## CHAPTER 5

# Passage to a New Europe

## *The First World War*

During his New York exile in 1941, the Austrian economist Gustav Stolper reflected on the First World War and how it had changed the world: 'On August 1, 1914, a world that seemed to be built for eternity went to pieces'. This was a world

> where everything was safe, certain, secure . . . where institutions, systems, customs, political frontiers, and economic forces were so much taken for granted that few people troubled to give critical thought to them; how it was to live in a world where progress was a matter of course, moral standards were not seriously questioned, and economic rules were immutable and general.[1]

The war changed Europe. Stolper's own country had collapsed together with Germany and Russia. Historians are able to provide some support for the relative stability of these pre-war empires, and have argued that the war caused their disintegration. In all three countries, the economies had weaknesses but were developing positively. In Austria, issues of nationality were, if not waning, at least abating, and not threatening to disintegrate the empire. In Russia, political separatism was mostly limited to certain circles, with the exception of nationalism among the Poles. Russia had found some stability after the revolution of 1905, and both Austria and Germany were taking steps to integrate the working classes.

Historians have generally seen the First World War as a turning point. For many it is deemed a radical break from the relatively peaceful preceding century.[2] For some it is seen as a discontinuity that people and societies were forced to cope with and muddle through.[3] In terms of the history of the concept of Europe, it is both. There was continuity of certain ideas and ways

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of thinking, which adapted to the new war conditions and re-emerged after the ceasefire. In the interbellum, European unity was one such idea that was reiterated from before the war, incorporating some new arguments. However, regarding the concept of Europe, certain changes were of a more fundamental nature. Instead of a sense of stability, there was one of ongoing crisis. At the heart of these changes was the understanding that Europe would no longer be a continent consisting of a decreasing number of states and dominated by a few empires. The hope for fewer borders was still alive, but it was strongly contested.

In research on the history of the concept of Europe, the First World War has been addressed marginally, with significantly more attention being paid to the interwar period.[4] However, the war saw the development of the concept of Europe really gain momentum, evolving from one of a Europe dominated by several empires and a few additional states, to one of a continent with an increasing number of nation states. This was a time of transition in thinking about Europe, when the war provoked discussions of the role that nationality played in Europe and of how to keep the peace among the many European nationalities. Before we consider the interwar period, we must take a closer look at the concept of Europe during the First World War.

From the first part of this book, we know that the concept of Europe is closely related to unity and borders within Europe, both of which were seriously affected by the First World War. The fact that international cooperation largely broke down when the war began is often cited with reference to trade, workers' movements, and religious groups. However, Jan Vermeiren has emphasised that, during the war, new practices of transnational interaction emerged, as exemplified by cooperation within military alliances, national independence movements in Central Europe, and pacifist groups' activities in the neutral countries.[5] One could argue that cooperation was not new within military alliances, especially between Austria and Germany, nor in the international peace movement. Furthermore, one could say that calls for European unity were raised throughout Europe, as well as within the individual countries at war. Still, these interactions intensified significantly because of the war. The impact of claims of national independence certainly added a new dimension to the discussion. As I am especially interested in how the mindset of the war affected ideas of unity and borders, I will focus on the notion of national independence.

We begin this chapter by taking a look at how intellectuals depicted the war, examining both their increasing nationalism and emphasis of borders, and the ongoing relevance of the idea of European unity. The notion of unity also concerned the unification of distinctive parts of the continent. The most significant of these was the notion of 'Mitteleuropa', widely upheld

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in Austria and Germany, which was also the title of a bestselling book by Friedrich Naumann. Later in this chapter, we will follow the turn of the tide, away from Central European empires and the idea of 'Mitteleuropa' as the notion of sovereign nation states became established. However, resistance to the establishment of a considerable number of new nation states was great, even among the allies. Two key concepts in this change were those of nationality and a 'new Europe', and the most crucial period was the winter of 1917 and spring of 1918.

## The European War

> The European war had broken out. The stream of time, which till that day had borne our destinies along, securely as it seemed, on somewhat troubled and stormy but still not dangerous waters, had now plunged headlong into a vast and wild abyss; and no one knows when and where and through what depths it will emerge, once more to look on the face of the sun, which had smiled upon our face until that fatal day of August 1, 1914.[6]

The conflict was often called 'the war', as it was war on a scale that Europe had not seen for a long time. It went beyond involving just two of the main powers, in contrast to the French–German war of 1870, and was driven by more than Prussia's ambitions to strengthen its position by defeating Denmark in 1866. It played out between highly capable parties, as in the Crimean War in 1855, which accelerated the decline of the Ottoman Empire in the Balkan region, but on a new scale. While most of the bloodshed after the Napoleonic Wars had occurred outside of Europe, in gaining control over colonies, the 1914–18 war involved most of Europe. When they called it 'the European war' or the 'European conflict', contemporary commentators such as Italian writer and historian Guglielmo Ferrero were indicating that it was indeed a major struggle among European powers over their influence. They were implying that this war was something more than just another battle over the balance of power, and referred to it as a 'world war' and a 'great war'. In Britain it became 'The Great War' or 'The Great European War' in which Britain was forced to defend its empire and help its European allies. In Germany it was referred to as 'the war', often with the understanding that it was 'the German war' – an opportunity for the nation to claim its rightful place in Europe and the world. Still, the mental impact of the view that this was a European war was great, and it was believed that this war would decide the future of Europe.[7]

The outbreak of the war was met with much exultation. The optimism of the pre-war era initially prevailed, fuelled by strong nationalistic sentiments. *The Times* reported on 2 September 1914 that there was a 'great rush

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to enlist', and '4,000 men altogether were enrolled in London yesterday'. One recruiting station was 'crowded all day with enthusiastic contingents of young clerks, eager to exchange the pen for the rifle and hoping they may be so lucky as to share in the risks and adventures'.[8] There was great hope in Britain and France, as indeed there was in Germany, of a victorious and hopefully short campaign.

Many lyricists and novelists welcomed the war. The German poet Hermann Stehr encouraged the German people, who were prepared to drop whatever they were doing to follow the emperor, stand shoulder to shoulder in his armies, and suffer sacrificial death. There was no need to worry, as 'God it is, that speaks through our weapons'; the future belonged to the Germans: 'Now people of Germany, you will be the masters of Europe'.[9] British poet Helen Abercromby found the war to be a 'harvest of glory and triumph, / All honour to those, who for Might and for Right / Laid down their lives, as they plunged into battle / Reaping reward, rich and rare in God's sight!'[10] Poetry and literature embodied ideas about the energising effects of war on both people and society. Novelist Maurice Barrès praised the war for uniting a fractured country and for awakening the soul of the French people. In wartime, citizens operated according to a higher moral standard. Because of the collective French spirit, soldiers bravely faced great risks; they 'leapt forward with enthusiasm to embrace it'. The soldiers, 'when brought forward face to face with the Germans, stood united in strength and effulgent with spiritual beauty'.[11] Neutral countries such as Sweden were no exception to the spreading nationalism, as lyricists and writers celebrated the new war, treating it as a thrilling adventure that brought a new dignity to their nations. The fact that Sweden had not declared war was of no significance to them, as the very threat of being involved had led to reconciliation among the classes and the emergence of a new patriotism. They praised the national troops for their heroism, and noted the unity between officers and soldiers.[12]

The causes of the war were widely discussed. The answers were manifold, with some citing the arming of the military on a new scale, along with the potential for industry to profit from metallurgical and mechanical technologies. Others stressed that competing empires ruled Europe and noted the lack of rational coordination, implying the need for international law or even a European federation. Some blamed the monarchs and elites, suggesting that the war had broken out due to a lack of democracy, a lack of national rights and autonomy, or perhaps a lack of independence for the Western and Southern Slavs.

Guglielmo Ferrero was very clear about what kind of war he considered this to be: a European war. In the piece cited above, which he wrote six months after the outbreak of the conflict, and in another from the final

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year of the war, he referred to it as 'the European war'. In the former piece, he made a great effort to show that Austria and Germany should be blamed for starting the war, while in the latter, he blamed the German mind. In attempting to explain what had caused the war, he significantly saw it as a crisis of civilisation:

> . . . that unshakable optimism, that blind faith in the progress and strength of man, that unbridled ambition and covetousness which has effaced or at all events dimmed the sense of limitation, of proportion, of the humanly possible and reasonable in the whole western civilization, in the realms of philosophy, religion, art, science, politics, finance, industry and commerce alike. Western civilization was on its way to thinking itself omnipotent.[13]

Ferrero does not give an entirely rosy description of Europe. Modern civilisation had indeed accomplished wonders, giving humans immense power over nearly everything. But while progress had led to the construction of ploughs, ships and railways, and to the invention of the telegraph, telephone and electricity, it had also meant that rifles and explosives were more powerful and deadlier than ever before. The notion of 'progress' now allowed for complete foolishness, Ferrero continued, as unlimited production meant that contemporary progress could occur without consideration for whether innovations were useful or harmful. Progress took no account of what was good or what was evil. Destructive goods such as alcohol and cannons were produced without an understanding or appreciation of limits. Rules and principles were needed to restrict humankind's destructive tendencies, be they aesthetic, philosophical, moral or religious.[14]

The enemies were assumed to constitute the guilty party, and to threaten Europe, its culture and civilisation, with the objective of controlling Europe by infringing on the lawful rights of others. For Paul Rohrbach, an apostle of the German foreign policy of 'Weltpolitik' – the intention to make Germany a world power – England was the foremost enemy of European culture, so its power had to be crushed.[15] The historian Werner Sombart called upon young German soldiers to act as the final defence in preventing the incoming flood of commercialisation from Western Europe and England.[16] In a British paper, one could read that the fighting had become 'less a national cause than the cause of world civilization'.[17] For Gertrud Bäumer, who chaired a German association for women, the war was about which nation would be leading the European collective of countries. She was concerned that enemies would not be able to see that Germany was best equipped for this, having a culture that was open to adopting foreign influences. 'In the streets, which our armies are clearing, will follow all peaceful powers of culture'.[18] Rudyard Kipling warned his compatriots of Germany's aims, being quoted in *The New York Times Current History of the European War* as claiming that Germany had long been preparing for battle, and now their objective

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was the complete destruction of England's power and wealth. Germany, he warned the United States, was not only a menace to Europe, 'but to the whole civilized world'.[19] Hilaire Belloc, the British-French author, accused the German government of trying to rule the world and 'to overthrow the ancient Christian tradition of Europe', while the British and Latin countries defended the 'sanctity of separate national units . . . and a great deal more which is, in their eyes, civilization'.[20] Henri Bergson claimed that the French were equipped with the moral force of liberty and justice that could transcend the nation, while the Germans had no ideals other than worship of brute force and the will to increase their power.[21]

Ferrero depicted a confrontation between Germanism and Latinism, claiming that the legacy of European civilisation came mainly from the shores of the Mediterranean and from the Latin peoples. North of these countries, the contributions were much fewer and more recent in history. Furthermore, the Germanic and Anglo-Saxon peoples focused too much on the 'indefinite and unlimited increase of human power'. He depicted Germany as a morally meagre country. For over thirty years, Germany had been obsessed with the idea of progress, more so than any other nation. Its success had led to dreams of never-ending triumph. It had a spirit of power and violence that entailed both expansion and the invasion of its neighbouring countries. The hunger for power had become a religion and had led to reduced moral limits. By contrast, the Latin-speaking peoples, guided by the ideal of moral perfection, favoured justice, equity, generosity and loyalty. The spirit of Latinism required that the state and international treaties curb the effects of unlimited commerce and industry; it would entail the enforcement of restrictions and even renunciation.[22] Ferrero was following one of the main strategies of wartime propaganda, emphasising that the enemy was threatening things of great value that were safeguarded by 'our' soldiers.

Werner Sombart believed that the enemy was obsessed with commercial interests. He developed this belief into a major theme, similar to Ferrero's, but here the enemy was England and the Germans were defending the higher cause. To Sombart, it was the spirit of commercialisation that expressed the English philosophy, culture and state. This spirit was both utilitarian and materialistic, permeating the state and setting the agenda for the governing of English possessions on other continents. While the English demanded their rights, the Germans focused on a mission, asking how they could contribute and what they could sacrifice. Instead of business and profit, Germans were concerned with their duty.[23] Sombart took this line of argument to its ultimate conclusion. He supported German militarism as an expression of the highest values of the nation, and emphasised that the German mind was quite exceptional and could encompass everything that human culture had accomplished: 'We understand all foreign people; no one

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understands us, no one can understand us'.[24] What does it matter, he continued, if international exchange in the worlds of culture and learning cease for a decade or two, when we are always the giving ones who do not have much to learn from foreign countries?[25]

Clearly, the borders and differences between the warring countries were emphasised in all sorts of ways. This phenomenon was prevalent before the war, with the political language of the early twentieth century emphasising the differences between the national cultures, not least between France and Germany. Readers frequently encountered enemy stereotypes in newspapers, essays and novels. In Germany one could read negative stereotypes of the English, and in Britain of the Germans. While France had long been a rival and enemy in the eyes of the British, whereas Germany had been viewed as an ally, after the turn of the century this began to change. In politics, Britain and France started to find peaceful solutions to problems arising from their imperial competition for space and influence, while Germany continued to push to establish an ocean-spanning empire of its own. Germany moreover joined the arms race to challenge the British navy's domination of the sea.[26]

The decades before the war had seen many efforts to develop and disseminate national traditions. Nationalists introduced practices, rituals and symbols at a large scale, inspiring Eric Hobsbawm to identify nationalism as an invented tradition.[27] During the war, nationalism became more obvious than ever, as Europe became a continent of conflicting nations. Depictions of a nation's own strengths and ambitions were coupled with enemy stereotypes to marginalise ideas of a European community. Despite this, ideas of unity managed to stay afloat.

## In Spite of It All: Defending Unity

For the Austrian writer and suffragist Rosa Mayreder, it was the concept of nation that had got Europe into its present impasse, with the war almost destroying the larger and more valuable community of European culture. Despite having developed over many years, this cultural community had ceased to exist.[28] In an article published in Geneva and Berlin, her compatriot Stefan Zweig lamented that the pre-war European spiritual unity no longer existed and had been almost completely forgotten; the cosmopolitan ideals of the nineteenth century had been thoroughly shaken by the Great War, giving way to growing nationalism.[29] Mayreder and Zweig were not the only ones who held on to ideas of European unity at a time when many novelists, artists and scholars were promoting nationalistic sentiments. The notion of European unity survived in spite of the national conflicts and wartime measures in place.

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Novelist Gabriele Reuter lamented the propagandistic caricatures of the German people produced in England and France. She declared that many Germans had 'an unbounded love for the universality of European culture', which had driven them to love the artistic and literary works of, for instance, the French, Belgians, Dutch and Scandinavians, and to admire the mystically religious soul of the Russians and the merchant mastery of the English. She deplored the hatred that 'has torn asunder what was believed to be a firmly woven net of a common European culture'.[30]

A sense of shared belonging and purpose was expressed by people who associated themselves with their homeland's rationale for waging war. Shared European culture, encompassing both Shakespeare and Goethe, as well as Homer, Maupassant and Flaubert, was still something many valued, but now it was the enemy who was to blame for dissolving it and causing its destruction.[31] The unity of a common civilisation was still there. One should 'agree in thinking that while our country's cause and the cause of our Allies is just and necessary and must be executed with the utmost vigour, it is not inopportune to reflect on those common and ineradicable elements in the civilization of the West which tend to form a real commonwealth of nations and will survive even the most shattering of conflicts'.[32] The author of this quotation, the British philosopher F.S. Marvin, spoke of Europe's common legacy of law, literature and art, adding science, philosophy, education, and commerce and finance, before ending by emphasising religion as a key factor; he mentioned all these fields as indicators of a civilisational understanding that spanned the whole of Europe.[33] Indeed, the ideas of a shared culture and a common civilisation were still evident.

Some literati continued to advocate European unity. In Barcelona, a group of intellectuals published the 'Manifesto of the Friends of a Moral Unity of Europe' in November 1914, urging their European colleagues to remain faithful to the idea of moral unity, saying that Europe was a commonwealth and all its parts were entitled to the right to well-being.[34] In the Netherlands, the Anti-War Council brought together societies representing political parties, religions, intellectuals and labour. They presented a manifesto that urged the people of the countries at war not to be blinded by strong patriotic feelings, and urged intellectuals to avoid ascribing callous motives or characters to their enemies. Having respect for the foe was implied, because 'faith in the virtues of one's own nation need not be coupled with the idea that all vices are inherent in the opposing nation'. The representatives of the warring nations were to 'remember what unites them and not only what separates them!'[35]

It was not only intellectuals from neutral states who invoked ideas of European unity. In autumn 1914, several prominent French and German scholars, including Albert Einstein, appealed for European unity out of

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despair at the national enthusiasm for war, highlighting the need to protect shared European culture.[36] Annette Kolb, a German-born writer with a French mother, saw it as her duty to plead for reconciliation, and wrote about the impossible task of annihilating either the French or the German spirit: for the sake of Europe they would have to unite, the Germans assimilating some French characteristics, and vice versa. If they could connect culturally, then they would be able to stand together politically and lead Europe.[37] A similar idea was germinating in the mind of René Schikele from Alsace, though broadened to encompass reconciliation between all European nations. He proclaimed that European unity was emerging in the very experience of the war, with soldiers throughout Europe wanting the same freedom from the war's catastrophic effects, and with the objectives and arguments for the war being the same in all European countries. He concluded that never 'was there a more united Europe, never was the solidarity of people trying to tear themselves apart, so great'.[38] Austrian playwright Hugo von Hofmannsthal turned to a spiritual unity that combined humanity ('*Humanität*') and religion, yielding something holy that went beyond mere utilitarianism and the pre-war era's fiscal concept of civilisation. Such communality could bring about a new focus on the greater deeds of tolerance, forgiveness and patience, but it would not come easily or from current political leaders. Instead, he placed his hopes in the efforts of writers to continue their exchange that transcended national borders, and it was through these activities that a spirit of unity could evolve.[39] Romain Rolland stood out among the French literati as one most concerned with the project of European reconciliation, and therefore received much criticism. In France, he was accused of being a traitor when he repeatedly stated that there were writers, artists and thinkers in Germany who belonged to an idealistic tradition that did not support Germany's oppression of its neighbours nor its menacing behaviour towards Europe's common civilisation.[40] He saw the war as the triumph of nationalism, flooding Europe with destruction. Rolland wished to focus on the idea of unity, and wanted only to safeguard Europe from collapse. In the contemporary 'storms of passion', he recognised that the greatest duty was to shelter 'the spiritual unity of civilized humanity'. He concluded that the countries at war belonged to one common European civilisation with common interests.[41]

In the peace movement, leaders continued to discuss the need to conclude the mutual hostilities of the European nations. To them, Europe represented a special community with the most advanced civilisation in world history. Europe was seen as an entity, albeit one that was in a dreadful state due to the revitalisation of militarism. Its only hope was that its nations would agree to peace for the common good.[42] Women of the peace movement called for solidarity among themselves: while men were at war, it was

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up to the women of Europe to bring peace, so they would have to stand together and strive for peaceful arbitration and reconciliation.[43] 'We are', read an appeal, 'the women, the mothers of Europe' calling for peace and for making this the last European war.[44]

There was another way to plead for European unity that did not lament what was lost or focus on a unity that existed despite the conflicts. Instead, attention was on the lack of organised cooperation despite all the factors that furthered exchanges between the countries, such as modern technology and means of communication that had made the world more accessible. British author H.G. Wells hoped for a United States of Europe that would consist of a body not driven by nationalism or imperialism, in order to address the commercial frictions and rivalries between states.[45] The British journalist and pacifist Norman Angell blamed the war's occurrence on the fact that 'Europe' as such had not formally existed previously. There was no pan-European organisation to prevent the war from breaking out, no shared law that states had to follow, and no community of mutual protection. War, he wrote in 1917, was the price to be paid for the anarchy of international politics and the lack of common organisations.[46] In general, the peace initiatives noted the lack of formal bodies in place to curb nationalistic excesses, and this interpretation supported initiatives that would eventually lead to the establishment of the League of Nations and to further initiatives for a united Europe.

Pleas for peace regularly included calls for a European federation.[47] Calls for a United States of Europe continued during the First World War. In Berlin, the 'Neues Vaterland' (New Fatherland) was founded, which included leaders of the peace movement and prominent economists, historians and scientists, such as Albert Einstein. In London, the Union for Democratic Control demanded a European federation, as did committees in the Netherlands and Spain.[48] The European Unity League, founded in 1913, with branches in many European countries and especially strong in Great Britain, pleaded for a United States of Europe based on a free market. Its founder, the German-born British citizen Max Waechter, argued that the elimination of trade tariffs would be a means to avoid both war and burdensome military expenses.[49] Such pleas for a European federation treated the war as a menace to civilisation and a harbinger of the collapse of an old order of militarism – for some, also, of capitalism – and said that the only salvation would be to deliver a federation that would shape Europe into the fatherland of all its peoples.[50] According to this line of thought, international disputes led to war because of the old order. A main argument for a federation was that the European states had many shared interests, with their inhabitants meeting in international associations and their politicians at congresses. Instead of fighting, the European states should be complementing each other.

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There was no need for them to fear losing power when centralising administration, one of several Swiss federalist-minded intellectuals emphasised.[51]

Promoting the idea of European unity in spite of the war, whether based on a common spirit, culture or civilisation, could well be seen as the project of intellectuals who had little influence on politics. To appeal to unity when countries were fully mobilising for warfare, however, could be interpreted as the only available means of pressing forward. In addition, it was well known that the transnational economy of pre-war Europe was utterly shaken and partly destroyed by blocked trade routes, disrupted financial systems, and the efforts of the nations at war to control enemy assets from the early autumn of 1914. However, for some businesses, this was seen as an opportunity to expand and develop branches promoting mass armament across the borders of allied countries.[52] However, in trade and commerce there were also arguments for continuing business with enemies, despite the war. When Great Britain pleaded for a trade embargo against the Entente, Russia hesitated for fear of ruining its agriculture sector. Russia had substantial trade with Germany, and the Russian Privy Council reportedly opposed an embargo. Italians wanted to uphold trade relations that were still in place with Austria and Germany. In London, there were fierce discussions in both houses of Parliament, with free-trade proponents arguing that the ongoing war should not be turned into a detrimental war of trade. A deputy of the Austrian Reichsrat warned as late as 1917 that certain policies could isolate the economies of Austria and Germany; instead, he backed a strategy that might lead to an economic alliance among the European states.[53]

Nevertheless, calls for custom unions and economic trading blocs were of much greater significance, as they could further entrench the division of the continent between the Triple Entente and the Central Powers. Politicians in both France and Italy initiated meetings and inter-Allied conferences in Paris, where they pleaded for an economic federation that would include England and possibly Russia. A Latin federation was also discussed, which would include Belgium. The French government, led by Aristide Briand, was more eager to form a trading bloc than were their Allied partners.[54] The idea of a bloc encompassing the Allied countries began to take shape. A union between the democracies, including the United States, was one option discussed.[55] The most important and evolved concept under consideration was that of 'Mitteleuropa'.

## Nationalism for an Empire: 'Mitteleuropa'

In the early twentieth century, the concept of Europe was associated with calls for expansion, as the dominant cultures were claimed to need space:

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Britain already had an overseas empire, French colonies were in place in Africa and South East Asia, and Russia had expanded in the Far East. Would Germany also have an opportunity to expand in similar fashion? It was often said that German culture was significant and, as such, had as legitimate a right to expand as did the other leading European cultures. One of the options proposed as a way to end the war was to ensure that Germany had room for expansion. Even British pacifists expressed such an idea, to the vexation of H.G. Wells: 'I cannot understand those Pacifists that talk about the German right to "expansion", and babble about a return of her justly lost colonies'.[56]

The most noteworthy understanding of a European empire during this period treated the war as a grand and powerful creator of a continent with fewer borders.[57] This idea took inspiration from the historical trend towards expanding political units, with smaller units and less successful national cultures gradually disappearing. It envisaged the successful expansion of German culture through the emergence of a broadly defined 'Mitteleuropa'.[58] As a geographical concept with political implications, the term 'Mitteleuropa' had been in use since the turn of the twentieth century, although the added implications of German expansionism only arrived with the First World War.[59]

Pleas to create a federation of Austria and Germany, together with some of their neighbouring states, experienced a rebirth starting in 1913 thanks to a number of accounts and pamphlets written mainly by Germans, but also by Austrians.[60] Some calling for a federation were conservative while others were aligned with German liberalism. Generally, they agreed with Prussian actions to unite Germany, and argued that the German emperor should take command of the new 'Mitteleuropa'. Its enemies were in the West and the East, and included England, France and Russia. By comparison, Germany had few harbours, no fertile colonies, and no German-speaking populations overseas. These authors considered Germany and Austria-Hungary to be the heart of 'Mitteleuropa', which could include Switzerland, the Netherlands, Bulgaria and Romania, as well as the Scandinavian countries. One of these authors wanted a pact between Berlin and Baghdad that included the Turkish Empire, while another encouraged the Swedes to liberate Finland from the tsarist yoke. After the war broke out, the defence pact of the two German states came under new scrutiny. Apart from that, the same themes from earlier plans for a 'Mitteleuropa' were repeated. These included a trading bloc large enough to compete with the Russian, British and American markets, plans to open up new countries to German farmers, saving the Germans in Austria-Hungary, and rescuing the Dual Monarchy from disintegration.[61]

The notion of a cultural community had taken shape. Franz von Liszt, professor of law at the University of Berlin, saw a specific German culture of language, art, science and technology, which he identified as the

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foundation of a shared culture of 'Mitteleuropa'. Hans Mühlstein, a Swiss art historian, imagined Germany's mission as one of spreading its culture and attaining world dominance. He based this belief on the spiritual renewal that Germany had undergone in Europe since the sixteenth century, with Luther and the Reformation, the music of Bach, the philosophy of Kant, and the discoveries of Copernicus. It was that spirit that had permeated the nations in the middle of Europe, Mühlstein wrote in the weeks following 1 August 2014, adding, optimistically and excitedly, that the German people represented the heart of humanity, which had only to manifest itself in the form of a shared body.[62]

The federation's organisation was addressed from several perspectives. The economist Eugen von Philippovich was concerned with the prerequisites for a trade and customs union between the two German states. The journalist Albert Ritter wanted a German-led defence union. Liszt elaborated on the legal aspects and was the only one who argued for a people's assembly, which could show the world that Austrians and Germans stood united in the war.[63] Philippovich, Ritter and Liszt were all Austrians, although they had close connections to Germany, and their careers spanned both states. The booklet by Liszt presented the German government's interest in these plans, as he was a member of parliament and a minister. Moreover, in August 1914, Walther Rathenau, an industrialist who advocated strongly for 'Mitteleuropa', was appointed head of the War Raw Materials Department in the War Ministry, and the chancellor initiated discussions in his inner circle of ways to attract allies and neighbours to Germany using economic means.[64] Finally, in a policy statement from 9 September 1914, the chancellor maintained that Germany should aim to establish a large federation called 'Mitteleuropa' in central Europe. He considered France a suitable candidate to join the union, in accordance with hopes for a quick victory against the French.[65] Accordingly, we can agree with the historian David Stevenson that the outbreak of war triggered the idea of 'Mitteleuropa'. Stevenson, who has charted the range of initiatives of the German government, convincingly argues that they lacked support from the industrial sector and were quite unsuccessful in accomplishing economic and political integration. Neither the Austrian nor German governments were prepared to relinquish sovereignty to shared institutions.[66]

Friedrich Naumann's *Mitteleuropa* was a bestseller in its genre during the First World War. Published in 1915, it had sold one hundred thousand copies within a year, and was eventually translated into Italian, French, English and Swedish. It became the most influential of all German writings on the subject.[67] Naumann himself was a liberal of the Wilhelmine era and called for social reforms. He was a theologian who favoured a strong Germany and the notion of its expansion. He had long been acquainted with the idea of

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'Mitteleuropa', had argued for such a federation at the turn of the century, and was familiar with the contributions of both Loch and Liszt.[68]

For Naumann it was now or never: blood was being spilled and nations were mobilising, and now was the time to unite the states between Russia and the West. The war offered a unique opportunity for political figures to demonstrate their greatness – afterwards, it would be too late. Writing optimistically early in the war, he encouraged the creation of 'Mitteleuropa'.[69]

Naumann believed that it was important for the two German states to handle the inner borders of 'Mitteleuropa' with care. The differences concerned Protestantism versus Catholicism, industrial versus agrarian economies, business versus leisure-minded mentalities, being at the frontier of technological development versus embodying traditions of the past, centralism versus decentralism, supporting nationalism versus rejecting it, and having a Western and Northern versus a Southern and Eastern mentality. A common worldview outlook would need to be cultivated in order to transcend these borders and forge the two states into a federation with shared ideas, history, culture, work and law. Joint institutions would need to handle electricity and railways, monetary issues and commercial law, customs tariffs and labour legislation. The legal, medical and historical professions would have to be merged.[70]

Naumann's historical determinism makes sense of the development of small states into larger entities. Just as gross production developed within industry, so did the organisation of states develop. The world would no longer contain many states, but rather continents and world states, such as Russia, America and Great Britain, or large federations. He saw a historical shift towards ever larger units, something of which he greatly approved. Thus, it became necessary for him to theorise the formation of the federation of 'Mitteleuropa'. The nationalities of 'Mitteleuropa' with fewer people had no future as independent states, and Naumann concluded: 'It is painful, but that is how world history wants it: political "small businesses" need affiliation'. However, he insisted that there would still be a place for certain smaller nations in 'Mitteleuropa' because Hungary and some of the Slavic nations would be impossible to Germanise as their distinctiveness was too pronounced. He did not recommend assimilating these into the German nationality; the Hungarian and Slavic nations were there to stay, although they would not be able to remain sovereign states. The very foundation of 'Mitteleuropa' would be the German people, with their superior culture, language, and capacity to organise. Yet, harmony would only be achieved if other languages besides German were given room. A 'Middle European' spirit would be necessary, one with consciousness of a shared history and culture, made possible thanks to the historical process of the German awakening during the nineteenth century, which was completed with the unification

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of the German states.[71] Naumann said that 'a Middle European culture will grow out of German nationality'.[72]

However, it was seen as impossible to fully civilise the Hungarians and Slavs into 'thinkers, men of reason, technicians, organizers, sober men of reality', like their German counterparts. Therefore, the Germans would need to adapt themselves to other nations, at least to a certain degree. Although German would be the official language, other languages would have to be accepted. In due time, a Middle European type of personality would develop as 'the bearer of a manifold, strong and rich culture that grows from the German nationality'.[73] In the end, Naumann believed that only Germans would be able to civilise the region. He saw them as possessing a superior capability to organise, compared with other nationalities in the region, and even with the British and French. Not least did this concern the organisation of economic life, which could weave together a public safety net, encompassing both individual and private interests.[74]

He offered a twofold answer on how to best organise the region. First, a federation would need to be created, with one political leadership and a common economic bloc. Next, a collection of nationalities would need to live together within this federation, with Germany serving as their leader and civiliser.

Advocacy for 'Mitteleuropa' continued following Naumann's book, with many further publications by other authors. His work was mostly praised, and his conception of 'Mitteleuropa' was considered an accomplishment, as the realities of war had forged unity between Germany and the Habsburg Empire. If certain dimensions seemed to be missing, it was only a matter of time until a fully fledged federation would emerge. The arguments mainly focused on the military and economic benefits of having two states, and on the global shift towards larger economic units, but it was also said that a federation would bring increased stability to Europe and strengthen its society.[75]

Still, 'Mitteleuropa' never became one of Germany's main objectives during the war.[76] Some reactions to Naumann were rather doubtful. His friend and fellow member of the Liberal Party, Paul Rohrbach, had criticisms regarding foreign affairs and colonial questions. He preferred a 'Weltpolitik' directed at other continents, recommending the annexation of European neighbours rather than a joint federation.[77] Naumann's imperialistic ambitions were milder, while Rohrbach stunned the public with a rigid imperialism. Some social democrats reacted favourably to Naumann's book, which caused Karl Kautsky to mention the idea of 'Mitteleuropa' in several of his writings, unsurprisingly disagreeing with the imperialistic ambitions and undemocratic visions underlying the concept. However, he was optimistic about the idea of a federation, agreed with the need for the states between

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Russia and England to cooperate more closely, and especially highlighted the closeness between the two German states.[78] Kautsky and others who promoted the idea of 'Mitteleuropa' were still operating under the assumption that this was a European movement that followed the trend towards larger units. It recognised the complexity involved in the question of nationalities, and found a way to merge nationalism with imperialism.

## The Nationality Principle

When H.G. Wells was forecasting the future in 1917, he predicted that the expansion of Europe would eventually end. The expansion of European empires was first halted in America, and it was about to end in Asia, with Africa following suit. The age of empires was drawing to a close: 'The days of suppression are over'.[79] He was correct in this, although it did not happen as soon as he had predicted, and the fall of the empires was a theme that would haunt Europe in coming decades. However, grandiose plans for empires persisted, in addition to the vision of a German 'Mitteleuropa'. Wells himself put considerable effort into predicting how Britain's dominions would continue to be British in the age to come. Britain would need to relinquish some of its control over its territories, and accept that they could have their own interests and a desire to forge new relationships with neighbouring countries. Instead, the feeling of Britishness should be developed, keeping Canada, India and the African and other territories together by encouraging a sense of community, rather than by ruling with a strong hand.[80] Wells reflected on the growing attention that many writers had begun to pay to the conditions of political organisation in Europe and the world, and nationalities were central to this idea.

In 1917 Wells saw a new age dawning, an age of nationalities. He observed that nations were undergoing fundamental growth, and proposed that once a nation had gone beyond its early, barbaric state, it would naturally want to make its own way and would reject foreign oppression. 'Nations will out!', he claimed, meaning that they would want to freely develop their opportunities. The consciousness of being, for example, Egyptian or Polish would endure despite foreign dominion. For Wells the nationality principle was applicable to regions where homogeneous nationalities existed. However, on 'the natural map of mankind', he found other areas that were much more complex. In some regions where religious and/or linguistic borders outnumbered the nationalities, it was better to adopt a Swiss-inspired district system that accepted some differences, but managed to keep the nation together. Moreover, some cities and regions were home to many nationalities and were, in effect, international spaces. He wanted those to be ruled

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in conjunction with the associated nations, in the form of a union between the peoples who were affected. In Europe, he identified the region between Germany and Russia as troublesome, with nations that were neither mature enough nor large enough to stand on their own. The Poles and the peoples of the Habsburg Empire had unique nationalities that would not allow them to assimilate, and that could continue to cause conflicts if they became independent. A union between the western Slavic nations could have offered a solution for the region, but he believed that it would be impossible to implement because of the interests of Germany and Russia in keeping such a construction under their own rule.[81]

Obviously, Wells saw the end of the era of empires and the dawning of a new one of nationalities. However, although he was half-hearted in rebutting the existence of empires, he could not fully accept the independence of smaller nations as a general pattern for Europe. He illustrated a kind of thinking shared by many others. Arnold Toynbee, the conservative historian, believed that nationality was the optimal organising principle for Europe. Still, he saw no chance of most of the Central and East European nationalities existing as independent states: the Czechs were too dependent on the Austrian and German economies; the Slavic nations of the Balkan Peninsula would do best in a shared customs union; and the nationalities of north-eastern Europe could only express themselves within the Russian Empire. For only a few peoples would nationality lead to independence, and most were 'undoubtedly unripe for it'.[82] The liberal prime minister, H.H. Asquith, declared that Britain would stand up for the nationality principle, and an imperialist-minded London journalist defended the independence of 'many of the smaller nations'. However, when listing them, like Wells and Toynbee, both men only mentioned nation states that were in existence before the war.[83] Similarly, during the 1915 International Congress of Women in The Hague, women from both warring and neutral countries struck the International Committee of Women for Permanent Peace, demanding 'respect for nationality' and a recognition of 'the right of the people to self-government' in a declaration. Occupied Belgium was on the minds of people outside of Germany and Austria, as was the looming referendum of those living in South Tyrol, Alsace and Schleswig regarding which state they wanted to belong to.[84] The Uruguayan-Spanish writer Adolfo Agorio brought up Belgium and Serbia when discussing the ideas of nationality and international justice as the bases for creating fraternity in Europe: these two ideas would deliver a just peace. He said nothing about other nations.[85]

It is possible to make the same observation in other discourses. Many writers and activists blamed imperialism for starting the war.[86] John Hobson, who had popularised the notion among leftists early in the century, saw the war as an outcome of previous European imperialist policies related to

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militarism and the financial exploitation of foreign countries.[87] Wells singled out Germany as the main imperialist culprit because of its policies, which he found aggressive, cowardly, undemocratic, and lacking in recognition of the rights of different nationalities.[88] In such rhetoric, national independence and the rights of people to determine their own fate were essential for building a lasting peace. However, the focus remained on existing nation states, while the nationality issue in Europe concerned many stateless minorities from the Austrian, German, Russian and Ottoman empires.

Both the Allies and the Central Powers used the nationality issue for their own purposes and took steps to empower nationalist movements, in the hope of diminishing enemy resources. Germany and Austria-Hungary promised nationality rights and institutional bodies to Finland and the Baltic region, to the Flemish in Belgium, to Ukraine and Moravia, and to the Poles in the former Russian possession of Warsaw. Britain offered the exiled Belgian government guarantees of restored independence, made promises to the nationalities of the Habsburg Empire, and raised hopes among the Poles to reunite the divided nation. However, German policies for Poles within the Reich offered them little hope, and those who ruled Vienna refused to increase the national rights of the Slavs, eventually becoming more hostile towards nationality movements when the war broke out. In London, those in power would listen to neither a Welsh campaign for federal autonomy, nor to the demands of the Irish for national rights. Instead, Irish leaders were arrested and, as protests against British rule escalated, people were killed. The new Bolshevik regime of Russia accepted in theory that nations were free to decide whether to form states with other nations or to become independent, and this also applied to its own non-Russian nations. In reality, however, the regime intervened in one way or another in Ukraine, Bessarabia/Moravia, Finland, and the Baltic states after their declarations of independence.[89]

A clear indication that the concept of nationality was growing in popularity was that it had entered the minds of socialists and social democrats, and forced them to consider it worth defending. Conditions had changed since the war began, and they needed to call for more than internationalism. They needed to support the governments of their countries in more ways than just backing the declarations of war in 1914, as during the war they had become more opposed to it. Even Lenin, who ascribed all talk, comments and noise made about nationality to capitalist propaganda, recognised the right of nationalities to be liberated from oppressing states.[90] Some went further, stating that the struggle for national independence was just as important as the class struggle, and noted that there were nationalities that did not have proper states. Leaders of the Social Democrats in Germany and Austria wrote at length on the topic. Karl Kautsky emphasised that freedom was crucial, not only for nations that were large or more culturally developed, but for

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all nations. He saw their self-determination as one of the main issues facing Europe. However, this did not mean that he welcomed new states, as he drew a clear distinction between self-determination and independence. His notion of a state included economic unity of trade with a free market and external customs, and a military strong enough to defend itself behind borders. He believed that, to form a nation state, it was essential to have community of language, and indicated that some nationalities were simply too small to form states. In that case, a national culture and language were still considered important for democracy and for a minority's right to express itself.[91] In line with these arguments, his party declared in 1917 that occupied Belgium and Serbia ought to retain their freedom, and that Poland, Finland and Ireland should be welcomed as independent states, while other minority nationalities should settle for autonomy within their states.[92]

The nationality question had a special resonance in Cisleithanien, the country located on the River Leitha, officially called the 'Kingdoms and countries represented in the Reichsrat', which consisted of the Austrian part of the Habsburg Empire. Transleithanien, the country beyond the Leitha River, was Hungary.[93] Before the war, the empire had experienced a long period of stability. Conflicts between nationalities did not threaten its reign because the nationalists, with few exceptions, wanted to keep the empire intact. It is true that the pan-German movement of George Schönerer wanted the German parts of Austria to break away and join Germany, but the movement attracted little support and was backed by only a minority within the Austrian Parliament.[94] Slavic nationalists won supporters in their objective to expand national autonomy when they called for the right to use their own languages in civic administration, but most were loyal to the state. More so than in any other groups, it was among the high-ranking officials that Austrian patriotism remained strong, with loyalty and obedience to the emperor trumping nationalist sentiments. The war, deliberately started by the monarchist leaders, changed the Austrian mindset. The army did not meet the standards of modern warfare and could hardly win a battle without the support of German troops. Rumours spread, with people saying that the war would lead to disaster for the Habsburg state, which was soon both militarily and economically in the hands of Germany. A customs union was enforced, and the monarchy was well on its way to becoming an integrated part of a German-dominated 'Mitteleuropa'.[95]

The notion of a German-led 'Mitteleuropa' was criticised as too focused on the economy and blind to anything besides German culture and nationalism. Polish nationalists writing in a journal in Vienna were enthusiastic about the possibility of uniting their divided country within a new 'Mitteleuropa', but they leaned towards the Habsburg Empire, hoping to increase their independence within a multinational state.[96] The historian Josef Pekař was

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among the nationalists who anticipated that the Czech nationality would occupy a stronger position in a future Austria, because its culture already had ample influence on the region and it would strengthen the Habsburg regime in its partnership with Germany.[97] In revising the notion of 'Mitteleuropa', economist Gustav Stolper emphasised higher aims and religious values when he argued that Austria could add a moral component to the federation.[98] Like Naumann and other Germans, Social Democratic Party leader Karl Renner also emphasised a cultural community in the region, but he did not define it as German or as specific to any other nationality. Instead, he turned to history and shared intellectual, religious and national experiences. Stolper said that Austria had a world mission to spread a specific sensitivity to cultural diversity, and building a new world order on this basis would be the greatest achievement of humanity since Christianity. Christian Social Party leader Ignaz Seipel understood the Dual Monarchy as exemplifying the highest standard of political organisation in existence. Only in a multinational state would it be possible to achieve perpetual peace, while also allowing multiple nationalities to uphold their own agendas – even while organising exchange between national cultures, without which they would not survive. We can see a vision of a federal and multinational Austria that is partly in harmony with the idea of 'Mitteleuropa'. These authors downplayed the idea of German culture as an organisational principle of society, instead seeing Austria as the heart of a region where nationalities were able to live peacefully together and learn from one another.[99] Evidently, they saw no reason for independent nation states.

All these efforts were futile in establishing an Austria of nations with a post-war future, as the Dual Monarchy fell under German control, which eventually undermined its political and economic sovereignty. The dynasty, with its new Kaiser, lost power to its German brother in arms. The ability of Slav nationalists to stay within the Austrian state seemed to promise a future with weak opportunities for self-determination. The military offensive by the Central Powers in 1918 ended in a grand failure, and the state began to break up. It was of no help that the young emperor, Charles, had initiated a plan to reorganise the state according to federal principles. The main nationalities declared themselves independent, and the emperor was forced to abdicate.

## A New Europe

After only a few months of warfare, people began to speculate about what Europe would look like when the war was over, as it would undoubtedly not be the same as before. Many insisted that the old Europe was dead, that

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the aspirations of the Congress of Vienna had finally collapsed, and that neither the Congress System of the Treaty of Vienna nor the coalition system of the pre-war years remained viable, as they were part of the problem. It was time to look to new principles of international relations, for a way to settle border issues without igniting new conflict. Different expectations of the future began to take hold, including hopes for new ethical standards and international law.[100] Some asked for a new way of thinking. The Swiss art historian Hans Mühlstein stated: 'The coming reformation of European politics and culture can only come from a better philosophy than the one that dominates our rulers'. [101] He had defended German expansion in 1914, but after his experiences in the war, he became a pacifist and socialist. However, the focus of the discourse remained the rights of nationalities and rectifying their divisions.

Indeed, there was quite a lot of speculation about post-war Europe. The notion of a new Europe gained traction mainly in the Allied countries with a focus on the concept of nationality as a fundamental asset for the coming political order in Europe. In 1915, the new Europe of Arnold Toynbee consisted of interconnected nations unified by their culture and language. In some cases, a nation represented an economic unit in and of itself, and sometimes nations were assembled into a group. Each nation matured in its own time, which could be seen as a kind of social evolution. Toynbee was adhering to a stagist theory of history when he said that immature nations should follow the more advanced ones in Europe, emphasising that more established nations should refrain from focusing on mere economic interests and from engaging in conflicts over foreign territories. He also added, rather elusively, that nationality should not be the final stage, and hoped that someday there could be an international authority in place by which nations could transcend nationality altogether.[102] Apparently, the early talk of a new Europe was vague, and masked an effort to discredit Prussianism and the current German regime. For Toynbee, Germany was not fit for a new Europe. Its Prussian conduct and dynastic ambitions were not appealing to a democratically inclined public, and did not apply to a political organisation of Europe based on nations. Its concept of nationality represented only brute force and domination; it was 'a menace to our civilization' as it relied on German glory during the Medieval period, and focused on territorial inclusion, while Britain truly represented a modern nation: 'a spiritual experience and self-expression of a human society' that represented democracy and cooperation.[103]

Discussion of a new Europe approached the matter from different perspectives. In *L'Europe Nouvelle*, also written in 1915, the socialist-leaning journalist Paul Louis wrote: 'The expression "New Europe", which is used daily, is very vague, it covers territorial Europe, social Europe, political

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Europe', adding that this also concerned a 'moral Europe'.[104] He stated that French, Germans, British and neutrals alike rejected a return to the way things were before August 1914; the Germans aimed for expansion, while the others opposed Germany's push for more territory. For Louis, the war was a historical moment of the same significance as the French Revolution, when an old era was left behind and a new one was dawning. In the new Europe, the will of the people and the nationality principle should rule, such that 'there were no more oppressed, despoiled, mutilated peoples'.[105]

This makes him another example of a socialist who valued nationalities, although he defined a nationality not by language, religion, or historical memory, but by the unity of its people. For instance, one nation can encompass more than one language, and one language may be spoken in several different countries. The new Europe would need to abandon the orders of the Treaty of Vienna and the Prussian, Bismarckian and pan-German doctrines of territorial expansion, whose 'monstrous ambitions' had tortured the French in Alsace-Lorraine, the Danish in Schleswig and Holstein, and, most of all, the western Poles. Louis wrote that referenda could sometimes be useful in letting the people decide where they belonged, but he saw only Poland as capable of forming a new independent state. He believed that Finland should have autonomy within the Russian state and that Austro-Germans, Czechs and Hungarians should form a tripartite state with equal rights for its three nationalities. Other parts of the Habsburg Empire should be included in the expanding territories of Italy, Serbia and Romania. A recurring argument was that nations were supposed to be large and populous enough to form a state. Using this logic, Louis dismissed the pre-war independence of Luxemburg, considering it part of Belgium. He concluded that this would be a Europe without slaves, because each nationality would have its freedom, which would increase the likelihood of peace.[106]

Neither Louis nor his ideological opposite Toynbee viewed Europe as providing an opportunity for new nation states to emerge. However, they reflected changing opinions regarding the significance of smaller nations. In late 1915, a Swedish envoy to Paris wrote in his diary that, after meeting representatives of the government and leading politicians, it was possible to view smaller states with fresh eyes and to appreciate their importance. Not only were these representatives interested in forging closer economic ties with Sweden, but they also spoke of their willingness to support the Finnish claim to self-determination, or even independence.[107] Louis argued that these nations – representing smaller states – without the power or grandeur of the main European countries nonetheless had an important part to play in establishing buffer zones. The free nations of the Netherlands, Belgium, Poland, Switzerland and Denmark would constitute buffer zones between bigger countries, reducing the risk of their direct confrontation. Smaller

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nations had nothing to gain by starting wars, which they would be bound to lose; rather, they feared war, and their peacefulness offered a kind of balance to Europe. They tended towards democratic and liberal governance, were concerned with the freedoms of their citizens, and offered asylum to expatriates. They were considered progressive in many respects regarding their own countries, civilisation, and international relations. Louis's song of praise concluded that, in a rejuvenated Europe, smaller states would be of greater importance than ever before, although he could not see that any new states should be established.[108] Despite the tributes paid to their literature, art, science, and innovative thought, Louis imagined that the post-war European states would remain almost exactly the same nations as they were before. A reorganised Europe with altered territorial borders? –Yes. A Europe with additional states? – No!

The Czech nationalist Tomáš Masaryk believed in the prospect of new nation states. He proposed an alternative to Austrian, German and Russian dominance of the western Slavic nationalities, and began to talk of a Central Europe composed of free and democratic states. In his earlier books on Czech nationality he did not discuss the concept of Central Europe, nor did he tie the future of the Czech people to that of other Central European nations or espouse an independent Czech state.[109] However, from 1912 onwards, he became increasingly opposed to the governance of Austria, and expressed indignation at the throne, the aristocracy and the Czech elites. He called upon the Czech and the other minor Austrian nations to strive for cultural and political self-determination. Even at that time, he considered the establishment of an independent Czech nation outside the Austrian Empire to be impossible. Only the war, and the possibility of gaining support from the Allies, made him change his mind.[110] It was also the war that made it possible to present Central Europe as an alternative to a German 'Mitteleuropa'. Czech nationalists had known about the latter since at least 1905, when the leader of the Young Czech Party, Karel Kramář, warned citizens of Germany's ambition to expand its power throughout the Habsburg Empire. A customs union would only benefit the Germans, not the Czechs. Kramář confronted a German 'Mitteleuropa' based on his interest in living in a Czech nation at 'the heart of Europe'. Nevertheless, there was still no talk of an alternative idea of Central Europe composed of nation states, as he believed that the Slavic nations of Austria should exist within the frame of a federalist reconstruction of the monarchy.[111]

Forced by the war into exile, Masaryk arrived in England in March 1915, at which point he began to campaign for Czech independence by establishing influential contacts, writing petitions to the minister of foreign affairs, and collaborating with the weekly *The New Europe*. He took every opportunity to petition for the freedom of the peoples of Central Europe,

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and tried to convince the British public that such an aim was exactly in line with Allied interests and victory. He contended that the Allies would soon defeat a disintegrating Habsburg Monarchy, which would open a path to victory over Germany. This proposed strategy evoked positive reactions from the British government and ministries, but only became part of official British policy in 1918.[112]

In a speech given in London at Kings College's newly established School of Slavonic and East European Studies, as well as in a memorandum to the British government in October–November 1915, Masaryk defined his own position as an alternative to the plans for a German 'Mitteleuropa', and was apparently quite familiar with the German literature and policy on the matter. He wanted a different plan from that of the Allies, a Central Europe free of German domination, where Czech sovereignty was not limited by German power and where the independence of the Slavic nations could provide a bulwark against future German expansion.[113] Cautiously, he wrote that England and France were defending the rights of smaller nations to self-determination, and underlined the assurances of the tsar that the Slavic peoples should be liberated. He was thus able to present his aims as very much aligned with those of the Allies. He did not mention his ambivalence towards tsarist rule in Russia, nor that the Allies' drive for self-determination differed from his for sovereignty. He was more outspoken in his criticism of the Austrian and German empires when he said that they represented a previous era's authoritarian rule, and he insisted that in the modern world a state would need to find common ground if it was to build a nation with a shared language and democratic rule. His European map consisted of a Western Europe with nineteen nations and twelve states. Eastern Europe was dominated by a few large empires and a multitude of smaller nations. Between Eastern and Western Europe he described an 'ethnological zone' with a southern border running from Trieste via Thessaloniki to Constantinople, and a northern border along the Baltic Sea. It included Eastern Prussia, Austria-Hungary, Western Russia, and the Turkish-ruled part of the Balkans. Masaryk called this zone 'Central Europe', and supported his plea for national sovereignty by looking at the national conflicts that had yet to be viably resolved. By releasing them from the empire, they could become more like Western nation states. Masaryk's new Europe began with a new Central Europe composed of independent nation states.[114]

Starting in January 1917, the Bohemian Masaryk began to edit *The New Europe*, in which he promoted democracy and independence for the nations of Austria-Hungary. *The New Europe* was Britain's main outlet for calls for national self-determination, with collaborators from all Allied countries, including occupied Belgium. It supported the right of all peoples to decide whether or not to be independent, and to decide on the degree of autonomy that they

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should have. The Macedonian people should have the right to hold a referendum regarding their partition among Serbia, Bulgaria and Greece. The 3.5 million Romanians of Transylvania should have the right to an autonomous province within a federalised Hungary.[115] Regarding Luxemburg, an article asked for the assurance of independence.[116] One article spoke of Icelandic attempts to persuade Denmark to agree to expand its self-governance.[117] Another article focused on Åland's petition to become part of Sweden, after Finland had declared its independence.[118] In addition, the journal reported every concession of the Allies to sovereignty. These included the new Russian regime's proclamation of autonomy for all non-Russian peoples, the French recognition of Finnish independence in January 1918, and the Allies' recognition of a Czech legion within their ranks. It also included the recognition by Russian delegates of Ukraine as an independent state four months later in May, and the promises of the British, French and Italian prime ministers to support Poland, Czechoslovakia and Yugoslavia in becoming their own nations in June of the same year. All of this stood in contrast to the Central Powers' insistence 'upon restricting its [i.e. self-determination's] applications to *states*, not nations, and leaving existing frontiers unimpaired'.[119] Guided by the motto 'Pour la Victoire Intégrale', *The New Europe* aspired to offer a new international order for Europe, promoting 'victory for the democratic idea, and for peace without annexations and on the basis of complete self-determination of nations'.[120] Democracy and national sovereignty formed the journal's formula for a new Europe.

In late 1917, national self-determination and sovereignty became options in Eastern Europe. From the beginning of the war, Ukrainian nationalists had declared that their nation had a culture of its own, with the richest musical and poetic traditions in Europe, and that it was capable of forming a unique state of its own. Ukrainian independence from Russia would benefit all of Europe, while it would weaken or even disintegrate Russia, free its subjects from tsarist rule, and relieve Germany and Austria of their eastern threat.[121] These were the claims, and after the October Revolution, Ukraine proclaimed independence from Russia, as did Moravia and Finland. In the Baltic region, under German occupation, national bodies were allowed to develop in order to gain distance from Russia. In early 1918, Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania declared themselves independent. In Austria-Hungary, nationalism became radicalised as the empire was on the brink of collapse due to food shortages, strikes, and a breakdown in transport. The army was running out of men, materials were in short supply, and Slavic troops refused to fight against the Entente. On 6 January 1918, Czech deputies of the Reichsrat and Diets of Bohemia, Moravia and Silesia agreed to a programme for Czechoslovakian independence.[122] Willingness to remain loyal to the empires of Central and Eastern Europe was rapidly declining.

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The process leading to the disintegration of the continental empires received further impetus when a manifesto for the future organisation of Europe arrived from the United States. Paul Louis was a witness:

> No document, since 1914, has had more resonance than Mister Wilson's message dated 8 January 1918. The words of the American president have always had the gift of catching the attention of men, because one feels his firm will, clear and at the same time audacious thoughts, a rather rare disinterestedness; but this time, it is not an exaggeration to say that they have provoked a profound shock in both aggressive and neutral countries.[123]

The idea of national self-determination was fundamental to the American president Woodrow Wilson. In his address to congress about the conditions for establishing peace, he set out 'the principle of justice to all peoples and nationalities, and their right to live on equal terms of liberty and safety with one another, whether they be strong or weak'. America represented, in his eyes, a historical development away from empires and towards nation states, while Germany and Austria were the prime examples of outmoded imperialism.[124] Detesting dynastic and authoritarian rule, he frankly declared his belief in democracy and the possibility of improving the world order: '[W]hat we seek is the reign of law based upon the consent of the governed, and sustained by the organized opinion of mankind'.[125]

Although his inspiration came mainly from the independence movements in North and South America, Wilson was aware that the European discourse of the war had inspired aspirations of national self-determination and even independence.[126] The declaration clearly addressed the Polish and Balkan demands for independence but was more conservative when it came to the Habsburg nationalities, to which it offered only self-determination. That limitation was of little importance as Wilson had already made a name for himself as an ardent proponent of moral principles in favour of peace, and his new declaration only further boosted national sentiments. For many, Wilson stood out as 'the recognized prophet of the Allied cause'.[127]

On 10 April 1918, non-German nationalities of the Habsburg Empire gathered in Rome at the Kongress der unterdrückten Völker Österreich-Ungarns, and on 17 May they gathered once again in Prague. The assembled included Slovaks, Croats, leaders of the Yugoslavian movement, Serbian dissidents, Bosnians, Italians, Romanians from Transylvania and Bukovina, Poles from Galicia and Silesia, and representatives from all of the Czech parties. Their declaration referred to hundreds of years of oppression, and envisioned a future of lasting peace that would lead to independence and overall 'a better future of the nations'. Aggressive imperialism would be exchanged for a system of free and equal nations. Wilson's principles left their mark in the resolution: the new future would be 'assured by the world democracy,

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by a real and sovereign national people's government, and by a universal League of Nations, endowed with the necessary authority'.[128]

The tide was quickly turning in favour of the Slavic nationalists as the Allies viewed the disintegration of the Habsburg Empire as a way to weaken and isolate Germany. By the end of May 1918, the British government and President Wilson praised the Slavic nationalists' ambitions, declaring that their independence and liberty were among the Allies' war aims. However, full sovereignty for every individual Habsburg nationality was not what the Allies had in mind, as sufficient size was thought necessary in order to become a viable nation state. The British spokesman uttered something vague about gathering these nations into a Central European federation. Wilson promised sovereignty to only Czechoslovakia and Yugoslavia, each of which comprised more than one nation.[129] Economic arguments proved useful when attempting to limit claims to national independence. In *The New Europe* it was explained that the southern Slavic provinces needed the mountains, plains, and coastal lands for economic development purposes. Developing trade routes, commerce and industry throughout the inland regions would require connections with the Dalmatian coastal towns, which would then enable trade across the Mediterranean. Trieste and Fiume would have to be oriented towards the Yugoslavian provinces instead of the Austrian centres in the north.[130] Clearly, an independent state should have the most conducive economic conditions.

Hopes for an Allied victory were high in autumn 1918, as the Habsburg Empire had collapsed and it had become clear that it only was a matter of time until Germany admitted defeat. In Copenhagen another journal was established, also entitled *The New Europe*, or in Danish *Det ny Europa*, by leading Scandinavian cultural figures, including the Danish critic Georg Brandes, the Norwegian explorer Fridtjof Nansen, and the Swedish suffragette Ellen Key. They declared that a new Europe was in the making, and they likened the European nations to the sons of a larger common fatherland. By heralding the coming of this new Europe and declaring their love for it, they were giving expression to the strong prevailing currents of hope.[131]

## The Wilsonian Moment: An Ending with New Divides

Recently, a researcher aptly called this juncture in 1918 'the Wilsonian moment'.[132] President Wilson was expected to take the lead in organising the new Europe according to his principles. Hopes were high when Germany asked for a ceasefire and accepted Wilson's terms. However, this was also a moment of great anxiety. While some saw Germany as the main threat to a future Europe of national self-determination, others believed that the

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German people were not to blame for what its leaders had perpetrated. Ellen Key asked the victors to respect the spirit of the German people: '[T]hose who now want to trample Germany's self-determination, pride, and future opportunities into pieces are beginning a new war in which their grandchildren will bleed and Europe will fall'.[133] That is, the notion of national self-determination should also include Germany.

Wilson's ideals were definitely anti-colonial, and met with resistance from the other Allied leaders, who had no understanding of national self-determination outside of Europe. In fact, Wilson himself believed that few non-Europeans could manage to govern their own countries. Wilson sought an alternative to the imperial system of pre-war Europe that would be more attractive than communist rule. His idea was to establish lasting peace by eliminating reasons for disputes through granting each nationality the right to self-determination, and offering a way to have an international body deal with conflicts.[134]

Intellectuals developed a range of arguments to support such a supranational association. They enthusiastically embraced Wilson's principles, finding that they represented freedom and the peaceful arbitration of international disputes. One argument constituted nothing but historical determinism: in the beginning was love for the family, then grew compassion for the tribe, after that for the nation, and the next step was to embrace a larger, international community. Another argument tried to apply a pedagogical logic: nationalism and a feeling of belonging to one people were necessary to foster internationalism. Only when people understood the complexities of national society would it be possible to extrapolate this understanding to the complexities of interacting nations: 'Only from nationalists could one create internationalists'.[135]

A third argument drew on the experience of wartime cooperation, with the pooling of resources, the unifying of military forces, and to some degree the combining of economic actions through the War Council of Versailles. This council acted as a supranational authority, and had come to signify 'that only a certain voluntary curtailment of the sovereign right of each nation can avail to equip the common cause with the means of victory'. Not only did this approach serve the Allies in the war, it represented the embodiment of a supranational body, illustrating how it would behave when it had the authority to control sovereign nations to address a shared aim. According to this argument, the council put 'the whole task of European reconstruction' on the agenda.[136]

As the expectations of internationalism continued to increase, so did early signs of disputes resulting from the self-determination of nations. When the Moldavian Republic was declared, Romania took steps to extend its territory to the detriment of the new state. Polish troops entered Lithuanian

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and Ukrainian territory. Bohemian-German parties opposed the creation of a Czechoslovakian state. The dispute over a border town between the new Czech and Polish republics remained unresolved. For the internationalists, and for all who found hope in Wilson's programme, it might have come as a surprise that the wave of nationalism and the establishment of nation states laid the ground for conflicts during the interbellum period.

The end of the war meant the dismantling of the Romanov, Hohenzollern, Habsburg and Ottoman empires, which allowed for the construction of independent nation states. However, this was not easily accomplished, as the nationalities constituting the former empires were not clear-cut entities. Many people were unaware of their national affiliation or were unwilling to belong to a certain nation, but would in any case, with or without their consent, be forced into it by the principle of self-determination. Linguistic and historical demarcation lines were often too complex to offer any obvious borders, as every choice would leave some minorities behind. Rather than solving territorial issues, the principle of self-determination seemed bound to create even more disputes between the European states. Furthermore, the victors were more interested in finding the best possible provisions for themselves than in finding agreements that everyone could live with. It is no wonder that the delegates of the conference in Paris were mostly pessimistic about the results of their deliberations, and were even alarmed at the resulting treaty. A British delegate wrote in a letter that 'the total effect is, I am quite sure, quite indefensible and in fact is, I think, quite unworkable'. John Maynard Keynes felt 'deep and violent shame', and left the conference very worried about the economic chaos that he thought the treaty would instigate.[137]

With the treaties after the war, Russia was removed from Finland, the Baltic States and Poland, Germany lost its foothold in Poland, and the Habsburg Empire was broken into four states. Albania gained its independence from Italy and the sovereignty of Belgium and Luxembourg were confirmed. Apart from that, Denmark signed a treaty that granted Iceland its freedom in all areas except foreign policy and the common monarch. Ukraine and Moravia declared their independence before the new Soviet Union eventually defeated them, and in 1922, the Irish Free State proclaimed its independence from the United Kingdom. This meant that the number of European states radically increased, and also that Europe could be seen as a continent composed of nation states.

Although the Allies were prepared to turn a page and give up their imperial ambitions in Europe, that did not mean they were ready to relinquish their power on other continents. The idea that Europeans had achieved a higher standard of development was still current, and imperial ambitions remained on the agenda. However, the fear of losing that higher position was pervasive and widespread. As a result, a new chapter in the history of the

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European idea emerged. While the new prominence of nation states reinforced the conception of a Europe of dividing borders, the fear of a diminishing European role in the world sparked the idea of European unification.

## Notes

1. Stolper, *This Age of Fable*, 3.
2. Hobsbawm, *The Age of Extremes*; Karlsson, *Urkatastrofen*.
3. Smith, Mollan and Tennent, *The Impact*.
4. As emphasised by Vermeiren, 'Notions of Solidarity and Integration'.
5. Ibid.
6. Ferrero, *Who Wanted European War?*, 37.
7. Belloc, *Sketch of the European War*, 4: 'This war is the largest and weightiest incident that Europe has known for centuries. It will surely determine the future of Europe. . .'.
8. 'Arms and The Men'.
9. Stehr, 'Der Krieg bricht los', 1185–88: 'und Gott ists, der durch unsere Waffen spricht', 'Nun deutsches Volk, wirst du Europa's Meister'.
10. Abercromby, 'The Harvest (September 1914)', 14–15.
11. Barrès, *The Faith of France*, 1–6.
12. Ahnlund, *Diktare i krig*, 154–57.
13. Ferrero, *Europe's Fateful Hour*, IV.
14. Ibid., 69–72, 222–33.
15. Rohrbach, *Der Krieg*, 99–100.
16. Sombart, *Händler und Helden*, 55, 145.
17. '(The) First Phase'.
18. Quotation from Anonymous, '(Der) Wille zum Frieden', 264: 'Auf den Strassen, die unsere Heeren bahnen, sollen nachher alle friedlichen Kulturmächte einhergehen'.
19. Kipling, 'As They Tested Our Fathers', 106–7.
20. Belloc, *Sketch of the European War*, 47.
21. Bergson, 'The Vital Energies of France', 153.
22. Ferrero, *Europe's Fateful Hour*, 51–68; on Latinism, 51: 'The religion, the political institutions and doctrines, the organization of armies, the law, the art, the literature, the philosophy . . . are . . . the work of those nations which one can, from their position, describe as Mediterranean'.
23. Sombart, *Händler und Helden*, 14–64.
24. Ibid., 135: 'Wir verstehen alle fremder Völker, keines verstehen uns, und keines kann uns verstehen'.
25. Ibid., 136–37.
26. Jaraush, *Out of Ashes*, 53–64.
27. Hobsbawn, 'The Nation as Invented Tradition'.
28. Mayreder, 'Die Frau und Internationalismus', 28.
29. Zweig, *Messages from a Lost World*, 58.
30. Reuter, 'The German Religion of Duty'.
31. Hauptmann, 'A Reply to Rolland'; Hauptmann, 'Are We Barbarians?'
32. Marvin, 'Preface'.
33. Marvin, 'The Growth of Humanity', 304–7.
34. D'Ors, 'Manifesto of Moral Unity'.
35. Dresselhuys, 'Nederlandsche anti-oorlog raad', 133–34.

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36. Einstein and Nicolai, 'Manifesto to the Europeans'.

37. Kolb, 'Briefe eines Deutsch-Französin'; Noe, *Die literarische Kritik in 'Die weissen Blätter'*, 149–53.

38. Noe, *Die literarische Kritik in 'Die weissen Blätter'*, 109–10; quotation from 110: '. . .hat ein einigeres Europa bestanden, nie war doe Solidaritär der Völker, die sich zu zerfleischen suchen, so gross'.

39. Hofmannsthal, 'Die Idee Europa'.

40. Starr, *Romain Rolland and War*, 3, 50–65.

41. Rolland, *Above the Battle*, 121, 129, 135.

42. Fried, *The Restoration of Europe*.

43. *Report of the International Congress*. See also, e.g., Wägner, 'Hvad säga kvinnorna?'; Qvarnström, *Motståndets berättelser*, 118–21, 162–75.

44. Anonymous, 'In ernster Zeit'.

45. Wells, *What Is Coming?*, 193, 254–62.

46. Angell, 'Introduction', xxv–xxvii.

47. See, e.g., the Swedish social democrat Erik Palmstierna, 'Europas förenta stater' or the Austrian Nobel laureate Alfred Fried, *Europäische Wiederherstellung*.

48. Lipgens, *Die Anfänge der Einigungspolitik*, 36. The secretary of the Dutch committee, Nico van Suchtelen, published *Europe United* (translated from Dutch in 1915; plus other translations, e.g. into Danish in 1916, *Europas forenede stater*).

49. Waechter, 'How to Prevent War'.

50. See, e.g. Blum, 'A European Dialogue'. See also the call to all Europeans in November 1914 by Nicolai, *Die Biologie des Krieges*, 12–15.

51. Wettstein, *Europas Einigungskrieg*, 86–89.

52. Smith, Mollan and Tennent, *Impact of First World War*, 6–12.

53. Battaglia, *Zoll- und Wirtschaftsbündnis*, 706–40.

54. Ibid., 704–7; Stevenson, 'War and European Integration'.

55. Wells, *What Is Coming?*, 46, 210; Angell, *War Aims*; Angell, *Conditions of Allied Success*.

56. Wells, *What Is Coming?*, 238.

57. Vermeieren discusses the political impact of the understanding of Germany's war aims in *The First World War*, 145–82.

58. The following pages on 'Mitteleuropa' are based on Andrén, *Att frambringa*, 149–56.

59. Chiantera-Stutte, 'Space, Großraum and Mitteleuropa'.

60. Meyer, *Mitteleuropa in German Thought*, 145–59, charts the relevant newspaper and magazine articles.

61. Klaein, *Die Kulturgemeinschaft der Völker*; Liszt, *Ein Mitteleuropäischer staatenverband*; Loch, *Der mitteleuropäische Wirtschaftsbloch*; Mehrmann, *Grossdeutschland*; Mühlstein, *Deutschlands Sendung*; Philippovich, *Ein Wirtschafts- und Zollverband*; Ritter, *Berlin-Bagdad*; Ritter, *Nordkap-Bagdad*. From 1913, the only major book treating 'Mitteleuropa' – openly critical of the policy of Bismarck and of the Prussian unification of Germany – was by the agrarian conservative Schuchardt, *Der mitteleuropäische Bund*.

62. Liszt, *Ein Mitteleuropäischer staatenverband*, 16, 42; Mühlstein, *Deutschlands Sendung*, 10–21, 45–48.

63. Philippovich, *Ein Wirtschafts- und Zollverband*; Ritter, *Berlin-Bagdad*; Liszt, *Ein Mitteleuropäischer staatenverband*, 29, 41.

64. Stevenson, 'War and European Integration'.

65. Theiner, *Sozialer Liberalismus*, 150, 239; cf. Fischer, 'Weltpolitik, Weltmachtstreben'. See also Mommsen, 'Die Mitteleuropaidee und die Mitteleuropaplanungen', 14.

66. Stevenson, 'War and European Integration'.

67. Theiner, *Sozialer Liberalismus*, 129–59.

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68. Ibid., 50; Meyer, *Mitteleuropa in German Thought*, 195; Naumann, 'Deutschland und Österreich'.

69. Naumann, *Mitteleuropa*, 496–97; quotation from 523: 'Mit disem krieg im Rücken können wir Berge versetzen. Jetzt oder nie wird die dauernde Einheit zwischen Ost und West, wird Mitteleuropa zwischen Russland und den westlichen Mächten'.

70. Ibid., 501–4, 519–22.

71. Ibid., 492–3, 523–33, 543–50, 578–9, 586–7, 595–6, 663–5; quotation from 586: 'Das ist schmerzlich, aber so will es die Weltgeschichte: politische kleinbetriebe bedürfen der Ahnlehnung'.

72. Ibid., 555: '. . .um das Deutschtum herum wächst die Kultur von Mitteleuropa'.

73. Ibid., 579: '. . .Denker, Verstandsmenschen, Techniker, Organisatoren, erfolgreiche Nüchternheitsmenschen ', and 596: ' der träger einer um das Deutschtum herum wachsenden vielgliedrigen starken und inhaltreichen Kultur'.

74. Ibid., 597–612.

75. List, *Deutschland und Mittel-Europa*, 107–9; Dix, 'England und die Mitteleuropäische Verkehrseinheit', 73–75; Stern, *Mitteleuropa*, 726–35.

76. Vermeieren, 'Notions of Solidarity'.

77. Mogk, *Rohrbach und 'Grössere Deutschland'*, 5, 182–83.

78. Kautsky, *Nationalstaat und Staatenbund*, 72–75; Kautsky, *Die vereinigten Staaten Mitteleuropas*, 1–14.

79. Wells, *What Is Coming?*, 239–42; quotation from 242.

80. Ibid., 38–44.

81. Ibid., 192–207, 254.

82. Toynbee, *Nationality and the* War, 476–77; Toynbee, *The New Europe*, 61–62.

83. Cook, *Britain and the Small Nations*. Asquith is quoted by Sydney Brooks, 'The New Europe', 66–78.

84. *Report of the International Congress*.

85. Agorio, *La Sombre de Europa*, 33.

86. Hobson, *Imperialism: A Study*.

87. Hobson, *Democracy after the War*.

88. Wells, *What Is Coming?*, 192–207.

89. Regarding the Russian case, see Seton-Watson, 'The Musings of a Slavophile'.

90. Lenin, *The Imperialist War*, 91, 190.

91. Kautsky, *Die Befreiung der Nationen*, 6, 27–46.

92. 'Memorandum of the Socialists'.

93. Kann, *Das Nationalitätenproblem der Habsburgmonarchie*, 17–39; Zöllner, 'Der Österreichbegriff'.

94. Sked, *Fall of the Habsburg Empire*, 218–39.

95. Ibid., 255–61.

96. Boleski, 'Die Einheit Mitteleuropas'; Grużewski, 'Die koalition Mitteleuropas'.

97. Pekař, 'Kdo založil Rakousko?'

98. Stolper, *Das mitteleuropäische Wirtschaftsproblem*, 100–101; Stolper, *Wir und Deutschland*, 29–30.

99. Renner, *Der Selbstbestimmungsrecht der Nationen*; Seipel, *Nation und Staat*, 31, 68, 92–95, 139; Stolper, *Wir und Deutschland*, 29–32.

100. See, e.g., Agorio, *La Sombre de Europa*, 23: 'Nos hallamos al borde de esta suprema transformación. Ya ha comenzado al gran proceso de todos los valores éticos, la gran revisión de todas las garantías jurídicas' [We stand on the brink of this supreme transformation. The great process of all ethical values has already begun, the great review of all legal guarantees].

101. Mühlstein, *Herrschaft der Weisen*, 3: 'Die kommende Reformation der europäischen Politik und Kultur kann nur von einer besseren Philosophie ausgehen'.

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102. Toynbee, *The New Europe*, 61–73.

103. Ibid., 9–18.

104. Louis, *L'Europe Nouvelle*, 6: 'L'Expression "Europe nouvelle", dont un use quotidiennement, est d'ailleurs très vague; elle recouvre l'Europe territoriale, l'Europe social, l'Europe politique'.

105. Ibid., 7: 'n'y avait plus de peuples opprimés, spoliés, mutilés'.

106. Ibid., 12–30.

107. Palmstierna, *Orostid I*, 155–75.

108. Louis, *L'Europe Nouvelle*, 22–131.

109. Andrén, *Att frambringa*, 171–84. The following paragraphs on Masaryk are based on Andrén, *Att frambringa*, 168–71.

110. Garver, 'Masaryk and Czech Politics'. For background on Czech policies of self-determination, see Garver, *The Young Czech Party*.

111. Kramář, *Anmerkungen zur böhmischen Politik*, 4, 90–97.

112. Seton-Watson, *Masaryk in England*, 75, 154.

113. Masaryk, 'At the Eleventh Hour', 186–94; Masaryk, 'Masaryk to Seton-Watson'.

114. Masaryk, 'Independent Bohemia', 117–19; Masaryk, 'The Problem of Small Nations', 135–38; Masaryk, *The Slavs Among the Nations*.

115. Rakovski, 'Transylvania and Macedonia'.

116. Gribble, 'The War Aims of Luxemburg'.

117. Anonymous, 'Iceland and Denmark'.

118. Valentin, 'Sweden and Åland Islands'.

119. Rubicon, 'The Czechs and Austria'.

120. Anonymous, 'Keep to the Left!'

121. Dontsov, *Die ukrainische Staatsidee*, 65–68.

122. Mick, '1918: Endgame', 141, 158; Rubicon, 'The Czechs and Austria'.

123. Louis, *Aspects politiques de la guerre*, 202: 'Aucun document, depuis 1914, n'a eu plus de retentissement que le message de M. Wilson en date du 8 janvier 1918. Les paroles du président américain ont toujours le don de saisir l'attention des hommes, parce qu'on sent une volonté ferme, une pensée Claire en même temps qu'audacieuse, un désintéressement plutôt rare; mais cette fois, il n'est pas exagéré de dire qu'elles ont provoqué une secousse profonde dans les deux combinaisons belligérantes comme chez les neutres'.

124. Wilson, 'The Ideals of Democracy'.

125. Anonymous, 'The Very Stuff of Triumph'.

126. According to Lida Gustava Heymann, the efforts of the women's peace movement and the Hague Conference were of great importance to Wilson's programme for a new Europe; see Heymann, *Erlebtes – Erschautes*, 130–34.

127. Anonymous, 'The Very Stuff of Triumph'.

128. Noser, 'Unrest in Bohemia', 182.

129. Mamatey, 'Masaryk and Wilson', 192–93; Anonymous, 'Lord Robert Cecil'.

130. Djuric, 'The Southern Slavs and Italy'.

131. 'Et nyt Europa'.

132. Manela, *The Wilsonian Moment*.

133. Key, 'Vart Fædreland Europa', 25: 'De, som nu vil trampe Tysklands Selvbestemmelseret, Stolthed of Framtidsmuligheder I Stumpen og Stykker, de forbereder den nye Krig, I hvilken deres Børnebørn vil forbløde og Europa gaa under'.

134. Neiburg, *The Treaty of Versailles*, 11–13.

135. Shaw, 'Nationalitet og Internationalisme', 30.

136. Whyte, 'The Versailles Mustard Seed'.

137. Neiburg, *The Treaty of Versailles*, 74, 76.

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