


# Handling residual risk in traffic situations with occluded road users

Bernd Gassmann, Shreya Dey, Ignacio Alvarez, Fabian Oboril, Kay-Ulrich Scholl, Intel Labs

05.06.2022




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
on the basis of a decision  
by the German Bundestag

# SafeADArchitect<sup>[1]</sup>

- Research project: overall system architecture that takes into account uncertainties and risks at various levels in order to safeguard autonomous vehicles
- Continuous risk assessment, monitoring and minimization at run-time
- Develop risk-sensitive safety layers
- Demonstrator for tests in the test area autonomous driving Baden-Württemberg





OSCAR



[1] <https://www.safeadarchitect.de/>

# Safety Layer: Monitor architecture

Monitor architecture<sup>[1]</sup>

- Safety Layer:
  - Monitor executed on second channel
- Planning Monitor:
  - Responsibility-Sensitive Safety (RSS) <sup>[2]</sup>
- Perception Monitor:
  - Ensure input to RSS is correct
  - Lightweight sensor checks to protect against common errors in perception system <sup>[3]</sup>


[1] I. ISO, "26262: Road vehicles-Functional safety," International Standard ISO/FDIS, vol. 26262, 2011.

[2] S. Shalev-Shwartz, S. Shammah, and A. Shashua, "On a formal model of safe and scalable self-driving cars," arXiv:1708.06374, 2017


[3] C. Buerkle, F. Geissler, M. Paulitsch and K.U. Scholl "Fault-Tolerant Perception for Automated Driving A Lightweight Monitoring Approach", <https://arxiv.org/abs/2111.12360>

# Responsibility-Sensitive Safety (RSS)

- Open, transparent, technology neutral **safety model** for autonomous driving
- RSS digitizes the implicit rules of human driving, **providing a check on AV decision-making**
  - Defines the threshold between safety and danger
  - Provides appropriate response: how can the AV escape from a dangerous situation
  - Flexible, culturally tunable




# Rules to model common sense behaviors for driving safely




**RULE 3.**  
*Right of way is given, not taken*

**DEFINE SAFE LONGITUDINAL DISTANCE**


$$d_{\min} = \left[ v_r \rho + \frac{1}{2} \alpha_{\max} \rho^2 + \frac{(v_r + \rho \alpha_{\max})^2}{2\beta_{\min}} - \frac{v_f^2}{2\beta_{\max}} \right]_+$$


**RULE 1.**  
*Do not hit the car in front (longitudinal distance)*



**RULE 4.**  
*Be cautious in areas with limited visibility*

**DEFINE SAFE LATERAL DISTANCE**

$$d_{\min} = \mu + \left[ \frac{(v_1 + v_{1,\rho})}{2} \rho + \frac{v_{1,\rho}^2}{2\beta_{1,lat,\min}} - \left( \frac{(v_2 + v_{1,\rho})}{2} \rho + \frac{v_{2,\rho}^2}{2\beta_{2,lat,\min}} \right) \right]$$



**RULE 2.**  
*Do not cut in recklessly (lateral distance)*



**RULE 5.**  
*If the vehicle can avoid a crash without causing another one, it must*

# Rule 4: Be cautious in areas with limited visibility

- A vehicle must perform a proper response also with respect to occluded road agents
- At any occluded position there might be an object
  - Any possible reasonably foreseeable speed
  - Appropriate behavior of the others (no „unreasonable situations“)
  - Other vehicles behave RSS „conform“





Example reasonable speed:

Yellow vehicle can expect that the red (occluded) vehicle will not change to its lane from behind the parked bus exceedingly fast


Example others behave according to RSS:

Yellow vehicle can expect, that the red one behaves according to RSS and does not change its lane out of a sudden based on an unsafe situation, e.g. because of a standing blue vehicle (occluded from yellow's vehicle point of view)




# Implementation: Occlusions with RSS

- Basis: Field of view
- Determine occluded lane regions
- Placement of „reasonably foreseeable “ virtual vehicles at region borders
- RSS Evaluation of those „artificial vehicles“



# Example: Determine occluded lane regions


- Perception Input: Freespace Polygon (orange)






# Example: Occluded lane regions

- Split lane into regions:
  - Visible region (green)
  - Occluded region (purple)
  - Partly visible/occluded border regions (grey)




# Example: Placement of virtual vehicles



- Virtual vehicles:
  - At border of occluded regions
  - Orientation along lane
  - Cover speed range:
    - $V_{\min} = 0$  m/s
    - $V_{\max} =$  e.g. speed limit

# Experimental setup with CARLA





# Scenario Town02: Acceleration

Supported by:






on the basis of a decision by the German Bundestag





# Scenario Town02: Braking artificial vehicles

Ego Speed vs. Proper Response



# Scenario Town02: Braking real vehicle



# Scenario Town02: Influence RSS Parameter

China ITS Standard RSS parameter

$\text{brake}_{\min}$ :  $-3.6 \text{ m/s}^2$

$\text{brake}_{\max}$ :  $-6.1 \text{ m/s}^2$

$\text{accel}_{\max}$ :  $1.8 \text{ m/s}^2$

response-time: 0.2 s

Assertive RSS parameter


$\text{brake}_{\min}$ :  $-6.0 \text{ m/s}^2$

$\text{brake}_{\max}$ :  $-6.1 \text{ m/s}^2$

$\text{accel}_{\max}$ :  $1.8 \text{ m/s}^2$

response-time: 0.1 s

Ego Speed vs. Proper Response




Later braking

Harder braking


Increased passage time

Ego Speed vs. Proper Response



# Scenario Town02: Usability

Time taken to reach goal (Other has priority)



Conservative/C-ITS RSS parameter

$\text{brake}_{\min}$ : -3.6 m/s<sup>2</sup>

$\text{brake}_{\max}$ : -6.1 m/s<sup>2</sup>

$\text{accel}_{\max}$ : 1.8 m/s<sup>2</sup>

response-time: 0.2 s

Assertive RSS parameter

$\text{brake}_{\min}$ : -6.0 m/s<sup>2</sup>

$\text{brake}_{\max}$ : -6.1 m/s<sup>2</sup>

$\text{accel}_{\max}$ : 1.8 m/s<sup>2</sup>

response-time: 0.1 s

Very Assertive RSS parameter

$\text{brake}_{\min}$ : -10.5 m/s<sup>2</sup>

$\text{brake}_{\max}$ : -11.0 m/s<sup>2</sup>




$\text{accel}_{\max}$ : 0.0 m/s<sup>2</sup>

response-time: 0.1 s







# Highway scenario: with virtual objects



Speed of other real vehicle : 180 km/hr


Speed of artificial vehicle: 160 km/hr

# Highway scenario: Usability curve driving




# Highway scenario: Usability curve driving


Conservative/C-ITS RSS parameter




Very Assertive RSS parameter



Assertive RSS parameter



Assertive RSS parameter  
Virt. Object speed<sub>min</sub> = 50 km/h



# How to parametrize virtual objects?


- Standard IEEE 2846 „Assumptions for Models in Safety-Related Automated Vehicle Behavior”
  - Minimum set of assumptions regarding reasonably foreseeable behaviors of other road users that shall be considered
- Virtual Objects:
  - RSS model parameter values to select
    - Conservative vs. Assertive
  - Artificial object states to expect
    - Standing still vs. driving at some reasonable delta speed
    - While worst case could even be a ghost-driver
  - Potentially even different parametrized virtual objects could be placed at once

Residual risk ⇔ Traffic flow

# Derive Reasonably Foreseeable worst-case Assumptions for Occluded Road Users

- Highway example
  - Key parameter: assumed speed
- HighD Dataset
  - Likelihood that leading vehicle is significantly slower  $\leq 1.2\%$

Confidence interval	Foreseeable Speed
$3\sigma$ (99.73 %)	87 km/h
$4\sigma$ (99.99 %)	68 km/h
$5\sigma$ (99.9999 %)	20 km/h



HighD-Dataset: Occurrence rate of situations where a (potentially occluded) lead vehicle is at least 20 km/h slower than a rear vehicle.

# SafeAD scenario: Collision OSCAR

The screenshot displays the SafeAD simulation environment. On the left, a 'Displays' panel lists various visualization options such as 'Global Options', 'Grid', 'MapVisualization', 'PurePursuit-Path', 'RGB Camera', and 'CarlaMarkers'. Below this is a 'CarlaControl' panel with sliders for Throttle (100%), Brake (0%), and Steer (50%), along with numerical fields for Position (95), Speed (24), and Heading (29). A 'Scenario Execution' dropdown is set to 'safead4\_occluder' with an 'Execute' button. At the bottom left, a 'Reset' button and a control scheme legend are visible.

The main simulation area shows a top-down view of a car (EGO) on a road. Text overlays indicate:
 

- EGO-ID: 87
- EGO-Rouge: 48 (100%)
- Other objects:
  - brake\_min:  $-3.6 \text{ m/s}^2$
  - brake\_max:  $-6.1 \text{ m/s}^2$
  - response\_time: 0.2 s
- OSCAR (Ego):
  - brake\_min:  $-0.5 \text{ m/s}^2$
  - brake\_max:  $-1.5 \text{ m/s}^2$
  - response\_time: 0.2 s

 The right side of the interface features an 'RGB Camera' window showing a first-person perspective from the car's front view, with a green sensor cone and a pink dashed line indicating the planned path.

31 fps

# SafeAD scenario: Artificial objects OSCAR

The screenshot displays the SafeAD simulation environment. On the left, a 'Displays' panel lists various visualization options like 'Global Options', 'Grid', 'MapVisualization', and 'RGB Camera'. Below it, a 'CarlaControl' panel shows vehicle parameters: Throttle at 100%, Brake at 0%, Steer at 50%, Position at (48.11, -118.86), Speed at 14.92, and Heading at -2.29. The main 3D view shows a teal car (EGO) on a road with several grey rectangular objects (Artificial objects) ahead. A dashed line indicates the OSCAR path. Text overlays provide object data: 'Object-ID: 3530149', 'Object-ID: 3570151', and 'EGO-ID: 37 EGO-Route: 4 (100%)'. The bottom right shows an 'RGB Camera' view from the car's perspective.

Artificial objects  
 max\_speed: 8.0 m/s  
 brake\_min: -3.6 m/s<sup>2</sup>  
 brake\_max: -6.1 m/s<sup>2</sup>  
 response\_time: 0.2 s

OSCAR (Ego)  
 brake\_min: -0.5 m/s<sup>2</sup>  
 brake\_max: -1.5 m/s<sup>2</sup>  
 response\_time: 0.2 s

31 fps



# Summary

- Virtual Objects in occluded areas applying RSS lead to cautious driving and mitigate dangerous situations introduced by occluded objects
- Different attributes of virtual objects and the selection of applied RSS-parameter values influence the residual risk as well as the utility in daily traffic
- Selecting conservative RSS model parameters might even increase utility measures in some occlusion scenarios
- Only the analysis of many critical scenarios and their variations will provide a balance between utility and residual risk in the field

Paper: Bernd Gassmann, Shreya Dey, Ignacio Alvarez, Fabian Oboril, Kay-Ulrich Scholl: Application of Responsibility-Sensitive Safety in areas with limited visibility: Occlusions in RSS, submitted for publication.



SAFEADARCHITECT

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