP<sub>1</sub>, SP<sub>2</sub>, SP<sub>3</sub>, SP<sub>4</sub>, etc., it is those phonetic parts that indicate the pronunciation while the semantic part S indicates a broad range of meaning. The sign S is useful in learning the meanings of those characters. It groups them together into a class of characters that creates a field of meaning. The semantic part

虫 hui3

for instance indicates spiders, insects, worms, and other cold-blooded animals and occurs in the characters

虯 qiu2, young dragon;

蚊 wen2, mosquito;

蚋 rui4, gnat;

蟬 pi2, large ant;

蚜 ya2, plant louse;

蚨 fu2, water beetle;

蚰 you2, millipede; etc.

This list could go on for another 100 entries. The semantic parts were usually originally pictures and then became stylized to such a degree that we can see the resemblance with the objects only when told what objects they were meant to depict. But once you are told, once you see it, you will not easily forget. Even if you have forgotten how to draw the resemblance, the semantic field remains vivid in your mind, because you know many words written with characters that contain that very semantic part. Hence this part S retains, I claim, the quality of a picture. It depicts that whole semantic field. Connections with semantically related words are graphically realized in the brain. Many characters have a more phonetic etymology and for them this graphic-semantic strategy fails, but the intention remains.

Here we have a very interesting instance of Wittgenstein’s family resemblance in the Chinese writing system. All those objects referred to by characters containing the same semantic element form a family, and it is this family that the semantic element “depicts”. The point is that the “common property” comes through the writing. Now, it might be argued that also in alphabetic languages a single word can occur in many composed words and thus create a semantic field. This is true, but such composed words have more than one syllable. Thus the family-resemblance phenomenon cuts much deeper in Chinese than in languages with alphabetic writing system. In Chinese it occurs through the writing and for almost every monosyllabic word.

Thus I think the pictorial aspect of Chinese characters does not only rely on a superficial resemblance between the sign and its object, but also on indirect similarities (family resemblances) between the objects grouped together by one semantic element. It is also such semantic fields and families of objects that form and “dress” the

“idea” Humboldt speaks of. The visible written character might not be a picture in the narrow sense any more, but it usually contains an element that once was a picture in the narrow sense and that still functions as classifier. The classification was formerly based on associations and still creates such associations today. Hence it is an “image” in the mind, not a passive one on a piece of paper, but an active image that strikes you. These visual-psychological and family-resemblance-semantic features are often overlooked. Although they can be said to function merely indirectly, they are vivid in the mind and create images in a wider sense.

#### **Acknowledgments**

Many thanks to L.D. Linus and P.J. Ivanhoe for helpful comments.

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