Leibniz–Zentrum Moderner Orient

New Directions in Research 2020–2022

Thinking through Translocal Entanglements



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Content

Explorations

From our Collection

In Dialogue with Society

ZMO Reads

Featured Visitors

Preface

Ulrike Freitag

This second edition of ZMO's triannual report gives a kaleidoscopic – but in its variety and relevance very representative – cross-section of the centre's engagement with Asian and African societies, past and present. At the same time, it reflects on how the great challenges of recent years and the foreseeable future, namely the Coronavirus pandemic, the Russian war on Ukraine and, perhaps more dramatic than these two, the rapidly changing environment, are affecting the regions where fellows conduct their research, as well as on the research itself. The combination of topics reflects what is, in reality, a vibrant collaborative laboratory of ideas, creative exchange and debate between scholars who seek to explore fundamental questions of human history and society while keeping current debates and challenges in mind.

Many of the contributions are concerned with a shift in perspective, one of the major concerns of scholars at ZMO more generally. Thus, the texts on the pandemic illustrate that, while we might have missed our overseas holidays, or, more pertinently, our research trips, others were faced with much graver predicaments. For them, the pandemic meant the cutting of vital avenues to earn a living, or to remain in close touch with loved-ones elsewhere who are, moreover, dependent on their income (Nerenberg, Schielke).

What does it mean if we, for one moment, put Western notions of democracy aside and look for mechanisms of consultation, deliberation and, yes, collective decision-making elsewhere, for example, in the Middle East and North Africa (Lafi)? Such an approach not only allows us to discover aspects of a political culture that have been neglected to date but also belies essentialising claims about the historical inability of Arab culture to develop towards what we have chosen to term democracy. Perhaps more pressing for the future might be the urgent call for a truly inclusive approach to climate action. Instead, current Western perspectives and inequalities threaten to condemn it to the same fate as so many well-intended development projects – namely to failure, as Schumacher argues. And while the West is wondering why it is that many countries in the Global South are hedging their bets in the current Russian war, even a cursory look at their geo-strategic and economic interests clarifies this apparent puzzle, as Freitag shows with regard to Saudi Arabia.

The ZMO community does not just research translocal connections and consider its topics from a translocal perspective, as Bromber reminds the reader. Rather, it sees itself as a place for people from different academic disciplines and cultures to come together. The diversity of positions provides sometimes difficult but always appreciated challenges to established

ways of seeing and thinking. One of the ways in which ZMO has been able to continuously renew such encounters is through the fellowships offered by the Alexander von Humboldt Foundation. Talha Çiçek reflects on his experience of temporarily joining ZMO and establishing lasting links to its fellows and the institution.

A research practice based on collaboration and diverse perspectives cannot function without a certain measure of self-reflection. The group of authors around Veronica Ferreri thematises the chances and complexities of researchers' collaborations and engagements. How distant can – how distant should – social scientists be to their "fields of study", fields, that is, composed of engaged individuals? How our personal backgrounds shape the encounter not just with our "fields" but also with our teachers or inspiring authorities in our respective fields is also the topic of Sonja Hegasy's discussion of her encounter with Edward Said. It also gives a different entry into the by now almost poisoned topic of Israel and Palestine. It is poisoned not only because of events in the region; it is also poisoned because of the German way of regarding the conflict almost exclusively through the lens of the Nazi persecution of Jews and the German way of framing unquestioning support for Israel as *raison d'état*.

The volume includes another very personal story – an interview with Mohamed Zine, the ever-present caretaker of ZMO. His journey from Chad to Berlin – which could otherwise be part of a ZMO research project – informs, in a very natural way, his multilingual engagement with the ZMO community, of which he has become an essential part.

Research at ZMO



Age and Generation

The global increase in life expectancy brings about the reshaping of relations between the generations. Corresponding debates as well as social, institutional, temporal and spatial practices are the result and basis of longer-term processes of transformation that produce specific demographic structures; also in Africa and Asia. Without ignoring the studies on youth, the focus of this research unit strengthens the historical perspective as well as the ongoing research on middle aged and the elderly. The unit seeks to understand how state as well as civil society organizations influenced contextual conceptions of age and generation and resulting practices. It studies how the reorganization of intergenerational relationships transforms socio-spatial practices triggered by rapid urbanization, infrastructure development and migration. How does this affect debates on intergenerational justice? Can we identify context-dependent concepts of 'correct' coming of age through the study of transforming intergenerational relationships?

A New Big Boss? Interethnic Patronage Networks in Kyrgyzstan

Aksana Ismailbekova

Following the parliamentary elections in Kyrgyzstan on October 4th 2020, a coup d'état took place on October 5th as a result of popular discontent with the results of parliamentary elections. There were young political groups and several established politicians from different opposition parties who played an important role in the protests.[1] However, this change of power in Kyrgyzstan has 'deeper and more structural causes than a mere power struggle'.[2]

Along with many other groups and individuals, supporters of Sadyr Japarov came out in force – the new rulers (Sadyr Japarov, Kamchy Tashiev, Talant Mamytov) being seen as 'patriots' by their supporters, and as 'nationalists' by many of the ethnic minorities, as well as by smaller more liberal or cosmopolitan elements in the Kyrgyz population. During the course of October 6th when Japarov was released from prison, he managed to be acquitted by the Supreme Court and become Prime Minister, before subsequently becoming acting President. During his 40 days in government, he managed to put his supporters in key positions (The State Committee for National Security, Speaker of Parliament, Prosecutor General and later acting President, after Japarov resigned in order to be a president, etc.).

However, instead of holding new parliamentary elections, Japarov pushed for parliament to decide on presidential elections and a referendum on the form of government.[3] He also initiated the drafting of a new constitution of the republic and established a council to draft the constitution. These actions divided society into two camps.[4] Throughout these political dramas and subsequent discussions about the political situation in Kyrgyzstan, the situation of ethnic minorities was largely ignored.

There is a paradox in current Kyrgyz politics: Why is Japarov popular despite his complete disregard for the rule of law and the constitution? As I mentioned in previous research, the popularity of Japarov among the Kyrgyz citizens is that of a 'native son' (*өz bala*).[5] He is seen as a 'simple man' with several hats, who seeks authoritarian power, but promotes his legitimacy as national leader through his perceived personal suffering (his imprisonment) and his successful use of kinship, familiarity with Kyrgyzstan's criminal elements, apparent com-

1 Aksana Ismailbekova, Intergenerational Conflict at the Core of Kyrgyzstan's Turmoil, The Diplomat, October 2020, https://thediplomat.com/2020/10/intergenerational-conflict-at-the-core-of-kyrgyzstans-turmoil/

2 Azamat Temirkulov, Kyrgyzskaya mechta i chudo Sadyra Zhaparova, Rosa Luxemburg Stiftung Central Asia, Medium, January 2021, https://rosaluxca.medium.com/

3 Mahabat Sadyrbek, Präsidentschaftswahl und Referendum in Kirgistan. Zwei Schritte zurück im kirgisischen "Demokratie-Experiment"?, Zentralasien-Analysen, 145, January 2021, https://laender-analysen.de/zentralasien-analysen/145/praesidentschaftswahl-und-referendum-in-kirgistan-zwei-schritte-zurueck-im-kirgisischen-demokratie-experiment/

4 Gulzat Baialieva and Joldon Kutmanaliev, How Kyrgyz social media backed an imprisoned politician's meteoric rise to power, openDemocracy, October 2020, https://www.opendemocracy.net/en/odr/how-kyrgyz-social-media-backed-an-imprisoned-politicians-meteoric-rise-to-power/

5 Ismailbekova, Aksana. 2017. Blood Ties and the Native Son: Poetics of Patronage in Kyrgyzstan. Bloomington: Indiana University Press.

mitment to ending corruption, 'native son' status, ritual symbols and genealogy – values that many ordinary people identify with.[6] This essay puts forward an analysis of the situation of ethnic minorities in Kyrgyzstan and provides their views based on my previous research as well as recent follow-up interviews via telephone. The essay discusses the interethnic patronage networks of Kyrgyz state authorities and Uzbek businessmen and seeks to understand their vision of the future.

Ethnic minorities and business

Ethnic Kyrgyz comprise 72 per cent of the population in Kyrgyzstan. The largest minority are the Uzbeks, comprising 14.6 per cent of the population, concentrated mainly in southern Kyrgyzstan near the border with Uzbekistan. More specifically, they are located mainly in the city of Osh and around Osh and Zhalal-Abad provinces in the Fergana Valley. Kyrgyz and Uzbeks reside in roughly equal proportions in southern Kyrgyzstan. For example, in 2009 the population of Osh city (total 258,000) was almost equally divided between Uzbeks (48 per cent) and Kyrgyz (43 per cent), while other ethnic groups made up the remaining nine per cent.[7]

Historically, the two ethnic groups have lived side by side, in constant contact with each other through a state-business 'symbiosis'.[8] More specifically, Uzbeks have dominated business activities – trading in the bazaar, working as shopkeepers, café owners and drivers – while Kyrgyz have tended to occupy local government structures.[9] However, the conflict of

6 Aksana Ismailbekova, Native son: the rise of Kyrgyzstan's Sadyr Japarov, openDemocracy, January 2021, https://www.opendemocracy.net/en/odr/native-son-the-rise-of-sadyr-japarov-kyrgyzstan/

7 NSC, 2009. Population and Housing Census of the Kyrgyz Republic of 2009. Book 1. National Statistical Committee of the Kyrgyz Republic, Bishkek.

8 Liu, Morgan. 2012. Under Solomon's Throne. Uzbek Visions of Renewal in Osh. Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press; Megoran, Nick. 2013. Shared Space, Divided Space: Narrating Ethnic Histories of Osh. Environment and Planning A 45(4), pp. 892–907.

9 Ibid.

Followers of Sadyr Japarov

2010 drastically changed and destroyed this symbiosis, and with it threatened the Uzbek business sector.

The conflict between Uzbeks and Kyrgyz that erupted in the city of Osh in the summer of 2010 was the worst the region had seen in years. On June 10th 2010 intercommunal clashes erupted as a result of political crisis in the country. Nationalism intensified in the country after the summer's deadly clashes, and a decade later a common discourse promotes Kyrgyzstan as 'the land of Kyrgyz and the rest, i. e. the ethnic minorities, are guests'. This remains a strongly held view not only among the youth, but also among the older generation in the South.[10] There is greater poverty in the south. Aspects of nationalisation, ethnic strife, and migration contributed to or created a sense of the Uzbeks being an ethnic minority, and have clearly sharpened the divisions between communities.

Many Uzbeks face a number of challenges on a daily basis. The main difficulties affect the economically active, who suffer constant pressure and intimidation from the state authorities and criminals alike. As a result, businesspeople have resorted to finding different kinds of creative strategies to keep their businesses secure. Measures include moving trading from the bazaar to the *mahallas* (neighbourhoods), using mobile phones for taking passenger bookings from the bus station and the airport, and avoiding selling to, or serving, potentially 'suspicious' clients. Uzbeks do not openly avoid developing businesses within their economic niches; rather they have tried to turn their existing niches into safer places by using practices that are not visible to the Kyrgyz community, and in this manner, safeguarding their businesses. Some businesses have been turned into 'safe' social projects, such as a school, hospital and madrasa. They have created ethnically exclusive zones as well as developed public services that are less likely to be targeted out of distrust.

Respondents to my research also try to use avoidance and concealment of businesses and identities, as well as using video cameras and social networks to evade contact with criminal networks. These securityscapes have developed as a reaction to different 'anticipations': the realities are experienced as physical violence, harassment and the seizure of Uzbek businesses.[11] According to von Boemcken et al. "securityscapes can be understood as 'imagined worlds' of security and insecurity that goad and structure the lives of people as they go about their daily business."[12] Thus, securityscapes are based on inter-subjectively enacted social practices and emphasise the individual agency of actors in seeking security – which is especially evident if these actors do not and cannot rely on state authorities. Below I would like to discuss three cases to show how people experience and create securityscapes: 1) Against Suyun Omurzakov's network; 2) against corruption and the system of '*dolya*' (share, cut); and 3) balance between 'low' nationalism and 'high' nationalism.

10 Sergei Abashin, Natsionalnoe stroitelstvo v Kyrgzystane i problema uzbekskogo menshin-stva, Fergana News, March 2012, http://www.ferganannews.com/article.php?id=7126

11 Ismailbekova, Aksana. 2018. Secure and Insecure Spaces for Uzbek Businesspeople in Southern Kyrgyzstan. IQAS Vol. 49 / 2018 1–2, pp. 41–60.

12 Marc von Boemcken, Conrad Schetter, Hafiz Boboyorov, Nina Bagdasarova, and Joomart Sulaimanov, Local Security-Making in Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan. The Production of Securityscapes by Everyday Practices, BICC Working Paper 5/2016, Bonn International Center for Conversion (BICC), May 2016, https://www.bicc.de/uploads/tx_bicctools/working_paper5-1_01.pdf

Searching for security I: Against Suyun Omurzakov's network

Police Major General Suyun Omurzakov, First Deputy Minister of Interior of the Kyrgyz Republic is the owner of several sport clubs in Osh, where local sportsmen train. He has a low respect and prestige among local businessmen in Osh even though he enjoys higher authority in the law enforcement agencies.

On September 12th 2018, Radio Azattyk's journalists conducted an investigation into crimes in which sportsmen from Suyun Omurzakov's club were implicated. They also investigated the Omurzakov family. They reported that Ulukbek Omurzakov, an employee of the Osh regional prosecutor's office, and brother of Suyun Omurzakov, was involved.[13]

This was supported by the findings of another investigative report entitled 'Are Omurzakov's sportsmen enjoying immunity in Osh?' that confirmed that local businessmen complained about the Omurzakovs' extortion rackets in Osh.[14] It was reported that after the events were publicised, Ulukbek Omurzakov threatened the businessmen and tried to force them to withdraw their statements. When this failed a criminal case was opened against the businessmen to silence them.[15]

In November 2020, officers of the State Committee for National Security detained Ulukbek Omurzakov in Osh. He was suspected of organising a raid on the coal mining company Zhol-Chirak. Together with the prosecutor, the law enforcers also detained four people from the Mukhammed-Umar sports club who it is reported were found to have 'seized special equipment, illegally mined and sold more than 82 million soms worth of coal without making the appropriate tax and social payments.'[16] During a meeting with Japarov, local residents revealed that the Omurzakov family had 'taken over' the entire southern capital.[17]

In a zoom interview, Aftandil, a local resident, claimed that Omurzakov was linked to President Jeenbekov: "*Jeenbekov and Omurzakov belong to the same 'mafia', because both come from the Kara-Kulja district. Omurzakov is a millionaire, so he used to share his 'dolya' (profit) with Jeenbekov's Kara-Kulja fund. They are related and Jeenbekov has protected Omurzakov all these years.*"

One of the owners of an Uzbek restaurant, Muhammed, told me on the phone that Suyun Omurzakov has been extorting money from the businessmen. "*I was threatened by sportsmen and militia because they asked me to sell my restaurant in the city center [to them].*" In his view, "*Sadyr has 'courage' and is not afraid of Omurzakov (i. e. as proof, Uluk Omurzakov was imprisoned).*" He comments, "*it is acceptable if Sadyr is illiterate, even if he does not know Russian, even if he is a bandit, because he displayed strong courage ('dukh'). Entrepreneurs just need stability in the government. The criminals are being arrested. Order seems to be coming here. But we have to see how things will go further.*"

13 Ydyrs Isakov, Bandytskyi Osh, Radio Azattyk, September 2018, https://rus.azattyk.org/a/29491208.html#player-set-time=4.259495

14 Ernist Nurmatov, Sportsmeny Omurzakova pol'zuyutsya neprikosnovennost'yu v Oshe?, Radio Azattyk, July 2016, https://rus.azattyk.org/a/27881112.html

15 Ibid.

16 Elgezit, Zaderjan prokuror Uluk Omurzakov – brat zamglavı MVD Suyunbeka Omurzakova, November 2020, https://elgezit.kg/2020/11/12/zaderzhan-prokuror-ulukbek-omurzakov/

17 Today.kg, Advokat schitayet bezosnovatel'nym soderzhaniye v SIZO Ulukbeka Omurzakova, January 2021, https://today.kg/news/411336/

Sadyr Japarov

The arrest of Suyun Omurzakov's younger brother was seen as a sign of strength and stimulated early confidence in Japarov for many Uzbeks. Locals say that for the safety of the restaurant owners, the arrest was a sign that he could take on Omurzakov's network. However, things got more complicated later on because Suyun Omurzakov worked hard during the presidential elections to get more votes from the south by mobilising his people in an attempt to save his younger brother from prison.

On January 30th 2021, right after Japarov's inauguration, Ulukbek Omurzakov was released. A decision was made to release him under house arrest by the Bishkek Pervomaiskiy District Court and it was agreed that Omurzakov should pay 20 million som to the state budget according to his lawyer, Ikramidin Aitkulov.[18]

Another Uzbek respondent confirmed this saying, "*See! Jeenbekov was neither meat nor fish; he did not have 'dukh' (courage). He did not even say anything to Matraimov [the notorious corrupt customs official]. Instead, Japarov said 'kusturam' ['vomit', i. e., cough up the extorted money], and he forced Matraimov to bring two billion som. Now Uluk has paid 20 million som to the government.*" Whether there has been some negotiation here between Suyun Omurzakov and Japarov's team is still uncertain; it may be that his younger brother was released because Omurzakov proved that he could be loyal to Japarov.

Searching for security II: Against corruption, '*dolya*' (share)

The owner of several cafés, Akbar, supported and voted for Japarov because Japarov said that he would fight corruption, in particular he said that he would eliminate the system of '*dolya*' (the practice by which shares of business profits are given to corrupt state authorities as well as to criminal groups). Akbar also said that Japarov had been in prison and had experienced injustice through his skin (*jon terisi menen otkorgon*) and (understood) the difficulties of life. Considering the situation of the Uzbek businessmen, Akbar further commented, "*we have to follow what the Government says to protect our business. We would not go against the Government.*"

When I asked the question as to whether there had been any changes since Japarov's presidency, Akbar responded positively. According to him, "*The younger brother of Kadyr Aliev [pseudonym], one of the important state authorities in Osh, used to be the head of police of Oron [pseudonym] district. He used to collect 'dolya' even from sunflower seed (semechki)*

18 Radio Azattyk, Zaderzhannyy po podozreniyu v reyderstve prokuror Omurzakov vyshel na svobodu, RFE/RL, January 2021, https://rus.azattyk.org/a/zaderzhannyy-po-podozreniyu-v-reyderstve-prokuror-omurzakov-vyshel-nasvobodu/31078504.html; Sputnik.kg Vyplatil 20 mln – brata zamglavy MVD KR otpustili pod domashniy arrest, February 2021 https://m.ru.sputnik.kg/society/20210201/1051299107/ulukbek-omurzakov-domashnij-arest.html?mobile_return=no

Sadyr Japarov at a Jeti Ake ceremony during his presidential campaign in 2020

sellers. [i. e. from small traders such as car washing services, small garages, food services, catering, shops, etc]. When Aliev's younger brother first came to power, he would invite each businessman into his office (at the request of the precinct officer) and openly tell them that they should share their profits (dolya suragan) as a way to 'congratulate him on his new position' (kuttuktap)."

Akbar gave him 2,000 som, saying that he only had that amount of money to give. The businessmen were also required to provide their telephone numbers. Depending on Aliev's brother's needs, they would then be called. For example, Albek Ormonov would demand two kilos of meat regularly, and once a month he would order *ash* (pilaf) for six to seven friends from the restaurateur gratis. Other precinct officers would also come and order the café owners to provide them with catering services. This official would threaten not only local businessmen, but even state officials, saying "*I heard you won the tender, where is my share (dolya)? Fortunately, this person has now been fired, and the current new appointee seems to be a trustworthy state official (taza bala eken).*"

Another businessman, Alisher, talked about the complexities of the electricity grid: "*I have electric service limited to 20 kilowatts for my restaurant, for which I paid 120,000 som, but in winter usage goes beyond 20 kilowatts because I need to heat the premises and have other additional needs. In summer, I have to cool ice cream and other products. So in winter or summer we exceed usage of 20 kilowatts and an electricity inspector immediately comes to me and asks for additional money (dolya). The electricity inspector gives me the option of either paying the full fine to the government or half the fine to him. Of course, I choose to pay half the fine to the inspector.*"

Apparently, it is not possible to obtain a 30 or 40 kilowatts supply; if it were available the state authorities would lose the chance to extract their *dolya*. Instead, they allow only 20 kilowatts and the inspectors 'deal' with the violations in their own ways. For a supply of over 30 kilowatts, the state requires the restaurant owner to get a transformer, which would cost 500,000 som. In addition, one also needs to get permissions from an architect, a technical inspector, the village head and finally the public's consent. It is not easy to get a transformer, so the businessmen have to stay within the 20 kilowatts permitted usage and pay for additional supplies used with *dolya*.

Another Uzbek respondent told me that the police are considered locally to be even more arrogant (*nahalnyi*) than criminals, and do not understand the situation of businesspeople. Criminals impose stricter controls than the official laws. According to the respondent you can 'buy off' the police, but it is very difficult to 'buy off' criminals. Uzbek businessmen

have to give '*dolya*' for the street boys/criminal networks (*köchö baldar*) and collect '*grev*' (a remittance or a package sent to a prisoner) for convicts, especially for the '*bratva*' (criminal leaders). Businessmen donate a small amount of money (for food, cigarettes, soap) to the prisoners. The state budget has very limited funds for prisoners. Apparently, the names of all cafés and restaurants are acknowledged by prisoners, in a practice known as *otmetka*. Business people describe criminals as less shameless (*oni ne naglye*) and say they understand that if their business is not doing well that they might have to wait a while for payment.

Three of my respondents told me that the '*nahalyni*' police had not come to them recently, which is already good news. Nevertheless, we will have to wait and see how things develop – at the moment there is a change of power. This period is called a 'waiting state' (*sostojina ojidanija*) by many businesspeople.

Searching for security III: Balance between 'low' nationalism and 'high' nationalism

Japarov's main opponent was a southerner, Madumarov, who is known as a 'ethnic' nationalist because of his advocacy against the Uzbek mass media when he was the first Secretary of State.[19] Madumarov got ten per cent of the vote in Osh oblast, whereas Japarov got 82 per cent, so Madumarov was a distant second.[20] However, he is also considered a nationalist by more than just ethnic minority groups. He is still remembered by many representatives of ethnic minorities for his divisive statement of 2007 (made when he was the State Secretary of Kyrgyzstan) when he opined that "Kyrgyzstan is indeed our common home, but other nations here are tenants".[21]

Most ethnic minorities habitually vote for a northern presidential candidate or party whose leader is a northerner. As such, every Kyrgyz politician tries to win votes from ethnic minorities, particularly Uzbeks. During the elections, Kyrgyz politicians used to win the support of ethnic minorities by recruiting influential people of non-titular ethnicity to their electoral teams. According to Ilias, another Uzbek businessman, Japarov has '*dukh*' (courage, in Kyrgyz as "*erki bar eken*") and is from the north of Kyrgyzstan. "*Since Soviet times, we have supported someone from the north*", says one of my respondents. Furthermore, Ilias says "*It is easy to deal with state authorities from the north. Northerners, unlike southerners, have very little nationalist thinking. They can also openly protest against criminals. Because of this trust and sympathy, the Southern Uzbeks prefer the Northern Kyrgyz authorities because they have not forgotten the conflicts in Osh of 2010 when the Uzbek community was targeted.*"[22] It is important to see distinction between Japarov's economic populism and cultural conservativism/nationalism, which differs from a more ethnic nationalist like Madumarov.

19 Interview with my informant in Osh, Zoom, 07. 02. 2021

20 President, Referendum 2021, Itogovye dannye ZIK posle ruchnogo podscheta, AKI Press, https://akipress.org/elections/president2021/?hl=ru#region-2

21 Erica Marat, Kyrgyzstan: perspektivy pluralizma, Global Centre for Pluralism, November 2017, https://www.pluralism.ca/wp-content/uploads/2017/11/ericamarat_prospectsforpluralism_RU.pdf

22 Aksana Ismailbekova and Philipp Lottholz, The Conflict in South Kyrgyzstan Ten Years on: Perspectives, Consequences, Actions, Central Asia Program, July 2020, https://centralasiaprogram.org/archives/16380?fbclid=IwAR2UZqrzfKRXotQtGjgpKWxbQHnhdkoy79xxd7vg- 4l2RxWVg6t3di3J774

A strategy was officially adopted to form a civil identity of 'Kyrgyzstani' in 2013, not based on ethnicity. Later, on the basis of this decision, the column indicating a citizen's ethnicity in the national passport was abolished. However, after Japarov came to power, he re-introduced this field by decree in response to a Supreme Court decision based on the current constitution. The 'ethnicity' column will again appear in the passports of Kyrgyz citizens. This began to worry ethnic minorities, particularly the Uzbeks who were particularly affected by the June 2010 events. Yet, the indication of ethnicity is voluntary, so they should not have to declare it if they do not want to.[23]

Concluding remarks

To understand why people support Japarov despite his violations of the rule of law, it is important to look at the security strategies of Uzbek businessmen. They have put their trust in someone who is a 'controversial' figure, but who also is perceived as having personally experienced the injustice of the law, and is able to show his strength against other strong 'mafia' networks. The boundaries of state, business, and criminal have been blurred in the context of Kyrgyzstan.[24] Despite this, we see how many ordinary people want an end to the absurd levels of corruption. Sadly, however, it is quite difficult to avoid having police and others with power trying to extract bribes and *dolya* in the current environment.[25] As the above examples show, the police, judges and prosecutors are highly corrupt, as the process of reforming law enforcement agencies has consistently failed to meet the expectations of donor organisations and members of civil society due to existing authoritarian political regimes and weak local governance.[26]

People's personalities and difficulties tend to coincide with the head of the potential state power they want. People are attracted to politicians who reflect their values. In the case of Japarov, people began to identify with him due to shared experiences, '*dukh*' (courage), and his identity as a 'northerner with 'low' nationalist ideals'. All these aspects contributed to people's mobilisation.

In times when the rule of law does not work and people are tired of judiciary injustice and do not trust the state anymore, they start supporting 'controversial' figures, such as Japarov, despite his violations of the rule of law, as the ways to search for justice and hope for change. At the same time, businessmen describe their situation as the 'waiting state', by claiming that we will see how things will develop.

23 24.kg, V pasportakh kyrgyzstantsev vnov' poyavitsya grafa «natsional'nost'», October 2020, https://24.kg/vlast/169312_vpasportah_kyirgyizstantsev_vnov_poyavitsya_grafa_natsionalnost/

24 Erica Marat, The State-Crime Nexus in Central Asia: State Weakness, Organized Crime, and Corruption in Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan, Central Asia-Caucasus Institute & Silk Road Studies Program, October 2006, https://isdp.eu/content/uploads/publications/2006_marat_the-state-crime-nexus-in-central-asia.pdf

25 I would like to thank Nathan Light for this comment during the Roundtable "Society and Politics in the 2019–2020 Elections and Constitutional Revisions in Kyrgyzstan" Organised by Institute for Russian and Eurasian Studies (IRES), February 2021.

26 Erica Marat, OSCE Police Reform Programmes in Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan: Past Constraints and Future Opportunities, EUCAM, October 2012, https://eucentralasia.eu/osce-police-reform-programmes-in-kyrgyzstan-and-tajikistan-past-constraints-and-future-opportunities/; more about The Politics of Police Reform of Erica Marat, can be found here: https://www.wilsoncenter.org/event/book-talk-the-politics-police-reform

Suspensions

Sana Chavoshian

A curious condition, coloured by the opacity of dust storms and economic sanctions, shaped my first encounter with the field in Khuzestan, south-west Iran, in early 2022. In an apartment on the sixth floor of an oil-industry workers' complex, I listen to my friend, Salim, as his breath seizes up in an early morning asthma attack. Salim turns in bed several times in a "self-designed breathing ritual" (Kenner 2018, 2), then presses an oxygen mask harder against his face and keeps it in place with his hand. The straps of the mask are loose; they were made in Tehran, since the originals are not imported to Iran anymore. I go to the kitchen to find his albuterol inhaler. Behind a locked rattling door, dust wind has dislodged the corner of an iron panel of the air channel. Caught in the wind, the panel flaps cacophonously and particles of dust stream inside the apartment from under the door. Outside the window, the brownish dust looks like a voluminous wall. I watch it descending smoothly, as the agitated particulates that are suspended in the air settle gradually all over the city and cover everything with a thin layer of dust.

Following the 2012 international sanctions that cut the Iranian economy off from the global market, the face of Khuzestan, the province of oil towers and refineries on the border of Iran and Iraq and located along the banks Shatt al-Arab, changed drastically. State-controlled "sanction circumvention methods" (Yildiz 2021, 605), namely cross-border commodity trade, the visible presence of Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) members and affiliated militia, empty boats and closed shops that used to sell foreign goods, have been worsened by years of draught, mismanagement of water sources and the mounting crisis of land degradation.

Dust city, 2022

Resistance, and empty boats, 2021

The dried beds of the marshlands have turned to vast tracts of sands that are exposed to the resonant dust winds since 2014. Over-extraction of oil from underneath the marshlands to fill the economic gaps created by the sanctions has impacted the shrinking level of water both intentionally and unintentionally. In this thick air, one can spot the orange flare atop the oil towers that the Iranian state has ordered to be kept always on to signal Iran's "resistance" against the sanctions.

This project traces the explosion of dust into Iranian politics as a conundrum of how the political dynamics of sanctions and intensified militarization interact with particles of dust and aerosols. The locals refer to these frequent incidences of dust wind mostly as "qubar", and the dense agitated particulates are known in the official meteorological term as "rizgard". Dust winds have provoked and closely resonate with the concerns of various activists in the field of environmental justice. However, the security measures in a borderland which is marked with toxic legacies of recurrent wars since the 1980s have led to the engagement of a particular group in the matter: namely an Iranian militia-organized "justice-seeking" group. I investigate the embroilment of toxicity, pollen, chemicals, particulates, sand and air as they compose a repertoire of atmospheric trespasses and render atmosphere explicit as a military agenda. The question that is raised here is: how can the dynamism of dust winds stoke an escalated oil economy, international economic sanctions and revoke war ecologies?

Anthropological literature on air and breathing has studied violent and dangerous airspaces caused by gas and chemical warfare, depleted uranium, nuclear accidents and defoliants to airborne epidemics and toxic events. In recent years, a mounting number of contributions have shed light on the toxic legacy of wars in Iraq and how the experience of life is changed through bad air (Dewachi 2017; Guarasci 2017; MacLeish and Wool 2022; Rubaii 2020). Indeed, not only commodities but also air moves across the borders of Iran and Iraq. Attuned to the atmospheric endangerment, anthropological literature draws us to both the actors causing or experiencing bad air as well as the conditions and contents of air. Meanwhile the sanctions should be approached here as a "slow" (Nixon 2011) mode of creating atmospheric violence that intervenes in topologies of power and adds to the thanatopolitics of compromised life.

Dusty rain

In his book *Continent in Dust*, the anthropologist Jerry Zee alerts us about the anthropocentric limitation which treats the political and the environmental as a binary, where the second always trails and resists the first. Rather, Zee (2022, 12) suggests attending the political imaginaries as they reconfigure, entrain and patters into meteorological dynamics they seek to control. Driven by his insight and the atmospheric notion of *suspension*, as Zee and Choy (2015) put it, I try to explore what "being held in the air" feels like. Suspension refers to an unstable mixture in which particles are dispersed in a fluid body but not collided into it. It pertains to specific temporality that develops through the stages of dispersion, re-separation and settlement. The mechanisms of *suspension* capture "how things lift and settle in mediums … it denotes both a condition and a process with a proper tempo to its specific mixes" (Choy and Zee 2015, 213).

In Khuzestan, suspension conjures up both a meteorological term that describes the mechanics of atmospheric changes and an 'affect' that points to the structure of feeling among the border-residing people through their daily struggle with conditions imposed by the sanctions and their unknown future. As in air suspension, the medium of sanctions carries ever more hazards into everyday life and awaits in each round to reappear.

I argue that the confluence of dust wind as a meteorological derangement and the economic sanctions have impacted Iran's war ecology on a new level. Together, they reveal the experimental apparatus of state's policies as it risks the stability of the system and geographical sustainment at the same time.

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Environment and Justice

Human-environment relations in Asia, Africa and the Middle East are changing at an ever-increasing pace. Previously 'remote' spaces and 'inaccessible' natural substances are being rendered accessible for global markets by new technologies and infrastructures. With this access comes new modes of production, consumption, and living that, in turn, bring long-lasting pollution. At the same time, the effects of anthropogenic climate change are transforming agricultural, pastoral and maritime practices. The projects of the research unit Environment and Justice examine these changes from both contemporary and historical perspectives. Through case studies drawn from the region, these projects seek to answer three key questions: How have local actors been acting and reacting to such transformations, and how have they been evaluating them? To what extent have they been discussing shifting human-environmental relations in terms of justice/injustice, or other related alternative concepts? What analytic concepts should we use to properly describe the relations between environmental change, social differences, and political hierarchies in these regions?

How Climate-Friendly is Academic Research?

Katharina Lange

Modes and means of travel are currently being critically reviewed by many scholars at German research institutions, including funding bodies. By January 2020, almost three thousand scholars and scientists at German, Austrian, and Swiss institutions had declared their voluntary commitment to "refrain immediately from taking official short-haul flights up to 1,000 km (equivalent to about 12 hours train journey)" (https://unter1000.scientists4future.org/signatures/).

Burning fuel while travelling to an academic conference in North America, with a view over Greenland where glaciers melt rapidly

Scholars at ZMO, too, are debating how to conduct research and engage in knowledge exchange in a climate-friendly way. The focus is especially on air travel, which accounts for most of researchers' greenhouse gas emissions. Yet, while the urge to reduce harmful practices such as frequent flying is shared by many, reducing air travel in a meaningful way also raises difficult questions for scholars. Our work is essentially dependent on long-distance travel, based, as it is, on fieldwork and archival research, as well as collaboration and exchange with colleagues in Africa, Asia, and the Middle East. Research-related travel may be supplemented and occasionally even replaced by more stationary practices: telephone or online interviews, as well as the increasing availability of news reports or digitized archival material on the internet, enabling new ways of conducting research. In many places where we do research, however, a reliable electricity supply, not to mention stable and swift internet connections, are not necessarily – and not always or for everyone – a given. Moreover (apart from the fact that increased internet use is, of course, not climate neutral either), internet communications may be subject to surveillance, which may threaten the safety of interlocutors and compromise research results. Most importantly, we learn profoundly from being physically present in the contexts we research: it deepens our appreciation and understanding of the circumstances in which people in our regions of research live their lives.

One solution could be to continue flying long-distance for fieldwork, but to cut down on short-haul flights, for instance, when attending conferences. Short flights can be replaced by train travel; conference travel can be reduced further by using remote attendance, lecturing and presenting via video conference. Conferences at ZMO have increasingly made use of these formats. However, this also raises new problems. Scholars may have obligations of care and other responsibilities that make quicker travel important. Moreover, conferences do not only serve to showcase a paper; they are occasions at which scholars meet and get to know

each other in person, where new project ideas and information about upcoming positions are shared, where contacts are made and networks extended. This typically takes place during the more informal 'in-between' times, over coffee or lunch. Physically attending specific meetings can thus be essential, especially for scholars who are employed on fixed-term contracts.

As we deliberate these issues, a working group has formed to explore what can we do to improve our record. At the individual level, many of us have already voluntarily changed our travel patterns, refraining from flying for distances that can be reached by train in twelve hours. Possible changes at the institutional level have yet to be discussed more fully. These could include an investment in technologies that enhance the quality of remote paper presentations, as well as explicit encouragement of train travel, including night trains, and supporting rail bonus cards for scholars. As we continue the discussion, the urgency of the issue of climate change and how to quickly reduce greenhouse gas emissions makes finding good solutions a pressing concern.

Juliane Schumacher: Die Regierung des Waldes. Klimawandel, Kohlenstoffmärkte und neoliberale Naturen in Marokko, (transcript, 2022)
Wie verändert sich die Beziehung von Gesellschaften zu ihrer natürlichen Umgebung über die Zeit? Wie werden natürliche Systeme »in Wert« gesetzt? Und welchen Einfluss hat das auf die von uns so bezeichnete »Natur«? Am Beispiel eines Korkeichenwaldes in Marokko geht Juliane Schumacher diesen Fragen nach. Unter Bezugnahme auf Ansätze der Politischen Ökologie, der Science and Technology Studies und Foucaults Gouvernementalitätsanalyse zeigt sie, wie sich seit der Kolonialzeit die Bewirtschaftung des Waldes verändert hat. Dabei wird deutlich, wie Programme zur Integration der Wälder in globale Finanz- und Kohlenstoffmärkte zu neuen, experimentellen Formen der »Regierung des Waldes« führen.

Blocking the Pandemic: Regional Boundary Controls in Indonesia's Far East (#WitnessingCorona)

Jacob Nerenberg

Indonesia, whose population of 267 million inhabits a vast archipelago, has not been spared the challenge of the SARS-CoV-2 pandemic. The difficulty of managing the disease has been compounded by limited public health and health care capacity, and high mobility of people and goods within the country and across its borders. A noteworthy feature of the response is that regional administrations have taken the lead in restricting transportation between regions. Such measures have been prominent in some of Indonesia's so-called 'outer islands' where health care infrastructures are especially uneven, resulting in a politics of 'outside-in' claims to authority.

During the past 10 years the country's health system has seen significant improvements while remaining underfunded and uneven. Structural adjustments and decentralization implemented after the economic crisis of 1997–98 set the stage for a proliferation of private providers and an increase in total spending, while unequal access to care persists for lower-income and more isolated populations (Mahendradhata et al. 2017). The SARS-CoV-2 outbreak has particularly affected residents in the most densely populated parts of Indonesia, as the government has struggled to procure sufficient testing equipment. Jakarta counts nearly half of Indonesia's fatal cases, and the four most affected provinces are on the island of Java. Observing developments in the center, representatives of outer regions – whose pockets of dense population are separated by wide distances with low infrastructural connectivity – have anticipated the problem of inadequate health care. Papua province is a case in point, and representatives have acted to protect limited health care capacity by suspending inbound and outbound travel. Papua and neighboring Papua Barat together form the contested territory known as West Papua to supporters of its independence movement. The long-running conflict has left an imprint on the politics of pandemic response. Representatives of constituencies in Papua's highlands, where inadequacy of health care facilities is acute, have become visible participants in Indonesia-wide debates about relations between central and regional authority as it pertains to mobility and transportation.

Uneven connections: Vulnerability and leverage

While Papua's vast interior remains weakly connected to major infrastructures, its handful of coastal cities are linked by human and commercial connections to the rest of Indonesia and the wider world. Papua's coastal capital Jayapura is an entry point for newcomers from economically stagnant regions of Indonesia and a site of settlement for indigenous migrants from the highlands in particular. Jayapura's port is habitually busy importing manufactured goods. Meanwhile the province exports a large quantity of natural resources such as timber and minerals; Mimika regency in Papua's western highland area hosts the world's largest gold mine, run by US-based Freeport McMoRan. The higher echelons of management and engineering at the mine consist mainly of internationally mobile professionals. Given these

Head of provincial health agency along with management and staff of Abepura Public Hospital in Jayapura, Papua on 19 May 2020

trans-regional and international connections it is not surprising that Jayapura and especially Mimika are the province's top 'red zones' for SARS-CoV-2 in Papua province (*The Jakarta Post* 2020; "COVID-19 Provinsi Papua" 2020).

Far fewer cases have been reported for Papua's major center of indigenous population, the La Pago territory of the central highlands. La Pago is home to a population of nearly one million, mostly smallholder sweet potato cultivators in rural areas, with road links to commercial and administrative hubs that are, for the most part, only accessible from the coast by air. Beyond its main town of Wamena and other administrative centers, the population mostly lives without modern water and sanitation infrastructures. Since 2010, I have conducted research on livelihoods and development in Wamena's hinterland. The area has a reputation as a heartland of the independence movement: an armed guerrilla organization has operated in isolated areas, and an urban protest movement has sporadically mobilized in Wamena since the 1990s. After the crisis of 1997–98, protests and confrontations with security forces there were part of a Papua-wide movement that set the stage for negotiations that yielded reforms called Special Autonomy (Mote and Rutherford 2001; Sumule 2003). Autonomy provided for increased indigenous participation in government, regional authority in development planning, and expanded distribution programs.

While Autonomy in Papua aimed specifically to resolve the conflict there, it took shape alongside a wider post-crisis state decentralization promoted by the IMF and advised by the World Bank. These reforms saw discourses of 'good governance' applied to various agendas including defusing separatism; partial transfer of social protection functions and extractive revenues from the center to regions; and facilitation of construction and resource extraction firms' direct access to regional administrations (Aragon 2007; Habibi and Juliawan 2018; Sangadji 2017; Silver 2003). In Papua, the Autonomy era has seen sporadic turbulence, as independence agitations and repression wax and wane. In particular, serious incidents of

violence took place in many cities including Wamena in August and September 2019. Since the onset of the pandemic in Papua, local representatives and groups in La Pago have taken the lead and actively restricted inbound transportation (Gokkon 2020). These actions have had an assertiveness that has agitated relations between the center and regions in general.

Alongside the announcement of Indonesia's first confirmed case on 2 March, and first death 11 March, a discourse alleging inadequate central government preparedness developed in domestic and international media (McBeth 2020). The week starting 23 March saw a flurry of announcements and statements on the question of restricting mobility between regions. An early decision was announced by John Banua, *bupati* (regent) of Jayawijaya regency in the central part of La Pago, who on 23 March stated that Wamena airport would be closed to passenger travel starting later that week (Yewun 2020). The announcement took up popular demands for government leaders to restrain the movement of people into Papua – at a time when the virus was just beginning to be detected there. While other regencies made similar announcements regarding their airports, the governor of Papua province Lukas Enembe declared that all passenger travel into Papua would be suspended as well (Mawel and Mambor 2020). Papua Barat's governor soon followed suit, and neighboring Maluku instituted its own travel ban.

The proliferation of regional-led travel bans has been characteristic of provinces such as Papua with low health care capacity and high rates of in-migration and travel in and out. The rationale was put in stark terms by Dr. Silwanus Sumule, spokesperson of Papua's COVID-19 Task Force, who on 26 March while commenting the presence of seven positive cases in Papua, made a stark statement in which he addressed anyone in the audience with plans to travel to Papua:

"Why did we disallow outsiders from coming here? Because if you come to Papua, you will die. I'm sorry for this overly direct language. Why? Just to handle our own population, our hospitals are not capable – and what's more, if others come here! We have already said it again and again; we are not capable. So the best thing is, don't come to Papua as long as this is ongoing. If you come here, and if you are infected with COVID-19, I can guarantee that we are not capable of treating you." (*Jangan Datang Ke Papua* 2020; *Smart City Makassar* 2020)

In previous interviews, Dr. Sumule had explained his concern that the pandemic could overwhelm Papua's health system, with just seven lung specialists and 62 ventilators for all of the province's 3.4 million people (Flassy 2020). The video of Dr. Sumule's statement circulated widely on social media, attracting support as a compelling statement of the fragile health situation and the relevance of suspending travel links. However, the legitimacy of Papua's travel shutdowns was questioned at the center, as two top government ministers denied that regions have the right to unilaterally suspend travel in and out of their territories (Nugraheny 2020). Such denials were met with firm responses from Papua, notably from Ham Pagawak, head of one of La Pago's smaller regencies (Warta Kota 2020). Meanwhile, regions far from Papua implemented their own restrictions. The town of Tegal, east of Jakarta on Java's north coast, announced it was shutting roads in and out for a period of four months. The governor of Jakarta, Anies Baswedan, seized on the discourse and accused the central government of narrowing his authority to handle the pandemic (*Straits Times* 2020).

Agrarian landscape in Jayawijaya, Papua, Indonesia, 2021

While media controversy swirled over the status of regional travel suspensions, the central government introduced a mechanism for regions to request authorization for regional quarantines. This framework covers restrictions on mobility within regions, and there remains uncertainty over the legitimacy of unilateral suspensions of inbound and outbound travel by regional administrations. The responses and debates took place in the lead-up to the start of Ramadan – a time when some of Jakarta's population visits hometowns (a practice known as *mudik*) to open the fast with relatives. Under pressure to take action, president Joko Widodo announced on 24 April a last-minute interdiction on mudik for the duration of Ramadan. The ban covers Eid ul Fitri (also known as Lebaran in Indonesia), which in normal years leaves Jakarta virtually deserted, and also sees significant departures from Papua by newcomer residents.

For the La Pago area, which has long lacked a paved road to the coast, shutting the airport to passenger travel was a simple way to have an immediate impact. The Jayawijaya administration has continued to permit cargo flights to land with essential goods – a vital channel given the need for medical items as well as food products such as rice. Recent progress in construction of the long-anticipated road linking Jayapura to Wamena (passing through steep mountain ranges and vast forests and swamps) has complicated travel restrictions. Responding to reports that vehicles had passed through recently cleared but unfinished sections of road into the highlands, officials in Yalimo regency led a team of volunteers to set up and monitor a checkpoint (Lokobal 2020). Such local government initiatives have also been reported in other areas of Papua, notably between the coastal town of Nabire and the boundary with Papua Barat province.

Shortly after regional travel restrictions were implemented, the Papua conflict returned to the news. On 30 March, an attack attributed to the West Papua Liberation Army killed a Freeport miner from New Zealand, and military pursuit of those responsible resulted in further casualties (Bayer 2020). Meanwhile in Jakarta, six pro-independence protesters were facing trial. Reappearance of violence has heightened controversy over the legitimacy of regional administrations' boundary enforcements. It remains to be seen whether and how the central government may incorporate such regional initiatives into its mechanisms for responding to public health emergencies

The partial, temporarily heightened, and contested legitimacy of regional-level control resonates with debates regarding measures to prevent disease spread to outlying regions and indigenous populations elsewhere in the world. In North America, examples include protests by Haida residents against visits from the British Columbia mainland; police checkpoints stopping non-essential travel into parts of Québec, especially in the north; and a lawsuit by the governor of South Dakota against two Lakota nations for implementing checkpoints (Kelly

2020; ICI.Radio-Canada.ca 2020; Walker 2020). Meanwhile in Brazil, indigenous groups in Amazonian borderlands have demanded the central government enforce a court decision prohibiting entry of US missionaries into their territory (Telesurtv.net 2020). Inadequate health facilities, tensions between policies of isolation or connection toward indigenous populations, sovereignty claims of various kinds, and policies to suppress or anticipate them – these factors have been involved in enactments of boundary controls normally associated with central governments. The post-crisis history of decentralization in Indonesia, with its conflict-resolution rationale in Papua, set the stage for such assertions to affect national-scale pandemic politics – while harm from the disease remains concentrated among workers at the country's center.

Compared to residents of Indonesia's cities, the capacity to cultivate their own food makes indigenous smallholders in La Pago in some ways better equipped to withstand the pandemic's interruption of regular economic life. Claims to authority over inbound travel by public representatives in Papua signal a combination of vulnerability due to inadequate health infrastructures, and partial leverage over transportation due to the region's relative disconnection. The pandemic has allowed this contradictory combination to complicate Indonesia's inter-governmental politics in the long wake of decentralization.

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Road and bridge in Jayawijaya, Papua, Indonesia, 2021

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Countering the 'Nuclear for Climate' Narrative: Testimonies from the Frontlines of the Nuclear Frontier

Beyond Extraction sought views from nuclear power's extractive frontier and from those actively resisting its expansion

Devin Holterman, Patrick Schukalla

'Nuclear for Climate' as an extractive strategy

Last year's COP meeting has just begun. Postponed due to the pandemic – Glasgow, Scotland, was to host the summit in November 2020 – representatives from around the world are once again turning their attention to the problem of climate change at the UN conference. COP26 in Glasgow will get a lot of attention, but probably not enough measured against the undisputed and enormous challenges of anthropogenic climate change. The year 2021 has – yet again – made it clear in many parts of the world, and in some cases cruelly,[1] that urgent action is needed. The latest IPCC report once again provides the scientific insights, but the political and economic consequences remain controversial and the result is all too often inaction. The changes necessary to avert complete breakdown will have to be more profound than merely changing electricity suppliers. At stake is a profound change in the way we produce, consume and live. In short, the dominant paradigm in the fight against climate change lacks a post-growth strategy. But some propagate a supposedly simple carbon-free way out: nuclear power. For years now, a narrative has been gaining renewed support in certain corners, according to which the production of electricity through nuclear fission seems imperative for climate change mitigation. Against the backdrop of COP26, *Beyond Extraction* draws a line from nuclear lobbying in the name of climate protection to the centre of our collective's work so far, the critical examination of the consequences and devastation of mining, exploration, and the speculation in raw materials.

In this brief article, we look at the link between the nuclear lobby, the mining industry and resource speculation and bring to the forefront the people and places who would be affected by uranium mining. While the nuclear industry is trying to present itself internationally as key to the energy solution of the climate crisis, the mining industry is waiting in the wings to offer new and old uranium mining projects as investment opportunities. But what about the people and places that would be affected by uranium mining? In order to answer this question, we need to focus on an area mostly ignored in the general debate: the initial stages in the nuclear fuel chain.[2]

The various other reasons[3] for which nuclear power cannot be a valid answer to the climate crisis are unaffected by this.

Beyond Extraction therefore sought to amplify the voices of those campaigning against old and projected uranium mines and the devastating legacy of nuclear fuel production in Canada, Greenland, Namibia, Spain, and Tanzania. They are pushing for a carbon free, truly renewable future of energy production and against a false promise of nuclear power.

Nuclear enthusiasm – nuclear renaissance – nuclear for climate

It is not the first time that nuclear power has been seen as a technological fix to major societal problems, nor the first time that climate change has been claimed as a problem to be solved by nuclear reactors. But all nuclear enthusiasm plays under the conditions and omens of its time. In the 1950s quasi-utopian future conditions were associated with the splitting of the uranium atom. The nuclear enthusiasm of the 1970s took place especially under the pretext of the oil crises and the subsequent debates on energy security. In both phases of great expectations in nuclear power, large mines were developed and uranium was explored across the globe. But the great expectations did not materialize as projected. This was no different in the overblown discourse of the 'nuclear renaissance' of the 2000s with its hyper ambitious growth scenarios. And yet, high future expectations in growing nuclear electricity production led to uranium exploration, mine expansions and new development activities. And this is precisely what we must be aware of today when governments, lobbying organizations and even some misguided environmentalists are talking about nuclear power being a potential force against the climate crisis. In fact, investing in uranium stocks is already being touted as a way to profit from climate policy.[4]

Greening nuclear power's finances!?

For some years now, the COP summits have repeatedly become an arena of the nuclear lobby. Attempts to present itself as a potential solution to the climate crisis at the Glasgow summit already led to debates in the run-up to the summit.[5]

Self-proclaimed pro-nuclear activists say they want to take the COP meeting by storm[6] and major nuclear companies and its lobby are represented in Glasgow and beat their radiant advertising drum. 'Nuclear for Climate' is their motto and it is echoed in different parts of the world. In the EU, for example, there is currently a serious debate under the slogan of a Green Deal about whether the design of a European sustainability label in the financial sector (the so-called EU taxonomy) should, in the future, treat the financial support for nuclear power as support for sustainability and climate neutrality. This would label subsidies for nuclear power as a supposedly sustainable technology.[7] Matter of fact, an assessment published in April 2021 by the EU's Joint Research Centre (JRC),[8] concluded that nuclear energy is not harmful to humans or the environment. This assessment is, of course, a travesty for all those who have lost land, health and livelihoods to uranium mining or would be threatened by it to say nothing of those harmed by the various catastrophic meltdowns, the most recent being in Fukushima, Japan in 2011. But Europe is not alone in this: Canada provides significant support for the development of so-called Small Modular Reactors (SMRs).[9] In the USA, too, plans are being discussed to provide financial subsidies and relief for nuclear energy, which would happen at the expense of the expansion of renewable energies.[10] One of the arguments is climate mitigation.

Resource speculation and the revival of a dinosaur at PDAC and elsewhere

Beyond Extraction's central activities so far have focused on the critical monitoring of the annual Toronto-based Prospectors and Developers Association of Canada (PDAC) convention. PDAC is amongst the most important global investment conferences for the mining sector. During the 2000s, the nuclear renaissance discourse translated into talk about market fundamentals that would indicate that prices for uranium would *definitely* have to rise due to a *definitely* rising number of operating nuclear reactors. So naturally the idea of a materializing nuclear renaissance was greeted with enthusiasm amongst the speculative prospectors and developers.

Measured by the aims of its proponents, the nuclear renaissance remained rather limited, yet it resulted in rampant speculation with uranium inventories, stocks, futures, prospective geology and flushed investment money into uranium exploration ventures. PDAC is not only emblematic of this form of speculation but is also one of the most important sites and gatherings for those who seek to turn geological riches into private profits. In its coverage of the PDAC convention in 2007, while uranium spot prices were approaching their peak during the so-called nuclear renaissance, the *Northern Miner* (2007) reported that "this was uranium's year at the PDAC, with junior explorers touting hundreds of new uranium exploration and development projects located around the world". The mining industry journal emphasized further, "there's actually a lot of [uranium] lying around the planet; the tricky part is jumping through the regulatory hurdles, mining it and selling it at a profit".[11]

The nuclear renaissance talk ended with the aftermath of the reactor core meltdown in Fukushima, Japan in March 2011. Containing the damage to the industry's image was the new motto and seemingly a job as hard as containing radiation in and around Fukushima Daiichi – which, even a decade after the accident, poses major challenges. Momentum in the nuclear industry today is undoubtedly linked to a collective amnesia about the catastrophic meltdown at Fukushima, coupled with the return of the renaissance discourse in the face of climate change.

Central to this is the investment in research and development of SMRs. For years now, PDAC has offered a platform for the nuclear industry and its most committed partners, such as the Government of Canada, to offer a vision of the nuclear industry that is more subtle and, crucially, more mobile. In Canada's Roadmap to SMR's[12] and its Minerals and Metals Plan, small and modular reactors are positioned as a powerful way for the mining industry to reduce its carbon emissions and the overall footprint of a project. Similarly, French president, Emanuel Macron, has recently spoken in favour of continuing down the nuclear path, with reference to the presumed developments of SMRs as a way of combatting climate change. Yet, as is usual, the promotion of this re-imagined dinosaur fails to account for the risks associated with both increasing demand for uranium and the danger of making nuclear reactors mobile. Take, for example, the 'Akademik Lomonosov," the only floating, and therefore mobile, nuclear power plant today. Built by Rosatom, the Russian state-owned Nuclear Corporation it is stationed at the arctic port town of Pevek. Rosatom claims that the power station was good to avoid C02 emissions, yet as an enabler of enhanced oil, gas, and mineral exploration and potential extraction in the Arctic region it is effectively a means to dig out more hydrocarbons.

Testimonies from nuclear power's extractive frontier and those actively resisting its expansion

Nuclear power is effectively on the decline.[13] Industry's repeated rescue attempts, however, are misleading, they waste time and resources, and they slowly start to inflate a speculative bubble around uranium resources. It is worrying that the narrative of a possible, albeit nuclear, "business as usual" could gain momentum in the face of increasingly severe climate change impacts. This is perhaps especially so for the communities affected by uranium mining or exploration whereby the threats of extraction are dangerously high. This list of testimonies is limited and would have to be expanded in order to do justice to the global spread of experiences with uranium mining and exploration. Yet here campaigners from across the globe offer their rich insights about the climate crisis and its mitigation.

Greenland

My name is Niels Henrik Hooge and I am from NOAH Friends of the Earth Denmark. NOAH opposes uranium mining as well as any type of large-scale mining in the Arctic region. Currently, there are about 90 active large-scale exploration and exploitation licenses in Greenland, covering thousands of square kilometres, and almost all related to surface mining projects. Most of them are located in Southern Greenland, which has the country's richest biodiversity and all of Greenland's farm land.

The Arctic environment is particularly vulnerable to pollution, because it recovers very slowly. The long-term economic costs of pollution in Greenland could be so high that they by far exceed the short-term economic benefits of large-scale mining and not least uranium mining.

Many other countries have experienced negative impacts, including widespread pollution of water, land and air, and the destruction of pristine nature and precious habitats.

The town of Narsaq in southern Greenland

For these reasons, NOAH calls on the Greenlandic and Danish governments, the European Union, and everybody else who takes an interest, to help establish an Arctic sanctuary. The inspiration could be the Antarctic Treaty, as supplemented by the Madrid Protocol signed in 1991, but respecting the fundamental difference represented by the populated nature of Greenland and the Arctic and the rights and needs of the peoples and nations of the Arctic region.

Namibia

My name is Bertchen Kohrs, I am the chairperson of Earthlife Namibia, a voluntary non-profit, non-governmental organisation, concerned about environmental and social justice and sustainable development. Earthlife is located in Windhoek, the capital of Namibia.

The nuclear cycle starts right here in Namibia where uranium is extracted by several foreign companies. Presently two open-pit uranium mines are fully operating, one mine is put under care and maintenance, and one mine will reopen soon.

In the face of a major number of uranium exploration licenses granted in 2006 /2007 by the Namibian government, Earthlife Namibia saw the need to research on the issue of uranium mining, raise awareness in the public and with politicians about the dangers and risks connected to uranium mining and the nuclear industry in general and initiate public debates on the issue. We conducted studies with the assistance of radiological scientists on the impact on the environment and on the health of mine workers. The studies clearly show significant environmental damage; contamination with uranium and other toxic substances were detected in soil and groundwater.

The health study clearly indicates that many workers develop severe disease symptoms from exposure to radiation and dust that are not recognized by the mines as occupationally related diseases. The workers pay a high price for being employed.

Uranium mining companies are inaccessible, non-transparent and spread humiliating lies to silence the population. Namibia is a desert country with an abundance of sun and wind, thus has the top conditions for renewable energy. The past has proven many times that nuclear energy is dangerous, dirty, not sustainable, too expensive, extremely risky, and generates non-manageable waste. Proliferation of nuclear weapons and munitions is a permanent threat to the planet. Nuclear energy is not at all climate friendly, on the contrary, nuclear industry hinders the development of renewable energy.

The only sensible solution is to leave the uranium untouched in the ground. This is what Earthlife Namibia fights for.

Tanzania

My Name is Anthony Bonifasi Lyamunda, I live in Dodoma, the Capital City of Tanzania and I am the founder of CESOPE (Civil Education is the Solution to Poverty and Environmental Management). Our organization has long supported the people of Bahi, an administrative district very close to Dodoma and the place where I grew up. But since the mid-2000s, we have been confronted with a threat that was previously unknown to us. In the places where the people of Bahi and neighbouring districts live and work, farm and fish, uranium has been

In Bahi, central Tanzania, activists rally against uranium mining projects and for food sovereignty through rice farming

explored and mining has been considered. In 2009 CESOPE started an advocacy campaign against the plans to mine uranium. We succeeded in creating substantial awareness about the problems coming with uranium mining among the people living in the area.

We oppose uranium mining because of the negative impact it would have. The central Tanzanian Bahi depression and its wetlands are of great importance for our livelihoods and for food security in the region more generally. Uranium mining remains a potential threat in Tanzania and worldwide as long as nuclear energy is still desired by various countries. Now that prices are slowly recovering we fear that the plans will be resumed and the ecological diversity in Bahi and the livelihood of many people will be threatened again. For us, uranium mining means the violation of human rights, land grabbing and all the many environmental problems that go along with it. When the Bahi wetlands are drained, that would contribute to climate change. Nuclear energy is not the solution, it is part of the problem. That's why we are standing up for the ecological and socially just improvement of the living conditions in Bahi and Tanzania as a whole, without uranium mining

Drill cores from the last exploration series at a semi-abandoned exploration camp in southern Tanzania

Southern Tanzania

Anonymous

I don't want to reveal my name because otherwise I would be threatened with repression, as it was the case in the past, but I continue to oppose uranium mining because it destroys our environment and is harmful for all living beings.

My activities and those of my fellow campaigners are directed against uranium exploration and mining projects in southern Tanzania. Particularly noteworthy is the fact that some of the projects are located within and on the periphery of a protected area, the Selous Game Reserve. Today, only one project remains, and it may start mining soon, but others could also be revived if uranium demand increases.[14]

But at the beginning of these plans, all this was unknown to us. For example: When the plans to mine uranium here became public people were only informed about the benefits they will get from uranium mining and that the mineral has no effect on humans. During some of the explorations, local workers have not even been provided with protective gear. Our campaigns are directed against such misinformation and its consequences. We have made and continue to make every effort to inform our communities about the consequences of mining projects in all transparency. We would like to see a future that is not oriented toward the temptations of short-term revenues from uranium mining and that ignores its dire consequences.

Spain

My name is José Ramón Barrueco and I am the spokesman for the Stop Uranium Platform, an organization that has been fighting against an Australian multinational, Berkeley Energia Limited, which intends to open uranium mines in the province of Salamanca, as well as a uranium processing plant in the town of Retortillo.

Protest against Berkeley Energy's plans to mine uranium in the Spanish province of Salamanca, August 2018

Angela Bischoff of the Ontario Clean Air Alliance

We oppose uranium mining for health reasons for the inhabitants of the area, for environmental reasons as the mining facilities are located next to areas protected by the Natura 2000 Network and for economic reasons as it destroys more jobs than it can create. Nuclear energy is tremendously unsupportive of future generations, as it leaves radioactive waste that will take thousands of years to lose its harmful effects, so it should not be exploited by the current generation.

Canada

My name is Angela Bischoff and I work with the Ontario Clean Air Alliance. Industry efforts to "greenwash" nuclear energy make a mockery of clean energy goals.

All stages of the nuclear fuel chain, from uranium mining, processing, refining, fuel fabrication, reactor operations and nuclear waste handling, all emit radioactive, carcinogenic pollutants, and leave a toxic legacy of radioactive wastes.

Nuclear is not a climate solution – it's too slow to make a difference during this climate decade and diverts valuable investment from renewable energy technologies.

In Ontario, for example, the Doug Ford government cancelled 758 renewable energy projects and slashed the budget of our conservation programs by 60%. It then quietly bought up 3 gas plants, committing to ramp up gas power pollution by 500% or more by 2040, and proceeded with plans to rebuild 10 of our aging nuclear reactors and build a new SMR (small modular nuclear reactor) in the GTA (Greater Toronto Area).

Meanwhile, conservation and renewables are now less than half the cost of a new nuclear reactor and even lower cost than running our existing reactors – with no radioactive waste legacy to leave for untold future generations.

The good news is we don't have to settle for nuclear and fossil fuels, both which are on the decline globally. In Ontario we can replace our gas power by 2030 and all nuclear extensions and rebuilds with a combination of made-in-Ontario wind and solar, conservation, and Quebec water power and storage imports. QC has massive surplus water power and storage that could turn Ontario's intermittent wind and solar energy into a firm 24/7 source of baseload electricity supply for Ontario – at a fraction of the cost and time of nuclear.

The world is moving to wind/water/solar. Wasting more dollars and time on nuclear would be a travesty. Nuclear is a dirty, dangerous, expensive false solution.

The climate crisis needs urgent action – nuclear is a brake pad

Anyone who claims to be able to protect the climate with nuclear power fails to grasp the disastrous consequences of uranium mining, the nuclear fuel chain, and the various and overlapping environmental crises the planet currently faces. It is well evidenced that climate change does not affect everyone equally, its consequences unequally distributed globally. The nuclear lobby's motto "Nuclear for Climate" is yet another example of how this dinosaur of an industry is trying to shirk responsibility at the expense of those who are already affected by

climate change and who contribute very little to its underlying conditions. After all, the major uranium mining areas are rarely located where their products are to be converted into electricity. Of course, the industry's narrative catches on with those who believe in a "business as usual" utopia. But, we cannot mine our way out of the climate crisis[15] and while it may not be perceived as such, nuclear power would be one attempt to do just that. "Nuclear for Climate" is merely a continuation of the same logics that have landed us in the climate crisis to begin with. It is oriented around the idea that we can dredge our way out of the crisis at the expense of others, who are too often hidden from view. Simply put, "Nuclear for Climate" is another inequitable and unjust approach to global environmental breakdown. Those pushing for nuclear "solutions" to the climate crisis must realize that environmental breakdown requires a post-growth strategy that moves *beyond extraction* – nothing less. Greening the surface of nuclear power won't do the job.

1 https://www.oxfam.org/en/5-natural-disasters-beg-climate-action
2 For more 'Facts and Data about the Raw Material of the Atomic Age' consult the 'Uranium Atlas': https://www.nuclear-free.com/uranium-atlas.html
3 For a summary of the counter-arguments (too dirty, too dangerous, too expensive, too slow) see: https://dont-nuke-the-climate.org/
4 https://www.ft.com/content/46c63e13-142b-4e18-b141-b621023e8073
5 Nuclear power wants to enter the 'Green Zone', but is not admitted: https://theferret.scot/were-barred-from-cop26-nuclear-industry-complains/
6 https://medium.com/generation-atomic/these-young-pro-nuclear-campaigners-promise-to-take-cop26-by-storm-133d8502c4ca
7 For "[a] critical analysis of the EU Joint Research Centre technical assessment of nuclear energy" see: https://eu.boell.org/en/2021/09/01/nuclear-energy-eu-taxonomy and https://www.worldnuclearreport.org/IMG/pdf/wnisr2021-lr.pdf from page 38.
8 https://ec.europa.eu/info/sites/default/files/business_economy_euro/banking_and_finance/documents/210329-jrc-report-nuclear-energy-assessment_en.pdf [https://archive.org/details/210329-jrc-report-nuclear-energy-assessment-en]
9 See for example: https://dont-nuke-the-climate.org/blog/dirty-dangerous-destruction
10 For more on this see: https://www.nirs.org/category/greenworld/
11 The Northern Miner (2007): Editorial: New uranium, moly projects flood PDAC. In: The Northern Miner 2007, 19. 03. 2007. Online verfügbar unter https://www.northernminer.com/news/editorial-new-uranium-moly-projects-flood-pdac/1000210861/
12 See: https://smrroadmap.ca/
13 For an overview of the state of the global nuclear industry consult the World Nuclear Industry Status Reports: https://www.worldnuclearreport.org/-The-Annual-Reports-.html
14 For more information on the situation in the Tanzanian south see: https://uranium-network.org/current-projects/mkuju-river-uranium-project/
15 https://theecologist.org/2021/may/25/we-cant-mine-our-way-out-climate-crisis/// https://cop26coalition.org/peoples-summit/extractivist-growth-and-alternatives-from-below-why-we-cant-mine-our-way-out-of-the-climate-crisis/

Representations of the Past

In times of social crises and upheaval, as well as a lack of utopias and visions for the future, pasts often become a contested resource. Under which circumstances and with which political goals can representations of the past become a mobilising social force? Which ideas of social justice and the right to speak about and for the past are linked to it? These are core questions of the research unit. Empirical research concentrates on (post-)colonial or (post-)socialist societies in Asia, Africa and the Middle East. The aim is to identify translocal connectivities between discourses and practices of representations as well as to compare struggles over images of the past in different periods of time. Thematic foci are the relationship between historically operating sciences and politics, the significance of memory politics as well as practices of interacting with historical images in everyday life.

Warme Wellenlängen im Kalten Krieg

Das Hindi-Programm des DDR-Auslandsrundfunks

Interview Theresa Brüheim mit Anandita Bajpai



Im Dokumentarfilm „The Sound of Friendship" erzählt Anandita Bajpai die Geschichte des Hindi-Programms des internationalen Rundfunksenders der DDR, Radio Berlin International (RBI). Das Programm wurde von 1967 bis 1990 aus dem Funkhaus in Berlin gesendet. Bajpai zeigt filmisch, wie sich im Kalten Krieg grenzüberschreitende Freundschaftsbeziehungen zwischen den Hörern in Indien und den Journalisten in Deutschland entfalteten. Theresa Brüheim spricht mit ihr über Idee, Hintergrund und Gegenstand des Films.

Theresa Brüheim: Wie kamen Sie auf die Idee zu „The Sound of Friendship"?

Anandita Bajpai: Ich arbeite als wissenschaftliche Mitarbeiterin am Leibniz-Zentrum Moderner Orient. In meiner Forschung untersuche ich Radiosender aus BRD und DDR, also die Deutsche Welle und Radio Berlin International. In diesem Rahmen habe ich Akten im Deutschen Rundfunkarchiv in Potsdam gesichtet. Dabei habe ich Abschriften der Sendungen der RBI-Abteilung Südostasien gelesen und herausgefunden, dass Hunderte von Zuhörern aus Indien an die Sendung geschrieben haben. Ich stieß auf die Namen und Fragen mehrerer Hörer der Hindi-Sendung, als ich rund 200 Tonbänder der Hindi-Sendung im Archiv hörte. Die Moderatoren nannten ihre Namen und kündigten ihre speziellen Fragen in der Sendung an.

Dabei kam ich zuerst auf die Idee, Interviews mit ehemaligen Redakteurinnen und Redakteuren des RBI zu führen. In Vorbereitung dafür bin ich auf eine private Sammlung einer RBI-Moderatorin gestoßen. Dort tauchte immer wieder ein Name auf: Arvind Srivastav. Mir ging die Idee nicht mehr aus dem Kopf, nach Indien zu fahren und diesen Mann zu treffen. So habe ich Arvind Srivastav, den Protagonisten meines Dokumentarfilms, entdeckt. Als ich ihn in Indien besuchte, zeigte er mir Tausende Dinge, die er damals vom RBI bekommen hat. Mein Film will auch die affektive Beziehung – die Gefühle, die Wärme, das Schweigen – zeigen, die ein Mensch auch heute noch zu diesen Dingen hat. Diese Affekte, die Pausen, die Stille, die Emotionen und die lauten Töne passen nur selten in die begrenzte Zeichenzahl eines akademischen Aufsatzes. Solche Emotionsschnipsel werden oft in die Fußnoten gequetscht, die in ihrer Schriftgröße so reduziert sind, dass man sie leicht überliest. Der Film ist also ein Versuch, die Schriftgröße dieses emotionalen Registers zu vergrößern.

Mit dem Dokumentarfilm möchte ich außerdem das weniger bekannte Kapitel des internationalen Gesichts der Deutschen Demokratischen Republik, also transnationale Verbindungen, die während des Kalten Krieges Grenzen überquerten, beleuchten.

Welche Rolle spielte der Auslandsrundfunk der DDR zur Zeit des Kalten Krieges insbesondere in Indien?

Durch meine Archivarbeit zu den Beziehungen zwischen Indien und der DDR habe ich entdeckt, dass es einen engen Austausch gab. Die DDR hat auch einen Platz in den Erinnerungen der Menschen außerhalb Deutschlands. Dieser Blickpunkt auf das Thema war für mich besonders wichtig. Natürlich wurde das Radio während des Kalten Krieges als wichtiges Propagandainstrument genutzt; das muss immer mitgedacht werden.

Aber was sehr interessant an der Geschichte von RBI ist, ist, dass es nicht nur um ideologische Einflüsse ging, sondern auch um persönliche Verbindungen zwischen Menschen in der DDR und in Indien, die einander zwar nie gesehen haben und trotzdem verbunden durch den regelmäßigen Austausch waren. Das ist das Besondere am Hindi-Programm von RBI.

Die Deutsche Welle hatte damals in Indien auch viele Hörerclubs. Aber eine solche starke Verbindung zwischen Redakteuren und Hörern wurde noch nicht entdeckt.

Behind the scenes of Warm Wavelengths

Auf einer Seite ging es um afroasiatische Solidarität, das war ein großes Thema in der DDR; auf der anderen Seite ging es auch um Antifaschismus und Antiimperialismus. Indien spielte eine große Rolle im sogenannten Non-Aligned-Movement, eine wichtige Dimension der damaligen Außenpolitik. Es gab also bei den Menschen in Indien sowohl eine ideologische Affinität zum RBI als auch eine persönliche Verbindung. Diese beiden Elemente sind ganz wichtig für meine Forschung.

Der Film zeigt eindrücklich diese persönlichen Verbindungen. Wie ist es RBI gelungen, diese Verbindung zu den Hörern bzw. Hörerclubs aufzubauen? Das ist ja etwas ganz Besonderes.

Es fing damit an, dass die Redakteure des RBI damals sogenannte Indexkarteikarten nutzen. Auf denen wurde detailliert festgehalten, welcher Hörer welche Fragen gestellt hat, was die Interessen des jeweiligen Hörers sind usw. Das wurde dann für die Programm-

planung genutzt. Ein Beispiel: Es war z. B. ein Feature im Hindi-Programm zum Thema „Sport in der DDR“ in Planung. Vorab haben sich die Redakteure des RBI die Zeit genommen, in diesen Hunderten Karteikarten zu prüfen, welcher Hörer welche Frage passend zum geplanten Thema gestellt hat. Auf diese Fragen und Leserbriefe wurden dann namentlich im Programm eingegangen und geantwortet. Das ist ein besonderer Punkt. Die Hörer haben sich eingebunden und wertgeschätzt gefühlt. Außerdem gab es den Austausch von Objekten, die damals per Post geschickt wurden. Das hat auch eine sehr große Rolle gespielt und war Teil der Strategie des RBI zur Hörergewinnung: Man schickte den Hörern kleine Souvenirs aus der DDR wie Magazine, Journale, Wimpel, Schirmmützen, Musik aus der DDR, Plakate und anderes.

Besonders waren außerdem die deutschen Stimmen, die Hindi sprachen. Das machte die Deutsche Welle oder der BBC nicht. Da sprachen nur Inder; Engländer oder Deutsche haben dort auch viel redaktionelle Arbeit im Hintergrund gemacht, aber sie haben nie als Moderatoren gesprochen. Das war bei RBI anders. Das war für die Hörerclubs in Indien ganz wichtig; in jedem meiner Interviews wurde dies deutlich. Versetzen Sie sich in die Situation der damaligen indischen Hörer: Es gibt Menschen, die ihr Land – die DDR – mit ihren Nachrichten und ihrer Kultur uns Indern präsentieren wollen; aber sie wollten dies in unserer Sprache, in Hindi, tun. Diese Bemühungen und diese harte Arbeit, die dahintersteckten, wurden deutlich und enorm von den Hörern honoriert.

Behind the scenes of Warm Wavelengths

Die Verbindungen waren so eng. Was bedeutete dann der Fall der Mauer und die Wiedervereinigung für RBI und seine Hörer in Indien? Wie wurde dies aufgenommen?

Eine wichtige Frage, die auch der Film behandelt. 1990 hörte Radio Berlin International auf zu existieren. Ein ganzes Jahr nach der Wende wurde der Sendebetrieb aus Ostberlin aufrechterhalten. Viele Hörer, nicht nur aus Indien, sondern aus der ganzen Welt, haben damals immer dieselbe Frage gestellt: Was wird in Zukunft aus RBI?

Auf den erhaltenen Kassettenaufzeichnungen kann man hören, wie die Redakteure immer wieder wiederholen, dass sie nicht wissen, wie die Zukunft von RBI aussehen wird, aber sie die Hörer dazu informieren werden, sobald mehr feststeht. Dann kam die Nachricht: Am 2. Oktober 1990 um Mitternacht stellt RBI den Sendebetrieb ein. Für viele Hörer in Indien kam das wie ein Schock. Sie hatten erwartet, dass es irgendwie weitergehen würde – z. B. bei der Deutschen Welle. Aber nur drei der Redakteure des RBI-Hindi-Programms haben bei der Deutschen Welle Hindi weitergemacht. Es gab dann Hörer, die nach dem Ende des RBI zum Hindi-Programm der Deutschen Welle gewechselt sind, weil sie dieselben Stimmen wieder hören wollten.

Vielen Dank.

Screening of Warm Wavelengths at Jawaharlal Nehru University, 2022

Screening of Warm Wavelengths at Funkhaus Berlin, 19 September 2021

Palestine Isn't Just Another Country

A German-Egyptian Memory of Edward W. Sa'id

Sonja Hegasy

Edward Said loved music, and I loved his love of music, as well as the musicality that characterized everything, he did. (Teju Cole, "A Quartet for Edward Said," from Black Paper (University of Chicago Press, 2021)[1]

In autumn 1989, freshly arrived at Columbia University, I had to smuggle myself into a class by Edward Said. There were simply too many students who wanted to audit his course and the room was packed. As I was an outsider to the US system, with its expensive university fees and student loans, I had only one year in town for my graduate studies in Middle East Languages and Cultures (MELAC) at Columbia University. So, I tried my luck in both seminars that Edward Said offered – his undergraduate, as well as his graduate class. The undergraduate classroom burst its seams. Said asked, "Who is not an undergraduate here?! Everybody who is not an undergraduate: please get out!" A considerable number of people shuffled through the narrow lines of chairs. I examined the wooden floor closely. When everybody had left, he pointed at me and asked: "What about you??" To this day, I have no clue how he could single me out. Columbia had stacked me in undergraduate housing on Riverside Drive with another 400 students – twelve to share the apartment, and one to share a room with. The latter wanted to join the Pentagon and planted articles on my desk about "Gorbachev, the Antichrist" – well, it was the year 1989/90. I stood up, and answered: "Me?? Uh, I am German!" This got me some nice laughs, but no permission to stay. Well, at least I suspect that this was my entry ticket to the graduate class: Finally, I was able to take Comparative Literature G8504, the first seminar in Cultural Studies at Columbia University, which Said co-taught with Jean Franco.

Though it was hardly the career his family had envisioned for him, Edward Said's critique of a ubiquitous Eurocentrism and the notorious knowledge-power nexus in so-called North-South relations has shaped disciplines across the board and beyond the humanities (the study of medicine for example testifies of a pervasive Euro- and male-centrism). I keep a cassette from those days. To hear Said's musings on audio today might be nothing special in the digital age with its countless interviews and recorded lectures on YouTube and other sites. Worse, my cassette is hardly audible. But gluing to an old cassette recorder allows me to relive the atmosphere of the class, the laughter, the passion for the literature we read and some loud door banging by latecomers. The distinct voice – as any voice from the past – does the rest to revive my memories: Edward Said was a charismatic person, who was never arrogant or detached. It would have been difficult not to notice his stylish outfit in class, and I would not have mentioned it here, were it not for Teju Cole who admitted (his own term) that as an impoverished student at Columbia University he first noticed Said's suit and noble figure and that

1 I thank Teju Cole for providing me with this script, and Roni Mann for her comments on an earlier version of the text.

he was awed by "the flash of glamour, a glamour present each time I caught sight of Said's noble figure on campus." (min. 0:50–60)

One other quality, that comes to my mind, was Said's interest in and – more important – ability for self-correction. Since my early studies, I have been interested in thinkers, who fundamentally revise their own theory-building later in life. Edward Said engaged in detail with his reviewers, answered their critique and re-thought his theories. This can well be seen in his article "Traveling Theory" in which Said asks what happens to a theory once it moves out of its original context? Here, Said sets out to examine the transtemporal and translocal entanglements of theories. At the time, he argued that in traveling they are often domesticated and stripped of their original force.

I was never convinced that a theory loses its rebelliousness when it moves out of its original context – quite the contrary. Where many see a process of "commodification" or even "Disneyfication" at work with Western cultural globalization overriding local ideas and unifying the world, I am rather interested to investigate the creative part, because people universally like to take "things" in and at the same time shape them with their own original imprint. So it was rewarding for me to read many years later, how Said altered his approach to "Traveling Theory" incorporating how it can be enriched and fused with life and originality exactly outside of its original context.

Many people do not know, that Said was in fact since 1986 the music critic of the US-American weekly *The Nation*. More than 50 reviews give us an introduction into one of Said's obsessions and what a "music buff" (Mariam C. Said) he was. Said was highly influenced by the German composer, philosopher, musicologist and founder of the Frankfurt school, Theodor Adorno. He uses Adorno's analysis to cognize what composers like Pierre Boulez and Arnold Schoenberg or performers like Glenn Gould intended to do or what they reacted to. Reading these reviews in 2020, draws you into a parallel world: we can for example see the young András Schiff through Said's eyes at Carnegie Hall in 1989. And at the same time, we can see and hear the Sir András Schiff today at the Pierre Boulez Saal in Berlin. This is a fascinating *game of shifting perspectives* (*Vexierspiel*, I like to call it) that Said has left for us. The lesson he and Daniel Barenboim as co-founders of the West-Eastern Divan Orchestra insist on, is that we learn from music that one voice is nothing without the other. Counterpoint "makes music more beautiful", we hear. Music accepts dissent and subversion, says Daniel Barenboim. But can this really be transposed from music to the political sphere??

With *Orientalism* Said carried out a contrapuntal reading of the European literary canon, thinking of works like *Kim* by Rudyard Kipling, *Mansfield Park* by Jane Austen, *The Stranger* by Albert Camus, or *Robinson Crusoe* by Daniel Defoe; not surprisingly often children's books shaping the image of "the Orient" from an early age on. Said strips bare the colonial gaze contained in such works. He used Karl Marx's phrase "They cannot represent themselves. They need to be represented" from *The Eighteenth Brumaire of Louis Bonaparte* as his epigram to *Orientalism* (1978) to illustrate the infantilization and misrepresentation of communities defined as outside of Western modernity. His discursive analysis can be applied to *Madame Bovary* (1856) as much as it can be used to deconstruct news coverage or Hollywood films today. What is adorned in the frothing European oil canvases of the 19th and 20th centuries is very candidly so the beauty of one's prey and its imagined twin. Sexual fantasies and essen-

tialist readings of race, religion and gender were literally 'framed' and carved in stone. The wish for possession as well as repulsion, desire and aversion are ingrained in Orientalist fine arts, music and literature. Said's readings show us how Empire and the anti-Empire are inscribed in the canon, and he turns our eyes to its inherent discrepancies. But he never claimed to be the first to make this argument. In contrast to what some critics wrote, he made it very clear in class (and in his writings) that he did not invent the critique of Orientalism; inter alia, he pointed to the works of Anouar Abdel-Malek, a Marxist Egyptian political scientist, who died in 2012, as one of his intellectual forerunners.[2]



Syllabus of Comparative Literature G8504 taught by Jean Franco and Edward Said at Columbia University in 1989

In 2013, the eminent Algerian author Kamel Daoud wrote a novel, *The Mersault Investigation*, that rewrites Camus' *The Stranger* from the perspective of Haroun, the brother of the nameless Arab killed in Camus' novel. Daoud turns the disdain and the condescending views on Algerians and their struggle for independence between "Allah and ennui", as the author puts it on its feet. As much of the postcolonial literature on trauma, he never gives us certitude about what has happened, is happening or will happen. Painfully, Daoud re-reads the original text to us or better with us, the bibliophiles, knowing Albert Camus as one of the big French icons of the 20th century, present in top-100 books list or the famous Magnum photos of Camus popping up in our lives. "Committing a real murder gives one some new, clear-cut certitudes", the protagonist writes: "Read what your hero wrote about his stay in a prison cell. I often reread that passage myself, it's the most interesting part of his whole hodgepodge of sun and salt. When your hero's in his cell, that's when he's best at asking the big questions." One could say with its multifarious repetitions and prompts, Daoud's narrative takes the form of a (textual) reenactment. It is the contrapuntal story already inherent in the original work that interested Edward Said as much as it interests Kamel Daoud.

Said lived to see the run-up to the invasion of Iraq and died on 24 September 2003, half a year into it. *Misinformation about Iraq* continues Said's seminal work on *Covering Islam. How the Media and the Experts Determine How We See the Rest of the World*. The arc from 1981 to today's ever-increasing Islamophobia and the way the media still base their reporting on the expected stereotypes is obvious. The tank drivers heading towards Baghdad in 2003 were listening to combat playlists to prop up their willingness to fight, ease their own fear, and

2 Abdel-Malek, Anouar: Orientalism in Crisis. *Diogène* 11, 1963, pp.103–140.

subdue their pain. Music, like "Touchdown" by T. I. and Eminem or "Indestructible" by Disturbed, was a constant during their deployment.

Said's memoir *Out of Place* (London 1999), which he started writing after his diagnosis with leukemia, is itself a work of "late style", I suggest. Said took this term from Adorno, to examine what happens to an art work towards the end of the life of its originator. What aesthetic quality do these works develop? "[W]hat of artistic lateness not as harmony and resolution but as intransigence, difficulty and unresolved contradiction? What if age and ill health don't produce the serenity of >ripeness is all<?", Said asked (2006: 7). His own memoir is in fact not more intransigent than his other works, but it is a keystone in the project of retaining first-hand narratives of forced displacement, lost land and "non-existing people". This endeavor was worth for him to change the genre. The memoir gives us a rare glimpse into a contemporary witness of the 1948 *nakba* (catastrophe) from the perspective of a 12-year-old. Today, after the so-called *nakba* law of 2011, which entitles the Ministry of Finance to divest public money in case an entity uses it for (amongst other stipulations): "Commemorating Independence Day or the day of the establishment of the state [of Israel, SH] as a day of mourning", but voices that can tell the event of the Palestinian expulsion are more indispensable than ever for the generations to come.

Out of Place only covers Said's childhood and teens until the end of his education in the United States. It is important to bear this trait of the autobiography in mind. Like all traumatic experiences, the family silenced the *nakba* at home, so that he had heard almost nothing about what had happened in Palestine except that he could remember himself: Palestinian refugees flocking into Egypt and his aunt Nabiha taking care of them. In many instances in the book, he recalls that his mother kept news from the children, saying they should not 'break their little heads over this or that'. But concealing the expulsion of one's own people surely was more than simple "news".

I can recall that I had no clue about the Israeli-Palestinian conflict until the exact age of 19, when I went to the American University in Cairo to study Arabic. Although my aspiration had been to go to a "real" American university, which in my teen logic meant to move to the United States after high school, my father came up with the idea of the AUC in Egypt as a smart diversion. Over Christmas 1986, the university announced a trip to Israel and Palestine, which I signed up for. But the excursion was canceled at the last minute. It was only when I inquired among my fellow students why this was the case? that I learned about the conflict. Akram Khater from CASA, a *Kaderschmiede* for US citizens to study Arabic abroad (which I was for passport-reasons not part of), enlightened me. It sounds uncanny for a German-Egyptian household to keep the Israeli-Palestinian-Egyptian entanglement at the time of Sadat's legendary trip to the Knesset outside. And if it were not for the oh so disappointing Christmas trip of December 1986, I would today surely not be able to pin down the exact moment when I learned about the *nakba*. Edward Said recounts family silences more than once in his memoir. The "unknowing witness," as he calls it, aptly refers to children listening in to family secrets. Let me quote him here at length about these present absences:

What overcomes me now is the scale of dislocation our family and friends experienced and of which I was a scarcely conscious, essentially unknowing witness in 1948. As a boy of twelve and a half in Cairo, I often saw the sadness and destitution in the faces and lives of

February 7. Caliban Speaks
Roberto Fernandez Retamar, Caliban
Aime Cesaire, Cahier du retour au pays natal

February 14. The Arab Awakening
George Antonious, The Arab Awakening
Tayeb Salih, Season of Migration to the North

February 21. Alternative Modernisms
Garcia Marquez, The Autumn of the Patriarch

February 28. Other Histories
C.L.R. James, Black Jacobins

March 7. Other Histories
Salman Rushdie, Midnight's Children

March 14. The ethnographic other and its critics
Levi Strauss, from Tristes tropiques
Derrida, "The Scheme of Writing," in Of Grammatology

March 21. no classes

March 28. The integration of the "Third World Intellectual"
V.S. Naipaul, A Bend in the River

April 4. Imaging the Other
Edward Said, Orientalism

April 11. Woman Native Other
Gayatri Spivak, Commentary and translation of the short story, "Draupadi" and "the Breast-Giver" from In Other Worlds: "Can the Subaltern Speak?" (xerox)

April 18. Margins and Marginality
Jean Genet, A Thief's Journal

April 25. New technologies and problems of global Americanization
Herbert Schiller, The Mind Managers
Noam Chomsky, Manufacturing Consent

May 2.
Deleuze and Guattari, Nomadology, the War Machine

films to be shown: Battle of Algiers (date will be announced)
one or two others

office hours: Franco Tuesday 1-3:30 4081 Philosophy Hall
Said Tuesday 3:30-5:30 508 Philosophy Hall

people I had formally known as ordinary middle-class people in Palestine, but I couldn't really comprehend the tragedy that had befallen them nor could I piece together all the different narrative fragments to understand what had really happened in Palestine. (1999: 114)

The subject of Palestine was rarely talked about openly although stray comments by my father suggested the catastrophic collapse of a society and a country's disappearance.[3] (1999: 116)

It seems inexplicable to me now that having dominated our lives for generations, the problem of Palestine and its tragic loss, which affected virtually everyone we knew, deeply changing our world, should have been so relatively repressed, undiscussed, or even remarked on by my parents. (1999: 117)

The silences that Said recounts evidently confirm what we know about traumatic events and intergenerational transmission. Many survivors of the Holocaust did not tell their children and grandchildren about what they had gone through. And when a culture of remembrance was endorsed by the mainstream media and subsequently the wider European and American public roughly since the late 1970s, it was possible for many to give their testimony to journalists and researchers – but still not to family members.

Said was an outspoken supporter of the two-state solution, and a chief critic of the *Oslo Process*, as he did not see any mention of the crucial issues in the accords (as the right of return, self-rule etc.). Today his views on the Oslo process read like the most apt comment on the present situation of Israel and Palestine. *How Do You Spell Apartheid?* O-s-*l*-o, published in Ha'aretz in 1998 for instance ties directly into the debates that exploded (one needs to call it this way) in 2020 in Germany around Achille Mbembe's criticism of Israel's occupation. Mbembe and Said obviously speak well to each other; recall Said's words in Ha'aretz: "Zionism appealed to a European audience for whom the classification of overseas territories and natives into various uneven classes was canonical and 'natural.' That is why, for example, every single state or movement in the formerly colonized territories of Africa and Asia today identifies with, fully supports and understands the Palestinian struggle." In this vein, Mbembe (and others) search for ways of civil disobedience to counter the occupation since 1967. Would for example a call for a boycott similar to the boycott against South Africa under apartheid be

3 This is at the turn of the year 1947/1948, SH.

a legitimate option? Or would that rather remind us (that is in particular the German but also the global memory community) of the boycott of Jews and Jewish businesses in Nazi Germany after April 1, 1933? With two resolutions by the German Bundestag over the last three years, which set a frame to easily defame criticism of Israel's policies as antisemitic, Mbembe, who had been awarded many important prizes in Germany, suddenly was treated as a pariah: From winner of the Geschwister-Scholl Prize to "Holocaust relativizer" seems to be a short and elegant road in Germany these days. Obviously, it did not take long till Edward Said (who is not well known in Germany outside university circles) was defamed in the German printing press. Said's article on *O-s-l-o* thus reminds us of the historicity of the term 'apartheid' within the Israeli-Palestinian context as well as the networks of solidarity stemming out of joint experiences in the 19th and 20th century.

During his lifetime, Said incessantly addressed all sides of the conflict through Hebrew as well as Arabic media. It would, for instance, take little courage to write in the New York Times: "We must recognize the realities of the Holocaust not as a blank check for Israelis to abuse us, but as a sign of our humanity, our ability to understand history, our requirement that our suffering be mutually acknowledged." But Said wrote this in 1998 in the widely circulated pan-Arab daily newspaper al-Hayat.

Last but not least, among the reviews he wrote, I stumbled across one which resonated especially with me: "Egyptian Rites" published in New York's popular Village Voice (Said would probably be blogging today). Which "rites" did he mean?? Said actually reviews here the Metropolitan Museum's new Egyptian wing with the complete Temple of Dendur on display and a film series accompanying the exhibition's opening in 1983. He wrote:

Egypt isn't just another foreign country; it is special. Everyone has some acquaintance with it, whether through photographs of Abu Simbel, busts of Nefertiti, school courses in ancient history, or images of Anwar Sadat on television. Historical characters – Cleopatra, Ramses, Tutankhamen, among many – have been drafted for service in mass culture, and they continue to exist and function as symbols of passion, conquest, and wealth complicated by an exotic remoteness that remains attractive in the late twentieth century. (1983: 43)

I like the "Everyone" at the start of this review. Pictures of the pyramids always from the same outbound angle, Nefertiti or Nofretete, as the Germans call her, in Berlin, and Tutankhamun (real or surreal) are today among the best-known global icons, who remain in a gluey and already deadly spiderweb of foreign ascriptions. On October 3rd, 2020, during German Unity Day, unknown vandals damaged Egyptian and further artifacts in the New Museum with an oily liquid.

We do not need to refresh the memory of Edward Wadī῾ Sa῾īd – current circumstances do this for us.

Sources:

Mike Dibb: The Last Interview, with Charles Glass and Edward Said. First Run/Icarus Films, 2004, 114.48 minutes (shot over 3 days, ca. Sept. 2002, i. e., half a year before the invasion of Iraq and a year before his death)
Edward W. Said: Zionism from the Standpoint of Its Victims. In: Social Text, 1 (Winter, 1979), pp. 7–58.
Edward W. Said: On Late Style: Music and Literature Against the Grain. New York: Vintage Books, 2006.

Contested Religion and Intellectual Culture

How does religiosity interrelate with morality and intellectual culture? The research unit Contested Religion takes this basic question that is at the heart of social life across the global south. Focusing on both contemporary and historical cases, the unit engages the ways in which religiosity is mobilized and invested in individual and collective life projects. How do both religiosity and knowledge inform and at the same time challenge political orders, eschatological aspirations, and moral norms? What forms, sites and agents of intellectual culture emerge within that context? Although engaging primarily Muslim contexts, the unit is particularly interested in the interactions between Muslim and their non-Muslim neighbors. Consequently, exclusionary politics, sectarianism, collaboration and strategic borrowing within and between groups and communities are important relational modalities, which the research unit analyses.

On the Anthropology of Philosophy

Interview Peter Adamson with Kai Kresse



Prof. Mohamed Bakari, Kai Kresse, and Sheikh Abdilahi Nassir in Mombasa, 2006

Peter: Hello and welcome to the History of Africana Philosophy by Chike Jeffers and Peter Adamson. It is brought to you with the support of the King's College London, Philosophy department, and the LMU in Munich. Online @historyofphilosophy.net. Today's episode will be an interview with Kai Kresse, who is a Professor of Social and Cultural anthropology at the Free University in Berlin and Vice Director at the Leibniz-Zentrum Moderner Orient. Hi Kai, thanks for coming to the podcast.

Kai: Hi there Peter, I'm grateful to be here.

One of the publications that we have actually been drawing on in our podcast series is called "Philosophising in Mombasa". In that book you present yourself as pursuing something you call "Anthropology of Philosophy". Could you explain what you mean by the phrase?

'The idea is that if Anthropology is the discipline that studies human beings, human nature all around the world, there is something to be said for the case that actually philosophy deserves a particular specific sort of subfield. If we imagine that philosophy is actually a socially embedded activity of reflection and seeking of intellectual orientation generally, about the fundamentals of our thinking, knowing and doing, then this is a socially embedded activity that happens all over the world, and we can

> imagine that it is happening in all different kinds of cultures and societies. In that sense it is then worthwhile for anthropology to cover this distinct subfield of human activity and fundamental concern as a field in its own right. That was the idea. It is distinct from an anthropology of religion, or of politics, it is not subsumable to these other existing fields. In that sense, I was there making an argument for this particular subfield deserving an anthropological focus in its own right.

The idea then would be that just as you could go into any culture and look at, say, their trading practices or the way their families are structured, or their religious practices, so you could look at their philosophical practices and do anthropology based on that.

> Put very simply, yes. But of course, in actuality it is a lot more complicated and complex because we will have to be able to identify those practices as philosophical and as philosophy and that is of course a difficulty which we can only overcome by knowing many details about the actual social dynamics, interrelations and histories of these people and regions that we are seeking to talk about. In some sense it is also a huge challenge to identify philosophy elsewhere where it is different. So I'm not assuming an easy similarity across cultures, but I thought that this working definition that I quoted, this fundamental orientation about what one is thinking, knowing and doing is sort of a human concern that we will find everywhere. We will find then, a philosophical discourse or the provision of orientation through reflexive thinking and expression, expressed in very different ways, not only different languages but also different genres, and so on.

Something else you have said about your own work is that it has been inspired by the sage philosophy project of Henry Odera Oruka, which we discussed in the previous episode. What did you take over from his approach, and how does your approach differ from his? I mean, for example, you were just talking in terms of everybody, like all humans doing philosophy, which sounds like the premise behind the ethnophilosophy research that he criticised. Do you take over his contrast between folk philosophy which is what ethnophilosophy really studies, and sage philosophy, which is the study of the thoughts and ideas and sayings of particularly wise individuals in the community.

> Yes, I was quite inspired by Oruka's approach and as a young philosophy student back then I also initially very much agreed with his critique of ethnophilosophy and his insistence also in response to the prejudice of Europeans that Africa would not be able to produce its own philosophers, to show that there are maybe individual critical thinkers also within what we call, the traditional context or historical cultural African contexts, that we will find individual critical thinkers there too. This distinction between the philosophical sages, which for Oruka are these individual critical thinkers who have the additional capacity, for him to also criticise the fundamentals of their communal sort of framework of the *Weltanschauung* of the world within which they think, and the folk sages who are not the critical thinkers but who are able in reproducing these wisdoms that hold communities together and so on. I find this paring initially quite

> useful to think with although as many critics have also noted, and rightfully so, the division in fact then becomes very large and it is sort of a grey field. But I think the gist of Oruka's argument still is a very important one to say, look, these philosophical sages, they are these individual thinkers, knowledgeable people who provide orientations for others, who do something else, and something more than producing situations of thought wisdoms that has its own merits, but there's still something else to be said for these particular group of critics.

Let's talk more concretely about some of the fieldwork you have actually done, since you are not just a philosopher who sits around in arm-chairs like me. A lot of the fieldwork you have done is on the Swahili coast of Africa, maybe all the fieldwork you have done. So can you briefly introduce the region to our listeners and just say something about the research you have done there?

> Yes, the Swahili Coast is the East African Coast from basically Southern Somalia to Northern Mozambique, so mainly the coasts of Kenya and Tanzania. It's been part of Indian Ocean trade connections for millenia and so it's been very well connected to the Arab Gulf and Western India, and also connected to wider spheres of the Mediterranean and China also in the early middle ages already. And it has been historically a Muslim area. Islam arrived there in the 8th Century and the port and trading towns became Muslim between the 10th and 12th Century. The region has been culturally shaped and influenced by these cosmopolitan interactions, very much being a part of a wider world. That is reflected in the Swahili language that has integrated a lot of vocabulary particularly from Arabic but also from a whole range of other languages that coastal speakers were in contact with historically, including the colonial languages of English and German.

Kiswahili is originally a Bantu language, is that right?

> Exactly, it is a Bantu language and that is clearly visible from the grammatical structure and the noun classes and all of that. It has been appropriating a lot of vocabulary but remains clearly a distinct Bantu language. And we should also point out that verbal art has been very important throughout, and variety genres of poetry in written and as well as oral forms, as well as semi-public recitals and listening processes and logical commentaries on society accompanying historical courses, be it rivalries between coastal towns fighting with each other and certain poets making claims and attacks on each other and responding to each other. We find that poetic genres and poetic discourse are also prominent regarding various aspects of society and people's occupation.

One of the phenomena you observe there and talk about in your work is the Baraza culture where men from the community sit around on benches in the streets in front of their houses and then they have discussions about politics and philosophy. That's the basic idea I took from your description of it, but I guess you can explain it better than I can and say why it's interesting and important?

For me as an anthropologist who lived there for a year and who was curious and interested in debates and discussions, because that's where the exchanges of arguments happen, I quite quickly came across these meeting points in the streets in my neighbourhood and elsewhere, where basically groups of neighbours and friends would assemble, usually after late afternoon or evening prayers for chats, for exchange of news, but also for discussions, and these could sometimes become quite elaborate, technical, fundamental, agitated, but also quite intellectual. And this is for me an insight into, in a way, the recognition of the social dimensions of knowledge exchange in practice in everyday life. We can say that these discussions are social performances of the negotiation of knowledge. And within these groups we can observe a kind of peer recognition of those thinkers that are particularly creative and original in their contributions in pinning something down through the kind of comments they give and being particularly witty. They are regarded and recognized as wise by their peers through the kind of takes and conversation acumen they possess, and I was allowed to sit in and listen to some of these Barazas as part of my field work.

You actually use the word 'wisdom' – the Arabic word is 'hikma' – and there is a related word in Swahili, right?

Yes, some pronounce it 'hikma', there is also 'hekima', so it depends a little bit where one is on the Swahili Coast. Yes, but there is basically a semantic field, we could say, of knowledge and wisdom, 'hekima' or 'busara'. There is a Swahili term 'ujuzi", there is 'ilm' or 'elimu'. So we have a range of related terms and concepts that overlap and are meaningful to Swahili speakers, partly show their trans-regional connection to the Arabic speaking world or Muslim speaking world.

And how religious is that context? I mean, when they talk about things like politics or philosophical questions like maybe knowledge, is that to be interpreted within the context of theological debate?

No, that's not necessarily so. These could very much be secular topics or any kind of topics could pop up during Baraza and be used. Discussions could turn theological depending also on the knowledge and experience of the speakers themselves. But I think, in regard to religion, what is important to keep in mind is that, basically everyone there (in the settings I visited and was based in) would be Muslim, and would think and discuss from within the framework of their worldview, of the kind of Muslim upbringing (and schooling) that they underwent in that particular region, so that would inform what they say, and would sometimes frame what they say. But that doesn't mean that discussions are always religious or religiously themed.

One of the figures you talk about is Sheikh Abdilahi Nassir, who I guess is a Muslim preacher, is that right?

Yes.

A point that you really bring out in your descriptions of him is the fact that he engages in what philosophers would call second order reflection, in other words, reflecting on the nature of beliefs or the nature of knowledge itself, and I have a quote here, you say: "it makes the audience think, and makes the audience question some of the values and standards of self-conception that they would normally take for granted". Can you say something about how he did that first of all, and also whether you think that in a sense what makes his practice philosophical because he is sort of jumping up to this higher level order of reflection?

> Sheikh Abdilahi Nassir (who sadly passed away in early 2022) was one of three people who I dedicated a chapter to in my book there. Like other knowledgeable people I worked with, I was introduced to him by people in town, people in the neighbourhood, and also scholars (local sheikhs and university professors) who knew of him as particularly knowledgeable. On the one hand he was, as you say, an Islamic scholar actively giving speeches, lectures and sermons. But before, he had been, in the late 1950s and early 1960s, he'd actually been a local politician who had campaigned for coastal independence, for an independence of the Coast from Kenya, but he had also had a career as an editor and publisher with Oxford University Press in East Africa, and later with his own publishing house, Shungwaya Press. His way of delivering lectures was very much marked and characterised by this motive of questioning things which people would be taking for granted. In that sense, he was very much the sort of an opposite of, a contrasting example to what one would commonly hear delivered by religious lecturers who are often quite ideological and or very insistent, sometimes slightly dogmatic lecturers who would teach something to the others, whereas here with him we would have this gesture of an invitation towards the audience, to think through certain issues. And he was responding to requests by the audience, for instance to know more the debates of the time, and about the new constitution for Kenya, and how Muslims would, should or could be integrated into that. Or the global politics scenario and the role of Saddam Hussein in the first Iraq war. So some background lectures and some themes formed his knowledge, and also his reflexive capacity would make his audience think more and further about underlying questions that he could show to be relevant.

I have to say that that sounds a lot like what a philosophy teacher does. Probing what the audience in a university, say the students, think and then challenging the basis on which they think these things, and then getting them to, I mean not necessarily getting them to give up on their beliefs, but probing into them to get them to think about why they believe what they believe.

> Exactly. So there is a sort of Socratic moment of questioning and thinking further, and in some ways it also reminded me of Kant's expression of *the Weltbegriff der Philosophie*, of the conception that there is wisdom used to think about what is of necessary interest to everyone, so trying to lead questioning processes to these big questions of that kind.

And did you have the impression that this was actually having an impression on the audience, I mean did you have a chance to talk to people about the lectures afterwards and get a sense of how it impacted them?

> Yes, it was very much appreciated, also in a way, the sober tone in which he spoke. Interestingly though, another component came into it because partly his speeches were then also seen as dangerous by, say, religious opponents because at the same time Sheikh Abdilahi was also a leading figure of the Shi'a convert group of local Swahili Muslims. Actually some of the teachers of the opponent Sunni groups were warning their community members not to attend these talks, because they would be tempted and they would be sort of sweet-talked into something else. They saw this capacity of Nassir to speak well as a kind of danger to their own constituency.

So far we have been talking about oral culture, I mean not oral culture exactly in the sense of some of the episodes we have heard recently in the series, you know, proverbs, poems that have been handed down from generations, but you know we are talking about discussions being held in a kind of impromptu fashion in the neighbourhoods, and talking about lectures delivered by a Sheikh to an audience. But you actually have worked with written documents quite a bit as well. For example, some of your publications have been about poetry, you mentioned that before, the importance of poetry in Swahili culture, but you have also published on political pamphlets which I find really interesting. So can you maybe say something about how you see these documents as relating to oral culture, and how you see the different contributions on a philosophical level made by written documents as opposed to your ability to observe oral exchanges as an anthropologist?

> I very much believe that both the oral and the written are significant forms, and they are both expressions of discursive reflections of the exchange of arguments, of reasoning processes, and in that sense we need to be treating them as equally relevant. And in some ways, I do also make use of Karin Barber's approach, what she calls the "Anthropology of Texts", adding that texts should be understood as covering both oral and written discursive forms and genres. And her work is on the Yoruba context in West Africa where she has worked on oral and written forms. And I would say that for the Swahili region, this certainly applies too. We have very significant oral genres, oral texts if you like, and a significant tradition of written Swahili literature as well, dating back a few hundred years. And there is an ongoing dual relevance of the oral and written discourse, I think I hinted at that already earlier on, where we have a variety of poetic forms that are composed in writing, that are meant to be recited, especially this form of long didactic poems called 'Tendi', also 'Tenzi'. This is still a very popular form of mediating knowledge, elaborating upon the way the world is. We have classic poems of that form that are still also circulating in recordings, nowadays in digital recordings. And we have new compositions in this form that can cover several hundred stanzas and the preferred way of dealing with these poems would be through the recording and not through the reading, although publications of some of these also exist. But these are mostly printed versions produced by and for an academic audience.

Actually, one thing that that implies is, in a way it's obvious but I'm going to say it, is that contrast between oral and written is actually far too crude because there are lots of different ways of transmitting language, and if you have something like, you know, a poem that exists now because it was written down a long time ago but then someone recites it publicly or then someone records it, and then you hear it on the radio, it's not really clear anymore if we are dealing with written or oral culture at all. And actually something else that I was really interested by is that in a book which you have actually just written that is coming out soon, you talk about even observing the discussions that people have on radio broadcasts like call-in radio, and then talking about the discussions that they have in that context, sort of like the discussions you saw in the Baraza culture, and that is a really unfamiliar context, I mean, I can't think of a historian or philosopher I ever read who was listening to call-in radio and thinking about the debates that they found there.

> Yes, and exactly the link to the Baraza which is also one which I specifically make there, but it is true that we find vivid and sometime intellectually demanding, ethically dedicated, and important discussions among peers there on the radio that might be very significant, and so it's important to cover the ways of reasoning and reasons for arguing as sort of overarching perspective (drawing from Talal Asad's essay on the anthropology of Islam here). I do think it is important to cast a greater focus on reasoning exchanges and also idioms and patterns of speech that are used in argumentations, so that was my goal there, to try and understand a little bit better how discussions and exchanges of arguments generally take place in different kinds of settings, oral and written.

If I could just ask you one last question, and this is really a question, I guess, about disciplinary boundaries. I work in a philosophy department, you work in an anthropology department. I can tell you, having spent my entire adult life around philosophers, that philosophers do not think they need to read anthropology as a general matter, and so I'm wondering: do you have a message for students and teachers of philosophy? What do you think that philosophers can get out of engaging with anthropology.

> I think, yes, there is something and I would first point to the postcolonial situation that we are all in, anywhere in the world, from whichever kind of perspective we are talking. We see that currently in academia, and particularly in philosophy institution, we are also, I think, under pressure to include philosophical traditions from elsewhere in the world into our institutional coverage, and we could use some great examples of that. But I think this is really fundamentally important, that there is a necessary transformation process of philosophy to be taking place from a more or less heavily Eurocentric one to one that is inclusive and integrative, because I think that, if philosophy is really truly and sincerely interested in general insights of human interest, issues that are of necessary interest to everyone, then it needs to actively seek to take on the concerns and insights about what it means to be human, or also to be good and wise, from all around the world, right, in order to be able to provide, sort of, general kind of statements and reflections on that. So, I think philosophy as an institution and academic

discipline needs to actively engage with knowledge and fundamental insights in many different languages, forms and idioms from all around the world. What I sketched out as an anthropology of philosophy can take a kind of mediating role between anthropology, or the empirically grounded sciences if you like, and philosophy as the conceptual discipline or the interest to formulate general universal statements perhaps. So I think philosophy has to reject and constructively overcome its Eurocentric bias in terms of a dialogic pathway of interaction with all the intellectual traditions that there are in the world, and so for these, anthropologists who have also had some qualifications in philosophy and can speak to philosophers can provide a useful mediating ground, or can cover this kind of mediating field, which I think we need to cover. We need to cover the intellectual productions and philosophical reflections from all around the world and integrate them into philosophy in order to be content with, I think, philosophy as the discipline that seeks to reflect on what it means to be human, and that of course is the connecting point to anthropology. I hope that made some sense.

Yeah, I'm convinced. And on that note, which was a good note to end on, I will thank Kai Kresse very much for coming on the podcast.

Thank you, I really enjoyed this, thanks.



Kai Kresse, Oriare Nyarwath: Rethinking Sage Philosophy. Interdisciplinary Perspectives on and beyond H. Odera Oruka, (Lexington Books / Rowman & Littlefield, 2022)

Rethinking Sage Philosophy: Interdisciplinary Perspectives on and beyond H. Odera Oruka discusses a variety of aspects of Henry Odera Oruka's sage philosophy project, rethinking it with a view to current demands and recent debates in scholarship across several disciplines. Edited by Kai Kresse and Oriare Nyarwath, the collection engages perspectives and interests from within and beyond African philosophy and African studies, including especially anthropology, literature, postcolonial critique, and decolonial scholarship. The chapters focus on: studies of women sages; sage philosophy in relation to oral literature; an Acholi poem on 'being human' in context; takes on aesthetics and gender in Maasai thought; a comparative discussion of Oruka's and Gramsci's approaches to the relevance of philosophy in society; a critical review of method; a comparative discussion dedicated to the project of decolonization, with a South African case study; and a conceptual reconsideration of Oruka's understanding of sages, presenting the 'pragmatic sage' as typical of the late phase of the sage philosophy project.

Early Feminist, Pioneering Novelist: Recalling Colonial-Era Marathi Christian Reformer Baba Padmanji

Deepra Dandekar

In 1857, India's first vernacular-Marathi novel emerged from the presses. At the time, it received only an ambivalent response. But in the years that followed, the book went through three further editions and was included in the curriculum of Bombay University. In 2002, the trenchant critic Bhalchandra Nemade extolled the novel as the first example of "realistic" writing in Marathi fiction that was much ahead of its times.

The work in question was called *Yamunaparyatan*, an angry lament about the unfair suffering of widows, forced into a life of loneliness and torture by their cruel Brahminical families.

It was a subject with which the author, Baba Padmanji Mulay, had personal familiarity. A firebrand, pioneering Protestant Christian reformer in the 19th-century Bombay Presidency, Padmanji had been divorced by his Hindu wife the year in which the novel appeared.

The shock and anger of this divorce had a profound impact on Padmanji, since his wife had not acted out of her free will but, as she later clarified, had been pressured to do so by her family. Padmanji bemoaned the fact that his wife would henceforth lead the lonely life of a widow.

Controversial opinions

But turmoil was not a condition unfamiliar to Padmanji, whose controversial opinions earned him several enemies. Padmanji often engaged in fierce print battles with Hindu reformers whom he denounced as fake, accusing them of posturing in convenient ways to retain caste privileges and left the hegemonic structures of Brahminical Hinduism intact.

His contested politics have inadvertently led Padmanji being neglected within scholarship on reform in India that emphasises indigenous contributions, while clubbing Christian reformers like Padmanji with missionaries and colonialism. In the four years that I researched my book *Baba Padmanji: Vernacular Christianity in Colonial India,* which was released in December, I discovered that far from being a European lackey, as he is sometimes characterised, he was a visionary whose contributions undergird the history of modernity in India.

Born in 1831 in Belgaum to a Konkani-Marathi family of repute from the Tvashta-Kasar caste of braziers, Padmanji began his education at the Bombay Scottish Mission's Wilson School (later Wilson College) in 1849.

Nineteenth-century Bombay was marked by an intellectual ferment, with nascent debate groups publishing newsletters. In 1850, Padmanji joined a similar debating and discussion group called the Paramhans Mandali but struggled with Hindu reform, criticising leading figures for what he called a peculiar variety of religion that was deist, theist, and bordered on atheism. As a consequence, Padmanji abandoned the Paramhans Mandali angrily, beginning his own group called the Satyashodhak Mandali.

At the same time, he was being influenced by the Bombay Scottish Mission's Free Church Institution, and European and native missionaries alike. His mentors included Murray

Mitchell, John Wilson, and Narayan Sheshadri (a Brahmin convert from Hyderabad). In September 1854, Padmanji converted to Christianity in Belgaum.

While the Paramhans Mandali was disbanded, it later regrouped as the Prarthana Samaj in Bombay in 1867, under the influence of Brahmo Christian leaders like Keshub Chandra Sen. Padmanji, as expected, did not join the Prarthana Samaj.

Despite these struggles, Padmanji remained an exceptionally powerful figure in the reform circles of 19th century Bombay, considered a formidable leader among Christian reformers.

Padmanji took Protestantism very seriously, and was ordained Pastor at the Free Church in 1867, serving the Free Church of Pune till 1872, before retiring and taking up full-time writing. When he died in 1906, Padmanji was buried at the Christian cemetery at Sewri, in Bombay.

The Rev. Baba Padmanji, from his autobiography published in 1892

Padmanji led a tumultuous and intense life. Hailing from a conservative, Hindu family, Padmanji's father was, nevertheless, a liberal man, serving in the public works department of the colonial administration. His father supported Padmanji through the travails of conversion that prompted his first wife to divorce him.

The turmoil of conversion and divorce would have shattered Padmanji, if not for his father, who was a bulwark of emotional support, funding Padmanji's writing projects, and encouraging him to remarry. This relationship in fact, went a long way in resuscitating Padmanji's hope in the Hindu family – a hope that other converts did not necessarily share.

Belonging to the upper-caste, Padmanji was nevertheless, non-Brahmin, and nursed a deep resentment against Brahminical practices associated with widowhood rituals and rules, child marriage, and the debarring of women's education that he deemed heinous products of heathen superstitious.

Though not in favour of conversion for the sake of escaping torture, finding this utilitarian approach to undercut the importance of Protestant conviction that must precede conversion, Padmanji favoured structural reforms instead, that would outlaw "superstition", and gradually wean non-Brahmins away from the socio-religious power wielded by Brahminism.

Once weaned away, coupled with all superstitions outlawed by the government, Padmanji hoped for true reform to become instituted within a consolidated social context of education and Protestant moral values about progress and rational faith.

Padmanji became known for pioneering Christian Marathi literature that inaugurated a new genre of vernacular Christianity in Bombay, encouraging social integration between all Christians. His writings posited Christianity as a native, Marathi religion, but also as a universal religion for Europeans and converts alike.

At the helm of many publishing houses run by missionary printing presses, Padmanji also ran his own press in Bombay (Victoria Press). He headed various prestigious Christian journals, and wrote more than 100 Marathi texts on Christian themes that combined didactics,

fiction, research, activism, and polemics, composed in terms of multiple interweaving styles: prose, letters and journal entries, dictionaries, thesauri, translations, conversations, and poems.

In 1877, Padmanji became famous for producing the first Bible (New Testament) translation with commentary, made by native Christians. He was also well-known as the first vernacular Christian autobiography writer in Marathi (*Arunodaya* published in 1888). It was translated into many languages. It had been preceded by his novel *Yamunaparyatan*.

Christian feminism

The most important aspect about Padmanj was his interest in Christian feminism. While Christian feminism as a movement arrived later, in the latter half of the 19th century, identified with the suffragists, in Maharashtra, Christian feminism was mostly associated with Pandita Ramabai. However, it was Padmanji, who pioneered Christian feminism in Bombay, drawing from the writings of Krishna Mohan Banerjea, a convert missionary of the Scottish Mission in Calcutta.

Padmanji saw himself as Banerjea's inheritor, further supporting Ishwar Chandra Vidyasagar's Widows Remarriage Act, passed in 1856. Dedicating *Yamunaparyatan* to the same cause of widow remarriage, Padmanji devoted an appendix in the book to Vidyasagar's achievements

This focus on feminism is perhaps the strongest feature of Baba Padmanji's contributions to modern India. He was a strong advocate of women's rights to education, freedom to remarry, and independence of women as decision makers, while also locating this gender emancipation within the family framework that advocated for women's equality within social and family relationships as influencers.

As evident from his essay on women's education published as early as 1852, a time even before he converted, it is crucial to appreciate Padmanji's pioneering role as an early feminist in Bombay.

In the context of anti-conversion activism today, with conversion being considered a variety of colonisation, and Christianity being considered a foreign, and western import, it is important to remember Baba Padmanji's contribution to religious freedom and women's rights as a convincing intervention that provided an alternative to Hindu reform.

Wilson College in 1893

Cross-Cutting, Exploratory and Supplementary Research

Research in this unit seeks to bring together the results of work conducted in the other units and relate them to the research programme. It elaborates on crosscutting themes that affect several units, and leads a more systematic investigation of the analytical vocabulary employed. In particular, one of the aims is to highlight how vernacular concepts can enrich, widen and modify social science approaches derived from the Western tradition. In addition, research in this category addresses questions of the overall programme, in particular different forms of translocality, and supplements it in terms of themes, concepts and methods. Furthermore, questions pertaining to debates on imperialism, coloniality and postcoloniality, both regarding historical and political developments and the intellectual debates triggered by these specific historical contexts are foregrounded in this research unit. Last but not least, the unit also offers space for third-party funded studies that are currently independent of the research programme but linked to the overall aims of the centre. These constitute important avenues for future research and therefore host this research.

Language Matters. Studying Legal History in the Russian Empire

Stefan B. Kirmse

My research on the Russian Empire's courts in the second half of the nineteenth century raises the crucial issue of language, both as a subject of research and as a methodological challenge.

As I discuss in my recent monograph *The Lawful Empire. Legal Change and Cultural Diversity in Late Tsarist Russia* (2019, paperback in 2022) the court system introduced by the Judicial Reform of 1864 developed and spread according to a spatial logic, expanding gradually from St. Petersburg and Moscow to other provinces in European Russia, and eventually into more distant borderlands. In so doing, the new courts did not do away with legal pluralism, which allowed for and even encouraged indigenous legal forums in some regions and areas of (mainly civil) law that made ample use of languages other than Russian. Yet, the geographical expansion of the imperial courts still furthered legal unification to a significant degree, and their establishment in culturally diverse regions brought large numbers of non-Russians under their jurisdiction.

Language in the courtroom

Formally, Russian was the only language allowed in the reformed courts; all officials had to speak it, and only people who understood sufficient Russian to follow the cases could be called up for service on the newly introduced juries. This monolingualism, however, soon met with the linguistic reality of the empire, in which non-Russians constituted a majority, namely 57 percent of the population, by the late nineteenth century. The situation, described by some jurists later as an issue the reformers had simply not thought about, required practical solutions. For cases in which the litigants or accused did not understand Russian, the law prescribed the use of interpreters. This arrangement worked in some cases, yet in regions as diverse as Crimea the court neither had the financial nor the human resources to meet the demand for constant interpretation. Either way, intermediaries were no solution for regions such as Bessarabia, the Baltic Sea provinces and especially Poland, where not only the litigants and witnesses but also the judges and lawyers tended to be native speakers of Polish, German, and Romanian (not least because few Russian jurists wanted to serve there). In practice, therefore, local languages were constantly used in state courts because the system would not have worked otherwise. It was a glitch the reformers had not foreseen.

Only in the Baltic provinces was linguistic diversity ever formally recognized. In May 1880, German, Estonian, and Latvian were admitted for both written and spoken court procedure. As before, though, there was a hierarchy of languages: in appeals sent to St. Petersburg, the key summaries had to be provided in Russian; accompanying materials (interrogation records etc.) were admissible in German, the language of the Baltic elites, but not Estonian or Latvian (which were considered less "cultured"), and had to be supplied with a Russian translation.

Tatar as court language

Most of the court activity examined in my research is from the two regions of Kazan/Middle Volga and Crimea, both of which had large populations of Muslim Tatars. That raises the question of the use of Tatar – a Turkic language then written in Arabic letters – in the reformed courts. Did the Tatar language feature at all in these courts? By the mid-nineteenth century, this language had long played a key role for the imperial state, not least in communicating with its Muslim population, and Tatars fulfilled important functions in the local administration, economic elite, and judiciary. Many new laws were quickly translated into Tatar (and circulated between Kazan and Crimea), to make sure that their implications were fully understood. That said, just as elsewhere in the empire, in Tatar regions the reformed courts were designed as monolingual, Russian-speaking institutions. In some districts of Kazan province, Tatars consistently made up more than 50 percent of the jurors. A small number of Tatars served as lawyers and surrogate judges, but far more importantly, they appeared as litigants, injured parties, and witnesses. In many of the cases I studied, Tatar was used in the courtroom by people who did not speak Russian, or spoke it poorly, but the statements were immediately translated by interpreters and never recorded in the original (the minutes of trials and interrogation records usually say things like "X answered in Tatar that …"). Tatar, along with other local languages such as Chuvash or Mordvin, could be used when native speakers had to swear an oath, and Tatars in court usually signed their names in the Arabic script; but unlike in the Baltic provinces, cases could not be brought to the courts' attention in local languages, and the only accompanying documents admissible in Tatar were deeds of purchase signed under Tatar rule (which de facto limited these documents to Crimea, where the Crimean khanate had only fallen in 1783). I did not see a single Tatar-language document in all the cases I came across in Kazan, not even Tatar-language originals with Russian translations. What was noticeable, however, was that some of the Russian-language documents addressed to the court were full of grammar mistakes and clearly not written by native speakers. Tatar was thus, at best, an informal language in the new courts. Surely it was used among jurors and litigants, by heckling members of the audience (as many trials were public events), or by Tatar officials to give quick, off-the-record explanations, but it was not formally admissible in court.

Tatar opinions on legal matters

While court documents are full of (usually translated) Tatar voices, contemporary publications from the 1860s to the 1890s, unfortunately, are not. As I explained in my previous blog entry, freedom of conscience and freedom of the press only came to Russia with the civil rights introduced by the 1905 revolution. Prior to this, with very few exceptions such as the Crimea-based newspaper *Tercüman* (ترجمان, "Translator"), which was simultaneously published in Tatar and Russian, Tatars could only publish on matters of Islamic thought and religious practice. Famous Islamic scholars such as Şihabaddin Mərcani (1818–1889) in Kazan, who also held a range of religious functions, produced many texts on religious questions while also addressing broader matters such as education. He even participated in sessions of the new imperial courts, administering Muslim oaths. Yet, I have not come across any writings in which he discusses the reformed courts directly (if anyone has, please let me know!).

After 1905, Tatar-language publications mushroomed, especially in Kazan and Orenburg. Newspapers like *Nur* (نور, "Light") and journals such as *Shura* (شورا) now examined a wide range of socio-economic, religious, and political problems, many of which touched upon legal questions. Satirical magazines like *Yashin* (یاشن, "Lightning") did the same with a different tone. Most importantly perhaps, while the aforementioned journals were mainly used by Islamic scholars for expressing their opinions, the legal journal *Hoquq va hayat* (حقوق و حیت, "Law and life", see below the cover of no. 5, May 31, 1913), published in Kazan from 1913 to 1914, became a vehicle for Tatar jurists trained at Kazan University to acquaint readers with the imperial court system more broadly. It went out of business after little more than a year, mainly for lack of subscribers.

For a number of reasons that I discussed in a blog entry (https://legalhistoryblog.blogspot.com/2020/10/exploring-law-in-russian-empire-spatial.html) last week, my book ended around 1890. As a result, I did not include the rich Tatar press of the post-1905 period in the analysis (but may well do so in follow-up articles tracking developments into the early twentieth century). By this time, the courts were no longer the institutions introduced some forty years earlier. The focus of Russian-language articles on the judiciary was also very different from what it had been in the 1860s.

Scholars of intellectual history have an advantage when it comes to sources because intellectuals love telling the world what they make of it. But I found it necessary not to write another book on Russian or Tatar scholars (of which there are many), and to focus instead on the rural masses. This choice leads to a lack of (unmediated) Tatar voices, which is both unfortunate and, in my view, unavoidable for the case at hand. Yet, this is a problem that scholars of rural society have always faced. In both Crimea and Kazan, the overwhelming majority of Muslim Tatars were farmers or small-town craftspeople, traders, and day laborers, who did not to sit down and take notes on law and legal practice. They were also very diverse, of different age, gender, and sexuality. Some cared about religion, others did not. Vodka was an important part of daily life in both Russian and Tatar villages. Thus, the detailed court records and other forms of state documentation, despite all their biases and power asymmetries, perhaps give these people more of a voice than intellectuals ever could.

Cover page of Hoquq va hayat, no. 5, 31 May 1913

Translokalität – ein Kernbegriff zur Erforschung grenzüberschreitender Beziehungen im Globalen Süden

Katrin Bromber

Translokalität ist eine Forschungsperspektive, welche die sich überlagernden und oftmals konflikthaften Interaktionen zwischen Menschen, Institutionen und Orten in ihrer historischen Tiefe in den Blick nimmt und die damit verbundenen Grenzüberschreitungen in ihrer Vielfalt berücksichtigt. Dieser Zugang untersucht globale Verflechtungen nicht als Einbahnstraße, sondern als Dynamik, bei der Verbindung und Entkopplung, Ein- und Ausschluss auf unterschiedlichen Ebenen von vornherein mitgedacht werden. Lokalitäten, Gemeinschaften oder Kulturen werden so nicht als starre Gebilde verstanden, sondern in ihrer mannigfaltigen Produktion betrachtet.[1] Das Ziel der Translokalitätsforschung am ZMO besteht darin, die unterschiedlichen historischen und aktuellen Beziehungen im globalen Süden (insbesondere in Asien, Afrika und dem Nahen Osten) und darüber hinaus besser zu verstehen.[2] Mit Blick auf die jeweiligen lokalen Akteure untersuchen wir die Dialektik von Überschreitung, Schaffung und Bestätigung von Grenzen und Räumen, und zwar sowohl der bestehenden als auch neuer, die durch translokale Praktiken entstehen.

Translokalität als Leitmotiv in der Erforschung von Süd-Süd-Beziehungen

Der Begriff Translokalität ist keine Erfindung des ZMO, sondern wurde in den 1990er Jahren im Zuge der 'räumlichen Wende' (*spatial turn*) in den Sozialwissenschaften eingeführt[3] und in der Folge sehr unterschiedlich verwendet. Sein Gebrauch in der internationalen Forschungsliteratur verwies anfangs sowohl auf eine durch Bewegung geprägte räumliche Praxis als auch auf konkrete Orte, die durch diese Praxis wesentlich bestimmt sind. Er zeigte das Überschreiten zumeist politischer Grenzen an, konnte aber auch einfach räumliche Entfernung bedeuten. Thomas Zitelmann fasste die Verwendungsweisen des Begriffes folgendermaßen zusammen:[4] Translokalität ist, erstens, eine „geographische Metapher". Sie suggeriert Veränderungen im menschlichen Aufeinandertreffen bzw. Austausch. Zweitens handelt es sich bei translokalen Phänomenen um „soziale Fakten". Diese werden als translokale soziale Räume untersucht, weil sie außerhalb des nationalen Rahmens liegen. Translokalität wird, drittens, als „Imageproduktion, -distribution und -konsumption" verstanden. Michel Ben Arrous vermu-

1 Ulrike Freitag/Achim von Oppen: "Introduction: 'Translocality': An Approach to Connection and Transfer in Regional Studies", in: dies. (Hg.): Translocality – The Study of Globalizing Phenomena of a Southern Perspective, Leiden 2010, S. 5.

2 Beim Schreiben dieses Beitrags konnte ich neben den zitierten Quellen auf die konzeptionellen Einleitungen der DFG-Anträge und -Berichte (2000–2007), also kollektiv verfasste Texte zurückgreifen. Ich danke vor allem Achim von Oppen, der als stellvertretender Direktor für Forschung die Synthetisierung unserer Forschungsergebnisse leistete, für die Erlaubnis, dieses Material zu verwenden.

3 Arjun Appadurai: "The Production of Locality", in: Richard Fardon (Hg.): Counterworks. Managing the Diversity of Knowledge, London /New York 1995, S. 204–225.

4 Thomas Zitelmann: "Was ist Translokalität?" Vortrag am ZMO, 8. 4. 2004.

tete nicht zu Unrecht, dass Translokalität ein „Omnibus-Begriff“ sei, mit dem jede*r verbindet, was er*sie will.[5]

Um der Entleerung des Begriffs entgegenzuwirken, zielte die Arbeit am ZMO darauf ab, ihn auf Grundlage empirischer Befunde konzeptuell zu schärfen.[6] Als Ausgangspunkt unserer Forschungen zu außereuropäischen Gesellschaften dienten Beziehungen, die durch geographische und gleichzeitig politische, soziale und kulturelle Grenzüberschreitungen geprägt sind. Eine verstärkte historische Betrachtung sowie die Berücksichtigung unterschiedlicher Akteure sollten die vielfältigen Überlagerungen sozial-räumlicher Praxen stärker in den Vordergrund rücken. Ein Beispiel aus der Forschung zum Indischen Ozean: Die Perspektive auf den Indischen Ozean der in ländlichen Gebieten rekrutierten ostafrikanischen Soldaten, die während des Zweiten Weltkriegs das erste Mal über den Ozean in ihre Einsatzgebiete (z. B. Madagaskar oder Südasien) fuhren, unterschied sich deutlich von der Sichtweise religiöser, muslimischer Eliten, die entlang etablierter interozeanischer Netzwerke unterwegs waren. Wir gingen ferner davon aus, dass sich die von uns untersuchten Grenzüberschreitungen überschneiden und historisch überlagern können. Die hierdurch produzierten Orte, Räume und soziokulturellen Verdichtungen bezeichneten wir als ‘Zwischen-Räume’. Als wichtigste Fallbeispiele dienten uns der westliche Indische Ozean (zwischen Südasien, Golfregion und Ostafrika) und der Sahara-Raum zwischen Nord- und Westafrika. Der Begriff Zwischen-Räume deutet bereits an, dass es sich dabei nicht um einheitliche, stabile Entitäten handelt. Vielmehr ist ihnen eine prozesshafte Dynamik eigen.

Seascapes, *sandscapes* und die Umsetzung des Translokalitätsansatzes auf der Projektebene

Um Translokalität als konzeptionellen Ansatz auf der Projektebene umsetzen zu können, entwickelten die Forschungsgruppen zum Indischen Ozean und zu Trans-Sahara-Beziehungen *seascape* bzw. *sandscape* als Konzepte mittlerer Reichweite. Darunter sind maritim bzw. durch die Wüste geprägte soziale und kulturelle Landschaften zu verstehen, die durch menschliche Praxis, nachhaltige Kulturkontakte, Konflikte und Überlagerungen erzeugt und durch Diskursgemeinschaften religiöser, sozialer, politischer und ökonomischer Natur in historisch nachvollziehbarer Weise reproduziert bzw. transformiert werden.[7] Es ging uns darum, die veränderliche Topographie dieser Landschaften sichtbar zu machen und insbesondere ihre fortwährend reorganisierten und transformierten Strukturelemente zu identifizieren.

5 Michel Ben Arrous: “La translocalité, pour quoi faire?”, in: Laurence Marfaing /Steffen Wippel (Hg.): Les relations transsahariennes à l’époque contemporaine. Un espace en constante mutation, Paris/Berlin 2004, S. 415–442.

6 Den ersten konzeptuellen Beitrag zur Translokalitätsforschung am ZMO leistete Achim von Oppen: “L’évolution de recherche: la ‘translocalité’ au Centre de Recherche sur l’Orient Moderne (ZMO)”, in: Marfaing /Wippel (Hg.): Les relations transsahariennes (Anm. 5), S. 401–414.

7 Brigitte Reinwald: “Espace(s) en mouvement? Quelques réflexions comparatives sur des processus translocaux”, in: Marfaing /Wippel (Hg.): Les relations transsahariennes (Anm. 5), S. 443–456; dies.: “Space on the Move. Perspectives on the Making of the Indian Ocean Seascape”, in: dies./Jan-Georg Deutsch (Hg.): Space on the Move: Transformations of the Indian Ocean Space in the Nineteenth and Twentieth Century, Berlin 2002, S. 9–20; Laurence Marfaing /Steffen Wippel: “Espace Transsaharien: espace en mouvement. Quelques réflexions pour une approche conceptuelle – une introduction”, in: dies. (Hg.): Les relations transsahariennes (Anm. 5), S. 7–26.

An Egyptian visitor takes a selfie at the Egyptian pavilion in the Global Village theme park in Dubai, 2021

Ich möchte das am Beispiel der *seascape* des Indischen Ozeans im 19. und 20. Jahrhundert, die zwischen 2000 und 2007 am ZMO von sechs historisch arbeitenden Projekten untersucht wurde, etwas genauer demonstrieren.[8] Ein wichtiges strukturgebendes Element waren die Tore zum Indischen Ozean, also die Küstenstädte. Im Zuge der Expansion von Kolonialherrschaft und Dampfschifffahrt konnten sie als Häfen an Gewicht gewinnen oder verlieren. Auch gesellschaftliche Charakteristika und symbolische Bedeutungen wandelten sich. Die Städte an den Küsten und ihre Bewohner wandten sich dem Meer stärker zu oder auch von ihm ab, sie wurden enger in die Binnenländer integriert oder aber gerieten ins Abseits. Ein weiteres strukturgebendes Element waren die Knotenpunkte des Indischen Ozeans: Aden zum Beispiel war nicht nur ein Tor zum Ozean, sondern stieg vor allem als Kohlestation und Drehkreuz des verstärkten Pilgerverkehrs kometenhaft auf. Ähnliches gilt für die Metropole Bombay, die sich zu einem Konzentrationspunkt moderner Transportarbeit entwickelte. Im Gegensatz dazu verkümmerten vormalige Knotenpunkte wie die Küstenstädtchen der indischen Malabarküste infolge geringerer Abhängigkeit der Dampfschifffahrt vom Monsun.[9] Allerdings liefen Dampfschiffe deutlich weniger und andere Häfen an als Dhaus, die im Indischen Ozean weit verbreiteten Segelschiffe. Hieraus ergaben sich neue Chancen für den oft von Dhaus dominierten Küstenverkehr. Diese Entwicklungen veränderten nicht nur die Schiffsrouten, sondern die interozeanischen sozial-ökonomischen Netzwerke insgesamt.

Die geographische Ausdehnung der *seascape* war ebenso Transformationen unterworfen. Die Kolonialökonomie und der Eisenbahnbau banden das Binnenland neu an die sea-

8 Die folgenden Überlegungen wurden von Brigitte Reinwald, Jan-Georg Deutsch, Patrick Krajewski, Friedhelm Hartwig, Ravi Ahuja und Katrin Bromber erarbeitet.

9 Vgl. Ravi Ahuja: "Die 'Lenksamkeit' des 'Lascars'. Regulierungsszenarien eines transterritorialen Arbeitsmarktes in der ersten Hälfte des 20. Jahrhunderts", in: Geschichte und Gesellschaft 31. 3 (2005), S. 323–353.

Indian fashion store in Dubai, 2021

scape an, verknüpften es etwa engstens mit dem Küsten- und Überseehandel, schlossen es an die maritimen Pilgerrouten an oder verwandelten es in Rekrutierungsgebiete für transozeanisch eingesetzte Seeleute, Soldaten, Eisenbahn- und Plantagenarbeiter. Umgekehrt haben kolonialstaatliche Regulierungen wie die Einführung von Pässen,[10] vor allem aber die Entwicklung nach der Dekolonisation zu einer Verkleinerung dieser *seascape* geführt.[11] Schließlich wandelten sich auch die zeitlichen Dimensionen der *seascape*. Durch verkürzte Reise- und Transportzeiten sowie die enorme Beschleunigung des Informationsaustauschs (durch politische Nachrichten, Presseerzeugnisse, private Briefe, Telegramme und Bildquellen) wurden Interaktionsmuster verändert.[12] In diesem Zusammenhang wandelten sich perzeptorische Dimensionen der *seascape*, also die räumlichen Wahrnehmungs- und Deutungsmuster.[13]

Der Begriff der *seascape* diente keineswegs der Beschreibung eines immer umfassenderen, weitgehend 'störungsfreien' Interaktionsnetzwerkes oder Kommunikationsraumes. Vielmehr ist er als ein Kraftfeld konfligierender gesellschaftlicher Akteure und Gruppen zu begreifen. Der 'Integrationsschub', besonders während des 20. Jahrhunderts, transformierte die *seascape* des Indischen Ozeans, indem er nicht nur alte 'Schließungen' und 'Verfestigungen' aufhob, sondern zugleich auch neue Grenzsetzungen, Exklusionen, Regulierungsszenarien und Zwangsmechanismen erzeugte. In ihrer jeweiligen historischen Verfasstheit birgt die *seascape* enormes Konfliktpotential. Die Dampfschifffahrt führte nicht nur zum Anwachsen der Hajj-Pilgerschaft, sondern auch zu ihrer Regulierung durch den Kolonialstaat. Die Eröffnung des Suezkanals (1869) resultierte nicht nur in einer enormen Vergrößerung des Handelsvolumens, sondern förderte auch eine restriktivere Kontrolle der Dhau-Schifffahrt. Das imperiale Verkehrssystem ermöglichte nicht nur eine neue Mobilität von Soldaten aus dem ostafrikanischen Binnenland nach Süd- und Südostasien, sondern erzeugte auch neue ideologische Kontrollmechanismen; es beförderte nicht nur die Entstehung neuer Arbeitsmärkte und von Mobilitätsstrategien ländlicher Gemeinschaften, sondern auch den Transfer restriktiver Disziplinierungstechniken.

10 Vgl. Friedhelm Hartwig: "The Segmentation of the Indian Ocean Region. Arabs and the Implementation of Immigration Regulations in Zanzibar and British East Africa", in: Deutsch/Reinwald (Hg.): Space on the Move, S. 21–38.
11 Vgl. Jan-Georg Deutsch: "The Indian Ocean World and a Very Small Place in Zanzibar", in: Deutsch/Reinwald (Hg.): Space on the Move, S. 61–73.
12 Vgl. Katrin Bromber: "Blühende Medienlandschaften. Britische Informationspolitik für ostafrikanische Truppen während des Zweiten Weltkriegs", in: Sozial.Geschichte Extra 22.3 (2007), S. 1–25.
13 Vgl. Brigitte Reinwald: "'Tonight at the Empire' – Cinema and Urbanity in Zanzibar, 1920s to 1960s", in: Afrique et Histoire 5 (2006), S. 81–109; dies.: "Travelling Pictures, Cinema Theatres, and Audiences in Zanzibar, 1920s to 1960s", in: ZIFF Journal 1.1 (2004), S. 41–51.

Fokus auf Bewegung

Während sich die erste Arbeitsphase am ZMO verstärkt mit den Toren und Knotenpunkten translokaler Raumproduktion wie beispielsweise den Hafenstädten befasste, wählten wir in der zweiten Phase konkrete 'Bewegungen' von Menschen, Gütern und Ideen als Ausgangspunkt unserer Untersuchungen. Weder setzten wir hierbei Translokalität mit räumlicher Mobilität an sich gleich, noch verstanden wir darunter plurikulturelle Lokalitäten, in denen Migrantengemeinschaften unterschiedlicher Herkunft zusammentreffen. Vielmehr verwendeten wir 'Translokalität' zur Bezeichnung eines Spannungszustands zwischen Bewegung und Verfestigung, von dem vielfältige Wandlungsprozesse ausgehen.

Vor allem zwei Formen der Bewegung wurden von uns untersucht. Zum einen *ökonomisch oder politisch begründete Bewegungen*, wie beispielsweise die von Kleinhändlern und besonders Kleinhändlerinnen im nordwestlichen Afrika zwischen Senegal, Mauretanien und Marokko im 20. Jahrhundert.[14] Zum anderen analysierten wir die translokale *Bewegung von Wissen*. Hierbei handelt es sich vor allem um religiöses (islamisches) Wissen, das durch Absolventen und Lehrkräfte religiöser Hochschulen zwischen Süd-, Südost- und Zentralasien und der arabischen Welt zirkuliert.[15] Drei weitere Projekte, die sich mit der Armeereform in Nordafrika von 1830 bis 1912 befassten, untersuchten die Translokalisierung von Wissen und den damit zusammenhängenden Einfluss der Bewegung alter und neuer militärischer Eliten in diesem geographischen Raum.[16]

Das ZMO bekam bereits bei seiner Gründung den Auftrag, verstärkt muslimische Gesellschaften zu untersuchen. Da es sich bei den am ZMO beforschten Regionen um muslimische Mehrheitsgesellschaften handelt, sind Süd-Süd-Beziehungen im Islam ein wichtiges Thema.[17] Darüber hinaus erfuhr die durch frühere Programmphasen am ZMO etablierte Forschung zu außereuropäischen Erfahrungen mit den Weltkriegen durch die Translokalitätsforschung einen wichtigen Schub. In Konferenzen und Publikationen trugen ZMO-Mitarbeiter*innen so zu einer stärkeren Vernetzung der aufkommenden internationalen Forschung zu außereuropäischen Wahrnehmungen der Kriege bei.[18]

Viele der von uns untersuchten translokalen Bewegungen hatten bereits Eingang in die historische Forschung zu Asien, Afrika und dem Nahen Osten gefunden. Unser Beitrag bestand demgegenüber in einem Perspektivwechsel. Während beispielsweise die sozial-ökonomische Geschichte Ostafrikas Ende des 19. und Anfang des 20. Jahrhunderts vor allem im Rahmen von scheinbar getrennt verlaufenden Geschichten kolonial besetzter Landmassen

14 Vgl. Elisabeth Boesen /Laurence Marfaing (Hg.): Mobilités dans l'espace ouest-africain: ressources, développement local et intégration régionale, Paris 2014.

15 Vgl. Chanfi Ahmed: "Networks of Islamic NGOs in Sub-Saharan Africa: Bilal Muslim Mission, African Muslim Agency (Direct Aid), and al-Haramayn", in: Journal of Eastern African Studies 3.3 (2009), S. 426–437; Dietrich Reetz: "Travelling Islam – Madrasa graduates from India and Pakistan in the Malay Archipelago", ZMO Working Papers 8 (2013), https://archiv.zmo.de/publikationen/WorkingPapers/reetz_2013.pdf (aufgerufen am 27. 5. 2021).

16 Vgl. Odile Moreau: L'Empire ottoman à l'âge des réformes: les hommes et les idées du "Nouvelle Ordre" militaire 1826–1914, Istanbul 2007.

17 Vgl. Bettina Dennerlein/Dietrich Reetz (Hg.): "South-South Linkages in Islam", in: Comparative Studies of South Asia, Africa and the Middle East 27 (2007), S. 3–6.

18 Heike Liebau u. a.: The World in World Wars. Experiences, Perceptions and Perspectives from Africa and Asia, Leiden 2010.

formuliert wurde, legt die Perspektive von der Seeseite her andere Dynamiken, Chronologien und Handlungshorizonte frei, die quer zu den sich etablierenden Kolonialstaaten standen.[19] Im Gegensatz zu einer transnationalen Betrachtung von Geschichte und Gegenwart erfasst die translokale Betrachtung eine größere historische Tiefe und breitere Blickwinkel.

Neue Impulse nach 2007

Translokalität im hier skizzierten Sinne als Forschungsperspektive und konkreter Untersuchungsgegenstand wurde zu einem grundlegenden Bestandteil unserer konzeptuellen Arbeit. Im ZMO-Forschungsprogramm "Muslimische Welten – Welt des Islam? Entwürfe, Praktiken und Krisen des Globalen" (2008–2019) befassten sich vor allem die Mitarbeiter*innen der Forschungsgruppe "Akteure im translokalen Raum" mit der Weiterentwicklung des Themas. Sie verglichen beispielsweise konkrete Fälle von Exil und Pilgerfahrt.[20] Aus sozial- und kulturanthropologischer Sicht untersuchten sie Migration als Idee und Vorhaben. Sie fragten nach der Rolle divinatorischer Praktiken für grenzüberschreitende räumliche Bewegung oder nach Formen der Selbstperfektionierung durch eine Verbindung von Arbeitsethos und Anpassungsfähigkeit, die im Zusammenhang mit translokalen Praktiken kultiviert werden. Besonders hervorzuheben ist die intensive historische und gegenwartsbezogene Forschung zu Stadtentwicklungen im osmanischen Reich und dem arabischen Raum, die neue Akzente in der Debatte um Kosmopolitanismus setzte.[21] Das seit 2020 laufende Forschungsprogramm "Translokale Verflechtungen neu denken: Perspektiven aus Asien, Afrika und dem Nahen Osten" wendet sich dem Paradigma der Translokalität in neuer Weise zu, und zwar mittels vier thematischer Zugänge: Das Forschungsfeld "Lebensalter und Generation" untersucht Beziehungen zwischen den Generationen, die vor allem durch Migration stabilisiert oder brüchig werden. "Umwelt und Gerechtigkeit" befasst sich mit Zusammenhängen zwischen lokalen und globalen Umweltveränderungen, sozialen Unterschieden und politischen Hierarchien. Im Forschungsfeld "Geschichtsbilder" spielt die Zirkulation von geschichtlichen Deutungsmustern eine wichtige Rolle. "Umstrittene Religionen" setzt sich in mehreren Projekten mit dem Spannungsverhältnis zwischen global zirkulierenden Mustern universitärer Bildung und der wachsenden Einbindung ebenfalls global zirkulierender Vorstellungen von religiös definierter Moral auseinander. Wichtig ist in diesem Forschungsprogramm die Verknüpfung von Translokalität mit Fragen von Gerechtigkeit. Dieser Ansatz spiegelt sich auch forschungspraktisch wider, indem Theorien und Intellektuelle aus dem Globalen Süden eine zentrale Rolle beim erneuten Nachdenken über translokale Verflechtungen einnehmen.

19 Vgl. Patrick Krajewski: Kautschuk, Quarantäne, Krieg: Dhauhandel in Ostafrika 1880–1914, Berlin 2006.
20 Vgl. "'Out of place' or 'Belonging'? Exile, Hijra and Communities", Workshopprogramm ZMO, 30. 6.–2. 7. 2010, https://archiv.zmo.de/veranstaltungen/2010/Out_of_place_Programme_2010.pdf (aufgerufen am 20. 3. 2021).
21 Vgl. Ulrike Freitag: "'Cosmopolitanism' and 'Conviviality'? Some Conceptual Considerations Concerning the Late Ottoman Empire", in: European Journal of Cultural Studies 17. 4 (2014), S. 375–391; dies./Nora Lafi: "Introduction: Cosmopolitanism and Conflicts: Changes and Challenges in Ottoman Urban Governance", in: dies. (Hg.): Urban Governance under the Ottomans. Between Cosmopolitanism and Conflict, London 2014, S. 1–17.

HISDEMAB: Exploring Deliberation, Representation, Elections, and the Question of the Historicity of Democracy in the Arab and Muslim Worlds

Nora Lafi

Archives nationales de Tunisie

The Historicity of Democracy in the Arab and Muslim Worlds (HISDEMAB) international and collaborative project seeks to establish an innovative research network that connects three institutes of the Leibniz Association (Leibniz-Zentrum Moderner Orient (ZMO) in Berlin, Leibniz-Institut für Europäische Geschichte (IEG) in Mainz and Leibniz-Zentrum für Zeithistorische Forschung (ZZF) in Potsdam) with two research institutions in the Arab world (Institut français du Proche-Orient (IFPO) in Amman, Jordan, and Manouba University in Tunis, Tunisia), while also including guest researchers from the wider Arab and Muslim worlds. The project is funded (2020–2023) by the Leibniz Collaborative Excellence programme. It explores democracy and debates about democracy in the region from a historical perspective. While this topic is highly relevant for contemporary debates, it is often subject to culturalist interpretations that insist on the ontological incompatibility of democracy with political life in the region. The aim of HISDEMAB is to promote global reflections on democracy that go beyond cultural boundaries and discuss entanglements and circulations in a critical way. This network works with original and innovative sources (archival records, chronicles, treaties, memoirs, minutes of assemblies and interviews) and investigates diverse forms of deliberation, decision-making and the mechanisms of representation in local societies, confronting this sphere with the question of democracy and its regimes of historicity. With historical case studies in Tunisia, Jordan, and other countries, from Syria or Egypt to Algeria, the aim is first to investigate the medieval and Ottoman roots of deliberative processes within professional guilds, confessional communities (Muslim, Jewish, Greek, Armenian) and different institutions (assemblies, petitioning system). The network is also designed to critically relate these roots to the evolution of deliberation and representation in the modern era (late Ottoman, colonial and national periods) and to Eurocentric discourses that have developed since the nineteenth century. While the team based at ZMO explores democracy and discourses on democracy in three phases of the Ottoman Empire (early modern, nineteenth century and early twentieth century), the ZZF-based team investigates the Turkish case in the post-Atatürk era under a historical perspective, and the IEG investigates the relationship between democracy and Islam in theoretical discourses and political practices in the nineteenth- and twentieth-century Arab world and particularly in Egypt. Partners at IFPO (In Aman) focus on the case

study on the Municipality of Jerusalem during the British Mandate, and on the legacy of Ottoman deliberative institutions and their interpretation in the twentieth century as well as on the historicity of democracy in Iraq. Project partners at Manouba University (Laboratoire Régions et Ressources Patrimoniales de Tunisie) work on a critical analysis of democratization processes in contemporary Tunisia, along with their (real and imagined) relationship with Europe. They also investigate the dimension of deliberation, vote and consultation that confessional organizations of the Jewish community maintained during the colonial period, based on practices dating back to the Ottoman era.


Liste des Candidats

aux Élections du 17 Janvier 1926

Raymond Valensi	Ingénieur
S. Calò	Industriel
Samson Boccara	Représentant
Joseph Valensi	Fenlier
Simon Timsit	Parfumeur (T. Simon)
Isaac di J. H. Boccara	Négociant
Isaac d'Ab. Bonan	Céréales
Joseph Bembaron	Pianos
Jacob Soria	Négociant
Victor Scialom	Avocat-Défenseur
Jacques Cittanova	Négociant
Samuel De Paz	Fabricant de [illegible]
Victor Vita Lumbroso	Comptable
Albert Lumbroso	Négociant
Elie de D. Lumbroso	Propriétaire
Victor Chalom	Négociant
Maurice Meimoun	»
Raoul Silvera	»
Isaac De Paz	Cordonnier

Archives nationales de Tunisie

The general theoretical and methodological framework of the programme is that of scholarly discussion on the interpretation of the relationship of the region with the notion of democracy. Contemporary debates on democracy in the Arab and Muslim worlds are dominated by bitter impressions following the return to authoritarian regimes after the short parenthesis of what mainstream media have often labelled as the 'Arab Spring'. After a few months or years of sometimes naïve enthusiasm, debates are now focusing again on the alleged incompatibility of democracy with societies of the broader region. The collaborative network of HISDEMAB moves beyond this dichotomy, which responds to culturalist biases in both situations (enthusiasm and bitterness), by investigating the historicity of democracy and deliberative practices for what they were in the societies of the region and by combining reflections on this complex sphere with reflections on democracy in other contexts. The aim is therefore to explore this crucial issue by examining the forms of political organization and debate that were inherent to societies of the region, from North Africa to the Middle East and from Anatolia to the Balkans. The programme also discusses the impact of such dimensions with various

forms of modernity, including late Ottoman, colonial and national, in challenging the multiple layers of euro-centred, colonial, and post-colonial interpretations that have accumulated since the nineteenth century. The objective of the programme is also to propose a critical examination of this heritage and its historical evolution between the study of existing local forms of deliberation, of the accommodation of circulating forms, of the negation of local existing forms by colonial powers, of the dilution of local governance schemes and of ambiguous resurgences of old forms under the lens of ideologically oriented solutions. Forms of collective deliberation that are relevant in a discussion on inherent, possibly early democratic, impulses include various councils and assemblies at various scales (various types of *diwan* and *majlis* for example), from villages and cities to provinces, deliberative institutions inside the world of guilds and inside confessional communities. The programme focuses on a micro-historical anthropology of deliberation with an attention to practices of debate, vote and decision. This discussion, based upon archival research (documents on the functioning of deliberative institutions, documents pertaining to the organization of decision-making processes, court records, petitions) and the interpretation of original manuscripts (chronicles, treaties) focuses on the concept of *ḥisba*, the Islamic precept regulating commercial and social life, as well as on institutions like the *majlis al-shūrā*. As far as the ambiguous impact with modernity is concerned, a focus is on the debates surrounding the enactment of the first constitutions of the region in the mid-nineteenth century, with the aim of reconnecting their interpretation with local historical roots. This angle of interpretation allows the scholars of the programme to take part in discussions about the relationship of societies of the region and power under an innovative perspective. Reflections also focus on the new definitions of citizenship and nationality that emerged and on their multiple ambiguities as well as relation to interpretations of past forms. A focus is also on colonial visions of local societies under the lens of discourses on democracy or on the alleged impossibility thereof, as well as on the period of the independences, with debates on democracy being inserted into a Cold War context. This effort allows researchers in the programme to propose alternative narratives of the evolution of the relationship between democracy and the Arab/Islamic/post-Ottoman world, avoiding neo-traditionalist visions, Islamist visions that tend to present religion as a unique source of social regulation and post-colonial trends that insist on the ontological externality of the notion to the region.

Explorations



Saddam's Mukhabarat in West Germany: Monitoring and Silencing the Iraqi Opposition

Ali Dogan

As I wrote earlier on *Sources & Methods*, exchanges and cooperation between the intelligence agencies of West Germany and Iraq boomed during the Iran-Iraq War.

During this period, three of the four chiefs of the West German Foreign Intelligence Agency met with their counterpart in Iraq, Fadhil Barrak, the chief of the Iraqi Intelligence Service. The image featured above, released on an Iraqi Youtube Channel (Min 2:40) in June 2021, depicts one of the meetings that took place between Fadhil Barrak and Eberhard Blum, who served from 1982 until 1985 as the chief of the *Bundesnachrichtendienst*.

This post builds on my earlier piece by focusing on the operations of Iraqi intelligence officers in West Germany, particularly their efforts to monitor and control the activities of the Iraqi opposition living in exile. Parts of it are based on an interview with a former high-ranking Iraqi intelligence official.

During Saddam Hussein's rule, Iraq's foreign intelligence agency (*Jihaz al-Mukhabarat al-'Amma*, or simply *Mukhabarat*) and its military attaches stationed abroad were the main intelligence gathering institutions of the Iraqi state in foreign countries. While the *Mukhabarat* was the main actor in political intelligence gathering, the Directorate of General Military Intelligence (*Mudiriyyat al-Istikhabarat al-'Askariyya al-'Amma*) focused on military related information, but occasionally also provided political intelligence to the Iraqi government.

For the *Mukhabarat*, intelligence gathering in a foreign country consisted of three operational pillars. First, there was the liaison officer of the *Mukhabarat* who served as the counterpart to the host country's intelligence agency. Second, there was the so-called legal station officer, who, together with the liaison officer, was stationed at the embassy. Lastly, there was the illegal station officer who was working undercover outside the embassy.

In West Germany, the Iraqi liaison officers were in charge of exchanging information with the *Bundesnachrichtendienst* on different security related topics. The exchange of liaison officers began in the 1980s. While this part of my research might be the most sensitive and most difficult area to find information on, German media outlets, such as the DPA, reported in summer 1993 that Iraq received information on the Iraqi opposition living in Germany from the BND.

The Legal Station Officers were tasked with intelligence gathering on topics according to the annual plan of the *Mukhabarat*, a plan which included the information needed by each department on a yearly basis. While the liaison officer was officially known as the counterpart to the host country's intelligence agency, the station officer was usually given cover as a consul working in the Iraqi embassy. The host nation did not necessarily know about their actual work as an intelligence official.

While the liaison officer and station officer in most cases knew that they worked for the same authority, both officers were not aware of each other's work. Both completed different elements of the annual plan, and only reported the results of their work directly to their respective chiefs in Baghdad, using separate, encrypted Telex communication booklets.

Eberhard Blum, president of BND, with Fadhil Barrak, head of the Iraqi Mukhabarat, probably 1982–85

Illegal stations were based at Iraqi governmental facilities outside the embassy. This included, for example, Iraqi schools, the Iraqi Airways offices at airports like Frankfurt, the chamber of commerce, or various company buildings. Like the legal stations, illegal stations also worked according to the *Mukhabarat*'s annual plan. In some countries, the illegal stations provided better intelligence than the liaison and station officers. Legal stations based at the embassies could be (and, in most cases, were) under constant surveillance by the host nation's intelligence agencies and therefore were less appealing for operations against dissidents abroad.

Iraq's interest in West Germany had many facets, such as the activities of Iraqi opposition figures living in Germany and German technology and expertise. The Iraqi Foreign Intelligence Agency used the liaison officer as well as the legal and illegal station officers to monitor and silence opposition movements abroad. From both the legal and illegal stations, Iraqi intelligence formed a vast network of informants, especially among students. Using said operational pillars, the *Mukhabarat* gathered intelligence on Kurdish and Shia opposition groups residing in Germany, for example. Likewise, the Military Attaché in Bonn actively gathered information on opposition meetings in West Germany.

One document from the Military Intelligence indicates that there were meetings between the Kurds and the Iranians in West Germany. The document also gives a detailed overview of the activities of the Iranians and their involvement with the "Talabani faction" and Iraq's Shia Dawa Party. The report from March 1989 further describes biweekly meetings between all three parties in cities such as Frankfurt and Hamburg and occasionally inside the Iranian embassy in Bonn (North Iraq Dataset 0787796).

The aim of the Iraqi *Mukhabarat* was usually to make dissidents return to Iraq in order to monitor them better. On November 7, 1982, for example, the General Security Service (*Mudiriya al-'Amn al-'Amma*) reported that a Kurdish opposition figure had returned to Iraq after the announcement of general amnesty earlier that year. Iraq's National Security Council (*Majlis al-'Amn al-Qawmi*) later gave an official directive on February 11, 1985, to monitor the returnees like this Kurdish opposition figure (North Iraq Dataset 0722516 & 1247070).

If dissidents and Iraqi opposition groups did not return and were seen as a threat to the regime, the Iraqi intelligence agencies took more drastic measures to silence them. According to a Stasi document from the 1980s, the Iraqi Revolutionary Command emphasized that "[Iraqi] embassies must use all means at their disposal to record, observe and, if possible,

West German delegation with Fadhil Barrak, head of the Iraqi Mukhabarat, undated

neutralize Iraqi communists, oppositional Kurds and other individuals opposing the Saddam regime."

On August 1, 1980, the above order was implemented by two *Mukhabarat* officials accredited at Iraq's embassy in East Berlin. Both officials planned to bomb the Kurdish Student Congress ASTA at Gesundbrunnen in West Berlin. Using their diplomatic immunity, they crossed the border from East Berlin to West Berlin with 500 grams of explosives and were planning to hand over the suitcase with the explosives to their informant who would be attending the congress. However, Syrian intelligence had informants in the Kurdish community in West Berlin and tipped off the *Bundesnachrichtendienst*, who then informed the police about the plan.

The *Mukhabarat*'s activities in Germany show that Iraq's intelligence agencies were instructed to monitor and silence the opposition abroad, and even to use extreme measures to do so. As Saddam Hussein once said in a speech: "The hand of the revolution can reach out to its enemies wherever they are found."

Sehr geehrte Herr Prof. Lukas

Seit längerer Zeit forsche ich - allerdings als Historiker und nicht als Sprachwissenschaftler über den deutschen Afrikaforscher Gottlob Adolf Krause, wie mir Herr Prof. Klingenheben ~~vorig n Jahr mitteilte hatte er Sie auch wegen des Nachlasses von~~ Krauses gefragt. Inzwischen habe ich zwar bei den verschiedensten Institutionen und Persönlichkeiten nachgefragt - allerdings ohne ~~eine positive Nachricht~~ folgend zu erhalten. Einem Hinweis von herrn Prof. Dammann ~~entsprechend~~, habe ich mir Ihr Buch "Deutsche Quellen zur Sprache der Musgu in Kamerun" angesehen. Da Sie mich den von Krause gesammelten Materialien bedeutenden Wert beimessen, halte ich es für wahrscheinlich, daß Sie der Gedanke bewegt haben mag, was wohl aus Krause selbst geworden ist. Ich erlaube mir deshalb zu fragen, Wußten Sie, daß Krause im Februar 1938 in Zürich verstorben war, wenn ja, von wem? Es kann Natürlich ~~möglicherweise~~ der Krause-Nachlaß in den letzten Kriegsjahren vernichtet worden ist. Der Nachlaß ist aber schon 1938 nach Deutschland übersandt worden, und da Krause Sprachwissenschaftler war, schlußfolgere ich, möchte ich fragen: Halten Sie es für möglich, daß in Fachkreisen sen daß er an eine entsprechende Instanz übergeben wurde. Ich möchte deshalb fragen: Halten sie es für möglich, daß es in Fachkreisen unbekannt bleibt, wenn z.B. der Nachlaß zum Beispiel dem Seminar für Orientalische Sprachen übergeben worden wäre?

Schließlich noch eine letzte Frage: Krause glaubte über den Verwandschaft der afrikanischen Sprache eine wichtige Entdeckung gemacht zu haben; er wünschte, daß eine kompetente Stelle in Deutschland dazu ein Gutachten anfertigen sollte. Ist Ihnen darüber irgend etwas bekannt.

Sehr geehrter Herr Professor! Ich habe mir die Aufgabe gestellt, Afrikaforschers Leben und Lebenswerk eines zu würdigen, der ja als Pionier afrikanischer Sprachforschung gilt. Ich wäre Ihnen dankbar, wenn Sie mich in meinen Bemühungen durch beantwortung der obengenannten Fragen unterstützen würden.

Kolonialismus und nationaler Befreiungskampf im Nachlass und Lebensweg des Afrikaforschers Peter Sebald (1934–2018)

Silke Nagel, Alisher Karabaev

Peter Sebald, Afrikaforscher

Bereits bevor sich Peter Sebald mit dem „dicksten Buch zur kleinsten Kolonie“ einen Namen als Togo-Historiker machte, beschäftigte er sich mit dem antikolonialen Denken und Handeln des deutschen Afrika-Wissenschaftlers Malam Musa. Dieser hieß eigentlich Gottlob Adolf Krause (1850–1938), trug aber auch den Hausa-Namen „Schriftgelehrter Musa“. Sebalds Doktorarbeit holte ihn aus dem Vergessen in das Licht der DDR-Wissenschaft und zeigte ihn als antikolonial gesinnten Humanisten.[1] Das auf der Schreibmaschine getippte Manuskript dieser Arbeit befindet sich seit Juni 2018 im Leibniz-Zentrum Moderner Orient, wo sich auch der afrikabezogene wissenschaftliche Nachlass Sebalds befindet. Dieser wurde dem Institut bereits 2015 als Vorlass übergeben.

Peter Sebald wurde 1934 in Niesky geboren, einer Kleinstadt in der Nähe von Görlitz, der er Zeit seines Lebens verbunden blieb. Früh verlor er seinen Vater, einen sozialdemokratisch gesinnten Buchhändler. Dieser starb 1939 an den Folgen von Misshandlungen, die er während seiner Haftzeit im Konzentrationslager erlitten hatte. Nach dem Abitur studierte Peter Sebald in Leipzig Universalgeschichte mit dem Schwerpunkt Kolonialgeschichte und Geschichte Afrikas. Seine Staatsexamensarbeit schrieb er 1956 über die deutsche Herrschaft in Kamerun. 1966 wurde er bei Professor Walter Markov mit der Dissertation über Gottlob Adolf Krause promoviert. Doch auch nach der Veröffentlichung 1972 ließ ihn das Thema nicht los. Hatte er im Vorwort noch geschrieben, dass kein Porträt von Malam Musa zu finden sei,[2] förderte seine beharrliche Suche erst nach 1990 in Libyen zwei Fotos zu Tage, die sich (als neuere Reproduktionen) in seinem Nachlass befinden. An Krause faszinierte ihn dessen Eintauchen in die afrikanische Gesellschaft, die einfache Lebensführung und die Konsequenz, mit der er sich trotz Anfeindungen und Schädigungen (wie der Vernichtung eines Teils seines wissenschaftlichen Werks) gegen den europäischen Kolonialismus wandte. „G. A. Krause […] widmete sein Leben wie seine wissenschaftliche Tätigkeit bewußt dem gesellschaftlichen Fortschritt der Afrikaner, kämpfte aktiv gegen den Kolonialismus und für ein neues Verhältnis der Europäer zu den Afrikanern. Er war einer jener aufrechten Europäer, deren Widerstand gegen die koloniale Unterdrückung zur gleichen Zeit einsetzte, als sich die vielfältigen Formen des Widerstands der

1 Peter Sebald: Malam Musa – Gottlob Adolf Krause 1850–1938. Forscher – Wissenschaftler – Humanist. Leben und Lebenswerk eines antikolonial gesinnten Afrika-Wissenschaftlers unter den Bedingungen des Kolonialismus, Berlin: Akademie-Verlag 1972.

2 Ebd., S. 10.

Afrikaner zu entwickeln und die Unabhängigkeitsbewegung zu formieren begann."[3] Sebald forderte auch: „Jede wissenschaftliche Tätigkeit eines Afrikaforschers dient entweder den Afrikanern oder den Kolonialherren, und von jedem Wissenschaftler verlangte der Kolonialismus und verlangt in heutiger Zeit der Neokolonialismus eine Entscheidung. [...] Jene Prinzipien und Ziele, für die G. A. Krause in Afrika lebte und forschte und für die er unter Einsatz seiner ganzen Persönlichkeit kämpfte, bestimmen heute das Verhältnis zwischen der nationalen Befreiungsbewegung in Afrika und der internationalen Arbeiterklasse, zwischen den jungen afrikanischen Nationalstaaten und dem sozialistischen Weltsystem."[4]

Wie sah Sebalds eigener Lebensweg aus? Universitätsprofessor wurde er nicht. 1954 absolvierte er ein Praktikum im Universitätsarchiv in Leipzig. Nach seinem Studium wurde ihm 1956 angetragen, zum Dietz-Verlag nach Berlin zu gehen, wo er Lektor für Literatur aus und über Asien, Afrika und Lateinamerika wurde. Im gleichen Jahr überführte die Sowjetunion die Akten des ehemaligen deutschen Reichskolonialamts in die DDR, wo sie im Deutschen Zentralarchiv Potsdam verwahrt wurden. Sebald arbeitete nun einerseits im Verlag, wo er afrikanische Literatur betreute und Übersetzungen verschiedener Autoren ins Deutsche veranlasste. Daneben studierte er die Kolonialakten im Archiv. Da die größeren deutschen Kolonien Afrikas bald von den Universitätswissenschaftlern aus Leipzig und Berlin bearbeitet wurden, konzentrierte er sich auf die kleinste und las und exzerpierte alles, was über Togo zu finden war. In seiner Doktorarbeit konnte er nur einen Bruchteil der Quellen auswerten. Das weitere Material floss später in seine umfassende Monographie über Togo ein.

Kontakte und erste Erfahrungen in Afrika

Während dieser arbeitsreichen 1960er-Jahre hielt Peter Sebald persönlichen Kontakt zu Afrikanern, die in der DDR studierten. 1961 wurde er Mitbegründer der Deutsch-Afrikanischen Gesellschaft (DAFRIG). Vier Jahre später hoffte er darauf, als Leiter einer Lesestube der DAFRIG nach Accra zu gehen und damit erstmals selbst ein afrikanisches Land zu besuchen. Mit diesem Ziel wurde er Mitarbeiter der Liga für Völkerfreundschaft, der Dachorganisation verschiedener Freundschaftsgesellschaften der DDR. Allerdings scheiterte die für 1966 vorgesehene Ausreise nach Ghana aufgrund des Sturzes des Präsidenten Kwame Nkrumah durch einen Militärputsch. Sebald wurde stattdessen nach Sansibar entsandt, wo er zwischen 1966 und 1971 mehrfach als Leiter des „Hauses der Freundschaft", einem von 1965 bis 1973 unterhaltenen Kulturinstitut, tätig war. Bis 1971 besuchte er für die Freundschaftsgesellschaft DDR-Afrika auch die afrikanische Staaten Sambia, Somalia, Nigeria und Sierra Leone.[5]

3 Ebd., S. 12.
4 Ebd., S. 13, 14.
5 Ulrich van der Heyden: Anstelle eines Vorworts. In: Peter Heine/Ulrich van der Heyden (Hg.), Studien zur Geschichte des deutschen Kolonialismus in Afrika. Festschrift zum 60. Geburtstag von Peter Sebald, Pfaffenweiler: Centaurus-Verlagsgesellschaft 1995, S. 7–16; Interview mit Peter Sebald, Franziska Benger: Als Direktor des „Nyumba ya urafiki" in Sansibar, geführt am 7. 12. 2007 in Berlin, in: Ulrich van der Heyden/Franziska Benger (Hg.), Kalter Krieg in Ostafrika. Die Beziehungen der DDR zu Sansibar und Tansania, Münster: LIT 2009, S. 251–266; Peter Sebald: Völkerfreundschaft oder Auslandsinformation. Impressionen zum Wirken der Deutsch-Afrikanischen Gesellschaft, in: Ulrich van der Heyden/Ilona und Hans-Georg Schleicher (Hg.), Die DDR und Afrika. Zwischen Klassenkampf und neuem Denken, Münster: LIT 1993, S. 79–94.

Die Arbeit in der Praxis war für den weiterhin wissenschaftlich interessierten und kritisch denkenden Peter Sebald nicht einfach, auch wenn sie ihn um viele Erfahrungen bereicherte: „Gleichzeitig jedoch erkannte er die immer größer werdende Diskrepanz zwischen Theorie und Wirklichkeit, zwischen den verkündeten sozialistischen Idealen und der tatsächlich praktizierten Politik in den afrikanischen Ländern, die sich auf dem deklarierten ‚sozialistischen Entwicklungsweg' befanden. Und diese Kluft sah er auch in seiner Heimat. […] Es war bitter für ihn, einsehen zu müssen, daß er auf dem Gebiet der sogenannten Freundschaftsarbeit nichts verändern, schon gar nicht verbessern konnte", schrieb sein Freund und Kollege Ulrich van der Heyden.[6] 1972 ergriff Sebald die Gelegenheit, Chefredakteur der neuen wissenschaftlichen Zeitschrift „Asien, Afrika, Lateinamerika" zu werden, die ab 1973 im Akademie-Verlag erschien und die interdisziplinär die Entwicklungsländerforschung der DDR vorstellte. Parallel dazu verarbeitete er seine Erfahrungen in einem im Jahr 1967 handelnden Roman. „Verschollen in Afrikas Urwald" erzählt die Erlebnisse des aus der DDR nach Sansibar entsandten Elektrikers Robby Krause (der Nachname dürfte kein Zufall sein), der einen Flugzeugabschuss über dem Kongo überlebt und in einem Urwalddorf seine ersten Erfahrungen macht. Dabei lernt er schnell, dass seine mitgebrachten Konzepte nicht unmittelbar auf die Realität des Dorfes übertragbar sind. Robby fragt sich: „Wieso ertappte ich mich dabei, Patentrezepte entwickeln zu wollen? Ist das ein besserwisserischer Zug in mir oder glaubte ich klüger zu sein, weil ich in einer höher entwickelten Gesellschaftsordnung groß geworden war? Natürlich ist unsere sozialistische Gesellschaftsordnung – mit deren Problemen ich mich vertraut weiß – viel weiter entwickelt als die Gesellschaftsordnung hier. Aber die Kenntnisse ihrer Probleme ist offensichtlich noch keine Voraussetzung dafür, nun auch für andere gesellschaftliche Formationen auf Anhieb richtige Alternativen entwickeln zu können. […] Aber mich zwang die Situation, mir meine Fragen zu beantworten: Was ist das hier für eine Gesellschaftsordnung? Kapitalismus, Kolonialismus, Feudalismus, Urgesellschaft – die ‚ismen' schwirrten mir durch den Kopf."[7]

Für die Zeitschrift „Asien, Afrika, Lateinamerika" verfasste Chefredakteur Sebald 1978 eine Rezension über einen Band mit dem Titel „Neokolonialismus in der Krise", der vom Staatsverlag der DDR herausgegebenen worden war. Er kritisierte an dem Band vor allem die mangelnde Theorie und ungenügende Einbettung des Neokolonialismus in die Universalgeschichte, ebenso die Beschränkung der Darstellung auf die USA und Bundesrepublik Deutschland unter weitgehender Vernachlässigung der Europäischen Wirtschaftsgemeinschaft und Japans als neokoloniale Mächte. Diese Kritik führte zu seiner Abberufung als Chefredakteur im gleichen Jahr.[8] Sebald kommentierte diesen Bruch in seiner Karriere später mit der Erinnerung an andere „alte Genossen" wie seinen früheren Professor Walter Markov: „Es gehört zum Leben eines guten Sozialisten, von der Parteiobrigkeit gemaßregelt zu werden."[9]

6 Van der Heyden 1995 (wie Anm. 5), S. 11–12.
7 Sebald, Peter: Verschollen in Afrikas Urwald, Berlin, 1974, S. 107–108.
8 Sebald, Peter: Rez. Paul Friedländer u. Gertraud Liebscher: Neokolonialismus in der Krise, Berlin: Staatsverlag der Deutschen Demokratischen Republik 1978. In: Asien, Afrika, Lateinamerika. Zeitschrift des Zentralen Rates für Asien-, Afrika- und Lateinamerikawissenschaften in der DDR, 7, 1978, H. 3, S. 552–554.
9 Autobiographischer Text über die Zeit im Dietz-Verlag, 7. 10. 2010, Nachlass Peter Sebald, Box „Reden, Biographien".

Neue Chancen und Herausforderungen

Allerdings bedeutete die Entlassung aus dem Verlagsdienst keinen Karrierebruch für Sebald. Schnell taten sich neue Chancen auf: Ab November 1978 konnte er an der Akademie der Wissenschaften der DDR im Zentralinstitut Geschichte (später Institut für Allgemeine Geschichte) ausschließlich wissenschaftlich arbeiten und 1984 seine Habilitationsschrift über die deutsche Kolonie Togo verteidigen.[10] Zwei Jahre zuvor war bereits ein Artikel „Die Einflüsse bürgerlicher Klasseninteressen auf die Anfänge der antikolonialen Bewegung in Togo" erschienen, in dem er sich fragt, wie weit die Wurzeln einer afrikanischen kapitalistisch orientierten Entwicklung in die Vergangenheit zurückreichen.[11]

1984 durfte Dr. habil. Sebald London und 1987 Accra besuchen, von wo aus er auch zum ersten Mal für einen Tag nach Togo (Lomé) reisen konnte. Nach dem Ende der DDR sollten weitere Aufenthalte folgen: zunächst ein dreimonatiger Aufenthalt in Ghana und Togo 1990, dann ein siebenmonatiger Forschungsaufenthalt 1991/92 im Nationalarchiv in Lomé, wo er deutsche Kolonialakten im Auftrag des französischen Forschungsinstituts ORSTOM (Institut Français de Recherche Scientifique pour le Dévelopement en Cooperation, Paris) auswertete. Diese Tätigkeit setzte er 1993 und 1994 fort.[12] Auch als Rentner (ab 1994) kehrte er bis 2010 jährlich für drei Monate nach Lomé zurück, wo er weiter deutsche Quellen im Nationalarchiv studierte und ordnete und daneben auch Paläographie und Aktenkunde unterrichtete. Das Ende der DDR-Regierung bedauerte er nicht, hatte ihn doch nach den hoffnungsvollen, zuversichtlichen 1960er Jahren der „autoritäre ‚Kommando-Sozialismus'" desillusioniert und frustriert. Jedoch beobachtete er jetzt nicht das Ende, sondern einen Wandel des Kolonialismus: „Die unterschiedlichen Entwicklungsstadien des Kapitalismus hatten in den vergangenen Jahrhunderten unterschiedliche Kolonialregimes hervorgebracht. Im 20. Jahrhundert war ein imperialistisches Kolonialregime, das der nationalen Kolonialimperien, zusammengebrochen. Es formierte und formiert sich ein neues, das des ‚kollektiven Kolonialismus' über abhängige selbständige Staaten."[13]

Sebald beschäftigte sich in seinem Leben immer wieder mit Malam Musa. In einem Manuskript für einen Vortrag in Frankfurt/Main im November 1992 schrieb er (möglicherweise im Hinblick auf eine Kritik seiner 1972 veröffentlichten Dissertation): „Wer im Osten seine eigene Vergangenheit aufarbeiten will[,] muß auch sein eigenes Schrifttum bewerten. Das Buch [von 1972] ist mit dem Engagement eines dreissigjährigen Jugendlichen geschrieben, der selbst die Welt und die Afrikanistik verbesser[n] wollte, heute doppelt so alt ist natürlich das Wissen breiter. Aber vom Prinzip würde ich auch heute G. A. Krause gar nicht so anders schreiben. Will damit sagen, von dem, was ich damals geschrieben, habe ich nichts zurückzunehmen."[14]

10 Sebald, Peter: Togo 1884–1914. Eine Geschichte der deutschen „Musterkolonie" auf der Grundlage amtlicher Quellen, Berlin: Akademie-Verlag 1988.
11 Sebald, Peter: Die Einflüsse bürgerlicher Klasseninteressen auf die Anfänge der antikolonialen Bewegung in Togo. In: Geistige Profile Asiens und Afrikas. Aktuelle Fragen der ideologischen Auseinandersetzung in der nationalen Befreiungsbewegung. Hrsg. von Georgij F. Kim u. a. Berlin, 1982, S. 359–378.
12 Van der Heyden 1995 (wie Anm. 5).
13 Benger 2009 (wie Anm. 5).
14 Vortragsmanuskript „G. A. Krause – Malam Musa Frankfurt/Main Nov. 92", Nachlass Sebald, Ordner „G. A. Krause Briefwechsel".

Der Arabische Frühling 2011 und das Bombardement Libyens im gleichen Jahr durch die internationale Militärmission der NATO und einiger arabischer Staaten gaben 2014 Anlass zu einer Veröffentlichung von 57 Aufsätzen Gottlob Adolf Krauses, die 1911/12, als Italien Tripolis besetzte, im Berliner Tageblatt veröffentlicht worden waren. In Sebalds Vorwort zu dieser Edition, das die aktuellen Ereignisse 2011 mit den historischen hundert Jahre früher verknüpft, erfahren wir u. a. auch, dass Sebald durch Veröffentlichungen des syrischen Libyen-Historikers Prof. Imad Al-Din Ghanem aus den 1990er-Jahren und der westdeutschen Akademiker Michael Broß und Klaus Larisch von 1989 erstmals Fotos von Krause lokalisieren konnte.[15]

Sebald veröffentlichte in seinen letzten Arbeitsjahren noch weitere Quelleneditionen. Hierbei ragt besonders eine Edition des Familienarchivs der togoischen Familie Lawson, die Sebald mit dem Leipziger Afrikanisten Adam Jones 2005 veröffentlichte, heraus.[16]

Der Nachlass

In seinen letzten Lebensjahren – er starb 2018 – konnte Peter Sebald nicht mehr wissenschaftlich arbeiten. Familie und Freunde kümmerten sich um sein Vermächtnis. Durch die Vermittlung von Ulrich van der Heyden erhielt das ZMO 2015 rund 50 Kartons Akten und Bücher, darunter auch die von ihm selbst geordneten 49 Aktenordner im Drehregal mit umfangreichen Schriftwechseln, Aktenabschriften, Vortrags- und Aufsatzmanuskripten, und vielem mehr. Die übrigen ungeordneten Materialien wurden inzwischen durch Alisher Karabaev sortiert und in Archivkartons verpackt, die Bücher der Bibliothek zugeführt. Eine detaillierte Erschließung steht noch aus. Äußerst spannende Beispiele für die Themenvielfalt des Nachlasses sind Sebalds Gutachten zu Staatsangehörigkeitsfragen, die er im Auftrag des bundesdeutschen Innenministeriums oder des Auswärtigen Amtes verfasste und die die Nachfahren deutscher Väter und togoischer Mütter betrafen. In einer Datei der „Kolonialdeutschen in Togo“ erfasste Sebald Informationen über Deutsche, die sich in den Jahren 1884 bis 1914 in Togo aufgehalten hatten. Dazu kommen auch Tagebücher von Kolonialdeutschen, die Sebald von der Sütterlin- in die lateinische Schrift transliterierte und somit leichter zugänglich macht. Ein besonders bemerkenswertes Beispiel für eine gewissenhafte Übertragung sind Tagebücher Valentin von Massows, dem Kommandeur der deutschen Polizeitruppe in Togo 1896, die Sebald 2014 herausgab und einleitete.[17] Seit 1956 hatte Sebald den Nachlass von

Das Drehregal von Peter Sebald mit seinen Akten

15 Sebald, Peter: Einleitung. In: Krause, Gottlob Adolf/Malam Musa: Tripolitanisches Kriegstagebuch. Hrsg. u. eingel. von Peter Sebald, Bremen 2014, S. 7–30.

16 An African Family Archive: the Lawsons of little Popo/Aneho (Togo) 1841–1938, Oxford 2005. Hrsg. von Adam Jones und Peter Sebald. Die französische Übersetzung erschien in zwei Bänden: Le Grand Livre des Lawson. Les archives d'une famille africaine d'Aného (Togo), Paris 2018.

17 Massow, Valentin von: Die Eroberung von Nordtogo 1896–1899. Hrsg. u. eingel. von Peter Sebald, Bremen 2014.

Valentin von Massow gesucht. Erst in den 1990er Jahren fand er ihn in der Außenstelle Wernigerode des Landeshauptarchivs Sachsen-Anhalt.

Forscher und Forscherinnen, die sich in der Zukunft mit Fragen der deutschen Kolonialgeschichte, der DDR-Entwicklungshilfe und des Kalten Krieges sowie mit der unterschiedlichen Bewertung der deutschen Kolonialzeit durch den ostdeutschen Historiker und westdeutsche Diplomaten auseinandersetzen möchten, werden im Sebald-Nachlass interessantes, vielfältiges Material finden.

Das ZMO erhielt den afrikabezogenen Teil des Nachlasses. Persönliche, die Familie betreffende Dokumente gingen an die Familie zurück, ebenso alle Sebalds Heimatstadt Niesky betreffenden Unterlagen. Peter Sebald hatte nämlich noch ein zweites Forschungsgebiet: die Geschichte seines Heimatortes Niesky, der von der Herrnhuter Brüdergemeine in der Oberlausitz gegründet worden war und dessen Ortschronist er wurde. Der Sebald-Nachlass enthält auch einen bisher noch unsortierten Nachlasssplitter des westdeutschen Soziologen Prof. Dr. Trutz von Trotha (1946–2013), der elf Umzugskartons umfasst. Sebald selbst konnte sie aus gesundheitlichen Gründen nicht mehr ordnen. Von Trotha und Sebald hatten sich in den neunziger Jahren persönlich kennengelernt. Der ostdeutsche und der westdeutsche Togo-Experte[18] vereinbarten per Handschlag, dass der zuerst aus dem Leben scheidende dem anderen seine Togo-Sammlung übergeben würde, damit sie später vereint an eine wissenschaftliche Einrichtung übergingen.[19] Es handelt sich bei von Trothas Teilnachlass um Bücher und Aufsätze und um weiteres Material, das noch gesichtet werden muss.

Das ZMO

Die Entscheidung der Angehörigen Peter Sebalds, seinen wissenschaftlichen, afrikabezogenen Nachlass an das Zentrum Moderner Orient zu geben, liegt wohl in Sebalds indirekter Verbindung mit der Geschichte des Instituts begründet. Das ZMO entstand 1991 als Forschungsschwerpunkt Moderner Orient auf der Basis der Abteilung „Geschichte der Entwicklungsländer“ des Instituts für Allgemeine Geschichte der Akademie der Wissenschaften der DDR, an der Sebald gearbeitet hatte. Allerdings hatte Sebald nach der Auflösung der Akademie und der Schließung dieses Instituts eine Stelle als Afrika-Historiker am Forschungsschwerpunkt Moderner Orient zugunsten seiner Forschungstätigkeit im Nationalarchiv von Lomé abgelehnt. Aus dem Forschungsschwerpunkt ging 1996 das Zentrum Moderner Orient hervor, das 2017 zum Leibniz-Zentrum Moderner Orient wurde. Gemeinsam mit dem Leibniz-Zentrum Allgemeine Sprachwissenschaft (ZAS) und dem Leibniz-Zentrum für Literatur- und Kulturforschung (ZfL) wird es von den Geisteswissenschaftlichen Zentren Berlin e. V. (GWZ) verwaltet.

Zu den Archivbeständen des ZMO gehören mehrere Nachlässe von Forscherinnen und Forschern der Akademie der Wissenschaften der DDR, deren Wirken das Institut vor allem in seinen frühen Jahren deutlich geprägt hat.

18 Wichtigstes Buch des Siegener Soziologen zur Kolonialgeschichte Togos: Trotha, Trutz von: Koloniale Herrschaft. Zur soziologischen Theorie der Staatsentstehung am Beispiel des „Schutzgebietes Togo“, Tübingen 1994.

19 Karabaev, Alisher: Vortragsmanuskript für die Veranstaltung „Das dickste Buch zur kleinsten Kolonie“. Vorstellung des Sebald-Nachlasses am Leibniz-Zentrum Moderner Orient. Veranstaltung in Kooperation mit der Gesellschaft zur Förderung des ZMO e. V. am 1. Juni 2018.

Bereits vollständig erschlossen ist der umfangreiche und international nachgefragte Nachlass von Prof. Dr. Gerhard Höpp (1942–2003). Seine Forschungsthemen umfassten vor allem Arabische Begegnungen mit dem Nationalsozialismus, Muslime in Deutschland vor 1945, den Schriftsteller Essad Bey, sowie Demokratiebewegung und Aufstände in den Golfstaaten zur Zeit des Kalten Krieges.

Von dem Historiker Dr. Horst Krueger (1920–1989), der 1957 bis 1959 Kulturberater an der Handelsvertretung der DDR in Indien war, erhielt das ZMO einen umfangreichen Nachlass, der aus Akten und Aktenverfilmungen aus Indien zum Thema „Die internationale Arbeiterbewegung und die indische nationale Befreiungsbewegung" besteht. Dr. Petra Heidrich (1940–2006) hinterließ weiteres indienbezogenes Material. Es besteht vor allem aus Kopien indischer Akten zur Sozialgeschichte, insbesondere der Bauern- und Landarbeiter, sowie der Reformbewegungen des 19. und 20. Jahrhunderts. Heidrich lebte von 1973 bis 1981 mit ihrer Familie in Indien, wo sie bis 1975 als Forscherin an der Universität von Kalkutta arbeitete. Informationen über diese und weitere Schenkungen und Nachlässe, die zum Teil auch aus ganz anderen Lebens- und Forschungszusammenhängen stammen, sind auf der ZMO-Internetseite hinterlegt.

Wie aus der Kurzbeschreibung der Nachlässe deutlich wird, wurde und wird am ZMO nicht nur über Afrika geforscht. Regional deckt es auch die MENA-Region (Mittlerer Osten und Nordafrika), Zentral-, Süd- und Südostasien ab. Nach langjähriger Förderung der Projekte durch die DFG wird es seit 2008 mit dem Dachprogramm „Muslimische Welten – Welt des Islams? Entwürfe, Praktiken und Krisen des Globalen" durch das Bundesministerium für Bildung und Forschung finanziert (2008–2019). Seit 2017 ist es in die Bund-Länder-Förderung der Leibniz-Gemeinschaft aufgenommen worden. Neben Historikern arbeiten hier Anthropologen, Islamwissenschaftler, Politologen, Kulturwissenschaftler und Vertreter weiterer Fachrichtungen interdisziplinär und in vergleichender Perspektive in vier Arbeitsgruppen über „Fortschritt: Ideen, Akteure und Symbolik", „Lebenswege und Wissen", „Ressourcenpolitik" und „Städte als Laboratorien des Wandels: die ‚Ränder' der Stadt". Im Zentrum des Interesses steht das Verständnis außereuropäischer Regionen, ihres Verhältnisses untereinander und zu Europa, wobei gesellschaftliche Akteure, Institutionen und Globalisierungsprozesse untersucht werden. Dabei legen die Forschenden auf der Basis ihrer breit gefächerten Sprach-, Quellen- und Regionalkenntnisse Wert auf Archivarbeit und empirisch untermauerte Studien.

In Dialogue with Society

Travel: A Post-Covid-19 Fantasy

Samuli Schielke

In Summer 2020, Barak Kalir, Catherine Besteman and Heath Cabot invited Samuli Schielke to contribute to an experimental series of short essays on 'Post-Covid Fantasies', requesting him to 'draw on your empirical and/or autobiographical research to propose imagined or speculative future scenarios for how things could be better in a post-covid world than previously'. Samuli Schielke's attempt to imagine a world of free but slow travel that does not ruin the ecosystem has evidently not come true, but the essay was first published on the American Ethnologist website on 27 July 2020. It is published for the first time in print in the ZMO triannual yearbook report.

As an anthropologist I'm better trained in critique than in fantasy, and so I asked Bassem Abu Gweily, a poet and migrant worker, for inspiration. He wrote:

"The first thing that crossed my mind was Don Quixote on his travels, or Che Guevara on his trip … and the journey of the *Divine Comedy*. This kind of things, and for example Invisible Cities and *If on a Winter's Night a Traveler* by Calvino, and the travels of the Friends of God (*awliya' Allah*), the people of the step. And there is the movie *Interstellar* …"

This is the kind of travel that I would like to see possible in a better world after Covid-19. However I'm not a poet; mine is a scientific fantasy bound by certain premises, of which there are three – two conservative, and one radical:

- *First*, laws of physics remain the same. We cannot have all the good things for all the people all the time because our economic activity inevitably depletes natural resources on which the survival of Earth's ecosystem relies.
- *Second*, humans will not turn to angels. We continue to be capable of cooperation and prone to competition alike. Our search for justice remains paired with our striving for privilege. Our sense of solidarity will still cast shadows of racism and other prejudice. Inequalities, conflicts, and double standards will be part of our better world.
- *Third*, and this is the radical assumption, at the end of the Covid-19 pandemic, humans will miraculously reach a moment of shared long-term insight of the situation we all are in, and join in a unique collective act to establish a world in which our constructive potentials of cooperation, solidarity, permissiveness, and care are utilized better, and our destructive potentials tamed. A miraculous solution to our economy's fateful dependency on growth is found, and we transition to an age of sustainable economic stability wherein even the poorest have enough to eat, and the wealthy may enjoy modest comfort but no excessive luxury. Don't ask me how.

In the new world, there is no discrimination between travellers. There are no visa regimes and no border controls. Everyone can move and settle as they want. The settlement of large populations in a new location requires a negotiation and agreement with the previous inhabitants of the area, but that is not needed very often, because people are rarely compelled to move in great numbers. Migration is easily available, but is no longer an urgent necessity because inequality throughout the globe has been somewhat reduced and is geographically

At Checkpoint Charlie where the Berlin Wall once stood, borders and controls are a memory from the past, and there are no tourists in May 2020

more evenly spread than it was before Covid-19. While there are richer and poorer, more and less powerful people in all countries, no country is richer or poorer than the other. The same is true for villages and cities. Village life is more vibrant and pluralistic than previously. Not all rural people appreciate the plurality, but they do appreciate that their children no longer have to move to the cities or abroad in search of opportunities. Big cities are less dynamic and cosmopolitan, but also less stressful and more affordable to live in than previously.

Political asylum is easily and universally available, but in not much demand because labor migrants are no longer forced to use the asylum system as a detour around visa regimes like they were previously, and because the relative equality of economic conditions around the world ensures a relative similarity of political conditions. Since conflicts still exist, refugees still exist, but one part of the miraculous reorganization of global society is that wars, when they happen, are short, limited, and conclusive, so that people displaced by them can return to their homes after weeks, or months at most.

But while everybody can travel, there is discrimination regarding the kinds, means, and speed of travel. Due to the great ecological damage it causes, high-speed long-distance travel is restricted to few uniquely important purposes, to which I return below. At the other end of the spectrum, travelling on foot, bicycle, and the like is free and unrestricted (and some amends are made for people who are disabled or sick). For migration, slow but long-distance means of travel such as trains and ships are available, allowing safe and comfortable passage but discouraging long-distance commuter lifestyles. Private cars are available for short-range transportation if they are more efficient than rail, busses, and cycling (they don't even have to be electric, if there are not too many of them).

Long-distance tourism is abolished. Leisure outings over short distances on foot, bicycle, rowing boat, regional train, or the like are easily available and very popular. Business travel is replaced by online meetings (which we don't like, but they fulfill their purpose). Business travel is in less demand anyway since the localization of inequalities makes it no longer profitable to produce and transport goods around the world just because salaries are lower on the other side of the globe.

Some means of travel, however, are so important that for them more wasteful and speedy means of transportation are available.

Dante's journey through Hell, Purgatory, and Heaven; Marco Polo's stories of strange, mind-bending communities in Italo Calvino's *Invisible Cities*; and the travels east and west of the Mediterranean by Muslim mystics (the Friends of God) who would become the founders of Sufi paths in the Middle East, together stand for travel for the sake of spiritual and imaginative learning and discovery. Such travel is not about literally walking through the afterlife or conversing with Genghis Khan; instead it shares the crucial feature of openness for new, unknown, invisible knowledge and experiences without which we would only be half human. Open-endedness is its most important characteristic. The Friends of God embarked from Andalusia and Morocco to Mecca on journeys that lasted a lifetime, for most of them either died or settled along the way (a few of them in Egypt).[1]

The Hollywood science fiction movie *Interstellar* stands for scientific study and research, especially of the kind that is crucial for planetary survival. Scientific travel in this sense is obviously not about attending conferences or job talks. The journey to the stars in *Interstellar* lasts literally longer than a lifetime and involves a dip into a black hole. Our scientific travel won't be quite that adventurous (human space flight probably won't be within the means of our ecologically limited energy budgets, and on visiting black holes, see the first premise above); again, what matters is open-endedness. (On this issue, I have a selfish interest, for as an anthropol-

1 The Friends of God were also reputed to know a miraculous, energy-free way of travelling vast distances in a single step. But since it is not in line with the first of the two conservative premises of my utopia, I am for the time being assuming that it will not be widely available.

ogist, I could be eligible to book a plane ticket every two or three years or so to embark on fieldwork where I may learn things that I could not otherwise imagine.)

The travels of Che Guevara, as recorded in *The Motorcycle Diaries* and later in his travels as a professional revolutionary, represent travel for urgent political, activist, and societal issues. Although most people now are mobile mainly over short distances, the problems we face are global, and require alliances and solutions that connect people around the globe. Guevara did not board a low-cost air-carrier, but embarked on an uncertain adventure upon motorcycle, hitchhiking, and a raft, among others. Later when he gained access to speedier means of travel, his journeys became more dangerous, and eventually got him killed. The willingness to take such risks are now a requirement for political travel.

Safety and certainty are features of short-range or slow travel, contributing to the safety and certainty of our ecosystem's survival. The privilege of range and speed is given to risky, unlikely, and open-ended journeys – travel that is like the beginnings of which Calvino's novel *If on a Winter's Night a Traveler* consists, one beginning leading to another beginning, never coming back to the previous story.

The highest, and only unlimited form of travel is therefore that of Don Quixote: journeys of poetic madness that lead to nowhere in particular, and by so doing give geographic contours to humanity's capacity to dream beyond and against utility. The world's only private jet is reserved for Don Quixote and Sancho Panza. But since they prefer wandering about the Mancha riding Rocinante and Sancho's donkey, the plane remains parked on the tarmac waiting, ready to take off upon their request.

Acknowledgements: Thanks are due to Asmaa Essakouti and Bassem Abu Gweily for inspiration and feedback.



Samuli Schielke, Mukhtar Saad Shehata: Shared Margins. An Ethnography with Writers in Alexandria after the Revolution, ZMO Studien 41 (Walter de Gruyter, 2021)

Shared Margins tells of writers, writing, and literary milieus in Alexandria, Egypt's second city. It de-centres cosmopolitan avant-gardes and secular-revolutionary aesthetics that have been intensively documented and studied since 2011. Instead, it offers a fieldwork-based account of various milieus and styles, and their common grounds and lines of division. Structured in two parts, *Shared Margins* gives an account of literature as a social practice embedded in milieus that at once enable and limit literary imagination, and of a life-worldly experience of plurality in absence of pluralism that marks literary engagements with the intimate and social realities of Alexandria after 2011.

“The Other” Costs of the Pandemic

Sonja Hegasy, Nitin Sinha

Are non-European experiences relevant for a country like Germany in dealing with the Covid-19 pandemic? After all, beyond the sameness of symptoms, the spread of virus has played out differently in different world regions. Yet, social and political events of the last few months have laid bare the interconnectedness and similarities of different countries. From the struggles related to rent and mortgage in the U. S. to those of internal migrant crises and the role of justice in housing in India, multiple examples have shown that the pandemic has affected the underprivileged of different societies in a similar manner. Women’s workload due to increased care work and the resulting gender imbalance hidden in “work from home” has been noticed in regions of both the Global North and the Global South. In Germany since the early days of the onset of Covid-19, the ZMO has been at the forefront of collecting and analysing responses to the unfolding crises in the Global South. Our colleagues at the centre and from its wider network have contributed to this effort. The result is what we call our “Corona dossier”, which is accessible at https://www.zmo.de/wissenstransfer/corona-experiences.

Covid-19 motivated scholars from all disciplines all over the world to test their previous assumptions about modernity, globalization, climate change, public health, welfare systems, and so on. Societies that had managed to bracket death away were suddenly confronted with the possibility of a large number of deaths, thus casting doubt on the “preparedness” managed by science and governance. Covid-19 laid bare the tension between life and livelihood.

In the 21st century, more people die of obesity than of hunger. Global hunger is a plague that scientists had hoped to overcome by 2030. Now the picture looks much bleaker: 135 million people were suffering from hunger before the pandemic. This number could have doubled by the end of the year due to the Corona pandemic, with South Asia having the steepest rise according to a report from the United Nations World Food Program (WFP). Thirty million people rely on life-saving food from the WFP that needs to reach them. “This does not include the increase of starvation due to Covid-19,” the Executive Director states. Day labourers and those working for daily wages obviously have no savings, provisions for state safety net are weak, and access to public health is greatly limited. Yet, this is rarely put into the equation when German opinion leaders discuss the pros and cons of the lockdown (see e. g. the debate between Jürgen Habermas and Klaus Günther on basic liberties versus the protection of life, DIE ZEIT, 7 May 2020).

Based on data representing 90% of global employment, the ILO estimates that 77% of the workers aged between 15 and 24 and around 60% of adult workers (aged 25 and older) have informal jobs. Therefore, we can read the writing on the wall that in all likelihood the questions of economy, health, and livelihood emerging from the Global South may result in a dramatic downside in the global shutdown as a whole. Unemployment resulting from firms closing has also been witnessed in the industrialised North, and increasing layoffs might further spread to new sectors, including academia.

In the months of May and June, German newspapers, one after the other, discovered this global dimension of Covid-19 beyond the medical context of the spread of the virus. In

Mumbai (Bombay), Maharashtra, India. A resident of Dharavi, Asia's largest slum and one of India's corona virus hotspots, collects spilled rice from the street that was shed by a truck carrying essential food items. The photographed asked for the wide distribution of the image.

early May, the authors Ilija Trojanow and Thomas Gebauer, Managing Director of Medico International, pointed to the experiences of "poor" countries potentially interrupting global production and consumption schemes. The authors quoted their interlocutor in Sierra Leone, Abu Brima, who works in a local NGO there: "If we subordinate ourselves to the rules and regulations of the North, we have to be prepared for a major catastrophe." (FAZ, 4 May 2020). Trojanow called this weighing up of measures to combat the spread of the virus and the effects of these measurements a "global triage" in which choices will be made as to which parts of the economy the states will support and which others will be allowed to recede in importance. At the end of May, DIE ZEIT headlined an article: "Deadlier than the virus. In many countries of the Global South, a new catastrophe looms as a result of the fight against the Corona pandemic: famine."

Experiences from India, the Gulf, Kenya, and Niger, which are discussed in the Dossier, have made it very clear that the question of hunger became critical right from the beginning of the Covid-19 pandemic. Caught between the choices related to life and livelihood, concerns have been raised whether this issue should not have been taken into account when decisions for global lockdowns were taken. Are these experiences operational for the Federal Republic of Germany? We would like to think so. It could have helped us had we paid attention to the concerns emerging from the Global South early on when we enter into the uncertain phase of the future of global economy, movements across regions, and interlinked systems of production chains.

The Russian Invasion of Ukraine as a Contestation of the Liberal Script? – № 12: The Saudi Reaction to the Ukraine War as Indicator of Shifting Alliances

Ulrike Freitag

The reactions to Russia's war in Ukraine shed a light on the global alliance of authoritarian regimes. Saudi Arabia's reaction, as described by Ulrike Freitag, illustrates the re-orientation of the foreign policy of the Gulf states. Its refusal to stabilise energy prices in the wake of the invasion of Ukraine serves as a reminder that the West cannot rely on its partnership for gas and oil supplies.

It was two weeks into the war in Ukraine when a number of news outlets reported that the leaders of Saudi Arabia and the UAE had refused to take calls by US President Joe Biden, instead choosing to speak to Russian President Vladimir Putin. While the veracity of the claim was quickly rejected, it is indicative of the steep deterioration in Gulf-US relations and a re-orientation of the foreign policy of the Gulf states. Why is it that Saudi Arabia, on which this blog entry focuses, is abandoning an alliance that had served it well for over seventy years?

In April 2018, the young Saudi crown prince Muhammad bin Salman reciprocated the visit of then-US President Donald Trump. MbS, as he is commonly known, spent a triumphant three weeks touring the United States, meeting its current and some former presidents as well as influential politicians, business people and students. Just as President Trump had sealed a major arms' deal during his visit to Saudi Arabia, so did MbS conclude a wide range of business deals.

The glamour of these two visits, and indeed the period of the Trump presidency, glossed over a rift which became visible during the Obama administration (2009–2017) and had arguably already started after the attacks of September 11, 2001. The shift of focus in American foreign policy from the Middle to the Far East and in particular the attempt to negotiate a nuclear agreement with Iran did not go down well with Saudi Arabia which had, since the Iranian Revolution of 1979, come to consider Shi'ite-led Iran as a major political and religious rival.

From a Saudi perspective, Iran is not only a regional rival and a potential influence on the Saudi Shi'ites living mostly in Saudi Arabia's oil-rich Eastern province. It is also seen as the main supporter for a major faction in the Yemen Civil War, the Shi'ite Houthi movement. Although the relations between the Houthis and Iran are less than straightforward, Saudi Arabia, together with the UAE, launched a war in March 2015. Seven years later, this war is still continuing. Beyond causing massive civilian and military losses, wide-scale destruction and a humanitarian catastrophe in Yemen, the Houthis have managed repeated drone attacks on Saudi Arabia and, to a lesser extent, the UAE.

The latest attacks by Houthis on Saudi Arabia in March 2022 which hit, among others, oil and gas installations in different parts of the country, prompted Saudi Arabia to declare that "it would not bear responsibility for any global oil supply shortages". This rang a warning bell with Western politicians at a time when they were desperately trying to woo the Gulf states into increasing supplies of oil and gas in order to stabilise world energy prices and com-

pensate for lower imports from Russia. This dependence became recently visible again during the visit of Germany's Minister for Economic Affairs and Climate Action in Qatar. The declaration which was issued by a state that prides itself as "the world's most reliable oil supplier" with a "unique oil infrastructure … to meet fluctuations in market demand", expressed Saudi exasperation at what they see as Western support for a militia causing major damage to Saudi infrastructure. Given the Saudi perception of the Houthis as an Iranian vassal, this is interpreted as another sign of support for Iran. The brutality of the Saudi attack on Yemen, ostensibly in support for the UN-recognised Yemeni government had indeed led to very public debates about Western arms sales to Saudi Arabia and the Gulf.

Beyond Western concerns about Saudi war crimes in Yemen, repeated Western criticism of human rights violations in Saudi Arabia itself against opposition figures is anathema in Saudi Arabia. The most blatant case was the assassination of US-based Saudi journalist Jamal Khashogghi in Istanbul, which, according to declassified US intelligence, was approved by the Saudi crown prince himself. In a country in which power is highly centralised and personalised, any critique, let alone when it comes from the most important international ally, is taken very personally.

Deputy Crown Prince Muhammad bin Salman and President Vladimir Putin meet at the G20 Summit in 2016

In the light of these and further grievances it is not surprising that Saudi Arabia and the UAE are urgently seeking to diversify their foreign policy options. In the summer of 2021, the Saudi and Russian Defence Ministers met and agreed on the development of military cooperation. This alliance builds on an earlier (failed) attempt by OPEC to hinder the US development of cheaper shale oil production, which had decreased significantly US dependency on Gulf oil. Between 2014 and 2016, OPEC cooperated closely with Russia, and following the failure of the so-called Oil Price War, Russia and Saudi Arabia intensified their cooperation notably in the gas sector.

Further afield, China in particular offers what, from a Gulf perspective, is an attractive alternative of governance to that of the United States. Its authoritarian model, based on rapid material progress and tight securitisation, seems a better and more reliable fit to the Gulf visions of unrestrained monarchic rule than the democratic systems that seem to change their mind on Middle East policy every few years. Furthermore, China is seen as a rising economic and political power, quite in contrast to the perception of a West declining economically and politically, offering cooperation in the fields of infrastructure, technology and security (Wakefield & Levenstein, 2011). It is a cooperation that is based on strict political non-interference in internal affairs. Thus, Saudi Arabia, long known as a champion of Muslim rights, has joined other Arab states in deporting (Muslim) Uyghurs to China.

Saudi Arabia's refusal to stabilise energy prices in the wake of the invasion of Ukraine serves as a reminder of its weakening links with the United States and its (and the Gulf's) re-orientation towards other powers. One of the attractions of Russia (as well as of China) is their reluctance to interfere in Saudi affairs, for example by criticising Saudi Arabia for its Human Rights Record, its authoritarian government or its involvement in Yemen. Critical debates in parliaments and newspapers about Saudi Arabia do not go down well with the rulers in Riyadh, and are considered to be a very irritating feature of liberal democracies, even if Western governments decide to cooperate closely. Hence, the Ukraine war and the re-positioning of Saudi Arabia (and the UAE) as independent from their former foremost allies is also an indication of the attraction of the authoritarian model found in Russia.

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

Randa Aboubakr, Sarah Jurkiewicz, Hicham Ait-Mansour, Ulrike Freitag (eds.): Spaces of Participation. Dynamics of Social and Political Change in the Arab World (AUC Press, 2021)

Where do people meet, form relations of trust, and begin debating social and political issues? Where do social movements start? In this fascinating collection, scholars and activists from a wealth of disciplinary backgrounds, including sociology, anthropology, history, and political science, take a fresh look at these questions and the factors leading to political and social change in the Arab world from a spatial perspective. Based on original field work in Egypt, Kuwait, Morocco, and Palestine, Spaces of Participation connects and reconnects social, cultural, and political participation with urban space. It explores timely themes such as formal and informal spaces of participation, alternative spaces of cultural production, space reclamation, and cultural activism, and the reconfiguring of space through different types of contestation. It also covers a range of spaces that include sports clubs, arts centers, and sites of protest and resistance, as well as virtual spaces such as social media platforms, in the process of examining the relationships and tensions between physical and virtual space.

Spaces of Participation underlines the temporal and transformative quality of participatory spaces and how they are shaped by their respective political contexts, highlighting different forms of access, control, and contestation.

Collaboration and Creativity

Veronica Ferreri, Fuad Musallam, Ella Parry-Davies and Nadine Plachta

It was already dark when I entered the small shop in the informal camp in rural Lebanon, where Khulud was waiting for customers. This was my first return to the field after more than a year of absence, and it was emotionally overwhelming. Khulud smiled and kissed me several times on the cheeks. I was visiting her together with her son, Abu Younes, who sat next to me while Khulud arranged food for us. I was surprised by her invitation to eat, a practice of hospitality I had only encountered at the beginning of my stay with the community when I was undoubtedly considered a foreign guest, a social standing I had thought altered by all my shared moments with Khulud.

That I wasn't the only one thinking this way was confirmed a little later. I was still eating when Abu Younes lit up a cigarette, a gesture to which Khulud reacted by whispering something in his ear. His irritated gaze reached her as he spoke: "She is family!" I looked to Abu Younes for an explanation. He said that Khulud was upset that he had stopped eating before me, the guest. She lamented his refusal to perform one of the duties of hospitality. But Abu Younes interpreted his own gesture not as a refusal of tradition but of her imposition of the host/guest framework. For him, I was not a guest because of my social and political role within the community. My presence in the family's everyday life was combined with my work at the informal school the community had created where I had helped plan the artistic programme, as well as draft and translate reports for international organisations and statements to Lebanese religious authorities regarding the hardships faced by displaced Syrians. My role was constantly renegotiated: sometimes, I was washing the dishes with Khulud's daughter-in-law, and at other times I was sipping coffee with Abu Younes and other Syrian elders to discuss the situation in Syria, the challenges of their displacement in Lebanon, their engagement with Lebanese authorities, and social relations with the broader Syrian exile community. My role in family life sealed a level of trust and care that went beyond political work, yet it also made possible the role I performed within the school.

This reflection from Veronica Ferreri's fieldwork is, in some ways, a story shared by many ethnographers. We come to the field and over time develop intense and shifting relationships with a range of people. We are drawn, by choice and by necessity, into the lives and projects of our interlocutors, all the more so when we have certain technical competencies that can work to the advantage of those we work with, or when we have explicit political commitments to our interlocutors. Veronica's collaborations were organic, ad-hoc, programmatic in the flow of ordinary life, or else reactive, responding to events, like the rumours of possible camp raids and evictions, as well as the closure of Syrian informal schools.

In the text that follows, co-authored by Veronica with Fuad Musallam, Ella Parry-Davies and Nadine Plachta, we bring this sense of ethnographic collaboration – forged in the crucible of familial, social, and political commitment – in conversation with the other three authors' collaborations: a participatory archive in Lebanon, a set of collaborative soundwalks in London, a work of speculative photography in Nepal. These collaborations are multimodal, participatory, and co-constituted, and they are explicit attempts to produce specific things that

can then have political effects for collaborators. They occur alongside, sometimes as part of, discrete political engagements, whose ambiguities are also central to the development of relations that feed into the political and creative work carried out by the communities and ourselves as researchers. Across them, we explore how similar re/negotiations are practised wherever collaboration is central to ethnographic work. In particular, we attend to the material conditions of collaboration – spatial, social, temporal and political – and how these shape and constrain the modes of engagement that take form. The following three reflections are on more time-bound collaborative projects, but framed by the opening vignette, they show how collaborative dynamics are informed by and also bleed into the "everyday" of ethnographic relationships. The reflections develop in open-ended ways, through the ebb and flow of the negotiation of roles, positions and modes of action, which have material contexts and conditions. This ebb and flow can even exceed what we think of as a discrete collaborative project and its intentions.

Materiality and tangibility

If Veronica's leaving the field shifted her position within Khulud's family, it was Fuad's return to the Beirut-based Migrant Community Centre (MCC) that made an archival collaboration there possible. In fact, in the years between first spending time at the MCC in 2013–14 and returning in 2018, almost all those members Fuad had developed friendships with had

Cigarette after a meal, Dubai 2021



Archives and collaborations, Alexandria 2016

left: deported, or granted asylum elsewhere, or no longer living near enough to the Centre, or simply moved away from the Centre's activities. Nevertheless, his recollections of the Centre as a hub of activity (a yearly calendar of marches, demonstrations and celebrations, a weekly calendar of meetings, classes, services, and leisure, and the daily experience of a site thick with photos on every wall) informed the initial idea of a participatory archive of the Centre, curated and organised with members. In the context of a high turnover in membership and an always precarious existence, long-time members participating in the collaboration then pushed to find ways to teach newcomers what the Centre had achieved and commemorate the legacy of those people who helped it do so, especially those no longer present.

If the high turnover and uncertain situation motivated the collaboration, then material conditions contoured the actual form it took: two changes of location in six years, a space too small and constantly in use for different activities, things moving and being moved. Between changes of building, lack of storage, and the physical space in constant use, whole years of time were (materially) unaccounted for. Archivable material was found tucked away in children's colouring books, or in drawers where it had been tidied away in haste when a room was needed for some other activity. MCC members involved in the archiving project tried to find times when one room or another was free to hold archiving sessions, but for month-long periods rooms were fully booked, often to create new things like posters and placards for demonstrations, but so too for the language classes, members' meetings, or medical check-ups that made up the weekly and yearly political calendar of migrant community organising.

All these material aspects constrained what was found, who was involved, and where collaboration took place. But the best parts of the collaboration also emerged from those conditions. Collaborators responded to what they found: a history of the MCC became a visual primer of MCC's activities, its form a response to the Centre's polyglossia and the resonance of photos as a record of the collective past. Meanwhile, the idea to exhibit placards and posters in the Centre was wholly serendipitous, a product of members in one archiving session suggesting something be put up in the room where the session took place. In a context where the possibility of migrant worker cross-community organising was a precarious achievement, the collaboration created tangible things: the protest paraphernalia up on the wall, the poster formatted and ready to print, the archive safely stored, accompanied with resources for how to use it. Material constraints were also sites of possibility, then. But the collaboration was, importantly, only ever one (small) part of the MCC as a space, and the lives and activities of members, even those actively collaborating. This should give pause for thought to consider the way that a collaboration relates to its object, and the social and political relations in which it is embedded.

The materiality of time

The noisy and stuff-filled life of Sundays at MCC belied silent weekdays when its members were at work elsewhere. Here wage labour shapes the time and space where collaboration can occur, pointing to temporality itself as a material concern. The question is acute when the community of collaboration is defined by their category of labour, and face severe forms of exploitation and oppression. This was the case for many MCC members who were subject to structural violence tied to misogyny, racism, and precarious migration status. Ella's research involved making collaborative soundwalks with migrant domestic workers in Lebanon and in the UK. The soundwalks attempted to generate a mode of listening attentive to participants' experiences and their decisions about self-representation. Soundwalk-making involves going for a walk and recording a conversation in a place a domestic worker has chosen for its significance, often a site of activism (either quotidian or organised). The recording is then co-edited with the collaborator, and the finished soundwalk is uploaded to the project website along with instructions and a map, so that listeners can return to the place in question, playing the edited soundwalk through headphones as they re-trace the initial walk.

While the finished soundwalks were between two and twenty-five minutes each, participants spent up to thirteen hours editing them. Making sure they would be remunerated for this time involved negotiations concerning research ethics, where the importance of non-coercion, and the principle that the collaboration involved more than a financial transaction, had to be balanced against recognition of their creative labour. Audio editing is extremely labour-intensive, and the collaborative intentions of the project were at times compromised by the realities of precarity, unpredictability and transience. If domestic workers' employers had unexpected guests, a day off would be retracted at the last minute, without pay. If their migratory status came under review, concerns about visibility and deportation might make somebody withdraw from the project entirely. Attending to these limitations recognises the uneven efforts of different bodies in collaboration and considers creative agency and labour as two sides of the same coin.

Collaboration, anticipation, and their limits

Each soundwalk expresses just a fragment of a person's narrative. As listeners, it asks us to acknowledge the limits of our understanding, a question that is underlined by the ambiguity of sound and the absence of the dominant visual sense. These uneven efforts at collaboration shift our gaze to issues of intention, reception, and audience. Collaboration can produce anticipation both towards the final product but also in relation to how a project is perceived by those we engage with in the process. This became apparent in a collaborative ethnographic project on the affective economies of road construction that Nadine and Konstantin Ikonomidis carried out. As a social anthropologist and an architect interested in infrastructure development, they wanted to draw attention to the challenges road construction poses for people's livelihoods and the environment in ecologically fragile Himalayan valleys. Roads, they contended, do not necessarily bring the development and economic benefits they promise. Their construction entails multifaceted processes that create and reproduce vulnerabilities and have many unintended outcomes.

Nadine and Konstantin's collaboration reflected their individual disciplinary background. Nadine, who has been engaged with people living in Nepal's Tsum valley since 2012, contributed to the project with the intimate knowledge of a place and the skills of creative ethnographic writing, while Konstantin drew on his training in architectural sketching, photography, and the creation of digitally enhanced images. Their research was based on fantastical and speculative images that rendered different infrastructures (highways, bridges, apartment buildings) in the local mountain landscape to allow people to imagine, consider and see versions of the future. That is, the images were meant to inspire people to speak out about their hopes and expectations as well as fears and doubts in regard to road construction.

The content of the images was constantly negotiated and renegotiated; they were created, exchanged, and revised in conversation with the people Konstantin and Nadine had met in Tsum. For example, an image depicting a road next to a pilgrimage place led one local resident to demand a sidewalk for the protection of pedestrians, something they included in the subsequent version of the image. Another person feared the consequences of pollution and dust on agricultural production, so they created an image featuring a bridge across fields to prevent negative environmental effects. An important part of the design and development process of the renderings, then, was how infrastructures fit into the landscape and how they will function.

But Konstantin and Nadine also came to realize that the images did not straightforwardly bring to life details about the future in their audience. Documenting and communicating ideas of progress and change in a geographically marginal region through digitally enhanced images offered an ethnographic space to negotiate the future, but also had its limits. People in Tsum had been mobilizing for a different alignment of the road to avert significant damage to culturally and architecturally important buildings and the environment. As a result of their political activism to press for an alternative route, however, some Tsum residents were subjected to threats from the government. They expressed disenchantment and exhaustion and hesitated to talk to Konstantin and Nadine, causing the ethnographers to reflect on their own positionality and how collaborative fieldwork is perceived under conditions of risk and uncertainty.

Conclusion

In all these stories, collaboration is born out of a combination of ethnographic research and political engagement: uncertain and open-ended, problematising or exceeding both positions. As Veronica's return to the community she worked and lived with shows, complex roles are formed through different modes of engagement, from participation in political struggle to care for quotidian family life. As social relations morph across time and space, so too do the political projects we, as ethnographers and researchers, inhabit and – at times – share with the communities we work with.

> "Collaboration is born out of a combination of ethnographic research and political engagement: uncertain and open-ended, problematising or exceeding both positions."

In Fuad's collaboration, we see attempts to retain the material record of political organising and social life in the face of loss of persons, places, and objects. To produce tangible things is to render that history into the present for new members of the community, to show that this history is theirs, too. Ella's work with migrant domestic workers also points to a range of material intentions, from making politicised self-representation audible, to the transformative effects this can have for individuals. Nadine's collaborative project is an attempt to make imaginable what the future can and should hold, an exercise that unintendedly materialised the fatigue of the community in resisting a future in which their political agency would be in question. The ambiguity of "collaboration" and its ties to creative and political work offer insights in the multitude of conditions that shape our engagements and their outcomes.



Kai Kresse, Abdoulaye Sounaye (eds.): Thinking the Re-Thinking of the World. Decolonial Challenges to the Humanities and Social Sciences from Africa, Asia and the Middle East, ZMO-Studien 43 (Walter de Gruyter, 2022)

As far too many intellectual histories and theoretical contributions from the 'Global South' remain under-explored, this volume works towards redressing such imbalance. Experienced authors from the regions concerned, along different disciplinary lines, and with a focus on different historical timeframes, sketch out their perspectives of envisaged transformations. The volume includes specific case studies and reflexive accounts from African, South Asian, and Middle Eastern contexts. Taking a critical stance on the ongoing dominance of Eurocentrism in academia, the authors present their contributions in relation to current decolonial debates and challenges.

Hereby, they consider intellectual, practical and structural aspects and dimensions, to mark and build their respective positions. From their particular vantage points of (trans)disciplinary and transregional engagement, they sketch out potential pathways for addressing the unfinished business of conceptual decolonization. The specific individual positionalities of the contributors, which are shaped by location and regional perspective as much as in disciplinary, biographical, linguistic, religious, and other terms, are hereby kept in view. Drawing on their significant experiences and insights gained in both the global north and global south, the contributors offer original and innovative models of engagement and theorizing frames that seek to restore and critically engage with intellectual practices from particular regions and transregional contexts in Africa, South Asia, and the Middle East.

“It’s a Very Western Vision of the World”

How Ideological Bias and Structural Inequality Prevent the IPCC from Exploring Possibilities for Fundamental Transformation

Interview Juliane Schumacher with Yamina Saheb and Kai Kuhnhenn

The most recent report from the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) not only shows that urgent and drastic changes will be necessary to avert even more devastating consequences of global warming than those which are already unavoidable, but also mentions, for the first time, the possibility or even necessity of reducing demand, i. e. the use of energy and resources.

This reality, however, is not reflected in the scenarios included in the IPCC report, as climate experts Yamina Saheb and Kai Kuhnhenn point out. Juliane Schumacher spoke with both of them to understand more about how IPCC reports are compiled, whose interests and biases they reflect, and how to address the deep inequalities in funding and access to the scientific process.

Juliane Schumacher: The third part of the IPCC report was published in April, with a focus on mitigation scenarios and policies. Yamina and Kai, you’re both familiar with the IPCC process or have even contributed to the report. Was there anything in it that surprised you?

Yamina Saheb: Yes, there was! We succeeded in including the concept of “sufficiency” in the Summary for Policymakers – that’s actually revolutionary. We even have a definition on page 41, footnote 60.

How is sufficiency defined?

YS: Sufficiency denotes all the policy measures and daily practices that avoid the demand for energy, materials, water, and land, while providing wellbeing for all within planetary boundaries. This means putting a cap on the overconsumption of the North to allow the South to develop, with another cap on the overconsumption of the richest in the North to allow low-income communities to access decent living standards.

Kai Kuhnhenn: I was surprised by Chapter 5, which mentioned the inequality of energy consumption and greenhouse gas emissions. It’s good that this is getting discussed.

If you look at the IPCC reports over the years, there is usually a statement on growth in some part of the report, something like: “economic growth is a driver of emissions”, or “economic growth does not correlate with wellbeing in saturated societies”. But then you have the modelling side, and that side has a very strict bias: “We will model economic growth until the end of times.”

So, there was always a certain kind of schizophrenia between the different parts of the IPCC. That is even stronger in this report, because there is so much talk about reducing demand, sufficiency, or even degrowth, but it's not reflected at all in the modelling part.

YS: You have to understand that we have 17 chapters, and what ultimately enters a chapter depends a lot on the coordinating lead authors and how much they're willing to push for. I regret that sufficiency doesn't appear much in Chapter 5, which is first-ever chapter on services and demand. It's a chapter I would have loved to be in, but I was the lead author of the chapter on buildings, my primary area of expertise. Then you have Chapter 3 on scenarios, which was led by two scientists from the Integrated Modelling Assessment (IAM) community.

The people in this chapter were responsible for developing the IPCC scenarios?

YS: No, we had a call – or rather, we had three calls – for scenarios. The IPCC doesn't develop its own scenarios.

This is important to know: people say "IPCC scenarios", but actually these are scenarios assessed by the IPCC authors. The assessment of long-term scenarios was led by the authors of Chapter 3. So we had three calls for scenarios: one for long-term scenarios, one for short-term, and one for the building sector. We got more than 3,300 scenarios, out of which 700 were Paris-compatible, meaning that you are between 1.5° and 2°C by the end of the century.

If you consider only those aiming for 1.5°C by the end of the century, the number of scenarios drops to 230. I've been looking for sufficiency measures, meaning measures to avoid the demand for energy and materials, in those 230 scenarios – you know the expression, "searching for a needle in a haystack"? – and I found just two. And those two scenarios don't even mention the word sufficiency.

KK: Oh, wow.

YS: This is such a scandal! At the global level, there are two other scenarios that include sufficiency. One of them is the Societal Transformation Scenario developed by Kai and his colleagues, and the other is the one developed by Julia Steinberger and her team in Leeds called "Providing decent living with minimum energy: A global scenario".

These two scenarios, however, didn't make it to the IPCC database, because to be able to submit to the database you need to have resources – especially human resources. Realistic scenarios for a liveable planet like the ones developed by Kai and Julia are often developed by very small teams, sometimes on a voluntary basis, putting in lots of hours during their free time.

The IAM models, by contrast, are developed by huge teams – 40, 60 people – and they have plenty of little hands to do the work. The IPCC database has been conceived for this majority. I contacted Kai and his team and Julia and asked them about submitting their scenarios, but it wasn't possible for either of them.



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Providing decent living with minimum energy: A global scenario

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ABSTRACT

It is increasingly clear that averting ecological breakdown will require drastic changes to contemporary human society and the global economy embedded within it. On the other hand, the basic material needs of billions of people across the planet remain unmet. Here, we develop a simple, bottom-up model to estimate a practical minimal threshold for the final energy consumption required to provide decent material livings to the entire global population. We find that global final energy consumption in 2050 could be reduced to the levels of the 1960s, despite a population three times larger. However, such a world requires a massive rollout of advanced technologies across all sectors, as well as radical demand-side changes to reduce consumption – regardless of income – to levels of sufficiency. Sufficiency is, however, far more materially generous in our model than what those opposed to strong reductions in consumption often assume.

1. Introduction

The annual energy use of late-Palaeolithic foragers is estimated to have been around 5 GJ per person annually (Smil, 2017) – the sum of food-energy metabolised plus biomass for cooking. By 1850, after of violence seen in some modern foraging societies – can never tell the full story (Harari, 2016).

Regarding the modern era, however, some things can be stated with certainty:

First, current levels of energy use underpin numerous existential

"Providing decent living with minimum energy: A global scenario", research article in Global Environmental Change

Because the datasets have to be prepared in a specific format?

YS: Yes, and that's a lot of work. So Julia's and Kai's scenario couldn't make it into the IPCC report. But even if they made it into the IPCC, this wouldn't have meant they would be among the five scenarios selected in the end. We were a group of more than 60 people discussing and selecting the scenarios, but the majority of these scientists are all from the IAM community, and IAM scenarios are based on growth – they are driven by continuous growth.

How are these IAM models made?

YS: Integrated Assessment Models have existed for about 30 years. They're a specific form of scientific computer modelling. A huge community works with these models, with associations in different parts of the world, one of the most important is the International Institute for Applied Systems Analysis (IIASA) in Austria.

All these models anticipate a continuation of growth. At the same time, they're driven by supply-side decarbonization and not by demand reduction. In our chapter, we clearly show what it means if we ignore the demand side and don't consider sufficiency measures. Between 1990 and 2019, the improvement of efficiency in the building sector led to reducing emissions by 49 percent. However, the lack of sufficiency

measures – people living or working in bigger buildings and using more and larger appliances – has led to an *increase* of emissions by 52 percent.

It is also highly problematic that these scenarios do not seek convergence between the Global North and Global South in terms of access to decent living standards.

They expect a continuation of economic growth in the North, but less so in the South?

YS: I'll give you an example from my area of expertise, buildings. Today, the floor area per capita in North America is around 60 square metres, while it's below 10 square metres in whole of Africa. In some African countries it is even below five, they don't have proper housing at all. But these scenarios usually expect continuous growth, so in some scenarios, by 2050 they reach 65 square metres per capita in North America, and the Africans reach 10 square metres per capita. Why the hell would I accept this as an African? It's just not acceptable.

From which disciplines are these modellers coming from, and where are they based?

YS: Most of them are based in the Global North. It's a very Western vision of the world – neo-colonial, as Jason Hickel wrote. I understand that, today, things are like that. This is the world we inherited. But what's really shocking for me as an European-African citizen, who is from both sides of the Mediterranean, is to see that they project a world for my son in 2050 that is similarly unequal to my world today.

And the IPCC models are all IAM models?

YS: The IAM models are the only ones to provide projections until 2100 and have the necessary human resources to support the IPCC process, which is quite heavy for small modelling teams. It's actually all that we have – as you see, other models like the Societal Transformation Scenario developed by Kai and his colleagues couldn't make it to the database. In the IPCC process, we prioritize all that is published in peer-reviewed journals. But if you look at who the editors of *Nature* are, for example, you will see that many are from the IAM community.

So the community is reproducing itself, because the reviewers of publication are all from the same community …

YS: Exactly! It's kind of an incestuous relationship.

KK: You asked what disciplines these modelers come from. My short answer would be: not enough disciplines. Most of them are economists and engineers, and they do what economists always do: they overstep their boundaries in what they can talk about. If you want to talk about how the world should be in 20 or 50 years, you need all kind of disciplines. Like Yamina said: these models are basically about how the world is today. Maybe they can tell what could be in ten years, but they can't look 30 or 70 years into the future.

YS: These scenarios go until the end of the century.

KK: Until 2100.

KK: And because these are economic models, they need all this data – prices for energy, for technology, from now until 2100. I think it's ridiculous to have any idea of what the oil price will be in 20 or 40 years. The energy market and energy prices are so influenced by politics and world phenomena that it's very hard for any mathematical model to predict them.

YS: There is another problems with the IAMs that I see in my field: one sector like building is just one point for them, one indicator – the energy consumption for the overall building stock. They don't have any idea how the building stock evolves. Many assumptions in their models are not based on data, so they come to very strange conclusions – some of the scenarios project negative emissions in the building stock in countries like Indonesia by 2030. Who could believe for one second that by 2030 negative emissions will decarbonize the building stock in a country like Indonesia!

KK: I tried to figure out what the welfare function of the IAMs is, or their utility function. Because what they actually do is tell the model, "Please stay within this or that emission budget by employing options A–Z" – such as renewables, nuclear energy, or sufficiency – but they usually don't include this last option. Then, the model tries to figure out the cheapest way to stay within these emissions budgets. Or, more specifically, it tries to optimize consumption per capita within the given emission budget.

Then some adjustments are made: it is more useful that poor people increase their consumption than rich people, for example, so there are some good parts in there. But the basic problem is that what the models try to optimize – or rather, maximize – is consumption per person. They're presenting their scenarios as the best paths, but it's just the past with the most consumption per capita. What about working hours, or how many resources are used for this lifestyle? That isn't factored in.

And all models work that way?

KK: That's the foundation. Then they employ the cheapest technology first, followed by the second-cheapest. For this they need a lot of data. They need to figure out how much all of the ways to produce electricity and mitigate emissions will cost from now until 2100.

So, the problem is that it's mainly mainstream economists who work on these models and bring in their neoliberal ideas.

KK: Definitely. I had a conversation with one modeler who said, "We are just employing the normal theory, the normal economic theory. This is not our idea, this is how it

is." There are so many ethics involved in these models that are not made public, not debated, and that is my main concern.

There's an issue of transparency?

KK: Definitely.

Are the codes and algorithms accessible? Or do only the modelers themselves know how the model actually works?

KK: The data is not public, of course, because that's their most valuable resource – their bread and butter. Sometimes, you find documentation that's good enough to figure out more or less how the models work, like in the case of the Remind model from the Potsdam Institute of Climate Research (PIK). When I looked at it three or four years ago, it was the only model where I found documentation that really showed the utility function in a mathematical sense.

How much influence do these models have? Why is it problematic that they're so homogenous?

YS: I'll give you an example. These models all work with continuous economic growth, and economic growth means more emissions. We have a limitation for the temperature at the end of the century, but because the economy cannot be decarbonized under these conditions, all the models end up putting in negative emissions to keep that limit.

But negative emission technology – technology that captures carbon out of the atmosphere – is still very speculative, it doesn't exist on that scale. When I was presenting the IPCC report to the minister in Paris in April, we were directly asked about negative emissions. What people take from the IPCC report is that we need negative emissions!

We had to explain that even among us IPCC authors, we don't agree on that. I explained to her that we have two options: option 1 with the scenarios assessed is the IAMs – we do need negative emissions. With option 2, with models like the one from Kai or Julia, we don't need negative emissions to maintain the temperature limit because they model the world differently. But the message that came out of the IPCC, unfortunately, is that we need negative emissions.

It has a huge impact if the IPCC only shows models relying on negative emissions.

KK: Exactly. Because then people only talk about negative emission technologies, and that's where the money goes instead of talking about what the world could look like and how we want to change it. It closes the political debate and brings it onto a very narrow path, without showing other solutions, because there's no relativation. The IPCC doesn't say, "With our approach, with our models, we did not come up with other options." They say: "These are the scenarios, these are the possibilities we can choose between, there are no others."

Are there interests behind this strong focus on growth-driven models and negative emission technologies?

KK: There is a general interest in a world with continued economic growth among governments, companies, and corporations, and some of those are also the ones that finance climate scenarios, such as the German government. As a result, researchers are asked to produce scenarios with continued economic growth.

I would've liked to create a scenario like the Societal Transformation Scenario on a national level – a scenario that would actually be quite helpful in the situation now with Ukraine, because we would have a scenario on how we could reduce fossil fuel use by reducing consumption and production – but it's hard to get that financed.

Maybe funders were also reluctant because they didn't want to criticize the IPCC?

KK: It's important to make clear that I don't mean to say that the IPCC is lying and there is no climate change. The whole natural scientific basis – that is all very good science. It's not a critique of the IPCC as such, but of a specific part of it – the scenarios – and of how they are made.

YS: The IPCC itself is a very interesting process because you have authors from different regions of the world, selected based on their publications. But for sure, the chances to contribute to the IPCC are very unequal. If you work as a scientist in the Global North, you have access to funding, publications, tools, and conferences. People from the South don't have access to all that.

In my group we had a colleague from Africa. He couldn't really participate because all our work was done online, and his internet connection wasn't working well enough. He didn't have access to publications, because they're usually behind expensive paywalls and you need a university or a well-funded institute to provide access. So he was lagging behind compared to us.

Another interesting part of the IPCC process is the fact that the Summary for Policymakers – which is very influential – is approved line-by-line by governments, and scientists have to clarify each single statement included in the summary for policy-makers.

This is often criticized, because in that way it's more a political document than a purely scientific one.

YS: But it also has some advantages. If governments approve the document, they also have to act accordingly. This allows NGOs to apply pressure on them to do so.

The IPCC is an interesting process, but there's definitely room to improve it. One major issue for improvement is how to deal with the scenarios. That they are all so homogenous is not the fault of the IPCC – these are the scenarios that are available at the moment. Other types of scenarios need to be developed, but to develop them you would need money and resources.



Scenarios in the" Summary for Policymakers" of IPCC, 2022, p. 16

Let's talk about alternatives. What would a better model or scenario look like?

KK: I could imagine having a global model that's relatively simple and easy to understand and can be used and changed by everyone. We could then put that out there and use it for all kinds of exercises.

An open-source model that can be used, for example, in education.

KK: Exactly. So people can add things – for example, someone who is an expert in the building sector may add a part to make it more realistic with regard to what can be built within a certain timeframe. And so, bit-by-bit, this open-source model would become the gold standard and could be used for different scenarios. That would be really nice.

YS: This would also better reflect the vision of the South. People could use and contribute more easily. You need people from all over the world to build these models. That people sit here in Paris and imagine the future of billions of people all over the world – this is just not possible.

Kai, was the scenario you developed going in this direction?

KK: Our model is very simple, it's basically a big slide ruler. You have to put everything in there: what are the average kilometres driven per year, how much of that is driven

by car, how much by bike, by train, and how many people sit in a car? You do this for every sector, and then you come up with, let's say, ten to 20 consumption parameters.

Then you do the same on the supply side. You have to assume, for example, the share of renewables and their increase over time. Then it calculates the result. It's a very simple model, basically one big spreadsheet file. You can even download it, it's all open. But the data is already a bit outdated, and it only distinguishes between Global North and South on the consumption side, so it would need more geographical differentiation.

But you showed that it can be done that way.

KK: In a way, it's kind of ridiculous to do a scenario like this and compare it with what people do with their IAMs. But we compared ours to the Low Energy Demand or LED scenario, the most sustainable scenario in the IPCC, and they were quite close with regard to the results. So its quality seems to be not much worse, and we just worked with the tools we had at hand.

If you could make one change to improve the IPCC process in relation to scenarios or the modelling community, what would it be?

KK: I would like to have all those social scientists in there contributing. Feminist economists, progressive sociologists, experts on colonialism – people who think very differently about economics and society.

YS: Today, in the IPCC process, we collect numbers about people contributing to the chapters, about their gender and whether they come from the Global North or South. But we don't have figures about the disciplines of the authors. My impression is that most of them are economists – mainstream economists – or engineers. The other disciplines are missing in that process, and it would be good to have them in there.

The other thing is how to ensure the participation of the Global South. We have to make sure that people from the Global South have access to publications like we have in the Global North, that they have access to the tools we have. And just as the research community usually only accepts peer-reviewed journal publications, we need to find a way for people from the Global South to publish and get cited.

Actually, it would be good to have a number of citations from the Global South in the IPCC, for example, and a number of citations from women. I don't know the figures, but I wouldn't be surprised if they're extremely low compared to the number of citations of men from the Global North. These kinds of differences keep the same development model going – and are also reflected in the models used today.

Between Welfare and Criminalisation: Were Domestic Servants Always Informal?

Nitin Sinha

High rise apartments, eight-lane expressways, and smart cities are the new 'temples' of modern India. The sprawling *bastis*, *chawls*, and slums, which we attempt to hide from the gaze of the outside world, are the living realities for millions of working people – men, women, and children.

In fact, we don't even know how many people's labour and skill we depend to run our households. They intrinsically appear in our elitist and sexist jokes – as the tagline of bookmybai.com shows, 'Diamonds are useless! Gift your wife a maid' – but hardly feature in the nation's collective and legal imagination to secure better working conditions for them. The idea of rights for them tweaks our idea of comfort. The lesser it is said about treating them as 'human equals' possessing dignity, the better.

The invisible and uncountable workforce

In 2010, Harish Rawat, the minister of state for labour and employment, accepted that there was no authentic data available on the number of domestic workers in India. According to the National Sample Survey (NSSO, 61st round 2004–05), the approximate figure of domestic workers in India was of 4.2 million. Before that, according to the 2001 census, it was around 6.7 million. The most recent government press release from January 2019 estimated (based upon NSSO 68th round 2011–12) the total number of domestic servants at 3.9 million.

These numbers are contentious. In all likelihood, they conceal the extent of the workforce. First of all, these are based on survey estimates and are not exact enumeration. It will be pertinent to go back to Rawat's interview to remain sceptical of this downward trend. Being a minister in the central government, he maintained that in his own conservative estimate, the total number of domestic servants in India would be around 15 million. He based his estimate on the fact that there were 30 million white-collared middle- class people in India and it's a rarity that such a household would run without a maid. The media reports put the figure much higher – around 90 million. The ILO found the Indian case particularly 'striking' and 'outstanding' because of the vagueness of the number ranging from 2.5 to 90 million.

An advertisement for BookMyBai.com

Domestic servants are one unique group of workers in

modern India which is ubiquitous but remains invisible. Their labour is sought after, but their personhood is ignored. Just a change in our language will suffice to show our tricks to invisibilise them: they were servants – *naukar and naukrani* – until a few decades ago. Now, they are domestic 'help' and 'aid'. Is this the elevation of status through the use of an English term or a cover over our collective guilt?

The missing legal structures

The explosion in urbanisation, migration, and the changes that have occurred in the nature of the household has created a great demand for this labour pool. But this is also the irony of this change: for them, the home of the employer is the site of their work. They leave their homes to work at others' homes. Historically, the home has been not seen as a site of work and labour as has been the factory and the office. The gendered notion of work has made some work appear 'unproductive'. Domestic workers are still seen as unproductive labour, no matter how well they cook, how meticulously they clean. Thus, they are not only invisible but also informal.

The current state of their existence is blamed on the lack of adequate laws and policies. The government's intention to regulate and regularise domestic work has been sluggish. It is to the credit of domestic servants, who have started to unionise themselves, and to the work done by some well-meaning NGOs and individuals, that of late, things have been put in motion. The ILO's (C189) intervention in defining domestic work through protective regulation has been globally very crucial, which the Indian state still has not ratified.

The National Commission for Women drafted the Domestic Workers (Registration Social Security and welfare) Act in 2008, which has not been notified by the central govern-

House worker: unorganised labour in urban area, India 2009

ment. Some state governments did indeed take the lead in framing laws on this subject. In 2018, it was said the central government was working on bringing out a national policy to protect the interests of domestic workers 'which has been pending for almost three years now'. Bill no. 92 of 2017 was introduced in the Lok Sabha (the lower house of the Indian parliament), which was titled The Domestic Workers (Regulation of Work and Social Security) Bill 2017 but going by the recent communique of the labour and employment ministry, the process of formulating a national policy is still in 'draft stage'. While domestic servants populate the waiting room of legal mechanism, incidents like that of Zohra Bibi in Noida continues to reveal the class antagonism and social stigma with which they are seen.

In recent years as well as in the past, attempts have been made to pass an all-India Act to regulate domestic workers. But they all have failed. Very revealing are the voices of women parliamentarians, particularly from the first attempt made in 1948: they categorically told their male counterpart that such an Act would make their presence in the parliament unlikely.

The contemporary situation of women joining the workforce in the organised sector is premised on the labour of domestic servants who inhabit the place of the unorganised and informal sector. The market that promises the emancipation of the likes of Sapna Jalan (as seen in the image below) is based upon the labour of young girls and women, a sizeable portion of whom have to suffer sexual abuse, exploitation, trafficking, and forced labour to enter into this workforce. It is also about time that good-intentioned employers think beyond the immediate services they procure. The role of agencies in procuring young girls from socially deprived communities, castes, and regions through coercion and abuse has been consistently reported.

The historical lineages of legal thought

In lack of the formal structures of protection, it is pertinent to ask two fundamental questions: are domestic servants really 'informal' and had they been always informal? What does informal mean and how has it evolved? While the demand grows for making them formal, what would possibly be its nature in practical terms? What does history tell us in this regard?

If informality means the lack of legal protection, cover of social security measures, and existence of well-defined contours of work and rest, then it is absolutely right to see them currently as 'informal'. It is equally desirable to bring them into the fold of the formal workforce if that ensures legal protection. But one would be grossly mistaken if by informality the meaning is deduced that they are entirely outside the purview of the state apparatus of control. The formalisation of workforce entails registration of workers, which is both desirable by the state as well as the workers. But for the state, it would also mean control and verification, which unsurprisingly, is already practised widely.

The presence of the state in the everyday life of the servants is felt through the institution of police. What is widely prevalent, in fact, encouraged, is the police verification of domestic servants on forms such as these, which require the servants to put in information such as names, addresses, local contacts, employment history, bodily personal description, and finger prints. The 'petwords of speech' and 'favourite ditty' are also part of the profiling exercise. Employers, on the other hand, do not need to submit such personal information.

The absence of social security on the one hand and the heavy presence of policing on the other are two sides of the servants' lives. The informal condition of work to enhance the control of the employers goes together with the formal ways of control established through verification. It is striking to see that none of the Cills (2008 and 2017) had any provision for the police stepping into any kind of regulative mechanism designed to protect work conditions of domestic workers but in reality, the police become the arbitrator of work conditions, usually siding with the employers.

This present core structure of imbalance has deep lineages from the past. This is the legacy of colonial rule layered with postcolonial state's disinterest. The legal provisions designed under colonialism had attempted to contain the breach of 'contract' between masters or employers and servants. No wonder, as early as the 1750s and the 1760s, measures were put in place to tackle the 'servant problem' in the ever-increasing mega-cities of Calcutta and Madras. J. Z. Holwell, the lone survivor, not only wrote on the Black Hole tragedy of 1756 but was also one of the members who penned down the specific measures to regulate domestic/menial servants in Calcutta in 1759. Much before securing the diwani (revenue) rights, the English East India Company had attempted to secure the servants' labour in a very formal way.

In subsequent orders passed in 1760, 1766, and 1774 the colonial state primarily did two things: first, it published wage lists for different categories of servants because members of the European community believed that the exorbitant wages demanded by the domestic servants made their own living in Calcutta expensive. This was not the minimum wage list but the opposite of it. Employers found hiring servants above the prescribed rates would forfeit their right to complain if their servants had run away or quit work without prior stipulated notice.

Second, and more importantly, these rules redesigned the classic British master-servant laws for the colony of which the core essence was that the masters and mistresses on default would be given a pecuniary fine but servants would be criminally punished. Broadly, this still seems to be the case as noticed in the un-notified Act of 2008 in which an employer failing to comply with the provisions of the Act will be punishable with a fine but service providers (agencies) are liable to imprisonment. The actual workers can't even file a complaint. The court will take cognisance of any offence only through the sanction of the state and district welfare boards (to be constituted under the provisions of the Act) or through a registered voluntary organisation. Although the eco-system of labour relations has drastically changed in more than three hundred years, the shadow of the colonial-era law and practices prevails.

Becoming informal

Unorganised Workers Social Security Act 2008 envisages to register domestic workers but once again the attempt has been tardy because of which the Supreme Court directed the Centre not to disburse funds to those states who have failed to do so. Registration is also an important part of the bills introduced recently in the parliament. The drafts, of course, suggest registration with district and state welfare boards but the parallel process of police verification in practical terms reminds us of the past practices.

Domestic worker washing clothes in Ahmedabad

In 1766, in Calcutta, a Register Office was opened to register all 'menial servants' working in Christian households (British, European, Armenian, and Portuguese). The office closed within a year. But the intention prevailed all through the nineteenth and twentieth century without being properly materialised.

The way the mechanism of registration was conceptualised, particularly in the 1770s and the 1780s, tells us about the long legacy of the presence of policing. In the 1774 order, the colonial state reiterated to maintain a register of servants under the superintendent of the police of Calcutta. The scheme involved one *anna* (pice) payment from the master for every servant so enrolled. Preference in dealing with complaints were to be given to those who had enrolled their servants. The police would do their utmost to apprehend the servants who fled from their duty.

The active role of police in monitoring the master-servant relationship equated servants as thieves, which has left an indelible mark on the relationship up till today. Thomas Motte, the Calcutta superintendent of police, had categorically stated in 1785 that the registration of servants was required because, 'it is universally acknowledged that almost all robberies are perpetuated by the aid and connivance of servants.'

Such a view is not only an echo from the past but also thrives in the minds of the majority of present employers. In 1819, the master-servant law, with the criminalisation of the breach of contract, was implemented all across the Bengal presidency. It remained in force until 1862 when the Indian Penal Code was implemented. The IPC dropped the criminalisation of the breach of contract for domestic servants, but the lingering effect of the 1819 Regulation continued. This was followed by the failure to come up with any master-servant law that would regulate the relationship in the civil domain. This paved the way for the 'privatisation' of this relationship. Hence, domestic servants slowly started becoming legally a part of the 'informal'. The protective labour legislations from the early twentieth century kept domestic servants outside their purview, and in doing so consolidated this trend.

But the 'servant class' continued to be seen as the prime agents of crime, as discussions from the early twentieth century for registering servants of the hill station of Simla shows. It was important to keep Simla safe as European ladies and children resided when the capital moved there from Calcutta in the summers. The military department had earlier (in the 1890s)

asked for a similar law that would allow European officers and residents in cantonment towns to 'secure better control' over domestic servants. Once again, the method proposed to achieve this was of registration and licensing. While these measures were not put in place, the constant anxiety for registration, the ideas of control, and the belief in their participation in crime always kept the servants under the surveillance of policing. It has continued to be so in the present times.

Open future

Amidst the forces of historical continuity, something has drastically reversed. From being a legally recognised category of domestic servant in the past, the contemporary domestic worker has become the inhabitant of the unrecognised, unorganised, and informal sector. From being regulated, s/he has become unregulated, thus driving the demand for better regulation.

It is the changing notion of 'regulation' itself that explains this shift from 'formal' to 'informal'. In the past, regulation for the colonial state was a means to establish a better control over the servants. From the late nineteenth century and into the postcolonial period, the lack of formal regulation was seen as a better way to maintain control over them because home was thought to be an arena that ought to be kept outside the purview of labour laws. In this long history of 'control', earlier the law was seen as an active instrument; later, its absence became the most suitable means.

In the past, the long debates on registration had the core idea of executing better control over servants. In the present times, registration is meant to afford social security to the servants. The presence of recruiting agencies is breaking down the 'privatised' mode of organising domestic work and bringing it under some form of bureaucratic process of hiring and registration but the abuses involved at each of the steps – from hiring to that of placement – is very rampant.

However, the way the police has been deeply involved in controlling servants puts the welfarian logic of registration somehow in direct conflict with the verificatory process of the police. After all, the Delhi police form of registration works under 'Neighbourhood Watch Scheme', thus betraying a deep-seated and long-nurtured belief that cooks, maids, servants, drivers, and other types of 'help' need to be watched. The easy access which the class privilege of the employers allows to use the institutions of the state is not just a product of the 'cultural' setting in which the postcolonial state has evolved. It is also the making of the legal culture which the state has promoted.

In this legal culture, the home remains the site of paid work for many as well as a set of relationships based upon invoked registers of emotion such as loyalty, trust, and terms of fictive kinship. The domestic worker is forced to navigate these two ends at the everyday level. While doing this, they remain ever incomplete as 'workers'. Very rarely do they also become 'part of the family' in any true sense. The future will tell if the welfarian protective legal regime will manage to bridge this gap. Will it elevate the condition from the 'help' to the 'worker' or will it again become a new gloss over the old practices?

In Search of Truth and Justice

Jasmin Mahazi

Usually during a Leibniz-Zentrum Moderner Orient (ZMO) retreat, all ZMO researchers and associates spend a few days together in a conference hotel somewhere on the outskirts of Berlin. As this was not possible in 2020 due to the worldwide corona pandemic, we decided to meet at ZMO and discuss pre-circulated and pre-read novels. We could choose between the following five novels which dealt with the theme of injustice: *Matigari* (Ngũgĩ wa Thiong'o), *The Day Lasts More than a Hundred Years* (Chinghiz Aitmatov), *The God of Small Things* (Arundhati Roy), *Season of Migration to the North* (Tayeb Salih) and *God's Bits of Wood* (Ousmane Sembène). After the group discussions we discussed our readings in the plenary. The following short article was written in retrospective by a member of the *Matigari* reading group.

First edition of Matigari

In the retreat's plenary, two things became clear to me. One: that novels or other literary art forms, in contrast to academic writings, can articulate and visualize the diversified, nuanced and ambiguous senses of "injustice" particularly well. Two: that "linguistic injustice" was common to all colonized countries. Even in the countries that attained independence very early, such as India in 1947, people today still struggle with the unjust politics of language. This particular theme was addressed by the celebrated Kenyan author Ngũgĩ wa Thiong'o in his novel *Matigari*. Ngũgĩ wa Thiong'o has countered the linguistic injustice he experienced in his country of origin, not only professionally and academically but also with the life decision he made to no longer write or hold public talks in the "world language" of English nor the lingua franca of Eastern Africa, Kiswahili, but to restrict his professional, academic and literary production to his mother tongue Gikuyu. Published in 1986, *Matigari* addresses the Gikuyu-speaking population of post-colonial Kenya. As he did with his choice of language, the author made the conscious use of oral literary aesthetics and local socio-political experiences. So-called world politics, such as the Cold War, expected to be of concern to everybody, is overwritten with local realities and references to East African oral histories and imaginations. The novel rather alludes to East African political heroes, such as Kinjikitile, who took a decisive role in the fight against German colonial oppression, and Fumo Liyongo, who was most probably politically active a little earlier, in the times of the Portuguese Christian invasion of the East African coast.

The novel *Matigari*, which tells the story of the independence freedom fighter Matigari on his search for truth and justice, was originally written in Gikuyu. Particularly in this novel, Ngũgĩ wa Thiong'o balances on the fine line between fiction and reality. *Matigari* is both a

masterpiece of the fusion of fiction and reality and, moreover, of the fusion of orality and literacy. Not only has the writer skilfully managed to accommodate orality within written literature, but he also managed to give life to a fictitious character. In choosing to write in Gikuyu, the author defines his target readers; this also explains why he chose to write Matigari's story using a straightforward plot, simple sentences and a highly metaphorical style. Translations of literary work in indigenous languages may give us some insight into another world, but as we know, things also get "lost in translation", and these are exactly the things we will never be able to know. And what we do not know, we cannot appreciate.

While the story of *Matigari* has definitely achieved its purpose of arousing aesthetic satisfaction among the predominantly oral Gikuyu-speaking audience, particularly by blurring the lines of fiction and reality, it rather puzzles the reader who is not familiar with the aesthetics of orality. The reader who is untrained to perceive oral aesthetics within written literature is led to pejoratively judge such a novel as simplistic. For they are used to the complexity of singularly written words and not the imaginative complexity which is found in groups of words, such as puns, proverbs and sayings. Aesthetic satisfaction comes with the cognizance of what one regards as truth. This cognizance of truth, however, is achieved in various ways.

For a literate audience or readership, the novel *Matigari* obviously criticizes British colonization, as well as Kenyans who inherited the colonialists' powers after independence, the non-reflective adaptation of Christianity and the radio as new media. The use of fixed and simple aphorisms, sayings, proverbs and repetition of phrases and themes can easily be misjudged as restricted and simplistic. For the predominantly oral audience, however, these same literary devices lend ambiguity and, thus, the potential for multiple interpretations and hidden truths and meanings, which provide reading enjoyment. Insight, cognition of truth and, thus, aesthetic satisfaction, for a predominantly oral audience, also unfold in the course of repetition.

The protagonist Matigari ma Njirũũngi (lit. "patriots who survived the bullets") reappears from the woods in which he has tirelessly and successfully fought the colonial invaders, to now wander through his independent country seeking "truth and justice". In his search, he encounters different situations and different groups of people to whom he asks the same question: "*Tell me, my people! Where can one find truth and justice in this country?*" The people either provide different answers or none, and finally denounce him a madman. On another level, the events that occur during Matigari's search for "truth and justice" reveal to the reader the undefinable and allusive sense of both truth as well as justice: "*What was the difference between right and wrong? Where was the line that divided truth from lies, good from bad, purity from evil?*" "*What was to be righted first? The condition which led people to sin, or the souls of the people who sinned? Where were truth and justice in life?*" As readers we become witnesses to the making of a myth. During his search for truth and justice, the protagonist Matigari, along with his journey, becomes mythologized through the rumours spread by the groups of people he meets along his way as well as those who merely hear of him. The people who encounter injustice do not want to engage with Matigari's difficult question; they would rather be saved by a redeemer and "enjoy" the making of stories, myths and rumours, because taking action oneself might mean suicide, due to government powers and oppression. Criticism in the novel *Matigari* is not only presented black on white, or against whites and white blacks, that is, those Africans who took on the behaviours of the former colonialists as they

Ngũgĩ wa Thiong'o in 2019

took over power. No, criticism is also aimed at the targeted reader who, for the sake of self-satisfaction, chooses to evade the harsh struggle for truth and justice. This message, however, is only revealed successively, through the repetitive steps the protagonist takes during his journey. The cognizance that unfolds within repetition, and the inner complexity within overt simplicity, are characteristics of orality which are not always recognized by predominantly literate people who experience cognizance and aesthetic satisfaction differently.

As academics undertaking research with or among people from other knowledge traditions, we must be sensitive towards such epistemological differences, to avoid injustices out of ignorance. Is it not unjust if we fail to recognize other estimations of how to value knowledge? We have to know what constitutes knowledge in the area of our research and how that knowledge is valued. We have to learn, understand, recognize and, subsequently, give recognition. This can only be achieved if we break loose and free ourselves from the rules and frames of our own knowledge tradition. This means that we also have to be aware of our own knowledge practice, that is, modes, means, methods, mediums and measures. Are we not being unjust if we rate all knowledge according to our accustomed estimations? Could it be that we are blind to the answers which we are seeking because we do not really know what we are searching for? And, also, because we find greater satisfaction from a quest that cannot be solved, from critiquing and from expanding the academic search, than from discovering and accepting a solution? We should bear this in mind when we engage with intellectual practices, intellectual properties and intellectuals within other knowledge traditions. Trans-local entanglements means to think across different knowledge traditions, to appreciate and make use of other epistemologies, so as to evade committing academic injustice. An injustice which comes about by rating what is valuable academic work, or valuable literature, according to one hegemonic measurement.

With *Matigari*, Ngũgĩ wa Thiong'o has shown that our stories as well as our histories are made by ourselves, and that it is up to us how the world's (hi)story unfolds. The reading of novels certainly inspires academic thinking, working and writing in all ways.

Ausstellung: Anfänge und Erinnerungen – Verbindungen und Begegnungen zwischen Syrien und Deutschland

In den letzten zehn Jahren flohen mehr als 800.000 Syrer*innen nach Deutschland. Seitdem haben viele von ihnen Deutsch gelernt, fanden Wege durch den Behördendschungel, mussten Papiere zu Schulabschlüssen und Familienstatus vorlegen oder eine Wohnung finden. Dabei konnten sie auf Erfahrungen und Fähigkeiten aus Syrien zurückgreifen. Gleichzeitig fühlen sich viele weiterhin mit den Ereignissen dort verbunden, sorgen sich um Verwandte und Freunde und beobachten die politische, wirtschaftliche und militärische Entwicklung in ihren Heimatorten.

In der deutschen Öffentlichkeit ist allerdings fast nichts über diese Erfahrungen und über den Alltag in Syrien, gerade vor 2011, bekannt. Hier erscheinen die Menschen vor allem als „Flüchtlinge", deren Leben vor der Einreise nach Deutschland unsichtbar bleibt. Daher haben Mitarbeiter*innen des Leibniz-Zentrums Moderner Orient erforscht, auf welche Weise in Syrien gemachte Erfahrungen im Prozess des Ankommens in Deutschland weiterleben. Ihre Forschungsergebnisse werden in der online-Ausstellung *Anfänge und Erinnerungen* präsentiert.
https://anfaenge-erinnerungen.zmo.de/

„Einen kürzeren Weg zur Arbeit gibt es nicht“

René Wildangel

Vier Fragen an Mohamed Zine

René und Zine kennen sich seit 2016 über eine gemeinsame Freundin, bei deren Familie Zine längere Zeit wohnen durfte. Seitdem sind sie befreundet. René motivierte Zine, in Deutschland seinen Schulabschluss nachzuholen – obwohl Zine durch verschiedene anstrengende Jobs anfangs kaum Zeit und Energie dazu hatte. Als Zine erfolgreich seinen Abschluss gemacht hat, waren beide stolz. Seit 2019 ist Zine als Hausmeister am ZMO beschäftigt – dem Ort an dem René vor 20 Jahren für seine Doktorarbeit geforscht hat. Das Gespräch fand im Oktober 2022 statt.

René Wildangel: Wann und wie bist du nach Deutschland gekommen?

> **Mohamed Zine:** 2010 habe ich meine Heimat – den Tschad – verlassen. Damals tobte ein Bürgerkrieg und ich wollte nach Libyen zu meinem Onkel, um wieder die Schule besuchen zu können. Dann begann dort die Militärintervention, Gaddafi wurde gestürzt. Es herrschte Chaos, das Land war abgeriegelt. Es blieb nur der gefährliche Weg über das Meer, so kam ich nach Italien. Es war eine schlimme Zeit. Ich habe Italienisch gelernt, aber es gab keine Chancen, keine Ausbildung, keine Arbeit. Wir konnten nur rumsitzen. Irgendwann bin ich nach Deutschland geflogen. Ich hatte keine Ahnung was mich erwartet!

Wie hast du es geschafft, dich nach dieser Odyssee in Deutschland zu etablieren und eine feste Stelle beim ZMO zu bekommen?

> 2012 kam ich in Deutschland an. Da war es erstmal nicht viel besser. Drei Jahre musste ich in Asylbewerberheimen verbringen. Ich konnte kein Wort Deutsch, auch kaum Englisch. Mit Italienisch oder Arabisch – oder gar meiner Muttersprache aus dem Tschad, Dazaga – kam ich nicht weiter. Mein Status war sehr unsicher, ich konnte nur aufgrund einer humanitären Duldung bleiben. Als ich arbeiten durfte, habe ich viele anstrengende Jobs gemacht: Fabrik, Baustelle, Putzkolonne, das volle Programm. Dann ging es langsam bergauf, dank vieler Leute die mich unterstützt haben, bei denen ich wohnen konnte, die mich motiviert haben. Sie haben mit mir gepaukt, um das Sprachniveau B1 zu schaffen und einen deutschen Schulabschluss zu machen.

Wie gefällt dir die Arbeit am Institut und was ist besonders für dich daran?

> Ich mag die Leute hier: Am ZMO wurde ich von Anfang an herzlich aufgenommen und unterstützt, hier sind Wissenschaftler aus aller Welt. Ich habe hier viele Freunde

gefunden. Meine Sprachkenntnisse haben mir sehr geholfen, ich konnte viel Arabisch und Italienisch reden – und mein Englisch verbessern. Dass ich die Gelegenheit habe hier auch zu wohnen ist sehr praktisch: Einen kürzeren Weg zur Arbeit gibt es nicht. Dafür hat man aber als Hausmeister auch nie wirklich Feierabend. Meine Aufgaben sind vielfältig. Ich stehe früh auf, um alles zu bewältigen: Reinigung, Wartung, kleine Reparaturen, Gartenarbeiten – wenn etwas Größeres ansteht, koordiniere ich die Aufträge mit der Zentralstelle der FU. Ich gebe mir große Mühe – und das wird auch honoriert.

Wie bist mit du mit deiner Familie in Tschad in Kontakt?

Das ist manchmal gar nicht so einfach, die Internetverbindung im Tschad ist oft nicht so stabil. Aber mit meinen Eltern telefoniere ich so oft wie möglich. 2021 bin ich dann nach über zehn Jahren das erste Mal wieder in den Tschad gereist. Die Reise war sehr ermüdend: Vierzehn Stunden mit Turkish Airlines über Istanbul und Kinshasa, dann weiter in die Hauptstadt N'Djamena – und dann noch eine mehrstündige Autofahrt in das Dorf meiner Familie. Aber es war wunderbar wieder dort zu sein. Kinder waren groß geworden, und neue Kinder waren geboren worden. Es gab Nichten und Neffen, die hatte ich noch nie gesehen. Die Abreise nach zwölf Tagen war nicht leicht – aber ich habe mich auch gefreut, nach Deutschland zurückzukommen.



Sounaye, Abdoulaye; Chappatte, André (eds.): Islam and Muslim Life in West Africa. Practices, Trajectories and Influences, ZMO-Studien 42 (Walter de Gruyter, 2022)
The book offers an empirical examination of issues, institutions and actors that have become central to Muslim life in the region in the last few decades. Focusing on leadership, authority, law, gender, media, aesthetics, radicalization and cooperation, it offers insights into processes that reshape power structures and the experience of being Muslim. It makes room for young scholars and perspectives from the region in an academic world dominated and shaped by scholarship mostly from Europe and America.

ZMO Reads

Colum McCann: *Apeirogon: A Novel*. Storytelling as Empathetic Unsettlement

Norman Saadi Nikro

In *Apeirogon: A Novel* (2020), the award-winning Irish writer Colum McCann develops a constellation of stories, focused in the main on the advocacy work of a Palestinian and an Israeli, Bassam Aramin and Rami Elhanan. At the same time, McCann recounts a number of other stories, mostly relating to the memory and history of Palestine/Israel.

His title, apeirogon, signifies an infinite, proliferating number of sides. The word captures his spiralling narrative, constituting not so much a series of stories, but rather layer upon layer of stories. Alluding to *A Thousand and One Nights* – to the idea of narrative as an inexhaustible cache of stories – the novel is structured by 1001 sections, though peculiarly set out in numerical reversal. Once the sections reach the number of 500, the next is numbered 1001, with the section after numbered 500 again, and from then on the count winds back to 1. "One Thousand and One Nights:" reads section 25, "a ruse for life in the face of death" (443).

Aramin and Elhanan are members of Combatants for Peace, a Palestinian/Israeli non-governmental organization that challenges Israel's occupation of Palestinian lands and other forms of violence. Through their advocacy work – meeting war veterans and ex-prisoners, hosting day tours for Israelis into the Occupied Territories, as well as giving talks at schools and seminars – they basically tell stories, mostly about their personal experiences of violence and loss, in an effort to promote awareness. McCann has somehow transformed their practices of storytelling into a novel style of literary writing.

This, it has to be said, is a peculiarity of the novel: while drawing so much from history, in his writing he reflects on the personal lives staged by history. In effect, McCann has gone about rummaging through history and discovered many remainders, people whose stories may well have been told, though have yet to be adequately heard. We could say that by writing *Apeirogon*, he not only listened to the stories of Aramin and Elhanan, but developed capacities by which their stories can be further heard. He did so by extensively researching Palestinian and Israeli history, depicting notable figures, as well as developing an ear for the circumstances in which the two advocates for peace, Aramin and Elhanan, go about telling their stories.



One of the most moving passages of the book is when McCann narrates the fate of the Palestinian poet, translator and painter Wael Zuaiter, an important cultural figure whose memory has not garnered much attention beyond Palestinian circles. As he notes, at the time of Zuaiter's assassination (October 1972) in Rome by the Israeli secret service, he had been working on a translation of *One Thousand and One Nights* into Italian. McCann quotes this moving passage from Zuaiter's journal: "To find living marrow in the ancient bones. To uncover. To make real. Feeling without action will shrink the heart" (441).

The notion "to find living marrow in the ancient bones" provides an almost perfect image for McCann's interest in resuscitating history, animating memory in a graphic exercise of recalling the past into a practice of storytelling. Approaching history and memory as many sided challenges the notion that there are only two narratives and challenges the predominance of one narrative over another. The predominating narrative of the creation of Israel in 1948 fails to acknowledge what Palestinians refer to as the Nakba (a term Israel's Education Ministry has banned from use in school history books) – when three quarters of a million Palestinians were abruptly, violently driven out of their ancestral homeland.

On the internet site of the civil society organization The Forgiveness Project, Aramin presents a condensed version of his story.[2] At the age of 17, he was jailed for throwing some old grenades he and his friends had found abandoned. He subsequently spent seven years in an Israeli prison, where he and his fellow inmates were regularly beaten by the guards. During one particularly severe bout of beatings, Aramin says, he thought of a film he had seen about the Holocaust, recalling how he felt empathy with Jews who were rounded up for the gas chambers. What is interesting about his account concerns not so much him sympathizing with the plight of Jews during the Nazi genocidal terror, but rather with what appeared to him as a failure to fight back. Aramin writes: "But some minutes into the movie, I found myself crying and feeling angry that the Jews were being herded into gas chambers without fighting back. If they knew they were going to die, why didn't they scream out."

These recollections came to him as he was being beaten by the prison guards, to whom he yelled out: "Murderers! Nazis! Oppressors!" (This story is also recounted in *Apeirogon*, 232). Strangely, in that instance he couldn't help identifying with the oppression of Jews; thus, between his beating and his memory of the film, he began to develop a sense of empathy. This led him to learn more about the Holocaust and plight of Jews, as well as an empathetic sense that the Holocaust is also part of Palestinian history, is entwined with the history of the Nakba – victims of victims, as Edward Said used to say.

Aramin's inchoate empathy, we can say, is not designed to accommodate the humanity of his oppressor, but to reference the circumstances, the history, shared by both he and his oppressor. Empathy is not about identifying with the Other through some sort of mutual understanding and dialogue. Empathy, as one historian has persuasively argued,[3] is rather about unsettling the ways in which one has come to understand history, unsettling predominating narratives by which history is parcelled, packaged and circulated, developing capacities to tell and listen otherwise.

The entwinement of stories, of past and present – of a past becoming present and a present becoming past – animates McCann's own empathy. In *Apeirogon*, this transpires as an empathetic exchanges of stories, practices of telling, practices of listening. As empathetic unsettlement, storytelling (the capacity to tell and listen) constitutes abrupt digressions from the main course. As McCann writes in section 280: "history is in constant acceleration, but sooner or later a force, any force, must hit a curve: that curve, then, is a story that must be told" (125).

2 https://www.theforgivenessproject.com/stories-library/bassam-aramin/.

3 Dominick LaCapra, *Writing History, Writing Trauma* (Baltimore, MD: John Hopkins University Press, 2001).

The Agency of Historians. Or What Edward Said Missed Out On

Sonja Hegasy

Is it legitimate for a historian to compare 11th century Nishapur with 20th century Rockford, Illinois? What possible motive can there be for studying Middle Eastern societies if you have no biographical ties with the region? Eminent Middle East historian Richard Bulliet answers these and other questions in his witty memoir "Methodists and Muslims: My life as an Orientalist". Sonja Hegasy read the book.

I do not agree with the former president of the American University in Beirut, John Waterbury, when he says that "it is difficult to pin down the central message or messages of this memoir".

In fact, I have rarely read a book with three such clear messages: firstly, we are invited to observe a historian at work during various stages of his formation (including adolescence), thereby raising the topical question of historical knowledge production. Secondly, the author examines the inherent motives of Orientalists and Middle East experts after the Second World War. And thirdly, the book is time and again an inner dialogue with the eminent professor of literature Edward Said.

In the first instance, Harvard-trained scholar Bulliet explores his positionality as someone who started off in 1960s USA as a historian of the medieval Middle East and "ended" by inviting Iranian President Ahmadinejad to Columbia University in 2007, via detours of painting and trying his hand as an author of fiction and pornography (for which latter Bulliet has conveniently forgotten his pen name).

Coming-of-age elements

Methodists and Muslims has something of the coming-of-age novel about it. Luckily, Bulliet kept and shares the sources about his family – don't skip part one on his parents and grandparents – and himself, including a diary penned while travelling between Iran and Morocco in the pre-Saidian era.

This in itself is a worthwhile read for anyone interested in the construction of knowledge about the Islamicate world. In addition: anybody who has heard Richard Bulliet teach will have experienced his dry humour, in which it is impossible to detect even the slightest change in tone or facial expression. The same is true of this book.

Once upon a time it was apparently acceptable to give lectures based on notes by someone else. While giving a lecture at Berkeley on Syrian history by Orientalist Hamilton A. R. Gibb, Bulliet was asked by a student during a moment of universal boredom: "Why are you giving this lecture?"

"Definitely not what I wanted to hear, and definitely not a Harvard question," writes Bulliet, and continues: "After quelling my instincts to give a barbed response, I said: I'm giving this lecture because I have the notes for it." It was the last time Richard Bulliet was seen to give a lecture from written notes.

Bulliet reveals himself in extensive quotes from his diaries as well. In doing so, he exemplifies the big questions in history writing, in his case, how he came to his assumptions about 11th-century society in Nishapur – by comparing it with modern Rockford, his birth town in Illinois. This is a long shot, and the majority of historians might formally object to such an approach. But Bulliet rationalises the comparison in his conclusion.

Mizan Project

Frankness of tone

His frankness is useful to the reader, as Bulliet sets out to examine *Orientalism* from within (i. e., as an Orientalist): "Was I wrong-headed in unconsciously assimilating the Nishapur I imagined to the Rockford that I grew up in? Of course I was. How could I *not* be? I hadn't been alive in the eleventh century. I wasn't Iranian. I wasn't Muslim. […] All I had to go on was my imagination, in my own life experience, and an array of textual sources that had almost nothing explicit to say about the areas of social history that interested me most. Was this Orientalism? Of course it was."

But – and this is the second "message" throughout the book – this interest was neither malign towards nor denigrating of non-Western cultures, as he implicitly substantiates with numerous examples of his own thinking and political engagement. Bulliet denies "that an imaginative and malign creation of 'the Oriental other' was a determining factor in my research."

While the awkwardness of research topics in Islamic and Middle Eastern Studies can sometimes feasibly make us believe that there is no benign willpower behind them, Bulliet is probably one of the few historians who can point to similarly "out-of-place" topics he has had published outside the region, like *Hunters, Herders, and Hamburgers: The Past and Future of Human-Animal Relationship* (Columbia University Press 2005).

The Said connection

Thirdly, *Methodists and Muslims* is an inner monologue with the late professor of literature Edward Said, his colleague at Columbia University for over 17 years. Bulliet accepts his fate as an Orientalist and writes this book to let the reader and Said know what else an Orientalist could be, and not from low motives.

He pinpoints three major fiascos where Middle Eastern and Oriental Studies were not able to make sense of developments on the ground: the Iranian Revolution in 1979, the 9/11 attacks carried out by al-Qaida in 2001 and the Arab Spring in 2011.

Was it Orientalism, the dogma of modernisation theory, or the implausibility of covering 1.8 billion people over 14 hundred years that was responsible for these failures? Bulliet's own conviction that the Iranian Revolution was as important as the French or Russian Revolutions made him *persona non grata* in U. S. policy circles for two decades.

The question of "becoming"

Methodists and Muslims is an account of how this eminent historian acquired the knowledge he published in other books. Therefore, there is probably less analysis of this or that conflict in the memoir, than the question of "becoming". For Bulliet, "becoming" is a chain reaction of either serendipity or bad luck. It is also the essence of historical study, as he maintains throughout the book. Still, the reader does get some sense of what is worthy of note in Islamic culture and society.

Methodists and Muslims can be applauded for what the author sets out in the beginning: "examining the 'pre-conversion' status, if I may call it that, of an Orientalist is not always easy, since the Orientalist may not fully understand his or her decision to delve into the cultural unknown, or be willing to speak candidly about it. I hope that the discussion of the wellsprings of my own path in life before I took my first Arabic class will be understood as an effort to supply the candor that is so often lost to memory."

It is a fine intertextuality that Richard Bulliet "discovered that many professors have at least one unpublished novel sitting around" when, in his first biography of Edward Said, Timothy Brennan (London 2021) finds such a novel fragment in Said's drawers.

Bulliet's book cannot conceal a certain melancholy about not having talked to Edward Said about anything substantial during 17 years of parallel Columbia University teaching. Seventeen years after Said's death in 2003, readers might regard this as awkward or beside the point. But having read this book, I suppose that gawkiness is not a term that is likely to antagonise the author. It is what people around the world are made of and build their careers on.

What Richard Bulliet shows here is a universal theme across regions and religions: the important thing is to embrace the right moment. One central question remains unanswered though: did Edward Said in fact think of him as an Orientalist?



Katrin Bromber: Sports & Modernity in Late Imperial Ethiopia (James Currey, 2022)

Sports in Ethiopia was always more than a means of useful recreation. It was also a way to enjoy and define fun, as new modes of behaviour emerged that showed what it meant to be a modern man or woman. This book is the first academic study of the history of modern sports in Ethiopia during the imperial rule of the twentieth century. Showing how agents, ideas and practices linked societal improvement and bodily improvement, this innovative study argues thatmodern sports offers new possibilities to explore the meanings of modernity in Africa.

Western Jesuit Scholars in India: Tracing Their Paths, Reassessing Their Goals, S. J. Francis X. Clooney

Deepra Dandekar

Western Jesuit Scholars in India is a remarkable collection of fifteen articles written over a span of three decades. The volume demonstrates authorial interest in Jesuits missionaries, and the history of Catholic theological interaction with Hinduism in Tamil Nadu between the 16th and 19th century. It is also a critical reading of Jesuit polemics produced in a context emphasizing conversion so deeply, that it disallowed missionaries from appreciating the nuances of Hinduism. Complete with a detailed introduction, this volume constitutes an intellectual corpus of Jesuit knowledge production in Tamil Nadu. Clooney clarifies his own authorial academic position as a Jesuit, and as Indologist interested in Catholic theology – a position strongly reflecting the early Jesuit intellectuals of India, missionaries like Robert de Nobili (1577–1656) himself. Clooney summarizes the core argument of his volume as (p. 5): "a study of the Jesuit missionary scholars in India, their texts, and deeds; the perspective of the Indologist with twentieth- and twenty-first century standards regarding the proper knowledge of Indian religious traditions; attention the missionaries' theology, its problems but also its continuing relevance in a Catholic Church that even now has not disowned the goal of conversion; and the self-reflective attitude of the Jesuit, attentive to and ambivalent about his own tradition, unwilling to disown it, and determined to contribute."

While the first eight articles of the volume analyse Robert de Nobili's missionary writings, the other articles broaden this scope, by investigating the writings of some prominent missionaries among de Nobili's Jesuit successors. Constituting a corpus of Jesuit knowledge, variously pitted against Hinduism, undergirded by missionary interest in conversion, the articles of this volume also demonstrate how this corpus stands evidence to an unparalleled tradition of interculturalism between Catholics and Hindus in India. Clooney demonstrates how Catholicism in India was equally transformed in a process of adaptation to Tamil culture – an adaptation that included an acceptance of caste hierarchy. While the author asks whether Jesuit missionaries would have written differently about Hinduism had they known more about it, he concludes that it was perhaps their very entry point as Jesuits and Catholic theologians in India, interested in conversion that sowed seeds of their own future destruction by constricting their learning of and from Hinduism. This background is also part of an intellectual challenge Clooney identifies for current-day Jesuits, Indologists, and Catholic theologians in India, who may no longer be impeded by obstacles faced by Western missionaries in 16th and 17th century India, but are nevertheless pressured anew by a political environment that questions their belonging.

While Clooney's primary focus in this volume is on de Nobili's re-imagination of Christianity in an Indian and Tamil context, despite remaining unsympathetic and judgemental of Hinduism, this scope is significantly widened in the later chapters that explore de Nobili's intellectual genealogy and legacy, evidenced in subsequent Jesuit Catholic missionary writings. Clooney begins with examining de Nobili's stress on the importance of Christ as a wise guru that brings Christianity closer to Tamil Saiva traditions (1988), also exploring the adapta-

tions inherently encompassed in de Nobili's Christian message (1990). This message, Clooney argues, heralded inculturation, a process that allowed converts to maintain their cultural but not religious everyday, while depending on universal axioms like reason, communicated across language and culture (de Nobili accepted the presence of many classical cultures), and the incarnation of Christ as guru, a pedagogical aspect separated from Sri Vaishnavism. Without romanticizing de Nobili, Clooney enters into an exploration of de Nobili's polemical enterprises (1993), investigating the latter's criticism of the irrationalities of Hinduism: the false nature of Hindu gods, idolatry, and the false worship of evil, imaginary beings (1999) – a sum total of polemics that disallowed any Hindu god from ever being considered the true God. At the same time, Clooney remains fair to de Nobili (1995), citing the latter's determination to search for true God within Hinduism through a reading of Upanishadic texts as praiseworthy, and for creating a uniquely inventive vernacular space for theological discourse. Looking beyond de Nobili (2006), Clooney explores the missionary writings of Jean Venance Bouchet in India (1655–1732), a successor of de Nobili, who not just drew parallels and comparisons between biblical and Indian beliefs, but also compared Hinduism with Greek philosophy, expanding the larger intellectual framework of Asia that had Jesuit scholars address both Hindu and Buddhist doctrines of rebirth (2016), albeit in a polemical sense that fed back into the criticism of Hindu ideas about rebirth in India. Defending de Nobili's toleration of caste within precolonial Tamil Catholicism (2007), Clooney returns to questions of caste in his examination of the writings of Fr. Joseph Bertrand's (1801–1884), where he identifies the French Jesuit tolerance of caste as contextualized in the urgency for Catholic institutional stability in colonial 19th century India (2009).



Topping this with two fascinating essays on Ignatian spirituality (both in 2016), Clooney highlights his own sensitivity about respect for Hinduism, seeking a reflection for his personal beliefs within Ignatian spirituality (Ignatius of Loyola, 1491–1556) that deeply intertwined with Hindu beliefs and culture through the key principle of "discernment". Describing this "discernment" as (p. 14) "At this deeper level, there is a consonance of traditions that can be an important resource in Jesuit life in India, or any Christian and Hindu context today", Clooney henceforth cites it as a key Ignatian spiritual principle that mirrors his own position on Hinduism in the Tamil country. Clooney describes this explicitly (in 2016 again) as (p. 14): "Starting with the famed Ignatian conviction that God can be found in all things, I turned to the Sri Vaishnava Hindu tradition of south India, finding there similar visionary realizations of God in all things, insights developed in practice and defended theologically." Importantly, despite this background for imbibing Ignatian spirituality as personal, Clooney remains critical of Jesuit missionary scholarship, especially polemic scholarship, often stating that while Jesuit missionaries learned a lot in India, they failed to appreciate the finer nuances of Hinduism (2007), their immunity to its myriad philosophical sophistications leading to blind spots that ultimately

caused their downfall (2017). Identifying Indology as part of Jesuit missionary tradition (2009), Clooney's analysis of de Nobili's Dispelling of Ignorance (1640) demonstrates the separation between missionary interests and the emerging field of religiously neutral but hegemonic Indology – a separation that gave birth to Indology as a sister discipline of the Catholic mission. Clooney describes this birthing process as (p. 10): "from conversations and arguments among Hindus and Christians, to European conversations about India and its religions." Dedicating his recent-most essay, included in this volume to the exploration of twentieth century Anglican missionary-turned Jesuit Catholic scholar, William Wallace (1863–1922), Clooney characterizes Wallace's scepticism positively; a scepticism that identified imperial constructions of Hinduism to be products of colonial and missionary interest, rather than any realistic evaluation (2018).

This volume is remarkable and unique due to the intellectual continuum it establishes between pioneering stalwarts like de Nobili and the scholarship of Clooney himself, as Western Jesuits, and Catholic theologians with an interest in Indology, writing and discussing Hinduism in the Tamil country. While Clooney is critical of Jesuit polemics, he appreciates their adaptation of the Christian message to Tamil vernacular culture. The transformative Catholic theology that Clooney remains invested in that is located both within his personal and academic engagements, is the question of conversion. Conversion attains salience here, as a debate primarily differentiating Clooney from the Jesuit missionaries of yore. Since Clooney identifies the urgency of effecting conversion as centrally problematic in that it gave rise to Jesuit polemics – a missionary agenda with a constricted aperture, he takes a vital step forward from this conversion agenda, apologizing for and doing away with it, to build a cooperative and almost consensual relationship of "discernment" with Hindu theology. Ending his exposition in this case with a positive evaluation of Wallace and finally Ignatius Loyola's embrace and acceptance of Hinduism, the contentiousness of effecting conversion undergoes a transformational shift in Clooney's writing that becomes part of a longer journey of Jesuit Catholic religious tolerance. This journey towards tolerance is the central driving force of Clooney's academic-personal journey, encompassed in this volume that spans not just three decades, but as an insider to the genealogy of Jesuit Catholic theology in India, spans a trajectory of many centuries. Transforming the conversion question, however, also transforms the nature of Christianity and its usefulness for Hindus in India, which though assumes a tolerant and resilient face for Hindu-Catholic relations in the 20th and 21st century, also produces suffering and weakness for Dalits, Adivasis, and other downtrodden groups that challenge Hindu theology, complicit with caste hierarchies to articulate the catastrophic consequences of Hinduism on their human rights. Protestant missions exploited this exact aspect, and the crying need for "dissent" among the downtrodden to its very fullest, by recognizing the urgent necessity of addressing caste oppression, and rejecting Hinduism as fundamentally un-religious, and un-Christian.

Featured Visitors

Joining ZMO as a Humboldt Fellow

M. Talha Çiçek

As an historian of the modern Middle East, I came across Leibniz-Zentrum Moderner Orient (ZMO) by way of their series *Programmatic Texts* and their journal *Orient Bulletin*, and through the publications of scholars working in my field. Therefore, when I decided to apply for the Alexander von Humboldt Foundation's Experienced Research Fellowship, I chose ZMO as my preferred host institution. Since I did not personally know anybody from the institute, I wrote directly to the director, Ulrike Freitag, sharing my proposal and CV and requesting sponsorship. After my application was reviewed and discussed by ZMO's extended directorate, they decided to support me. Thus, my story with the institute started.

ZMO gave support during the application process through answering technical questions and commenting on my research proposal. I had the good fortune to be awarded the fellowship by the Humboldt Foundation and was able to work at ZMO between October 2019 and October 2020, June to September 2021 and June to September 2022. Here, I somewhat unexpectedly found myself to be part of a fruitful academic and intellectual circle which remarkably diversified my perspectives. Both colleagues at ZMO and scholars I met at conferences and workshops come together and discuss various subjects relating to their research, studying similar research questions but from a variety of disciplines and working on different geographies. This provides an immeasurably rich setting and enables comparative perspectives. My research subject was to study the political agency of the nomadic societies in the Arab East in the post-Ottoman era, whom I conceptualized as "semi-independent" political actors. My time at ZMO enriched my approach to history with a trans-local and connected mindset and expanded the subjects on which I am focusing to non-political – but more inclusive – social and societal aspects, such as human–environment interactions and urban–rural economic intertwinements which influenced tribal action. In addition, focusing on the translocality of the urban–cultivable–desert spaces in the Arab East, I could better contextualize the socio-political – and of course trans-local – agency of the Arab nomads in the world of a Middle East partitioned by the French and British Empires following the First World War. As a historian of the modern Middle East, I was able to see similar global trends that impacted nomadic societies in Africa and Asia, as well as in the Middle East, in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, besides differentiations from one space to another. Discovering similarities in the ways in which socio-political agency was transformed among Sudanese, Syrian and Iraqi nomadic tribes, for instance, was particularly exciting.

Interaction with and integration into ZMO Research Units resulted in novel approaches for me. After joining ZMO, I became part of the Environment and Justice Research Unit, one of the institute's four units, since my project was focusing on the desert space and nomadic communities. It was, indeed, my own choice because I thought that attention to the environmental

dimension would be beneficial for my project, which had potential to contribute to the environmental history of the Middle East. Being part of this group broadened my perspective from my initial focus on political and social subjects to include environmental and economic issues. As part of the unit, one could contribute by proposing texts to be discussed which one thought convenient to the group's focus, including one's own published and unpublished research. It was also possible for the group members to get initial feedback for their research proposals before progressing further. Inspired by the discussions during the group meetings and one-to-one exchange of ideas, I added a chapter on tribal justice to my book, which I had largely completed before the initiation of my tenure, thus diversifying its approach. The book was published in July 2021 by Cambridge University Press with the title *Negotiating Empire in the Middle East: Ottomans and Arab Nomads in the Modern Era, 1840–1914*.

I am currently working on a long-term project – writing a connected history of the rural Middle East in the modern era from the Ottoman times to the end of the Second World War – largely shaped by my experience at ZMO. Another advantage of being part of the institute was network-building activities: despite the detrimental effect of the Covid pandemic, online and in-house meetings and monthly conferences have made a noticeable contribution to the establishment of new networks in Germany and the wider world.



ZMO was also a wonderful place to conduct individual research. The quiet and isolated location enabled me to focus on long-term projects, on which I am still working. I could reach many primary and published sources with the help of ZMO's wonderful librarians. My host, Katharina Lange, took time to read my manuscript and give feedback each time I finished an article or chapter draft. The institute's beautiful garden was a great space in which to have one-to-one meetings and exchange ideas with friends and colleagues from related fields as well as from other disciplines. This stimulating environment helped me to finalize a largely completed book manuscript and two article drafts in a year, despite the conditions during the pandemic.

On a personal level, staff and colleagues were very helpful in facilitating the process of adaptation to Berlin for me and my family. We had moved from Turkey, so there was quite a culture change. They even helped me with issues such as finding places of entertainment suitable for families and the translation of a bureaucratic application document into German. The administrative staff took a research-minded approach and quickly resolved any complicated problems, such as when I had to travel to another country for research purposes, even offering help in finding accommodation. This communal spirit and environment of equality and diversity created a strong bond between us.

Although my tenure has ended, I am confident that our individual and institutional academic collaborations will remain and evolve into new projects in the near future. For me, ZMO will always remain an academic home in Germany and will be the first option when I plan a collaborative project in partnership with an institute in Germany in the future.

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Bildnachweise

Umschlag
Vorderseite: Global Village theme park, Dubai 2021. Samuli Schielke
Rückseite: Billboard, Jeddah 2022. Ulrike Freitag

7	Revision of a research article, 2020. Samuli Schielke
8	Annual pilgrimage of Saint George, Egypt 2002. Samuli Schielke
10	Public domain
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20	Residents of Tolikara (Papua, Indonesia) carry government-distributed rice, 2014. Jacob Nerenberg
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26–27	Jacob Nerenberg
32	Jeremy Harbeck/NASA ICE - Creative Commons 2.0
34	(o.) CESOPE
34	(u.) Patrick Schukalla
35	Plataforma Stop Uranio
36	Ontario Clean Air Alliance
38	Arvind Srivastava shows his collection of RBI and GDR memorabilia, Madhepura, Bihar, 2019. Anandita Bajpai
39	Anandita Bajpai
40–41	Jyothidas KV
42	(o.) Jyothidas KV
42	(u.) Samuli Schielke
45–47	Sonja Hegasy
49	A cross and a sign marking Christian and Muslim spaces on the campus of the University of Ibadan, Nigeria, 2018. Abdoulaye Sounaye
50	Kai Kresse
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72	Ahlem Hajaji
74	Dubai, 2021. Samuli Schielke
76–77	https://www.facebook.com/groups/841925372584291/permalink/3704379023005564
78	Briefentwurf, Peter Sebald an Prof. Lukas, Nachlass Peter Sebald/ZMO
79	Peter Sebald, Nachlass Peter Sebald/ZMO
83	Silke Nagel
86	Workshop Pathways of Knowledge, Nairobi, 2019. Kai Kresse
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124	Reading at the ZMO, 2022. Marc Beckmann
128	Mizan Project
133	Tag der offenen Tür, ZMO 2022. Marc Beckmann
134	Talha Çiçek, 2020. Lena Herzog/ZMO

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