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Emotionale Konsequenzen dyadischer Unausgewogenheit: Eine experimentelle Untersuchung zum Einfluß von Fehlattributionen
Abstract
A two-factorial experiment investigated the importance of emotional consequences of distributive injustice. We manipulated payment inequity (disadvantageously inequitable, advantageously inequitable, equitable) between a subject and a confederate. At the same time, by means of fictitious ion concentration with assumed arousing, relaxing or emotionally irrelevant side effects we manipulated misattributions of arousal. In accordance with equity theory (WALSTER, WALSTER & BERSCHEID, 1978) and two factor theory of emotion (SCHACHTER, 1964) we found, that Ss who were led to believe in arousing side effects of ion concentration were less motivated to restore equity than Ss in the irrelevant symptoms control group. On the other side, Ss who were led to believe in relaxing side effects showed intensified motivation to restore equity to their relationship with the confederate. Results support the assumption that inequity distress is a necessary, although not a sufficient condition for reactions aimed at the restoration of equity. Finally, consequences of the results for future research in the field of distributive injustice are discussed.
... Davon ausgehend werden zwei Zustände von Inequity unterschieden, vorteilige Inequity, wenn man m ehr erhält, als einem nach diesem Fairnessprinzip zusteht, und nachteilige lnequity, wenn man relativ zu einer Vergleichsperson zu wenig erhält. Beide Verletzungen des Prinzips führen zu unangenehmen emotionalen Konsequenzen (in equity distress) und motivieren das Individuum, durch kognitive Umbewertungen oder tatsächliche Veränderungen der Beiträge und/oder Ergebnisse einen Zusta nd von Ausgewogenheit (Equity) wieder herzustellen (Hassebrauck, 1987(Hassebrauck, , 1991 . Diese Berücksichtigung einer sozialen Vergleichsdimension ist ein wesentlicher Unterschied zu anderen austauschtheoretischen Konzepten wie der Interdependenztheorie oder d em Inves titionsmodell. ...
... The causal arrow can be reversed and procedural justice judgments can also be influenced by prior affective states (van den Bos, 2003). Other research, relevant to hate, considers the relationship between injustice (often inequity) and negative emotions: distress (Hassebrauck, 1991), aggression (BeugrØ, 2005, disappointment, anger (Clayton, 1992), disgust, fear, and sadness (Mikula et al., 1998), rage, indignation (Mikula, 1986), guilt (Sprecher, 1992) and derogation (Kay et al., 2005). While these negative emotions are close to hate, they are not the same as hate. ...
Hate, a simple word, is easily understood by young children. But as a concept, hate is vast, complex, and slippery. The study
of hate is not limited to one discipline; it is studied throughout the humanities and social sciences. This paper, which presents
a psychological theory of hating, argues that hate is an understudied psychological construct and has particular relevance
to justice research. Hate can trigger injustice, and injustice has the capacity to trigger derogation, violence, and hate.
Relying on four literatures—justice, psychology, psychoanalysis, and criminal justice—we present a theory of hating that describes
the formation, perpetuation, and expression of this influential emotional state. The Intensification Theory of Hating describes
hate as a dynamic process that moves from antecedents to emotions, cognitions, morals, and behaviors. Hate, we argue, is not
only an emotion; it becomes systemic when interactions among its components unfold over time to intensify hate. We conclude
by proposing research approaches and questions that could address hate in psychological and justice research.
In Study 1, female subjects received information suggesting either that a stranger (a female accomplice) shared their attitudes and evaluated them positively or that a stranger did not share their attitudes and evaluated them negatively. These procedures took place in the presence of a low (ambient) or high level of negative ions. On the basis of previous research, it was predicted that a high level of negative ions would intensify subjects' reactions to the stranger, thus enhancing their evaluations of her when she seemed to share their attitudes and to like them, but reducing these evaluations when she did not share their attitudes and disliked them. Results offered support for these predictions. In Study 2, female subjects performed two tasks (letter and digit copying) in the presence of a low or high concentration of negative ions. Their blood pressure and pulse were measured at several points during the experiment. Results indicated that on various trials both systolic and diastolic blood pressure were higher in the high-ions than in the low-ions condition. In addition, subjects reported higher levels of subjective arousal and made significantly more errors on the letter-copying task in the presence of a high concentration of negative ions.
In the article by S. Schachter and J. Singer, which appeared in Psychological Review (1962, 69(5), 379-399) the following corrections should be made: The superscript "a" should precede the word "All" in the footnote to Table 2. The superscript "a" should appear next to the column heading "Initiates" in Table 3. The following Tables 6-9 should be substituted for those which appeared in print. (The following abstract of this article originally appeared in record 196306064-001.) It is suggested that emotional states may be considered a function of a state of physiological arousal and of a cognition appropriate to this state of arousal. From this follows these propositions: (a) Given a state of physiological arousal for which an individual has no immediate explanation, he will label this state and describe his feelings in terms of the cognitions available to him. (b) Given a state of physiological arousal for which an individual has a completely appropriate explanation, no evaluative needs will arise and the individual is unlikely to label his feelings in terms of the alternative cognitions available. (c) Given the same cognitive circumstances, the individual will react emotionally or describe his feelings as emotions only to the extent that he experiences a state of physiological arousal. An experiment is described which, together with the results of other studies, supports these propositions. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2006 APA, all rights reserved).
• Conducted 2 experiments with female undergraduates to determine whether arousal plays a central role in the defensive attribution process. Defensive attribution theorists presume that observing another's unwarranted victimization arouses a negative affective state by threatening observers with the prospect that similarly capricious misfortune could occur to them. Observers are thought to defend cognitively against the threat by distorting their perceptual judgments of the victim's causal role in his or her own victimization. In Exp I, 48 Ss completed attitudinal questionnaires before reading a bogus account of a female student's sexual victimization. Ss indicated their opinions of the morality, intelligence, and responsibility of the victim. In Exp II, 56 Ss completed the same social perception task under conditions of private self-awareness and personal similarity/dissimilarity. Results of both experiments provide convergent evidence that arousal plays a central role in the defensive attribution process. For instance, a personally similar victim was assigned less responsibility for her victimization than was a dissimilar victim. The implications of a distinction between behavioral and characterological responsibility for the defensive attribution process are also examined and discussed. (44 ref) (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2016 APA, all rights reserved)
• Conducted 2 experiments with female undergraduates to determine whether arousal plays a central role in the defensive attribution process. Defensive attribution theorists presume that observing another's unwarranted victimization arouses a negative affective state by threatening observers with the prospect that similarly capricious misfortune could occur to them. Observers are thought to defend cognitively against the threat by distorting their perceptual judgments of the victim's causal role in his or her own victimization. In Exp I, 48 Ss completed attitudinal questionnaires before reading a bogus account of a female student's sexual victimization. Ss indicated their opinions of the morality, intelligence, and responsibility of the victim. In Exp II, 56 Ss completed the same social perception task under conditions of private self-awareness and personal similarity/dissimilarity. Results of both experiments provide convergent evidence that arousal plays a central role in the defensive attribution process. For instance, a personally similar victim was assigned less responsibility for her victimization than was a dissimilar victim. The implications of a distinction between behavioral and characterological responsibility for the defensive attribution process are also examined and discussed. (44 ref) (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2016 APA, all rights reserved)
Evidence is reviewed which suggests that there may be little or no direct introspective access to higher order cognitive processes. Subjects are sometimes (a) unaware of the existence of a stimulus that importantly influenced a response, (b) unaware of the existence of the response, and (c) unaware that the stimulus has affected the response. It is proposed that when people attempt to report on their cognitive processes, that is, on the processes mediating the effects of a stimulus on a response, they do not do so on the basis of any true introspection. Instead, their reports are based on a priori, implicit causal theories, or judgments about the extent to which a particular stimulus is a plausible cause of a given response. This suggests that though people may not be able to observe directly their cognitive processes, they will sometimes be able to report accurately about them. Accurate reports will occur when influential stimuli are salient and are plausible causes of the responses they produce, and will not occur when stimuli are not salient or are not plausible causes.
The basic assumptions of contemporary equity theories (e.g., Adams, 1963, 1965; Walster, Berscheid, & Walster, 1973) are that: (1) States of inequity lead to distress, and (2) Persons act so as to redress inequity cognitively or behaviorally in order to relieve their distress. Despite the fundamental nature of these assumptions, they have been the subject of surprisingly little empirical research, a situation that some observers have found disquieting.
The process of exchange is almost continual in human interactions, and appears to have characteristics peculiar to itself, and to generate affect, motivation, and behavior that cannot be predicted unless exchange processes are understood. This chapter describes two major concepts relating to the perception of justice and injustice; the concept of relative deprivation and the complementary concept of relative gratification. All dissatisfaction and low morale are related to a person's suffering injustice in social exchanges. However, a significant portion of cases can be usefully explained by invoking injustice as an explanatory concept. In the theory of inequity, both the antecedents and consequences of perceived injustice have been stated in terms that permit quite specific predictions to be made about the behavior of persons entering social exchanges. Relative deprivation and distributive justice, as theoretical concepts, specify some of the conditions that arouse perceptions of injustice and complementarily, the conditions that lead men to feel that their relations with others are just. The need for much additional research notwithstanding, the theoretical analyses that have been made of injustice in social exchanges should result not only in a better general understanding of the phenomenon, but should lead to a degree of social control not previously possible. The experience of injustice need not be an accepted fact of life.
Experiment 1 was a replication in the Netherlands of a study reported by D. M. Messick, S. Bloom, J. P. Boldizar, and C. D. Samuelson (1985, Journal of Experimental Social Psychology, 21, 480–500). Subjects were asked to write down as many fair or unfair things as they could think of in 5 min. If the subjects thought that they did those things more often than others, they were to start the sentence with “I”, if not, then they were to start the sentence wit “They”. In both the Messick et al. study and in the present one, subjects began more fair behaviors with “I” than with “They“, and began more unfair behaviors with “They”. This basic bias is thus found in the Netherlands as well as the United States. In Experiment 2, subjects had to rate 80 randomly selected behaviors on their fairness, frequency, and salience. The differential slope pattern of results reported by Messick et al. was replicated in the Dutch study, i.e., “Fair” behaviors were rated as more frequent than “Unfair” behaviors, and the difference in frequency was greater for behaviors beginning with “I” than for behaviors beginning with “They”. Unfair behaviors beginning with “They” were also rated as particularly salient. Subjects sorted the samples of behaviors into ones that they did more than others and ones that others did more often. The frequency of self-ascription depended not only on the behaviors' fairness, frequency, and salience, but also on whether it was originally written as an “I” or a “They” behavior. Finally, some of the subjects were asked to recall as many as possible of the behaviors that they had rated. The most frequently recalled acts were “They-unfair” behaviors.